Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 87211 March 5, 1991 JOVENCIO L. MAYOR petitioner, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. RIZALINA CAJUCOM, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. LOURDES A. SALES and RICARDO OLAIREZ, petitioners-intervenors. G.R. No. 90044 March 5, 1991 PASCUAL V. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondent. G.R. No. 91547 March 5, 1991 CEFERINO E. DULAY, ROSARIO G. ENCARNACION and DANIEL LUCAS, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, as Secretary of Budget and Management, HON. DIONISIO DE LA SERNA, as Acting Secretary of Labor & Employment, BARTOLOME CARALE, VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III, ROMEO B. TUOMO, EDNA BONTO PEREZ, DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, RUSTICO L. DIOKNO, LOURDES C. JAVIER, IRINEO B. BARNALDO, ROGELIO I. RAYALA, ERNESTO G. LADRINO III, IRENEA E. CENIZA, BERNABE S. BATUHAN, MUSIB M. BUAT, L.B. GONZAGA, JR. and OSCAR ABELLA, respondents. G.R. No. 91730 March 5, 1991 CONRADO B. MAGLAYA, petitioner, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAEG, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. RIZALINA CAJOCUM, and the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents. G.R. No. 94518 March 5, 1991 ROLANDO D. GAMBITO, petitioner, vs.

THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents. Ma. Luisa Y. Cortes for petitioner-intervenor Sales in G.R. No. 87211. Jose C. Espinas for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 90044 & 91730. Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioners in G.R. No. 91547.

NARVASA, J.:p Five (5) special civil actions are hereby jointly decided because they involve one common, fundamental issue, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6715, effective March 21, 1989, in so far as it declares vacant "all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission," and operates to remove the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. The law is entitled, "AN ACT TO EXTEND PROTECTION TO LABOR, STRENGTHEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS TO SELF-ORGANIZATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PEACEFUL CONCERTED ACTIVITIES, FOSTER INDUSTRIAL PEACE AND HARMONY, PROMOTE THE PREFERENTIAL USE OF VOLUNTARY MODES OF SETTLING LABOR DISPUTES AND RE-ORGANIZE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 441, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." 1 The provision directly dealing with the reorganization of the National Labor Relations Commission is Section 35. It reads as follows:
2

Sec. 35. Equity of the Incumbent. Incumbent career officials and rank-and-file employees of the National labor Relations Commission not otherwise affected by the Act shall continue to hold office without need of reappointment. However, consistent with the need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments, all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commission are hereby declared vacant. However, subject officials shall continue to temporarily discharge their duties and functions until their successors shall have been duly appointed and qualified. The first of these five consolidated cases was filed by Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor on March 8, 1989. In the year that followed, eight other officers of the Commission, as initiators of their own separate actions or as intervenors, joined Mayor in the attempt to invalidate the reorganization and to be reinstated to their positions in the Government service. G.R. No. 87211: Jovencio Mayor; and Intervenors Lourdes A. Sales and Ricardo Olairez

Jovencio Ll. Mayor, a member of the Philippine Bar for fifteen (15) years, was appointed Labor Arbiter in 1986 after he had, according to him, met the prescribed qualifications and passed "a rigid screening process." Fearing that he would be removed from office on account of the expected reorganization, he filed in this Court the action now docketed as G.R. No. 87211. His fears proved groundless, however. He was in fact reappointed a Labor Arbiter on March 8, 1990. Hence, as he himself says, the case became moot as to him. Like Mayor, both intervenors Lourdes A. Sales and Ricardo N. Olairez were appointed Labor Arbiters in 1986, but unlike Mayor, were not among the one hundred fifty-one (151) Labor Arbiters reappointed by the President on March 8, 1990. G.R. No. 90044; Pascual Y Reyes; and Intervenor Eugenio L Sagmit, Jr. At the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, Pascual Y. Reyes was holding the office of Executive Director of the National Labor Relations Commission in virtue of an appointment extended to him on May 30, 1975. As specified by Administrative Order No. 10 of the Secretary of Labor, dated July 14, 1975, the functions of his office were "to take charge of all administrative matters of the Commission and to have direct supervision overall units and personnel assigned to perform administrative tasks;" and Article 213 of the Labor Code, as amended, declared that the "Executive Director, assisted by a Deputy Executive Director, shall exercise the administrative functions of the Commission." Reyes states that he has been "a public servant for 42 years," and "is about to retire at sixty-five (65)," in 1991. The petitioner-in-intervention, Eugenio I. Sagmit, Jr., was Reyes' Deputy Executive Director, appointed as such on October 27, 1987 after twenty-five (25) years of government service. Both Reyes and Sagmit were informed that they had been separated from employment upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, pursuant to a Memorandum-Order issued by then Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon on August 17, 1989 to the effect that the offices of Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director had been abolished by Section 35, in relation to Section 5 of said Act, and "their functions transferred to the Chairman, aided by the Executive Clerk. Reyes moved for reconsideration on August 29, 1989, but when no action was allegedly taken thereon, he instituted the action at bar, G.R. No. 90044. Sagmit was afterwards granted leave to intervene in the action. G.R. No. 91547: Ceferino Dulay, Rosario G. Encarnacion, and Daniel M. Lucas Petitioners Rosario G. Encarnacion and Daniel M. Lucas, Jr. were appointed National Labor Relations Commissioners on October 20, 1986, after the Commission was reorganized pursuant to Executive Order No. 47 of President Aquino. Later, or more precisely on November 19, 1986, Lucas was designated Presiding Commissioner of the Commission's Second Division; and Commissioner Ceferino E. Dulay was appointed Presiding Commissioner of the Third Division. Executive Order No. 252, issued by the President on July 25, 1987, amended Article 215 of the Labor Code by providing that "the Commissioners appointed under Executive Order No. 47

dated September 10, 1986 shall hold office for a term of six (6) years . . . (but of those thus appointed) three shall hold office for four (4) years, and three for two (2) years . . . without prejudice to reappointment." Under Executive Order No. 252, the terms of Encarnacion and Lucas would expire on October 23, 1992, and that of Dulay, on December 18, 1992. On November 18, 1989, R.A. No. 6715 being then already in effect, the President extended to Encarnacion, Lucas and Dulay new appointments as Commissioners of the NLRC despite the fact that, according to them, they had not been served with notice of the termination of their services as incumbent commissioners, and no vacancy existed in their positions. Their new appointments were submitted to Congress, but since Congress adjourned on December 22, 1989 without approving their appointments, said appointments became functus officio. No other appointments were thereafter extended to Encarnacion and Dulay. Lucas was however offered the position of Assistant Regional Director by Secretary Drilon and then by Acting Secretary Dionisio de la Serna (by letter dated January 9, 1990 which referred to his appointment as such Assistant Regional Director supposedly "issued by the President on November 8, 1989"). Lucas declined the offer, believing it imported a demotion. They all pray that their removal be pronounced unconstitutional and void and they be declared Commissioners lawfully in office, or, alternatively, that they be paid all salaries, benefits and emoluments accruing to them for the unexpired portions of their six-year terms and allowed to enjoy retirement benefits under applicable laws (pursuant to R.A. 910 and the Resolution re Judge Mario Ortiz, G. R. No. 78951, June 28, 1988). Of the incumbent Commissioners as of the effectivity of R.A. 6715, six (6) were reappointed, namely: (1) Hon. Edna Bonto Perez (as Presiding Commissioner, Second Division NCR]), (2) Domingo H. Zapanta (Associate Commissioner, Second Division), (3) Lourdes C. Javier (Presiding Commissioner, Third Division [Luzon except NCR]), (4) Ernesto G. Ladrido III (Presiding Commissioner, Fourth Division [Visayas]), (5) Musib M. Buat (Presiding Commissioner, Fifth Division [Mindanao]), and (6) Oscar N. Abella (Associate Commissioner, Fifth Division). Other members appointed to the reorganized Commission were Vicente S.E. Veloso III, Romeo B. Putong, Rustico L. Diokno, Ireneo B. Bernardo, Rogelio I. Rayala, Irenea E. Ceniza, Bernabe S. Batuhan, and Leon G. Gonzaga, Jr. Appointed Chairman was Hon. Bartolome Carale, quondam Dean of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines. G.R. No. 91730: Conrado Maglaya Petitioner Conrado Maglaya alleges that he has been "a member of the Philippine Bar for thirtysix (36) years of which 31 years . . . (had been) devoted to public service, the last 24 years in the field of labor relations law;" that he was appointed Labor Arbiter on May 30, 1975 and "was retained in such position despite the reorganization under the Freedom Constitution of 1986 . . . (and) later promoted to and appointed by the President as Commissioner of the . . . (NLRC) First Division on October 23, 1986." He complains that he was effectively removed from his position as a result of the designation of the full complement of Commissioners in and to all Five Divisions of the NLRC by Administrative Order No. 161 dated November 18, 1989, issued by Labor Secretary Drilon.

