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Security Kritik

1NC Shells

1NCSecurity K (CIP)
Their framing of infrastructure in terms of security discourse authorizes violent disciplinary control which frames humanity in terms of logistical life to be managed and manipulated. This reductionist mindset destroys quality of life and legitimizes endless wars to preserve existence. Vote negative to reject their security discourse - this is key to reconceptualize our policymaking and problem-solving approach Reid 8Julian Reid, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College, visiting professor in
International Relations at the University of Lapland, Conclusion: The Biopolitics of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Securing the Homeland: Critical Infrastructure, Risk and (In)Security, Ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Kristian Soby Kristensen, p. 178-179
Therefore, the contemporary reification of critical infrastructure as an object for protection owes a significant debt to the development of new forms of political agency concerned with attacking liberal regimes by undermining specifically liberal sources of security and governance. All of these developments only serve to fuel liberal representations of the war on terror as a struggle between regimes tasked with promoting security for human life against enemies dedicated to its nihilistic destruction. Why would anyone seek to destroy infrastructure other than out of a profound antipathy for the fundamental conditions which human life requires for its prosperity and security? This volume, in opening up the debate on CIP to allow for the examination of the dehumanising dimensions and implications of the practices involved in CIP, and objectives at stake in it, throws a spanner into the works of such modes of representation. This is especially true for the chapters by Der Derian and Finkelstein (Chapter 4) as well as Bonditti (Chapter 6), both of which extend Michel Foucault's seminal analysis of the origins of liberal regimes in practices of discipline and biopolitics whereupon infrastructure was first objectified as a fundamental source of security to the state. Both of these chapters demonstrate in different ways why the rationalities informing CIP cannot be understood in simplistic terms of a desire for the protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of terrorists, but express more

technocratic will to defend infrastructures even at the cost and to the detriment of distinctly human capacities. involves the deployment of tactics which, rather than simply securing the life of populations imperilled by terrorist tactics, deliberately target it with newly insidious techniques of discipline and control, all in the name of infrastructure protection. In doing so, the volume highlights what can justly be described as the biopolitical dimensions of the war on terror and the broader security strategies of liberal regimes that have been developed to prosecute it. In concluding this volume, then, I would like to extend and draw
Second they underline the fact that the waging of this war out what I read as being its most valuable contribution to our knowledge of this lugubrious phenomenon. If we believe our governments and most of the academic literature on the subject,

provision of such infrastructure protection requires the deliberate targeting of the human life that inhabits critical infrastructures with increasingly invasive techniques of governance . As a consequence of the declaration of the war on terror, and more especially as a result of the ways in which the threat of terrorism is being interpreted and understood by its proponents, the investment of regimes in the development of new techniques and technologies for the control of human life is increasing rapidly. Strategies for critical infrastructure
both the security and quality of life is inextricably dependent on the protection of the critical infrastructures through which liberal regimes are organised. But the protection are affording significant advances in the development of scientific knowledge and technological control of the evolutionary capacities and adaptive capabilities of the human. Amid the creation of plans for the provision of critical infrastructure protection, and in the establishment of new governmental agencies for the execution of those plans, the biological sciences in particular are undergoing a major renaissance (Cooper 2006). The implications of these new forms of knowledge and security technologies for the quality of human life are profoundly

human beings within critical infrastructures are also regarded as posing the greatest danger to them (Dunn 2005). In this context, the human can be seen to have become both the rogue element against which liberal regimes are today seeking to secure themselves, as well as the central resource on which they are attempting to draw in pursuit of their security. In order to afford their own protection, liberal regimes have learned historically to govern human life via its reduction to what I have called 'logistical life'. This
paradoxical. Human beings themselves do, of course, rely significantly on the operability and maintenance of infrastructures themelves. But it is a fact that term is apt because the techniques and practices of social control through which regimes of the eighteenth century learned to govern were drawn directly from the domains of war, military

Logistical life is a life lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one's purposes transparently in relation to others, to be positioned where one is required, to use time economically, to be able to move when and where one is told to, and crucially, to be able to extol these capacities as the values for which one will agree to kill and die for
strategy, tactics and organisation (Reid 2006: 17-39). (Reid 2006: 13). In the eighteenth century, the deployment of techniques with which to increase the logistical efficiencies of societies was legitimised by regimes through the claim that it was necessary for the exceptional defence of the civil domain of society from its external enemies. Increased military efficiency and discipline was said to be necessary and beneficial to forms of civil life, the 'quality' of which was defined by their distinction from the warlike conditions that were said to prevail beyond the boundaries of the state. It is in critique of this type of legitimisation that Foucault's analysis, in its demonstration of the ways in which techniques for the increase of the logistical efficiency of armed forces impacted directly upon the everyday order of life within the civil domain of society, is so powerful. He exposes how the methods with which liberal regimes historically prepared for war with external enemies provided model

liberal regimes have sought to legitimise their wars in the name of the defence and development of the very forms of logistical ways of living they were busy inculcating within and among their subjects. Now, in the twenty-first century and in the context of the war on terror, we are witnessing precisely the same methods of legitimisation being employed by liberal regimes, but with a radical twist. Today, the argument being
templates with which to subject the life of their civilian populations to new insidious forms of control and manipulation, and how, in turn, deployed is not, as it was in the eighteenth century, that the increase of the logistical efficiency of societies is a necessary sacrifice in the interest of defending an otherwise distinctly civilian

population. Today, it is deemed necessary to defend the logistical life of society from enemies that are deemed dangerous precisely because they target life in its logistical dimensions. Amid

the capacities of societies to practice a logistical way of life have become indistinguishable from conceptions of the 'quality of life' for human beings. Throughout, for example, the seminal US National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection, one finds the quality of human life construed in terms of its logistical capacities. The docility and plasticity of human bodies, the manipulability of human dispositions, and the many ways in which human behaviour can be subjected to techniques of control, are conceptualised not just as a means for the protection of liberal societies, but as qualities that distinguish the uniqueness of the human species. As the Plan for Research and Development states: Part of the challenge of infrastructure protection is how to take full advantage of human capabilities. The Social, Behavioral
the global campaign against terrorism, and Economic (SBE) Working Group in the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is focused on scientific research in the areas of sensory, motor, cognitive and adaptive capability of the human. Currently, the brain is unmatched by any technological system. The human brain is a semi-quantitative supercomputer that is programmable and reprogrammable by explicit

The quality of human life, we are told in forthright terms, is reducible to its superior amenability to logistical transformation. Its greater
training, previous experience, and on-going observations on a real-time, virtually instantaneous basis. (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 63) capacity for adaptation and transformation is what distinguishes it from other life forms. Contemporary accounts of this form of human superiority, understood in terms of humans' amenability to logistical techniques of transformation, recall in their depth and specificity the expressions of wonderment at life's malleability to be found in military texts of the eighteenth century that Foucault's original exploration of the disciplinary and biopolitical underpinnings of liberal modernity first exposed (1991: 135-69). Human eyes are capable of high-resolution, stereo-optical vision with immense range, and, integrated with a highly plastic brain, make humans uniquely capable of discovery, integration, and complex pattern recognition. Human hands constitute a dexterous, sensitive biomechanical system that, integrated with the brains and eyes, are unmatched by current and near-future robotic technologies. Humans operate in groups synergistically and dynamically, adjusting perceptions, relationships and connections as needed on a real-time and virtually instantaneous basis. Human language capabilities exist and operate within a dimensional space that is far more complex and fluid than any known artificial architectures. (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 63) As Foucault's original analysis of the development of liberal regimes of power revealed, the emergence of the military sciences in the eighteenth century was allied to as well as constitutive of the broader development of the life sciences. Developments in modern military science have consistently fed off and contributed to changes in the life sciences more generally. Now, in the twenty-first century, we can see this alliance being cemented in the development of new methods for the defence of liberal regimes in what is known as 'human factors engineering', or HF/E. HF/E is, as the National Plan describes, 'both a science of human performance and an engineering discipline, concerned with the design of systems for both efficiency and safety' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 64). Developed since before the Second World War, its aim is to harness the 'cognitive, emotional and social capabilities of the human' in order to design more secure systems for the defence of critical infrastructures and to invest in such human capabilities with a view to creating systems of infrastructure that are resilient to 'deceptive behaviors', 'rogue activities', and to 'insider

in engineering, the means with which to secure infrastructures against the 'deceptions', 'rogues' and 'insider threats' aimed at it, human life today faces increasingly intense threats to its integrity. The radical indeterminacy of the human, its capacity for error, its creative capacities for thought and expression, are directly endangered by the increasingly insidious forms of control being wielded and asserted in strategies for the securing of critical infrastructures against terrorism. As the Plan informs its readership, 'Anyone can be presumed to be a candidate for insider threat' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 43). Indeed, everyone is suspect of constituting this form of threat . Research and
threats' said to endanger critical infrastructures (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 42). But development in response to the fear of insider threats is aimed at the creation of what is called a 'National Common Operating Picture for Critical Infrastructure' (COP) not simply in order to 'sense rogue behavior' in pre-identified sources of threats to life, but in order to be able to 'sense rogue behaviour in a trusted resource or anticipate that they may be a candidate threat' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 41). It is therefore deemed necessary 'that we presume any insider could conduct unauthorised or rogue activities' (Department of Homeland

every possible human disposition and expression, is becoming the target of strategies construed paradoxically for the defence of human well-being. In this context, any action or thought that borders on abnormality is to be targeted as a potential source of threat. As the Plan states, 'the same anticipation of overt damaging action by a purposeful threat can be used to anticipate an unfortunate excursion in thought or action by a well-meaning actor' (Depattment of Homeland Security 2004: 44). The development of technologies and techniques for the analysis of 'what people do' and their 'deceptive behaviours' runs the risk not simply of outlawing fundamental conditions for quality of human life . It creates and indeed instantiates the risk of the violent destruction of forms of life, of human populations and individuals, who through no fault of their own are deemed to exhibit signs of anomalous and threatening behaviour. The deliberate
Security 2004: 42). Consequently, the movement of human life, each and

murder of Jean Charles de Menezes, killed with five gunshots to the head fired at point-blank range by British police on 22 July 2005, is a case in point. This human being, described as an 'unidentified male' with 'dark hair beard/stubble', was targeted on account of the fact that his 'description and demeanour' matched the identity of a bomber suspect'. The simple fact of his leaving an apartment block thought to have been used by terrorist suspects, the simple fact that on his subsequent journey, he exited and re-entered the bus on which he travelled, and in spite of the fact that he walked and did not run, showed no sign of possessing weapons of destruction, and gave no signal of intent of any sort, was nevertheless deemed to represent a divergence from a normal pattern of behaviour so serious that he was targeted and killed with the most deliberate violence. In spite of the scale and intensity with which the aim of a complete mapping of human dispositions and behaviours has been pursued, and in spite of the urgency with which today it is being implemented, the most banal and everyday expressions of life continue to fall, tragically, outside its grasp. As it was in the eighteenth century that the

fantasy of a society which functions as a type of socio-military machine, and 'that would cover the whole territory of the nation and in which each individual would be occupied without interruption but in a
different way according to the evolutive segment, the genetic sequence in which he finds himself' (Foucault 1991: 165) emerged, so at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can see

being given new forms in the shape of critical infrastructure protection. Making sense of what is at stake in this phenomenon requires a complete reversal of the terms in which its utility is currently being articulated by liberal regimes of power. Rather than conceptualise this present struggle in terms of a war on terror in the defence of a common humanity against an enemy that is inimical to life, we can better conceptualise it as a conflict over the political constitution of life itself. When the methods with which regimes are seeking to secure the life of their societies demand an incremental targeting of life, to the point where the most ordinary expressions of life are rendered objects of strategic intervention, it is necessary to question the ways of valorising life that create such paradoxical conditions. This volume, in my reading, creates important openings for the further exploration of such a line of questioning.
that fantasy

1NCSecurity K (Short)
The affirmative's pursuit of international stability via military dominance is a fantasy of control that relies on threat construction. This writes a blank check for state-sponsored terrorism and permanent conflict Chernus 6Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict
Studies Program University of Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54 The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to
inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended. Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that dont. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. Its no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret.
turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it wont stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons effort s Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a secret plan for worl d conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution. They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: We should not try to convince people that things are getting better. Michael Ledeen: The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn f rom observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the

a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm
neocons fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem

The neocons story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy.
plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy.

Their aff conceptualizes life in terms of geopolitical strategythis approach crowds out alternative approaches and primes us for conflict, guaranteeing war and killing value to life. Burke 7Anthony Burke, Lecturer in Politics and Professor of International Relations @ University of New
South Wales, Beyond Security: Ethics, and Violence, pg 52 -53 the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics
This essay develops a theory about

or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale.

But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon ; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent , that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a

norm of war

-- and because

they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in

which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction , and force -- in the words of one
famous Cold War strategist --

can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.

Threat constructions shape reality and make constructing new threats inevitable. Dillon 96
(Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR at the University of Lancaster, Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster. He has published widely in international relations and in cultural and political theory. He is currently researching the problematisation of security and war from the perspective of continental philosophy with particular interest in what happens to the problematisation of security when security discourses and technologies take life rather than sovereign territoriality as their referent object. Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought.pg. 27) Metaphysics, therefore, becomes material in politics of security because metaphysically determined being has a foundational requirement to secure security.

Hence our (inter)national politics of security are the municipal metaphysics of the Western tradition. That is why the fate of metaphysics and the fate of that politics of security are so inextricably intertwined. There is more than an academic interest at stake, therefore, in this
modern conjunction between the philosophical and the political. How we think and what we do, what we think and how we are doing, condition one another. There is clearly more than a coincidence also in relying upon
post-Nietzschean thought to argue for that reappraisal of both which requires a recovery of the question of the political. For between Hegel and Heidegger metaphysics exposed itself to its own deconstructive impulses. After Marx 'one finds Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Freud, and Nietzsche turning philosophy upon itself, thereby unmasking its own taboos and twisted roots; realising and exhausting its potential, according to Heidegger, in the advent of the epoch of technology. The same period also witnessed the exhaustion of the European State system's modern metaphysical resolution of the question of the political - its profoundly ambiguous and deeply problematic inauguration as both a State of emergency and a certain kind of democratic project - through the very globalisation of the language, forms and practices of the politics of security upon which it was based. The

advent of the globalised industrial nuclear age exhibits not only the hollowness of that system's foundational promises to secure order, identity and freedom - hence the reason why the disciplines which promise to tell the truth

about the operation of its orders and identities appear to be so peculiarly limited and unreal in

their vaunted realistic representation of reality - but also, in the gulf that exists between what its (inter)national political prospectus offers and what its (inter)national politics provides; the exhaustion of its political imagination. For this was a period, in which World War One was critical, when that (inter)national politics of security finally realised the full potential of the selfimmolative dynamic pre-figured in its very inception; the real prospect of human species extinction.

The creation of threats leads to inevitable war and extinction Frank and Melville 1
(Jerome and Andrei, professor Emeritus of Psychiatry, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Section Head, Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/frank.html)

The arms race is not driven by weapons alone. It is also driven by a very simple psychological phenomenon, the image of the enemy. Weapons of total destruction would be useless without such images. For such weapons to have any purpose, there must be people who may be totally destroyed. Adversaries must be transformed into demons. Once such images have been created, they, in turn, drive the arms race. People resist giving them up. There is a desire to see everything in a light which will reinforce the image. Images foster closed minds and reinforce resistance to change. But change is possible. It has happened many times in history. Whole
been followed. New technologies offer new potentials for communication. New

peoples have changed their views of one another. Even between the superpowers, areas of special accommodation have been achieved, agreements have

goals which transcend the narrow national interests of each will offer a framework for future common actions. In working out the way to achieve those goals the enemy images can be gradually lessened, perhaps even dissolved. If humankind is to survive in the nuclear age, there must be progress in this direction.

Critical infrastructure protection authorizes violent disciplinary biopower which frames humanity in terms of logistical life to be managed and manipulated. This reductionist mindset destroys quality of life and legitimizes endless wars to preserve existence. Reid 8Julian Reid, lecturer in International Relations at Kings College, visiting professor in
International Relations at the University of Lapland, Conclusion: The Biopolitics of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Securing the Homeland: Critical Infrastructure, Risk and (In)Security, Ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Kristian Soby Kristensen, p. 178-179
Therefore, the contemporary reification of critical infrastructure as an object for protection owes a significant debt to the development of new forms of political agency concerned with attacking liberal regimes by undermining specifically liberal sources of security and governance. All of these developments only serve to fuel liberal representations of the war on terror as a struggle between regimes tasked with promoting security for human life against enemies dedicated to its nihilistic destruction. Why would anyone seek to destroy infrastructure other than out of a profound antipathy for the fundamental conditions which human life requires for its prosperity and security? This volume, in opening up the debate on CIP to allow for the examination of the dehumanising dimensions and implications of the practices involved in CIP, and objectives at stake in it, throws a spanner into the works of such modes of representation. This is especially true for the chapters by Der Derian and Finkelstein (Chapter 4) as well as Bonditti (Chapter 6), both of which extend Michel Foucault's seminal analysis of the origins of liberal regimes in practices of discipline and biopolitics whereupon infrastructure was first objectified as a fundamental source of security to the state. Both of these chapters demonstrate in different ways why

a more technocratic will to defend infrastructures even at the cost and to the detriment of distinctly human capacities. Second they underline the fact that the waging of this war involves the deployment of tactics which, rather than simply securing the life of populations imperilled by terrorist tactics, deliberately target it with newly insidious techniques of discipline and control , all in the name of infrastructure protection. In doing so, the volume highlights what can justly be described as the biopolitical dimensions of the war on terror and the broader security strategies of liberal regimes that have been developed to prosecute it. In concluding this volume, then, I would like to extend and draw
the rationalities informing CIP cannot be understood in simplistic terms of a desire for the protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of terrorists, but express out what I read as being its most valuable contribution to our knowledge of this lugubrious phenomenon. If we believe our governments and most of the academic literature on the subject,

provision of such infrastructure protection requires the deliberate targeting of the human life that inhabits critical infrastructures with increasingly invasive techniques of governance . As a consequence of the declaration of the war on terror, and more especially as a result of the ways in which the threat of terrorism is being interpreted and understood by its proponents, the investment of regimes in the development of new
both the security and quality of life is inextricably dependent on the protection of the critical infrastructures through which liberal regimes are organised. But the

techniques and technologies for the control of human life is increasing rapidly. Strategies for critical infrastructure
protection are affording significant advances in the development of scientific knowledge and technological control of the evolutionary capacities and adaptive capabilities of the human. Amid the creation of plans for the provision of critical infrastructure protection, and in the establishment of new governmental agencies for the execution of those plans, the biological sciences in particular are undergoing a major renaissance (Cooper 2006). The implications of these new forms of knowledge and security technologies for the quality of human life are profoundly

human beings within critical infrastructures are also regarded as posing the greatest danger to them (Dunn 2005). In this context, the human can be seen to have become both the rogue element against which liberal regimes are today seeking to secure themselves, as well as the central resource on which they are attempting to draw in pursuit of their security. In order to afford their own protection, liberal regimes have learned historically to govern human life via its reduction to what I have called 'logistical life'. This
paradoxical. Human beings themselves do, of course, rely significantly on the operability and maintenance of infrastructures themelves. But it is a fact that term is apt because the techniques and practices of social control through which regimes of the eighteenth century learned to govern were drawn directly from the domains of war, military

Logistical life is a life lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one's purposes transparently in relation to others, to be positioned where one is required, to use time economically, to be able to move when and where one is told to, and crucially, to be able to extol these capacities as the values for which one will agree to kill and die for
strategy, tactics and organisation (Reid 2006: 17-39). (Reid 2006: 13). In the eighteenth century, the deployment of techniques with which to increase the logistical efficiencies of societies was legitimised by regimes through the claim that it was necessary for the exceptional defence of the civil domain of society from its external enemies. Increased military efficiency and discipline was said to be necessary and beneficial to forms of civil life, the 'quality' of which was defined by their distinction from the warlike conditions that were said to prevail beyond the boundaries of the state. It is in critique of this type of legitimisation that Foucault's analysis, in its demonstration of the ways in which techniques for the increase of the logistical efficiency of armed forces impacted directly upon the everyday order of life within the civil domain of society, is so powerful. He exposes how the methods with which liberal regimes historically prepared for war with external enemies provided model

liberal regimes have sought to legitimise their wars in the name of the defence and development of the very forms of logistical ways of living they were busy inculcating within and among their subjects. Now, in the twenty-first century and in the context of the war on terror, we are witnessing precisely the same methods of legitimisation being employed by liberal regimes , but with a radical twist. Today, the
templates with which to subject the life of their civilian populations to new insidious forms of control and manipulation, and how, in turn, argument being deployed is not, as it was in the eighteenth century, that the increase of the logistical efficiency of societies is a necessary sacrifice in the interest of defending an otherwise distinctly civilian population. Today, it is deemed necessary to defend the logistical life of society from enemies that are deemed dangerous precisely because they target life in its logistical

the capacities of societies to practice a logistical way of life have become indistinguishable from conceptions of the 'quality of life' for human beings. Throughout, for example, the seminal US National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection, one finds the quality of human life construed in terms of its logistical capacities. The docility and plasticity of human bodies, the manipulability of human dispositions, and the many ways in which human behaviour can be subjected to techniques of control, are conceptualised not just as a means for the protection of liberal societies, but as qualities that distinguish the uniqueness of the human species. As the Plan for Research and Development states: Part of the challenge of infrastructure protection is how to take full advantage of human capabilities. The Social,
dimensions. Amid the global campaign against terrorism, Behavioral and Economic (SBE) Working Group in the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) is focused on scientific research in the areas of sensory, motor, cognitive and adaptive capability of the human. Currently, the brain is unmatched by any technological system. The human brain is a semi-quantitative supercomputer that is programmable and reprogrammable by

The quality of human life, we are told in forthright terms, is reducible to its superior amenability to logistical transformation. Its
explicit training, previous experience, and on-going observations on a real-time, virtually instantaneous basis. (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 63) greater capacity for adaptation and transformation is what distinguishes it from other life forms. Contemporary accounts of this form of human superiority, understood in terms of humans' amenability to logistical techniques of transformation, recall in their depth and specificity the expressions of wonderment at life's malleability to be found in military texts of the eighteenth century that Foucault's original exploration of the disciplinary and biopolitical underpinnings of liberal modernity first exposed (1991: 135-69). Human eyes are capable of high-resolution, stereo-optical vision with immense range, and, integrated with a highly plastic brain, make humans uniquely capable of discovery, integration, and complex pattern recognition. Human hands constitute a dexterous, sensitive biomechanical system that, integrated with the brains and eyes, are unmatched by current and near-future robotic technologies. Humans operate in groups synergistically and dynamically, adjusting perceptions, relationships and connections as needed on a real-time and virtually instantaneous basis. Human language capabilities exist and operate within a dimensional space that is far more complex and fluid than any known artificial architectures. (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 63) As Foucault's original analysis of the development of liberal regimes of power revealed, the emergence of the military sciences in the eighteenth century was allied to as well as constitutive of the broader development of the life sciences. Developments in modern military science have consistently fed off and contributed to changes in the life sciences more generally. Now, in the twenty-first century, we can see this alliance being cemented in the development of new methods for the defence of liberal regimes in what is known as 'human factors engineering', or HF/E. HF/E is, as the National Plan describes, 'both a science of human performance and an engineering discipline, concerned with the design of systems for both efficiency and safety' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 64). Developed since before the Second World War, its aim is to harness the 'cognitive, emotional and social capabilities of the human' in order to design more secure systems for the defence of critical infrastructures and to invest in such human capabilities with a view to creating systems of infrastructure that are resilient to 'deceptive behaviors', 'rogue activities', and to 'insider

in engineering, the means with which to secure infrastructures against the 'deceptions', 'rogues' and 'insider threats' aimed at it, human life today faces increasingly intense threats to its integrity. The radical indeterminacy of the human, its capacity for error, its creative capacities for thought and expression, are directly endangered by the increasingly insidious forms of control being wielded and asserted in strategies for the securing of critical infrastructures against terrorism. As the Plan informs its readership, 'Anyone can be presumed to be a candidate for insider threat' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 43). Indeed, everyone is suspect of constituting this form of threat . Research and
threats' said to endanger critical infrastructures (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 42). But development in response to the fear of insider threats is aimed at the creation of what is called a 'National Common Operating Picture for Critical Infrastructure' (COP) not simply in order to 'sense rogue behavior' in pre-identified sources of threats to life, but in order to be able to 'sense rogue behaviour in a trusted resource or anticipate that they may be a candidate threat' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 41). It is therefore deemed necessary 'that we presume any insider could conduct unauthorised or rogue activities' (Department of Homeland Security 2004: 42). Consequently, the movement of human life, each and

every possible human disposition

and expression,

is becoming the

target of strategies construed paradoxically for the defence of human well-being. In this context, any action or thought that borders on abnormality is to be targeted as a potential source of threat. As the Plan states, 'the same anticipation of overt damaging action by a purposeful threat can be used to anticipate an unfortunate excursion in thought or action by a well-meaning actor' (Depattment of Homeland Security 2004: 44). The development of technologies and techniques for the analysis of 'what people do' and their 'deceptive behaviours' runs the risk not simply of outlawing fundamental conditions for quality of human life . It creates and indeed instantiates the risk of the violent destruction of forms of life, of human populations and individuals, who through no fault of their own are deemed to exhibit signs of anomalous and threatening behaviour. The
deliberate murder of Jean Charles de Menezes, killed with five gunshots to the head fired at point-blank range by British police on 22 July 2005, is a case in point. This human being, described as an 'unidentified male' with 'dark hair beard/stubble', was targeted on account of the fact that his 'description and demeanour' matched the identity of a bomber suspect'. The simple fact of his leaving an apartment block thought to have been used by terrorist suspects, the simple fact that on his subsequent journey, he exited and re-entered the bus on which he travelled, and in spite of the fact that he walked and did not run, showed no sign of possessing weapons of destruction, and gave no signal of intent of any sort, was nevertheless deemed to represent a divergence from a normal pattern of behaviour so serious that he was targeted and killed with the most deliberate violence. In spite of the scale and intensity with which the aim of a complete mapping of human dispositions and behaviours has been pursued, and in spite of the urgency with which today it is being implemented, the most banal and everyday expressions of life continue to fall, tragically, outside its grasp. As it was in the eighteenth century that the fantasy of a

society which functions as a type of socio-military machine, and 'that would cover the whole territory of the nation and in which each individual would be occupied without interruption but in a different way according to the evolutive segment, the genetic sequence in which he finds himself' (Foucault 1991: 165) emerged, so at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can see that fantasy being given new forms in the shape of critical infrastructure protection. Making sense of what is at stake in this phenomenon requires a complete reversal of the terms in which its utility is currently being articulated by liberal regimes of power. Rather than conceptualise this present struggle in terms of a war on terror in the defence of a common humanity against an enemy that is inimical to life, we can better conceptualise it as a conflict over the political constitution of life itself. When the methods with which regimes are seeking to secure the life of their societies demand an incremental targeting of life, to the point where the most ordinary expressions of life are rendered objects of strategic intervention, it is necessary to question the ways of valorising life that create such paradoxical conditions. This volume, in my reading, creates important openings
for the further exploration of such a line of questioning.

Vote negative to reject the 1AC's security discoursethat's a prior question Bruce 96Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman,
Senior Lecturer University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9
This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its knowledge form as reality in debates on defence and security. Ind eed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue

defence and security is to be invigorated. This counterparts sets of

critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australias identity are both required and essential if Australias thinking on is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of

the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their context
in the world, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply wit h the rightness of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it.

Before engaging in

the

policy debate

the

critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and

underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Saids critical intellectuals.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-makers frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between open societies and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australias security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how

theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book

also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult

and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation

becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical

that terms and concepts state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of

political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of
steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the worlds ills in general, or Australias security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which

attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to
often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier,

be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies

may follow . As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at
challenging the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of reality] their meaning and which direct
[Australias] policy/analytical/military responses. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australias academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclus ively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australias security community. They also question the discourse of regional security, security cooperation, peacekeeping and alliance politics that are central to Australias official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important ta sk especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australias public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australias policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

1NCSecurity K (Long)
The affirmative's pursuit of international stability via military dominance is a fantasy of control that relies on threat construction. This writes a blank check for state-sponsored terrorism and permanent conflict Chernus 6Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict
Studies Program University of Colorado-Boulder, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin, p. 53-54 The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to
inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended. Gary Dorrien sees insecurity coming at the neoconservatives in another way, too: For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that dont. Indeed, change of any kind, in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. Its no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret.
turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fantasy; it wont stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons efforts Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a secret plan for worl d conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution. They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: We should not try to convince people that things are getting better. Michael Ledeen: The struggle against evil is going to go on forever.40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn f rom observing reality. It is both the premise and the goal of the

a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict, so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm
neocons fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem

The neocons story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy.
plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy.

Specificallylinking economics and national security makes extinction inevitable by foregoing issues of ecological and resource sustainability Bristow 10School of City & Regional Planning, Cardiff University) (Gillian, Resilient regions: replaceing regional competitiveness, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2010, 3, 153 167)
In recent years, regional development strategies have been subjugated to the hegemonic discourse of competitiveness, such that the ultimate objective for all regional development policymakers and practitioners has become the creation of economic advantage through superior productivity performance, or the attr action of new rms and labour (Bristow, 2005). A major consequence is the developing ubiquitication of regional development strategies (Bristow, 2005; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). This reects t he status of competitiveness as a key discursive

, the competitiveness hegemony is such that many policies previously considered only indirectly relevant to unfettered economic growth tend to be hijacked in support of competitiveness agendas (for example Raco, 2008; also Dannestam, 2008). This paper will argue, however, that a particularly narrow discourse of competitiveness has been constructed that has a number of negative connotations for
construct (Jessop, 2008) that has acquired hugely signicant rhetorical power for certain interests intent on reinforcing capitalist relations (Bristow, 2005; Fougner, 2006). Indeed

the resilience of regions. Resilience is dened as the regions ability to experience positive economic success that is socially inclusive, works within environmental limits and which can ride global economic punches (Ashby et al., 2009). As such, resilience clearly resonates with literatures on sustainability, localisation and diversication, and the developing understanding of regions as intrinsically diverse entities with evolutionary and context-specic development trajectories (Hayter, 2004). In contrast, the dominant discourse of competitiveness is placeless and increasingly associated with globalised, growth-rst and environmentally malign agendas (Hudson, 2005). However, this paper will argue that the relationships between competitiveness and resilience are more complex
than might at rst appear. Using insights from the Cultural Political Economy (CPE) approach, which focuses on understanding the construction, development and spread of hegemonic policy discourses, the paper will argue that the dominant discourse of competitiveness used in regional development policy is narrowly constructed and is thus insensitive to contingencies of place and the more nuanced role of competition within economies. This leads to problems of resilience that can be partly overcome with the development of a more contextualised approach to competitiveness. The paper is now structured as follows. It begins by examining the developing understanding of resilience in the theorising and policy discourse around regional development. It then describes the CPE approach and utilises its framework to explain both how a narrow conception of competitiveness has come to dominate regional development policy and how resilience inter-plays in subtle and complex ways with competitiveness and its emerg ing critique. The paper then proceeds to illustrate what resilience means for regional development rstly, with reference to the Transition Towns concept, and then by developing a typology of regional strategies to show the different characteristics of policy approaches based on competitiveness and resilience. Regional resilience Resilience is rapidly emerging as an idea whose time has come in policy discourses around localities and regions, where it is developing widespread appeal owing to the peculiarly powerful combination of transformative pressures from below, and various catalytic, crisis-induced imperatives for change from above. It features strongly in policy discourses around environmental management and sustainable development (see Hudson, 2008a), but has also more recently emerged in relation to emergency and disaster planning with, for example Regional Resilience Teams established in the English regions to support and co-ordinate civil protection activities around various emergency situations such as the threat of a swine u pandemic. The discourse of resilience is also taking hold in discussions around desirable local and regional development activities and strategies. The recent global credit crunch and the accompanying in-crease in livelihood insecurity has highlighted the advantages of those local and regional economies that have greater resilience by virtue o f being less dependent upon globally footloose activities, hav-ing greater economic diversity, and/or having a de-termination to prioritise and effect more signicant structural change (Ashby et al, 2009; Larkin and Cooper,

resilience features particular strongly in the grey literature spawned by thinktanks, consultancies and environmental interest groups around the consequences of the global recession, catastrophic climate change and the arrival of the era of peak oil for localities and regions with all its implications for the longevity of carbon-fuelled economies, cheap, long-distance transport and global trade. This popularly labelled triple crunch (New Economics Foundation, 2008) has power-fully illuminated the potentially disastrous material consequences of the voracious growth imperative at the heart of neoliberalism and competitiveness, both in the form of resource constraints (especially food security) and in the inability of the current system to manage global nancial and ecological sustainability. In so doing, it appears to be galvinising previously disparate, fractured debates about the merits of the current system, and challenging public and political opinion
2009). Indeed, to develop a new, global concern with frugality, egalitarianism and localism (see, for example Jackson, 2009; New Economics Foundation, 2008).

This security framework causes constant interventionism and extinction Florig 10Dennis Florig, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, "Hegemonic Overreach vs. Imperial
Overstretch," Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1548783_code1259934.pdf?abstractid=1548783&mi rid=1) In the 21st century, two factors taking place outside the West seem more of a threat to the reproduction to the hegemony of the American state and the western system than conflict between western states: 1. resistance to western hegemony in the Muslim world and other parts of the subordinated South, and 2. the rise of newly powerful or reformed super states. Relations between the core and
periphery have already undergone one massive transformation in the 20th century decolonization. The historical significance of decolonization was overshadowed somewhat by the

. Recognition of its impact was dampened somewhat by the subsequent relative lack of change of fundamental economic relations between core and periphery. But one of the historical
emergence of the Cold War and the nuclear age legacies of decolonization is that ideological legitimation has become more crucial in operating the global system. The manufacture of some level of consent, particularly among the elite in the

Less raw force is necessary but in return a greater burden of ideological and cultural legitimation is required. Now it is no longer enough for colonials to obey, willing participants must believe. Therefore, cultural and ideological
periphery has to some degree replaced brute domination. challenges to the foundations of the liberal capitalist world view assume much greater significance. Thus the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic nationalism, and even social democracy in Latin America as ideologies of opposition have increasing significance in a system dependent on greater levels of willing consent. As Ayoob suggests, the sustained resistance within the Islamic world to western hegemony may have a demonstration effect on other southern states with similar grievances against the West.26 The other new dynamic is the reemergence of great states that at one time or another have been brought low by the western hegemonic system. China, in recent centuries low on the international division of labor, was in some ways a classic case of a peripheral state, or today a semi-peripheral state. But its sheer size, its rapid growth, its currency reserves, its actual and potential markets, etc. make it a major power and a potential future counter hegemon. India lags behind China, but has similar aspirations. Russia has fallen from great power to semi-peripheral status since the collapse of the Soviet

No one knows exactly what the resurgence of Asia portends for the future. However, just as half a century ago global decolonization was a blow to western domination, so the shift in
empire, but its energy resources and the technological skills of its people make recovery of its former greatness possible. economic production to Asia will redefine global power relations throughout the 21st century. Classical theory of hegemonic cycle is useful if not articulated in too rigid a form.

Hegemonic systems do not last forever ; they do have a life span. The hegemonic state cannot maintain itself as the fastest growing major economy forever and thus eventually will face relative decline against some major power or powers. The hegemon faces recurrent challenges both on the periphery and from other major powers who feel constrained by the hegemons power or are ambitious to usurp it s

place. Techniques of the application of military force and ideological control may become more sophisticated over time, but so too do techniques of guerilla warfare and ideological forms of resistance such as religious fundamentalism, nationalism , and politicization of ethnic identity. World war may not be imminent, but wars on the periphery have become quite deadly, and the threat of the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD by the rising number of powers who possess them looms. The hegemonic state tends to become overstretched, but more importantly the U.S., because of its messianic sense of mission, tends to overreach. Some of the burden the hegemon has to assume is inevitable, but the U.S. is particularly prone to massive miscalculation.

Utilitarianism conceptualizes life in terms of geopolitical strategythis reductionist approach crowds out alternative approaches and primes us for conflict Burke 7Lecturer Politics and Prof IR @ Univ of New South Wales (Anthony, Beyond Security: Ethics, and
Violence, pg 52-53) the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics
This essay develops a theory about

or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent , that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a

norm of war

-- and because

they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in

which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction , and force -- in the words of one
famous Cold War strategist --

can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.

Vote negative to reject the 1AC's security discoursethat's a prior question Bruce 96Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman,
Senior Lecturer University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9
This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its knowledge form as reality in debates on defence and security. Ind eed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue

defence and security is to be invigorated. This counterparts sets of

critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australias identity are both required and essential if Australias thinking on is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of

the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their context
in the world, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with t he rightness of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it.

Before engaging in

the

policy debate

the

critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and

underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Saids critical intellectuals.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, th at the policy-makers frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances up on power. In short, one of the major differences between open societies and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australias security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how

theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book

also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation

becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical

that terms and concepts state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of

political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of
steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the worlds ills in general, or Australias security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which

attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to
often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier,

be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies

may follow . As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of reality] their meaning and which direct
[Australias] policy/analytical/military responses. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australias academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australias security community. They also question the discourse of regional security, security cooperation, peacekeeping and alliance politics that are central to Australias official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important ta sk especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australias public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australias policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

1NCSecurity K (Arctic)
Arctic conflict and competition claims are framed through security politics
ISN 11 (International Relations and Security Network, Colliding Geopolitics and the Arctic, 12/8/11, ISN) Borgersons highly geopolitical tale is illustrative of a common narrative about the Arctic. It invariably stresses climate change, increasing competition for resources, and the potential for conflict. Last weeks discussion of critical geopolitics , however, should remind us that this narrative is far from the only one that can tell us about the Arctic today. Todays second article, Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics, challenges this conventional narrative. Far from accepting it as an inevitable reflection of global warming or climate change, it argues that the prospect of military conflict in the Arctic is largely a manufactured one. According to the authors, this orthodox construction of Arctic geopolitics has two main elements, neither of which are legitimate 1) the construction of Arctic space in general as open, indeterminate and therefore dangerous, and 2) the political construction of Arctic space in the neo-realist terms of structural anarchy and territorial competition associated with a great game. Together these two groups of representational choices conspire to misread Arctic geography and the recent events of Arctic history. In particular, they contribute to an almost complete misunderstanding of the 2007 Russian Polar expedition as a geopolitically motivated Arctic resource grab, instead of a routine scientific endeavor that was only retroactively (and self-consciously) exploited by Moscow.

Their security lens towards Arctic conflict justifies perpetual militarization and escalation Greaves 12Wilfrid Greaves, Ph.D. candidate Political Science @ U Toronto, SSHRC Doctoral Scholar
and DFAIT Graduate Student Fellow, "Turtle Island Blues: Climate Change and Failed Indigenous Securitization in the Canadian Arctic," Gordon Foundation) Even a brief examination of the competing narratives of security in and for the region suggests that there is no consensus about what constitutes Arctic security and its attendant practices. Conventional analyses employ a militarized lens reminiscent of the Cold War, or an updated focus upon unconventional threats to state sovereignty transmitted through the Arctic, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. Other commentators view Arctic security as inherently linked to the environmental and human security implications of climate change for the people (particularly indigenous peoples) who inhabit the circumpolar North. Still others link Arctic security to
domestic or continental energy security, and the development of large-scale hydrocarbon resources in the comparatively stable neighbourhood of the Euro-American Arctic region. In

short, Arctic security remains fundamentally contested . These competing conceptualizations of security can be understood not as objective analyses of conditions of (in)security in the Arctic, but as efforts to securitize to raise to the extra-political level of security threat issues that affect the interests of particular actors. Regardless of their accuracy or normativity, these representations of Arctic security constitute speech acts, or securitizing moves, attempting to designate particular phenomena as threats requiring emergency measures and superordinate status within relevant policy discussions. Given the discursive power of security logic, and the extra-political authority that accrues to governments whenever states of emergency are invoked and issues successfully securitized, the struggle to define (in)security in the Arctic is central to the regions future.This paper investigates how Arctic security is understood by people who live in the region. How have indigenous actors conceptualized Arctic security in the
Canadian North? What explains the failure of indigenous efforts to securitize Arctic climate change? It undertakes textual analysis of indigenous securitizing moves in the Arctic through the publicly available online documents of four actors: the three Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council representing Canadian indigenous peoples (Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich in Council International, and the Inuit Circumpolar Council), and the national Inuit organization in Canada, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK). The paper a) lays out a revised securitization framework for understanding security claims; b) maps how Arctic security has been articulated by these indigenous actors in the Canadian North; and c) applies the revised securitization theory to partially explain the failure of indigenous efforts to securitize Arctic climate change. The findings suggests that the Page | 3 traditional indigenous concern over cultural security driven by modernization and Southern Canadian influence is giving way to a central security concern over climate change as the greatest threat to traditional indigenous ways of life. The paper further hypothesizes that indigenous securitization claims, especially as related to climate change, are particularly susceptible to failed or unsuccessful securitization because of the insecurity of non-dominance that discursively and practically constructs indigenous Canadians outside the scope of acceptable securitizing act ors in Canada. The findings provide some insight into securitization processes in Canada, including the security priorities of the federal government and indigenous groups; the nature of i ndigenous understandings of security in

The logic of security is the logic of emergency; it invokes an existential challenge to a given referent object to
the Canadian Arctic; and the effectiveness (i.e. policy influence) of indigenous securiti zing moves.Constituting (In)Security The Copenhagen Schools Securitization Theory

justify extraordinary measures in the protection of that object. Security, however, is not an absolute property or fixed state, but rather an inter-subjective, aspirational condition characterized by effective response to the threat of danger to a

given referent objects continued existence or wellbeing. The conceptualization of security as socially constructed has been most
prominently developed by the Copenhagen Schools (CS) securitization theory, particularly the work of Ole Wver and Barry Buzan. In the Schools original theorization, security is neither

insecurity is the situation when there is a threat and no defence against it; security is a situation with a threat and a defence against it. 1 Security is thus not constituted by the absence of threat, but by the identification of a threat and a suitable defence-response. The
characterized by the absence of threat per se, nor is it a binary opposite to insecurity; instead, Copenhagen securitization theory, however, is explicitly not concerned with identifying real security threats, but rather i dentifying the discursive and performative processes that

security threats are not inherently so; rather the performative speech act part the securitising move only evolves into a complete securitisation at the point when a designated audience accepts the speech act. 3 The CS theory is radically constructivist in that security is determined by the success of particular security speech acts, or securitizing moves, in elevating an issue in theory, any issue to the fore of the audiences consciousness and the apex of political priority. 4 Spoken, written, and performed representations of (in)security can be considered tactical manoeuvring by actors seeking to securitize their issue. The process of speaking and/or writing security and having those security claims accepted by the appropriate audience is the essence of securitization theory; security is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as
transform a given issue into a security threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. 2 Thus,

such a threat. 5 The radically constructed nature of security is the source of the CS theorys analytical strength and normative weakness. Analytically, examining the discursive and performative ways that security is constructed provides explanatory leverage over competing or contradictory representations of security within a particular context or for a particular referent
object. Securitization theory offers a powerful framework for examining the success and failure of different securitizing moves, including the successful securitization of phenomena that bear little resemblance to quantifiable security issues affecting observable or valued referent objects. 6

Indeed, it provides a theoretical lens for

understanding how security is always contested, or at least is always susceptible to contestation.

