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Types of Public Officer ARIMAO vs TAHER FACTS: Arimao was appointed as Director II, Bureau of Nonformal Education, Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS-ARMM). Thereafter, Taher was appointed Education Supervisor II. Arimaos appointment, however, was protested on the ground that said appointment did not pass through any evaluation by the personnel selection board. Arimaos appointment was eventually disapproved by the Civil Service Commission-Field Office for failure to meet the experience required for the position. The CSC affirmed the findings of the CSC-FO and ordered Arimao to be reverted to her former position of Education Supervisor II. 2She sought reconsideration of the decision. Arimao was granted a study for one year but she came back as Supervisor II about a year after the expiration of her leave. Her motion was denied. Arimao and Taher both reported as Education Supervisor II. Taher filed a complaint against Arimao relative to her continued absence. She was declared AWOL and was dropped from the payroll. The Regional Vice Governor/Acting Governor ordered her to reassume her former position as Supervisor II. Taher filed a Petition for prohibition as she stands to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury if she is removed from the office which she has held for more than 5 years. ISSUE: Who, as between Arimao and Taher, is entitled to the position of Education Supervisor? HELD: Neither Arimao and Taher is entitled to the position of Education Supervisor II. Arimao cannot be reinstated by mere directive of the ARMM Regional Governor. With the finality of the AWOL order and her having been dropped from the rolls, is no longer disputed. Thus, as found by CSC in its Resolution No. 020743, Tesda has no legal obligation to reinstate Arimao to the position of Supervisor II. This however should not be construed as a declaration that Taher is entitled to the position as Supervisor II. Section 13, Rule 6 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, E.O. 292, provides: All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments. As a chain reaction of the disapproval of petitioners promotional appointment as Director II, respondents appointment to Education Supervisor II was likewise invalidated. The efficacy of respondents appointment was dependent on the validity of petitioners promotional appointment which in turn was subject to the outcome of the protest against it. Thus, as of 17 October 1998or the date of finality of the denial of the petition questioning the disapproval of petitioners appointment as Director IIboth petitioner and respondent were reverted to their former positions. Petitioner should have been allowed to re-assume her position of Education Supervisor II as of the said date, and thereafter remain in the said office until she was dropped from the rolls in 1999. Respondent, in turn, should have been made to return to her former position. Indeed, for all intents and purposes, respondent became the Education Supervisor II by virtue of her appointment as such on 25 July 1995. However, her tenure ended when petitioner was reverted to the same position on 17 October 1998. Thus, during respondents occupancy of the position of Education Supervisor II after petitioners promotional appointment had been disapproved, respondent should be deemed a de facto officer only. 43 A de facto officer is "one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a good officer in point of law." He is one who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. 44 The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation. 45 In Monroy v. Court of Appeals , et al., 46 this Court ruled that a rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure. A de facto officer,not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period of his wrongful tenure. 47 In the instant case, respondent should account to petitioner for the salaries she received from the time the disapproval of petitioners promotion became final, up to the time when petitioner was declared on AWOL and dropped from the rolls. However, respondent may be allowed to keep the emoluments she received during said period, there being no de jure officer at the time, 48following our ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 49 to wit: [I]n cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. 50 There is no question that Taher discharged the duties of Education Supervisor II from the time she was appointed to the position and even after her appointment was invalidated as a result of the invalidation of Arimaos promotional appointment. In view of the services respondent rendered to the TESDA and the people of the ARMM, it would be iniquitous to deny her the salary appertaining to the position corresponding to the period of her service. All the same, however, Taher cannot continue her unauthorized occupancy, notwithstanding the fact that the position of Education Supervisor II has been vacant since 1999. Absent any showing that she has been reappointed to the position after petitioner was declared AWOL and dropped from the rolls, Taher cannot lay a valid claim thereto. MENZON VS PETILLA FACTS: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. On March 25, 1988, Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued a resolution where it held invalid the appointment of Menzon as acting ViceGovernor of Leyte. The Regional Director of the Department of Local Government, wrote a letter that the resolution be modified and salary be paid to Menzon as acting ViceGovernor of Leyte. The Acting Governor and SP refused to correct the resolution. Menzon filed a petition for the nullification of Resolution. In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte. During the pendency of the petition, more particularly on May 16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00, for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting ViceGovernor.