G.R. No. 94518: Rolando D. Gambito Rolando Gambito passed the bar examinations in 1971, joined the Government service in 1974, serving for sixteen years in the Department of Health, and as Labor Arbiter in the Department of Labor and Employment from October, 1986. He was not included in the list of newly appointed Labor Arbiters released on March 8, 1990; and his attempt to obtain a recosideration of his exclusion therefrom and bring about his reinstatement as Labor Arbiter was unavailing. The Basic Issue A number of issues have been raised and ventilated by the petitioners in their separate pleadings. They may all be reduced to one basic question, relating to the constitutionality of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6715 DECLARING VACANT "all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commission," 3 according to which the public respondents 1) considered as effectively separated from the service inter alia, all holders of said positions at the time of the effectivity of said Republic Act No. 6715, including the positions of Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director of the Commission, and 2) consequently, thereafter caused the appointment of other persons to the new positions specified in said statute: of Chairman Commissioners, Executive Clerk, Deputy Executive Clerk, and Labor Arbiters of the reorganized National Labor Relations Commission. The old positions were declared vacant because, as the statute states, of "the need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments." As everyone knows, security of tenure is a protected right under the Constitution. The right is secured to all employees in privates as well as in public employment. "No officer or employee in the civil service," the Constitution declares, "shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." 4 There can scarcely be any doubt that each of the petitioners commissioner, administrative officer, or labor arbiter falls within the concept of an "officer or employee in the civil service" since the civil service "embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters." 5 The Commissioners thus had the right to remain of office until the expiration of the terms for which they had been appointed, unless sooner removed "for cause provided by law." So, too, the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director, and the Labor Arbiters had the right to retain their positions until the age of compulsory retirement, unless sooner removed "for cause provided by law." None of them could be deemed to be serving at the pleasure of the President. Now, a recognized cause for several or termination of employment of a Government officer or employee is the abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. 6 Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that that office is vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to

abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It can not be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments." The Constitution does not, of course, ordain the abolition of the petitioners' positions of their removal from their offices; and there is no claim that the petitioners' separation from the service is due to a cause other than RA 6715. The inquiry therefore should be whether or not RA 6715 has worked such an abolition of the petitioners' offices, expressly or impliedly. This is the only mode by which, under the circumstances, the petitioners' removal from their positions may be defended and sustained. It is immediately apparent that there is no express abolition in RA 6715 of the petitioners' positions. So, justification must be sought, if at all, in an implied abolition thereof; i.e., that resulting from an irreconcilable inconsistency between the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' offices under the old rules and those corresponding thereof under the new law. An examination of the relevant provisions of RA 6715, with a view to discovering the changes thereby effected on the nature, composition, powers, duties and functions of the Commission and the Commissioners, the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director, and the labor Arbiters under the prior legislation, fails to disclose such essential inconsistencies. 1. Amendments as Regards the NLRC and the Commissioners First, as regards the National Labor Relations Commissioners. A. Nature and Composition of the Commission, Generally 1. Prior to its amendment by RA 6715, Article 213 of the Labor Code envisaged the NLRC as being an integral part of the Department of labor and Employment. "There shall," it said, "be a National Labor Relations Commission in the Department of Labor and Employment . . . ." RA 6715 would appear to have made the Commission somewhat more autonomous. Article 213 now declares that, "There shall be a National labor Relations Commission which shall be attached to the Department of labor and Employment for program coordination only . . . ." 2. Tripartite representation was to a certain extent restored in the Commission. The same Section 213, as amended, now provides that the Chairman and fourteen (14) members composing the NLRC shall be chosen from the workers', employers' and the public sectors, as follows: Five (5) members each shall be chosen from among the nominees of the workers and employers organization, respectively. The Chairman and the four (4) remaining members shall come from the public sector, with the latter to be chosen from among the recommendees of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

However, once they assume office," the members nominated by the workers and employers organizations shall divest themselves of any affiliations with or interest in the federation or association to which they belong." B. Allocation of Powers Between NLRC En Banc and its Divisions Another amendment was made in respect of the allocation of powers and functions between the Commission en banc, on the one hand, and its divisions, on the other. Both under the old and the amended law, the Commission was vested with rule-making and administrative authority, as well as adjudicatory and other powers, functions and duties, and could sit en banc or in divisions of three (3) members each. But whereas under the old law, the cases to be decided en banc and those by a division were determined by rules laid down by the Commission with the approval of the ex officio, Chairman (the Secretary of labor) said Commission, in other words, then exercise both administrative and adjudicatory powers the law now, as amended by RA 6715, provides that 1) the Commission "shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and formulating policies affecting its administration and operations;" but 2) it "shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through its divisions." C. Official Stations, and Appellate Jurisdiction over Fixed Territory Other changes related to the official station of the Commission and its divisions, and the territory over which the divisions could exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction. 1. Under the old law, the Commission en banc and its divisions had their main office in Metropolitan Manila; and appeals could be taken to them from decisions of Labor Arbiters regardless of the regional office whence the case originated. 2. Under the law now, the First and Second Divisions have their official station in Metropolitan Manila and "handle cases coming from the National Capital Region;" the Third Division has its main office also in Metropolitan Manila but would have appellate jurisdiction over "cases from other parts of Luzon;" and the Fourth and Fifth Divisions have their main offices in Cebu and Cagayan de Oro City, and exercise jurisdiction over cases "from the Visayas and Mindanao," respectively; and the appellate authority of the divisions is exclusive "within their respective territorial jurisdiction." D. Qualifications and Tenure of Commissioners Revisions were also made by RA 6715 with respect to the qualifications and tenure of the National Labor Relations Commissioners.

Prescribed by the old law as qualifications for commissioners appointed for a term of six (6) years were that they (a) by members of the Philippine bar, and (b) have at least five years' experience in handling labor-management relations. 7 RA 6715, on the other hand, requires (a) membership in the bar, (b) engagement in the practice of law for at least 15 years, (c) at least five years' experience or exposure in the field of labor-management relations, and (d) preferably, residence in the region where the commissioner is to hold office. The commissioners appointed shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of sixty-five (65) years, unless they are sooner removed for cause as provided by law or become incapacited to discharge the duties of their office. 2. Amendments Regarding Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters A. Qualifications The old provided for one hundred fifty (150) labor arbiters assigned to the different regional offices or branches of the Department of Labor and Employment (including sub-regional branches or provincial extension units), each regional branch being headed by an Executive Labor Arbiter. RA 6715 does not specify any fixed number of labor arbiters, but simply provides that there shall be as many labor arbiters as may be necessary for the effective and efficient operation of the Commission. The old law declared that Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters should be members of the Bar, with at least two (2) years experience in the field of labor management relations. They were appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chairman, and were "subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations." On the other hand, RA 6715 requires that the "Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall likewise be members of the Philippine Bar," but in addition "must have been in the practice of law in the Philippines for at least seven (7) years, with at least three (3) years experience or exposure in the field of labor-management relations." For "purposes of reappointment," however, "incumbent Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least five (5) years may be considered as already qualified." They are appointed by the President, on recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and are subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. B. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction Before the effectivity of RA 6715, the exclusive original jurisdiction of labor arbiters comprehended the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural: (1) Unfair labor practice cases; (2) Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

(3) All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; (Old law) (4) Cases involving household services; and (5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. Some changes were introduced by RA 6715, indicated by italics in the enumeration which shortly follows. The exclusive, original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters now embraces the following involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: (1) Unfair labor practice cases; (2) Termination disputes; (3) If accompanies with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; (4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations; 8 (5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; (6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanies with a claim for reinstatement. Now, as before, the Labor Arbiters are given thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties to decide the case, without extension, except that the present statute stresses that "even in the absence of stenographic notes," the period to decide is still thirty days, without extension. Furthermore, RA 6715 provides that "Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements." (neW Law) 3. Amendments as Regards the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director