The framework of threat construction with Russia that enables moralistic double-standards triggers multiple scenarios for conflict Cohen 10Stephen Cohen, Prof, Russian Studies and History, NYU. Prof emeritus, Princeton, "USRussian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism: An Interview with Stephen F. Cohen," 25 May 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/us-russian-relations-age-american-triumphalism-interviewstephen-f-cohen) The third post-1991 conflict is stated like a mantra by American policymakers: Russia cannot have the sphere of influence it wants in the former Soviet territories. This issue, the fundamental, underlying conflict in U.S.-Russian relations, needs to be rethought and openly discussed. The United States had and has spheres of influence. We had the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and tacitly cling to it even today. More to the point, the expansion of NATO is, of course, an expansion of the American sphere of influence, which brings America's military, political, and economic might to
new member countries. Certainly, this has been the case since the 1990s, as NATO expanded across the former Soviet bloc, from Germany to the Baltic nations. All of these countries are now

American policy is this: The United States can have spheres of influence but Russia cannot, not even in its own security neighborhood. Moscow understands this, and has reacted predictably. If U.S. policymakers and their accommodating media really care about American national security, which requires fulsome Russian cooperation in many areas, they would rethink this presumption. Instead,
part of the U.S. sphere of influence, though Washington doesn't openly use this expression. So leaders like Senator McCain and Vice President Biden repeatedly visit Tblisi and Kiev to declare that Russia is not entitled to influence in those capitals while trying to tug those governments into NATO. Unless we want a new, full-scale cold war with Russia, we must ask what Moscow actually wants in former Soviet republics like Georgia and Ukraine. There are, of course,

Russian political forces that would like to restore them to their Soviet status under Moscows hegemony. But for the Kremlin leadership, from Putin to Medvedev, their essential demand is an absence of pro-American military bases and governments in those neighboring countries. In a word, that they not become members of NATO. Is that unreasonable? Imagine Washingtons reaction if pro-Russian bases and governments suddenly began appearing in America's sphere, from Latin America and Mexico to Canada. Of course, there has been no such discussion in the United States. And that has created the fourth major conflict with Russia since 1991: Moscow's perception that U.S. policy has been based on an unrelenting, triumphalist double standard, as it has been. Washington can break solemn promises, but Moscow cannot. The United States can have large and expanding spheres of influence, but Russia can have none. Moscow is

told to make its vast energy reserves available to all countries at fair-market prices, except to those governments Washington has recruited or is currently recruiting into NATO, such as the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia, which Moscow should supply at sharply below-market prices. Moscow is asked to support Washington's perceived national interests in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, but without considering that Moscow may have legitimately different security or economic interests in those places. And so it goes. Journal: What have been the consequences of this attitude toward Russia? Cohen: I think we've had an omen: the so-called "RussianGeorgian" war in August 2008. It's called the "Russian-Georgian" war, but was also a proxy American-Russian war. Washington created
Saakashvili's Georgian regime and continues to support it. Washington created his fighting force and supplied it with American military minders. American leaders were in Tblisi in the days and weeks leading up to the war. Georgia fired the first shots, as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has confirmed. And since then Washington and the mainstream

the first ever American-Russian proxy war on Russia's own borders, potentially the most dangerous moment in American-Russian relations since the Cuban Missile Crisis. What would have happened, for example, if an American with or near Saakashvili's forces had been killed by the Russians? There would have been clamor in the United States for military retaliation. Or if Moscow thought, as it
U.S. media have made excuses for what Georgia did by blaming Russia. What they should be focusing on instead is that this was seemed to have at first, that the Georgian attack on South Ossetia would be backed by NATO forces if necessary? In July 2009, President Obama went to Moscow and told President Medvedev that Russia was a co-equal great power with legitimate national interests, implying that Washington's reckless policy that led to the Georgian war would end. A few days later, an American

Is the current U.S. policy toward Russia putting us in greater danger than during the Cold War? Cohen: The real concern I have with this "we won the Cold War" triumphalism is the
warship sailed into a Georgian port. Moscow wondered who sent it, and who is running current U.S. policy. Journal: mythology that we are safer today than we were when the Soviet Union existed. Though it is blasphemous to say so, we are not safer for several reasons, one being that the Soviet state kept the lid on very dangerous things. The Soviet Union was in control of its nuclear and related arsenals. Post-Soviet Russia is "sorta" in control, but "sorta" is not enough. There is no margin for error. Reagan's goal in the 1980s was not to end the Soviet Union, but to turn it into a permanent partner of the United States. He came very close to achieving that and deserves enormous credit. He did what had to be done by meeting Gorbachev half-way. But since 1991, the arrogance of American policymaking toward Russia has either kept the Cold War from being fully ended

The greatest threats to our national security still reside in Russia. This is not because it's communist, but because it is laden with all these nuclear, chemical, and biological devicesthats the threat. The reaction of the second Bush
or started a new one. administration was to junk decades of safe-guarding agreements with Moscow. It was the first time in modern times that we have had no nuclear control reduction agreement with the

What should worry us every day and night is the triumphalist notion that nuclear war is no longer possible. It is now possible in even more ways than before, especially accidental ones. Meanwhile, the former Soviet
Russians. territories remain a Wal-Mart of dirty material and know-how. If terrorists ever explode a dirty device in the United States, even a small one, the material is likely to come from the former Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar Act (1992) was the best program Congress ever enacted to help Russia secure its nuclear material and know-how, a major contribution to American national

we need Russia's complete cooperation to make his own legislation fully successful, but he repeatedly speaks undiplomatically, even in ugly ways, about Russias leaders, thereby limiting their cooperation and undermining his own legacy. In other words, to have a nuclear relationship with Russia that will secure our national security, we must have a fully cooperative, trusting political relationship with Moscow. Thats why all the talk about a
security. But no one in Washington connects the dots. Take Senator Lugar himself. He seems not to understand that replacement for the expired START agreement, which Obama has been having trouble reaching with the Kremlin, is half-witted. Even if the two sides agree, and even if the Senate and Russian Duma ratify a new treaty,

the agreement will be unstable because the political relationship is bad and growing

worse. Evidently, no one in the Administration, Congress, or the mainstream media, or, I should add in the think tanks, can connect these dots.

Their representation of conflict enable securitizing moves like containment Whitcomb 1Roger Whitcomb, Prof Political Science at Kutztown University, author of two books about
Russia, "Containment: Misreading Soviet Russia," Global Dialogue, Vol. 3(4), Autumn 2001

The conspiracy theory also gave US decision makers the necessary arguments to cultivate domestic support for the resources needed to operate a global containment policy. It was difficult to explain, let alone justify, the demand for ever-growing resources to expend in areas that seemingly had little or no direct connection to US security. But the allegation of a worldwide communist conspiracy made precisely that connection and thus served to prevent the public, and Congress, from ignoring potential trouble spots that might later lead to dangerous security challenges. Ultimately, the conspiracy notion reflected only too well the United States dominant Puritan ethic, pandering on the one hand to the publics fundamentalist tendencies, while on the other serving to socialise those attentive citizens (and their representatives in Congress) who remained sceptical. By Eisenhowers first term, the conspiracy idea had gained an incredible momentum of its own because of its usefulness in generating public support for the application of containment worldwide. It came to form the basis of the national consensus in waging the Cold War. A virtually complete consensus on this point, strengthened by the hysteria of the McCarthy period, held for at least a decade, and weakened only slowly thereafter. Unfortunately, it locked the country into a highly inflexible containment strategy. Containment NSC-68 was at the centre of this development, epitomising much of what was injurious and destructive in the US tradition of foreign
affairs. The goal of NSC-68 was to light the path to peace and order. Americans had to bear witness to their values. NSC -68 reflected the moralistic appeal to righteousness, the selfimage of uniqueness and the fundamentalist conception of a central evil with which Americans had to do battle that feature in several of the key documents and pronouncements of US history: for example, Lincolns second inaugural address, Woodrow Wilsons declaration of war against Germany, Kennans X article, John F. Kennedys inaugural address and George Bushs justification for war against Iraq. Its primary author, Paul Nitze, argued in NSC -68 that the United States had to take the lead in trying to bring about or der and justice by means

The concept of the evil other so assiduously cultivated in that document is central to the vision of US foreign policya symbolism one first detects in the Truman Doctrine. NSC-68s power derived not from any original formulations but from its clever reworking of the powerful tradition of
consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. There is also in NSC-68 a strident statement of militant nationalism.

The fundamentalist urge to reduce complex reality to black-and-white simplicity became a dominant feature of the Cold War under Truman and Eisenhower. Over time, the idea of a Kremlin design was more frequently employed b y US leaders. For Forrestal, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Nitze and Dulles, for example, no debate over Russian intentions was necessary. And because human beings tend to attribute greater logic and coherence to others behaviour than actually exists, it was not difficult to take the next step and conclude that Moscow had a clear strategy to conquer the world, and was now beginning to develop the capacity to bring it off. It was necessary, therefore, to move to counteract what the Russians might be capable of doing. A single-minded, persistent emphasis on such an approach would surely bring dividends. Beginning in 1947, the Rio de Janeiro Pact,
American nationalism. Truman Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty, South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, Caracas Declaration, Taiwan Resolution, Baghdad Pact and Eisenhower Doctrine all marked distinct but related steps in a policy which appeared unable to articulate any purpose other than preventing a military expansion of the Russian sphere of influence.

Numerous

palpable opportunities to manage the conflict successfully at lower levels of intensity, if not settle it altogether, were ignored. One can only conclude that the rhetoric of response, that is to say the quantification of means over ends, was allowed in the end to dictate US policy towards Soviet Russia. The spectre of Soviet Russia after 1945 may well have been the most stressful intrusion upon the United States political consciousness since the Civil War. The disappearance of the Soviet Union in 1991, and with it the Cold War, seemed to vindicate the US approach. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, numerous US political leaders spoke confidently of the next American century in which the rule of
law would prevail as part of a new world order. Like Henry Luce fifty years earlier, George Bush led the way in the early 1990s by predicting that the United States pre-eminent world role would continue. Only the United States, he said, has the moral leadership to preside over the worlds affairs.

Utilitarianism conceptualizes life in terms of geopolitical strategythis reductionist approach crowds out alternative approaches and primes us for conflict Burke 7Lecturer Politics and Prof IR @ Univ of New South Wales (Anthony, Beyond Security: Ethics, and
Violence, pg 52-53) the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics
This essay develops a theory about

or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent , that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are

witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration , or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a

norm of war

-- and because

they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in

which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction , and force -- in the words of one
famous Cold War strategist --

can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.

Security discourse leads to biopolitical control over the masses, leading to inevitable extinction. Coviello 2000
(Peter, Professor of English at Bowdoin College, Apocalypse from Now On) Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) "remainderless and a-symbolic destruction," then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of

." This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not 'Apocalypse Now' but
a cherished "general population

'Apocalypse from Now On.'" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of
Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering." Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life *and+ endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to p recise controls and comprehensive regulations." In his brief comments on what20he calls "the atomic situation," however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not

. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone." Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating.
be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means

"If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill' it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." For a state
that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

Alternative Reject the affirmatives security logic only resistance to the discourse of security can generate genuine political thought Vote negative to reject the 1AC's security discourseaccepting insecurity is key to more genuine political thoughtthat's a prior question

Bruce 96Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman,
Senior Lecturer University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9
This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its knowledge form as reality in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue

defence and security is to be invigorated. This counterparts sets of

critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australias identity are both required and essential if Australias thinking on is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of

the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their context
in the world, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the rightness of the official line. But it is precisely t he official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it.

Before engaging in

the

policy debate

the

critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and

underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Saids critical intellectuals.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, th at the policy-makers frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major d ifferences between open societies and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australias security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how

theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book

also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation

becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical

that terms and concepts state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of

political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of
steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the worlds ills in general, or Australias security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which

attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to
often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier,

be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies

may follow . As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of reality] their meaning and which direct
[Australias] policy/analytical/military responses. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australias academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclus ively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australias security community. They also question the discourse of regional security, security cooperation, peacekeeping and alliance politics that are central to Australias official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important ta sk especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and securit y studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australias public policies on defence and security are informed, underpin ned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australias policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

1NCSecurity K (China Link)


Chinese threat construction essentializes a violent Chinese "other" - causes war and kills value to life Pan 4Chengxin Pan, International Relations at Australian National University, "The 'China Threat' in
American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29(3) Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an

externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international


interactions.
In this sense,

the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from

(neo)realism, a positivist, ahistorical framework of analysis within which global

life is reduced to endless interstate

rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo)realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo)realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other ," (45) and "All other states are potential threats." (46) In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other." (47) The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power , with a particular emphasis on China's
military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is

China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo)realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to
the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost by default, demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective

of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For
American foreign policy." (50) And this self-identification in turn leads to the definitio n example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53) In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not

Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences.... U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"
entirely....

Framework

ATFramework
The role of the ballot is to render a judgment on the 1ACs representation of the world that's a prior question before they win any offense on why plan implementation is good
1. This is key to advocacy skillsdefending the assumptions of the 1AC teaches effective and responsible argumentation for change 2. Their framework is anti-educationyou wouldn't see a "heg good" or "no politics" framework excluding the kritik guts effective policy analysis because assumptions are a critical part of government decisionmaking 3. It's predictablethey chose how to write the 1ACour kritik is just an indict of their authors assumptions and methodology

You are a policymaker, not a policymakerpolicy relevance kills effective reformreject them to flunk their research paperit's not necessary to write them a whole new one Biswas 7Shampa, Professor of Politics Whitman College, Empire and Global Public Intellectuals:
Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125) Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Saids critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an in tellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I
believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Saids thematic foci in his

IR scholars need to develop what I call a global intellectual posture. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an amateur, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking truth to power and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Saids critique of professionalism and the cult of expertise as it applies to
enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Saids reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Saids comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Saids comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From International

a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of liberal bias and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught
Experts to Global Public Intellectuals One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administrati on has been supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and concerned citizen groups within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with

what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying professionalisation that goes with it. Expressing concern with academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States, H erbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a culture of professionalism where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing , minor academic
considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But

turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular expert cultures have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public
space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that the American Univers ity, with its

The most serious threat to the intellectual vocation, he , is professionalism and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of specializations and the cult of expertise with their focus on relatively narrow areas of knowledge, technical formalism, impersonal theories and methodologies, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and
munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)16. argues research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as organic intellectuals involved in a dialectical relationship with fo reign policy-makers and examining the

institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third

This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation . It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where relevance is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Saids searing indictment of US intellectuals policyexperts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic for or against and
World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of intellectual articulation.19

costs and benefits analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of intellectual relevance that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the
vocation.21

Their commitment to policymaking ensures serial policy failure - the problems and solutions they identify are prefigured by their approach of threat construction - guaranteeing error replication - that's Burke Even if policymaking is good, our K proves their policy is bad. The alternative can justify policy action, but interrogating their reps is keythe ballot is a referendum on the justifications for the 1AC which means it's not plan vs. status quoit's our scholarship versus their scholarship. We dont need an alternative besides our framework of analysisthat's Bruce

Reps
Representations must be considered before policy action can occur Doty 96
(Roxanne, Assistant professor of political science at arizona state university, imperial encounters) This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of

The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and, identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real," though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomiesthought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objectivethat a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms
inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." the material and'performative character of discourse.'In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North

issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the first world. Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.
and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the

Our Violent representations matter, and are the root cause of war and violence. Kappeler 95
(Susanne, lecturer in English at the University of East Anglia and an Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Al Akhawayn University,[2] and now works as a freelance writer and teacher in England and Germany. Kappeler also taught 'The literary representation of women' in the Faculty of English at Cambridge while a research fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge[3] and was a part-time tutor for the Open University Course A History of Violence, 1995, pg 8-9)

Violence what we usually recognize as such It is no misbehaviour of a minority amid good behaviour by the majority, nor the deeds of inhuman monsters amid humane humans , in a society in which there is no equality, in which people divide others according to race,

class, sex and many other factors in order to rule, exploit, use, objectify, enslave, sell, torture and kill them, in which millions of animals are tortured, genetically manipulated, enslaved and slaughtered daily for 'harmless' consumption by humans. It is no error of judgement, no moral lapse and no
transgression against the customs of a culture which is thoroughly steeped in the values of profit and desire, of self-realization, expansion and progress. Violence as we usually perceive it is 'simply' a specific and to us still visible form of violence, the consistent and logical application of the principles of our

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.`We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell
culture and everyday life. [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values in short: us. We are the war ... And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else

'We are the war' and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen.
responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happens

The act of threat construction allows us to turn our simulations into a reality. Cavelty and Kristensen 8
(Myriam Cavelty, lecturer and head of the new risks research unit at the Center for Security studies. Kristian Kristensen, PhD candidate working with the Research Unit on Defense and Security at the Danish Institute for International Studies,Securing the Homeland Critical infrastructur e, risk and (in)security pg 96-98) Before pushing these technological trends further and trying to realize the true potential of CIP technologies in the conflation of public a nd private sectors efforts

attention back to the question of vulnerability and agency in networks. An early foray into this critical aspect of networks was made by sociologist Charles Perrow. In his now classic book, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies, he deploys the seemingly oxymoronic concept of the normal accident to make sense of f how catastrophes are inherent features of complex technologies , like nuclear power, petrochemical plants, the Space Shuttle, and advanced weapon systems(Perrow 1984). He is particularly interesting in how non-linear, tightlycoupled systems can produce a negative strategy built upon a false mimicry of human decision-making. Perrow presents in detail how particular incidents escalate into system disasters when contrived solutions interact to produce a negative synergy of incr easingly complex problems. Might a similar effect be in operation when multiple networks media, military, and terrorist become densely interconnected under the imperative of national security? In other words, is the national security state, in its very effort to prepare against catastrophic risks, actually increasing the probability of what could be called planned disasters . Scenario-making, modeling and gaming might
to monitor and routinize behaviour, we want to turn our differ in terms of the degree of abstraction and qualification involved, but what they have in common is a belief in the power of simulation to reduce the

This faith might just be more dangerous than the dangers that simulations seek to anticipate and pre-empt. Do these technologies of representation actually contribute to outcomes that they are supposedly only attempting to predict? Are present dangers being constructed through the modelling of future threats ? Chanelling Jean Louis Borges(and in turn inspiring Morpheus soliloquy in the movie The Matrix), Jean Baud rillard suggests that the simulation precedes and engenders the reality it purports only to model: Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the
contingencies of reality. concept. Simulation is no longer that of territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory- precession of simulacra- that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose

This is not to deny that there are real threats out there, including hostile actors and dangerous
vestiges persist here and there in the deserts and that are not longer those of the Empire, but ours. The desert of the real itself. (Baudrillard 1994:1)

weather patterns. Rather, we aim to expose the extent to which present dangers are constructed through the simulation of future fears. This fear-induced syncretism of simulation and reality bubbles to the surface with every ultra-catastrophe, from 9/11 to Katrina to most recently the California wildfires- to which FEMA notoriously responded with a simulated press conference presented as the real thing (Lipton 2007). At the cusp of the twenty-first century, in the year 2000, the CIAs National Intelligence Council organized a crystal-ball exercise called Global Trends 2015, which can serve as an example of threatconstructing simulations. Organized around a year-long series of workshops at think-tanks, war colleges and universities, GT-2015 was designed to
be a dialogue about the future among non -governmental experts. The last event, Alternative Global Futures: 2000-2015, was co-sponsored by the Department of States Bureau of Intelligence, and although it took place inside the Washington beltway, it was very much out of the box b ased on the character of the participants. After a series of pedagogical warm-up exercises, the participants were I divided into break-out groups and asked to develop their own alternative future scenarios. As one might suspect, no one came back with simultaneous aerial terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. However,

present the resulting scenario to the re-convened group. Here is what JDD presented to the assembled group: An electrical power grid goes down, and a black-out quickly spreads throughout the East Coast. President Warren Beatty publicly responds as if it is a catastrophic accident; but he is convinced by his National Security Council that a terrorist cyber-attack is actually to blame. Retaliatory strikes are ordered against suspected training camps in the Middle East; however, a plane is shot down by Stinger missiles (accidental blowback from an earlier today abstraction is no longer that of the map, double, mirror, Or the struggle against the Soviet Union), a rescue mission is botched, and the situation quickly escalates into a shooting war.The kicker? It turns out after the fact that the originating cause of the electrical failure was neither intentional or accidental, but the result of a local electrical company mistaking a simulation training exercise of a terrorist attack as the real thing, leading to a series of cascading network effects that quickly run out of human control, transforming a local accident into a global event. If Arnold Schwarzenegger rather than Warren
displaying less reluctance than others to mix fiction and fact, one of the authors of this chapter, James Der Derian (JDD) was selected to Beatty had been cast as the acting president, perhaps the scenario would have made it into the final report. However, a few y ears later JDD was spooked in both senses of the word after the November 2003 massive electrical power failure in the Northeast (set Off by a falling branch in Ohio and spread through a series of cascading power Surges), and which was bracketed though this was not reported widely in the US media by significant electrical grid failures in Spain and Italy (two of the most prominent coalition partners of the US in Iraq). Apart from making us wonder once again about technologies of representation and how they might actually contribute to outcomes that they are only predicting, there are four lessons that might actually contribute to outcomes that they are only predicting, there

networked nature of critical infrastructures from the Internet to the electrical grid to the jihadist cell- will make it increasingly difficult to determine whether effects are the result of attack, accident- or some quantum blurring of the two. This not only makes it more difficult to map, game, or simulate, but also to prevent, pre-empt and effectively manage future critical infrastructure events. Second, every new critical infrastructure has hard-wired into it the potential for an accident as well as a vulnerability to attack. Like the Titanic, Chernobyl, the Challenger shuttle and Wall Street, all new technologies produce disasters that can act as diagnoses for improvement or grounds for termination. Third, the densely networked nature of critical infrastructures, even when taking into account redundancy and resilience, makes it increasingly difficult to isolate or contain a future failure or attack. Fourth, facing critical infrastructure failure and being unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security and well-being, the sovereign state, even the US exercising state-of-emergency exceptions to reaffirm its hegemonic status, must increasingly turn to regional, international or private institutions to protect itself against and manage eventual attacks and failures. This takes us into the apocalyptic but suddenly more realistic realm that Paul Virilio refers to as the integral accident (Virilio 2007). Traversing and transgressing multiple boundaries (territorial, demographic, ideological and, most fundamentally, epistemological), triggering even more disastrous auto: immune reactions through preventive measures and punitive attacks, offering states the means to deny their diminished significance as well as to evade their public responsibility, the networked
are four lessons that might be learned from the GT-2015 scenario and JDDs foray into world of scenarios: first, the

integral accident elevates the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington and the 7 July 2005 attack in London, as well as the US military debacle in Iraq and the mishandling of the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe, from singular episodes to an escalating continuum of disasters. Or, as Virilio once put it: The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means.

2NCBureaucracy DA
Your framework causes extinction Hedges 12Christopher Lynn Hedges, spent two decades as a foreign correspondent, writer for CSM,
NPR, and NYT, Pulitzer Prize winning group, Amnesty International Global Award for Human Rights Journalism, senior fellow @ The Nation Institute, Lecturer @ Columbia, NYU, and Princeton, writer, columnist for Truthdig, Harper's Magazine, the New Statesman, The New York Review of Books, and Foreign Affairs, "The Careerists," Truthdig, http://www.truthdig.com/report/print/the_careerists_20120723/) The greatest crimes of human history are made possible by the most colorless human beings. They are the careerists. The bureaucrats. The cynics. They do the little chores that make vast, complicated systems of exploitation and death a reality. They collect and read the personal data gathered on tens of millions of us by the security and surveillance state. They keep the accounts of ExxonMobil, BP and Goldman Sachs. They build or pilot aerial drones. They work in corporate advertising and public relations. They issue the forms. They process the papers. They deny food stamps to some and unemployment benefits or medical coverage to others. They enforce the laws and the regulations. And they do not ask questions . Good. Evil. These words
do not mean anything to them.

They are beyond morality . They are there to make corporate systems function. If

insurance companies abandon tens of millions of sick to suffer and die , so be it. If banks and sheriff departments toss families out of their homes, so be it. If financial firms rob citizens of their savings, so be it. If the government shuts down schools and libraries, so be it. If the military murders children in Pakistan or Afghanistan, so be it. If commodity speculators drive up the cost of rice and corn and wheat so that they are unaffordable for hundreds of millions of poor across the planet, so be it. If Congress and the courts strip citizens of basic civil liberties, so be it. If the fossil fuel industry turns the earth into a broiler of greenhouse gases that doom us, so be it . They serve the system. The god of profit and exploitation. The most dangerous force in the industrialized world does not come from those who wield radical creeds, whether Islamic radicalism or Christian fundamentalism, but from legions of faceless bureaucrats who claw their way up layered corporate and governmental machines. They serve any system that meets their pathetic quota of needs. These systems managers believe nothing. They have no loyalty. They are rootless. They do not think beyond their tiny, insignificant roles . They are blind and deaf. They are, at least regarding the great ideas and patterns of human civilization and history, utterly illiterate. And we churn them out of universities. Lawyers. Technocrats. Business majors. Financial managers. IT specialists. Consultants. Petroleum engineers. Positive psychologists. Communications majors. Cadets. Sales representatives. Computer programmers. Men and women who know no history, know no ideas. They live and think in an intellectual vacuum , a world of stultifying minutia . They are T.S. Eliots the hollow men, the stuffed men. Shape without form, shade without colour, the poet wrote. Paralysed force, gesture without motion. It was the careerists who made possible the genocides, from the extermination of Native Americans to the Turkish slaughter of the Armenians to the Nazi Holocaust to Stalins liquidations. They were the ones who kept the trains running. They filled out the forms and presided over the property confiscations. They rationed the food while children starved. They manufactured the guns. They ran the prisons. They enforced travel bans, confiscated passports, seized bank accounts and carried out segregation. They enforced the law. They did their jobs. Political and military careerists, backed by war profiteers, have led us into useless wars, including

World War I, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. And millions followed them. Duty. Honor. Country. Carnivals of death. They sacrifice us all. In the futile battles of Verdun and the Somme in World War I, 1.8 million on both sides were killed, wounded or never
found. In July of 1917 British Field Marshal Douglas Haig, despite the seas of dead, doomed even more in the mud of Passchendaele. By November, when it was clear his promised breakthrough at Passchendaele had failed, he jettisoned the initial goalas we did in Iraq when it turned out there were no weapons of mass destruction and in Afghanistan when al-Qaida left the countryand opted for a simple war of attrition. Haig won if more Germans than allied troops died. Death as sc ore card. Passchendaele took 600,000 more lives on both sides of the line before it ended. It is not a new story. Generals are almost always buffoons. Soldiers followed John the Blind, who had lost his eyesight a decade earlier, to resounding defeat at the Battle of Crcy in 1337 during the Hundred Years War. David Lloyd George, who was the British prime minister during the Passchendaele campaign, wrote in his memoirs: *Before the battle o f Passchendaele] the Tanks Corps Staff prepared maps to show how a bombardment which obliterated the drainage would inevitably lead to a series of pools, and they located the exact spots where the waters would gather. The only reply was a peremptory order that they were to Send no more of these ridiculous maps. Maps must conform to plans and not plans to maps. Facts that interfered with plans were impertinencies. Here you have the

We discover that leaders are mediocrities only when it is too late.

our ruling elites do nothing about climate change, refuse to respond rationally to economic meltdown and are incapable of coping with the collapse of globalization and empire. These are circumstances that interfere with the very viability and sustainability of the system. And bureaucrats know only how to serve the system. They know only the managerial skills they ingested at West Point or Harvard Business School. They cannot think on their own. They cannot challenge assumptions or structures. They cannot intellectually or emotionally recognize that the system might implode. And so they do what Napoleon warned was the worst mistake a general could makepaint an imaginary picture of a situation and accept it as real. But we blithely ignore reality along with them. The mania for a happy ending blinds us. We do not want to believe what we see. It is too depressing. So we all retreat into collective self-delusion . In Claude Lanzmanns monumental documentary film Shoah, on the Holocaust, he interviews Filip Mller, a Czech
explanation of why Jew who survived the liquidations in Auschwitz as a member of the special detail. Mller relates this story: One day in 1943 when I was already in Crematorium 5, a tr ain from Bialystok arrived. A prisoner on the special detail saw a woman in the undressing room who was the wife of a friend of his. He came right out and told her: You are going to be exterminated. In three hours youll be ashes. The woman believed him because she knew him. She ran all over and warned to the other women. Were going to be killed. Were going to be gassed. Mothers carrying their children on their shoulders didnt want to hear that. They decided the woman was crazy. They chased her away. So she went to the men. To no avail. Not that they didnt believe her. Theyd heard rumors in the Bialystok ghetto, or in Grodno, and elsewhere. But who wanted to hear that? When she saw that no one would listen, she scratched her whole face. Out of despair.

Blaise Pascal wrote in Penses, We run heedlessly into the abyss after putting something in front of us to stop us from seeing it. Hannah Arendt, in writing Eichmann in Jerusalem, noted that Adolf Eichmann was primarily motivated by an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement. He joined the Nazi Party because it was a good career move. The trouble with Eichmann, she wrote, was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else, Arendt wrote. No communication was possible with him, not because he lied but because he was surrounded by the most reliable of all safeguards against words and the presence of others, and hence against reality as such. Gitta Sereny makes the same point in her book Into That Darkness, about Franz Stangl,
In shock. And she started to scream. the commandant of Treblinka. The assignment to the SS was a promotion for the Austrian policeman. Stangl was not a sadist. He was soft-spoken and polite. He loved his wife and children very much. Unlike most Nazi camp officers, he did not take Jewish women as concubines. He was efficient and highly organized. He took pride in having received an official commendation as the best camp commander in Poland. Prisoners were simply objects. Goods. That was my profession, he said. I enjoyed it. It fulfilled me. And yes, I was ambitious about that, I wont deny it. When Sereny asked Stangl how as a father he could kill children, he answered that he rarely saw them as individuals. It was always a huge mass. *T+hey were naked, packed together, running, being driven with whips. He later told Sereny that when he read about lemmings it reminded him of Treblinka. Christopher Brownings collection of essays, The Path to Genocide, notes that . Germaine Tillion pointed out the tragic easiness *during the Holocaust+ with which decent people could become the most callous executioners without seeming to notice what was happening to them. The Russian novelist Vasily Grossman in his book Forever Flowing observed that the new state did not require holy apostles, fanatic, inspired builders, faithful, devout

it was the moderate, normal bureaucrats, not the zealots, who made the Holocaust possible

The most nauseating type of S.S. were to me personally the cynics who no longer genuinely believed in their cause, but went on collecting blood guilt for its own sake, wrote
disciples. The new state did not even require servantsjust clerks. Dr. Ella Lingens-Reiner in Prisoners of Fear, her searing memoir of Auschwitz. Those cynics were not always brutal to the prisoners, their behavior changed with their mood. They took nothing seriouslyneither themselves nor their cause, neither us nor our situation. One of the worst among them was Dr. Mengele, the Camp Doctor I have mentioned before. When a batch of newly arrived Jews was being classified into those fit for work and those fit for death, he would whistle a melody and rhythmically jerk his thumb over his right or his left shoulderwhich meant gas or work. He thought conditions in the camp rotten, and even did a few things to improve them, but at the same time he committed murder callously, without any qualms.

These armies of bureaucrats serve a corporate system that will quite literally kill us. They are as cold and disconnected as Mengele. They carry out minute tasks. They are docile. Compliant. They obey. They find their self-worth in the prestige and power of the corporation, in the status of their positions and in their career promotions. They assure themselves of their own goodness through their private acts as husbands, wives, mothers and fathers. They sit on school boards. They go to Rotary. They attend church. It is moral schizophrenia . They erect walls to create an isolated consciousness. They make the lethal goals of ExxonMobil or Goldman Sachs or Raytheon or insurance companies possible. They destroy the ecosystem, the economy and the body politic and turn workingmen and -women into impoverished serfs. They feel nothing. Metaphysical naivet always ends in murder. It fragments the world . Little acts of kindness

and charity mask the monstrous evil they abet. And the system rolls forward. The polar ice caps melt. The droughts rage over cropland. The drones deliver death from the sky. The state moves inexorably forward to place us in chains. The sick die. The poor starve. The prisons fill. And the careerist, plodding forward, does his or her job.

ATCede the Political


They cede the politicaltheir normative demands create zero social change Pierre Schlag, Law at Univ. of Colorado, April 1991, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. (801)
it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: What should be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These are the momentous questions. And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implication. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to
For these legal thinkers, assume blithely that -- in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitoring -- they

these normative questions that enable them to represent themselves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts. It isn't so.
somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is

Accepting insecurity is key to more genuine political engagement Neocleous 8Mark Neocleous, Government @ Brunel Univ., Critique of Security, p. 185-186
The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the
political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be

it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are
transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby

if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or
reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the

The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state.
grounds of security.

Turn our poststructuralist stance is the only effective political strategy the political has already been ceded to the right broadening the scope of politics is key to effective engagement.

Grondin 4 *David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa (Re)Writing the
National Security State: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War, http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf]
A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the repoliticization of practices of world politics that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in ones inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to bring the political back in (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the political is narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the political acquires a broader meaning, especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). Poststructuralism thus gives primacy to the political, since it acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and differentiate ourselves from others. This political act is never complete and celebrates undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition, difference thereby the discourse of otherness is highlighted, since one always defines an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from our person, group, etc. Specif ying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indee d, poststructuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes, It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, community, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts those processes that systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original). In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a myth that theory can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs to be contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood with respect to its role in preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations present in all language forms. Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses that shape our view of the world (the subject) and our ways of understanding it.

The political has already been ceded try or die for the alternative.
Grondin 4 *David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa (Re)Writing the National Security State: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War, http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf]
As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, the national security ideology framed the Cold

War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined Americas national identity by reference to the un-American other, usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge it would have amounted to an act of disloyalty (Hogan, 1998: 18).15While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the new national security ideology. It posits an American way, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the countrys democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which to say is to do, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, [] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and margina-lization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious national unity on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence a power socially constructed, following Max Webers work on the ethic of responsibility to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the unified Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the states very conditions of existence are generated18.

ATShort-Term Threats
If their 1AC is true and extinction is coming nowwhy are you at a debate tournament? We have time to think about itit's your role to expose the fantasy of short-termism Bilgin 4Pinar Bilgin, IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre
for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ NottinghamFrom Rogue to Failed States? The Fallacy of Short-termism Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience
Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas 'something' needs to be done here and now . Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of 'short-termism' in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as 'approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation'. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking . The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating . The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused . Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention . Although some commentators may judge that the road to the
existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state 'failure'. Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of 'state failure' in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167 170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed

through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are
readily identified (al-Qa'eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, 'strong'/'weak' states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The

key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to distorts information . Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns . Factors
assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the 'war on terror' be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories. Shifting

bring conceptual baggage to bear

on an issue that simplifies but also

attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a
conventional problem-solving mode 'wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds', towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to 'failed states', the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of 'failure' raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention frompractitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.

ATOwen
1. Owen is circular---their evidence says pragmatism is necessary to solve problems---our K calls into question the very existence of those problems 2. Epistemological questions are important to international relationsit doesn't lead to infinite regressOwen says that's inevitable and the alternative solvescross-x proves Owen 2David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No
3, Sage
Commenting on the philosophical turn in IR, Wver remarks that *a+ frenzy for words like epistemology and ontology often signals this philosophical turn, although he goes on to

debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly
comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn.

3. Vote negrejecting the aff now makes for better policy later Miller 12Aaron David Miller, distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, US Advisory Council of Israel Policy, "The Dumb Idea Hall of Fame," Foreign Policy, May 2nd Dumb Idea No. 5: A bad idea is better than no idea Dumb ideas come along for many reasons. Sometimes they result from bad analysis , imperfect policy options, or desperation . They can also arise from wishful thinking or from an obsession with fixing things. It's a variation of that last notion that represents the dumbest idea of all: that action -- any action, no matter how harebrained and ill-advised -- is better than no action. This idea is quintessentially American and results from the unique blend of idealism and pragmatism that cuts to the core of who Americans are as a people and how they see the world. The fact is, Americans can't help themselves. America isn't a potted plant. Americans believe they can always make a bad situation better. This fix-it mentality is in our DNA. If it's harnessed and rigorously controlled, the United States can actually accomplish some things, particularly if it actually thinks through a strategy. But if not, it leads to what my friend Gamal Helal, an Arabic-language interpreter and confidant of presidents and secretaries of state, calls the United States' rush toward disaster. America is headed that way on Syria, I'm afraid

ATNye
Policy relevance bad - unable to create transformative change Jones 9Lee Jones, Lecturer in IR at Queen Mary, University of London, PhD in IR at Nuffield , Journal
of Critical Globalization Studies, Issue 1 Having conceded where Nye has a point, lets now consider the ways in which he may simply be wrong. His assumption is that the academic should be, needs to be, policy-relevant. As indicated above, this can be a very pernicious assumption. As an invitation to academics to contribute to discussions about the direction of society and policy, no one could reasonably object: those who wished to contribute could do so, while others could be left to
investigate topics of perhaps dubious immediate relevance that nonetheless enrich human understanding and thus contribute to the accumul ation of knowledge and general social progress

As an imperative, however, it creates all sorts of distortions that are injurious to academic freedom. It encourages academics to study certain things, in certain ways, with certain outcomes and certain ways of disseminating ones findings. This encouragement is more or less coercive, backed as it is by the allure of large
(and, quite probably, to those scholars research communities and their students). research grants which advance ones institution and personal career, versus the threat of a fate as an entirely marginal scho lar incapable of attracting research funding a nowadays a

policy-relevant research already have predefined notions of what is relevant. This means both that academics risk being drawn into policy-based evidence-making, rather than its much-vaunted opposite, and that academics will tend to be selected by the policy world based on whether they will reflect, endorse and legitimise the overall interests and ideologies that underpin the prevailing order. Consider the examples Nye gives as leading examples of policy-relevant scholars: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of whom served as National Security Advisers (under Nixon and Carter respectively), while Kissinger also went on to become Secretary of State (under Nixon and Ford). Kissinger, as is now widely known, is a war criminal who does not travel very much outside the USA for fear of being arrested la General Pinochet (Hitchens, 2001). Brzezinski has not yet been subject to the same scrutiny and even popped up to advise Obama recently, but can hardly be regarded as a particularly progressive individual. Under his watch, after Vietnam overthrew the genocidal Khmer Rouge in 1978, Washington sent tens of millions of dollars to help them regroup and rearm on Thai soil as a proxy force against Hanoi (Peou, 2000, p. 143). Clearly, a rejection of US imperialism was not part of whatever Kissinger and Brzezinski added to the policy mix. In addition to them, Nye says that of the top twenty-five most influential scholars as identified by a recent survey, only three have served in policy circles (Jordan et al, 2009). This
standard criteria for academic employment and promotion. Furthermore, those funding apparently referred to himself (ranked sixth), Samuel Huntington (eighth), and John Ikenberry (twenty-fourth).2 Huntington, despite his reputation for iconoclasm, never strayed far from

Nye and Ikenberry, despite their more liberal credentials, have built their careers around the project of institutionalising, preserving and extending American hegemony. This concern in Nyes work spans from
reflecting elite concerns and prejudices (Jones, 2009). After Hegemony (1984), his book co-authored with Robert Keohane (rated first most influential), which explicitly sought to maintain US power through institutional means, through cheerleading post-Cold War US hegemony in Bound to Lead (1990), to his exhortations for Washington to regain its battered post-Iraq standing in Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in International Politics (2004). Ikenberry, who was a State Department advisor in 2003-04, has a very similar trajectory. He only criticised the Bush administrations imperial ambition on the pragmatic

These scholars commitment to the continued benign dominance of US values, capital and power overrides any superficial dissimilarities occasioned by their personal conservative or liberal predilections. It is this that qualifies them to act as advisers to the modern-day prince; genuinely critical voices are unlikely to ever hear the call to serve. The idea of, say, Noam Chomsky as Assistant Secretary of State is simply absurd. At stake here is the fundamental distinction between problem-solving and critical theory, which Robert Cox introduced in a famous article in 1981. Cox argued that theory, despite being presented as a neutral analytical tool, was always for someone and for some purpose. Problem-solving theories ultimately endorsed the prevailing system by generating suggestions as to how the system could be run more smoothly. Critical theories, by contrast, seek to explain why the system exists in the first place and what could be done to transform it. What unifies Nye, Ikenberry Huntington, Brzezinski and Kissinger (along with the majority of IR scholars) is their problem-solving approach. Naturally, policy-makers want academics to be problemsolvers, since policies seek precisely to well, solve problems. But this does not necessarily mean that this should be the function of the academy. Indeed, the tyranny of policy relevance achieves its most destructive form when it becomes so dominant that it imperils the space the academy is supposed to provide to allow scholars to think about the foundations of prevailing orders in a critical, even hostile, fashion. Taking clear inspiration from Marx, Cox produced pathbreaking work showing how different social orders,
grounds that empire was not attainable, not that it was undesirable, and he is currently engaged in a Nye-esque project proposing ways to bolster the US-led liberal order. corresponding to different modes of production, generated different world orders, and looked for contradictions within the existing orders to see how the world might be changing.1

Marxist theories of world order are unlikely to be seen as very policy relevant by capitalist elites (despite the fact that, where Marxist theory is good, it is not only critical but also potentially problem -solving, a possibility that Cox overlooked). Does this mean that such inquiry should be replaced by government-funded policy wonkery? Absolutely not, especially when we

consider the horrors that entails. At one recent conference, for instance, a Kings College London team which had won a gargantuan sum of money from the
government to study civil contingency plans in the event of terrorist attacks presented their research outputs. They sugges ted a raft of measures to securitise everyday life, including

There are always plenty of academics who are willing to turn their hand to repressive, official agendas. There are some who produce fine problem-solving work who ought to disseminate their ideas much more widely, beyond the narrow confines of academia. There are far fewer who are genuinely critical. The political economy of research funding combines with the tyranny of policy relevance to entrench a hierarchy topped by tame academics. Policy relevance, then, is a double-edged sword. No one would wish to describe their work as irrelevant, so the key question, as always, is relevant to whom? Relevance to ones research community, students, and so on, ought to be more than enough justification for academic freedom, provided that scholars shoulder their responsibilities to teach and to communicate their subjects to society at large, and thus repay something to the society that supports them. But beyond that, we also need to fully respect work that will never be policy-relevant, because it refuses to swallow fashionable concerns or toe the line on government agendas. Truly critical voices are worth more to the progress of human civilisation than ten thousand Deputy Undersecretaries of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology. (p. 127-30)
developing clearly sign-posted escape routes from London to enable citizens to flee the capital.

ATInevitability (Wendt)
Our framework creates better educationjust because things 'are' a certain way doesn't mean that we should debate like they will inevitably be sothis approach fosters a "winners and losers" approach to politics which is overly simplistic and kills progressivism Zalewski 96Marysia, Prof Women's Studies @ Queens, "International Theory: Positivism and
Beyond," ed. Smith & Booth All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up5 The 'real worlders' use a variety of tactics to delegitimise those forms of theorising which they see as either useless or downright dangerous to international politics. These range from ridicule, attempts at incorporation, scare-mongering and claiming that such theories are the product of 'juvenile' whims, fads and fashions. The charitable interpretation of these manoeuvrings is that they are instigated by a sense of fear, with the 'real worlders' insisting that the 'theorists' and the plethora of theories do not relate to what is 'really' going on in the world and thus the 'bodies keep piling up' while the 'theorists' make nice points. Conversely, the 'theorists' accuse the 'real worlders' of being complicit in the construction of a
world in which the 'bodies keep piling up' and the resistance to criticism simply reflects their institutional and, sometimes, public power as well as their intellectual weaknesses. Perhaps it is not surprising that we are having these debates about theory as 'the practice of theory has been deeply affected by the debate about modernism versus postmodernism and the attendant questions of a social theory which can foster human autonomy and emancipation' (Marshall, 1994, p. 1). But what is the future for the discipline and practice of international politics if such a debate has the effect of bringing out the worst in people and which is often conducted within a spirit of 'jousting' verging on the hostile? Richard Ashley's contribution to this volume attests somewhat to the futility of and angst felt by many who are party to and witness to these debates with his comments that there is little point in offering arguments to a community 'who have repeatedly shown themselves so proficient at doing what it takes not to hear'. In a paradigmatically masculinist discipline such as international relations perhaps the sport of intellectual

concentration on wars, foreign policy, practices of diplomacy and the imageries of 'us' and 'them' that goes along with all of that fosters a 'winners' and 'losers' mentality. So the 'theorists' do battle with the 'real worlders' and the 'modernists' do battle with the 'post- modernists'. So who wins? Perhaps nobody wins with the
jousting and parodies of bar room brawling is functionally inevitable. Maybe the possible exception of the publishers, especially in the context of contemporary academic life, where an academic's value is measured by the quantity of publications. If research produced in International Relations departments is to be of use besides advancing careers and increasing departmental budgets then it surely has something to do with making sense of events in the world, at the very least. In that endeavour it will be of supreme importance what counts as an appropriate event to pay attention to and who counts as a 'relevant' theorist, which in turn

. International politics is what we make it to be, the contents of the 'what' and the group that is the 'we' are questions of vital theoretical and therefore political importance. We need to re-think the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both what we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world. The bodies do keep piling up but I would suggest that having a plethora of theories is not the problem. My fear is that statements such as 'all these theories yet the bodies keep piling up' might be used to foster a 'back to basics' mentality, which, in the context of international relations, implies a retreat to the comfort of theories and understanding of theory which offers relatively immediate gratification, simplistic solutions to complex problems and reifies and reflects the interests of the already powerful.
fundamentally depends on what we think theory is and how it relates to the so-called 'real world'

Policymakers don't live in a vacuumyour intellectual rejection impacts policies Booth 2Ken Booth, IR Theorist, Prof Intl. Politics @ Aberstwyth Univ., Researcher @ Naval War
College, Dalhousie Univ., and Cambridge, Editor of Review of International Studies, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, p 115-116 During the Cold War, Western security specialists were particularly deferential to the worldview and agendas of governments. Politicians, diplomats, and military establishments have their own identities and interests that are not always shared by those for whom they supposedly speak. This is particularly the case where state and society do not coincide. This is why the growth of civil society is so important for security, cooperation, and development, whether regionally or globally. Within civil society, academics in many countries have a special and privileged role: they have knowledge and they are removed from the daily pressures of political life. With this in mind the role of academics in the intellectual enterprise of security studies might be defined as follows: to provide new knowledge and more helpful accounts of world affairs and human lives; to look at old facts in new ways; to unsilence the silenced; to help give longerterm perspectives than decision makers concerned with the next election; to expose the hypocrisies, inconsistencies, and power plays in language, relationships, and policies; to provide a more sophisticated language with which to analyze events and problems; to engage in dialogues with policy makers in order to try to open the latters

imaginations and minds about the ways in which concepts might be translated into better (more friendly to people and nature) policies; to expose false ideas and reveal the unstated assumptions of policies; to open up space for thought and action; to help students think for themselves; to develop new and more rational theories about global security; to cast a critical eye on all theories and all exercises of power, including ones
own; and to speak for cosmopolitan values and to speak up for those who do not have a voice. To attempt to do less is to commit ourselves as university teachers and researchers to being clerks of the powerful, the priests of necessity (rather than architects of possibility), and fatalists about the geography of meaning.