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Types of Public Officer On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filed by Aurelio D. Menzon. On September 6, 1990, Leopoldo Petilla, by virtue of the above resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct Menzon to pay back to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Menzon filed a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON Menzon is entitled to the emoluments for his services rendered as designated acting vice-governor under the principles of good faith, simple justice and equity? YES HELD: By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided in LG Code for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. Menzon is a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment. Menzons right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to Menzon, following the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, and pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor. And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint Menzon, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. There is no denying that Menzon assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, Menzon was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of Menzon's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting ViceGovernor that the validity of the appointment of Menzon was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn. Menzon, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which contains a provision allowing members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation of not more than two positions. Petitioner maintains that EO 284 is unconstitutional being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 13 prohibits the President, VP, members of the cabinet and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office during their tenure unless otherwise provided by the Consitution. In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order being challenged by petitioners on the principal that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII those provided in the Constitution. According to No. 284 is submission other than petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution. ISSUE: WON EO 284 is unconstitutional? YES. HELD: Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required 22 by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. 23 To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Exofficio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." 27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or principal function. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution. It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor . The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.

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Types of Public Officer In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 46 It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. MALALUAN vs EVANGELISTA FACTS: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against Malaluans 9,792 votes. Malauan filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court declared Malaluan as the duly elected municipal mayor. Malaluan immediately assumed office through an Execution Pending Appeal. Evangelista appealed to COMELEC. COMELEC ordered Malaluan to vacate the office and so declared Evangelista to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. Malauan was ordered to pay as part of damages constituting salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995 that would have accrued to him had there not been an execution of the trial courts decision pending appeal therefrom in the COMELEC. ISSUE: WON Malauan is a de facto officer? WON he is entitled to salary? Malaluan was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, [31] the Malaluan exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. [32] It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared Malaluan as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidates right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem Malaluan, therefore, to be a de facto officer who, in good faith, has a possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto [33] and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the office. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of that office, is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally provided for the position. ISSUE: WON Malaluan should be liable for damages? We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner no breach of contract or quasicontract; or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable for actual damages. Neither has private respondent been able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party. Malaluan should not be held liable for damages. Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code mandates that the award for compensatory damages is allowed only if it is duly proven that the losing party is directly and indirectly had committed any wrongful or unlawful breach of obligation, which resulted to his proclamation. In the instant case, such was not proven. Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election cases of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The victorious party in an election case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly attributable to the losing party. Evidently, if any damage had been suffered by private respondent due to the execution ofjudgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is, damage without injury, or damage or injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy. TARROSA vs SINGSON FACTS: Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective on July 6, 1993. Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer," filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment of r Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Tarrosa argues that Singson's appointment is null and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653 which provides that the appointment of the Governor shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. ISSUE: WON Tarrosa has the capacity to challenge the appointment of Singson? NO. HELD: The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another.

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Types of Public Officer A person not claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another could not bring the action for quo warranto to oust another from said office as a mere usurper. ISSUE: WON the appointment of Singson was validly made? YES HELD: In Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992) we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. MENDOZA vs ALLAS FACTS: Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS) which was further classified as Director III. Later, he was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite Mendoza's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III. In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. Mendoza wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights. A decision was rendered granting the petition. Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, Mendoza moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and Mendoza prays for its execution. The court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Mendoza's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest.[20] ISSUE: WON Olores should be ousted from his position upon the allegation that the nullity of the position held extends to the successor in interest? NO. HELD: The rule that a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor-in-office is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.[22] In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of Mendoza to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision. Note: Olores is not a party to the proceeding. BOC being not impleaded as party. XXX Special Civil Action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court: Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. [9] In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.[10] The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal [11] against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated.[12] The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[13] Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.[14] If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. [15] If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows: "Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires."

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