Prior to RA 6715, there was, as earlier stated, an Executive Director, assisted by a Deputy Executive Director, who was charged with the "exercise (of) the administrative functions of the Commission." 9 More particularly, his chief functions were "to take charge of all administrative matters of the Commission and to have direct supervision over all units and personnel assigned to perform administrative tasks." 10 Although not so stated in the law, in the performance of their functions, the Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director were obviously themselves subject to the supervision and control of the head of office, the ex officio Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (the Secretary of Labor), or the Commission itself. Under RA 6715, the Secretary of Labor is no longer ex officio Chairman of the Commission. There has been created the office of Chairman, who "shall have the administrative supervision over the Commission and its regional branches and all its personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters." In this function, the law says, he shall be "aided by the Executive Clerk of the Commission." The Executive Clerk appears to be the officer who used to be known under the old law as the Executive Director. The office of Executive Director is nowhere mentioned in RA 6715. Said Executive Clerk is given the additional responsibility of assisting the Commission en banc and the First Division, in performing "such similar or equivalent functions and duties as are discharged by the Clerk of Court . . . of the Court of Appeals." The position of Deputy Executive Clerks have also been created whose main role is to assist the other divisions of the Commission (the second, third, fourth and fifth) "in the performance of such similar or equivalent functions and duties as are discharged by the . . . Deputy Clerk(s) of the Court of Appeals." Summing up 1. Republic Act No. 6715 did not abolish the NLRC, or change its essential character as a supervisory and adjudicatory body. Under said Act, as under the former law, the NLRC continues to act collegially, whether it performs administrative or rule-making functions or exercises appellate jurisdiction to review decisions and final orders of the Labor Arbiters. The provisions conferring a somewhat greater measure of autonomy; requiring that its membership be drawn from tripartite sectors (workers, employees and the public sector); changing the official stations of the Commission's divisions, and even those prescribing higher or other qualifications for the positions of Commissioner which, if at all, should operate only prospectively, not to mention the fact that the petitioners (in G.R. No. 91547) have asserted without dispute that they possess the new qualifications none of these can be said to work so essential or radical a revision of the nature, powers and duties of the NLRC as to justify a conclusion that the Act in truth did not merely declare vacant but actually abolished the offices of commissioners and created others in their place. 2. Similar considerations yield the same conclusion as far as the positions of Labor Arbiters are concerned, there being no essential inconsistency on that score between Republic Act No. 6715 and the old law. The Labor Arbiters continue to exercise the same basic power and function: the adjudication, in the first instance, of certain classes of labor disputes. Their original and

exclusive jurisdiction remains substantially the same under both the old law and the new. Again, their incumbents' constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure cannot be defeated by the provision for higher or other qualifications than were prescribed under the old law; said provision can only operate prospectively and as to new appointees to positions regularly vacated; and there is, besides, also no showing that the petitioning Arbiters do not qualify under the new law. 3. The position titles of "Executive Clerk" and "Deputy Executive Clerk(s)" provided for in RA 6715 are obviously not those of newly-created offices, but new appellations or designations given to the existing positions of Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director. There is no essential change from the prescribed and basically administrative duties of these positions and, at the same time, no mention in the Act of the former titles, from which the logical conclusion is that what was intended was merely a change in nomenclature, not an express or implied abolition. Neither does the Act specify the qualifications for Executive Clerk and Deputy Executive Clerks. There is no reason to suppose that these could be higher than those for Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director, or that anything inheres in these positions that would preclude their incumbents from being named Executive Clerk and Deputy Executive Clerks. WHEREFORE, the petitions are, as they must be, GRANTED , and the following specific dispositions are hereby RENDERED: 1. In G.R. No. 91547, and G.R. No. 91730, the removal of petitioners Rosario G. Encarnacion, Daniel M. Lucas, Jr., Ceferino E. Dulay, and Conrado Maglaya as Commissioners of the NLRC is ruled unconstitutional and void; however, to avoid displacement of any of the incumbent Commissioners now serving, it not appearing that any of them is unfit or has given cause for removal, and conformably to the alternative prayer of the petitioners themselves, it is ORDERED that said petitioners be paid all salaries, benefits and emoluments accruing to them for the unexpired portions of their six-year terms and allowed to enjoy retirement benefits under applicable laws, pursuant to RA No. 910 and this Court's Resolution in Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 79857, 161 SCRA 812; This disposition does not involve or apply to respondent Hon. Bartolome Carale, who replaced the Secretary of Labor as ex officio Chairman of the NLRC pursuant to RA 6715, none of the petitioners having been affected or in any manner prejudiced by his appointment and incumbency as such; 2. In G.R. No. 90044, the removal of petitioner Pascual Y. Reyes and petitioner-inintervention Eugenio L. Sagmit, Jr. as NLRC Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director, respectively, is likewise declared unconstitutional and void, and they are ordered reinstated as Executive Clerk and Deputy Executive Clerk, respectively, unless they opt for retirement, in either case with full back salaries, emoluments and benefits from the date of their removal to that of their reinstatement; and

3. In G.R. Nos. 87211, and 94518, petitioners-intervenors Lourdes A. Sales and Ricardo Olairez and petitioner Rolando D. Gambito, having also been illegally removed as Labor Arbiters, are ordered reinstated to said positions with full back salaries, emoluments and benefits from the dates of their removal up to the time they are reinstated. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., J., took no part

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992 PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, petitioner, vs. BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission, EDNA BONTO PEREZ, LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G. LADRIDO III, MUSIB M. BUAT, DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III, IRENEO B. BERNARDO, IRENEA E. CENIZA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ROMEO B. PUTONG, ROGELIO I. RAYALA, RUSTICO L. DIOKNO, BERNABE S. BATUHAN and OSCAR N. ABELLA, in their capacity as Commissioners of the National Labor Relations

Commission, and GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

PADILLA, J.: Controversy is focused anew on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest (BESTOW) the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. 1 The power of the Commission on Appointments (CA for brevity) to confirm appointments, contained in the aforequoted paragraph 1 of Sec. 16, Art. VII, was first construed in Sarmiento III vs. Mison 2 as follows: . . . it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. . . . Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. . . . . . . In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices

expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the president) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII." (emphasis supplied) Next came Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, 3 this time involving the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Adhering to the doctrine in Mison, the Court explained: . . . Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the president with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The president appoints the Chairman and Members of The Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. Consistent with its rulings in Mison and Bautista, in Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitutional Commissions, et al., 4 the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over appointments by the President of sectoral representatives in Congress was upheld because: . . . Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. From the three (3) cases above-mentioned, these doctrines are deducible:

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: xxx xxx xxx The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. 5 Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715. Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. RA 6715 is not, according to petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent

appointments to the respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of such appointments. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis. Mison and Bautista laid the issue to rest, says the Solicitor General, with the following exposition: As interpreted by this Honorable Court in the Mison case, confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required. Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase "and other officers required by law" at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent of the Commission on Appointments" at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions. The original text of Section 16 of Article VII of the present Constitution as embodied in Resolution No. 517 of the Constitutional Commission reads as follows: "The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts or in the heads of the department." Three points should be noted regarding sub-section 3 of Section 10 of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution and in the original text of Section 16 of Article VII of the present Constitution as proposed in Resolution No. 517.

First, in both of them, the appointments of heads of bureaus were required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Second, in both of them, the appointments of other officers, "whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law to appoint" are expressly made subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, in the final version of Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Section 16 of Article VII of the present Constitution, the appointment of the above mentioned officers (heads of bureaus; other officers whose appointments are not provided for by law; and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint) are excluded from the list of those officers whose appointments are to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. This amendment, reflected in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, clearly shows the intent of the framers to exclude such appointments from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Third, under the 1935 Constitution the word "nominate" qualifies the entire Subsection 3 of Section 10 of Article VII thereof. Respondent reiterates that if confirmation is required, the three (3) stage process of nomination, confirmation and appointment operates. This is only true of the first group enumerated in Section 16, but the word nominate does not any more appear in the 2nd and 3rd sentences. Therefore, the president's appointment pursuant to the 2nd and 3rd sentences needs no confirmation. 6 The only issue to be resolved by the Court in the present case is whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To resolve the issue, we go back to Mison where the Court stated: . . . there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. 7 Mison also opined: In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence of the section from the same requirement. . . . The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof. Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. 8 No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
9

. . . The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction

merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretado legis vim obtinent" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. 10 The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently in one manner. Can legislation expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has interpreted it? In Endencia and Jugo vs. David, 11 the Court held: By legislative fiat as enunciated in Section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. xxx xxx xxx The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied). The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am., Jur., 919, emphasis supplied). We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the

Legislative department that would be neither wise nor desirable, being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers. 14 (Emphasis supplied) Congress, of course, must interpret the Constitution, must estimate the scope of its constitutional powers when it sets out to enact legislation and it must take into account the relevant constitutional prohibitions. 15 . . . The Constitution did not change with public opinion. It is not only the same words, but the same in meaning . . . and as long as it it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted and adopted by the people . . . 16 The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is to "lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former" and to "announce its considered judgment upon the question." 17 It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided: 3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; . . . The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members of Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional convention or Congress sitting as a constituent (constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it interpreted. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of

appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 107610 November 25, 1994 CRUZVALE, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER ANGELI M. TUYAY AND UNION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (UFW), respondents. Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for petitioner.

QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 25, 1992 of respondent Undersecretary of Labor and Employment and his Order dated October 13, 1992 in OS-MA-A-11-334-91.

I On July 23, 1991, private respondent, a labor union, filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. IV, a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file workers of petitioner, docketed as Case No. RO-400-9107-RU-0107. On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed its comment to the petition for certification election. It sought the denial of the petition on the following grounds: (a) That no charter certificate evidencing the organization of a local union therein was attached to the petition or submitted to the DOLE at the time the petition was filed; (b) That the respondent Union has not presented any proof that it is a legitimate labor organization; and (c) That the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE has no jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company's place of business is located at Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the jurisdiction of the said Regional Office. Consequently, it is the National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has jurisdiction over said petition (Rollo, p. 7). On September 27, 1991, respondent Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, pertinent portion of which reads as follows: Anent the first issue on the status of the petitioner, it is established that the petitioner is a legitimate organization with Dole Registration Certificate No. 11106 LC (FED) and has a local chapter in the respondent's company located at Cainta, Rizal. The existence of a local union is likewise undisputed as the same is evidenced by Charter Certificate No. 82 issued to it by the petitioner, United Filipino Workers, and submitted to this Office which automatically forms part of the records of this case. As regards the second and third issues on whether or not the herein petition is duly filed or not, the allegation of the respondent that the same is defective in form and substance since no charter certificate and signatories were attached thereto at the time of filing of this petition is unmeritorious and without legal basis. The respondent is an unorganized establishment which is governed by Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, which read as follows: Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the

filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization (Rollo, pp. 74-75). Petitioner appealed the said order to the DOLE. The latter, thru respondent Undersecretary, upheld the order of respondent Med-Arbiter. Not satisfied with the decision of the DOLE, petitioner filed the instant petition and assigned the following errors: 1 RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING A PATENTLY NULL AND VOID DECISION OF THE MED-ARBITER HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION WAS FILED BY A LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION. 2 RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN LIMITING THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO PETITIONER'S EMPLOYEES AT CAINTA, THEREBY DISENFRANCHISING THE OTHER REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER COMPANY AND INSPITE OF A FINAL ORDER CALLING FOR A CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO BE PARTICIPATED IN BY ALL REGULAR RANK-ANDFILE EMPLOYEES. 3 RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE AMENDED OUT OF HIS OWN WILL AND DERIVED A PROVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES WITHOUT ANY BASIS OR AUTHORITY IN THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED. II As to the first assigned error, petitioner avers that private respondent is not a legitimate labor organization, "considering that its local or chapter, at the time said petition was filed, did not undergo the rudiments of registration required under Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code and the pronouncements made by this Court in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment (205 SCRA 802) . . ." (Rollo, pp. 13-14).

The Med-Arbiter found that private respondent was issued Certificate of Registration No. 11106 and Charter Certificate No. 82. Findings of fact of labor officials are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence (Five J Taxi v. National Labor Relations Commission, 212 SCRA 225 [1992]). Progressive Development Corporation, (supra.) is inappropriate to the case at bench. Thereat, the union failed to show that it had complied with the statutory requirements of Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The copy of the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations by the union were not certified under oath by the union secretary. As to the second assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent Undersecretary should not have limited the certification election to petitioner's employees at the garment factory in Cainta but should have also covered those employed in the cinema business. We agree with the following observation made by respondent Undersecretary in his Decision dated September 25, 1992: As regards the question on the composition of the bargaining unit, we stress once more that the call for the conduct of election covers all the regular rank-and-file employees of Cruzvale, Inc. at its garment manufacturing corporation. The use of the pronoun "all" in our decision dated 16 December 1991 refers to all aforementioned employees at the garment manufacturing operation based on the finding that they were the ones sought to be represented by the petitioner as clearly reflected on the face of the petition and as embodied in the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 24 April 1992 which was affirmed by this Office on appeal. Moreover, as stated in the questioned Decision the employees at the Cinema operation and those at the garment manufacturing operation do not share commonality of interest as the former clearly perform work entirely different from that of the latter. Thus, their separation into two (2) distinct bargaining units is proper. This is in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77395, 26 November 1988 (Rollo, p. 42; Emphasis supplied). As to the third assigned error, petitioner contends that the petition for certification election should have been filed with the regional office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer in accordance with Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Rollo, p. 27). Said section provides: Where to file. A petition for certification election shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath (Emphasis supplied).

The word "jurisdiction" as used in said provision refers to the venue where the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which implies the power of the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought (Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, Inc., 72 SCRA 347 [1976]). Venue touches more the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case (Consolidated Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 34 [1991]). Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the employees and the place of the principal office of the employer are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the petition for certification election is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal office of the employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of different regional offices. We assume that in the drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and Employment took into consideration the fact that there are many companies with factories located in places different from places where the corporate offices are located. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal and the employer must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to the inconvenience of the worker (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 209 SCRA 834 [1992]). Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the principal place of business of petitioner is located. Petitioner is, therefore, being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification election be filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds offices in Manila. Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission prescribes that all cases in which labor arbiters have jurisdiction should be filed in the branch office which has territorial jurisdiction over the "workplace of the complainant/petitioner" (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules defines the workplace as follows: For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. . . . The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code has no provision as to when an objection to improper venue may be raised. The Med-Arbiter ruled that where the employer had appeared twice at the hearing of the petition for certification election without questioning the venue, said employer was barred from raising the issue in the subsequent proceedings. He observed:

. . . This practice of deliberately delaying the legal proceedings cannot be countenanced any further, otherwise, the ends of justice will forever be defeated. We don't see any reason for the respondent to delay as it did, the proceedings of the case only to assail later on the jurisdiction of the office. This issue could have been brought up or objected to during the initial hearing (Rollo, p. 77). The stance of the Med-Arbiter, that the question of the venue in representation cases should be raised at the first hearing, was accepted by respondent Undersecretary. We are not prepared to say that said administrative Officials have gravely abused their discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order is LIFTED. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 91025 : December 19, 1990.] 192 SCRA 414

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents. RESOLUTION MEDIALDEA, J.: This special civil action of Certiorari assails the resolution (dated June 5, 1989) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) relative to Certified Case No. 0522, and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (dated August 8, 1989). The antecedents are: On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed a Notice of Strike at the Department of Labor raising the issues of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practice. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) invited the parties for a conference on February 4, 1988 for the purpose of settling the dispute. The private respondent however, assailed the legal personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to represent the Nestle employees. This notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to attend the conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to attend contending that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws. The records show that before the filing of said notice of strike, or on June 30, 1987, the respective CBAs in the four (4) units of Nestle, in Alabang-Cabuyao, Makati, Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao work locations had all expired. Under the said CBAs, Alabang/Cabuyao and Makati units were represented by the UFE; the Cagayan de Oro unit was represented by WATU; while the Cebu-Davao was represented by TUPAS. Prior to the expiration of the CBAs for Makati and Alabang/Cabuyao, UFE submitted to the company a list of CBA proposals. The company, on the other hand, expressed its readiness to negotiate a new CBA for Makati and Alabang/Cabuyao units but reserved the negotiation for Cagayan de Oro and Cebu-Davao considering that the issue of representation for the latter units was not yet settled. On June 10, 1987 and July 28, 1987, UFE was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units, respectively. On September 14, 1987, the Company terminated from employment all UFE Union officers, headed by its president, Mr. Manuel Sarmiento, and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating and knowingly participating in a strike staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on September 11, 1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the purpose. On September 21, 1987, the union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, in a decision dated January 12, 1988, upheld the validity of the dismissal of said union officers. The decision was later on affirmed by the respondent NLRC en banc, on November 2, 1988.