Rejection contributes to the marketplace of ideas Krause 96Keith Krause, Grad Institute of IR, Geneva, Critical Theory and Security Studies Co-operation and
Conflict, vol 22, no. 3

Since one of the main accusations leveled against critical theory (at least in International Relations) is that it cannot get "beyond critique," I intend to demonstrate that one can find lurking in the interstices of the discipline a wide range of critical scholarship and research that is "about" security (and its core subject matter), but which its authors, or the discipline, refuses to label as such. Simply bringing together these perspectives makes the challenges to orthodoxy more clear, and signals that critical approaches to security studies are more than a passing fad or the idiosyncratic obsession of a few scholars. Ultimately, this is
healthy for security studies as a whole. Security studies continues to be treated by many scholars as a theoretically-impoverished cousin to the sturdy children of International Relations, which could include (depending on your preference) liberal and radical approaches to International Political Economy, neoliberal institutionalist analyses, regime theory, foreign policy analysis and so

Debate among competing approaches, and a greater conceptual clarity, can only strengthen the claims of security studies scholars for intellectual respect. What is more, it is possible to argue that far from falling into desuetude with the end of the Cold War, many of the most interesting theoretical issues in International Relations - concerning, for example, identity politics and communal conflict, multilateral security institutions, the development of norms and practices, and so-called new issues (such as the environment) - can be most usefully studied through a prism labelled "security studies."
forth.4

Impacts
\

FIRST:
The aff is illogical under THEIR OWN frameworkeverything could potentially be a threat Kristensen 8Kristian Soby Kristensen, PhD candidate with the Research Unit on Defense and Security
at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Political Science @ University of Copenhagen, "'The absolute protection of our citizens': critical infrastructure protection and the practice of security," Securing 'the Homeland:' Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (In)Security, ed. Cavelty and Kristensen, pg. 63-84 This view is diametrically opposed to the conception outlined earlier. If, as stated by President Bush, every terrorist attack has a national impact (Bush 2003a: ix), then every terrorist attack is important. This effectively annuls the discriminating function of risk. There are two simultaneous CIP rationalities at work in government strategies, with two opposing goals. On the one hand, the goal of absolute protection inevitably expands the meaning of critical infrastructure protection, and security concerns cover more and more parts of society and thus necessarily integrate an increasing number of private actors. On the other hand, the concept of risk makes anti-terror strategies relative, dependent on other goals besides absolute protection. There is a fundamental conceptual instability in the discourse on how to protect critical infrastructure and secure society. Risk introduces probability as the basis for action, which makes sense from the economic-risk perspective of business. Taking action based on calculated risk is a normal and legitimate business practice. However, that is not the way things usually work when national security is at stake. In the national security context, action is usually justified by the precautionary principle of 'better safe than sorry' (on the precautionary principle as security strategy, see Rasmussen 2006: 123-9; Aradau
and van Munster 2007). Risk analysis depends on how important the object of analysis is deemed to be, and on how the consequences of putting it at risk are assessed; ultimately, it depends

, when protection from terror has already been defined as the most important activity of the state, the costs of a terrorist attack are always already analyzed as being too high; the risk of incurring such an attack would always be catastrophic. Applying a risk perspective will not fundamentally change this, and thus the goal of securing the homeland is still conceived as consisting of 'absolute protection'. The two opposing conceptualizations, which are not easily made compatible, both live on in the discourse.
on a costbenefit analysis. Furthermore

Peace is psychologicalreframing your decision calculus solves. Byles 3Joanna, Prof English at Univ of Cyprus Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective
Identification, http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/articles/art_byles01.shtml It is here of course that language plays an important role in imagining the other, the other within the self, and the other as self, as well as the enormously influential visual images each group can have of the other. In the need to emphasize similarity in difference, both verbal and visual metaphor can play a meaningful role in creating a climate for peaceful understanding, and this is where literature, especially the social world of the drama and of film, but also the more private world of poetry, can be immensely significant. Of course not all literature is equally transparent. In conclusion, war, in all its manifestations, is a phenomenon put into action by individuals who have been politicized as a group to give and receive violent death, to appropriate the enemy's land, homes, women, children, and goods, and perhaps to lose their own. As we have seen, in wartime the splitting of the self and other into friend and enemy enormously relieves the normal psychic tension caused by human ambivalence when love and hate find two separate objects of attention. Hence the .soldier's and terrorist's willingness to sacrifice her/his life for "a just cause," which may be a Nation, a Group, or a Leader with whom he has close emotional ties and identity. I n this way s/he does not feel guilty: the destructive impulses, mobilised by her/his own superego, together with that of the social superego, have projected the guilt s/he might feel at killing strangers onto the enemy. In other words, the charging of the enemy with guilt by which the superego of the State mobilizes the individual's superego seems to be of fundamental importance in escaping the sense of guilt which war provokes in those engaged in the killing; yet the mobilization of superego activities can still involve the individual's self-punitive mechanisms, even though most of his/her guilt

has been projected onto the enemy in the name of his own civilization and culture. As we all know, this guilt can become a problem at the end of a war, leading to varying degrees of misery and mental illness. For some, the killing of an enemy and a stranger cannot be truly mourned, and there remains a blank space, an irretrievable act or event to be lived through over and over again. This dilemma is poignantly expressed in Wilfred Owen's World War One poem "Strange Meeting" the final lines of which read as follows: I am the enemy you killed, my friend. I knew you in this dark: for so you frowned Yesterday through me as you jabbed and killed. I parried; but my hands were loath and cold. Let us sleep now. ... (Owen 126) The problem for us today is how to create the psychological climate of opinion, amentality, that will reject war, genocide, and terrorism as viable solutions to internal and external situations of conflict; to recognize our projections for what they are: dangerously irresponsible psychic acts based on superego hatred and violence. We must challenge the way in which the State superego can manipulate our responses in its own interests, even take away our subjectivities. We should acknowledge and learn to displace the violence in ourselves in socially harmless ways, getting rid of our fears and anxieties of the other and of differenceby relating and identifying with the other and thus creating the serious desire to live together in a peaceful world. What seems to be needed is for the superego to regain its developmental role of mitigating omniscient protective identification by ensuring an intact, integrated object world, a world that will be able to contain unconscious fears, hatred, and anxieties without the need for splitting and projection. As Bion has pointed out, omnipotence replaces thinking and omniscience replaces learning. We must learn to link our internal and external worlds so as to act as a container of the other's fears and anxieties, and thus in turn to encourage the other to reciprocate as a container of our hatreds and fears. If war represents cultural formations that in turn represent objectifications of the psyche via the super-ego of the individual and of the State, then perhaps we can reformulate these psychic social mechanisms of projection and superego aggression. Here, that old peace-time ego and the reparative component of the individual and State superego will have to play a large part. The greater the clash of cultural formations for example, Western Modernism and Islamic Fundamentalism the more urgent the need. "The knowledge now most worth having" is an authentic way of internalizing what it is we understand about war and international terrorism that will liberate us from the history of our collective traumatic past and the imperatives it has imposed on us. The inner psychic world of the individual has an enormously important adaptive role to play here in developing mechanisms of protective identification not as a means of damaging and destroying the other, but as a means of empathy, of containing the other, and in turn being contained. These changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual ratherthan speedy. Peace and dare I say it contentment are not just an absence of war, but a state of mind. Furthermore, we should learn not to project too much into our group, and our nation, for this allows the group to tyrannize us, so that we follow like lost sheep. But speaking our minds takes courage because groups do not like open dissenters. These radical psychic changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual rather than speedy; however, my proposition that understanding the other so that we can reduce her/his motivation to kill requires urgent action. Peace is not just an absence of war, but a state of mind and, most importantly, a way of thinking.

Security
Security thinking creates pockets of violence Duffield 8 (Mark, Dept. of Politics, U. of Bristol, Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International
Containment and Post-Interventionary Society, Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 161-162) This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant. While the former was secure within the juridicopolitical framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself. Through their associated modalities of circulationand the need to police themglobal civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North. Since the end of the Cold War, the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the Wests ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainableif limited to basic needsmust give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. In one way or another, we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.

The looming threats of extinction are just means the State uses to manipulate the masses and results in genocide. Coviello 2000
(Peter Professor of English at Bowdoin College, Apocalypse From Now On)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derridas suitably menacing phrase) remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,6 then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local in shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an other people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and the prosperity of a cherished general population . This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontags incisive o bservation, from 1989, that, Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not Apocalypse Now but Apocalypse from Now On.7 The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful . That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History
of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, life-administering. Power, he contends, exerts a positive influence on life *and+ endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it t o precise controls and comprehensive regulations. In his brief comments on what he calls the atomic situation, however, Foucault insists as well that the produ ctiveness of modern power must not be

For as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, agencies of modern power presume to act on the behalf of the existence of everyone. Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power, Foucault writes, this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.8 For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.
mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means.

The creation of threats leads to inevitable war and extinction Frank and Melville 1
(Jerome and Andrei, professor Emeritus of Psychiatry, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Section Head, Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/frank.html)

The arms race is not driven by weapons alone. It is also driven by a very simple psychological phenomenon, the image of the enemy. Weapons of total destruction would be useless without such images. For such weapons to have any purpose, there must be people who may be totally destroyed. Adversaries must be transformed into demons. Once such images have been created, they, in turn, drive the arms race. People resist giving them up. There is a desire to see everything in a light which will reinforce the image. Images foster closed minds and reinforce resistance to change. But change is possible. It has happened many times in history. Whole

peoples have changed their views of one another. Even between the superpowers, areas of special accommodation have been achieved, agreements have

been followed. New technologies offer new potentials for communication. New

goals which transcend the narrow national interests of each will offer a framework for future common actions. In working out the way to achieve those goals the enemy images can be gradually lessened, perhaps even dissolved. If humankind is to survive in the nuclear age, there must be progress in this direction.

The search for security provokes endless conflict because no solution is ever sufficient. The aff cant solve the advantage it will merely pop back up in ever-more destructive forms turns the case Der Derian 98
(James Der Derian, The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, in the book On Security by Ronnie Lipschutz, 1998)
We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an apriori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledgehammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bombsite for a permanently electioneering elite.

Impact value to life


Securitization negates lifeonly the alternative allows for an aesthetic affirmation of difference.
Der Derian, 1995 (James Der Derian, professor of Political Science at Brown University, On Security, The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard p. 33-34)
The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life.

Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is
essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the

denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader:
"Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not

The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols :
the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" to produce The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and

37

A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39
hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.

38

This Relationship To Security Reduces Human Lives To Be Manipulated By The New Order Killing VTL Dillon And Reid 2000
(PHD; researches the problematisation of politics, security and war & PhD in Politics (Michael And Dillon, Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emerge Alternatives: Local, Global, Political Vol. 25 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2000 JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986) //JES What is of primary interest here, however, is not the histori-cally well-documented propensity of liberal peace to make war against authoritarian regimes. Nor are

. We are concerned, for the moment, with exploring theoretically the ways in which it problematizes the question of order itself, and with the correlate strategizing of power relations, locally and globally de-rived from the ways in which it does so. We argue that these de-pend upon notions of immanent emergency. Specifically, they de-pend upon its twin
its extremely powerful mil-itary-industrial-scientific dynamics immediately at issue

cognates, exception and emergence, to which the phenomenon of complex emergency draws our attention. We argue in addition that each such "emergency" reduces human life to a zone of indistinction in which it becomes mere stuff for the ordering strategies of the hybrid form of sovereign and governmental power that distinguishes the liberal peace of global governance. Interpreted this way, complex emergencies not only draw attention to the operation of a specific international po-litical rationality - that of
global liberal governance - but also to certain key distinguishing features of it as a hybrid order of power.

Value to life outweighs Hayden, '10School of IR, Univ. of St. Andrews (Patrick, HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW Volume 11, Number
4, 451-467, February 2010, The Relevance of Hannah Arendts Reflections on Evil: Globalization and Rightlessness) Arendt was drawn to formulate the notion of human superfluous-ness by the chain of catastrophes touched off by the First World War culminating in the actual event of totalitarian domination (1968a, 27). However, the novelty introduced by the structure and conditions of the twentieth century, which Arendt insists constitute the horizon of experience for the world after the Final Solution, is that killing is far from the worst that man can inflict on man (1968a, 127). The evils that can be visited upon human beings involve not only murder but more significantly the widespread and thoughtless treatment of certain persons as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they were already dead (2004, 574). Killing people is not the primary issue; generating and perpetuating human superfluousness as a normal condition of the socio-political order is. To forestall any misunderstanding, Arendt is not suggesting that the mass killing of human beings carried out by the Nazi (or any other) genocide is not evil. What she is suggesting, however, is that the meaning of this atrocity is located in the experiential space opened up between the actual killing itself and the preparatory dehumanization carried out independently of it. How can we make sense of the moral and political distinction between murder on the one hand and exclusion from humanity on the other? More than murder itself, which Arendt regards as a limited evil (2004, 570), the deprivation of human status that excludes superfluous persons from a common world is the most terrifying possibility we can now too easily imagine. Whereas murder destroys a life, superfluity destroys reality, the fact of existence itself (2004, 571). No value to life outweighs their impacts Cerni 7 (Paula, cultural logic electronic collection of Marxist Theory and Practice independent writer, The Age of Consumer Capitalism, http://clogic.eserver.org/2007/Cerni.pdf) Thus the powerlessness of the consumer vis--vis the production process is experienced as the active tyranny of the finished object as an object-sized moral law. Morality is now restricted to the single and immediate dimension of is, no longer transcended by means of its negation, ought ( Marcuse, 1991); while reason similarly limits itself to the set of available options. If people very strongly desire what they cannot get, they will be unhappy; such desires, therefore, are irrational, says Jon Elster (1986: 15). In the age of consumer capitalism, then, morality and reason submit to a reality principle that no longer defers pleasure and accepts pain for the sake of future achievements, but asserts the pleasure and pain of the actually experienced world. And so we find the materiality of a there-to-be-consumed world perfectly aligned with the malleable performances of postmodern reflexivity. Dehumanized things and immaterial meanings are two sides of one coin, the objective and subjective aspects of social experience under consumer capitalism.19 That is
why the authority of the given material world co-exists with notions of contemporary society as somehow uniquely cultural, virtual, even immaterial. It is why unknowable and impenetrable objects end up reflecting our

constructed desires; mere things turn into carriers of social meaning (Douglas and Isherwood, 1996),

aesthetic objects (Haug, 1986), or stuff embedded in social narratives (Harr, 2002); people

become post-human informational-material entities (Hayles, 1999: 11); and an economy of physical plenty melts away into intangible flows of information and knowledge.

Bio Power
Security discourse leads to biopolitical control over the masses, leading to inevitable extinction. Coviello 2000
(Peter, Professor of English at Bowdoin College, Apocalypse from Now On) Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) "remainderless and a-symbolic destruction," then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of

." This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not 'Apocalypse Now' but
a cherished "general population

'Apocalypse from Now On.'" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of
Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering." Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life *and+ endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to p recise controls and comprehensive regulations." In his brief comments on what20he calls "the atomic situation," however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not

. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of
be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means

everyone." Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating.

"If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill' it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." For a state
that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

The affs foreign enemy construction requires maintenance of domestic identityto justify the aff, the state rationalizes mass genocide and violence.
Campbell, 2005 (David Campbell, American Quarterly, The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle Volume 57, Number 3, September, pp. 943-972) As an imagined community, the state can be seen as the effect of formalized practices and ritualized acts that operate in its name or in the service of its ideals. This understanding, which is enabled by shifting our theoretical commitments from a belief in pregiven subjects to a concern with the problematic of subjectivity, renders foreign policy as a boundaryproducing political performance in which the spatial domains of inside/outside, self/other, and domestic/ foreign are constituted through the writing of threats as externalized dangers. The narratives of primary and stable identities that continue to govern much of the social sciences obscure such an understanding. In international relations these concepts of identity limit analysis to a concern with the domestic influences on foreign policy ; this
perspective allows for a consideration of the influence of the internal forces on state identity, but it assumes that the external is a fixed reality that presents itself to the pregiven state and its agents. In contrast, by

assuming that the identity of the state is performatively constituted, we can argue that there are no foundations of state identity that exist prior to the problematic of identity/difference that situates the state within the framework of inside/outside and self/other. Identity

is constituted in relation to difference, and difference is constituted in relation to identity, which means that the state, the international system, and the dangers to each are coeval in their construction. Over time, of course, ambiguity is disciplined, contingency is fixed, and dominant meanings are established. In the history of U.S. foreign policy regardless of the radically different contexts in which it has operatedthe formalized practices and ritualized acts of security discourse have worked to produce a conception of the United States in which freedom, liberty, law,
democracy, individualism, faith, order, prosperity, and civilization are claimed to exist because of the constant struggle with and often violent suppression of opponents said to embody tyranny, oppression, anarchy, totalitarianism, collectivism, atheism, and barbarism. This record demonstrates that the boundary-producing political performance of foreign policy does more than inscribe a geopolitical marker on a map. This construction of social space also involves an axiological dimension in which the delineation of an inside from an outside gives rise to a moral

hierarchy that renders the domestic superior and the foreign inferior. Foreign policy thus incorporates an ethical power of segregation in its performance of identity/difference. While this produces a geography of foreign (even evil) others in conventional terms, it also requires a disciplining of domestic elements on the inside that challenge this state identity. This is achieved through exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the inside are linked through a discourse of danger with threats identified and located on the outside. Though global in scope, these effects are national in their legitimation.12 The ONDCP drugs and terror campaign was an overt example of this
sort of exclusionary practice. However, the boundary-producing political performances of foreign policy operate within a global context wherein relations of sovereignty are changing. Although Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have overplayed the transition from modern sovereignty to imperial sovereignty in Empire, there is little doubt that new relations of power and identity are present. According to Hardt and Negri, in our current condition, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow.13 As shall be argued here, the sense of fading national colors is being resisted by the reassertion of national identity boundaries through foreign p olicys writing of danger in a range of cultural sites. Nonetheless, this takes place within the context of flow, flexibility, and reterritorialization summarized by Hardt and Negri. Moreover, these transformations are part and parcel of change in the relations of production. As Hardt and Negri declare: In the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wea lth tends ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another.14 While the implied periodization of the term postmodernization renders it problematic, the notion of biopolitics, with its connecting and penetrative networks across and through all domains of life, opens up new possibilities for conceptualizing the complex relationships that embrace oil, security, U.S. policy, and the SUV. In Todd Gitlins words, the SUV is the place where foreign policy meets the road.15 It is also the

biopolitics arrives with the historical transformation in waging war from the defense of the sovereign to securing the existence of a population. In Foucaults argument, this historical shift means that decisions to fight are made in terms of collective survival, and
place where the road affects foreign policy. Biopolitics is a key concept in understanding how those meetings take place. Michel Foucault argues that

killing is justified by the necessity of preserving life.16 It is this centering of the life of the population rather than the safety of the sovereign or the security of territory that is the hallmark of biopolitical power that distinguishes it from sovereign power. Giorgio Agamben has extended the notion through the concept of the administration of life and argues that the

defense of life often takes place in a zone of indistinction between violence and the law such that sovereignty can be violated in the name of life.17 Indeed, the biopolitical privileging of life has provided the rationale for some of the worst cases of mass death, with genocide deemed understandable as one groups life is violently secured through the demise of another group.18

Biopower is the root cause of war and conflict Michel Foucault, Professor of History of Systems of Thought at the Collge de France, 1978, The
History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley, p. 135-137
For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. In a formal sense, it derived no doubt from the ancient patria potestas that granted the father of the Roman family the right to dispose of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them life, so he could take it away. By the time the right of life and death was framed by the classical theoreticians, it was in a considerably diminished form. It was no longer considered that this power of the sovereign over his subjects could be exercised in an absolute and unconditional way, but only in cases where the sovereigns very existence was in jeopardy: a sort of right of rejoinder. If he were threatened by external enemies who sought to overthrow him or contest his rights, he could then legitimately wage war, and require his subjects to take part in the defense of the state; without directly proposing their death, he was empowered to expose their life: in this sense, he wielded an indirect power over them of life and death. But if someone dared to rise up against him and transgress his laws, then he could exercise a direct power over the offenders life: as punishment, the latter would be put to death. Viewed in this way, the power of life and death was not an absolute privilege: it was conditioned by the defense of the sovereign, and his own survival. Must we follow Hobbes in seeing it as the transfer to the prince of the natural right possessed by every individual to defend his life even if this meant the death of others? Or should it be regarded as a specific right that was manifested with the formation of that

the right of life and death is a dissymmetrical one. The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which was formulated as the power of life and death was in reality the right to
new juridical being, the sovereign? In any case, in its modern formrelative and limitedas in its ancient and absolute form,

take life or let live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword. Perhaps this juridical form must be referred to a historical type of society in which power was
exercised mainly as a means of deduction ( prelevement), a subtraction mechanism, a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products, goods and services, labor and blood, levied on the subjects. Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it

the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. Deduction has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one
culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it. Since the classical age element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the

This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of deathand this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limitsnow presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individuals continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle-that one has to be capable of killing in
right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of

at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.
sovereignty;

A2: Extinction
And the affirmative is missing the fundamental point. The biggest impact in the round is not extinction but is the systemic violence that occurs in the name of national and personal security. The fact that the aff keeps reverting to big magnitude impacts is precisely what we are critiquing. Securitization against the other and the threat of destruction authorizes any f orm of force on the illusionary premise of preserving the existence of everyone. Under their interpretation, any threat, whether big or small, whether realistic or improbable, justifies preemptory action, no matter how potentially annihilating only a step back from this type of security logic allows genuine political thinking thats Neocleous

Generic Materials

2NC Overview
Kritik outweighs and turns the case. The plan is a methodological strategy that's more
likely to CAUSE hostility The fact that other nations are INTERESTED in the Arctic DOES NOT mean they would be willing to RISK CONFLICT over it - that's the sort of reductionist caricature we criticize. The ONLY risk of war is IF the US acts aggressively and poisons relations War in the Arctic would obviously badbut their methodology is the root cause of WHY those conflicts happen. 1. Security deludes populations into buying low-probability high-magnitude scenarios. Grant the aff zero risk of solvencythey remain within a national security framework that causes every problem to be defined as a crisis which makes interventions or arms races the only possible solution Burke 7Anthony Burke, Lecturer in Politics and Professor of International Relations @ University of
New South Wales, Beyond Security: Ethics, and Violence, pg 52-53 This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and

how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement
about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival ). These derive from the classical idea
of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see

ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent , that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-

political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for
ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic , one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as

such. The second

is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social

and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to

quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration
unintended effects.

, or in

2. Dehumanizationsecurity justifies atrocity and suffering for the "greater good"there is no value to life in a world where we postpone all ethical and moral considerations Burke 7Anthony Burke, Lecturer in Politics and Professor of International Relations @ University of
New South Wales, Beyond Security: Ethics, and Violence, pg 52-53 In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt
and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The

of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which
ethical problem arises because

humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.
3. ANDdehumanization outweighs death on probability and magnitude Hayden 10Patrick Hayden, International Relations @ Univ. of St. Andrews, "The Relevance of Hannah
Arendt's Reflections on Evil: Globalization and Rightslessness," Human Rights Review, Vol. 11(4), p. 451, February 2010, gender paraphrased
Arendt was drawn to formulate the notion of human superfluous-ness by the chain of catastrophes touched off by the First World War culminating in the actual event of totalitarian domination (1968a, 27). However, the novelty introduced by the structure and conditions of the twentieth century, which Arendt insists constitute the horizon of experience for the world

killing is far from the worst that [hu]man can inflict on [hu]man (1968a, 127). The evils that can be visited upon human beings involve not only murder but more significantly the widespread and thoughtless treatment of certain persons as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no longer of any interest to anybody, as if they were already dead (2004, 574). Killing people is not the primary issue; generating and perpetuating human superfluousness as a normal condition of the socio-political order is. To forestall any misunderstanding, Arendt is not suggesting that the mass killing of human beings carried out by the Nazi (or any other) genocide is not evil. What she is suggesting, however, is that the meaning of this atrocity is located in the experiential space opened up between the actual killing itself and the preparatory dehumanization carried out independently of it. How can we make sense of the moral and political distinction between murder on the one hand and exclusion from humanity on the other? More than murder itself, which Arendt regards as a limited evil (2004, 570), the deprivation of human status that excludes superfluous persons from a common world is the most terrifying possibility we can now too easily imagine. Whereas murder destroys a life, superfluity destroys reality, the fact of existence itself (2004, 571).
after the Final Solution, is that

4. ANDthe aff only creates negative peacethat invisibilizes enemy creation. Sandy & Perkins 1 Leo Sandy, Co-founder of Peace Studies @ Plymouth State College AND Ray
Perkins, Prof Philosophy @ Plymouth State College The Nature of Peace and Its Implications for Peace Education, Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolutions, Vol. 4(2) In its most myopic and limited definition, peace is the mere absence of war. O'Kane (1992) sees this definition as a "vacuous, passive, simplistic, and unresponsive escape mechanism too often resorted to in the past - without success." This definition also commits a serious oversight: it ignores the

residual feelings of mistrust and suspicion that the winners and losers of a war harbor toward each other. The subsequent suppression of mutual hostile feelings is not taken into account by those who define peace so simply. Their stance is that as long as people are not actively engaged in overt, mutual, violent, physical, and destructive activity, then peace exists. This, of course, is just another way of defining cold war. In other words, this simplistic definition is too broad because it allows us to attribute the term "peace" to states of affairs that are not truly peaceful (Copi and Cohen, p. 194). Unfortunately, this definition of peace appears to be the prevailing one in the world. It is the kind of peace maintained by a "peace through strength" posture that has led to the arms race , stockpiles of nuclear weapons , and the ultimate threat of mutually assured destruction . This
version of peace was defended by the "peacekeeper" - a name that actually adorns some U.S. nuclear weapons deployed since 1986

5. ANDalt solves the caseaccepting that insecurity is inevitable creates space for productive social relations. This is a more sustainable way of solving their war and violence scenarios

ATCase Outweighs (Short)


1. Securitization causes extinctionframing issues as matters of national security and survival destroys effective and coherent international interactionseven if the affirmative solves a particular war scenario, remaining within their framework of enemy construction makes global WMD lashout and violent conflict inevitable insecurity is inevitable but the affirmative's attempt to order and control via hegemony constructs the very threats they try to avoid.

2. This outweighs caseeven if securitization prevents war in the short termit reduces existence to bare life and maintains a permanent state of emergencythere is no value to life in a world where we postpone all ethical and moral considerationsthat's Burkealso results in negative peace which causes extinction. The kritik is a prerequisite to the case impacts. Sandy & Perkins 1 Leo Sandy, Co-founder of Peace Studies @ Plymouth State College AND Ray Perkins,
Prof Philosophy @ Plymouth State College The Nature of Peace and Its Implications for Peace Education, Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolutions, vol 4 no 2 In its most myopic and limited definition, peace is the mere absence of war. O'Kane (1992) sees this definition as a "vacuous, passive, simplistic, and unresponsive escape mechanism too often resorted to in the past - without success." This definition also commits a serious oversight: it ignores the residual feelings of mistrust and suspicion that the winners and losers of a war harbor toward each other. The subsequent suppression of mutual hostile feelings is not taken into account by those who define peace so simply. Their stance is that as long as people are not actively engaged in overt, mutual, violent, physical, and destructive activity, then peace exists. This, of course, is just another way of defining cold war. In other words, this simplistic definition is too broad because it allows us to attribute the term "peace" to states of affairs that are not truly peaceful (Copi and Cohen, p. 194). Unfortunately, this definition of peace appears to be the prevailing one in the world. It is the kind of peace maintained by a "peace through strength" posture that has led to the arms race, stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and the ultimate threat of mutually assured destruction. This version of peace was defended by the "peacekeeper" - a name that actually adorns some U.S. nuclear weapons deployed
since 1986

3. Alt solves the caseaccepting that insecurity is inevitable creates space for productive social relations. This is a more sustainable way of solving their war and violence scenarios

ATCase Outweighs
1. Securitization causes extinctionframing issues as matters of national security and survival destroys effective and coherent international interactionseven if the affirmative solves a particular war scenario, enemy construction outweighs Mack 91Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, The Enemy System
http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 *Gender modified) The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior . Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices . It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real . The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat -by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy , or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity ".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us.
which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons

in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: " War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy ."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies,

and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the

psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would
never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.

2. This outweighs caseeven if securitization prevents war in the short termit reduces existence to bare life and maintains a permanent state of emergencythere is no value to life in a world where we postpone all ethical and moral considerationsthat's Burkealso results in negative peace which causes extinction Sandy & Perkins 1 Leo Sandy, Co-founder of Peace Studies @ Plymouth State College AND Ray Perkins,
Prof Philosophy @ Plymouth State College The Nature of Peace and Its Implications for Peace Education, Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolutions, vol 4 no 2 In its most myopic and limited definition, peace is the mere absence of war. O'Kane (1992) sees this definition as a "vacuous, passive, simplistic, and unresponsive escape mechanism too often resorted to in the past - without success." This definition also commits a serious oversight: it ignores the residual feelings of mistrust and suspicion that the winners and losers of a war harbor toward each other. The subsequent suppression of mutual hostile feelings is not taken into account by those who define peace so simply. Their stance is that as long as people are not actively engaged in overt, mutual, violent, physical, and destructive activity, then peace exists. This, of course, is just another way of defining cold war. In other words, this simplistic definition is too broad because it allows us to attribute the term "peace" to states of affairs that are not truly peaceful (Copi and Cohen, p. 194). Unfortunately, this definition of peace appears to be the prevailing one in the world. It is the kind of peace maintained by a "peace through strength" posture that has led to the arms race, stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and the ultimate threat of mutually assured destruction. This version of peace was defended by the "peacekeeper" - a name that actually adorns some U.S. nuclear weapons deployed
since 1986

3. Alt solves the caseaccepting that insecurity is inevitable creates space for productive social relations. This is a more sustainable way of solving their war and violence scenarios

ATThreats Real
1. Begs the question - even if threats are real, framing policies exclusively around threat reductions the way the 1AC does is counterproductive. We critique the step between identifying a problem and approaching it in a security framework that justifies constant wars 2. Their impacts are manufactured and distorted by the threat industry Pieterse 7 (Jan, Professor of Sociology University of Illinois (Urbana), Political and Economic
Brinkmanship, Review of International Political Economy, 14(3), p. 473) Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune . That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of deniability the president is i nsulated from That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable . Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, stuff happens. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includ es a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation , and in inflated threats finds rationales
certain operations (Risen, 2006).

for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers . Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence
apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000).

Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates

in a perpetual state of self hypnosis

with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.

3. Turns casesecurity logic leads to threat exaggeration and failed interventions Zenko & Cohen 12Micah Zenko, fellow at the Center for Preventative Action at the Council on
Foreign Relations AND Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March/April 2012, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91(2)) The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threatmongering results from a confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited from attacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage . For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against gop attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government-defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments. There is also a pernicious feedback loop at work. Because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the United States, Washington overemphasizes military approaches to problems (including many that could best be solved by nonmilitary means). The militarization of foreign policy leads, in turn, to further dark warnings about the potentially harmful effects of any effort to rebalance U.S. national security spending or trim the massive military budget- warnings that are inevitably bolstered by more threat
exaggeration. Last fall, General Norton Schwartz, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, said that defense cuts that would return military spending to its 2007 level would undermine the military's "ability to protect the nation" and could create "dire consequences." Along the same lines, Panetta warned that the same reductions would "invite aggression" from enemies. These are a

the United States still maintains weapons systems designed to fight an enemy that disappeared 20 years ago. Of course, threat inflation is not new. During the Cold War, although the United States faced genuine existential threats, American political leaders nevertheless hyped smaller threats or conflated them with larger ones. Today, there are no dangers to the United States remotely resembling those of the Cold War era, yet policymakers routinely talk in the alarmist terms once used to describe superpower conflict.
puzzling statements given that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries' defense budgets combined and that

ATPerm: Both
They make a permutation 1. The role of the ballot is a referendum on the 1ACthe permutation can't change that initial framingthe alternative is a methodological rejection which cannot be 'permuted' that's Bruce 2. This means the perm severs justificationsthat makes the 1AC an unpredictable moving target which kills our ability to strategically read offensereject the perm 3. No net benefit - the perm can't reject security framing of infrastructure better than the alt. No reason to prefer means you vote neg 4. Predictions DApredicting conflict is inevitable makes it so by mobilizing strategic planning. This inevitability paradigm defines debate within a pre-existing, limited narrative. That primes us for aggression and war and fails to challenge reductionist logic 5. Crowd-out DAsecurity's all-encompassing approach pays lip service to our criticism - this precludes alternative considerations. Forgetting the 1ac is key Bleiker 1Roland Bleiker, Senior Lecturer and Co-Director Rotary Centre of International Studies in
Peace and Conflict Resolution, The Zen of International Relations, Ed. Chan, Mandeville, and Blieker, p. 38-39
IR stories have been told for so long that they no longer appear as stories. They are accepted as fact for their metaphorical dimensions have vanished from our collective memories. We have become accustomed to our distorting IR metaphors until we come
The power to tell stories is the power to define common sense. Prevalent to lie, as Nietzsche would say herd-like in a style obligatory for all. As a result dominant ir stories have successfully transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the realist one, into reality per se. of the international gradually , to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and objectified world view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Steve Smith argues , 'is the ultimate act of political power.8 It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practic e of

Realist perceptions

have

become accepted as common sense

The prime objective of this essay is to challenge prevalent IR stories. The most effective way of doing so, the chapter argues, is not to critique but to forget them , to tell new stories that are not constrained by the boundaries of established and objectified IR narratives. Such an approach diverges from many critical engagements with world politics. Most challenges against dominant IR stories have been advanced in the form of critiques . While critiquing orthodox IR stories remains an important task, it is not sufficient . Exploring the origins of problems, in this case discourse of power politics and their positivist framing of the political practice, cannot overcome all the existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox IR theory , the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that have been established through the initial framing of debates. A successful challenge to orthodox IR stories must do more than merely critique their narrow and problematic nature. To be effective, critique must be supplemented with a process of forgetting the object of critique, of theorizing world politics
international relations on a particular path. beyond the agendas, issues and terminologies that are prest by orthodox debates. Indeed the most powerful potential of critical scholarship may well lie in the attempt to tell different stories

once theres stories have become validated , they may well open up spaces for a more inclusive and less violence prone practice of real world politics.
about IR, for

ATPerm: Other Instances


1. The "double bind" permutation is intrinsicvote neg because they can add infinite extratopical planks like rejection to nullify our criticism 2. The alternative isn't a fiated rejection of securityit's a referendum on the justifications for the affirmativethe affirmative's model of security has unique disadvantages 3. Multiple permutations are a voting issuetimeskews overstretch the negative, make the aff a moving target and justify conditionality

ATRealism
1. Realism takes out caseit proves structural motivations for conflict means the aff solves nothingvote neg on presumption 2. Realism's confirmation bias makes it non-falsifiable and non-scientific. Rejecting the aff allows us to see IR differently and the system to adapt Inan 4Annette Freyberg-Inan, Fellow @ Univ of Bucharest, Associate Prof IR and PoliSci @ Univ. of
Amsterdam, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature, 150-52) Lakatos argues that a research program does not have to be refuted to be discarded. Instead, if it is found to be degenerating, it will just go out of fashion, however, it is obvious that there exist powerful impediments to paradigmatic research programs or theories simply going out of fashion. Only a strong reliance on the criterion of refutability could counteract these forces. However, as we have seen, realist theories dodge refutation. The fact that realism functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy in the real world contributes to the ease with which the paradigm avoids its scientific refutation. The more widely accepted realist arguments become, the less it appears necessary to question the ad-hoc adjustments that are employed to save the theory and its assumptions from refutation. The less such adjustments are questioned, the more widely accepted the paradigm becomes. this is how, as Jim
George has observed, realism's "self-affirming logic" came to exert its "abiding influence on everyday mainstream theory/practice throughout the Cold War and into the post-Cold War era."

the realist view of human nature, in general, and of motivation (and rationality), in particular, that supports the self-fulfilling tendency of the realist paradigm. It encourages distorted judgments of the motives of others and creates incentives to respond to their behavior in exactly the ways predicted by the paradigmatic worldview. Realist motivational assumptions are usually not made explicit, which allows for the possibility of their ad-hoc modification and the increased flexibility of realist arguments. Realist motivational assumptions also contain a bias in favor of that particular view of human nature which is consistent with the realist favor of that particular view of human nature which is consistent with the realist worldview as a whole. As a consequence, they function to support realist arguments ex post facto by favoring such interpretation of political events that are consistent with the same bias. By informing reflexive predictions, they help render realist expectations self-fulfilling. This circularity, in turn, served to uphold the traditional usage of realist motivational assumptions.
The Motivational assumptions of realism play a crucial role in this situation for a number of reasons. It is

3. K turns realism - even if states are self-interested, security logic is merely a construction used to justify control - no justification for framing threats the way their 1ac does. Threat analysis and interventionist discourse leads to worse security dilemmas. 4. The justifications for realism are employed ad-hoc to rationalize behavior as inevitable independent DA to the plan Kohn 88 Alfie Kohn, Independent scholar on education and human behavior, speaker, writer, "Are
Humans Innately Aggressive?," Psychology Today, June The belief that violence is unavoidable, while disturbing at first glance, actually holds a curious attraction for many people, both psychologically and ideologically. It does have that let's face the grim reality flavor, which has a certain appeal to people, says Robert Holt, a psychologist at New York University . It also allows us to excuse our own acts of aggression by suggesting that we really have little choice. If one is born innately aggressive, then one cannot be blamed for being so, says Montagu. The belief, he maintains, functions as a kind of pseudoscientific version of the doctrine of original sin. In order to justify, accept and live with war, we've created a psychology that makes it inevitable, Lown says. It's a rationalization for accepting war as a system of resolving human conflict. To accept this explanation for the war-is-inevitable
belief is simultaneously to realize its consequences.

Treating any behavior as inevitable sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy : By

assuming we are bound to be aggressive, we are more likely to act that way and provide evidence for

the assumption. People who believe that humans are naturally aggressive may also be relatively unlikely to oppose particular wars or get involved in the peace movement. Some observers insist that this belief functions only as
an excuse for their unwillingness to become active. But others attribute some effect to the attitude itself. The belief that war is inevitable leads people to rely on armament rather than

There is some empirical support for this position. In a 1985 Finnish study of 375 young people, Riitta Wahlstrom found that those who considered war to be part of human nature were less inclined to support the idea of teaching peace or of personally working for it.
working for disarmament, says M. Brewster Smith, professor of psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz.

XTRealism = Extinction
The underlying assumption of this argument is wrongthe most recent scientific evidence proves humans arent predisposed to strive for social statusthis is an argument that they cannot simply kicktheyve invoked a model of how the world works that creates a self-fulfilling prophecyturns the case and causes extinction Rifkin 10 [Jeremy Rifkin MA Tufts, Senior Lecturer @ Wharton University, 1-11-10 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathiccivilization_b_416589.html] The problem runs deeper than the issue of finding new ways to regulate the market or imposing legally binding global green house gas emission reduction targets.

The real crisis lies in the set of assumptions about human nature that governs the behavior of world leaders-assumptions that were spawned during the Enlightenment more than 200 years ago at the dawn of the modern market economy and the emergence of the nation state era. The Enlightenment

thinkers--John Locke, Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet et. al.--took umbrage with the Medieval Christian world view that to cast their lot with the idea that human beings' essential nature is rational, detached, autonomous, acquisitive and utilitarian and argued that individual salvation lies in unlimited material progress here on Earth. The Enlightenment notions about human nature were reflected in the newly minted nation-state whose raison d'tre was to protect private property relations and stimulate market forces as
saw human nature as fallen and depraved and that looked to salvation in the next world through God's grace. They preferred well as act as a surrogate of the collective self-interest of the citizenry in the international arena. Like individuals, nation-states were considered to be autonomous agents embroiled in a relentless battle with other sovereign nations in the pursuit of material gains. It

was these very assumptions that provided the philosophical underpinnings for a geopolitical frame of reference that accompanied the first and second industrial revolutions in the 19th and 20th centuries. These beliefs about human nature came to the fore in the aftermath of the global economic meltdown and in the boisterous and acrimonious confrontations in the meeting rooms in Copenhagen, with potentially disastrous consequences for the future of humanity and the planet. If human nature is as the Enlightenment philosophers claimed, then we are likely doomed. It is impossible to imagine how we might create a sustainable global economy and restore the biosphere to health if each and every one of us is, at the core of our biology, an autonomous agent and a self-centered and materialistic being. Recent discoveries in brain science and child development, however, are forcing us to rethink these long-held shibboleths about human nature. Biologists and cognitive neuroscientists are discovering mirror-neurons--the so-called empathy neurons--that allow human beings and other species to feel and experience another's situation as if it were one's own. We are, it appears, the most social of animals and seek intimate participation and companionship with our fellows. Social scientists, in turn, are beginning to reexamine human history from an empathic lens and, in the process, discovering previously hidden strands of the human narrative which suggests that human evolution is measured not only by the expansion of power over nature, but also by the intensification and extension of empathy to more diverse others across broader temporal and spatial domains. The growing scientific evidence that we are a fundamentally empathic species has profound and far-reaching consequences for society, and may well determine our fate as a species. What is required now is nothing less than a leap to global empathic consciousness and in less than a generation if we are to resurrect the global economy and revitalize the biosphere. The question becomes this: what is the mechanism that allows empathic sensitivity to mature and consciousness to expand through history? The pivotal turning points in human consciousness occur when new energy regimes converge with new communications revolutions, creating new economic eras. The new communications revolutions become the command and control mechanisms for structuring, organizing and managing more complex civilizations that the new energy regimes make possible. For
example, in the early modern age, print communication became the means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution. It would have been impossible to administer the first industrial revolution using script and codex. Communication revolutions not only manage new, more complex energy regimes, but also change human consciousness in the process. Forager/hunter societies relied on oral communications and their consciousness was mythologically constructed. The great hydraulic agricultural civilizations were, for the most part, organized around script communication and steeped in theological consciousness. The first industrial revolution of the 19th century was managed by print communication and ushered in ideological consciousness. Electronic communication became the command and control mechanism for arranging the second industrial revolution in the 20th century and spawned psychological consciousness. Each more sophisticated communication revolution brings together more diverse people in increasingly more expansive and varied social networks. Oral communication has only limited temporal and spatial reach while script, print and electronic communications each extend the range and depth of human social interaction. By

extending the central nervous system of each individual and the society as a whole, communication revolutions provide an evermore inclusive playing field for empathy to mature and consciousness to expand. For example, during the period of the great hydraulic agricultural civilizations characterized by script and theological consciousness, empathic sensitivity
broadened from tribal blood ties to associational ties based on common religious affiliation. Jews came to empathize with Jews, Christians with Christians, Muslims with Muslims, etc. In the first industrial revolution characterized by print and ideological consciousness, empathic sensibility extended to national borders, with Americans empathizing with Americans, Germans with Germans, Japanese with Japanese and so on. In the second industrial revolution, characterized by electronic communication and psychological consciousness, individuals began to identify with like-minded others. Today,

we are on the cusp of another historic convergence of energy and communication--a third industrial revolution--that could extend empathic sensibility to the biosphere itself and all of life
on Earth. The distributed Internet revolution is coming together with distributed renewable energies, making possible a sustainable, post-carbon economy that is both globally connected and locally managed. In the 21st century, hundreds of millions--and eventually billions--of human beings will transform their buildings into power plants to harvest renewable energies on site, store those energies in the form of hydrogen and share electricity, peer-to-peer, across local, regional, national and continental inter-grids that act much like the Internet. The open source sharing of energy, like open source sharing of information, will give rise to collaborative energy spaces--not unlike the collaborative social spaces that currently exist on the Internet. When every family and business comes to take responsibility for its

own small swath of the biosphere by harnessing renewable energy and sharing it with millions of others on smart power grids that stretch across continents, we become intimately interconnected at the most basic level of earthly existence by jointly stewarding the energy that bathes the planet and sustains all of life. The

new distributed communication revolution not only organizes distributed renewable energies, but also changes human consciousness. The information communication technologies (ICT) revolution is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space, allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale, for the first time in history. Whether in fact we will begin to empathize as a species will depend on how we use the new
distributed communication medium. While distributed communications technologies-and, soon, distributed renewable energies - are connecting the human race, what is so shocking is that no one has offered much of a reason as to why we ought to be connected. We talk breathlessly about access and inclusion in a global communications network but speak little of exactly why we want to communicate with one another on such a planetary scale. What's sorely missing is an overarching reason that billions of human beings should be increasingly connected. Toward what end? The only feeble explanations thus far offered are to share information, be entertained, advance commercial exchange and speed the globalization of the economy. All the above, while relevant, nonetheless seem insufficient to justify why nearly seven billion human beings should be connected and mutually embedded in a globalized society. The idea of even billion individual connections, absent any overall unifying purpose, seems a colossal waste of human energy. More important, making global connections without any real transcendent purpose risks a narrowing rather than an expanding of human consciousness. But what if our distributed global communication networks were put to the task of helping us re-participate in deep communion with the common biosphere that sustains all of our lives? The biosphere is the narrow band that extends some forty miles from the ocean floor to outer space where living creatures and the Earth's geochemical processes interact to sustain each other. We are learning that the biosphere functions like an indivisible organism. It is the continuous symbiotic relationships between every living creature and between living creatures and the geochemical processes that ensure the survival of the planetary organism and the individual species that live within its biospheric envelope. If every human life, the species as a whole, and all other life-forms are entwined with one another and with the geochemistry of the planet in a rich and complex choreography that sustains life itself, then we are all dependent on and responsible for the health of the whole organism. Carrying out that responsibility means living out our individual lives in our

If we can harness our empathic sensibility to establish a new global ethic that recognizes and acts to harmonize the many relationships that make up the life-sustaining forces of the planet, we will have moved beyond the detached, self-interested and utilitarian philosophical assumptions that accompanied national markets and nation state governance and into a new era of biosphere consciousness. We leave the old world of geopolitics behind and enter into a new world of biosphere politics, with new forms of governance emerging to accompany our new biosphere awareness. The Third Industrial
neighborhoods and communities in ways that promote the general well-being of the larger biosphere within which we dwell. The Third Industrial Revolution offers just such an opportunity .

Revolution and the new era of distributed capitalism allow us to sculpt a new approach to globalization, this time emphasizing continentalization from the bottom up. Because renewable energies are more or less equally distributed around the world, every region is potentially amply endowed with the power it needs to be relatively self-sufficient and sustainable in its lifestyle, while at the same time interconnected via smart grids to other regions across countries and continents. When every community is locally empowered, both figuratively and literally, it can engage directly in regional, transnational, continental, and limited global trade without the severe restrictions that are imposed by the geopolitics that oversee elite fossil fuels and uranium energy distribution. Continentalization is already bringing with it a new form of governance. The

nation-state, which grew up alongside the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and provided the regulatory mechanism for managing an energy regime whose reach was the geosphere, is ill suited for a Third Industrial Revolution whose domain is the biosphere. Distributed renewable energies generated locally and regionally and shared openly--peer to
peer--across vast contiguous land masses connected by intelligent utility networks and smart logistics and supply chains favor a seamless network of governing institutions that span entire continents. The European Union is the first continental governing institution of the Third Industrial Revolution era. The EU is already beginning to put in place the infrastructure for a Europeanwide energy regime, along with the codes, regulations, and standards to effectively operate a seamless transport, communications, and energy grid that will stretch from the Irish Sea to the doorsteps of Russia by midcentury. Asian, African, and Latin American continental political unions are also in the making and will likely be the premier governing institutions on their respective continents by 2050. In this new era of distributed energy, governing institutions will more resemble the workings of the ecosystems they manage. Just as habitats function within ecosystems, and ecosystems within the biosphere in a web of interrelationships, governing institutions will similarly function in a collaborative network of relationships with localities, regions, and nations all embedded within the continent as a whole. This new complex political organism operates like the biosphere it attends, synergistically and reciprocally. This is biosphere politics. The new biosphere politics transcends traditional right/left distinctions so characteristic of the geopolitics of the modern market economy and nation-state era. The new divide is generational and contrasts the traditional top-down model of structuring family life, education, commerce, and governance with a younger generation whose thinking is more relational and distributed, whose nature is more collaborative and cosmopolitan, and whose work and social spaces favor open-source commons. For the Internet generation, "quality of life" becomes as important as individual

The transition to biosphere consciousness has already begun. All over the world, a younger generation is beginning to realize that one's daily consumption of energy and other resources ultimately affects the lives of every other human being and
opportunity in fashioning a new dream for the 21st century.

every other creature that inhabits the Earth. The Empathic Civilization is emerging. A

younger generation is fast extending its empathic embrace beyond religious affiliations and national identification to include the whole of humanity and the vast project of life that envelops the Earth. But our rush to universal empathic connectivity is running up against a rapidly accelerating entropic juggernaut in the form of climate change. Can we reach biosphere consciousness and global empathy in time to avert planetary collapse?

ATPinker
The status quo generates uniqueness for a move away from the liberal ontology of violence but the aff creates a telos of peace enforced through liberal violenceif the world truly is getting safer then the aff's lashout is arbitrary and unjustified and you should vote neg on presumption Dalby 11Simon Dalby, Carleton University "Peace And Geopolitics: Imagining Peaceful Geographies"
Nov 2011 http-server.carleton.ca/~sdalby/papers/PEACEFUL_GEOGRAPHIES.pdf
This paper suggests this focus

on war and violence has to be read against rapidly shifting geographies and the recent general trend of a temporary historical blip remains to be seen, but substantial empirical
(Human Security Report 2011). This

reduced violence in human affairs . Whether this is the promise of the liberal peace, a transitory imperial pax,
something more fundamental in human affairs, or

stands in stark contrast to realist assertions of war as the human condition as well as to repeated warnings about the supposed dangers to international order of rising Asian powers. Likewise the remilitarization of Anglo-Saxon culture since 9/11 has suggested that warring is a routine part of modern life. But the nature of war has changed in some important ways even if contemporary imperial adventures in peripheral places look all too familiar to historians. Peace, all this crucially implies, is a matter of social processes , not a final Telos , a resolution of the tensions of human life, nor a utopia that will arrive sometime. In Christian terms the aspirational "Kingdom of God" is a work in progress. Nick Megoran (2011) in particular has suggested that the geography discipline needs to think much more carefully about peace making and the possibilities of non-violence as modes of political action . The key question is focused on in the Megoran's pointed refusal to accept the simplistic dismissal of the efficacy of non-violence given the obvious prevalence of violence. The point of his argument is that nonviolence is a political strategy in part to respond to violence, to initiate political actions in ways that are not hostage to the use of force. In doing so, especially in his discussion of resistance to Nazi policies in Germany during the war, Megoran (2011) underplays the important points about legitimacy as part of politics, and likewise hints at the important contrast between non-violence as a strategic mode of political action. Implied here is that while war may be politics by other means, to gloss the classic Clausewitzian formulation, nonviolence is politics too. But politics plays in the larger geopolitical context, and this must not be forgotten in deliberations concerning the possible new initiatives geographers might take in thinking carefully about disciplinary contributions to peace research and practice. Contemporary social theory might point to Michel Foucault, and the argument drawn from his writings that politics is the extension of war rather than the other way round. Given the interest in biopolitics and geogovernance within the discipline these matters are obviously relevant but the connection to peace needs to be thought carefully beyond formulations that simply assume it as the opposite of wars (Morrissey 2011). This is especially the case given the changing modes of contemporary warfare and the advocacy of violence as an appropriate policy in

analyses do suggest that violence is declining

modes of warfare at the heart of liberalism suggest that the security of what Reid and Dillon (2009) call the biohuman, the liberal consuming subject, involves a violent series of practices designed to pacify the world by the
present circumstances. The

elimination of political alternatives . The tension here suggests an imperial peace , a forceful imposition of a state of non-war . In George W. Bush's terms justifying the war on terror, a long struggle to eliminate tyranny (Dalby
2009a).

Peace is, in this geopolitical understanding, what comes after the elimination of opposition . In late 2011

such formulations dominated discussions of the death of Colonel Gadaffi in Libya . The dramatic transformation of human affairs in the last couple of generations do require that would-be peaceful geographers look both to the importance of non-violence and simultaneously to how global transformations are changing the landscape of violence and social change,
all of it still under the threat of nuclear devastation should major inter-state war occur once again.

The re-emergence of non-

violence as an explicit political strategy, and in particular the use of Gene Sharp's (1973) ideas of non-violent direct action in
recent events pose

these questions very pointedly. Geographers have much to offer in such re-thinking that may yet

play their part in a more global understanding of how interconnected our fates are becoming and how inappropriate national state boundaries are as the premise for political action in a rapidly changing biosphere. But to do so some hard thinking is needed on geopolitics, and on how it works as well as
how peace-full scholarship might foster that which it desires. Linking the practical actions of non-violence from Tahrir Square to those of the Occupy Wall Street actions, underway as the first draft of this paper was keyboarded, requires that we think very carefully about the practices that now are designated in terms of globalization . Not all this is
novel, but the geopolitical scene is shifting in ways that need to be incorporated into the new thinking within geography about war, peace, violence and what the discipline might have to say about, and contribute to, non-violence as well as to contestations of contemporary lawfare (Gregory 2006). Whether the decades is

delegitimization of violence as a mode of rule will be extended further

in coming

one of the big questions facing peace researchers. The American reaction to 9/11 set things back

dramatically, an opportunity to respond in terms of response to a crime and diplomacy was squandered, but the wider social refusal to accept repression and violence as appropriate modes of rule has interesting potential to

constrain the use of military force . The professionalization of many high technology militaries also reduces their inclination to
involve themselves in repressing social movements, although here Mikhail Gorbachev's refusal to use the Red Army against dissidents in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s remains emblematic of the changes norms of acceptable rule that have been extended in the last few generations. Geopolitics has mostly been about rivalries between great powers and their contestations of power on the large scale. These

specifications of the political world focus on states and the perpetuation of threats mapped as external dangers to

supposedly pacific polities. great powers

Much geopolitical

discourse specifies the world as a dangerous place, hence precisely

because of these mappings, one supposedly necessitating violence in what passes for a realist interpretation of
as the prime movers of history (Mearsheimer 2001). Geopolitical thinking is about order and order is in part a cartographic notion. Juliet Fall (2010) once again emphasizes the importance of taken for granted boundaries as the ontological given of contemporary politics. Politics is about the cartographic control of territories, as Megoran (2011) too ponders regarding the first half of the twentieth century, but it also about much more than this, despite the fascination that so many commentators have with the ideal form of the supposedly national territorial state. Part of what geographers bring to the discussion of peace is a more nuanced geographical imagination than that found in so much of international studies (Dalby 2011a). On the other hand much of the discussion of peace sees war as the problem, peace as the solution. Implied in that is geopolitics as the problem,

mapping dangers turns out to be a dangerous enterprise insofar

as it facilitates the perpetuation of violence by representing other places as threats to which our place is

susceptible . But this only matters if this is related to the realist assumptions of the inevitability of rivalry , the eternal search for power as key to humanity's self-organisation and the assumption that organized violence is the
ultimate arbiter (Dalby 2010). Critical geopolitics is about challenging such contextualizations , and as such its relationships to peace would seem to be obvious, albeit as Megoran (2011) notes mostly by way of a focus on what Galtung (1969, 1971) calls negative peace. Given the repeated reinvention of colonial tropes in contemporary Western political discourse such critique remains an essential part of a political geography that grants peoples "the courtesy of political geography" (Mitchell and Smith 1991). Undercutting the moral logics of violence, so frequently relying on simplistic
invocations of geographical inevitability, to

structure their apologetics, remains a crucial contribution .

AT: Security Good

1) Aff doesnt solve They frame their advocacy around a politics of survival and existential threats, not positive security thats above. 2) Only the Alt solves we advance a nuanced kritik of security thats framed specifically in terms of their 1AC. Their defense of security is generic and limitless. 3) We control uniqueness security politics dominates in the squo taking a critical approach is key to solve.
Neocleous 8 (Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History
Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 6-7) Marx once described Capital as a critique of economic categories or, if you like, a critical expose of the system of bourgeois economy. He was critique as a method for simultaneously unmasking ideas and rooting them within the context of class society and the commodity form. This book is an attempt at a critique of one of the key political categories of our time, as a simultaneous critical expose of the system of bourgeois politics. In that sense it is meant as an unmasking of the ideology and a defetishing of the system of security. One of the features of ideology is that it imposes an obviousness or naturalness on ideas without appearing to do so a double victory in which the obviousness of the ideas in question is taken as a product of their naturalness, and vice versa: their obviousness is obvious because they are so natural. This is nowhere truer than with security, the necessity of which appears so obvious and natural, so right and true, that it close off all opposition; it has to remain unquestioned, unanalyzed and undialectically presupposed, rather like the order which it is expected to secure. And if opposition to security is closed off, then so too is opposition to the political and social forces which have placed it at the heart of the political agenda. I want to write against this ideology by writing about the ways in which security has been coined, shaped and deployed by political, commercial, and intellectual forces. The book is therefore written against the security-mongering in the literal sense of the monger as one who traffics in a petty or discreditable way that dominates contemporary politics. I will perhaps be charged with not taking insecurity seriously enough. But to take security seriously means to take it critically, and not to cower in the face of it monopolistic character. This is to hold true to the idea of critique as a political genre that aims to reset the course of a world which continues to hold a gun to the heads of human beings.

AT: Threats Real


They say threats real 1. Begs the question the fact that threats can exist in the abstract doesnt mean we should frame policy exclusively around threat reduction or that the way they frame threats in their 1AC is valid. Their approach of worst-case scenario planning and constructing policies in terms of reducing insecurity forecloses all alternative approaches extend Neocleus. 2. Their impacts are manufactured and distorted by the threat industry.
Pieterse 7 (Jan, Professor of Sociology University of Illinois (Urbana), Political and Economic
Brinkmanship, Review of International Political Economy, 14(3), p. 473) Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and
represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune . That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of deniability the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable . Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, stuff happens. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a

military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation , and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers . Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.

AT: No Impact
They say no impact 1. Kritik outweighs the case drive toward security makes global war and violence inevitable extend Reid 2. Kritiks key to value to life framing infrastructure in terms of security makes massive curtailments of quality of life inevitable extended Reid 3. Kritik turns the case the impulse to securitization constructs people and users as a threat to infrastructure extend Reid 4. Alt solves the case rejecting security politics undermines the root cause of international violence were the only sustainable solution to the impacts they outline extend Neocleous

ATUtilitarianism
Utilitarianism causes extinction - views humans as a standing reserve and foregoes issues of the quality of lifethats Burkewe're also impact turning their approach towards politics the 1AC's war scenarios are constructed and prime us for endless state of conflict the aff plan doesn't prevent violencetheir framework ensure that they replicate it.

ATJudge Choice
1. Judge choice provides an infinitely regressive justification for any discursive flawsthis condones racist and sexist language because it's not part of the 3-second plan text 2. This flows negthe K proves the advantage descriptions are incorrect. Rejecting the entire aff advantages means you vote neg on presumption 3. The ballot is a referendum on the justifications for the 1AC - it's impossible to divorce the desirability of the plan from the value of their discourse Hill 1991 Philosophy @ UNC Chapel Hill (Thomas, "The Message of Affirmative Action," The
Affirmative Action Debate, ed. SM Cahn, Routeledge, Social Philosophy and Policy, p. 169-170)
Actions, as the saying goes, often speak louder than words. There are times, too, when only actions can effectively communicate the message we want to convey, and times when giving a message is a central part of the purpose of action. What our actions say to others depends largely, though not entirely, upon our avowed reasons for acting; and this is a matter for reflective [end page 169] decision, not something we discover later by looking back at what we did and its effects. The decision is important because "the same act" can have very different consequences, depending

upon how we choose to justify it. In a sense, acts done for different reasons are not "the same act" even if otherwise similar, and so not merely the consequences but also the moral nature of our acts depend in part on our decisions about the reasons for doing them. Unfortunately, the message actually
conveyed by our actions does not depend only on our intentions and reasons, for our acts may have a meaning for others quite at odds with what we hoped to express. Others may misunderstand our intentions, doubt our sincerity, or discern a subtext that undermines the primary message. Even if sincere, well-intended, and successfully conveyed, the message of an act or policy does not by itself justify the means by which it is conveyed; it is almost always a relevant factor, however, in the moral assessment of the act or policy. These remarks may strike you as too obvious to be worth mentioning; for, even if we do not usually express the ideas so abstractly, we are all familiar with them in our daily interactions with our friends, families, and colleagues. Who, for example, does not know the importance of the message expressed in

offering money to another person, as well as the dangers of misunderstanding? What is superficially "the same act" can be an offer to buy, an admission of guilt, an expression of gratitude, a contribution to a common cause, a condescending display of superiority, or an outrageous insult.

4. Proves the link to our K - the refusal to defend assumptions and constantly shift the target of discussion neutralizes criticism and provides a useful shield to conceal domination - if we win their words have negative effects you vote neg 5. It's precisely the sort of strategic position taking that we criticize. This is a debate already about techne versus ontology. The question is what kind of mode of being we should embrace, not who can out position the other. Privileging their exploitation of rational decision-making is precisely the kind of deference to strategy that authorizes MAD, preemption, etc.

ATRisk Assessment
Insecurity is inevitable and the affirmative's strategy of risk management creates a perpetual state of emergency Kristensen 8Kristian Soby Kristensen, PhD candidate with the Research Unit on Defense and Security
at the Danish Institute for International Studies, Political Science @ University of Copenhagen, "'The absolute protection of our citizens': critical infrastructure protection and the practice of security," Securing 'the Homeland:' Critical Infrastructure, Risk, and (In)Security, ed. Cavelty and Kristensen, pg. 63-84) This view is diametrically opposed to the conception outlined earlier. If, as stated by President Bush, every terrorist attack has a national impact (Bush 2003a: ix), then every terrorist attack is important. This effectively annuls the discriminating function of risk. There are two simultaneous CIP rationalities at work in government strategies, with two opposing goals. On the one hand, the goal of absolute protection inevitably expands the meaning of critical infrastructure protection, and security concerns cover more and more parts of society and thus necessarily integrate an increasing number of private actors. On the other hand, the concept of risk makes anti-terror strategies relative, dependent on other goals besides absolute protection. There is a fundamental conceptual instability in the discourse on how to protect critical infrastructure and secure society. Risk introduces probability as the basis for action, which makes sense from the economic-risk perspective of business. Taking action based on calculated risk is a normal and legitimate business practice. However, that is not the way things usually work when national security is at stake. In the national security context, action is usually justified by the precautionary principle of 'better safe than sorry' (on the precautionary principle as security strategy, see Rasmussen 2006: 123-9; Aradau
and van Munster 2007). Risk analysis depends on how important the object of analysis is deemed to be, and on how the consequences of putting it at risk are assessed; ultimately, it depends

, when protection from terror has already been defined as the most important activity of the state, the costs of a terrorist attack are always already analysed as being too high; the risk of incurring such an attack would always be catastrophic. Applying a risk perspective will not fundamentally change this, and thus the goal of securing the homeland is still conceived as consisting of 'absolute protection'. The two opposing conceptualizations, which are not easily made compatible, both live on in the discourse.
on a costbenefit analysis. Furthermore

ATFloating PIK
1. Key to make the kritik relevant if we need to kritik each of their impacts, theyll just read a ton of bad advantages and add ons to nullify our criticism. Their model of debate crowds out substantive kritiks with a bad model of policy debate. 2. Their interpretation condones racist and sexist discourse the Aff could make morally repugnant arguments and win on other advantages. Our interp is key to hold the Aff accountable for what they say. 3. Our interpretation causes better K debating a. Forcing the Neg to read link arguments to every advantage is bad it means we need to read hodgepodge kritiks with a bunch of inconsistent link arguments just to keep up. AIKs focus the debate on coherent strains of scholarship. b. Their interpretation encourages overly general kritiks their standard means we only get monolithic and simplistic critiques that impact turn the whole Aff. Our interp is key to enable specific, nuanced kritiks. 4. No infinite regress net benefits check since we need to establish substantive reasons why their particular representations should be the focus of the debate. Just because the Neg could read bad PICs like plan minus a penny doesnt mean you reject all PICs you should hold AIKs to the same standard. 5. Plan Focus Bad a. Real World debates a communication activity and how we shape our advocacies influences persuasion. Interrogating representations and discourse is key to understanding how language functions and structures advocacies. b. Arbitrary debate has existed without plan focus we shouldnt dogmatically bind ourselves to a model of debate that crowds out good K arguments. 6. Offense/Defense is a bad standard for theory debates it creates an incentive for the Aff to make lots of blippy theory arguments based on trivial distinctions. Our interpretation meets a reasonable standard of predictability and fairness since we have evidence saying their representations are bad and should be the focus of discussion. That should be sufficient. 7. Reject the argument not the team at worst you result to an Alt without an AIK.

ATVagueness
Vagueness is key to solvencyattempts to pin down our project to a stable locus for discussion is a tactic of the state to delegitimize resistance Der Derian 98 *James, prof of political science at Brown, The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx,
Nietzsche, and Baudrillard On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html] What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I
first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." 9 Foucault, however, gives

the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. 10 The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference.

ATYoon
Pre-emption - even if they are correct in their identification of threats, security inflates them and leads to hyper-militarized solutions Davis 6 Prof English @ Gordon College (Doug, Future-War Storytelling: National Security and Popular Film,
ReThinking Global Security, Ed. Martin and Petro, pg 16) Strategic Fiction and the History of the Future Fictions of nuclear terrorism have become part of a priviledged class of storytelling that represents the strategic facts of U.S. national security. Straddling facts and fiction, they are strategic fictions, tales of catastrophic future wars whose scenarios everyday citizens and defense planners alike treat as seriously as historical fact. Strategic fictions become an intrinsic part of U.S. national security strategy during the world war with the formulation of a policy of nuclear defense built on an imagined catastrophic future war. Imagined nuclear terrorism and other kinds of indefensible catastrophic attacks now occupy the central place in the imaginary of national defense once held by the vision of nuclear war. The events described by these stories and scenarios are not real, but they could be. For national defense planners, that is reality enough. The catastrophic near-future worlds these imaginary narratives build are, in a dramatic way, the future of our world. The threats they represent are a license to act, to arm, and to war.

ATBest Arctic Models


Their models are reasons why liberalism is good - we agree. The aff's containment policy destroys liberal IR by undermining relations with Russia - that's 1AC Cohen - and here's more evidence that distrust poisons relations Allison & Blackwill 11 Chairs, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, Director of
Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Graham Allison AND Robert Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care?," Harvard Belfer Center, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf) In some respects, difficulty sustaining improvements in the U.S.-Russia relationship has had less to do with specific differences and more to do with an inability to break down lasting mutual distrust. This suspicion of one anothers motives may in fact be a greater obstacle to cooperation than sometimes divergent national interests and values. Some of the most challenging problems, like missile defense, are quite hard to manage without mutual confidence, but failure to manage them only creates further doubt in the minds of leaders in both capitals . Addressing these
difficult issues requires a process of dialogue that works simultaneously toward building more trust and toward developing practical policy solutions. Shared success in tackling hard problems can create its own momentum.

Prefer specific evidence describing relations with Russia over their generic evidence about Arctic multilateralism. Even if cooperating over Arctic security is bad, the status quo is a balance of power, not multilateral engagement. The plan's containment strategy poisons Russia relations even if it stabilizes the Arctic
Defenders of the status quo might contend that chronic threat inflation and an overmilitarized foreign policy have not prevented the United States from preserving a
high degree of safety and security and therefore are not pressing problems. Others might argue that although the world might not be dangerous now, it could quickly become so if the United

underestimate the costs and risks of the status quo and overestimate the need for the United States to rely on an aggressive military posture driven by outsized fears. Since the end of the Cold War, most improvements in U.S. security have not depended primarily on the country's massive military, nor have they resulted from the constantly expanding definition of U.S. national security interests. The United States deserves praise for promoting greater international economic interdependence and open markets and, along with a host of international and regional organizations and private actors, more limited credit for improving global public health and assisting in the development of democratic governance. But although U.S. military strength has occasionally contributed to creating a conducive environment for positive change, those improvements were achieved mostly through the work of civilian agencies and nongovernmental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors. The record of an overgrown post-Cold War U.S. military is far more mixed. Although some U.S.-led military efforts, such as the NATO intervention in the Balkans, have contributed to safer regional environments, the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened regional and global security, leading to hundreds of thousands of casualties and refugee crises (according to the Office of the un High Commissioner for Refugees, 45 percent of all refugees today are fleeing the violence provoked by those two wars). Indeed, overreactions to perceived security threats, mainly from terrorism, have done significant damage to U.S. interests and threaten to weaken the global norms and institutions that helped create and sustain the current era of peace and security. None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a diaerent role,
States grows too sanguine about global risks and reduces its military strength. Both positions one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups.

Links

Airports
Airports are a representation of the securitized state
Salter 07
Mark Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport:Heterotopia and Confession, International Political Sociology(2007)1, 4966 The modern international airport represents and reflects the intersecting forces that organize contemporary politics, facilitating transit while simultaneously securitizing identity. I take this site seriously and ask: how is the airport governed? I make use of two neglected notions from Foucaults considerable body of work: the confessionary complex and the heterotopia. Modern subjects, according to Foucault, are conditioned by a Christian notion of continual, exhaustive confes- sion in the face of state apparatus, securing not only a docile body but also an anxious, self-disclosing citizen. The airport, while emancipatory and open for some, represents a locus of anxiety and interrogation for many others. In his lecture Of Other Spaces, Foucault proposes an examination of heterotopias, locations that are in relation with all other sites, but in such a way to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect (1986:24). The airport connects the national and the international (also the national to itself), the domestic and the foreign, in a way that problematizes those connections. In particular, I argue that within this multifaceted environment dominated by doctrines of risk management and customer service, the confessionary complex facilitates the self-policing of transiting individuals and that the overlapping and obscured lines of authority subtly restrict the possibilities of resistance. International political sociology balances theoretical analysis and empirical material, with an overtly political but not prescriptive frame. By focusing on the system of policies, practices, and discourses that govern particular intersections of the local, national, and global, international political sociology explores the intersections of power and authority that shape the governance of these specific institutions. By eschewing a strict linguistic turn, international political sociology examines not simply the language of politics but also a wider notion of discourse including prac- tices, institutions, and authorities. Bigos attention to the rise of international risk consultancies and Walters examination of the deportation and decitizenship re- gimes provide new ways of looking at policing and security. International political sociology is well situated to reflect critically on the airport, taking as its subject matter not the grand structure of a universal politics, but more modest examin- ations of specific sites and institutions where politics are enacted, or as Foucault terms it humble modalities, minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of state

Airports are a key location for biopolitical organization


Salter 07 (Mark Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport:Heterotopia and Confession, International Political
Sociology(2007)1, 4966) Train stations, ports, and airports Fall the sites of institutionalized mobility present the state with a policing challenge. Although he does not examine these transit sites in particular, Foucault is particularly useful in placing discussions of territory, population, and control within a theoretical frame that analyzes both sovereign and governmental modes of power. The airport represents a combination of the sovereign power to ban or exclude, and the disciplinary surveillance of mobile citizens. Throughout his work, Foucault illustrated an interest in the way that political and power relationships could be demonstrated or obscured through spatial arrangements. In modern Europe, Foucault argues that architecture [. . .] is no longer built simply to be seen, or to observe the external space, but to general terms, an architecture that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them (1977: 172). He encourages the analysis of heterotopias as spaces which are linked with all the others, which however contradict all the(se) sites . . . (1986:24). Airports are an architectural shell in which mobility is channeled even as the buildings themselves are in a constant state of flux, flirting with obsolescence, reshaping themselves, and adapting to new technologies (Gordon 2004:167); though they remain metastable: stable in their constant instability (Fuller and Harley 2005:114). Analyses of these kinds of

heterotopic spaces populate Foucaults work on prisons, clinics, workhouses, and archives . He argues that crisis heterotopias such as convents, boarding schools, military academies, and so on, in which dangerous rites of pas- sage are spatially contained are being replaced by heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed. (1986:25). Although Foucault does not examine it, the airport certainly qualifies as this kind of heterotopia, both in terms of the isolation of the rites of passage of entry into and exit from the territory of the state, and in terms of the containment of deviant, mobile subjects. International mobility is deviance in a system of territorial nation-states. As Fuller and Harley aver, transit-life is a direct challenge to more placed notions of self and citizen (2005:38). Torpey (2000) and Noiriel (1996) examine how the machinery of government identification attempts to know the mobile population in order to control it. Where I gain the most traction, however, is in Foucaults delineation of heterotopias as capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several places, several sites that are in themselves incompatible (1986:25). In an extension of Bigos mob us ribbon metaphor, one might argue that in the airport the national, the international, and the non-national spaces of transit are all proximate if not coterminous in the space of the terminal. Further, heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable (2001:26), as the airport is both separated from its own proximate urban space and connected to distant urban spaces (Adey 2006:343345).

Airports are a key matrix for modern biopower


Salter 07 (Mark Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport:Heterotopia and Confession, International Political
Sociology(2007)1, 4966) Airports are spaces that represent the policing power of the sovereign state, that contain the dangerous or risky elements of the unknown, and that render certain mobilities visible and others impossible or invisible. The trick of the modern airport is to present immobility as mobility, stagnancy as efficiency, and incarceration as freedom. Adey (forthcoming b) takes this interrogation of the space further to disrupt the common avowal of airports as exclusively spaces of flows. He argues that passengers are often made relatively immobile, encourage to dwell and stay within specific area s of the airport space (forthcoming b:3). Evaluating the intertwining commercial and managerial imperatives, Adey illustrates how airport design and function serve to create relatively stationary passengers (forthcoming b:10). The mobility machine creates dead time at odds with its aim of efficient transit (arriving 3 hours before departure), which is then consumed by shops and restaurants. The airport is not the place of the idle flaneur who strolls among the vaulted terminals that characterize mode rn airport architecture. Pedestrian movements and transit time are both structured by design to enable consumption, mobility, and social sorting. It should not surprise us that the same architects design modern airport terminals, shopping malls, and penitentiaries (Gordon 2004:238). Fuller and Harley argue that, similar to the prison or the clinic, the disciplinary tactics of the airport are made possible through a logic of exceptionality: in our need to move, we submit to a series of invasive procedures and security checks that are becoming more pervasive and yet are still rationalized through a discourse of exception only at the airport (2005:44). Modern international airports are borders, where claims to citizenship, immigration, and refugee status are adjudicated. Moreover, the bordering or sorting process takes place throughout the terminal in the airline check-in lines for economy and business class travelers, the customs lines for foreigners and nationals, the frequent flyer lounges, and deportation holding cells. The utility of a heterotopic analysis, in the face of competing models of a non-space stems from the attention Foucault pays to the contradictory elements in these spaces. Following Lisles discussion of mediated power at the airport, heterotopias are deceptive in that they seem to be pure and simple openings, but [. . .] hide curious exclusions (2003:26). In the judicial trial, the accused is the author of his/her testimony, but not the final arbiter of truth about themselves. In the clinic, the patient is the author of the symptoms and history, but not the final arbiter of the diagnosis. So too in the airport, a traveler is the author of ones identity, but not the final arbiter of his/her belonging or mobility. The space of transit is fragmented so that arriving, departing, accompanying, and supporting staff are all hidden from one another. The connection of domestic to foreign is also smoothed by an international uniform language of iconic signs, and in the cases of Ben Gurion and Incheon airports, great walls of stones that simulate a solid boundary between inside and outside. As engaged critics, we must take note not simply of travelers eager to limit their time in the airport through frequent flyer and trusted traveler programs but also those travelers reluctantly

hustled out of the airport aboard deportation class (Walters 2002). Although a primary function of the airport is security, the most fundamental policing functions are conducted out of sight. Many of the gates and check-points that structure mobilities in the airport are invisible (Adey 2004a, 2004b). Indeed, given most airports detachment from urban space, travelers have already been pre -cleared, if only by their ability to arrive at the airport itself. Lloyd argues that the space of the airport has been configured into a space of consumption so that the figure of global traveler is allied to the global consumer, whereas the national citizens othered figures, the homeless person and refugee, are precluded by consumption practices . . . This image scape of free mobility in the international terminal is markedly different from the backstage containment of national others in identity checks, detention, and deportation that takes place within the very same institution (2003:106). The airport attempts to make all of these in- congruous forces appear smooth and systematic, as if all travelers were safe, all planes on time and all policing efficient. Analyzing the airport as a heterotopia leads to three insights: the disaggregation of sovereignty and territory, the importance of confession and surveillance at the airport, and the hidden dynamics of airport security screening.

Competitiveness
The notion of competitiveness authorizes global violence. Schoenberger, Geography and Envtl Eng @ Johns Hopkins, 98. *Erica, Discourse and practice in
human geography. Progress in Human Geography 22 (1) p. 2-5]
In what follows, I want to examine the meaning and use of the concept of `competitiveness'. The analysis claims, in essence, that the term is not merely an `objective' description of a fact of economic life, but also part of a discursive strategy that constructs a particular understanding of reality and elicits actions and reactions appropriate to that understanding. This is followed by a discussion of why the discourse has the power that it does and how it may influence how we think about and act in the world. I then work through some examples of how an unexamined acceptance of a discursive convention may obscure as much as it reveals. II Competitiveness as an economic category and discursive strategy I'm going to make this as simple as possible for myself by reducing the whole problem of discourse to one word: competitiveness. For economic geographers in general and for me in particular, the categories of competition, competitive strategy and competitiveness have a great deal of importance and might even be thought to pervade our work, even when they are not directly under analysis. All sorts of industrial and spatial economic outcomes are implicitly or explicitly linked to some notion of `competitiveness' (cf. Krugman, 1994). The rise and decline of particular industrial regions have something to do with the competitiveness of the labour force (generally understood in terms of comparative costs and unionization), which (for geographers if for no one else) has something to do with the competitiveness of the region in the first place, understood as its particular mix of resources, infrastructure, location and cost profile. More than that, though, `competitiveness' seems to me a term that has become truly hegemonic in the Gramscian sense. It is a culturally and socially sanctioned category that, when invoked, can completely halt public discussion of public or private activities. There is virtually no counterargument available to the simple claim that `doing X will make us uncompetitive,' whatever X and whomever `us' might be.2 In a capitalist society, of course, it is more than reasonable to be concerned with competition and competitiveness. No matter what your theoretical orientation, main- stream to Marxist, these must be seen as real forces shaping real outcomes in society. They are not just intellectual constructs that lend a false sense of order to a messy world. On the other hand, we can also analyse them as elements of a discursive strategy that shapes our understanding of the world and our possibilities for action in it. In that case, it seems to me the first questions to ask are whose discursive strategy is it, what do they really mean by it, where does its power come from, and what kinds of actions does it tend to open up or foreclose. 1 Whose discourse? The discourse on competitiveness comes from two principal sources and in part its power is their power. In the first instance, it is the discourse of the economics profession which doesn't really need to analyse what it is or what it means socially. The market is the impartial and ultimate arbiter of right behaviour in the economy and competitiveness simply describes the result of responding correctly to market signals. The blandness of this `objective' language conceals the underlying harshness of the metaphor. For Adam Smith, the idea of competition plausibly evoked nothing more disturbing than a horse race in which the losers are not summarily executed. Since then, the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a life or death struggle (cf. Niehans, 1990).3 In short, on competitiveness hangs life itself. As Krugman (1994: 31) defines it: `. . . when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is . . . unsustainable that unless it improves its performance it will cease to exist.' As with evolutionary theory, our ability to strip the moral and ethical content from the concepts of life and death is not so great as the self-image of modern science suggests. Competitiveness becomes inescapably associated with ideas of fitness and unfitness, and these in turn with the unstated premise of merit, as in `deserving to live' and `deserving to die'. Secondly, competitiveness is the discourse of the business community and represents both an essential value and an essential validation. More generally, it serves as an all- purpose and unarguable explanation for any behaviour: `We must do X in order to be competitive.' Again, the implied `or else' is death. As hinted, though, the discourse of competitiveness has seeped out beyond these sources and is becoming socially pervasive. University presidents, hospital admin- istrators and government bureaucrats also discourse quite fluently now about compet- itiveness and its related accoutrements: customers, total quality, flexibility and so forth. It will be objected that competitiveness is a deeply ingrained social category and value in the USA and elsewhere

and there is no particular reason to single out economists and business persons as culprits in its dissemination. That objection is true enough, and no doubt contributes to the general power of the discourse since it resonates so well with this broader heritage. But `competitiveness' in the sense of `deserving to live' is not what was commonly meant by this more diffuse social understanding. It is, however, what is meant in economic analysis and business life, and it is increasingly what is meant in other institutional and social settings as well.

Use of economic competitiveness discourse justifies trade wars and protectionism


Berger and Bristow (Thomas, Professor, Department of International Relations, Boston University, and Gillian, Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography at Cardiff) 09
(Thomas and Gillian, Competitiveness and the Benchmarking of Nations- A Critical Reflection, September 9, 2009. http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=1de2b04e-c758-4225-8cb3396889ad585f%40sessionmgr14&vid=2&hid=10)
National competitiveness is also frequently conceptualized in terms of the ability to earn or the economys overall results in macroeconomic terms. In short, it is assumed that a higher degree of competitiveness leads to a higher GDP or income, and therefore to a higher standard of living (McFetridge 1995). The source for this is seen in productivity gains (Porter 1990). Indeed, Porter asserts that national competitiveness is equivalent to productivity. This reflects the close links which he believes exist between the microeconomic productivity of firms and the macroeconomic performance of the national economy. It follows that the ability to adjust through continuous innovation and flexibility to changing market demands is also deemed by some to be synonymous with national competitiveness. Finally, competitiveness is also increasingly conceived as reflecting a nations ability to attract outside investments in both financial capital and the skilled human resources required for development (Kovai 2007, 555). This reflects the predominance of the discourse of globalization which has helped sediment that view that nations are engaged in fierce competition with one another for globally mobile capital, innovative firms, finite government resources and skilled, creative labour (Bristow 2005). A Growing Critique Porters so-called competitive diamond has become one of the most influential frameworks for conceptualizing national economic competitiveness and identifying some of its key determinants, namely firm strategy, structure and rivalry; factor input conditions; demand conditions; and related and supporting industries. However, it falls short of providing a comprehensive theory capable of yielding testable predictions on the precise causal relationships shaping competitiveness performance (Lall 2001).As a consequence, there has been growing critique of the concept of national competitiveness and the rather flimsy theoretical base on which it rests. Krugman (1997, 7) summarizes the confusion which surrounds the meaning of national competitiveness with his assertion that it is largely defined in vague and approximate terms as the combination of favorable trade performance and something else. This is referring to the fact that most definitionsjust like the one by the OECD (1992)refer to the ability to sell concept. This is often accompanied with a call for a strategic management on the national level, focusing on high-value added activities, exports or innovation, depending on the underlying concept. The danger here is that such rhetoric is used to justify protectionism and trade wars. Krugman (1994, 1997) goes on to argue that national competitiveness is either a new word for domestic productivity or meaningless political rhetoric. Whilst nations may compete for investments if companies seek new business locations, this represents only a minor fraction of economic activities for bigger economies. Furthermore, this is often connected with subsidies or tax reductions to attract such investments. This strategic management for the attraction of investment and the fostering of exports is, according to Krugman, little more than political rhetoric, designed to promote an image rather than secure clear and unambiguous economic dividends,. Similarly, Cohen (1994, 196) describes the notion of national competitiveness in terms of Presidential metaphors, [trying] to encapsulate complicated matters for purposes of political mobilization, perhaps implying that national competitiveness might be better understood in the fields of political science and place marketing. Indeed, growing interest in the notion of competitiveness as a hegemonic construct or discourse provides further strength to the view that its value lies beyond that of an economic model or concept, but rests instead with its capacity to mobilize interestrelated action (Bristow 2005). As such, this paper focuses on the utility of national indices of

competitiveness, particularly for policymakers and key interest groups promoting it.

Discourse of Economic Competitiveness is based off of securitization of relative decline that leads to all forms of protectionism Cable (Head of the International Economics Program, Royal Institute of International Affairs) 95
(Vincent, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) , Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 305-324, April 1995, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2623436)
While it is difficult to see much evidence that Western governments are moving decisively towards 'geoeconomic' thinking, there has been a powerful upsurge in populist forms of protectionism, fed by the idea- promulgated by the likes of Ross Perot and, more recently in Europe, by Sir James Goldsmith-that foreign trade is a threat to jobs and living standards. The fallacies embodied in these ideas have been set out in considered detail elsewhere.20 The practical consequence of their popularity is that geo- economic ideas can become embedded politically, in particular the belief that international economic integration is a win-lose, zero-sum game. Thus the groundwork is laid for protectionism in all its forms. The most pervasive danger in the competitiveness obsession is that it shifts the attention of policy-makers away from those things which affect absolute economic performance and living standards towards the 'threat' of relative decline. Thus Samuel Huntington worries that 'American influence in third countries declines relative to that of Japan ... Japan has supplanted the US as the largest provider of economic assistance.'2I In this sense, geo-economics is doomed to frustration, since technological catch-up and liberal policy reform mean that emerging market economies are almost certainly bound to grow faster than the US (or EU), which will consequently have a steadily shrinking share of world GNP and trade. Britain has had to get used to relative decline for a century or more and the process is by no means complete. Such relativities should be a matter of indifference but, in practice, states, like individuals, are often more agitated by differential than absolute performance. And in the context of geo-economics relativities trigger alarm because they are seen as affecting the capacities of countries to defend themselves. Geoeconomic prescriptions-where this involves protectionism-may, however, actually make the problem, if it is one, worse.

Economy
Securitization of the economy is another attempt to maintain power, but it leads to protectionist policies and destroys economic strength
Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie, Director Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz, 1998. On Security p. 11 -12)
The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and "economic security." What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: "Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence") shows how strategic economic interdependence--a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle--undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that have been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this "new security dilemma," as Crawford has stylized it? According to Crawford, state decisionmakers can respond in three ways. First, they can try to restore state autonomy through self-reliance although, in doing so, they are likely to undermine state strength via reduced competitiveness. Second, they can try to restrict technology transfer to potential enemies, or the trading partners of potential enemies, although this begins to include pretty much everybody. It also threatens to limit the market shares of those corporations that produce the most innovative technologies. Finally, they can enter into co-production projects or encourage strategic alliances among firms. The former approach may slow down technological development; the latter places control in the hands of actors who are driven by market, and not military, forces. They are, therefore, potentially unreliable. All else being equal, in all three cases, the state appears to be a net loser where its security is concerned. But this does not prevent the state from trying to gain.

The foundations of state power have changed since the Cold War Efforts to improve economic power represent attempts at securitization
Schweller, 11 (Randall Schweller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Rational Theory for
a Bygone Era, Security Studies Vol. 20 Issue 3, 8/25/2011, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2011.599196, RM) But geography and policies rooted in geopolitics have become less relevant to the formation of strategy and politics than they were when raw materials and land were the major prerequisites for state power. We no longer live in a world governed by the logic of the mercantilist age, when military conquest to control territory and achieve autarky (or a monopoly on goods) was the surest route to riches and power. Today, the traditional link between territory and wealth has been largely broken. The current era of high technology, instant communication, and nuclear weapons has significantly raised the benefits of peace and the costs of war. What matters most today is not a state's ability to exert direct control over resources but its capacity to purchase them in a free global market. Accordingly, the foundation of modern state power has shifted away from traditional military power toward an emphasis on economic production and a sustained capacity to generate ideas and commercial innovations that create wealth. To be perfectly clear on this point, innovation and economic growth remain key building blocks of military power; I am not suggesting otherwise. Rather, I am saying that military power is no longer an essential building block of economic growth and wealth creation; and this has deeply changed the nature of international politics and how the game is played.