Respondent company contends that, "with the dismissal of UFE officers including all the members of the union negotiating panel as later on confirmed by the NLRC en banc, said union negotiating panel thus ceased to exist and its former members divested of any legal personality, standing and capacity to act as such or represent the union in any manner whatsoever." The union officers, on the other hand, asserted their authority to represent the regular rank-andfile employees of Nestle, Philippines, being the duly elected officers of the union. In the meantime, private respondent sought guidelines from the Department of Labor on how it should treat letters from several splinter groups claiming to have possessed authority to negotiate in behalf of the UFE. It is noteworthy that aside from the names of the negotiating panel submitted by one UFE officials, three (3) other groups in the Nestle plant in Cabuyao and two groups in the Makati office have expressed a desire to bargain with management professing alleged authorization from and by the general membership. These groups however, it must be noted, belong to just one (1) union, the UFE. In a letter dated August 20, 1988, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja advised: "Any attempt on the part of management to directly deal with any of the factions claiming to have the imprimatur of the majority of the employees, or to recognize any act by a particular group to adopt the deadlock counter proposal of the management, at this stage, would be most unwise. It may only fan the fire." (Rollo, pp. 61-62) On March 20, 1988 and August 5, 1988, the company concluded separate CBAs with the general membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units, respectively. The workers thereat likewise conducted separate elections of their officers. Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed a case of ULP against the company with the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch on November 16, 1988. Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB but yielded negative result because of the irreconcilable conflicts of the parties on the matter of who should represent and negotiate for the workers.: nad On October 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. On October 28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon certified to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and Nestle, Philippines, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this office hereby certifies the sole issue of deadlock in CBA negotiations affecting the Makati, Alabang and Cabuyao units to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. "The NLRC is further directed to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within twenty (20) days from submission of the case for resolution." (Rollo, p. 225) On June 5, 1989, the Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestle's employees, ruling on non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge. The dispositive portion states as follows:

"WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the parties are hereby ordered to execute and implement through their duly authorized representatives a collective bargaining agreement for a duration of five (5) years from promulgation of this Resolution. "SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 180) Petitioner finds said resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. It filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied on August 8, 1989. Hence, this petition for Certiorari. Petitioner originally raised 13 errors committed by the public respondent. However, in its Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated September 24, 1990, petitioner limited the issues to be resolved into six (6). Thus, only the following shall be dealt with in this resolution: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE NLRC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION, THE SAME BEING RENDERED ONLY BY A DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND NOT BY EN BANC; 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT NLRC SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CBA TO BE SIGNED BY THE PARTIES SHALL COVER SOLELY THE BARGAINING UNIT CONSISTING OF ALL REGULAR RANKAND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE RESPONDENT COMPANY AT MAKATI, ALABANG AND CABUYAO; 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT NLRC HAD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS IN FACT AND IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CBA IS EFFECTIVE ONLY UPON THE PROMULGATION OF THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION; 4. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAD SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S DEMAND FOR A CONTRACT SIGNING BONUS AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE LONG PRACTICE AND TRADITION IN THE COMPANY WHICH AMOUNT TO DIMINUTION OF EMPLOYEES BENEFITS; 5. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE UNION'S DEMAND FOR A "MODIFIED UNION SHOP" SECURITY CLAUSE IN THE CBA AS ITS RULING CLEARLY COLLIDES WITH SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER; 6. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN ENTIRELY ABSOLVING THE COMPANY FROM THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE AND IN DISREGARDING THE SUBSTANTIAL INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE RELATIVE THERETO; (p. 9, Petitioner's Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated September 24, 1990). Counsel for the private respondent company filed a motion for leave of court to oppose the aforesaid urgent manifestation and motion. It appearing that the allowance of said opposition would necessarily delay the early disposition of this case, the Court Resolved to DISPENSE with the filing of the same.:-cralaw We affirm the public respondent's findings and rule as regards the issue of jurisdiction.

This case was certified on October 28, 1988 when existing rules prescribed that, it is incumbent upon the Commission en banc to decide or resolve a certified dispute. However, R.A. 6715 took effect during the pendency of this case. Aside from vesting upon each division the power to adjudicate cases filed before the Commission, said Act further provides that the divisions of the Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Section 5 of RA 6715 provides as follows: "Section 5. Article 213 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, is further amended to read as follows: Art. 213. National Labor Relations Commission. There shall be a National Labor Relations Commission which shall be attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only, composed of (a) Chairman and fourteen (14) Members. Five (5) members each shall be chosen from among the nominees of the workers and employers organization, respectively. The Chairman and the four (4) remaining members shall come from the public sector, with the latter to be chosen from among the recommendees of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Upon assumption into office, the members nominated by the workers and employers organizations shall divest themselves of any affiliation with or interest in the federation or association to which they belong. The Commission may sit en banc or in five (5) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and formulating policies affecting its administration and operations. The Commission shall exercise its adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through its divisions. Of the five (5) divisions, the first and second divisions shall handle cases coming from the National Capital Region and the third, fourth and fifth divisions, cases from other parts of Luzon, from the Visayas and Mindanao, respectively. The divisions of the Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases within their respective territorial jurisdiction. The concurrence of two (2) Commissioners of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment or resolution. Whenever the required membership in a division is not complete and the concurrence of two (2) commissioners to arrive at a judgment or resolution cannot be obtained, the Chairman shall designate such number of additional Commissioners from the other divisions as may be necessary. The conclusions of a division on any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion. It shall be mandatory for the division to meet for purposes of the consultation ordained therein. A certification to this effect signed by the Presiding Commissioner of the division shall be issued, and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. The Chairman shall be the Presiding Commissioner of the first division, and the four (4) other members from the public sector shall be the Presiding Commissioners of the

second, third, fourth and fifth divisions, respectively. In case of the effective absence or incapacity of the Chairman, the Presiding Commissioner of the second division shall be the Acting Chairman. The Chairman, aided by the Executive Clerk of the Commission, shall have administrative supervision over the Commission and its regional branches and all its personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. The Commission when sitting en banc, shall be assisted by the same Executive Clerk, and, when acting thru its Divisions, by said Executive Clerk for its First Division and four (4) other Deputy Executive Clerks for the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions, respectively, in the performance of such similar or equivalent functions and duties as are discharged by the Clerk of Court and Deputy Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals." (Emphasis supplied) In view of the enactment of Republic Act 6715, the aforementioned rules requiring the Commission en banc to decide or resolve a certified dispute have accordingly been repealed. This is supported by the fact that on March 21, 1989, the Secretary of Labor, issued Administrative Order No. 36 (Series of 1989), which reads: "2. Effective March 21, 1989, the date of the effectivity of Republic Act 6715, the Commission shall cease holding en banc sessions for purposes of adjudicating cases and shall discharge their adjudicatory functions and powers through their respective Divisions." Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, the above-cited Administrative Order is valid, having been issued in accordance with existing legislation as the Secretary of Labor is clothed with the power to promulgate rules for the implementation of the said amendatory law.:-cralaw Section 36 of R.A. 6715 provides: Section 36. Rule-Making Authority. The Secretary of Labor and Employment is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this Act." Moreover, it is to be emphasized and it is a matter of judicial notice that since the effectivity of R.A. 6715, many cases have already been decided by the five (5) divisions of the NLRC. We find no legal justification in entertaining petitioner's claim considering that the clear intent of the amendatory provision is to expedite the disposition of labor cases filed before the Commission. To rule otherwise would not be congruous to the proper administration of justice. As to the second issue, the Court is convinced that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving only the sole issue certified to by the Secretary and formulating a CBA which covers the bargaining units consisting of all regular rank-and-file employees of the respondent company at Makati, Alabang and Cabuyao only. In its assailed resolution, public respondent stated: "A perusal of the records and proceedings of this case reveals that after the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of his Order dated 28 October 1988 certifying the dispute to Us, the Union filed an Urgent Manifestation seeking the modification of the certification order to include the Cebu Davao and Cagayan de Oro divisions, the employees/workers therein being all bonafide members of the Union which is the sole and exclusive

bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file workers of the company nationwide. Their non-inclusion in the certification order, the union argues, would give premium to the alleged unlawful act of the Company in entering into separate 'Collective Bargaining Agreements' directly with the workers thereat. "In the same vein, the union manifested its intention to file a complaint for ULP against the company and its officers responsible for such act, which it eventually did. "Considering that the Union had reserved the right to prosecute the Company and its officers responsible for the alleged unlawful execution of the CBA directly with the union members in Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units, as it has in fact filed a case which is now pending with our Arbitration Branch, the issue as to whether such acts constitute ULP is best heard and decided separately from the certified case, not only because of the evidentiary need to resolve the issue, but also because of the delay that may ensue in the resolution of the present conflict. "Furthermore, the consolidation of the issue with the instant case poses complicated questions regarding venue and joinder of parties. We feel that each of the issues propounded by the parties shall be better dealt with separately according to its own merits. "Thus, We rule to resolve the sole issue in dispute certified to this Commission, i.e., the deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiations in Cabuyao/Alabang and Makati units." (Rollo, pp. 174-176) We agree. Public respondent's resolution is proper and in full compliance with the order of the Secretary of Labor. The concomitant delay that will result in resolving petitioner's motion for the modification of the certification order to determine whether to include Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro Divisions or not will defeat the very purpose of the Secretary of Labor's assumption of jurisdiction and his subsequent certification order for compulsory arbitration. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure. It cannot be denied that the private respondent is engaged in an undertaking affected with public interest being one of the largest manufacturers of food products. The compelling consideration of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction is the fact that a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to the national economy and thus, the need to implement some measures to suppress any act which will hinder the company's essential productions is indispensable for the promotion of the common good. Under this situation, the Secretary's certification order for compulsory arbitration which was intended for the immediate formulation of an already delayed CBA was proper. Corollarily, the NLRC was thereby charged with the task of implementing the certification order for compulsory arbitration. As the implementing body, its authority did not include the power to amend the Secretary's order (University of Santo Tomas v. National Labor Relations Commission, UST Faculty Union, G.R. No. 89920, October 18, 1990).:- nad For the same reason, We rule that the prayer to declare the respondent company guilty of acts of unfair labor practice when it allegedly resorted to practices designed to delay the collective bargaining negotiations cannot be subsumed in this petition, it being beyond the scope of the certification order.

Petitioner argues that because of the public respondent's actuation in this regard, it committed grave abuse of discretion as it allowed multiplicity of suits and splitting causes of action which are barred by procedural rule. We cannot subscribe to this argument. In the recent case of the Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court had occasion to define what a compulsory arbitration is. In said case, this Court stated: "When the consent of one of the parties is enforced by statutory provisions, the proceeding is referred to as compulsory arbitration In labor cases, compulsory arbitration is the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties. (G.R. No. 55159, 22 Dec. 89)." When sitting in a compulsory arbitration certified to by the Secretary of Labor, the NLRC is not sitting as a judicial court but as an administrative body charged with the duty to implement the order of the Secretary. Its function only is to formulate the terms and conditions of the CBA and cannot go beyond the scope of the order. Moreover, the Commission is further tasked to act within the earliest time possible and with the end in view that its action would not only serve the interests of the parties alone, but would also have favorable implications to the community and to the economy as a whole. This is the clear intention of the legislative body in enacting Art. 263 paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 27 of R.A. 6175, which provides: (g) When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or lockout employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.nad(Emphasis supplied) In view of the avowed but limited purpose of respondent's assumption of jurisdiction over this compulsory arbitration case, it cannot be faulted in not taking cognizance of other matters that would defeat this purpose. As regards the third issue raised by petitioner, this Court finds the provisions of Article 253 and Article 253-A of the Labor Code as amended by R.A. 6715 as the applicable laws, thus: "Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the

terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Art. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this Code." Chanrobles virtuallawlibrary(Emphasis supplied) In the light of the foregoing, this Court upholds the pronouncement of the NLRC holding the CBA to be signed by the parties effective upon the promulgation of the assailed resolution. It is clear and explicit from Article 253-A that any agreement on such other provisions of the CBA shall be given retroactive effect only when it is entered into within six (6) months from its expiry date. If the agreement was entered into outside the six (6) month period, then the parties shall agree on the duration of the retroactivity thereof.- nad The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed by the parties was promulgated June 5, 1989, and hence, outside the 6 month period from June 30, 1987, the expiry date of the past CBA. Based on the provision of Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon by the parties. But since no agreement to that effect was made, public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving the said CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public respondent is within the ambit of its authority vested by existing laws. In assailing the public respondent's actuation, the Union cited the case of Villar v. Inciong (121 SCRA 444) where this Court ruled: ". . . While petitioners were charged for alleged commission of acts of disloyalty inimical to the interests of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU in the Resolution of February 14, 1977 of the Amigo-Employees Union-PAFLU and on February 15, 1977, PAFLU and the company entered into and concluded a new collective bargaining agreement, petitioners may not escape the effects of the security clause under either the old CBA or the new CBA by claiming that the old CBA had expired and that the new CBA cannot be given retroactive enforcement. To do so would be to create a gap during which no agreement would govern, from the time the old contract expired to the time a new agreement shall have been entered into with the union . . ." In the aforecited case, the Court only pointed out that, it is not right for union members to argue that they cannot be covered by the past and the new CBAs both containing the same closed-shop agreement for acts committed during the interregnum. What was emphasized by this Court is that in no case should there be a period in which no agreement would govern at all. But nowhere in

the said pronouncement did We rule that every CBA contracted after the expiry date of the previous CBA must retroact to the day following such date. Hence, it is proper to rule that in the case at bar, the clear and unmistakable terms of Articles 253 and 253-A must be deemed controlling. Articles 253 and 253-A mandate the parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Consequently, there being no new agreement reached, the automatic renewal clause provided for by the law which is deemed incorporated in all CBAs, provides the reason why the new CBA can only be given a prospective effect. Petitioner claims that because of the prospective effect of the CBA, union members were deprived of substantial amount of monetary benefits which they could have enjoyed had the CBA be given retroactive effect. This would include backwages, the immediate effects of the mandated wage increase on the fringe benefits such as the 13th and 14th month pay, overtime premium, and right to differential pay, leaves, etc. This Court, is not unmindful of these. Nevertheless, We are convinced that the CBA formulated by public respondent is fair, reasonable and just. Even if prospective in effect, said CBA still entitles the Nestle workers and employees reasonable compensation and benefits which, in the opinion of this Court, is one of the highest, if not the highest in the industry. Petitioner did not succeed in overcoming the presumption of regularity in the performance of the public respondent's functions. Even if the resolution fell short of meeting the numerous demands of the union, the petitioner failed to establish that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving the CBA a retrospective effect. The fourth and fifth assignment of errors should be resolved jointly considering that they are the terms and conditions of the CBA. According to petitioner, the terms and conditions thereof are inadequate, unreasonable, incompetitive and thus, prejudicial to the workers. It further decries public respondent's alleged taking side with the private respondent. Petitioner contends that in issuing the assailed resolutions, public respondent considered only the position of the private respondent and totally disregarded that of the petitioner. It further avers that the awards are bereft of any factual and legal basis. Petitioner made so many claims and statements which were adopted and asserted without good ground. It fails to substantiate why, in not granting its demands for the inclusion in the CBA of a "Contract Signing Bonus" and a "Modified Union Shop Agreement," the assailed resolutions were erroneous and were drawn up arbitrarily and whimsically.chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Palencia v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75763, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 247, We ruled that the findings of fact of the then Court of Industrial Relations (now NLRC), are conclusive and will not be disturbed. Thus: "Following a long line of decisions this Court has consistently declined to disturb the findings of fact of the then Court of Industrial Relations whose functions the NLRC now performs. [Pambusco Employees Union Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil. 591 (1939); nad Manila Electric Co. v. National Labor Union, 70 Phil. 617 (1940); San Carlos Milling Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 111 Phil. 323 (1961),1 SCRA 734; Philippine Educational

Institution v. MLQSEA Faculty Assn., 135 Phil. 282 (1968), 26 SCRA 272; University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan and NLRC, G.R. No. L-63122, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 691]. The findings of fact are conclusive and will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that there has been grave abuse of discretion. [Philippine Educational Institution v. MLQSEA Faculty Association, 26 SCRA 272, 276] and there being no indication that the findings are unsubstantiated by evidence [University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan and NLRC, G.R. No. 63122, February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 694, 704]." Moreover, the NLRC is in the best position to formulate a CBA which is equitable to all concerned. Because of its expertise in settling labor disputes, it is imbued with competence to appraise and evaluate the evidence and positions presented by the parties. In the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the respondent NLRC on the terms of the CBA should not be disturbed. Taken as a whole, the assailed resolutions are after all responsive to the call of compassionate justice observed in labor law and the dictates of reason which is considered supreme in every adjudication. ACCORDINGLY, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the NLRC, dated June 5, 1989 and August 8, 1989 are AFFIRMED, except insofar as the ruling absolving the private respondent of unfair labor practice which is declared SET ASIDE.:-cralaw SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 113907 April 20, 2001

MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD (MSMGUWP), petitioners, vs. HON. CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, M. GREENFIELD (B), INC., SAUL TAWIL, CARLOS T. JAVELOSA, RENATO C. PUANGCO, WINCEL LIGOT, MARCIANO HALOG, GODOFREDO PACENO, SR., GERVACIO CASILLANO, LORENZO ITAOC, ATTY. GODOFREDO PACENO, JR., MARGARITO CABRERA, GAUDENCIO RACHO, SANTIAGO IBANEZ, AND RODRIGO AGUILING, respondents. RESOLUTION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Before us is petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration of our decision dated February 28, 2000,1 the dispositive portion of which reads:2 "WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. NCR-00-09-04199-89 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the respondent company is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate the petitioners to their respective positions. Should reinstatement be not feasible, month salary for every year of service. Since petitioners least 30 days prior to their termination, following the recent ruling in the case of Ruben Serrano vs. National Labor Relations Commission and

Isetann Department Store, the respondent company is hereby ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-employees while the Federation is also ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-union officers who were dismissed upon its instigation. Since the dismissal of petitioners was without cause, backwages shall be computed from the time the herein petitioner employees and union officers were dismissed until their actual reinstatement. Should reinstatement be not feasible, their backwages shall be computed from the time petitioners were terminated until the finality of this decision. Costs against the respondent company.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED." Petitioners allege that this Court committed patent and palpable error in holding the "the respondent company officials cannot be held personally liable for damages on account of employees' dismissal because the employer corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers who merely acted as its agents" whereas the records clearly established that respondent company officers Saul Tawil, Carlos T. Javelosa and Renato C. Puangco have caused the hasty, arbitrary and unlawful dismissal of petitioners from work; that as top officials of the respondent company who handed down the decision dismissing the petitioners, they are responsible for acts of unfair labor practice; that these respondent corporate officers should not be considered as mere agents of the company but the wrongdoers. Petitioners further contend that while the case was pending before the public respondents, the respondent company, in the early part of February 1990, began removing its machineries and equipment from its plant located at Merville Park, Paranaque and began diverting jobs intended for the regular employees to its sub-contractor/satellite branches;3 that the respondent company officials are also the officers and incorporators of these satellite companies as shown in their articles of incorporation and the general information sheet. They added that during their ocular inspection of the plant site of the respondent company, they found that the same is being used by other unnamed business entities also engaged in the manufacture of garments. Petitioners further claim that the respondent company no longer operates its plant site as M. Greenfield thus it will be very difficult for them to fully enforce and implement the court's decision. In their subsequent motion filed on the same day, petitioners also pray for the (A) inclusion of the names of employees listed in Annex "D" of the petition which they inadvertently omitted in the caption of the case, to wit: (1) Amores, Imelda (2) Andres, Josefina (3) Aragon, Felicidad (4) Arias, Genevive (5) Arroyo, Salvacion (6) Arceo, Elizabeth (7) Anonuevo, Monica (8) Abellada, Josefina (9) Advincula, Harmelina (10) Ajayo, Rosario (11) Alilay, Marilyn (12) Almario, Anliza (13) Almario, Angelita (14) Almazan, Marilou (15) Almonte, Rosalina (16) Alvaran, Marites (17) Alvarez, Edna (18) Ampo, Anacorita (19) Aquino, Leonisa (20) Bactat, Celia (21) Carpio, Azucena G. (22) Cruz, Amelia (23) Glifonia, Eugenia (24) Escurel, Evelyn F. (25) Hilario, Bonifacio G. (26) Payuan, Adoracion (27) Perez, Mercedita (28) Rempis, Zenaida (29) Rosario, Margie del (30) Salvador, Norma (31) Sambayanan, Olivia (32) Tiaga, Aida (33) Torbela, Maria (34) Trono, Nenevina (35) Varona, Asuncion (36) Vasquez, Elisa M. (37) Villanueva, Milagros (38) Villapondo, Eva C. (39) Villon, Adeliza T.; (B) correction of their own typographical errors of the names of employees appearing in the caption, which should be as follows: Manuela Avelin, Belen Barquio, Lita Buquid, Violeta C. Ciervo, Marilou Dejocos, Maximina Faustino, Primitiva Gomez, Myrna Palaca, Mercedita Perez, Rebecca Poceran, Amorlita Rotairo, Emma Saludario, Tita Senis, Salvacion Wilson,4 Anita Ahillon, Gregoria Arguelles, Tessie Balbis, Betty Borja,

Rodrigo Buella, Celsa Doropan, Maria Enicame, Josephine Lasco, Julita Maniba, Juanita Osuyos, Juana Overencio, Azucena Postigo, Cristina Rapinan, Roselyn Rivero, Edeltrudes Romero, Rodelia Royandoyon, Fausta Segundo, Teodora Sulit, Elena Tebis, Paulina Valdez,5 Susan Abogona, Diana Adovas, Carmen Rosimo Basco, Macaria Barrion, Maria Fe Berezo, Matilde de Blas, Rufina Bugnot, Aurora Bravo, Jovita Cera, Precila Carta, Amalia Eugenio, Milagros Fonseca, Jose Irlanda, Rowena Jarabejo, Regina Lapidario, Josie Marcos, Shirley Melegrito, Noemi Menguillo, Teresita Nierves, Ricardo Paloga, Florenia Ragos, Leonila Rodil, Emma Saludario, Narcisa Songuad, Josie Sumarsar, Evangeline Tayco;6 {C) inclusion of other employees similarly situated whose names were not included in Annex "D" or in the caption of the case, to wit: (1) Dionisa Aban, (2) Alicia Aragon, (3) Vicky Francia, (4) Nelita F. Gelongos, (5) Erlinda San Juan, (6) Erlinda Baby Patungan Manalo, (7) Jenette Patungan,7 (8) Blandina Simbahan,8 (9) Asuncion Varona,9 (10) Josefina Andres, (11) Teresita Arales, (12) Alice Artikulo, (13) Esther Cometa, (14) Eliza Cabiting, (15) Erlinda Dalut, (16) Edna Fernandez, (17) Emily Inocencio, (18) Esperanza Jalocon, (19) Imelda Jarabe, (20) Mercedes Pabadora, (21) Venerado Pastoral, (22) Cristina Perlas, (23) Margie del Rosario.10 In their Comment, the Solicitor General interposes no objection to petitioners' prayer for the inclusion of omitted and similarly situated employees and the correction of employees' names in the caption of the case. On the other hand, private respondent company officials Carlos Javelosa arid Remedios Caoleng, in their Comment, state that considering that petitioners admitted having knowledge of the fact that private respondent officers are also holding key positions in the alleged satellite companies, they should have presented the pertinent evidence with the public respondents; thus it is too late for petitioners to require this Court to admit and evaluate evidence not presented during the trial; that the supposed proof of satellite companies hardly constitute newly discovered evidence. Respondent officials interpose no objection to the inclusion of employees inadvertently excluded in the caption of the case but object to the inclusion of employees who were allegedly similarly situated for the reason that these employees had not been parties to the case, hence should not be granted any relief from the court. Respondent company failed to file its comment.11 Petitioners' contention that respondent company officials should be made personally liable for damages on account of petitioners' dismissal is not impressed with merit. A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general from the people comprising it.12 The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees are its sole liabilities.13 True, solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the following cases:14 1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation (a) Vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation; (b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs;