Hegemony
The impulse to preserve hegemony authorizes global violence along racial lines. Amy Kaplan, Prof. of English @ Univ. of Pennslyvania, 3 *American Quarterly 56.1, Violent Belongings
and the Question of Empire Today, p. muse+
Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the "reluctant imperialist." 10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an [End Page 4] uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes not reluctantly at allin "Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World": "The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society." 11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image. This is also a narrative about race. The images of an unruly world, of anarchy and chaos, of failed modernity, recycle stereotypes of racial inferiority from earlier colonial discourses about races who are incapable of governing themselves, Kipling's "lesser breeds without the law," or Roosevelt's "loosening ties of civilized society," in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In his much-noted article in the New York Times Magazine entitled "The American Empire," Michael Ignatieff appended the subtitle "The Burden" but insisted that "America's empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden." 12 Denial and exceptionalism are apparently alive and well. In American studies we need to go beyond simply exposing the racism of empire and examine the dynamics by which Arabs and the religion of Islam are becoming racialized through the interplay of templates of U.S. racial codes and colonial Orientalism. These narratives of the origins of the current empire that is, the neoconservative and the liberal interventionisthave much in common. They take American exceptionalism to new heights: its paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality at the same time. They share a teleological narrative of inevitability, that America is the apotheosis of history, the embodiment of universal values of human rights, liberalism, and democracy, the "indispensable nation," in Madeleine Albright's words. In this logic, the United States claims the authority to "make sovereign judgments on what is right and what is wrong" for everyone [End Page 5] else and "to exempt itself with an absolutely clear conscience from all the rules that it proclaims and applies to others." 13 Absolutely protective of its own sovereignty, it upholds a doctrine of limited sovereignty for others and thus deems the entire world a potential site of intervention. Universalism thus can be made manifest only through the threat and use of violence. If in these narratives imperial power is deemed the solution to a broken world, then they preempt any counternarratives that claim U.S. imperial actions, past and present, may have something to do with the world's problems. According to this logic, resistance to empire can never be opposition to the imposition of foreign rule; rather, resistance means irrational opposition to modernity and universal human values. Although these narratives of empire seem ahistorical at best, they are buttressed not only by nostalgia for the British Empire but also by an effort to rewrite the history of U.S. imperialism by appropriating a progressive historiography that has exposed empire as a dynamic engine of American history. As part of the "coming-out" narrative, the message is: "Hey what's the big deal. We've always been interventionist and imperialist since the Barbary Coast and Jefferson's 'empire for liberty.' Let's just be ourselves." A shocking example can be found in the reevaluation of the brutal U.S. war against the Philippines in its

struggle for independence a century ago. This is a chapter of history long ignored or at best seen as a shameful aberration, one that American studies scholars here and in the Philippines have worked hard to expose, which gained special resonance during the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet proponents of empire from different political perspectives are now pointing to the Philippine-American War as a model for the twenty-first century. As Max Boot concludes in Savage Wars of Peace, "The Philippine War stands as a monument to the U.S. armed forces' ability to fight and win a major counterinsurgency campaign one that was bigger and uglier than any that America is likely to confront in the future." 14 Historians of the United States have much work to do here, not only in disinterring the buried history of imperialism but also in debating its meaning and its lessons for the present, and in showing how U.S. interventions have worked from the perspective of comparative imperialisms, in relation to other historical changes and movements across the globe. The struggle over history also entails a struggle over language and culture. It is not enough to expose the lies when Bush hijacks words [End Page 6] such as freedom, democracy, and liberty. It's imperative that we draw on our knowledge of the powerful alternative meanings of these key words from both national and transnational sources. Today's reluctant imperialists are making arguments about "soft power," the global circulation of American culture to promote its universal values. As Ignatieff writes, "America fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires." 15 The work of scholars in popular culture is more important than ever to show that the Americanization of global culture is not a one-way street, but a process of transnational exchange, conflict, and transformation, which creates new cultural forms that express dreams and desires not dictated by empire. In this fantasy of global desire for all things American, those whose dreams are different are often labeled terrorists who must hate our way of life and thus hate humanity itself. As one of the authors of the Patriot Act wrote, "when you adopt a way of terror you've excused yourself from the community of human beings." 16 Although I would not minimize the violence caused by specific terrorist acts, I do want to point out the violence of these definitions of who belongs to humanity. Often in our juridical system under the Patriot Act, the accusation of terrorism alone, without due process and proof, is enough to exclude persons from the category of humanity. As scholars of American studies, we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and slaves to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.

The portrayal of the U.S. as a benign hegemon justifies its violence in the name of peace. The U.S. forces its image of an ideal world onto the world order. Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies,
University of Edinburgh. The Rhetoric of Security, The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005. The Bush administration perpetually affirms that the war against terrorism declared in response to the attacks of September 2001 is "different from any other war in our history" and will continue "for the foreseeable future." This affirmation, and indeed the very declaration of such a war, belongs to a rhetoric of security that predates the Bush administration and which this administration has intensified but not fundamentally altered. Rhetorically speaking, terrorism is the ideal enemy of the United States, more so than any alien civilization and perhaps even more so than the tyrannies of communism and fascism, terrorism's defeated sisters. This is because terrorism is depicted in U.S. rhetoric not as an immoral tactic employed in political struggle, but as an immoral condition that extinguishes the possibility of peaceful political deliberation. This condition is the state of war, in absolute moral opposition to the peaceful condition of civil society. As a state of war, terrorism portends the dissolution of the civil relations obtaining within and among nations, particularly liberal nations, and thus portends the dissolution of civilization itself. Terrorism is therefore outside the world order, in the sense that it cannot be managed within this order since it is the very absence of civil order. For there to be a world order at all, terrorism must be eradicated. In prosecuting a world war against the state of war, the United States puts itself outside the world order as well. The Bush administration affirms, like the Clinton administration before it, that because the identity of the United States lies in the values that engender peace (freedom and democracy), the national interests of the United

States always coincide with the interests of the world order. The United States is the animus of the world order and the power that sustains it. For this reason, any threat to the existence of the United States is a threat to world peace itself, and anything that the United States does to secure its existence is justified as necessary for the preservation of world peace. In this way, the existence of the United States stands at the center of world peace and liberal values, yet remains outside the purview of these values, since when under threat it is subject only to the extra-moral necessity of self-preservation. I will argue that the symmetrical externality of the United States and terrorism to the world order lies at the foundation of the rhetoric of security by which the U.S. government justifies its hegemonic actions and policies. This
rhetoric depicts a world in which helpless, vulnerable citizens can achieve agency only through the U.S. government, while terrorist individuals and organizations command magnitudes of destructive power previously held only by states. The moral-psychological discourse of agency and fear, freedom and enslavement invoked by this rhetoric is rooted in both classical liberalism and postwar U.S. foreign policy. The war of "freedom" against "fear" is a psychic struggle with no specific military

enemies or objectives. It arises from the portrayal of the United States as an autarkic, ideally impermeable collective agent that reshapes the external world in its own image. The
war of freedom against fear thereby justifies measures said to increase the defenses and internal security of the United States as well as measures said to spread freedom and democracy over the world. Now

that the destructive capacity of warlike individuals can threaten the world order, the power of the United States must be deployed in equal measure to neutralize this threat throughout the world. The world as a whole now comes within the purview of U.S. disciplinary action. Any manifestation of the state of war, terrorist activity, anywhere in the world, is now a threat to the existence of the United States and to world peace.There is
no clash of civilizations, but the Middle East, as the current site of the state of war, is the primary danger to the world and must be contained,controlled, and reshaped. The symmetrical externality of the United States and terrorism to the world order, then, allows its rhetoric to envision a historic opportunity for mankindthe final elimination of the state of war from human existence, and fear from the political psyche. Thiswill be achieved, however, only by incorporating the world order into the United States for the foreseeable future.

Generic Link
The affs creation of new infrastructure just provides another object to securitize and protect since it is another vulnerability Cavelty and Kristensen 8
(Myriam Cavelty, lecturer and head of the new risks research unit at the Center for Security studies. Kristian Kristensen, PhD candidate working with the Research Unit on Defense and Security at the Danish Institute for International Studies,Securing the Homeland Critical infrastructur e, risk and (in)security pg10-12)

homeland security is painted with the help of CIP. What emerges is a specific kind of materiality, which is both an condition for protection practices, but also reproduced through them. As we have pointed out before, an infrastructure is, in the first instance of its etymology, something that exists, and is also fundamentally on the inside. In other words, we are looking at the practic e of protecting physical and inanimate things. Bridges, storage facilities, streets or buildings, for instance, are objects that are easily identifiable (within Euclidian space) and that have a value for society that is usually undisputed. That they should be made safe makes perfect sense to everyone: infrastructure protection is therefore ultimately concerned with protecting property and it is obviously legitimate for the state to protect its property. We can even take this argument a step further and argue that cyberspace, too, is grounded in physical reality. Quite obviously, there would be no virtual realm without the physical infrastructures that facilitate its existence. As one observer argues, the channelling of information flows occurs within the framework of a real geography (Suteanu 2005: 130) made up of servers, cables, computers, satellites, etc. Philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Zizek even suggests that cyberspace realises the oxymoron of being actually virtual that these technologies materialise virtuality (Zizek 1999). The protection of the critical information infrastructure like the protection of knowledge is also concerned with protecting the physical reality of the real geography with the help of electromagnetic-pulse-proof rooms or backup storages in impenetrable mountain reservoirs, but also with the help of better locks on server rooms.If the (core) rationality of CIP is associated with physical objects that exist in time and Space, CIP practices give specific value to the inside, to things that are tangible .
This image of underlying More than a metaphysical or legal expression of something that a state has, or is, CI and CIP is a concrete instantiation of these properties. CIP identifies,

Seen this way, infrastructure emerges as an alternative to the image of Leviathan as postulated by Hobbes: instead of being made up of its citizens, the state may be regarded as consisting of the things inside its territory that make life there good. Thus, the state consists of assets that are not directly identified with its citizens. Again, CIP, in the first place, sidesteps the traditional set of problems associated with security policy. Most importantly, there are no concerns about freedorn/security tradeoffs, and no civil liberty issues are involved, which differentiates CIP from other better-investigated security strategies.CIP thus seems to slip past Foucauldian bio-politics, and past the Home Sacer of Giorgio Agamben (1999). CIP does not depend upon the invocation of a state of emergency (Dillon 2003: 532), but is clean and unproblernatic. However, this ideal-type and utopian view of things is inevitably problematised, because there is no way of avoiding the intermingling with both flows and processes, with the truly virtual, and also with questions related to human subjects and the law. Even if cyberspace is assumed to have a material quality, the objects of protection in CIP include not only static infrastructures, but also various abstract things such as services, (information) flows, the role and function of infrastructures for society, and especially the core values that are delivered by the infrastructures. The physical pathways through which
signifies and makes specific the sovereign territory of the state, and is thus a way of re-actualising and re-identifying the state. information is transmitted do matter, but the role of the participants in the game, their functional attributes, their position in the virtual context (Suteanu 2005: 131) matter even more. While technologies may appear to accumulate information objectively and apolitically, the way in which that information is encoded, articulated and interpreted is always political. The protection of abstractions, such as the population or knowledge in the security domain becomes problemat ic rather quickly when considering surveillance programmes, the PATRIOT Act etc.The implications of security strategies for liberty, citizenship, and the freedom of

CIP emerges as an intermediate entity: even in discussions about virtual aspects or flows and processes, there is always a connection to a
human subjects has been thoroughly investigated and criticised elsewhere. But

place, to a space, to a space of protection. This book shows that homeland security and critical infrastructure protection practices are
expressions as well as causes of the breakdown of the central political distinctions between inside/outside, public/private, civil/military and normal/exceptional. It

Changing the practice of security. In other words, security is privatised while the Private is securitised . In transcending the distinction between inside and outside and reconfiguring the conditions for the exercise of sovereign authority, CIP destabilises our relation to space, time and territory. Security is no longer a special and extraordinary issue. This discourse is not primarily about threats and battles against an enemy, the focus of Part II of this volume, but is characterised almost more by an inward-looking narrative about vulnerability (Bigo 2006b: 89). This means that the traditional and normal conditions for day-to-day politics are intermingled with the exceptional dynamics
shows that the traditional sovereign act of making society secure has moved into the domestic space, of national security; and new forms of (in)security and protection emerge.

Hegemony link
The U.S. military strategy of creating a perfect safe world through its power is impossible. It futile attempts just create more violence in the name of liberty and peace.
Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27] Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the NSS reads more like late very latenineteenthcentury poetry than a strategic doctrine for the twenty-first century. The rhetoric of the White House

favors and clearly intends to mobilize the moral clarity, nostalgic sentimentality, and uncontested dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the ambiguities, complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. However, the gulf between the nation's stated cause ("to help make the world not just safer but better" [1]) and defensive needs (to fight "a war against terrorists of global reach" [5]) is so vast that one detects what Nietzsche referred to as the "breath of empty space," that void between the world as it is and as we would wish it to be, which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions. In short shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S. global objectives to the Congress elevates strategic discourse from a traditional, temporal calculation of means and ends, to the theological realm of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than analysis, revelation than reason, the NSS is not grand but grandiose strategy. In pursuit of an impossible state of national security against terrorist evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil liberties curtailed, civilians collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed.
But a nation's imperial overreach should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what's a full-spectrum dominance of the battle space for? Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of the NSS could be interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend the opening paragraph, which begins with "The United States possesses unprecedentedand unequaledstrength and influence in the world" and ends with "The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians that make up the defense intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration (among them, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol) have come up with a nuanced, indeed, anti-Machiavellian reading of Machiavelli that escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world in America's image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent threat, once rooted in historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions, [End Page 20] become free-floating signifiers. Few Europeans, "old" or "new," would recognize the balance

of power principle deployed by the NSS to justify preemptive, unilateral, military action against not actual but "emerging" imminent threats (15). Defined by the eighteenth-century
jurist Emerich de Vattel as a state of affairs in which no one preponderant power can lay down the law to others, the classical sense of balance of power is effectively inverted in principle by the NSS document and in practice by the go-it-alone statecraft of the United States. Balance of power is global

suzerainty, and war is peace.

The U.S. attempts to create a safe world do not always lead to the ideal world we hope for
Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19 -27] What significance should we make of the fact that the shortest section of the NSS (barely a page and a half) is on the "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" and rights, including "free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property" (3). Are these rights so self-evident and inalienable that they do not warrant further clarification or justification? It would seem so: "History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted

the rights and aspirations of their people" (3). And yet this universalist avowal of rights requires a selective if not outright denial of history. Where was the U.S. support of freedom, justice, and

religious and ethnic tolerance when it supported Saddam Hussein in his earlier war against Iran? When it provided intelligence, arms, and the precursors for chemical weapons of mass destruction? When it abandoned the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north of Iraq after the first Gulf War? Most significant is that these rights are considered "nonnegotiable," making war, if not the first, certainly more of a viable option when these [End Page 21] rights are violated. In this regard, President Bush's NSS is a continuation
rather than a repudiation of President Clinton's National Security Strategy of the United States 1994 1995: Engagement and Enlargement. To be sure, Clinton's National Security Strategy places greater emphasis on "preventive diplomacy" and multilateral intervention than Bush's preference for preemptive war and unilateralist predispositions. But the virtuous imperatives are in full evidence in the Clinton strategy: "All of America's strategic interestsfrom promoting prosperity at home to

checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territoryare served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy." 1 It is hardly surprising, then, that many liberals, both within the government and the university, supported the war against Iraq, and hardly unfair to question the extent to which Clinton and other moral interventionists prepared the high ground for this war. As a microcosm, consider one of
the most visible splits in the ranks at top American universities, when such "moral" liberals as Joseph Nye, Michael Ignatieff, and Samantha Power came out in support of the war, whereas such "amoral" realists as Stanley Hoffmann, Steve Walt, and John Mearsheimer publicly opposed it. Nietzsche, who always detected the smell of the swamp in all talk of virtue, finds in The Twilight of the Idols a "bestowing virtue" in the realist's "courage in the face of reality": "My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. Thucydides, and perhaps the Principe of

Machiavelli, are related to me closely by their unconditional will not to deceive themselves and to see reason in realitynot in reason,' still less in morality.' . . ."

Our national security strategy leaves us stuck in an endless war in which the world must either follow the U.S. or die
Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19 -27] The NSS might aim for peace, but it amounts to a blueprint for a permanent war. Gone is any trace of the humility that presidential candidate Bush invoked in his foreign policy addresses. In its place, hubris of an epic size obviates any historical or self-consciousness about the costs of

empire. What ends not predestined by America's righteousness are to be preempted by the sanctity of holy war. The NSS leaves the world with two options: peace on U.S. terms, or the perpetual peace of the grave. The evangelical seeps through the prose of global realpolitik and mitigates its harshest pronouncements with the solace of a better life to come. We all shall beas played by the band as the Titanic sank"Nearer My God to Thee"
(coincidently, written by Sarah Flower Adams, sister of the nineteenth-century poet Elizabeth Barrett, who secretly married . . .) .

The U.S.s hope for peace and strive to stay a hegemon usually ends violently with more problems
Der Derian 03 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19 -27] Ultimately, however, real-world transformations exceed the grasp of the NSS. The war in

Iraq put on full display just how effective the military could be in attaining its planned goals. But what falls outside the engineering and imaginary of the plan, what Edmund Burke
called the "empire of circumstance," is in the driver's seat and beyond the cybernetic machinations of the NSS, as we see in the "peace" that followed. Many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an occasion to debate the merits of a unipolar future as well as to wax nostalgic over the stability of a bipolar past. These debates continued to be state-centric as well as materialist in their interpretation of how power works. By such criteria, there was little doubt that the United States would emerge as the dominant military, economic, and, indeed, civilizational power. Even in Paul Wolfowitz's worst-case nightmares, it was difficult to identify a potential "peer competitor" on the horizon. [End Page 26] But then came

9/11, and blueprints for a steady-state hegemony were shredded. Asymmetrical power and fundamentalist resentment, force-multiplied by the mass media, prompted a permanent state of emergency. After the first responders came a semiotic fix with a kick, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. But from the tragedy of 9/11 to the farce of war in Iraq, after the multilateral hopes for a "safer and better world" were subverted by the unilateral nihilism of preventive war, the syntax of order and the code of the simulacrum began to break down. We caught a glimpse of a heteropolar matrix, in which actors radically different in identity
and interests (states versus super-empowered individuals), using technologies in revolutionary ways (civilian airliners to create kamikaze weapons of mass destruction, the Internet to mobilize the largest antiwar demonstrations ever), were suddenly comparable in their capability to produce improbable global effects. It might be small solace, but out of this deeply nihilistic moment might yet come a real balance of power and truth, in which the Straussian reach of The National Security Strategy is foreshortened by a Nietzschean grasp of reality.

The U.S. tries to maintain its power through preemptive actions. The U.S. is a paradox of both vulnerability and invincibility.
Kaplan 04 (Amy Kaplan, Prof. of English @ Univ. of Pennslyvania, 3 [American Quarterly 56.1, Violent
Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,2004, p. muse] This coming-out narrative, associated primarily with neoconservatives, aggressively celebrates the United States as finally revealing its true essenceits manifest destinyon a global stage. We won the Cold

War, so the story goes, and as the only superpower, we will maintain global supremacy primarily by military means, by preemptive strikes against any potential rivals, and by a perpetual war against terror, defined primarily as the Muslim world. We need to remain vigilant against those rogue states and terrorists who resist not our power but the universal human values that we embody. This narrative is about time as well as space. It imagines an empire in perpetuity, one that beats back the question haunting all empires in J. M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians: "One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era." 9 In this hypermasculine narrative there's a paradoxical sense of invincibility and unparalleled power and at the same time utter and incomprehensible vulnerabilitya lethal combination, which reminds us that the word vulnerable once also referred to the capacity to harm.

Warming
Warming rhetoric gets co-opted by the military furthering militarism - that turns the case Marntinot, 07 [Steve Instructor at the Center for Interdisciplinary Programs at San Francisco State University, Militarism and Global
Warming+ http://www.greens.org/s-r/42/42-06.html

In other words, war is the factor that renders the military a self-generating cyclic producer of global warming. Wars add untold and inestimable damage to the ecology on all levels, while fulfilling their major function of producing mass murder. War is the essential logic of a military machine, and of an ethic and a politics of militarism. Its fundamental purpose is to guarantee access to resources, and in particular petroleum, for its constituency. Its constituency is the US economy, and US industry. As the largest single consumer of petroleum in the world, its role is to guarantee the continued consumption of petroleum by the US economy, the largest national consumer of petroleum in the world. In addition, the military has become a major industrial factor in the US itself, as part of a greater economic cycle. This is a result of an ancillary economic process, the movement of runaway shops and of whole industries relocating to lower wage areas. Some industries moved south, others to Latin America, others to Asia or wherever on the globe they could be more exploitative. The US government, from the Reagan administration on, has provided subsidies to major industries to move to low-wage areas, and produced agreements in many countries for establishing export production zones that is, zones in which production is only for export; they add little to the local host economies, and create international assembly lines whose only coherence is the multinational corporate structure that controls it. The effect of this process has been to gut the industrial base of the US economy. The subsidiary internal effect was that the military, the one industry that could not run away because it was strategic, gained economic hegemony by default. The US economy fell into the hands of the military-industrial complex. This brings us to the third dimension of militarist self-generation as a global warming factor. In the face of runaway industries, the US economy has become dominated by military production. The military is now connected and conjoined to roughly 50% of all economic activity in the US. This doesnt mean that 50% of all production is military production; it means that 50% of all economic activity is associated with the military, either in the production of military hardware, the running of bases, or in ancillary industries whose major customer is the military, and who thus owe their existence and functions to that major customer. Military appropriations by Congress may be 25% of the budget, but there are ripple and multiplier effects that expand the economic involvement of the military to far beyond that 25%. the citizens of that structure, the corporations themselves, have no ethical concerns toward the planet nor toward life. Here is how corporate control of the economy, a history of militarism, and corporate globalization all come together. The US military is what facilitated the acquisition of exploitation rights in other countries by US corporations, leaving the US economy essentially a military-oriented economy. That is, militarism has engendered a military economy. Second, it fosters a situation in which a transnational corporate structure becomes the predominant political force in the world; and the citizens of that structure, the corporations themselves, have no ethical concerns toward the planet nor toward life. Its ethics are governed by the maintenance of its stock value on the stock markets of the world. Thus, resource exploitation is its food, and resource consumption is its metabolism. Militarism is the way corporations maintain their access to their food supply the planet. Because the military economy is by nature a monopoly, owing to government control, security clearances, national security considerations, etc., all military industries fall into a culture of corruption that is far beyond that of ordinary industries. This corruption is a cultural phenomenon that makes health and longevity an ancillary concern. In the interests of that

corruption, beyond profit or stock price levels, the military drives the political processes and
thinking of this society to ideologically ignore or deny the problem of global warming. The profit picture is important, of course, and it leads the oil and coal interests to buy prostituted scientists to help them promulgate that denial. But the real opposition to recognition of global warming is more immediately the corruption that exudes from the military and its militarism. In order to seriously address the problem, the movements (ecology, environmentalist, anti-consumption, alternative energy) will have to be anti-militarist. The military is key to the cycle of self-generation of global warming at the human (initiatory) end of the spectrum of factors. The military may not be the worst offender in producing greenhouse gases in the pragmatic sense, but it is the worst offender as an entity and an ideology in the world. It has to be seen as lying at the heart of the offense itself. The military may not be the worst offender in producing greenhouse gases in the pragmatic sense, but it is the worst offender as an entity and an ideology It is not possible for the environmental movement to take a step toward preserving the environment unless two things are brought to an end the existence of the US military machine and the existence of the corporate structure.

Attempting to halt global warming produces securitization- countries compete against each other to reduce, or avoid reducing their emissions
Buzan et al, 1998 (Barry Buzan, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of
Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole Waever, a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen Jaap de Wilde, Professor of International Relations and World Politics at the University of Groningen., 1998 Security: A New Framework for Analysis p.86) The third sequence of questions is decisive, because it is here that a political constellation of mutual security concerns is formed. Who feels threatened? Who must those parties cooperate with if action is to be effective? Effects and causes are significant conditions in disposing who will become involved with whom and how, but they do not fully determine our outcomes. Securitization always involves political choice: thus, actors might choose to ignore major causes for political or pragmatic reasons and therefore may form a security constellation that is different from what one would expect based on ones knowledge of effects and causes. Occasionally , pragmatism may prescribe global action, but even then it is necessary to subdivide global issues according to the context of their causes and effects. Dealing with the causes of, for instance, global warming require a global contest. The fossil CO2 emissions that contribute to the greenhouse effect occur worldwide are therefore a global problem, even though important regional differences should be realized. Meeting the causes of global warming points to the urgency of a global regime, which was recognized at UNCED where the climate treaty that became effective in March 1994 was signed. It is telling, however tat at the follow-up conference in Berlin (28 March-7 April 1995), saving the intentions declared at UNCED was the optimum goal. Further decision making and regime formation were postponed to the third Climate Summit, to be held in Tokyo in 1997. This postponement is in part a result of the fact that those who have to pay the price for prevention are different from those who pay the price of failure.

Specific Links

2NCAg Management DA
Neg discourse of managing international agricultural systems invites western interventions Edkins 2kJenny Edkins, Professor of International Politics University of Wales, Whose Hunger?
Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid, p. 53-55
What do the apparently opposing theoretical views of Sen and Malthus have in common? What does the argument that famine is caused by a shortage of food share with the argument that famine is a problem of lost

famine is seen as a failure, and famine has a causal explanation. Famine is a disaster with a scientific cause. It is the equivalent of a technical malfunction of a mechanism: once the cause of the problem is identified, it can be solved by prompt expert action and the machine returned to working order. Both Malthus's food shortage and Sen's entitlement theories see famine in this way: as a failure. It is a disaster, whether of a natural or an economic kind, whether it leads to death or to destitution. It is undesirable and preventable: for Malthus, by control of human fertility or by increasing food productio n; for Sen's followers, by putting in place a mechanism to replace lost entitlements (for example, through cash for work schemes). Neither Malthus nor Sen see famine as produced by the normal run of things; it occurs only exceptionally. Malthus sees famine as benefitting nature, but neither approach attaches importance to famine as benefitting particular groups of people. There is "a prevailing consensus that famine situations are extraordinary and that they should be met by extraordinary means."57 The constitution of famine as a disaster has certain power effects, as Barbara Hendrie points out. Narrating famine in this way produces it as an event and "enables it to be detached from its embeddedness, within a set of historically specific and locally based economic and political processes.58 This decontextualization is what I am calling depoliticization or technologization. The specificities of time and place can be bracketed out and famine can be removed into "the realm of regulation and control by humanitarian institutions."59 Or rather, because the regime of truth of modernity is based around a scientific form of knowledge that seeks generalizable, universal laws, famine, in all its specificity and with all its "disturbing implications"60 must inevitably be seen as a disaster if it occurs in modernity. The alternative, as I have argued, is to regard it as anachronistic and not part of the modern. Either way, famine is technologized. Famine as failure, as disaster, produces victims. Victims need welfare provision or aid, not a political voice. Vulnerable or at-risk households are produced as subjects on whom data can be collected. They are then controlled by administrative mechanisms of food distribution or food aid .61 The process depoliticizes famine and constitutes it as a site for intervention and control. The "famine as failure" narrative has a role in the reproduction of the international system. It is deeply enmeshed in the third world/ first world discourse. The solution to the problems of Africa, for example, is seen as coming from the benevolence of the economically rich countries of the North. Africa is produced as a region that is almost depoliticized by virtue of its status as a recipient of advice, concern, and aid, and existing global structures of power are buttressed. Famine is technologized. Neither food shortage nor entitlement theories provide a historical account nor explore the processes of change that occur during a famine. Preventing famine, as a technical malfunction, favors expert knowledge and expensive (and profitable) technological solutions. It is linked with the centralization of power/knowledge in international organizations or research institutes. In Foucauldian terms, the Science of famine produces the starving subject as a subject of knowledge within a regime of truth produced by the institutions and practices of development studies. The coping strategies of households in famine situations are studied; victims of famine and refugees from famine are interviewed, categorized, and counted. The numbers that died in a particular famine are counted, though how this is possible when conditions in famines are often such that there is even no means of burying the dead, we are left to imagine. A second point of intersection that food shortage and entitlement theories share is that they both see famine as something with a cause. The problem of famine is situated as a question suitable for theoretical investigation by, in a broad sense, the scientific method. The modern episteme is characterized by its reliance on separation of subject and object, theory and practice, and its choice of quantitative methods. This way of thinking produces a discourse that distances the emotional, humane response and prioritizes the search for causation over the need to respond. Theorizing and empiricizing famine make it the terrain of the expert, the agriculturalist, and the development specialist, just as war can become the terrain of the defense expert, the strategist, and the military commander. Only the experts can tell us how the problem can be tackled and what mechanisms are at work.62 The reliance on experts produces institutions devoted to the production of knowledge about famine within the framework of progress-oriented discourse. Hard facts are sought, and famine is excluded from political debate. As Kirsten Hastrup points out, this reliance on experts and technical solutions represents a gendered approach .63 When famine is looked at in scientific terms, any connection with pain suffering, or the body is taken away. The relationship between persons is removed. Other
entitlements? There are two points:

approaches, as we shall see in the final chapter, locate famines precisely in this relationship: a relationship between winners and losers. They move beyond the view of famine as a failure and look instead at the functions of famine and those who benefit from it.

2NCArctic Containment DA
Designating the Arctic as a place of crisis and combat writes a blank check for militarism justifies insidious biopower and hostility towards "threatening" nations - that's Greaves. The alt solves - it examines the discursive presentation of security discourse - explanatory power creates space for questioning Containment collapses relations and causes war - creates moralistic double standards that undermine coherent policy engagement with Russia and risk interventions and draw-in that's Cohen Relations is an independent impact - securitizing Russia causes war and containment strategies risk destroying a cooperative and constructive foreign policy that solves all global problems - that's also Cohen Military doctrine and strategic security require the maintenance of a sphere of influence intrusion guarantees conflict Guldseth 9 Adviser in Strategic Communication. Post graduate in "Media, Communication and ICT"
Russia's new military doctrine opens for first strike nuclear attacks in "local or regional wars", Eistein Guldseth, 10-14-2009 http://writern.blogspot.com/2009/10/russia-might-open-for-first-strike.html The Russian newspaper Izvestia reports that Cremlin is working on a new military doctrine on first strike use of nuclear arms against aggressors. That must include Georgia according to President Medvedevs statement after the war in Georgia in 2008: The aggressor has been punished. Patrushev: Nuclear weapons could be used in case of a nuclear attack, but also in 'regional or even local wars. According to Izvestia, Russia will insist on the right to pre-emptive nuclear strikes against aggressor countries in its new military doctrine, the head of the country's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, said. A greater threat to Russia's neighboring countries This new doctrine is contrary to US nuclear military policy, which do not allow for first strike attacks. This leads us once more to seriously wonder whats going on in the Cremlin. Such an aggressive move means a further treat to Russias bordering countries and serves no civilized purpose. As we have seen the later period, US reset has had no impact on the hawks in Moscow when it comes to serious cooperation on for instance Iran. Judging from this doctrine, one could on the contrary be led to believe that Russia today poses a significant greater danger to civilization than Iran: The combination of Putins restoration of Stalin as "a great leader", Russia claiming a priveledged sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, and now the suggested doctrine of first strike use of nuclear arms against local/regional wars and "agressors" should really start to worry all governments in the modern world. Who's the target? Georgia certainly will have to seriously consider it self as a prime target for a nuclear attack from Russia . The latest Russian accusations of Georgia supporting and aiding Al Quaeda operations in
Russia is a reminder of the fact that the war is not over.

Russia uses all means available to portray Georgia as an aggressor, and thus threatens Georgia with first

strike use of nuclear arms

if neccessary. Judging by Russias willingness to use excessive force in the attack on Georg ia in 2008, this represents a real threat to Georgia

and also Ukraine, where the situation on the Crimean peninsula is gradually heating up. In fact the whole of North Caucasus might be targeted due to uprise and intensivated terrorist attacs in several regions.

The political is already ceded in the context of their advantages Arctic security priveliges elite perspective and marginalizes legitimate analysis

Greaves 12 Wilfrid Greaves, Ph.D. candidate Political Science @ U Toronto, SSHRC Doctoral
Scholar and DFAIT Graduate Student Fellow, "Turtle Island Blues: Climate Change and Failed Indigenous Securitization in the Canadian Arctic," Gordon Foundation) Whether threats to a particular identity are actually securitized, however, is a function of the power relations between the holders of that identity, other securitizing actors, and the audience that must accept the validity of the identity groups security claims. The question that highlights the role of power in security policy is: who has been vested with the legitimacy and/or expertise to be able to perform the act of securitization within a given society? 31 No actor is entirely excluded from securitization processes, but some have privileged access , usually on the basis of some prior legitimacy or social capital. 32 Socio-political and state elites, through their greater control of political and economic resources, mass media, and the instruments of government authority , therefore occupy a dominant position within securitization processes that privileges their conceptions of security (i.e. statist
and elite) over those of non-dominant actors. 33 As such, identities that are shared by these elites or that are strongly linked with the state are privileged as more security-worthy than competing or marginal sub- and trans-state identities. Accordingly, beyond hazards to a particular identity, identities matter for security: relations of dominance and non-dominance determine who defines norms and practices and who must follow them; who is important and who is not; who defines the parameters of the debate and who does not; who is valuable and who is not 34 ; and, by extension, who is to be secured a nd who is not. Securitization nondominance, understood as structural or systematic restrictions upon a groups ability to influence government policy regardin g designation and defence against security threats to that group, is crucial to understanding security in modern liber al democratic states. 35 Insofar as CS securitization theory exhibits a democratic bias towards the actor-audience relationship, but views the relationship as essentially non-hierarchical and open to rational decision-making, it denies relations of dominance and non-dominance within the global north itself. People

[who] are located in the north but that do not reap the benefits of the dominant group such as, for example, indigenous peoples or marginalized communities vanish within such a security approach. 36 The security and identities of dominant social groups are privileged within any power-free analysis of (in)security; the concerns of the minority and marginalized are erased . Societal power relations form a crucial part of answering the base questions of securitization: what has been designated as a threat, by whom, and to what referent object?

2NCArctic Insecurity DA
Worst-case forecasting results in cycles of insecurityempirically proven. Labanca 11Gregory Robert, Masters in Security Studies from Georgetown University, Forecasting
Uncertainty: U.S. and Russia Threat Dynamics During the 'Reset,', Georgetown University Library
The process of worst case forecasting created an increasingly threatening relationship between the U.S. and Russia from 2002-2009. The U.S. came to regard Russia as an increasingly U.S. focused actor (intent on subverting the American democratization agenda abroad); an increasingly powerful actor (willing to exert economic, energy, military and political power toward this end), and an increasingly coherent and different actor from itself (the model of antidemocratic authoritarianism). Likewise, Russia came to perceive the U.S. as an increasingly Russiafocused actor (seeking to contain an expansion of Russian power in the name of American hegemony); an increasingly powerful actor (capable of launching successful bottom up
revolutions in multiple countries simultaneously) and an increasingly coherent and different actor from itself (naively focused on making every other country look like itself). These

processes hung together and were mutually reinforcing. The reset reflected the decoupling of these self-reinforcing processes. This assessment poses a substantial challenge to existing theoretical approaches to threat dynamics, because those approaches cannot fully account for the way in which perceptions of capability and identity interact over time. Power transition theory correctly identifies power equalization between a hegemon and a rising power as the most threatening moment in a bilateral relationship. However, it fails to recognize that perceptions of material capabilities are as significant to the overall power balance as are the actual, objectively verifiable capabilities. This perceptual element skews the key inflection point in power transition
theorythe point at which a rising power is approaching a dominate power. Although Russia became a more powerful actor during the early and mid 2000s, it also perceived that the U.S. was an increasingly powerful actor due to its perception that democratic revolutions and international terrorism were part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit. Accordingly, the inflection point described in power transition theory should not have been reached until late 2008, the moment at w hich, in Russias eyes, the U.S. was at its weakest. The August Russia -Georgia war revealed that the color revolutions had not produced the enduring U.S. allies that Russia perceived the U.S. had sought. Moreover, the U.S. was maximally over-extended in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to power transition theory, we should have seen a deepening of the threat spiral, marked by an aggressive Russian effort to undermine a relatively weaker U.S. and an aggressive U.S. seeking to contain Russian power. Since U.S.-Russian threat dynamics moved in exactly the opposite direction, power transition theory does not convincingly describe the bilateral threat dynamic. Defensive

realisms over-reliance on material balance of power. However, it fails to articulate how material elements and perceptual elements interact to generate threat perceptions. Walt, for example, admits that his balance of threat theory
realisms focus on the role of intentions helps to address cannot determine a priori . . . which sources of threat will be most important in any given case.73 Walts theory is limited because it holds state identity constant and because it focuses, like most rationalist theories, on future expectations of utility in isolation from processes of interaction. Since realist theories do not admit the possibility of states updating their identities during

realist theories cannot account for how perceptions of intention influence threat dynamics. For example, as explained above, Moscow only determined that it was in its interests to try to work with the U.S. to dispel the pernicious effects of the security dilemma when it assessed that the U.S. was no longer capable of using or willing to use democratization as a foreign policy tool to contain Russia. For both defensive realists and liberal institutionalists, security seekers can find themselves in threatening interactions because uncertainty about future expectations generates fear the essence of the security dilemmaprompting both sides to accumulate more power in order to hedge against the possibility that the other side may choose to harm it. However, this
interaction, and since interests are defined significantly by identities, assumption about the role of uncertainty is wrong. Rather, threat is a subjective realization that someone has sufficient capabilities to harm you and the intention of harming you. The language of

theoretical dialogue through which we seek to understand why we ought to fear others, is really the voice of the cautious paranoid.74
realism, the

Be skeptical of their evidence


[2NRasking the military whether Arctic heg is good is like asking a barber if you need a haircut - they have financial incentives to justify intervention - that's Dyer - their author that says Russia is questioning US resolve in the Arctic is the Lieutenant Governor of Alaska - he clearly has bias - his article deliberately inflates the Arctic threat to elicit a financial subsidy from the federal government. It's not a product of accurate political analysis] Dyer 8/4 Gwynne Dyer, columnist, PhD in Military History and Middle Eastern History, Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, "Race for Arctic Mostly Rhetoric," Winnipeg Free Press, http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/columnists/race-for-arctic-mostly-rhetoric164986566.html The media always love conflict, and now that the Cold War is long gone, there's no other potential military confrontation between the great powers to worry about. Governments around the Arctic Ocean are beefing up their armed forces for the coming struggle, so where are the flashpoints and what are the strategies? It's great fun to speculate about possible wars. In the end I didn't do the interview because the Skype didn't work, so I didn't get the chance to rain on their parade. But here's what I would said to the Russians if my server hadn't gone down at the wrong time. First, you should never ask the barber if you need a haircut. The armed forces in every country are always looking for reasons to worry about impending conflict, because that's the only reason their governments will spend money on them. Sometimes they will be right to worry, and sometimes they will be wrong, but right or wrong, they will predict conflict. Like the barbers, it's in their professional interest to say you need their services. So you'd be better off to ask somebody who doesn't have a stake in the game. As I don't own a single warship, I'm practically ideal for the job. And I don't think there will be any significant role for the
armed forces in the Arctic, although there is certainly going to be a huge investment in exploiting the region's resources.

2NCChina Containment DA
Their discourse causes containment - presupposing conflict incentivizes war plans which replicate the security dilemma Weber 8PhD Candidate at Johann Wolfgang-Goeth University (Christian, Securitizing China and
Russia?, Western relations with rising powers in the East, Journal of Historical Sociology, Vol. 16(3), http://www.soz.unifrankfurt.de/hellmann/projekt/Securitizing%20China%20and%20Russia_September_2008.pdf)
One clear example for the reproduction of the West through practices of securitization is the conceptualization of Chinas rise as a long term security threat. Since the mid-1990s, Western scholars and politicians try to evaluate the power potential and the aims of the Chinese leadership in order to assess in a more informed fashion whether Western states should be either concerned or dispassionate about Chinas impressive economic growth rates and its increases in military spending.19 One striking feature of this literature is its normative Western outlook. Scholars, particularly in the U.S., presume that the current liberal international order and the Western supremacy within this order must be preserved. A revision of the existing rules on Chinas terms is hardly ever considered as an acceptable option and is associated with warlike escalations of previous power transitions. Thus, the literature on Chinas rise starts from the presupposition that Western predominance should be upheld and depicts a more powerful China as a challenger that should be either fully socialized into the liberal system through a policy of engagement or restrained from subverting it through a containment strategy.20 Proponents
of containment who regard a future antagonism between China and the West as almost inevitable made themselves heard with explicit securitizing moves when conflicts between U.S. and Chinese foreign policy came up. For example, a few months after the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 the journal Foreign Affairs appeared with a special section on The China threat.21 In the lead article, Richard Bernstei n and Ross Munro, two American journalists, made some deterministic predictions suggesting that China is bound to be no strategic friend of the United States, but a long -term adversary (p.22). In East Asia, they contended, military conflict between China and the U.S. over Taiwan or over territorial claims in the South China Sea was always possible and becoming more and more likely as Chinas military strength continued to grow. B ernstein and Munro did not see this conflict confined only to China and the U.S. but instead presented it as a veritable global security problem: Moreover, the Chinese-American rivalry of the future could fit into a broader new global arrangement that will increasingly challenge Western, and especially American, global supremacy. Chinas close military cooperation with the former Sovi et Union, particularly its purchase of advanced weapons in the almost unrestricted Russian arms bazaar, its technological and political help to the Islamic countries of central Asia and North Africa, and its looming dominance in East Asia put it at the center of an informal network of states, many of which have goals and philosophies inimical to those of the United States, and many of which share Chinas sense of grievance at the long global domination of the West.22 This quote reads like a textbook version of a securitization move in which China is stylized as the leader of an informal but nevertheless dangerous coalition of autocratic and Islamic enemies that prepare for a struggle against Western dominance. It is hardly surprising that they cite Samuel Huntingtons thesis on the clash of civilizations in the subsequent paragraph. Their vision shares quite a similarity with Huntingtons idea of a Confucian- Islamic Connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power.23 Interes tingly, they would see less need for concern if China would become a democracy. Then, its military strength would be less threatening than if it remained a dictatorship. They dont believe that to happen, however, since that would be contrary to Chinese culture.24 Bernstein and Munros essay was not the last one to portray China as the coming danger to for the West. Washington Times journalist Bill Gertz made very similar claims in his book on the The China threat.

In the context of renewed tensions over Taiwan in 2000, the Gertz argued that China was the most serious long-term

national security challenge to the United States. It threatened Taiwan with a massive missile buildup, supported terrorist groups that threatened the U.S. and enhanced military cooperation with Russia.
These claims and allegations of anti-American intentions are only garnished with quotes from Chinese senior generals and illustrated with incidents where China and the U.S. have come into diplomatic conflict. The Clinton administration is accused of having sold out American interests in ignoring the most serious security threat of the United States by naively trying to engage China via economic cooperation. As trade would not ensure friendly relations, he argues, instead China must be contained through a recommitment to East Asian military involvement and a U.S. military buildup.25 Although the western security agenda after 9/11 had clearly shifted towards Islamic terrorism, in the second edition of his book Gertz sticks to his war ning that the danger from the nuclear-armed communist dictatorship in China is growing. From an IR theory perspective there seem to be two separate arguments about the alleged dangers of Chinas rise. The first is the liberal argument that there is a qua litative difference in the foreign policy behaviour of democratic and autocratic regimes with the latter being more riskacceptant and dangerous because their leaders are not as dependent on the consent of their respective population as the former.26 The second argument is a realist one about power transitions. According to this perspective, a look at the historical record allows draw- ing the lesson that the hegemony of a state does not last forever because over time the distribution of power will change to its detriment. New rising powers, also frequently called revisionist powers, will not be prepared to satisfy themselves with the existing set of rules that constituted the old hegemonic order and will instead seek to change the rules to their own favour.27 Since there is no reliable mechanism in international society to manage this transition peacefully and because the dominant actors will not give up their power position voluntarily, serious conflict over world hegemony and a radical revision of the old rules seem inevitable. 28 Against this backdrop it should come as no surprise that realist scholars like John Mearsheimer and Robert Kagan join the public dispute with the message that a more powerful China is a long term threat that must be contained by the United States and its allies.29 In the public debate about Chinas rise the liberal and the realist arguments are combined to a distinctive narrative that can be summarized as follows.30 China poses a long term threat to the security of the U.S. and the liberal Western order as a whole. As soon as the leading great power in the world is seriously challenged by the rise of gr eat powers that are equipped with the sufficient demographic and economic potential, the fight over world hegemony cannot be preve nted forever. Democracies and totalitarian regimes cannot coexist peacefully indefinitely. This is a lesson that can be drawn from 19th and 20th century history. Sooner or later they will fight each other until one or the other side prevails. Therefore, it would be detrimental to U.S. long term interests to engage China in a policy of appeasement e.g. through trade

Instead it must assume a firm posture and contain China through a politics of strength e.g. with a military build-up in East Asia and the forging of alliances of democracies. It is up to the U.S. as the leader of the Western world to take the initiative and demonstrate military strength. This narrative had a considerable impact in China itself where it was received under the label of Chinese threat theory. Chinese scholars and officials reviewed U.S. and European articles that named China as a security threat and took it as an illustration of the onesidedness with which China was treated by foreigners. In this way, complaining about the Western Chinese threat theory at the same time fostered Chinese foreign policy identity: the country would not turn to imperial
partnership as the Clinton administration had practiced it.

expansion as Western great powers had done in the past but would ins tead go its own way of peaceful rise or peaceful development. 31 This short reconstruction of the China threat narrative shall serve only as a starting point illustrate how a securitization of China could look like. Of course it is only one specific part of an overall discourse about how to understand and react to Chinas growing importance in world politics that is taking place in the academy as well as in policy circles and in the wider public. But at least one preliminary observation still seems worth noting. China is not only seen as a threat in the United States as one might expect.32 For example, the Gaullist former French prime minister Edouard Balladur recently called for a union of the West that could stop the alleged relative decline of the Atlantic community vis--vis Chinas economic growth.33 Opinion polls indicate that large parts of the population not only in the United States but also Europe see the growing power of China as an economic and even as a military threat.34 Of course this does not mean that they would support a policy of

But nevertheless the description of the problem has an impact on the range of options that are taken into consideration. When the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in its recent Asia Strategy conceptualizes Asia as a strategic challenge and opportunity for Germany and Europe, it p ushes the range of alternatives in a certain direction.35 If even those who prefer a politization of Sino-Western relations through multila- teral negotiations and economic cooperation build their arguments upon a description of Chinas rise as a strategic challenge the plausibility to treat it like a se curity issue increases.
containment. People who are worried about Chinas growth may favor diplomatic negotiations as the more adequate measure.

Nuclear war Eland 5/11/05 Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent
Institute (Ian Eland, "Coexisting with a Rising China," Independent Institute)

the United States should take a page from another chapter in British history. In the late 1800s, although not without tension, the British peacefully allowed the fledging United States to rise as a great power, knowing both countries were protected by the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean that separated them. Taking advantage of that same kind separation by a major ocean, the United States could also safely allow China to obtain respect as a great power, with a sphere of influence to match. If China went beyond obtaining a reasonable sphere of influence into an Imperial Japanese-style expansion, the United States could very well need to mount a challenge. However, at present, little evidence exists of Chinese intent for such expansion, which would run counter to recent Chinese history. Therefore, a U.S. policy of coexistence, rather than neocontainment, might avoid a future catastrophic war or even a nuclear conflagration.
Instead of emulating the policies of pre-World War I Britain toward Germany,

2NCChina Racism DA
Negative representations result in an essentialist and racist policy towards China, turns case Lubman 4 Lecturer in Law and Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society
(Stanley, "The Dragon As Demon: Images Of China On Capitol Hill," Working Papers, March) In Congress, alliances of partisans of single issues insist vocally on highly negative views of China. Critics of
Chinas human rights practices, including a repressive criminal process and suppression of dissent, have joined with members who speak for the religious right in decrying Chinas birth -control policies and hostility to religions not licensed by the state. Supporters of Tibetan independence and an autonomous Taiwan add further heat to debate, as do others in whose geostrategic perspective China has already become a threat to American security. Underlying the views of some, echoing the labor unions, is a commitment to protectionism. One respected Senator

during the debates that latent racism may lurk even deeper. These views cloud debate because they often caricature a complex society and foster unconstructive moralizing rather than analysis of the problems that they address. By demonizing China they obstruct the formulation and maintenance of a coherent American policy toward China and weaken Congress contribution to making US policy.
suggested

That's a decision rule - you should reject racism in every instance because it confines our knowledge and replicates cruelty and injustice - c/a Batur

2ACChina Threats Not Real


Prefer our holistic view of Chinatheir security analysis creates a self-justifying race to destroythis creates a rigged game Bruce Blair, president of the World Security Institute, ex-Brookings Institution AND Chen Yali is the
editor in chief of Washington Observer, works with the Chen Shi China Research Group, ex-China Daily, China Security, Vol. 2, 2006 American threat assessments, however, focus almost exclusively on real or potential capabilities. Because intentions can be easily changed, asserting peaceful aims carries little weight for Americans. Such assurances do little to assuage suspicions or downgrade threat projections. Also, since the late 1990s, the predominance of "hawkish" American attitudes toward potential threats has pushed the U.S. intelligence community to adopt extremely conservative criteria for projecting threat -- for instance, by assessing an adversary's 'possible capabilities' instead of 'likely capabilities.' This is a throwback to the early Cold War habit of using 'greater-than-expected' threats as the basis for building up U.S. nuclear forces. 'Possible' threat is even more extreme than 'greater-than-expected' threat. In any case, there is nothing China can do to convince American worst-case analysts that China could not possibly adapt its dual-use space capabilities for 'possibly' posing military threats to the United States. There is no escape from this logic trap.

Chinese threat literature is an exercise in the construction of US identity not true statements about China Pan 4Chengxin Pan, International Relations at Australian National University, "The 'China Threat' in
American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29(3) Instead, China as a "threat" has much to do with the particular mode of U.S. self-imagination. As Steve Chan notes: China is an object of attention not only because of its huge size, ancient legacy, or current or projected relative national power. . . . The importance of China has to do with perceptions, especially those regarding the potential that Beijing will become an example, source, or model that contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm. In an era of supposed universalizing cosmopolitanism, China demonstrates the potency and persistence of nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and especially U.S. conceptions of democracy and capitalism. China is a
reminder that history is not close to an Certainly, I do not deny China's potential for strategic misbehavior in the global context, nor do I claim the "essential peacefulness" of Chinese culture."

the "China threat" is essentially a specifically social meaning given to China by its U.S. observers, a meaning that cannot be disconnected from the dominant U.S. self-construction. Thus, to fully understand the U.S. "China threat" argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature. Indeed, the construction of other is not only a product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a necessary foil to it. For example, by taking this representation of China as Chinese reality per se, those scholars are able to assert their self-identity as "mature," "rational" realists capable of knowing the "hard facts" of international politics, in distinction from
Having said that, my main point here is that there is no such thing as "Chinese reality" that can automatically speak for itself, for example, as a "threat." Rather, those "idealists" whose views are said to be grounded more in "an article of faith" than in "historical experience."41 On the other hand, given that history is apparently not "progressively"

, the invocation of a certain other not only helps explain away such historical uncertainties or "anomalies" and maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the United States, but also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability." As Samuel Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being committed to the principles of
linear liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes

?" In this way, it seems that the constructions of the particular U.S. self and its other are always intertwined and mutually reinforcing.
of American national interests

Be skeptical of their evidence, its written by neocons and hacks and doesnt reflect technological realities Foust 8 aerospace analyst, editor and publisher of The Space Review, degrees from Caltech and MIT
(Jeff, China and the US: Space Race or Miscommunication?, The Space Review, March)

Those in the US who are concerned about Chinese military space capabilities routinely cite a bevy of evidence , much of
which appears in official Defense Department documents, in support of their claims. This evidence suggests that China is actively developing a wide range of ASAT weapons, from the kinetic kill vehicle tested last year to exotic approaches, like parasitic microsatellites that could stealthily attack larger spacecraft. Many of those claims, though, are dubious. A lot of the

perceptions of Chinese intent regarding their civil and their military space programsis based on very shoddy sources, said Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China program manager for the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists. Kulacki, speaking about US-Chinese relations in space at the New America Foundation in Washington last month, said that many of the reports about Chinese military space projects came from questionable sources and were either inaccurate or misinterpreted by US analysts. A case in point is the claim of Chinese development of parasitic microsatellites, which appeared in the 2003 and 2004 editions of Defense Department reports to Congress about the Chinese military. In chasing that source down, it turns out its from an individuals web sitea bloggerwho made the whole thing up, Kulacki said. (The same Chinese blogger, he added, had published claims of a fanciful array of other advanced weapons on his site.) In another case, the National Air
information that our analysts and intelligence officers are consuming thats driving their and Space Intelligence Center mistranslated a publication by a junior instructor at a Chinese artillery college and concluded that China was planning to deploy ASAT systems. To better understand the types of sources out there, Kulacki and colleagues reviewed 1,500 articles published in China that referenced ASAT technology in some manner between 1971 and 2007, and grouped them into four categories. Nearly half49 percentwere classified as reviews that provided only general information, while an additional 16 percent were polemics, or polit ical

Such articles are considered trash articles in China, Kulacki said: Theyre things people have to publish because 29 percent of the articles represented some kind of original analysis of ASAT technology, while only 6 percent delved into technical issues. Moreover, those technical articles dont get the same level
diatribes with little technical information. theyve got to publish something. Theyre very low value and not read in China. Of the rest, of attention by American analysts as the reviews and polemics. If you look at the citations in US reports on this, were undervaluing the journals that actually might contain information that could tell us something meaningful about Chinese ASAT capabilities, he said. While American views of Chinese space efforts may be based on questionable sources, Chinese views of American space efforts are more complex. In a general sense, the Chinese public and Chinese professionals have a very positive view of the US space program, Kulacki said. He noted that a public expo about spaceflight in China shortly before the Shenzhou 6 mission was primarily about American space efforts, including a wall in the back that featured portraits of the astronauts

There are, though, more hostile views of US space programs in China, particularly of American military space projects. Those articles tend to be written not by space professionals but by political officers in the Chinese military, who write polemics that claim that the US wants to fight space wars . Because theyre not
who died on the space shuttle Columbia in 2003. written by professionals, Kulacki said, they tend not to be sophisticated: in one example shown by Kulacki, a Chinese article was illustrated by a model of an American ASAT weaponmade of

This results in something of an echo cha mber effect between the polemical communities in the US and China. They feed off of each other for sure, Kulacki said. There is this whole tiny dialogue between these two hawkish communities in these two countries that dominates the entire discussion on this in the public domain. There are also Chinese
Lego bricks. suspicions of American motives elsewhere in space. Kulacki noted that, shortly before the Shenzhou 5 launch, NASA provided orbital debris tracking data to the Chinese so they could avoid any potential collisions. A Chinese official involved with the mission told Kulacki that the data came late in their planning process, rais ing suspicions. The relationship is so bad that he was convinced that NASA did that on purpose to mess them up, he said. Theres a lot of mistrust and bad feelings.

2NCCIP DA
Threat discourse writes a blank check for critical infrastructure protection that expands insidious government control into every facet of daily lifethis framework makes war inevitable because life is viewed as strategic bare life to be managed and manipulated independently causes warthat's 1AC Burke Locating insecurity in something as trivial as transportation translates everyday safety into the essence of security logic Lundborg 10Tom Lundborg, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Nick Vaughan-Williams,
University of Warwick, Theres More to Life than Biopolitics: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience Planning, and Molecular Security, Paper prepared for the SGIR Conference, Stockholm, 7-10 September, 2010
While the terrain of security studies is of course fiercely contested, what is common among a range of otherwise often dive rse perspectives is the core premise that security relates to a

a securitizing move occurs when an issue not previously thought of as a security threat comes to be produced as such via a speech act that declares an existential threat to a referent object (Buzan et al 1998). A similar logic can be identified in approaches to security that focus on exceptionalism: the idea, following the paradigmatic thought of Carl
realm of activity in some sense beyond the norm of political life. Thus, in the language of the Copenhagen School, Schmitt, that sovereign practices rely upon the decision to suspend the normal state of affairs in order to produce emergency conditions in which extraordinary measures such as martial law, for exampleare legitimised. For this reason, a tendency in security studies even among self-styled critical approaches is to privilege analysis of high-profile speech acts of elites,

this leads to an emphasis on what we might call the spectacle of security, rather than more mundane, prosaic, and everyday aspects of security policy and practice. By contrast, the world of CIs necessitates a shift in the referent object of security away from the spectacular to the banal. Instead of highprofile speech-based acts of securitization, we are here dealing with telecommunications and transportation networks, water treatment and sewage works, and so on: semi-invisible phenomena that are often taken-for-granted fixtures and fittings of society, yet vital for the maintenance of what is considered to be normal daily life. For this reason our subject matter calls for a re-thinking of the very stuff considered to be apposite for the study of international security. Indeed, analysing the role of CIs and resilience planning in global security relations adds particular resonance to existing calls within the literature to broaden and deepen the way in which acts of securitization are conceptualised (Bigo 2002; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Williams 2003). Those adopting more sociologically-oriented perspectives, for example, have sought to emphasise the way in which securitizing moves can be made by institutions (as well as individuals), through repeated activity (as well as one-off acts), and involve various media (not only speech, but visual culture, for example). From this reconfigured point of view it is possible to then see how the design, planning, management, and execution of CIs also constitute an arena in which processes of securitizationof physical and cyber networkstakes place.
exceptional responses to exceptional circumstances, and events that are deemed to be extraordinary. Arguably

Extinction Coviello 2kAssoc. Prof English @ Bowdoin College (Peter Coviello, "Apocalypse from Now On," Queer
frontiers, by J. Boone, Women Studies @ USC)
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derridas suitably menacing phrase) remainderless and a-symbolic destruction, then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an other people whose very prese nce might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished general population. This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontags incisive observation, from 1989, that, Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not Apocalypse Now but Apocalypse from Now On. The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag go es on, at length, to miss) is that

the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addressess himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, lifeadministering. Power, he contends, exerts a positive influence on life [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations . In his brief comments on what he calls the atomic situation, however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, agencies of modern power presume to act on the behalf of the existence of everyone. Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power, Foucault writes, this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the

patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

2NCCMR Blurring DA
The affirmative blurs the line between defense and civilian policy by linking the military i.e. naval power with economic growth i.e. the trade advantageresults in social militarismit reduces the value to life by brushing aside ethical and moral considerations and instead declares war on unnamed economic adversaries Engelhardt 12Tom Engelhardt, writer of Tomdispatch.com, fellow at the Nation Institute, co-founder
of the American Empire Project, writer, teaching fellow @ Berkeley, author, editor at Pacific News Services, senior editor at Pantheon Books, consulting editor at Metropolitan Books, "The Military Solution," The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/07/the-military-solution/) Americans may feel more distant from war than at any time since World War II began. Certainly, a smaller percentage of us less than 1% serves in the military in this all-volunteer era of ours and, on the face of it, Washingtons constant warring in distant lands seems barely to touch the lives of most Americans. And yet the militarization of the United States and the strengthening of the National Security Complex continues to accelerate. The Pentagon is, by now, a world unto itself, with a staggering budget at a moment when no other power or combination of powers comes near to challenging this countrys might. In the post-9/11 era, the military-industrial complex has been thoroughly mobilized under the rubric of privatization and now goes to war with the Pentagon. With its $80 billion-plus budget, the intelligence bureaucracy has simply exploded. There are so many competing agencies and outfits, surrounded by a universe of private intelligence contractors, all enswathed in a penumbra of secrecy, and they have grown so large, mainly under the Pentagons aegis, that you could say intelligence is now a ruling way of life in Washington and it, too, is being thoroughly militarized. Even the once-civilian CIA has undergone a process of para-militarization and now runs its own covert drone wars in Pakistan and elsewhere. Its director, a widely hailed retired four-star general, was previously the U.S. war commander in Iraq and then Afghanistan, just as the National Intelligence Director who oversees the whole intelligence labyrinth is a retired Air Force lieutenant general. In a sense, even the military has been militarized. In these last years, a secret army of special operations forces, 60,000 or more strong and still expanding, has grown like an incubus inside the regular armed forces. As the CIAs drones have become the presidents private air force, so the special ops troops are his private army, and are now given free rein to go about the business of war in their own cocoon of secrecy in areas far removed from what are normally considered Americas war zones. Diplomacy, too, has been militarized. Diplomats work ever more closely with the military, while the State Department is transforming itself into an
unofficial arm of the Pentagon as the Secretary of State is happy to admit as well as of the weapons industry. And keep in mind that we now have two Pentagons, thanks to the

with the help of the DHS, local police forces nationwide have, over the last decade, been significantly up-armored and have, in the name of fighting terrorism, gained a distinctly military patina. They have ever more access to elaborate weaponry and gadgets, including billions of dollars of surplus military equipment of every sort, often being funneled to once peaceable small town police departments.
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is focused, among other things, on militarizing our southern border. Meanwhile,

Extinction Hedges 8Christopher Lynn Hedges, spent two decades as a foreign correspondent, writer for CSM,
NPR, and NYT, Pulitzer Prize winning group, Amnesty International Global Award for Human Rights Journalism, senior fellow @ The Nation Institute, Lecturer @ Columbia, NYU, and Princeton, writer, columnist for Truthdig, Harper's Magazine, the New Statesman, The New York Review of Books, and Foreign Affairs, "America's Wars of Self-Destruction," Truthdig)
War is a poison. It is a poison that nations and groups must at times ingest to ensure their survival. But, like any poison, it can kill you just as surely as the disease it is meant to eradicate.

The poison of war courses unchecked through the body politic of the United States. We believe that because we have the capacity to wage war we have the right to wage war. We embrace the dangerous self-delusion that we are on a providential mission to save the rest of the world from itself, to implant our virtueswhich we see as superior to all other virtueson others, and that we have a right to do this by force. This belief has corrupted Republicans and Democrats alike. And if Barack Obama drinks, as it appears he will, the dark elixir of war and imperial power offered to him by the national security state, he will accelerate the downward spiral of the American empire. Obama and those around him embrace the folly of the war on terror. They may want
to shift the emphasis of this war to Afghanistan rather than Iraq, but this is a difference in strategy, not policy. By clinging to Iraq and expanding the war in Afghanistan, the poison will continue in deadly doses. These

wars of occupation are doomed to failure. We cannot afford them. The rash of home

foreclosures, the mounting job losses, the collapse of banks and the financial services industry, the poverty that is ripping apart the working class, our crumbling infrastructure and the killing of hapless Afghans in wedding parties and Iraqis by our iron fragmentation bombs are neatly interwoven. These events form a perfect circle. The costly forms of death we dispense on one side of the globe are hollowing us out from the inside at home. The war on terror is an absurd war against a tactic. It posits the idea of perpetual, or what is now called generational, war. It has no discernable end. There is no way to define victory. It is, in metaphysical terms, a war against evil, and evil, as any good seminarian can tell you, will always be with us. The most destructive evils, however, are not those that are externalized. The most destructive are those that are internal. These hidden evils, often defined as virtues, are unleashed by our hubris, self-delusion and ignorance. Evil masquerading as good is evil in its deadliest form. The decline of American empire began long before the current economic meltdown or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It began before the first Gulf War or Ronald Reagan. It began when we shifted, in the words of the
historian Charles Maier, from an empire of production to an empire of consumption. By the end of the Vietnam War, when the costs of the war ate away at Lyndon Johnsons Great Society

we saw our country transformed from one that primarily produced to one that primarily consumed. We started borrowing to maintain a lifestyle we could no longer afford. We began to use force, especially in the
and domestic oil production began its steady, inexorable decline, Middle East, to feed our insatiable demand for cheap oil. The years after World War II, when the United States accounted for one-third of world exports and half of the worlds manufacturing, gave way to huge trade imbalances, outsourced jobs, rusting hulks of abandoned factories, stagnant wages and personal and public debts that most of us cannot repay. The bill is now due. Americas most dangerous enemies are not Islamic radicals, but those who promote the perverted ideology of national security that, as Andrew Bacevich writes, is our surrogate religion. If we continue to believe that we can expand our wars and go deeper into debt to maintain an unsustainable level of consumption, we will dynamite the foundations of our society. The Big Lies are not the pledge of tax cuts, universal health care, family values restored, or a world rendered peaceful through forceful demonstrations of American leadership, Bacevich writes in The Limits of Power. The Big Lies are the truths that remain unspoken: that freedom has an underside; that nations, like households, must ultimately live within their means; that historys

Power is finite. Politicians pass over matters such as these in silence. As a consequence, the absence of self-awareness that forms such an enduring element of the American character persists. Those clustered around Barack Obama, from Madeline Albright to Hillary Clinton to Dennis Ross to Colin
purpose, the subject of so many confident pronouncements, remains inscrutable. Above all, there is this: Powell, have no interest in dismantling the structure of the imperial presidency or the vast national security state. They will keep these institutions intact and seek to increase their power. We have a childish belief that Obama will magically save us from economic free fall, restore our profligate levels of consumption and resurrect our imperial power. This nave belief is part of our

The problems we face are structural. The old America is not coming back. The corporate forces that control the state will never permit real reform. This is the Faustian bargain made between these corporate forces and the Republican and Democratic parties. We will never, under the current system, achieve energy independence. Energy independence would devastate the
disconnection with reality. profits of the oil and gas industry. It would wipe out tens of billions of dollars in weapons contracts, spoil the financial health of a host of private contractors from Halliburton to Blackwater and render obsolete the existence of U.S. Central Command. There are groups and people who seek to do us harm. The attacks of Sept. 11 will not be the last acts of terrorism on American soil.

the only way to defeat terrorism is to isolate terrorists within their own societies, to mount cultural and propaganda wars, to discredit their ideas, to seek concurrence even with those defined as our enemies. Force, while a part of this battle, is rarely
But necessary. The 2001 attacks that roused our fury and unleashed the war on terror also unleashed a worldwide revulsion again st al-Qaida and Islamic terrorism, including throughout the Muslim world, where I was working as a reporter at the time. If we had had the courage to be vulnerable, to build on this empathy rather than drop explosive ordinance all over the Middle

If we had reached out for allies and partners instead of arrogantly assuming that American military power would restore our sense of invulnerability and mitigate our collective humiliation, we would have done much to defeat al-Qaida. But we did not. We demanded that all kneel before us. And in our ruthless and indiscriminate use of violence and illegal wars of occupation, we resurrected the very forces that we could, under astute leadership, have marginalized. We forgot that fighting terrorism is a war of shadows, an intelligence war, not a conventional war. We forgot that, as strong as we may be militarily, no nation, including us, can survive isolated and alone. The American empire, along with our wanton self-indulgence and gluttonous consumption, has come to an end. We are undergoing a period of profound economic, political and military decline. We can continue to dance to the tunes of self-delusion, circling the fire as we chant ridiculous mantras about our greatness, virtue and power, or we can face the painful reality that has engulfed us. We cannot reverse this decline. It will happen no matter what we do. But we can, if we break free from our self-delusion, dismantle our crumbling empire and the national security state with a minimum of damage to ourselves and others. If we refuse to accept our limitations, if do not face the changes forced upon us by a bankrupt elite that has grossly mismanaged our economy, our military and our government, we will barrel forward toward internal and external collapse. Our self-delusion constitutes our greatest danger. We will either confront reality or plunge headlong into the minefields that lie before us.
East, we would be far safer and more secure today.

2NCCompetitiveness DA
The pursuit of competitiveness results in extinctionit surpasses the economic limits by fueling misspendingthe "growth first" approach ignores environmental destruction and results in rapid climate change and habitat loss The impact controls casewe have a lock on magnitude because competitiveness discourse fundamentally changes decision calculusit pits nations in conflict against one another, prevents trade and creates hostilitythe economy won't collapse because of interdependence but competitiveness decreases interdependenceresource competitions also structurally cause war because nonrenewable energy runs out leading to peak oilthat's all Bristow This discourse mobilizes populations for the purposes of economic warfareit's a product of threat discourse and interpretation, rather than reality Bristow 4 Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography @ Cardiff University (Dr. Gillian Bristow,
"Everyone's a 'winner'," Journal of Economic Geography 5.3: 285-304) This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused, narrow and ill-defined content has become so salient in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute the only valid currency of argument (Schoenberger, 1998, 12). Whilst alternative discourses based around co-operation can be conceived (e.g. see Hines, 2000; Bunzl, 2001), they have as yet failed to make a significant impact on the dominant view that a particular, quantifiable form of output-related regional competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and ultimately beneficial. The answer appears to lie within the policy process, which refers to all aspects involved in the provision of policy direction for the work of the public sector. This therefore includes the ideas which inform policy conception, the talk and work which goes into providing the formulation of policy directions, and all the talk, work and collaboration which goes into translating these into practice (Yeatman, 1998; p. 9). A major debate exists in the policy studies literature about the scope and limitations of reason, analysis and intelligence in policy-makinga debate which has been re-ignited with the recent emphasis upon evidence-based policy-making (see Davies et
al., 2000). Keynes is often cited as the main proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he argued that policy-making should be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and

has significantly challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely objective, rational, technical assessment of policy alternatives. He has argued that in practice, policy makers use theory, knowledge and evidence selectively to justify policy choices which are heavily based on value judgements. It is thus persuasion (through rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their institutionalisation) that is the key to the policy process, not the logical correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is interests rather than ideas that shape policy making in practice. Ultimately, the language of competitiveness is the language of the business community. Thus, critical to understanding the power of the discourse is firstly, understanding the appeal and significance of the discourse to business interests and, secondly, exploring their role in influencing the ideas of regional and national policy elites. Part of the allure of the discourse of competitiveness for the business community is its seeming comprehensibility. Business leaders feel that they already understand the basics of what competitiveness means and thus it offers them the gain of apparent sophistication without the pain of grasping something complex and new. Furthermore, competitive images are exciting and their accoutrements of battles, wars and races have an intuitive appeal to businesses
facts (Keynes, 1971, vol. xxi, 289). However, Majone (1989) familiar with the cycle of growth, survival and sometimes collapse (Krugman, 1996b). The climate of globalisation and the turn towards neo-liberal, capitalist forms of regulation has empowered business interests and created a demand for new concepts and models of development which offer guidance on how economies can innovate and prosper in the face of increasing

Global policy elites of governmental and corporate institutions, who share the same neo-liberal consensus, have played a critical role in promoting both the discourse of national and regional competitiveness, and of competitiveness policies which they think are good for them (such as supportive institutions and funding for research and development agendas). In the EU, for example, the
competition for investment and resources. European Round Table of Industrialists played a prominent role in ensuring that the Commission's 1993 White Paper placed the pursuit of international competitiveness (and thus the support of business), on an equal footing with job creation and social cohesion objectives (Lovering, 1998; Balanya et al., 2000). This discourse rapidly spread and competitiveness policies were transferred through global policy networks as large quasi-governmental organisations such as the OECD and World Bank pushed the national and, subsequently, the regional competitiveness agenda upon national governments (Peet, 2003).

Part of the appeal of the regional competitiveness discourse for policy-makers is that like the discourse of

, it presents a relatively structured set of ideas, often in the form of implicit and sedimented assumptions, upon which they can draw in formulating strategy and, indeed, in legitimating strategy pursued for quite distinct ends (Hay and Rosamond, 2002). Thus, the discourse clearly dovetails with discussions about the appropriate level at which economic
globalisation governance should be exercised and fits in well with a growing trend towards the decentralised, bottom -up approaches to economic development policy and a focus on the indigenous potential of regions. For example, in the UK:the Government believes that a successful regional and sub-regional economic policy must be based on building the indigenous strengths in each locality, region and county. The best mechanisms for achieving this are likely to be based in the regions themselves (HM Treasury, 2001a, vi). The devolution of powers and responsibilities to regional institutions, whether democratic or more narrowly administrative, is given added tour de force when accompanied by the arguments contained within the regional competitiveness discourse. There is clear political capital to be gained from highlighting endogenous capacities to shape economic processes, not least because it helps generate the sense of regional identity that motivates economic actors and institutions towards a common regional purpose (Rosamond, 2002). Furthermore, the regional competitiveness discourse points to a clear set of agendas for policy action over which regional institutions have some potential for leverage agendas such as the development of university-business relationships and strong innovation networks.

This provides policy-makers with the ability to point to the existence of seemingly secure paths to prosperity, as reinforced by the successes of exemplar regions. In this way, the discourse of regional competitiveness helps to provide a way of constituting regions as legitimate agents of economic governance. The language of regional competitiveness also fits in very neatly with the ideological shift to the Third Way popularised most notably by the New Labour government in the UK. This promotes the reconstruction of the state rather than its shrinkage (as under neo-liberal market
imperatives) or expansion (as under traditional socialist systems of mass state intervention). Significantly, this philosophy sees state economic competencies as being restricted to the ability to intervene in line with perceived microeconomic or supply-side imperatives rather than active macroeconomic, demand-side interventionan agenda that is thus clearly in tune with the

attractiveness of the competitiveness discourse may also be partly a product of the power of pseudo-scientific, mathematised nature of the economics discipline and the business strategy literature from which it emanates. This creates an innate impartiality and technicality for the market outcomes (such as competitiveness) it describes (Schoenberger, 1998). Public policy in developed countries experiencing the marketisation of the state, is increasingly driven by managerialism which emphasises the improved performance and efficiency of the state. This managerialism is founded upon economistic and rationalistic assumptions which include an emphasis upon measuring performance in the context of a planning system driven by objectives and targets (Sanderson, 2001). The result is an increasing requirement for people, places and organisations to be accountable and for their performance and success to be measured and assessed. In this emerging evaluative state, performance tends to be scrutinised through a variety of means, with particular emphasis placed upon output indicators. This provides not only a means of lending legitimacy to the institutional environment, but also some sense of exactitude and certainty, particularly for central governments who are thus able to retain some top-down, mechanical sense that things are somehow under their control (Boyle, 2001). The evolutionary, survival of the fittest basis of the regional competitiveness discourse clearly resonates with this evaluative culture. The discourse of competitiveness strongly appeals to the stratum of policy makers and analysts who can use it to justify what they are doing and/or to find out how well they are doing it relative to their rivals. This helps explain the interest in trying to measure regional competitiveness and the development of
discourse around competitiveness. The composite indices and league tables. It also helps explain why particular elements of the discourse have assumed particular significanceoutput indicators of firm performance are much easier to compare and rank on a single axis than are indicators relating to institutional behaviour, for example. This in turn points to a central paradox in measures of regional competitiveness.

The key ingredients of firm competitiveness and regional prosperity are increasingly perceived as lying with assets such as knowledge and information which are, by definition, intangible or at least difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy. The obsession with performance measurement and the tendency to reduce complex variables to one, easily digestible number brings a kind of blindness with it as to what is really important (Boyle, 2001, 60)in this case, how to improve regional prosperity. Thus while a composite index number of regional competitiveness will attract
widespread attention in the media and amongst policy-makers and development agencies, the difficulty presented by such a measure is in knowing what exactly needs to be targeted for

competitiveness is more than simply the linguistic expression of powerful competitiveness is deployed in a strategic and persuasive way, often in conjunction with other discourses (notably globalisation) to legitimate specific policy initiatives and courses of action. The rhetoric of regional competitiveness serves a useful political purpose in that it is easier to justify change or the adoption of a particular course of policy action by reference to some external threat that makes change seem inevitable. It is much easier for example, for politicians to argue for the removal of supply-side rigidities and flexible hire-and-fire workplace rules by suggesting that there is no alternative and that jobs would be lost anyway if productivity improvement was not achieved. Thus, the language of external competitiveness...provides a rosy glow of shared endeavour and shared enemies which can unite captains of industry and representatives of the shop floor in the same big tent (Turner, 2001, 40). In this sense it is a discourse which provides some shared sense of meaning and a means of legitimising neo-liberalism rather than a material focus on the actual improvement of economic welfare. 5. Conclusions The discourse of regional competitiveness has become ubiquitous in the deliberations and statements of policy actors and regional analysts. However, this paper has argued that it is a rather confused, chaotic discourse which seems to conflate serious theoretical work on regional economies, with national and international policy discourses on
appropriate remedial action. All of this suggests that regional exogenous interests. It has also become rhetoric. In other words, regional

globalisation and the knowledge economy. There are, however, some dominant axioms which collectively define the discourse, notably that regional
competitiveness is a firm-based, output-related conception, strongly shaped by the regional business environment. However, regional competitiveness tends to be defined in different ways, sometimes microeconomic, sometimes macroeconomic, such that it is not entirely clear when a situation of competitiveness has been achieved. It is argued here that the discourse is based on

The discourse chooses to ignore broader, non-output related modalities of regional competition which may tend to have rather more negative than positive connotations. Moreover, it over-emphasises the importance of the region to firm competitiveness and indeed the importance of firm competitiveness to regional prosperity. In this sense proponents of regional competitiveness are guilty of what the eminent philosopher Alfred North Whitehead termed the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. In other words, they have assumed that what applies to firms can simply be read across to those other entities called regions, and that this is a concrete reality rather than simply a belief or opinion.
relatively thinly developed and narrow conceptions of how regions compete, prosper and grow in economic terms.

Turns casecauses confrontational, protectionist policies and trade wars Krugman 94Paul, Nobel Prize winning Economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, and an op-ed columnist for The New York Times) March/April Foreign Affairs Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession l/n A much more serious risk is that the obsession with competitiveness will lead to trade conflict, perhaps even to a world trade war. Most of those who have preached the doctrine of competitiveness have not been old-fashioned protectionists. They want their countries to win the global trade game, not drop out. But what if, despite its best efforts, a country does not seem to be winning, or lacks confidence that it can? Then the competitive diagnosis inevitably suggests that to close the borders is better than to risk having foreigners take away high-wage jobs and high-value sectors. At the very least, the focus on the supposedly competitive nature of international economic relations greases the rails for those who want confrontational if not frankly protectionist policies. We can already see this process at work, in both the
United States and Europe. In the United States, it was remarkable how quickly the sophisticated interventionist arguments advanced by Laura Tyson in her published work gave way to the simple-minded claim by U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor that Japan's bilateral trade surplus was costing the United States millions of jobs. And the trade rhetoric of President Clinton, who stresses the supposed creation of high-wage jobs rather than the gains from specialization, left his administration in a weak position when it tried to argue with the claims of NAFTA foes that competition from cheap Mexican labor will destroy the U.S. manufacturing base.

Destroys value to life. Schoenberger 98Geography and Envtl Eng @ Johns Hopkins *Erica, Discourse and practice in
human geography. Progress in Human Geography 22 (1) p. 2-5] In what follows, I want to examine the meaning and use of the concept of `competi- tiveness'. The analysis claims, in essence, that the term is not merely an `objective' description of a fact of economic life, but also part of a discursive strategy that constructs a particular understanding of reality and elicits actions and reactions appropriate to that understanding. This is followed by a discussion of why the discourse has the power that it does and how it may influence how we think about
and act in the world. I then work through some examples of how an unexamined acceptance of a discursive convention may obscure as much as it reveals. II Competitiveness as an economic category and discursive strategy I'm going to make this as simple as possible for myself by reducing the whole problem of discourse to one word: competitiveness. For economic geographers in general and for me in particular, the categories of competition, competitive strategy and competitiveness have a great deal of importance and might even be thought to pervade our work, even when they are not directly under analysis. All sorts of industrial and spatial economic outcomes are implicitly or explicitly linked to some notion of `competitiveness' (cf. Krugman, 1994).

The rise and decline of particular industrial regions have something to do with the competitiveness of the labour force (generally understood in terms of comparative costs and unionization), which (for geographers if for no one else) has something to do with the competitiveness of the region in the first place, understood as its particular mix of resources, infrastructure, location and cost profile. More than that, though, `competitiveness' seems to me a term that has become truly hegemonic in the Gramscian sense. It is a culturally and socially sanctioned category that, when invoked, can completely halt public discussion of public or private activities. There is virtually no counterargument available to the simple claim that `doing X will make us uncompetitive,' whatever X and whomever `us' might be.2 In a capitalist society, of course, it is more
than reasonable to be concerned with competition and competitiveness. No matter what your theoretical orientation, main- stream to Marxist, these must be seen as real forces shaping real outcomes in society. They are not just intellectual constructs that lend a false sense of order to a messy world. On the other hand, we can also analyse them as elements of a discursive strategy that shapes our understanding of the world and our possibilities for action in it. In that case, it seems to me the first questions to ask are whose discursive strategy is it, what do they really mean by it, where does its power come from, and what kinds of actions does it tend to open up or foreclose. 1 Whose discourse? The discourse on competitiveness comes from two principal sources and in part its power is their power. In the first instance, it is the discourse of the economics profession which doesn't really need to analyse what it is or what it means

The market is the impartial and ultimate arbiter of right behaviour in the economy and competitiveness simply describes the result of responding correctly to market signals. The blandness of this `objective'
socially. language conceals the underlying harshness of the metaphor. For Adam Smith, the idea of competition plausibly evoked nothing more disturbing than a horse race in which the losers are not summarily executed. Since then

, the close identification of marginalist economics with evolutionary theory has

unavoidably imbued the concept with the sense of a life or death struggle (cf. Niehans, 1990).3 In short, on competitiveness hangs life itself. As Krugman (1994: 31) defines it: `. . . when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is .
. . unsustainable that unless it improves its performance it will cease to exist.' As with evolutionary theory, our ability to strip the moral and ethical content from the concepts of life and

Com- petitiveness becomes inescapably associated with ideas of fitness and unfitness, and these in turn with the unstated premise of merit, as in `deserving to live' and `deserving to die'. Secondly, competitiveness is the discourse of the business community and represents both an essential value and an essential validation. More generally, it serves as an all- purpose and unarguable explanation for any behaviour: `We must do X in order to be competitive.' Again, the implied `or else' is death. As hinted, though, the discourse of competitiveness has seeped out beyond these sources and is becoming socially pervasive. University presidents, hospital admindeath is not so great as the self-image of modern science suggests. istrators and government bureaucrats also discourse quite fluently now about compet- itiveness and its related accoutrements: customers, total quality, flexibility and so forth. It will be objected that competitiveness is a deeply ingrained social category and value in the USA and elsewhere and there is no particular reason to single out economists and business persons as culprits in its dissemination. That objection is true enough, and no doubt contributes to the general power of the discourse since it resonates so well with this broader heritage. But `competitiveness' in the sense of `deserving to live' is not what was commonly meant by this more diffuse social understanding. It is, however, what is meant in economic analysis and business life, and it is increasingly what is meant in other institutional and social settings

as well.

This Relationship To Security Reduces Human Lives To Be Manipulated By The New Order Killing VTL Dillon And Reid 2000
(PHD; researches the problematisation of politics, security and war & PhD in Politics (Michael And Dillon, Global Governance , Liberal Peace, and Complex Emerge Alternatives: Local, Global, Political Vol. 25 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2000 JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986) //JES What is of primary interest here, however, is not the histori-cally well-documented propensity of liberal peace to make war against authoritarian regimes. Nor are

. We are concerned, for the moment, with exploring theoretically the ways in which it problematizes the question of order itself, and with the correlate strategizing of power relations, locally and globally de-rived from the ways in which it does so. We argue that these de-pend upon notions of immanent emergency. Specifically, they de-pend upon its twin cognates, exception and emergence, to which the phenomenon of complex emergency draws our attention. We argue in addition that each such "emergency" reduces human life to a zone of indistinction in which it becomes mere stuff for the ordering strategies of the hybrid form of sovereign and governmental power that distinguishes the liberal peace of global governance. Interpreted this way, complex emergencies not only draw attention to the operation of a specific international po-litical rationality - that of
its extremely powerful mil-itary-industrial-scientific dynamics immediately at issue global liberal governance - but also to certain key distinguishing features of it as a hybrid order of power.

The Affs Preserves Sovereign Power Ideology Which Reduces Humans to Bare Life Dillon And Reid 2000
(PHD; researches the problematisation of politics, security and war & PhD in Politics (Michael And Dillon, Global Governance , Liberal Peace, and Complex Emerge Alternatives: Local, Global, Political Vol. 25 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2000 JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986) //JES

Agamben's analysis discloses a certain com-parability in the operation of sovereign power and the power/ knowledge that Foucault termed governmentality. Not only are they both a strategic form of power, they each operate by effecting a kind of "phenomenological" reduction. Both claim to reduce life to its bare essentials in order to disclose the truth about it, but in so doing actually reduce it to a format that will bear the pro-gramming of power to which it must be subject if the power of sovereignty (or, as we shall see, that of governance as well) is to be in- scribed, instituted, and operated. Life here is not of
For our purposes, course "natural" life, whatever that may be. It is in every sense the life of power. But since we are talking different operations of power, we are also talking different forms of life; modalities formed by the different exercises of reduction through which each operation of power institutes and maintains itself. Each form of life is the "stuff of power, but in dissimilar ways. That is what we mean when we say that sovereignty and governmentality reproduce life amenable to their sway. It is not uncommon for a form of life thus reproduced to desire the processes that originate it. Sovereign and governmental powers alike each also therefore work their own particular powers of seduction on the subjects of power that they summon into being. Seduction, as well as imposition, is thus inte-gral also to their very modus operandi.31 Nationalism might be said to be one form of such seduction, consumerism another. In respect of sovereignty, Agamben calls the life of sovereign power

." Bare life is thus life without context, meaning, or history - the state of nature - so that sovereignty may be in-stalled as the power that orders it. In being abandoned, that which is excluded is cast into a condition that places it at the mercy of the sovereign power that institutes itself through instituting this relation. The formal structure of sovereign power understood as a strategic principle of formation rather than as a
"bare life metaphysical point of origin is therefore precisely this: "the excluded included as excluded." By virtue of that inclusion as excluded, bare life is si-multaneously both produced by the exercise of sovereign power and subject to it in a particular way. As excluded life,

bare life under the strategic ordering

of sovereign power is life exposed to death - life available to be killed. Mundanely, it is life that is dis-posable. In either instance - irrespective of the different ratio-nales advanced for it - the bare life effected by the strategic or-dering of life instituted by the operation of sovereign power is a life-form available ultimately to serve the interest of continuously preserving the institution of sovereign power itself. Consider the classical nature of sovereign warfare, the discourse of political re-alism that articulates it, and the fictions of political subjectivity and interest that are said to fuel it. Security Is Utilized By The State To De-world Humans To Create Life Capable Of Ordering Dillon And Reid 2000
(PHD; researches the problematisation of politics, security and war & PhD in Politics (Michael And Dillon, Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emerge Alternatives: Local, Global, Political Vol. 25 Issue 1 Jan-Mar 2000 JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986) //JES Here, in Agamben 's account, the metaphysical fiction that em- anates from an intentional consciousness, the location of which al- ways regresses to infinity, is replaced by a material analytics of its formal structure that discloses how it, too, operates as a strategy of power. Neither the epicenter of power nor the terminus of its oth- erwise infinite

we discover that sovereign power insti- tutes emergency in the form of the exception as a principle of formation that presupposes and works to produce a certain form of life, one capable of bearing the ordering and thereby reproducing the power of sovereignty itself. Classically, in Hobbes for example, as well as in Schmitt, the formal structure of sovereign power comprises an exclusion that is included as excluded. The exclusion is the exception, that which is said to be outside the law. In the process, the very differentia- tion of inside/outside is instituted. In being excluded, that which is cast out is not, however, severed of all relation with the power that in instituting this reduction thereby institutes itself. On the contrary, that which is excluded enters into a singular relation with the instituting power. Hence, "the state is founded not as the expression of a social contract but as an untying"22 of life from its existing relations that renders life down-and-out in order to, sub-jecting it to its power, institute itself as a power. Sovereign state power is a protection racket that de-worlds human beings in order to re-world them as sovereign subjects, subject of course to the op-eration of sovereignty, on the grounds minimally of securing them security. Ask traditional peoples who currently bear the
regress, it is therefore misleading to ask, What is sovereign power? Rather we should ask, How does sovereign power work? In doing so, brunt of this principle of formation as it is applied to subject them to the rule of a modern state.