(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or members, and other persons.15 (2) When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto.16 (3) When a director, trustee or officer as contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the Corporation.17 (4) When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action.18 In labor cases, particularly, the Court has held corporate directors and officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of corporate employees done with malice or in bad faith.19 Bad faith or negligence is a question of fact and is evidentiary.20 It has been held that bad faith does not connote bad judgement or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of known duty thru some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.21 In the instant case, there is nothing substantial on record to show that respondent officers acted in patent bad faith or were guilty of gross negligence in terminating the services of petitioners so as to warrant personal liability. As held in Sunio vs. NLRC,22 "We now come to the personal liability of petitioner, Sunio, who was made jointly and severally responsible with petitioner company and CIPI for the payment of the backwages of private respondents. This is reversible error. The Assistant Regional Director's Decision failed to disclose the reason why he was made personally liable. Respondents, however, alleged as grounds thereof, his being the owner of one half (1/2) interest of said corporation, and his alleged arbitrary dismissal of private respondents. Petitioner Sunio was impleaded in the Complaint in his capacity as several Manager of petitioner corporation. There appears to be no evidence on record that he acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating the services of private respondents. His act, therefore, was within the scope of his authority and was a corporate act. It is basic that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality. Petitioner Sunio, therefore, should nor have been made personally answerable for the payment of private respondents ' back salaries." Petitioners' claim that the jobs intended for the respondent company's regular employees were diverted, to its satellite companies where the respondent company officers are holding key

positions is not substantiated and was raised for the first time in this motion for reconsideration. Even assuming that the respondent company officials are also officers and incorporators of the satellite companies, such circumstance does not in itself amount to fraud. The documents attached to petitioners' motion for reconsideration show that these satellite companies23 were established prior to the filing of petitioners' complaint against private respondents with the Department of Labor and Employment on September 6, 1989 and that these corporations have different sets of incorporators aside from the respondent officers and are holding their principal offices at different locations. Substantial identity of incorporators between respondent company and these satellite companies does not necessarily imply fraud.24 In such a case, respondent company's corporate personality remains inviolable.25 Although there were earlier decisions of this Court in labor cases where corporate officers were held to be personally liable for the payment of wages and other money claims to its employees, we find those rulings inapplicable to this case. In La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa La Campana (KKM},26 La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. and La Campana Gaugau Packing were substantially owned by the same person. They had one office, one management, and a single payroll for both businesses. The laborers of the gaugau factory and the coffee factory were also interchangeable, i.e., the workers in one factory worked also in the other factory. In Claparols vs. Court of Industrial Relations,27 , the Claparol Steel and Nail Plant which was ordered to pay its workers backwages, ceased operations on June 30, 1957 and was succeeded on the next day, July 1, 1957 by the Claparols Steel Corporation. Both corporations were substantially owned and controlled by the same person and there was no break or cessation in operations. Moreover, all the assets of the steel and nail pant were transferred to the new corporation. Notably, in the above-mentioned cases, a new corporation was created, owned by the same family, engaged in the same business and operating in the same compound, a situation which is not obtaining in the instant case. In AC Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC,28 the Court ruled that under the Minimum Wage Law, the responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally liable for nonpayment of backwages for "if the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer would have devious ways for evading of back wages." This Court said: "In the instant case, it would appear that RANSOM; in 1969, foreseeing the possibility or probability of payment of backwages to the 22 strikers, organized ROSARIO to replace RANSOM, with the latter to be eventually phased out if the 22 strikers win their case. RANSOM actually ceased operations on May 1, 1973, after the December 19, 1972 Decision of the Court of Industrial Relations was promulgated against RANSOM." Clearly, the situation in AC Ransom does not obtain in this case, where the alleged satellite companies were established even prior to the filing of petitioners' complaint with the Department of Labor.

Petitioners' prayer for the inclusion of employees listed in Annex "D" whose names were admittedly inadvertently excluded in the caption of the case and for the correction of typographical errors of the employees' names appearing in the caption, is well taken and is hereby granted. However, petitioners' prayer for the inclusion of other employees allegedly similarly situated but whose names were not included either in Annex "D" or in the caption of the case must be denied. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.29 It is elementary that strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court and such judgment is not available as an adjudication either against or in favor of such other person.30 Petitioners failed to explain why these employees allegedly similarly situated were not included in the submitted list filed before us. Such inclusion would be tantamount to a substantial amendment which cannot be allowed at this late stage of the proceedings as it will definitely work to the prejudice and disadvantage of the private respondents.31 WHEREFORE, petitioners' motion for reconsideration is partially granted so as to include the names of employees listed in Annex "D" which petitioners inadvertently omitted in the caption of this case, to wit: (1) Amores, Imelda (2) Andres, Josefina (3)Aragon, Felicidad (4) Arias, Genevive (5) Arroyo, Salvacion (6) Arceo, Elizabeth (7) Anonuevo, Monica (8) Abellada, Josefina (9) Advincula, Harmelina (10) Ajayo, Rosario (11) Alilay, Marilyn (12) Almario, An1iza (13) A1mario, Angelita (14) Almazan, Marilou (15) Almonte, Rosalina (16) Alvaran, Marites (17) Alvarez, Edna (18) Ampo, Anacorita (19) Aquino , Leonisa (20) Bactat, Celia (21) Carpio, Azucena G. (22) Cruz, Amelia (23) Glifonia, Eugenia (24) Escurel, Evelyn F. (25) Hilario, Bonifacio G. (26) Payuan, Adoracion (27) Perez, Mercedita (28) Rempis, Zenaida (29) Rosario, Margie del (30) Salvador, Norma (31) Sambayanan, Olivia (32) Tiaga, Aida (33) Torbela, Maria (34) Trono, Nenevina (35) Varona, Asuncion (36) Vasquez, Elisa M. (37) Villanueva, Milagros (38) Villapondo, Eva C. (39) Villon, Adeliza T.; and to correct the typographical errors of the names of employees appearing in the caption, as follows: Manuela Avelin, Belen Barquio, Lita Buquid, Violeta C. Ciervo, Marilou Dejocos, Maximina Faustino, Primitiva Gomez, Myrna Palaca, Mercedita Perez, Rebecca Poceran, Amorlita Rotairo, Emma Saludario, Tita Senis, Salvacion Wilson, Anita Ahillon, Gregoria Arguelles, Tessie Balbis, Betty Borja, Rodrigo Buella, Celsa Doropan, Maria Enicame, Josephine Lasco, Julita Maniba, Juanita Osuyos, Juana Overencio, Azucena Postigo, Cristina Rapinan, Roselyn Rivero, Edeltrudes Romero, Rodelia Royandoyon, Fausta Segundo, Teodora Sulit, Elena Tebis, Paulina Valdez, Susan Abogona, Diana Adovas, Carmen Rosimo Basco, Macaria Barrion, Maria Fe Berezo, Matilde de Blas, Rufina Bugnot, Aurora Bravo, Jovita Cera, Precila Carta, Amalia Eugenio, Milagros Fonseca, Jose Irlanda, Rowena Jarabejo, Regina Lapidario, Josie Marcos, Shirley Melegrito, Noemi Menguillo, Teresita Nierves, Ricardo Paloga, Florenia Ragos, Leonila Rodil, Emma Saludario, Narcisa Songuad, Josie Sumarsar, Evangeline Tayco. SO ORDERED. Melo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Vitug, Panganiban, JJ, reiterate separate opinion in Serrano v. NLRC, GR No. 117040.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

PADILLA, J.: Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the

Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit. By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987. This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution. The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that: The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2 Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3 Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5 The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos: In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6 It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that xxx xxx xxx (3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. (4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. xxx xxx xxx (7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ... Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides thatSection 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective offices. Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:

Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied]. The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. ThusMr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later. Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that I would like to propose to the Committee this morning. xxx xxx xxx On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels. xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.) In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following: MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This

last amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera. MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The first proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on line 26. MR. FOZ: That is correct. MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion? MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the executive department, and to require further confirmation of presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to political influence. MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from merely staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff directors who only stay in the office. MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors. xxx xxx xxx MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the President? MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer of Commissioner de Castro? MR. FOZ: Yes. MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the Committee? xxx xxx xxx MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this matter should be submitted to the body for a vote. MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you. MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors. . . . THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendments is approved. xxx xxx xxx MR. ROMULO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY. MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. MR. DAVIDE: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized. xxx xxx xxx

MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION? FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague. MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions. FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words I proposed. FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed amendment? MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION. FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION"? MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the Committee. FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things. THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept? MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman. MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification made by Commissioner Bernas.

THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide. xxx xxx xxx THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied). It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII readingHe (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied) with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentenceRather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences.

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service. But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof. Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied]. and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third sentence. The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything

else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof ...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied]. The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, thus3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; ... In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII. Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first

group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows: 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the proper department head. Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows: Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.) Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for

confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.