2NCCompetitiveness KF/W
TI doesn't exist in a vacuum - it's interpretive and the product of micro-conduits of action their prescriptive policy approach is massively reductionist and results in serial confusion which turns case Hartwig 85 (Richard, Visiting Fellow at Australian National Univ., Prof Political Science at Texas A&M,
Roads to Reason: Transportation Administration and Rationality in Colombia, pg. 209-210) Chapter 4 discusses public transportation policy in general and the limitations of technical and economic transportation policy in particular. "Policy" implies a problem. and a distinct type of problem implies the need for a distinct type of policy. "Transportation." however. means different things to different people. Engineers tend to focus on the technical problems of building good highways for an acceptable price; economists are concerned with maximizing utility per unit of resource expended; and politicians are sensitive to currents of opinion and levers of power. which may be affected by the location and funding of public works projects. Engineers. economists. and politicians employ different modes of thought and evaluate success by distinct and often conicting criteria. What then is transportation policy? To the extent that a policy is dened as a response to a problem or problem set, and to the extent that transportation represents different types of problems to different people. interests. and levels of government. I conclude that there is no such single thing as transportation policy." This implies that the essentially economic decision-making criteria of cost-benet analysis and some systems analysis are insufficient guides for transportation policymaking.

It's predictable - our kritik is an indict of their authors assumptions and methodology - we don't shift the focus from the 1ac - we specifically interrogate it The capitalist assumption that the economy can be managed in terms of "risk" and "security" justifies expanding structural inequities b/c worldviews can't cater to specific instances of suffering or crisis their policies are doomed to failure Tooze 5 Visiting Professor of IR at CUNY (Roger, "The Missing: Security, Critical International
Political Economy, and Community," Critical Security Studies and World Politics, ed. Booth) We are living at a time of underlying but largely unrecognized economic and financial crisis. In these first years of the twenty-first century, the world's financial, investment, and trading structures are creaking. Former U.S. president Bill Clinton has described this time as offering the biggest challenge facing the world economy for over fifty years. Its a time of high drama and much talk of systemic risk and threats to security, a time when the world economy is affected by uncertainty, risk, and the impediments to economic activity imposed in the search for security, for which the world's governments are desperately
seeking solutions,23 Suddenly, past orthodoxies, embedded and institutionalized at every level of government and economy, are no longer automatically seen by academics and policymakers alike as the common sense they have been portrayed as. The values and policies that have driven the operation, institutions, and governance of the world political economy are now part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Although it often seems easy to put the blame for problems on the intransigence or self-interest of the United States or the European Union, this is to mistake the symptoms for the structural imperatives of the embedded logic of neoliberalism. That being the case, the crisis that CSS has identified in commonsense IR with respect to security converges dramatically with the crisis that a critical IPE reveals in orthodox IPE. The continuing concern over financial structures and the failure of the post-2001 Doha Round of the World Trade Organization are fundamental in the sense that these structures and their associated modes of behavior are a necessary and integral part of the system of advanced financial capitalism. Yet from the gaze of a critical IPE this concern is just one element of a larger problem that very few of the analysts and commentators on the world economy acknowledge or, indeed, can even recognize given their assumptions, concepts, and values. Other manifestations of this larger problem include the massive and increasing disparities of wealth and poverty that have accompanied the overall growth of the world product both within and between national political economies.24 By the early 1990s, for example, the top 1 percent of earners in the United States received more income than the combined total of the bottom 40 percent, and the 400 richest individuals listed by the U.S. Forbes magazine had a net worth equal to the gross domestic product (GDP) of India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Srf Lanka which together had a combined population of more than 1 billion.25 There has been increasing world unemployment and underemployment, with all the implications of these conditions; the total is now more than 1 billion people, one-third of all possible employees. and complementary forms of community in the face of the manifest problems and limitations of the state, as shown both by the efforts of regional organizations and subnational social movements. And not least, we can see the hardening of the global

There is a growing search for meaningful alternatives

human beings, through our economic activities, have destroyed one-third of our natural habitat since 1970 and are also destroying the ozone layer at rates previously thought impossible. Together, these elements making up the
scientific consensus on the conclusion that contemporary global situation indicate a far broader and a far deeper problem than the myriad economists and business analysts who regularly pontificate in and on our media are able and willing to recognize and discuss. Despite this, these are the people to whom we as concerned and aware citizensinvariably turn to for knowledge. Our societies have seemingly given them legitimacy to be the only bona fide interpreters of these matters (apart from politicians, who properly claim democratic legitimacy, but most of whom have simply accepted the values and assumptions of a neoliberal economism). Moreover, as this chapter illustrates, we do not seem to be getting much help from those academic disciplines that we might have expected to have had the expertise and critical distance to provide analyses and understanding, namely, international political economy, international relations, and economics. To the

extent that these disciplinary practices of knowledge in their mainstream or orthodox manifestations have accepted particular values and assumptions, they have weakened their own ability to offer anything other than system-supporting analyses. This is particularly the case when the prevailing structures of neoliberal capitalism are under threat or are under conditions

Practitioners of orthodox disciplines (particularly, but not solely, economics) are content to offer us their solutions, derived from universal and nomological categories, on the implicit basis of problem-solving theory,26 rather than acknowledge the limitations and inappropriateness of such knowledge for the conditions in which we now find ourselves.
of longer-term change.

Predictions massively oversimplify complex interactionsthis justifies the instrumentalization of human beings and causes error replication Goede 3 (Marieke De, PhD International Studies, Review of International Studies, Vol. 29(1), pg. 7997, Jstor) A similar point is made by Ruggie, who makes a distinction between meanings and brute facts, in which the latter exist in the familiar world of material capabilities and similar palpable properties, of pregiven and fixed preferences, of increases in trade restraints and depreciations of currencies and so on.47 These arguments overlook a body of literature in the history of science which investigates the ways in which scientific facts are culturally, socially and historically articulated and contested.48 They also foreclose the possibility of considering the political processes of valuation that underpin the functioning of money and capital, exemplified by Ruggies assumption that currencies exist independently of mental states, beliefs, desires, hopes and fears.49 In conclusion, then, the epistemic communities approach operates with a high degree of economism, which takes the economic sphere to be a distinct, independently existing sphere of life whose elements have no intrinsic political aspect and, as such, can be definitely separated from the social, political and legal aspects of life.50

The inability to map out micro-conduits of action perpetuates cycles of nationalism, discrimination and poverty Pauker 12Senior Editor at Foreign Policy (Benjamin, Interviewing Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia
Group and author AND Nouriel Roubini, professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business, co-founder and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, "'We've Got Bigger Problems Right Now'," Foreign Policy, Jan 25th) NR: I don't want to overstress class factors -- nationalism, race, religion, even inter-generational cleavages. Yes, they are going to be important, but there's a broad nexus of economic and financial concerns. It's about income and wealth inequality, but it's also about jobs -- whether your children are going to be better off than you. It's about economic insecurity, about whether the benefits of social security, health care are going to be there. It's about underemployment, or unemployment. So it takes different manifestation in different places, of course. There's the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, the riots in London, the middle class in Israel demonstrating because they cannot afford their homes, the Chilean students that cannot afford good education, anti-corruption in India, people saying enough of what's going on in Russia, and in China where people cannot go out on the streets to protest so they turn to the microblogs to voice anger about corruption and inequality. So it's a whole nexus of things that have to do with economic insecurity, whether it's poverty, education, skills, the ability to compete in a global economy, keeping your old-age benefits, and then inequality. The manifestation of them can be class warfare as opposed to nationalism, or religious warfare as opposed to inter-generational cleavages between young and old. But I think there's a complex nexus of economic concerns that are at the basis for many of the things that are happening in different ways in different countries.

That's extinction Nhanenge 7 [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, ECOFEMINSM:

TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT] Generation of wealth was an important part of the Scientific Revolution and its modem society. The scientific discipline of economics therefore became a significant means for wealth creation. However, since it is founded on similar dualised premises as science, also economics became a system of domination and exploitation of women, Others and nature. The following discussion is intended to show that. The way in which economics, with its priority on masculine forces, becomes dominant relates to web-like, inter-connected and complex processes, which are not always clearly perceived. The below discussions try to show how the dualised priority of the individual over society, reason over emotion, self-interest over community-interest, competition over cooperation, and more pairs, generate domination that leads to the four crises of violence and war, poverty, human oppression and environmental degradation. The aim in sum is to show how the current perspective of economics is destroying society (women and Others) and nature. The following discussion is consequently a critique of economics. It is meant to highlight some elements that make economics a dominant ideology, rather than a system of knowledge. It adopts a feministic view and it is therefore seen from the side of women, poor people and nature. The critique is
extensive, but not exhaustive. It is extensive because economics is the single most important tool used by mainstream institutions for development in the South. Thus if we want to understand why development does not alleviate poverty, then we first need to comprehend why its main instrument, economics, cannot alleviate poverty. A critical analysis of economics and its influence in development is therefore important as an introduction to next chapter, which discusses ecofeminism and development. However, the critique is not exhaustive because it focuses only on the dualised elements in economics. It is highly likely that there are many more critical issues in economics, which should be analyzed in addition to the below mentioned. However, it would exceed this scope. Each of the following 10 sections discusses a specific issue in economics that relates to its dualised nature. Thus, each can as such be read on its own. However, all sections are systemically interconnected. Therefore each re-enforces the others and integrated, they are meant to show the web of masculine forces that make economics

economics sees itself as a neutral, objective, quantitative and universal science, which does not need to be integrated in social and natural reality. The outcome of this is, however, that economics cannot value social and environmental needs. Hence, a few individuals become very rich from capitalising on free social and natural resources, while the health of the public and the environment is degraded. It also is shown that the exaggerated focus on monetary wealth does not increase human happiness. It rather leads to a deteriorating quality of life. Thus, the false belief in eternal economic growth may eventually destroy life on planet Earth. The
dominant towards women, Others and nature. The first three sections intend to show that

next section shows that economics is based on dualism, with a focus solely on yang forces. This has serious consequences for all yin issues: For example, the priority on individualism over community may in its extreme form lead to self-destruction. Similarly, the priority on rationality while excluding human emotions may end in greed, domination, poverty, violence and war. The next section is important as a means to understanding rational economics. Its aim is to clarify the psychologi cal meaning of money. In reality, reason and emotion are interrelated parts of the human mind; they cannot be separated. Thus, economic

rationality and its focus on eternal wealth generation are based on personal emotions like fears and inadequacies, rather than reason. The false belief in dualism means that human beings are lying to themselves, which results in disturbed minds, stupid actions with disastrous consequences. The
focus on masculine forces is consequently psychologically unhealthy; it leads to domination of society and nature, and will eventually destroy the world.

2NCCybersecuritization DA
Worries about cyberterrorism create a threatening other and justify invasive securitization Bialasiewicz 7 Luiza Bialasiewicz a, David Campbell b, Stuart Elden b, Stephen Graham b, Alex Jeffrey c,
Alison J. Williams a Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London, United Kingdom b International Boundaries Research Unit, Geography Department, Durham University, Durham, DH1 3LE, United Kingdom c School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom, Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy Political Geography 26 (2007) 405e422, via sciencedirect.com) Abroad, one contradiction between the moral cartography of terror and the spatiality of globalization can be found in the attention US national security discourse pays to the deepening connectivity between domestic US space and burgeoning circuits of computer communication, electronic transaction, and organized criminal activity. Significant here is the US militarys discussion of the risk of cyber -terrorism; their efforts to clamp down on transitional financial dealings of alleged terrorist sympathizers; or their analyses of the biological pathogens which routinely flow around the worlds airline and shipping systems (The White House, 2002a). These bring into being a world in which everything and everywhere is perceived as a border from which a potentially threatening Other can leap (Hage, 2003: 86). Such a world of porosity, flow and rhizomatic, fibrous connectivities is deeply at odds with the imaginative geographies of exclusion and their moral cartography.

2NCDemocracy Promotion DA
The idea that other inferior nations will be more peaceful upon the export of democracy ensures constant crisis construction to justify democracy promotion. The imposition of the democratic norm re-asserts the position of the rational American savior. Clifford 1 Asst Prof of Phil @ Mizzou State U, [Michael, Political Genealogy After Foucault : Savage
Identities p.60-61]
The other common discursive element of a national identity, according to Weber, is a sense of common political destiny. In America this destiny is largely a reflection and a projection of that same frontier mentality the idea that America is destined to conquer all of the wildernesses of the world, natural, social, moral, political, economic and technological. By the middle of the nineteenth century this mythos would become explicit and would be concretized in the jingoistic discourse of Manifest Destiny, a term coined by John Louis OSullivan in 1845 in a popular magazine with a nationalistic orientation. The notion of Manifest Destiny would be appealed to to justify the territorial expansion of the United States for the next fifty years or more. This expansion was about much more than the acquisition of land, of course. It was about sending a beacon of light into the darkness, of bringing American values and ideology to that part of the world that remained a kind of wilderness, awaiting its penetration, appropriation, and spiritual intubation. This era paralleled the period of high colonialism during which native peoples savages would have Western culture imposed upon them in often cruel and violent ways. 41 Yet colonialism proper differed from the expansionist projects of nineteenth-century America. Americans were giving something, not taking it away: namely, freedom and the liberal-democratic values of self-government. Of course, America was willing to go to war with anyone who refused to accept this gift. And well into the twentieth century, even after harsh political realities brought the expansionist policies of Manifest Destiny to a close, America continued to define itself as a nation in similar terms, that is, not only as the land of liberty, but of its fount and guardian around the globe. Any nation that did not share these values automatically became a threat, and was thus subject to American interventions, in the form of trade, aid, diplomacy, and, if necessary, war.

2NCDeterrence DA
Deterrence doesn't exist causes extinction Krieger 11David Krieger, founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and has served as President
of the Foundation since 1982, Councilor of the World Future Council; Chair of the Executive Committee of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, "Ten Serious Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence Theory," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2/7/12
As volcanoes often give off strong warning signals that they may erupt, so we have witnessed such signals regarding nuclear arsenals and the failure of nuclear deterrence theory over the

Nuclear arsenals could erupt with volcano-like force, totally overwhelming the relatively flimsy veneer of protection provided by nuclear deterrence theory. In the face of such dangers, we must not be complacent. Nor should we continue to be soothed by the experts who assure us not to worry because the weapons will keep us safe. There is, in
course of the Nuclear Age. fact, much to worry about, much more than the nuclear policy makers and theorists in each of the nuclear weapon states have led us to believe. I will examine below what I believe are ten

nuclear deterrence theory, flaws that lead to the conclusion that the theory is unstable, unreliable and invalid. 1. It is only a theory. It is not proven and cannot be proven . A theory may posit a causal relationship, for example, if one party does something, certain results will follow. In the case of nuclear deterrence theory, it is posited that if one party threatens to retaliate with nuclear weapons, the other side will not attack. That an attack has not occurred, however, does not prove that it was prevented by nuclear deterrence. That is, in logic, a false assumption of causality. In logic, one cannot prove a negative, that is, that doing something causes something else not to happen. That a nuclear attack has not happened may be a result of any number of other factors, or simply of exceptional good fortune. To attribute the absence of nuclear war to nuclear deterrence is to register a false positive, which imbues nuclear deterrence with a false sense of efficacy. 2. It requires a commitment to mass murder. Nuclear deterrence leads to policy debates about how many threatened deaths with nuclear weapons are enough to deter an adversary? Are one million deaths sufficient to deter adversary A? Is it a different number for adversary B? How many deaths are sufficient? One million? Ten million? One hundred million? More? There will always be a tendency to err on the side of more deaths, and thus the creation of more elaborate nuclear killing systems. Such calculations, in turn, drive arms races , requiring huge allocations of resources to weapons systems that must never be used. Leaders must convince their own populations that the threat of mass murder and the expenditure of resources to support this threat make them secure and is preferable to other allocations of scientific and financial resources. The result is not only a misallocation of resources , but also a
serious flaws in

diversion of effort away from cooperative solutions to global problems. 3. It requires effective communications. In effect, nuclear
deterrence is a communications theory. Side A must communicate its capability and willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in retaliation for an attack by adversary B, thereby preventing adversary B from attacking. The threat to retaliate and commit mass murder must be believable to a potential attacker. in speeches by leaders and parliamentary statements, as well as news reports and even by rumors. Communications also take place non-verbally in the form of alliance formations and nuclear

Communications take place verbally

There is much room for error and misunderstanding. 4. It requires rational decision makers. Nuclear deterrence will not be effective against a decision maker who is irrational. For example, side A may threaten nuclear retaliation for an attack by adversary B, but the leader of side B may irrationally conclude that the leader of side A will not do what he says. Or, the leader of side B may irrationally attack side A because he does not care if one million or ten million of his countrymen die as a result of side As nuclear retaliation. I believe two very important questi ons to consider are these: Do all leaders of all states behave rationally at all times, particularly under conditions of extreme stress when tensions are very high? Can we be assured that all leaders of all states will behave rationally at all times in the future? Most people believe the answer to these questions is an unqualified No. 5. It instills a false sense of confidence. Nuclear deterrence is frequently confused with nuclear defense, leading to the conclusion that nuclear weapons provide some form of physical protection against attack. This conclusion is simply wrong. The weapons and the threat of their use provide no physical protection. The only protection provided is psychological and once the weapons start flying it will become clear that psychological protection is not physical protection. One can believe the weapons make him safer, but this is not the same as actually being safer. Because nuclear deterrence theory provides a false sense of confidence, it could lead a possessor of the weapons to take risks that would be avoided without nuclear threats in place. Such risks could be counterproductive and actually lead to nuclear war. 6. It does not work against an accidental use. Nuclear deterrence is useful, if at all, only
weapons and missile tests. In relation to nuclear deterrence, virtually everything that each side does is a deliberate or inadvertent form of communication to a potential adversary. against the possibility of an intentional, premeditated nuclear attack. Its purpose is to make the leader who contemplates the intentional use of a nuclear weapon decide against doing so. But

nuclear deterrence cannot prevent an accidental use of a nuclear weapon, such as an accidental launch. This point was made in the movie Dr.
Strangelove, in which a US nuclear attack was accidentally set in motion against the Soviet Union. In the movie, bomber crews passed their failsafe point in a training exercise and couldnt be recalled. The president of the United States had to get on the phone with his Soviet counterpart and try to explain that the attack on Moscow that had been set in motion was just an accident.

There is no such thing as a foolproof system, and when nuclear weapons are involved it is extremely dangerous to think there is. 7. It doesnt work against terrorist organizations.
The Americans were helpless to stop the accident from occurring, and so were the Soviets. Accidents happen! Nuclear deterrence is based upon the threat of retaliation. Since it is not possible to retaliate against a foe that you cannot locate, the threat of retaliation is not credible under these circumstances. Further, terrorists are often suicidal (e.g., suicide bombers), and are willing to die to inflict death and suffering on an adversary. For these reasons, nuclear deterrence will be ineffective in preventing nuclear terrorism. The only way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to prevent the weapons themselves from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. This will become increasingly difficult if nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials to build them proliferate to more and more countries. 8. It encourages nuclear proliferation. To the extent that the

nuclear deterrence is accepted as valid and its flaws overlooked or ignored, it will make nuclear weapons seem to be valuable instruments for the protection of a country. Thus, the uncritical acceptance of nuclear deterrence theory provides an incentive for nuclear proliferation. If it is believed that nuclear weapons can keep a country safe, there will be commensurate pressure to develop such weapons. 9. It is not believable. In the final analysis, it is likely that even the policy makers who promote nuclear deterrence do not truly believe in it. If policy
theory of makers did truly believe that nuclear deterrence works as they claim, they would not need to develop missile defenses. The United States alone has spent over $100 billion on developing missile defenses over the past three decades, and is continuing to spend some $10 billion annually on missile defense systems. Such attempts at physical protection against nuclear attacks are unlikely to ever be fully successful, but they demonstrate the underlying understanding of policy makers that nuclear deterrence alone is insufficient to provide protection to a country. If

only people being fooled by the promised effectiveness of nuclear deterrence theory are the ordinary people who place their faith in their leaders, the same people who are the targets of nuclear weapons and will suffer the consequences should nuclear deterrence fail. Their political and military leaders have made them the fools in what is far from a foolproof system. 10. Its failure would be catastrophic. Nuclear deterrence theory requires the development and deployment of nuclear weapons for the threat of retaliation. These weapons can, of course, be used for initiating attacks as well as for seeking to prevent attacks by means of threatened retaliation. Should deterrence theory fail, such failure could result in consequences beyond our greatest fears. For example, scientists have found in simulations of the use of 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons in an exchange between India and Pakistan, the deaths could reach one billion individuals due to blast, fire, radiation, climate change, crop failures and resulting starvation. A larger nuclear war between the US and Russia could destroy civilization as we know it.
policy makers understand that nuclear deterrence is far from foolproof, then who is being fooled by nuclear deterrence theory? In all likelihood, the

2NCEconomic Imperialism DA
Their drive for growth justifies economic imperialismthis totalitarian project empirically kills millions under the guise of integrating nations into global trade patterns Neocleous 8Mark Neocleous, Government @ Brunel Univ., Critique of Security, p. 185-186
In other words, the

new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all its economic strength in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of economic security.99 Despite the fact that econ omic security
would never be formally dened beyond economic order or economic well-being,100 the signicant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of economic well-being, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thushuman needs over military ones. The

reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and humanitarian. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for
personal security by using notions such as personal freedom andsocial equality.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves.

this ability to batter down all Chinese walls would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole worldbecame a garden to be cultivated to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fteen years the concept economic security had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe . Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according
In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capitalaccumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and Americas core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but alsosecured everywhere. Security

politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global intervention, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of
American foreign policy.103 One face is the good liberal cop: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the worlds nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the bad liberal cop: should one of these nat ions decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face;

the liberal moment becomes the moment of violence . This Janus-

faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen t to either overtly or cover tly re-order the affairs of myriads of

there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries, adding that every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security.105 These would include interventions in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the
nations those rogue or outlaw states on the wrong side of history.104 Extrapolating the gures as best we can, one CIA agent com mented in 1991, Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan,

The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security making the economy scream via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIAs Health Alteration Committee whose mandate was to incapacitate foreign ofcials; drugtrafcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co- opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to
Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the 60 or more countries identied as the bases of terror cells by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106

the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism owed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly,
national security has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory security partnerships could be established wit h certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ve Centr al Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and

Either way, the whole world was to be included in the newsecure global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers . John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like
China. this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and guring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difcult. But, adding them up as best we can,

we come up with a gure of six million people killed and this is a minimum gure.

Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola the operation I was part of and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note

that the six million is a minimum gure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conrmed by events in the twentyrst century: in a
speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush

reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly new doctrine of preemption in the early twentyrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the worlds only superpower in its current war on terror is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of economic order. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a single sustainable model for national success based on political
and economic liberty, with whole sections devoted to the security benets of economic liberty, and the benets to liberty of th e security strategy proposed.111

2NCSynoptic Delusion DA
Central planning can't know all relevant information security attempts to parsimonize hyper-complex situations by focusing on short-term fixes instead of long-term reform Bergmann 5Prof Emeritus of Economics at Univ. of Maryland and American Univ., trustee of the
Economists for Peace and Security, "The Current State of Economics: Needs Lots of Work," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 600(1) More than two hundred years have passed since the publication of The Wealth of Nations, yet we are still far from having a science we can rely on to prevent major malfunctions of the economy or to treat them when they do occur. A nation's economy is a difficult entity to study. Yet the inherent difficulty of the subject matter is not the only problem. The study of the economy has not developed as have other sciences, in which direct observation and data collection by the scientists themselves play a large part. Most members of the economics profession study and create economic theory that is neither inspired nor validated by observation. There is little direct engagement by economists with people, businesses, banks, markets; little inquiry as to who does what and why; little observing at firsthand of any actual economic functioning.1 There are exceptions: a relatively small segment of the profession is doing hands-on research on the way people behave when faced with economic decisions. However, they are only in the earliest stagey of developing a body of knowledge that could inform economic policy making. And only a handful have yet ventured out of the laboratory, where observations are made on students playing the part of the economic actors, to go into the field, where the behavior of real economic actors going about their business is to be seen. One indication of the poor state of development of economics is the well-known and much ridiculed lack of agreement among professional economists on policy with regard to such vital issues as unemployment, budget deficits, taxes, inflation, international trade, the promotion of growth, and the government regulation of business. What is even more disturbing than the lack of agreement is the fact that political ideology quite obviously determines which side of any controversy about economic theory or economic policy any particular economist is likely to take. The invasion of scientific argument by nonscientific considerationssympathies for particular groups, attachment to certain extrascientific beliefs or value judgmentsis not totally unheard of in the physical sciences, but there its effect, unlike the situation in economics, is minor. A few professional biologists of some eminence are fundamentalist Christians who reject the theory of evolution. But the factual evidence for evolution is so overwhelming that their numbers remain tiny, and their influence on ongoing research and theorizing among biologists is nil. In economics, on the other hand, evidence that has so far been collected on most of the important issues is scarce, indirect, difficult to interpret, and not well suited to provide answers that would settle the controversies. This is particularly true in macroeconomics, which deals with such issues as unemployment, inflation, and foreign trade. As a result, evidence is seldom decisive in winning adherents to a particular view of any economic issue. The failure of appeals to evidence to settle controversies decisively and the pervasive influence of ideology combine to allow great freedom to the formulators of economic theory. Without fear of contradiction, at least from the faction to which they belong, economists can and do purvey far-fetched notions to considerable acclaim, some of which are referred to below. Material gain and career advancement also come into play. Any particular economic policy holds the possibility of adding to the income and wealth of some people and subtracting from the income and wealth of others. Politicians beholden to particular groups in the population can pick and choose among economists. This gives an incentive for economists to divide themselves into two camps, so that whichever party comes to power will have a ready-made corps of economists willing and ready to recommend policies congenial to the party's constituency.

Synoptic delusion makes predictions useless

Rowley 98Prof Economics at George Mason University (Charles, George Mason Law Review, Vol.
971(6))
Within the context of social choice theory, this unconstrained vision manifests itself in the notion that social institutions are the product of deliberate design by unboundedly rational elites. It is vested with an error of assumption categorized by Hayek as synoptic delusion , a delusion in which intellectuals assume that all relevant information is known to a single elite mind (the precedent-setting judge in the case of law-and-economics) and that this mind is capable of constructing from such universal knowledge the particulars of a desirable social order. / In essence this is the fatal conceit identified by Hayek in 1988 as the principal cause of the then-impending collapse of world-wide socialism. n131 In reality, every individual is necessarily ignorant of most of the particular facts that determine the actions of other members of human society.

This makes their policy presumptively wrong Steele 92Author & Editorial Director of Open Court Publishing (David, From Marx to Mises, p. 100)
Does this lead us to embrace the extremely anti -Misesian contention that the realism of the assumption doesnt matter? Unrealistic assumptions is a euphemism for false assumptions. If the assumptions are part of the theory, then false assumptions mean that the theory is false. The claim, then is that it doesnt matter whether the theory is false. The claim is usually followed up with the assertion that what really matters is whether the theory predicts well. But if the assumptions are part of the theory, then the theory predicts its own assumptions, and is immediately refuted if one of its assumptions is shown to be false. There can be no worse predictive performance for any theory than for it to be found to require a false assumption: the theory is immediately a failure, as far as predictions goes. We can instead say that the assumptions are not part of the theory, but then it is not clear that the theory needs the assumptions. If the assumptions are expository mnemonics not implied by the theory, or metaphysical view that people who hold the theory find congenial, then there is no reason why they need to be true.

Also results in elite co-option which stops the case from happening Browne 95Harry Browne, Why Government Doesnt Work, p. 20-21)
Government grows also because well-meaning people like you and me believe it should do certain things that seem beyond controversyfind a cure for cancer, stop air pollution, keep violence off television, hold back an aggressor in the Middle Eastsomething that everyone seems to agree should be done. Whatever the goal, it's easy to imagine that a single-minded government could achieve it. I call this The Dictator Syndrome. You see suffering or danger, and in your imagination you see a government program eliminating it. But in the real world the program would operate as you expect only if you were an absolute dictatorhaving at your disposal all of government's power to compel everyone to do things your way. Running the Gauntlet of Political Action Just for a moment, think about something you wish the government would do and that nearly everyone would like to see happen provide swifter and surer punishment for criminals, teach children right and wrong, furnish health care to those who don't have it, bring peace to Bosnia, or whatever. Imagine a goal so important that it seems to justify using government's power to coerce. And now, consider what will actually happen to your program. To get it enacted you'll need political allies, since alone you have only limited influence. But other people will support your plan and work for it only if you modify it in dozens of ways that further their goals and satisfy their opinions. Suppose you make the necessary compromises and amass enough support to pressure the politicians to vote for your revised program. Who will write the actual law? You? Of course not. It will be written by the same legislators and aides who created all the laws, programs, and problems you object to now. Each of them will compromise your program still further to satisfy his political supporters. And if the law passes, who will administer it? You? Of course not. It will be implemented by bureaucratsmany of whom will use it to pursue goals quite different from what you had in mind. They won't care what your purpose was. It's their law now, and they'll use it to suit their objectives. And, lastly, the new law probably will generate many disputes cases that must be settled in a courtroom. Who will decide those cases? You? Of course not. It will be the same judges who today rule according to their own beliefs, rather than by reference to the written law. A judge may even rule that your law means exactly the opposite of what you had intended. By the time your program has run this gauntlet, it will be far bigger and far more expensive (in money and disrupted lives) than you had imagined. And it will have been twisted to satisfy many factions. In

fact, your program may end up being the opposite of what you had intended. In any case, you will have provided a new tool by which others can use government for their own ends.

2NCInterventionism DA
Viewing military deployments as a panacea for all international conflicts attempts to eliminate all uncertaintyignores the complexity of international response to US hegemonythe security paradigm constantly justifies a blind military buildup like the affirmative without questioning why conflicts happen in the first placecauses extinction McCoy 12Alfred McCoy, Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, "Beyond
Bayonets and Battleships: Space Warfare and the Future of U.S. Global Power ," TomDispatch, http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175614/tomgram%3A_alfred_mccoy%2C_super_weapons_and_glo bal_dominion/ Amid all the post-debate media chatter, however, not a single commentator seemed to have a clue when it came to the profound strategic changes encoded in the president's sparse words. Yet for the past four years, working in silence and secrecy, the Obama administration has presided over a technological revolution in defense planning, moving the nation far beyond bayonets and battleships to cyberwarfare and the full-scale weaponization of space. In the face of waning economic influence, this bold new breakthrough in what's called "information warfare" may prove significantly responsible should U.S. global dominion somehow continue far into the twenty-first century. While the technological changes involved are nothing less than revolutionary, they have deep historical roots in a distinctive style of American global power. It's been evident from the moment this nation first stepped onto the world stage with its conquest of the Philippines in 1898. Over the

span of a century, plunged into three Asian crucibles of counterinsurgency -- in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Afghanistan -- the U.S. military has repeatedly been pushed to the breaking point. It has repeatedly responded by fusing the nation's most advanced technologies into new information infrastructures of unprecedented power. That military first created a manual information regime for Philippine pacification, then a computerized apparatus to fight communist guerrillas in Vietnam. Finally, during its decade-plus in Afghanistan (and its years in Iraq), the Pentagon has begun to fuse biometrics, cyberwarfare, and a potential future triple canopy aerospace shield into a robotic

This distinctive U.S. system of imperial information gathering (and the surveillance and war-making practices that go with it) traces its origins to some brilliant American innovations in the management of textual, statistical, and visual data. Their sum was nothing less than a new information infrastructure with an unprecedented capacity for mass surveillance. During two extraordinary decades, American inventions like Thomas Alva Edison's quadruplex telegraph (1874), Philo Remington's commercial typewriter (1874), Melvil Dewey's library decimal system (1876), and Herman Hollerith's patented punch card (1889) created synergies that led to the militarized application of America's first information revolution. To pacify a determined guerrilla resistance that persisted in the Philippines for a decade
information regime that could produce a platform of unprecedented power for the exercise of global dominion -- or for future military disaster. America's First Information Revolution

after 1898, the U.S. colonial regime -- unlike European empires with their cultural studies of "Oriental civilizations" -- used these advanced information technologies to amass detailed empirical data on Philippine society. In this way, they forged an Argus-eyed security apparatus that played a major role in crushing the Filipino nationalist movement. The resulting colonial policing and surveillance system would also leave a lasting institutional imprint on the emerging American state. When the U.S. entered World War I in 1917, the "father of U.S. military intelligence" Colonel Ralph Van Deman drew upon security methods he had developed years before in the Philippines to found the Army's Military Intelligence Division. He recruited a staff that quickly grew from one (himself) to 1,700, deployed some 300,000 citizen-operatives to compile more than a million pages of surveillance reports on American citizens, and laid the foundations for a permanent domestic surveillance apparatus. A version of this system rose to unparalleled success during World War II when Washington established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as the nation's first worldwide espionage agency. Among its nine branches, Research & Analysis recruited a staff of nearly 2,000 academics who amassed 300,000 photographs, a million maps, and three million file cards, which they deployed in an information system via "indexing, cross-indexing, and counter-indexing" to answer countless tactical questions. Yet by early 1944, the OSS found itself, in the words of historian Robin Winks, "drowning under the

Despite its ambitious global reach, this first U.S. information regime, absent technological change, might well have collapsed under its own weight,
flow of information." Many of the materials it had so carefully collected were left to molder in storage, unread and unprocessed. slowing the flow of foreign intelligence that would prove so crucial for America's exercise of global dominion after World War II. Computerizing Vietnam Under the pressures of a never-ending war in Vietnam, those running the U.S. information infrastructure turned to computerized data management, launching a second American information regime. Powered by the most advanced IBM mainframe computers, the U.S. military compiled monthly tabulations of security in all of South Vietnam's 12,000 villages and filed the three million enemy documents its soldiers captured annually on giant reels of bar-coded film. At the same time, the CIA collated and computerized diverse data on the communist civilian infrastructure as part of its infamous Phoenix Program. This, in turn, became the basis for its systematic tortures and 41,000 "extra-judicial executions" (which, based on disinformation from petty local grudges and communist counterintelligence, killed many but failed to capture more than a handfull of top communist cadres). Most ambitiously, the U.S. Air Force spent $800 million a year to lace southern Laos with a network of 20,000 acoustic, seismic, thermal, and ammonia-sensitive sensors to pinpoint Hanoi's truck convoys coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail under a heavy jungle canopy. The information these provided was then gathered on computerized systems for the targeting of incessant bombing runs. After 100,000 North Vietnamese troops passed right through this electronic grid undetected with trucks, tanks, and heavy artillery to launch the Nguyen Hue Offensive in 1972, the U.S. Pacific Air Force pronounced this bold attempt to build an "electronic battlefield" an unqualified failure. In this pressure cooker of what became history's largest air war, the Air Force also accelerated the transformation of a new information system that would rise to significance three decades later: the Firebee target drone. By war's end, it had morphed into an increasingly agile unmanned aircraft that would make 3,500 top-secret surveillance sorties over China, North Vietnam, and Laos. By 1972, the SC/TV drone, with a camera in its nose, was capable of flying 2,400 miles while navigating via a low-resolution television image. On balance, all this computerized data helped foster the illusion that American "pacification" programs in the countryside were winning over the inhabitants of Vietnam's villages, and the delusion that the air war was successfully destroying North Vietnam's supply effort. Despite a dismal succession of short-term failures that helped deliver a soul-searing blow to American power, all this computerized data-gathering proved a seminal experiment, even if its advances would

As it found itself at the edge of defeat in the attempted pacification of two complex societies, Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington responded in part by adapting new technologies of electronic surveillance, biometric identification, and drone warfare -- all of which are now melding into what may become an information regime far more powerful and destructive than anything that has come before. After six years of a failing counterinsurgency effort in Iraq, the Pentagon discovered the power of biometric identification and electronic surveillance to pacify the country's sprawling cities. It then built a biometric database with more than a million Iraqi fingerprints and iris scans that U.S. patrols on the streets of Baghdad could access instantaneously by satellite link to a computer center in West Virginia. When President Obama took office and launched his "surge," escalating the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, that country became a new frontier for testing and perfecting such biometric databases, as well as for full-scale drone war in both that country and the Pakistani tribal borderlands, the latest wrinkle in a technowar already loosed by the Bush administration. This meant accelerating technological developments in drone warfare that had largely been suspended for two decades after the Vietnam War. Launched as an experimental, unarmed surveillance aircraft in 1994, the Predator drone was first deployed in 2000 for combat surveillance under the CIA's "Operation Afghan Eyes." By 2011, the
not become evident for another 30 years until the U.S. began creating a third -- robotic -- information regime. The Global War on Terror

advanced MQ-9 Reaper drone, with "persistent hunter killer" capabilities, was heavily armed with missiles and bombs as well as sensors that could read disturbed dirt at 5,000 feet and track footprints back to enemy installations. Indicating the torrid pace of drone development, between 2004 and 2010 total flying time for all unmanned vehicles rose from just 71 hours to 250,000 hours. By 2009, the Air Force and the CIA were already deploying a drone armada of at least 195 Predators and 28 Reapers inside Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan -- and it's only grown since. These collected and transmitted 16,000 hours of video daily, and from 2006-2012 fired hundreds of Hellfire

missiles that killed an estimated 2,600 supposed insurgents inside Pakistan's tribal areas. Though the second-generation Reaper drones might seem stunningly sophisticated, one defense analyst has called them "very much Model T Fords." Beyond the battlefield, there are now some 7,000 drones in the U.S. armada of unmanned aircraft, including 800 larger missile-firing drones. By funding its own fleet of 35 drones and borrowing others from the Air Force,

Over two administrations, there has been continuity in the development of a cyberwarfare capability at home and abroad. Starting in 2002, President George W. Bush illegally authorized the National Security Agency to scan countless millions of electronic messages with its top-secret "Pinwale" database. Similarly, the FBI started an Investigative Data Warehouse that, by 2009, held a billion individual records. Under Presidents Bush and Obama, defensive digital surveillance has grown into an offensive "cyberwarfare" capacity, which has already been deployed against Iran in history's first significant cyberwar. In 2009, the Pentagon formed U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), with headquarters at Ft. Meade, Maryland, and a cyberwarfare center at Lackland Air Base in Texas, staffed by 7,000 Air Force employees. Two years later, it declared cyberspace an "operational domain" like air, land, or sea, and began putting its energy into developing a cadre of cyber-warriors capable of launching offensive operations, such as a variety of attacks on the computerized centrifuges in Iran's nuclear facilities and Middle Eastern banks handling Iranian money. A
the CIA has moved beyond passive intelligence collection to build a permanent robotic paramilitary capacity. In the same years, another form of information warfare came, quite literally, online.

Robotic Information Regime As with the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War, the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan have served as the catalyst for a new information regime, fusing aerospace, cyberspace, biometrics, and robotics into an apparatus of potentially unprecedented power. In 2012, after years of ground warfare in both countries and the continuous expansion of the Pentagon budget, the Obama administration announced a leaner future defense strategy. It included a 14% cut in future infantry strength to be compensated for by an increased emphasis on investments in the dominions of outer space and cyberspace, particularly in what the administration

By 2020, this new defense architecture should theoretically be able to integrate space, cyberspace, and terrestrial combat through robotics for -- so the claims go -- the delivery of seamless information for lethal action. Significantly, both space and cyberspace are new, unregulated domains of military conflict, largely beyond international law. And Washington hopes to use both, without limitation, as Archimedean levers to exercise new forms of global dominion far into the twenty-first century, just as the British Empire once ruled from the seas and the Cold War American imperium exercised its global reach via airpower. As Washington seeks to surveil the globe from space, the world might well ask: Just how high is national sovereignty? Absent any international agreement about the vertical extent of sovereign airspace (since a conference on international air law, convened in Paris in 1910, failed), some puckish Pentagon lawyer might reply: only as high as you can enforce it. And Washington has filled this legal void with a secret executive matrix -- operated by the CIA and the clandestine Special Operations Command -- that assigns names arbitrarily, without any judicial oversight, to a classified "kill list" that means silent, sudden death from the sky for terror suspects across the Muslim world. Although U.S. plans for space warfare remain highly classified, it is possible to assemble the pieces of this aerospace puzzle by trolling the Pentagon's websites, and finding many of the key components in technical descriptions at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As early as 2020, the Pentagon hopes to patrol the entire globe ceaselessly, relentlessly via a triple canopy space shield reaching from stratosphere to exosphere, driven by drones armed with agile missiles, linked by a resilient modular satellite system, monitored through a telescopic panopticon, and operated by robotic controls. At the lowest tier of
calls "critical space-based capabilities."

this emerging U.S. aerospace shield, within striking distance of Earth in the lower stratosphere, the Pentagon is building an armada of 99 Global Hawk drones equipped with high-resolution cameras capable of surveilling all terrain within a 100-mile radius, electronic sensors to intercept communications, efficient engines for continuous 24-hour flights, and eventually Triple Terminator missiles to destroy targets below. By late 2011, the Air Force and the CIA had already ringed the Eurasian land mass with a network of 60 bases for drones armed with Hellfire missiles and GBU-30 bombs, allowing air strikes against targets just about anywhere in Europe, Africa, or Asia. The sophistication of the technology at this level was exposed in December 2011 when one of the CIA's RQ-170 Sentinels came down in Iran. Revealed was a bat-winged drone equipped with radar-evading stealth capacity, active electronically scanned array radar, and advanced optics "that allow operators to positively identify terror suspects from tens of thousands of feet in the air." If things go according to plan, in this same lower tier at altitudes up to 12 miles unmanned aircraft such as the "Vulture," with solar panels covering its massive 400-foot wingspan, will be patrolling the globe ceaselessly for up to five years at a time with sensors for "unblinking" surveillance, and possibly missiles for lethal strikes. Establishing the viability of this new technology, NASA's solar-powered aircraft Pathfinder, with a 100-foot wingspan, reached an altitude of 71,500 feet altitude in 1997, and its fourth-generation successor the "Helios" flew at 97,000 feet with a 247-foot wingspan in 2001, two miles higher than any previous aircraft. For the next tier above the Earth, in the upper stratosphere, DARPA and the Air Force are collaborating in the development of the Falcon Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle. Flying at an altitude of 20 miles, it is expected to "deliver 12,000 pounds of payload at a distance of 9,000 nautical miles from the continental United States in less than two hours." Although the first test launches in April 2010 and August 2011 crashed midflight, they did reach an amazing 13,000 miles per hour, 22 times the speed of sound, and sent back "unique data" that should help resolve remaining aerodynamic problems. At the outer level of this triple-tier aerospace canopy, the age of space warfare dawned in April 2010 when the Pentagon quietly launched the X-37B space drone, an unmanned craft just 29 feet long, into an orbit 250 miles above the Earth. By the time its second prototype landed at Vandenberg Air Force Base in June 2012 after a 15-month flight, this classified mission represented a successful test of "robotically controlled

orbital satellites are the prime targets, a vulnerability that became obvious in 2007 when China used a ground-to-air missile to shoot down one of its own satellites. In response, the Pentagon is now developing the F-6 satellite system that will "decompose a large monolithic spacecraft into a group of wirelessly linked elements, or nodes [that increases] resistance to... a bad part breaking or an adversary attacking." And keep in mind that the X-37B has a capacious cargo bay to carry missiles or future laser weaponry to knock out enemy satellites -- in other words, the potential capability to cripple the communications of a future military rival like China, which will have its own global satellite system operational by 2020. Ultimately, the impact of this third information regime will be shaped by the ability of the U.S. military to integrate its array of global aerospace weaponry into a robotic command structure that would be capable of coordinating operations across all combat domains: space, cyberspace, sky, sea, and land. To manage the surging torrent of information within this delicately balanced triple canopy, the system would, in the end, have to become self-maintaining through "robotic manipulator technologies," such as the Pentagon's FREND system that someday could potentially
reusable spacecraft" and established the viability of unmanned space drones in the exosphere. At this apex of the triple canopy, 200 miles above Earth where the space drones will soon roam,

deliver fuel, provide repairs, or reposition satellites. For a new global optic, DARPA is building the wide-angle Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), which could be sited at bases ringing the globe for a quantum leap in "space

Operation of this complex worldwide apparatus will require, as one DARPA official explained in 2007, "an integrated collection of space surveillance systems -- an architecture -- that is leak-proof." Thus, by 2010, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency had 16,000 employees, a $5 billion budget, and a massive $2
surveillance." The system would allow future space warriors to see the whole sky wrapped around the entire planet while seated before a single screen, making it possible to track every object in Earth orbit.

billion headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, with 8,500 staffers wrapped in electronic security -- all aimed at coordinating the flood of surveillance data pouring in from Predators, Reapers, U-2 spy planes, Global Hawks, X-37B space drones, Google Earth, Space Surveillance Telescopes, and orbiting satellites. By 2020 or thereafter -- such a complex techno-system is unlikely to respect schedules -- this triple canopy should be able to atomize a single "terrorist" with a missile strike after tracking his eyeball, facial image, or heat signature for hundreds of miles through field and favela, or blind an entire army by knocking out all ground communications, avionics, and naval

a still uncertain balance of forces offers two competing scenarios for the continuation of U.S. global power. If all or much goes according to plan, sometime in the third decade of this century the Pentagon will complete a comprehensive global surveillance system for Earth, sky, and space using robotics to coordinate a veritable flood of data from biometric street-level monitoring, cyber-data mining, a worldwide network of Space Surveillance Telescopes, and triple canopy aeronautic patrols. Through agile data management of exceptional power, this system might allow the United States a veto of global lethality, an equalizer for any further loss of economic strength.
navigation. Technological Dominion or Techno-Disaster? Peering into the future,

2NCInterventionism Fails
Securitization causes hegemony to failit focuses on increasing the power gap while ignoring political, economic, and cultural consequences of interventions Engelhardt 12Tom Engelhardt, writer of Tomdispatch.com, fellow at the Nation Institute, co-founder
of the American Empire Project, writer, teaching fellow @ Berkeley, author, editor at Pacific News Services, senior editor at Pantheon Books, consulting editor at Metropolitan Books, "Overwrought Empire The Discrediting of U.S. Military Power," http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175602/tomgram%3A_engelhardt%2C_disaster_on_autopilot/) Americans lived in a victory culture for much of the twentieth century. You could say that we experienced an almost 75-year stretch of triumphalism -- think of it as the real American Century -- from World War I to the end of the Cold War, with time off for a
destructive stalemate in Korea and a defeat in Vietnam too shocking to absorb or shake off. When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, it all seemed so obvious. Fate had clearly dealt

The United States was, after all, the last standing superpower, after centuries of unceasing great power rivalries on the planet. It had a military beyond compare and no enemy, hardly a rogue state, on the horizon. It was almost unnerving, such clear sailing into a dominant future, but a moment for the ages nonetheless. Within a decade, pundits in Washington were hailing us as the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome. And heres the odd thing: in a sense, little has changed since then and yet everything seems different. Think of it as the American imperial paradox: everywhere there are now threats against our well-being which seem to demand action and yet nowhere are there commensurate enemies to go with them. Everywhere the U.S. military still reigns supreme by almost any measure you might care to apply; and yet -- in case the paradox has escaped you -- nowhere can it achieve its goals, however modest. At one level, the American situation should simply take your breath away. Never before in modern history had there been an arms race of only one or a great
Washington a royal flush. It was victory with a capital V. power confrontation of only one. And at least in military terms, just as the neoconservatives imagined in those early years of the twenty-first century, the United States remains the sole

yet the more dominant the U.S. military becomes in its ability to destroy and the more its forces are spread across the globe, the more the defeats and semi-defeats pile up, the more the missteps and mistakes grow, the more the strains show, the more the suicides rise, the more the nations treasure disappears down a black hole -- and in response to all of this, the more moves the Pentagon makes. A great power without a significant enemy? You might have to go
superpower or even hyperpower of planet Earth. The Planets Top Gun And back to the Roman Empire at its height or some Chinese dynasty in full flower to find anything like it. And yet Osama bin Laden is dead. Al-Qaeda is reportedly a shadow of its former self. The great regional threats of the moment, North Korea and Iran, are regimes held together by baling wire and the suffering of their populaces. The only incipient great power rival on the planet, China, has just launched its first aircraft carrier, a refurbished Ukrainian throwaway from the 1990s on whose deck the country has no planes capable of landing. The U.S. has 1,000 or more bases around the world; other countries, a handful. The U.S. spends as much on its military as the next 14 powers (mostly all ies) combined. In fact, its investing an estimated $1.45 trillion to

The U.S. military is singular in has divided the globe -- the complete world -- into six commands. With (lest anything be left out) an added command, Stratcom, for the heavens and another, recently established, for the only space not previously occupied, cyberspace, where were already unofficially at war. No other country on the planet thinks of itself in faintly comparable military terms. When its high command plans for its future needs, thanks to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey,
produce and operate a single future aircraft, the F-35 -- more than any country, the U.S. included, now spends on its national defense annually. other ways, too. It alone they repair (dont say retreat) to a military base south of the capital where they argue out their future and war -game various possible crises while striding across a map of the world larger

The president now has at his command not one, but two private armies. The first is the CIA, which in recent years has been heavily militarized, is overseen by a former four-star general (who calls the job living the dream), and is running its own private assassination campaigns and drone air wars throughout the Greater Middle East. The second is an expanding elite, the Joint Special Operations Command, cocooned inside the U.S. military, members of whom are now deployed to hot spots around the globe. The U.S. Navy, with its 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier task
than a basketball court. What other military would come up with such a method? forces, is dominant on the global waves in a way that only the British Navy might once have been; and the U.S. Air Force controls the global skies in much of the world in a totally uncontested

there is no sovereign space Washingtons drones cant penetrate to kill those judged by the White House to be threats. In sum, the U.S. is now the sole planetary Top Gun in a way that empire-builders once undoubtedly fantasized about, but that none from Genghis Khan on have ever achieved: alone and essentially uncontested on the planet. In fact, by every measure (except success), the likes of it has never been seen. Blindsided by Predictably Unintended Consequences By all the usual measuring sticks, the U.S. should be supreme in a historically unprecedented way. And yet it couldnt be more obvious that its not, that despite all the bases, elite forces, private armies, drones, aircraft carriers, wars, conflicts, strikes, interventions, and clandestine operations, despite a labyrinthine intelligence bureaucracy that never seems to stop growing and into which we pour a minimum of $80 billion a year, nothing seems to work out in an imperially satisfying way. It couldnt be more obvious that this is not a glorious dream, but some
fashion. (Despite numerous wars and conflicts, the last American plane possibly downed in aerial combat was in the first Gulf War in 1991.) Across much of the global south, kind of ever-expanding imperial nightmare. This should, of course, have been self-evident since at least early 2004, less than a year after the Bush administration invaded and occupied Iraq, when the roadside bombs started to explode and the suicide bombings to mount, while the comparisons of the United States to Rome and of a prospective Pax Americana in the Greater

Middle East to the Pax Romana vanished like a morning mist on a blazing day. Still, the wars against relatively small, ill-armed sets of insurgents dragged toward their dismally predictable ends. (It says the world that, after almost 11 years of war, the 2,000th U.S. military death in Afghanistan occurred at the hands of an Afghan ally in an insider attack.) In those years, Washington continued to be regularly blindsided by the unintended consequences of its military moves. Surprises -- none pleasant -- became the order of the day and victories proved vanishingly rare. One

: a superpower military with unparalleled capabilities for one-way destruction no longer has the more basic ability to impose its will anywhere on the planet. Quite the opposite, U.S. military power has been remarkably discredited globally by the most pitiful of forces. From Pakistan to Honduras, just about anywhere it goes in the old colonial or
thing seems obvious neocolonial world, in those regions known in the contested Cold War era as the Third World, resistance of one unexpected sort or another arises and failure ensues in some often long-drawn-

Given the lack of enemies -- a few thousand jihadis, a small set of minority insurgencies, a couple of feeble regional powers -- why this is so, what exactly the force is that prevents Washingtons success, remains mysterious. Certainly, its in some way related to the more than half-century of decolonization movements, rebellions, and insurgencies that were a feature of the previous century. It also has something to do with the way economic heft has spread
out and spectacular fashion. beyond the U.S., Europe, and Japan -- with the rise of the tigers in Asia, the explosion of the Chinese and Indian economies, the advances of Brazil and Turkey, and the movement of the planet toward some kind of genuine economic multipolarity. It may also have something to do with the end of the Cold War, which put an end as well to several centuries of imperial or great

humanity, had somehow been inoculated against the imposition of imperial power, as if it now rejected it whenever and wherever applied. In the previous century, it took a half-nation, North Korea, backed by Russian supplies and Chinese troops to fight the U.S. to a
power competition and left the sole victor, it now seems clear, heading toward the exits wreathed in self -congratulation. Explain it as you will, its as if the planet itself, or draw, or a popular insurgent movement backed by a local power, North Vietnam, backed in turn by the Soviet Union and China to defeat American power. Now, small-scale minority insurgencies, largely using roadside bombs and suicide bombers, are fighting American power to a draw (or worse) with no great power behind them at all. Think of the growing force that resists such military might as the equivalent of the dark matter in the universe. The evidence is in. We now know (or should know) that its there, even if we cant see it. Washington's Wars

After the last decade of military failures, stand-offs, and frustrations, you might think that this would be apparent in Washington. After all, the U.S. is now visibly an overextended empire, its sway waning from the Greater Middle East to Latin America, the limits of its power increasingly evident. And yet, heres the curious thing: two administrations in Washington
on Autopilot have drawn none of the obvious conclusions, and no matter how the presidential election turns out, its already clear that, in thi s regard, nothing will change. Even as military power has proven

policymakers have come to rely ever more completely on a military-first response to global problems. In other words, we are not just a classically overextended empire, but also an overwrought one operating on some kind of militarized autopilot. Lacking is a learning curve. By all evidence, its not just that there isnt one, but that there cant be one. Washington, it seems, now has only one mode of thought and action, no matter who is at the helm or what the problem may be, and it always involves, directly or indirectly, openly or clandestinely, the application of militarized force. Nor does it matter that each further application only destabilizes some region yet more or undermines further what once were known as American interests.
itself a bust again and again, our

2NCIran Reps DA
Enmity motivates cycles of miscalculation and escalation - threat construction is a selffulfilling prophecy Parsi 12Trita Parsi, founder and president of the National Iranian American Council, expert on USIranian relations, Iranian foreign politics, and the geopolitics of the Middle East, 7/21/12, "The Enmity Conspiracy, or How War with Iran Became Inevitable," The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/21/the-enmity-conspiracy-or-how-war-with-iran-became-inevitable/ The U.S.-Iran conflict has acquired an air of inevitability. The last ten years appear as a slow-motion prequal to a pre-destined outcome: War. While structural factors have helped push the two actors towards confrontation, there has never been anything inevitable about this conflict. Rather, a long series of miscalculated escalations have brought the two states to the current deadlock. Iran and the United States are entrapped in a paradigm of enmity. Within the mindset of this paradigm, both assume the worst about the other's intentions. The other embodies almost pure evil, and everything it does is aimed at making life more difficult for you. The gradual adoption of this mindset has created a self-fulfilling prophecyacting on those assumptions has further entrenched the two sides and rendered a solution to their tensions more difficult. All actions of the other have been interpreted from a lens of absolute, unwaivering suspicion. Information that appears to vindicate the mistrust has been seized upon, while data that contradict it have been dismissed, neglected or disbelieved. Moreover, according to the conspiracy-like understanding that has emerged from this mindset, the other side is believed to
have a magnificent grand strategy. All its actions fit into this grand strategy and push the country closer a nd closer to its assumed goal.

Short-circuits diplomacy Parsi 12Trita Parsi, founder and president of the National Iranian American Council, expert on USIranian relations, Iranian foreign politics, and the geopolitics of the Middle East, 7/21/12, "The Enmity Conspiracy, or How War with Iran Became Inevitable," The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/21/the-enmity-conspiracy-or-how-war-with-iran-became-inevitable/ What America and the West See Similarly, the U.S. assumes that all Iranian actions are geared towards winning time to advance their nuclear program and present a nuclear fait accompli. When Iran rejected the U.S. offer in 2006 to discuss the nuclear issuealbeit with the precondition that Iran first suspend enrichment activitiesWashington interpreted that as evidence of Irans long-term intent to seek nuclear weapons. The problem was not with the precondition
for the talks, the argument went, but rather with Irans disinterest in real diplomacy. In Februay 2010, Tehran began enrichi ng uranium at the 20% level, following its rejection of a fuel swap

To Washington, this result was not born out of the failure of the talks and Iran's growing desperation to provide medicine for its cancer patients. Rather, in a calculated and premeditated fashion, the
proposal by the U.S. and the Wests refusal to sell fuel pads for Iran's production of medical isotopes for cancer patients. Iranians had engineered the collapse of the talks in order to have a pretext to expand its nuclear program and inch closer to a nuclear weapons capability. It was all an ingenious plan. The

this reading of Iranian conduct was the fact that Irans escalatory steps were timid and small enough not to generate a harsh response from the international community. That way, Iran could slowly and patiently achieve a
detail that proved weapons capaibility without paying the high price that a swift, dash-for-the-bomb strategy would bring about. Similarly, when Tehran accepted a variation of the American fuel swap proposal through Turkish and Brazilian mediation, Washington and its Western allies read Iran's agreement to compromise as a last-ditch effort to evade United Nations Security Council sanctions. If you look at the timing of the Tehran Declaration, it was done at the eve of the v ote, Germanys UN ambassador Peter Wittig told me. Is that a very credible sign? So the whole timing, the way it was brought about and the phrasing of this declaration did not inspire any confidence. . . . The P-5 didnt want any monkey business at that time. It was just another act of deception by Iran aimed at splitting the international communitya tactical maneuver designed to recalibrate the strategy of expanding the nuclear program through small steps that did not generate an

Iranians were saying yes to a proposal that was built on the American swap proposal from October 2009 and which Obama himself had endorsed in letter to the leaders of Brazil and Turkey mattered little. Tehrans conduct simply fit too well into the theory on Iran's grand strategy. And within the paradigm of enmity, theory trumps reality, and assumptions and conclusions are the same. Like all conspiracy theories, the grand strategy belief offers comfort and a sense of orientation. It also exonerates the beholder of any wrongdong since the disastrous situation between the two countries is a product of the evil designs of the other side, not of any mistakes or miscalculations of ones own making. As appealing or comforting as this theory may be, it simply doesnt hold up.
international backlash. The fact that the

Vote negative to reject Iran threat discourse and question their assumptionsthat prevents lock-ins to cycles of escalation that make war inevitable Parsi 12Trita Parsi, founder and president of the National Iranian American Council, expert on USIranian relations, Iranian foreign politics, and the geopolitics of the Middle East, 7/21/12, "The Enmity Conspiracy, or How War with Iran Became Inevitable," The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/21/the-enmity-conspiracy-or-how-war-with-iran-became-inevitable/ A Clumsy Improvisation? A far more plausible explanation for the current deadlock is not that the two sides have a glorious grand strategy but that they actually dont have a strategy at all. European officials I interviewed for my book A Single Roll of the Dice Obama's
Diplomacy with Iran admitted as much, insisting that their coordination meetings focused on the next tactical steps rather than on a broader strategy. Rather than working according to a premeditated design, the

two sides have reacted to each other based on worst-case

assumptions and the unquestioned belief that the other side invariably is acting with hostility. Opportunties have been missed and hostilities have drawn far beyond what either side actually originally intended. Neither side wanted to or planned to go as far as they have in their grandstanding. The two countries are on the brink of war due to this vicious cycle of unending escalation and counter-escalation, born from their unquestioned assumptions and conclusions about each other. Only by revisiting these assumptions and questioning these conclusions can a path towards peace be found. If this pattern is not broken, however, then open war is
indeed a

likely outcome. But there has never been anything inevitable about this man-made disaster.

2NCLinear Conflict Plans DA


The idea that "just presence" is a panacea for every ill in the Arctic relies on a flawed conception of the US as a savioralso ignores the complexity of regional response to military deployments. Turns case because evaluation of military interventions in a vacuum causes serial policy failure Jervis 97 Prof IR at Columbia
(Robert Jervis, Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions, in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, National Defense University) Because actions change the environment in which they operate, identical but later behavior does not produce identical results: history is about the changes produced by previous thought and action as people and organizations confront each other through time. The final crisis leading to World War II provides an illustration of some of these processes. Hitler had witnessed his adversaries give in to pressure; as he explained, "Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich."21 But the allies had changed because of Hitlers behavior. So had Poland. As A.J.P. Taylor puts it, "Munich cast a long shadow. Hitler waited for it to happen again; Beck took warning from the fate of Benes."22 Hitler was not the only leader to fail to understand that his behavior would change his environment. Like good linear social scientists, many statesmen see that their actions can produce a desired outcome, all other things being equal, and project into the future the maintenance of the conditions that their behavior will in fact undermine. This in part explains the Argentine calculations preceding the seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas. Their leaders could see that Britains ability to protect its position was waning, as evinced by the declining naval presence, and that Argentinas claim to the islands had received widespread international support. But what they neglected was the likelihood that the invasion would alter these facts, unifying British opinion against accepting humiliation and changing the issue for international audiences from the illegitimacy of colonialism to the illegitimacy of the use of force. A similar neglect of the transformative power of action may explain why Saddam Hussein thought he could conquer Kuwait. Even if America wanted to intervene, it could do so only with the support and cooperation of other Arab countries, which had sympathized with Iraqs claims and urged American restraint. But the invasion of Kuwait drastically increased the Arabs perception of threat and so altered their stance. Furthermore, their willingness to give credence to Iraqi promises was destroyed by the deception that had enabled the invasion to take everyone by surprise. Germanys miscalculation in 1917 was based on a related error: although unrestricted submarine warfare succeeded in sinking more British shipping than the Germans had estimated would be required to drive Britain from the war, the American entry (which Germany expected) led the British to tolerate shortages that otherwise would have broken their will because they knew that if they held out, the U.S. would rescue them.23 The failure to appreciate the fact that the behavior of the actors is in part responsible for the environment which then impinges on them can lead observersand actors as well to underestimate actors influence. Thus states caught in a conflict spiral believe that they have little choice but to respond in kind to the adversarys hostility. This may be true, but it may have been the states earlier behavior that generated the situation that now is compelling. Robert
McNamara complains about how he was mislead by faulty military reporting but similarly fails to consider whether his style and pressure might have contributed to what he was being told.24

can be so intense and transformative that we can no longer fruitfully distinguish between actors and their environments, let alone say much about any element in isolation.
Products of Interaction as the Unit of Analysis Interaction We are accustomed to referring to roads as safe or dangerous, but if the drivers understand the road conditions this formulation may be misleading: the knowledge that, driving habits held constant, one stretch is safe or dangerous will affect how people drivethey are likely to slow down and be more careful when they think the road is dangerous and speed up and let their attention wander when it is "safe." It is then the road-driver system that is the most meaningful unit of analysis. In the wake of the sinking of a roll-on roll-off ferry, an industry representative said: With roros, the basic problem is that you have a huge open car deck with doors at each end. But people are well aware of this, and it is taken into account in design and operation. You dont mess around with them. There have not been too many accidents because they are operated with such care.25

Warfighting based on linearity causes extinctionrethinking the terms of the simulation itself is key to grappling with every threat environment Skyttner 5 Lars Skyttner, professor of natural science University of Gvle, professor Royal
Swedish Military Academy, Systems theory and the science of military command and control, Kybernetes Vol. 34, Issue 7/8, p. 1240-1260) Military activity has constantly been characterised by the need to design, realize, train and thereafter maintain an organization capable to fight against various kinds of external threats. Such a force has always been used in offensive as well as defensive tasks, e.g. from attacking neighbouring enemies to going together in order to defend oneself from invading forces. To succeed with this, strategical, operational and tactical skill is necessary for the joint effort. Further, a flexible tactical adaptation is necessary when the enemy changes his behaviour or take countermeasure. The military manoeuvring has always felt the need for some kind of decision support and a management system. The decision support has sometimes manifested itself as good advisors or as today in the shape of advanced hightechnological computer-aided expert systems. The management system has always consisted of various communication and control devices. How these systems should be constructed, adapted and developed to challenge new threatening pictures in the constantly changing surrounding world is no simple task. Today the socio-technical systems of the modern society are increasingly all embracing and tighter integrated. System-relations more and more stand out as untransparent, incomprehensible and unmanageable. Furthermore, the world around is so rapidly changed that circumstantial planning often is a thing of the past. The uncertainties regarding the nature of future combat therefore bring about great demands of flexibility and adaptability of our command and control systems. That qualities like information-advantage and a realistic surrounding-world apprehension call for increased integration of different sensors, arms and communication systems are nevertheless given. As given is that success in combat always is a function of how command is executed and how danger, stress, obscurity and general confusion which constantly exist will be handled. When the enemy no longer is seen in our binoculars and when we not even know who has released an attack against us, the need for creative thinking is of highest priority. Today an event of war even can lack the attacking component and imply hitherto unknown social phenomena. As compared with such circumstances, traditional military thinking could not be considered particularly successful. There tactical problems always have been reduced to easily recognizable situations with a well-learned standard response. Quite natural, critical thinking, questioning and creativity have not got a prominent role in this kind of education. Today the security policy situation of Sweden is radically different from the situation only ten years ago. New, extremely fragmented scenarios of a threat exist. A military threatening picture still exists even if it has deteriorated substantially after the end of the cold war. Russia still has attacking capability via distant and NBC-weapons. A military recovery in this country can result in nonmilitary information operations within a ten-year period. The development is difficult to
judge but is coherent with the democratic development and the relations to the West. Just now the most probable threat comes from terrorism. The last years have signified a development towards

an ever increasing extent of terrorist groups with better and better armaments. No doubt, some

of these groups have NBC-weapons. Those who not have access to such weapons strive for them. Attacks
resulting in thousands of victims among innocent people, today is a reality which has been demonstrated by the assault upon World Trade Centre. It is quite possible that such groups will choose to locate internal controversies to neutral ground like Stockholm with pertinent consequence like taking hostages, etc. When such things happen, the odds are against the anti terrorist forces. The terrorists only need to have success once while the combatting forces must be successful every time. A third kind of security policy threat are those which are information

States as well as criminal gangs and terrorist organisations already today use IT-related systems as weapons apart from their ordinary use. Attacks can be targeted toward our own IT systems, electricity supply systems, telecommunications and economical systems. In our highly computerized society, a small group can
technology related. cause damages which early required an army. That the danger of IT-attacks has increased can be related to the simple fact that the more something is exposed, the more the threatening picture is reinforced. A special problem in this context is the difficulty to discover if an attack exists at all. The defence against such information warfare will be a big problem in the foreseeable future for our vulnerable society. It is also not possible to leave out of account the threats coming from Even if the country today has a reasonably stable economy and is supported by the membership of EU, strongly increased fuel price during a period will destabilize society. Large-scale economical crimes pursued for example by the powerful drug mafia in Colombia can also be a real threat. This organisation has scarcely an interest to capture a geographical area. However, they want to consolidate and expand their economical flows. It is necessary to bear in mind that their financial annual turnover is bigger than most European countries. Consequently, it is necessary to realise that the

economical warfare.

old and exact

security-policy classification into war and peace hardly is relevant today. A war-like terror action with disastrous consequence can happen without early warning in a situation which we apprehend to be in deepest peace. The goal can be to crush our basic values not our geographical area. An enumeration of what the modern societies consider these values to be, can be
the following: territorial integrity in the livingspace; political sovereignty and democracy; freedom of thought, religion and speech; a state governed by law with human rights and minority rights; free market economy; and the free university. In the protection of these values, the extensive invasion and mobilization defence with its mass army no longer has a justification. Not including the frontiers of land, sea and air combat, a new frontier has emerged where the battle is fought with global information systems. There the strategic goals have changed so that destruction has been replaced by manipulation, infiltration and assimilation. All this taken together is the reason why

big-scale problem solving seldom

work as before. The traditional way of managing war with a large quantity of troops fighting a well defined and localized enemy is barely no longer possible. The lack of success for traditional methods is visible also on civil frontiers like the war against poverty, the war against drugs, and the attempts to extinct AIDS. The new, multinational and complex threatening pictures which have replaced the old ones, can only be met with a smaller, more modern and flexible elite-force. The heavy striking-force with small command and intelligence resources will be reduced in
favour of a network-defence based on the development within information and communication technology. The designation network will, however, not in the first instance represent the

a more flexible way of handling a new situation to combine different entities and components for more complex tasks. One of its main duties will be peace-keeping international contributions.
connecting of different technical systems. Instead it will represent Another task will be to handle attacks realised with nerve-gas or bacteria. High-technological data-virus should also be possible to combat. The building up of such a defence will demand an entirely new way of thinking regarding decision-making, command and control and use of modern technology. Internationally, this kind of thinking has attracted great interest and got the designation Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The term is based on a number of technological breakthroughs which have occurred after the end of the cold war about 1990. In several ways, these have changed the ground for modern warfare. Here the most important achievements have been the information-technological progresses which will permit the use of lots of sensors and the capability to transfer and manage big information-flows. Realistic training with the aid of virtual three-dimensional computer scenarios (Battlefield Computer Games), has signified a pronounced increase in the combat-skill of tank-crews. Some important trends within the RMA-concept is presented below: Unmanned fighting vehicles and aircrafts. Automated, computerized technology will replace drivers and pilots. Start navigation, interpreting of the surrounding world, target-interpretation, target combatting and possible landing, is handled completely automatic. The opportunity of human handling and target combats remain. No consideration regarding the weight of the pilot, G-forces and life-supporting systems is necessary. The construction can be lighter, stronger, more rapid and cheaper. The instruction time can be shorter. Data-streams, threat-analyses and military preparedness. Miniaturized networks of cheap sensors deliver data from areas which earlier have not been accessible. Immediate processing creates information which is distributed via coded broadband to all units needing it. Chemical, bacteriological, radiological detection and protection. Micro sensors integrated in new protective clothes will dramatically increase the ability to move and increase freedom of action in contaminated areas. High sensibility and selectivity will make possible an immediate detection of the threat. Body-armour for fighting soldiers. Extremely strong and light bullet proof materials increase the survival on the battlefield. Field-equipment of lightweight type. New, lightweight materials will decrease the total carrying load for the soldier. Hence endurance and strength will increase. This holds well for uniforms, personal weapons, communication equipment and darkness-optics. New bio-treatment for augmented performance. Without the use of drugs, human staying power can be doubled. Lack of sleep and impaired vigilance now can be compensated for as well as the impact of physical damage. A science of command and control Today's military command and control embrace different kinds of affairs from battle conduct to more administrative activities. It takes place on different strata from lower tactical levels to the highest strategical level. In contrast to civil command and control it includes fundamental questions regarding life and death for involved persons. In battlefields the unmasked principle of causality always rules. There the connection between conclusions and orders and their consequences are terrifyingly short. A simple definition of the aim of command and control could be the coordination of human actions with different resources to get effects. In practise, this is often considered as something diffuse. Difficulties often arise when analysing the content and form of the activity. Problem solutions too often are seen as applied science without either theories or scientific method. Obstacles to attain a comprehensive view with hitherto used frames of reference have been experienced by both commanders and military theorists. With this background, an attempt to regard command and control as part of The Art of War may be understandable. As an art, it can only be developed and reach its fulfilment inside the born leader with his special creativity, intuition capability and the divine vestige, existing in very few persons. However, such a view will have some less successful consequences, especially for the education of higher commanders. The divine vestige is scarcely possible to gauge and the number of born leaders is not in enough supply for the demands of society. At all events it cannot be the foundation for the recruitment of general staff candidates. Here more measurable and tangible properties must be decisive. A more fruitful attitude therefore has appeared to be an integration of the problems of military management into a general scientific educational frame and denote it a science of command and control. The military competent at once realise that this area has two central questions at issue, on the one hand to make relevant decisions and on the other to carry them out adequately. With a slight reformulation it is possible to say that decision-making is to determine what should be done. The realization, the command, concerns how it should be done. Here the continuous existing aspect of time is present with its deadlines for thinking, planning, decision-making, taking measures, etc. This kind of activity always embraces the old truism of the equal importance of making the right things as doing things right. Regarding civil decision-making and execution, it often differs marginally (in principle) from the military counterpart. Thus, it is possible to speak of a general science of command and control. In English, the area is denoted by the words command, control, communication and information with the acronym C3I. Command implies goal-oriented conduct and action, executed by people over people who all are living creatures and thereby process information for their survival. The process of life is to adapt the own situation to an ever-changing environment and a relation between information and control. Control comprises the processing of information, programming, decision and communication. Two-way communication between the controller and the controlled feeds back the result of the action for necessary justification and new activity. In reality, the

control and command process is a very complex phenomenon. The physical and mental status of the decision-maker as well as deeply existing conceptions and preferences influence the procedure. Also organisational structures and technical equipment will influence the result. Everything is connected to everything else. Later in the text, it will be evident that the used English keywords can represent subsets of a comprehensive theory. Without this theory the term science in the label A science of command and control should be irrelevant. To synthesize a new subject field like command and control will imply the finding and understanding of the joint factors existing within different kinds of the area. It also demands definitions regarding basic terms and concepts as a starting point for problem-solving and various kinds of reasoning. Below some fundamental concept are presented. The theory of command and control is founded on a number of related academic areas. The integration of these creates the theoretical basis which allows a commander to understand the function of command and control. That is to master the prerequisite for relevant decisions and their transformation into reality. The science of command and control is the application of the theory in a real world. It indicates how a
described system of command and control should be designed and used for decision-making, execution, followup, and government in a mainly unpredictable and chaotic environment (especially the combat). A system of command and control is an integrated gathering of people, functions, procedures and equipment which together constitute the function of command and control.

This system is the tool of the commander and secures that the capacity of the directed unity is utilized

in the best manner in order to fulfill the goal. The research problem of the science of command and control can be formulated as: How should the intentions of the commander be converted into reality as completely as possible? Something which must be elucidated in the definitions above is the concept of a commander. The presumption that one can count with an
unambiguous, conclusive commander as in military units, civil service departments or oil-tankers are not always correct. A committee, a board or some kind of collective often is the equivalent. This must be considered the rule when controversial political problems should be solved. The concept of a commander implies that somebody (sometimes several) can formulate a criterion for the best problem solution and take the responsibility for a decision. Likewise that this (or these) people finally shoulder the responsibility for execution even if this can be

a science of command and control is necessary to adapt managing power and exercise of command to new kinds of organisations and new operational principles. The area is transformed at a rapid
transferred to other instances. Today pace by social changes and new trends like the internationalisation of economies and knowledge production, globalization of media and knowledge mediation and also changed forms of cooperation and conflicts. Moreover, modern leadership is often executed at a distance which implies both possibilities and risks. Today's communication technology will permit operations (both surgical and military!) to be literally managed and controlled from the other side of the globe. Modern dispersed organisations thus have their specific problems which cannot be neglected. How should social relations be managed when the personal encounter becomes a rare event and directors are dematerialized to a voice in a satellite-mediated phone call? Regarding military command and control systems, they are today typically multi-component phenomena. The deciding functions are performed by people, simple decision-support systems in computer-based algorithms and advanced expert-systems. The decision-components are geographically dispersed dependent on the appearance of the environment but also for reason of

The need for a comprehensive theory For the military scientist it is obvious that studies in such a complex area as command and control scarcely are possible without the help of a theory of generalization, a metatheory. Such a theory must be able to sum up and explain common factors and problems existing in all kinds of command
survival. This distributed system gets its character by the quality of the sensors together with velocity and effectiveness of actual weapons. and control. It must also be able to integrate different knowledge and reflections from various subject fields, which apparently do not seem to be related. In addition it must preferably furnish a hierarchy of theories and models where key-variables and their changes are intelligible and measurable. The supply of relevant models to facilitate studies, simulations and calculations

A meta-theory likewise must supply general definitions and a common language, joining all subareas which taken together, will constitute a science of command and control. The application must take place in an area which has an ever growing need for rapid decisions and the mastering of very complex processes despite tight margins, ambiguous and disturbed information. As a frame of reference it
defines the limits for both knowledge acquisition and information-dispersal. must also be able to answer the same questions like other scientific areas, namely: what theories represent the core of the field? which methods are used? which sources are used? and to what extent are these theories, methods and sources universally applicable? Does such a theory exist? From the viewpoint of the systems-scientist, the answer is affirmative. General

Systems Theory (GST) studies patterns which do not relate to a specific area. It examines generalizations, applicable on specific problems, e.g. in command and control. As meta-discipline it can transfer its knowledge-structure to other areas without calling in question their content. It can supplement a great number of areas and integrate phenomena which had not been successfully handled. Above all this theory will support the generalist, who often is found to solve today's problem better than the specialist with his narrow limits. A popular formulation could be that systems theory creates a knowledge structure which facilitates the providing of fact to the right place and creates possibilities to see a connected whole. A locution is that its main task is to help scientists to elucidate the complexity of the existence, technologists to make use of it and generalists to learn to live with it.

2NCRussia Orientalism DA
Descriptions of 'Russian danger' are constructed and reproduce a self/other distinction Jger 2k Norweigian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
(yvind, Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the Baltic States, Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 7(2)) The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996:
58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of

In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up
equivalence".

an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security
and thus securitised in the Wverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizens resolution to resist to *an+ assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizens age and *or+ profession, of taking part in Lithuanias defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2,

one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the
Sc. 1, 2) list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuanias century -old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the

. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.
construction of the enemy within

2NCResolve DA
The pursuit of resolve is the link to our kritikit conceptually justifies endless warfare to save face or look credible in the face of adversaries and motivates a " tough guy" approach to foreign policy where we constantly kill the innocent to maintain an illusory reputation Tang 5 Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional
Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict, Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62 The general validity of reputation, however, has come under assault. Whereas in 1961 Glenn Snyder touted the virtue of drawing the line in places such as Quemoy and Matsu,4 he later all but acknowledged the flaw of his logic.5 Likewise, a decade after claiming that "a state can usually convince others of its willingness to defend its vital interests by frequently fighting for interests others believe it feels are less than vital,"6 Jervis was no longer so sure in 1982: "We cannot predict with great assurance how a given behavior will influence others' expectations of how the state will act in the future."7 This assault on reputation remains anathema for most politicians (and many political scientists). As statesman Henry Kissinger warned his colleagues, "No serious policymaker could allow himself to succumb to the fashionable debunking of 'prestige,' or 'honor* or 'credibility.'"8 Judging from politicians' rhetoric and behavior, Kissinger's advice has been well taken. There seems to be a gap, therefore, between politicians' persistent obsession with reputation and scholars' increasing doubt about reputation's importance, and that gap is widening. Several more recent studies have taken the case against reputation (and credibility) even further.9 Compared to previous studies, these tend to be more systematic and better grounded empirically. They can be divided into two categories. The first group of work focuses on the impact of politicians' concern for reputation on state behavior and concludes that the concern for reputation has had a profound influence on state behavior in conflicts.10 The second group of work, taking politicians' belief in reputation as a fact, argues that this belief is unjustified because reputation in international conflicts is difficult, if not impossible, to develop. To put it differently, this line of work contends that reputation actually does not matter as much as politicians usually believe, if it matters at all.11

Their mindset of credibility causing challengers to back down relies on a flawed Cold War mythreject it Gelb 12Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The Myth that Screwed
Up 50 Years of US Foreign Policy," November 2012, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/08/the_lie_that_screwed_up_50_years_of_us_foreign _policy?page=0,2 Kennedy's victory in the messy and inconclusive Cold War naturally came to dominate the politics of U.S. foreign policy. It deified military power and willpower and denigrated the give-and-take of diplomacy. It set a standard for toughness and risky dueling with bad guys that could not be matched -because it never happened in the first place. Of course, Americans had a long-standing mania against compromising with devils, but
compromise they did. President Harry Truman even went so far as to offer communist Moscow a place in the Marshall Plan. His secretary of state, Dean Acheson, later argued that you could deal with communists only by creating "situations of strength." And there matters more or less rested until the Cuban missile crisis, when JFK demonstrated the strength proposition in spades, elevating pressures on his successors to resist compromise with those devils.

It's there now, all these decades later, in worries over making any concessions to Iran over nuclear weapons or to the Taliban over their role in Afghanistan. American leaders don't like to compromise, and a lingering misunderstanding of those 13 days in October 1962 has a lot to do with it. FOR MORE Thirteen Days in October - An FP Slideshow In fact, the crisis concluded not with Moscow's unconditional diplomatic whimper, but with mutual concessions. The Soviets withdrew their missiles from Cuba in return for U.S. pledges not to invade Fidel Castro's island and to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey. For reasons that seem clear, the Kennedy clan kept the Jupiter part of the deal secret for nearly two decades and, even then, portrayed it as a trifle. For reasons that remain baffling, the Soviets also kept mum. Scholars like
What people came to understand about the Cuban missile crisis -- that JFK succeeded without giving an inch -- implanted itself in policy deliberations and political debate, spoken or unspoken.

Harvard University's Graham Allison set forth the truth over the years, but their efforts rarely suffused either public debates or White House meetings on how to stare down America's foes. FROM THE OUTSET,

Kennedy's people went out of their way to conceal the Jupiter concession. It started when the president's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, met Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on Oct. 27 to present the Jupiters-for-Soviet-missiles swap. He told Dobrynin: We'll take the Jupiters out, but it's not part of the deal, and you can never talk about i t. The Soviets removed their missiles, the United States removed the Jupiters, and the secret held for 16 years, until a small paragraph in an Arthur Schlesinger book upon which few remarked. Four years later, Kennedy's key advisors wrote a
Time article on the 20th anniversary of the crisis in which they admitted including the Jupiters in the agreement. They did so, however, in such a way as to diminish its importance, presenting the Jupiters almost as an afterthought

a leak "would have had explosive and destructive effects on the security of the U.S. and its allies." These Kennedy aides were so devoted to their triumphal myth that most of them continued to propagate it long after they themselves had turned against its very precepts. Most ended up opposing a Vietnam war that JFK had still been fighting when he was assassinated. They all grew skeptical about the value of military might and big-power confrontations, and they became formidable advocates of diplomatic compromise. It was not until 1988, however, that one among them clearly and openly acknowledged his decadeswhile saying that JFK had already decided to remove them from Turkey. Then, they totally contradicted themselves, acknowledging that secrecy surrounding the Jupiter part of the deal was so important that long hypocrisy and its costs. In his book Danger and Survival, McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security advisor, lamented: "Secrecy of this sort has its costs. By keeping to ourselves the assurance on the Jupiters, we misled our colleagues, our countrymen, our successors, and our allies" into concluding "that it had been enough to stand firm on that Saturday." It took 26 years, but there it was. STUNNINGLY, THE RUSSIANS didn't reveal the truth far earlier. A well-timed Soviet leak after the Jupiters were removed could have done two things for Moscow. First, the story of the swap would have sharply blunted accounts of their utter defeat. Never mind that JFK was planning to take out the Jupiters anyway and replace them with Polaris missile-firing subs. Second, it would have caused great consternation in NATO, where the swap would have been portrayed as selling out Turkey. RFK even told Dobrynin that this fear was his major reason for keeping the deal secret. Dobrynin cabled Bobby's words back to Moscow: "If such a decision were announced now, it would seriously tear apart NATO." Once the Jupiters had been removed, Moscow could have pounced. One would think the Soviets would have welcomed the opportunity. Dobrynin fully grasped how the myth chilled U.S. willingness to compromise, something he told me about in the late 1970s when I was ensconced at the State Department. He didn't say so publicly, however, until his memoirs came out in 1995. He wrote: "If Khrushchev had managed to arrange [a leak], the resolution of the crisis need not have been seen as such an inglorious retreat." Why, then, didn't the Soviets leak it? It's quite possible, even likely, that Khrushchev and his Politburo never considered leaking because they had no idea how the crisis would be portrayed -- how weak they would look. On the day the crisis was reaching a crescendo, before he knew that Kennedy would offer up the Jupiters, Khrushchev was ready to back down. He told his colleagues that the Soviet Union was "face to face with the danger of war and of nuclear catastrophe, with the possible result of destroying the human race." He wasn't thinking about the Jupiters; he just wanted out and was determined to convince his colleagues that a U.S. pledge not to invade would be enough to protect Soviet power and pride. To check this view, I contacted the three living people most likely to know: Sergei Khrushchev (son of Nikita), Anatoly Gromyko (son of Andrei, the Soviet foreign minister during the missile crisis), and Alexander "Sasha" Bessmertnykh (a Foreign Ministry official at the time of the crisis and later foreign minister). All backed this theory, though they acknowledged not knowing the details of Khrushchev's thinking. Soviet leaders, they said, genuinely feared a U.S. invasion of Cuba. None was moved by my argument that by the time of the crisis, there was no likelihood of such an invasion. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, this idea was laughable in U.S. policy circles. None would grant that Moscow's leaking of the swap was necessary to preserve Soviet honor. Yet as we spoke further, all eventually conceded that the image of Soviet power indeed would have fared far better had the swap become known. In Moscow at a retrospective on the crisis in 1989, JFK speechwriter and confidant Ted Sorensen touted Bobby Kennedy's Thirteen Days as the definitive account. Dobrynin interrupted to say that the book omitted the Jupiters, to which Sorensen replied that Dobrynin was correct, but at the time, the deal was still "secret." "So I took it upon myself to edit that out," he said. Reporters covering the meeting took it upon themselves not to chronicle this exchange. Nor has foreign-policy chatter over the years made much reference to the Jupiters. Indeed, the compromise is mentioned so infrequently that journalist Fred Kaplan had to nail it to the wall at considerable length in a recent Slate review of Robert Caro's latest volume on President Lyndon B. Johnson. Careful as he is, Caro relied on sources that extolled Kennedy's resolve, and he ignored the Jupiters. COMPROMISE IS NOT a word that generally makes political hearts flutter, and it is even less loved when it comes to the politics of U.S. foreign policy. The myth of the missile crisis strengthened the scorn. The myth, not the reality, became the measure for how to bargain with adversaries. Everyone feared becoming the next Adlai Stevenson, whom the Kennedys, their aides, and their foes discredited for proposing the Jupiter deal publicly. It's not that Washingtonians scurried about proclaiming their desire to emulate the missile-crisis myth, but it was very much a part of the city's ether in columns and conversations with friends from the early 1960s to the 1990s. Few wanted to expose themselves by proposing even mild compromises with enemies. In the famous "A to Z" review of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, ordered by LBJ after the 1968 Tet Offensive, we (I was in the Pentagon at that time) weren't even permitted to study possible compromises with Hanoi. And there's no doubt that only a dyed-in-the-wool Cold Warrior like Richard Nixon finally could have withdrawn from Vietnam. It took extraordinary courage to propose

Today, it is near political suicide to publicly suggest letting Iran enrich uranium up to an inconsequential 5 percent with strong inspections, though the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permits it. And while Barack Obama's team is talking to the Taliban, its demands are so absolute -- the Taliban must lay down their arms and accept the Kabul constitution -- that any serious give-and-take is impossible. Were it at all serious, the White House would have to at least dangle the possibility of a power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban. For too long, U.S. foreign-policy debates have lionized threats and confrontation and minimized realistic compromise. And yes, to be sure, compromise is not always the answer, and sometimes it's precisely the wrong answer. But policymakers and politicians have to be able to examine it openly and without fear, and measure it against alternatives. Compromises do fail, and presidents can then ratchet up threats or even use force. But they need to remember that the ever steely-eyed JFK found a compromise solution to the Cuban missile crisis -- and the compromise worked.
compromises in arms control talks with Moscow. Even treaties for trivial reductions in nuclear forces on both sides faced furious battles in Congress.

Low resolve good - creates expectations of future resolve Tang 5Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security
Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict, Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62 Moreover, whereas a state that backed down in a previous conflict should be perceived to be less resolute, according to the logic of the cult, the bruised state actually may become more resolute (to exact revenge or regain reputation) in the next conflict exactly because it backed down in the previous one. 6 For instance, Russia's humiliation over the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 might have made it unlikely to back down again in 1914,7 and the "peace with honor" in Vietnam might have given the United States more reason to take drastic action in the Mayague-^ incident.78 Therefore, because of the very nature of international politics (anarchy), the link between past behavior and reputation in conflicts is illusory or tenuous at best. To put the reputation question rhetorically, why would anyone believe in your supposedly "hardearned" reputation when the incentive for you to lie looms so large in the background? After all, in a self-help world, lying is not a sin but a virtue. Unlike human society, in which there is a price to pay for

lying, in the anarchic world no one is expected to tell the truth, and the price of lying is simply discounted by the need for survival.

2NCSpace Mil DA
Discourse of a space in terms of military strategy makes cooperation impossible and space militarization inevitable Bormann 9dept. of politics @ Northeastern; previously held a position @ Watson Institute for Int'l
Studies @ Brown (Natalie, 2009, "Securing Outer Space," ed. by Natalie Bormann & Michael Sheehan)
there is no denying US attempts to codify a strategy of conducting warfare 'in , from and through' space. With a new National Space Policy at the ready and plans for space-based missile defence components firmly in place, efforts to understand the recent push for weaponising space seem ever more pressing. Yet, despite the proliferating theoretical and empirical discourses on outer space, most existing theories tend to neglect the concept of spaciality as a category for analysing US practices. In trying to eradicate this shortcoming, this chapter directly links recent US policies to some of the recurring
As the contributors in this volume highlight, spatial representations of, and narrations about, outer space as a 'final frontier'. It is suggested hete that the imagination of outer space as a 'place' of permanent crisis, a 'battlefield', tells us something about that which informs the preferences underlying US policies. In so doing, this chapter turns to Paul Virilio's theorising oh the military organisation of the category of space.

the current space 'vision', we must direct our attention to the development of new military technologies as it is these that produce our modes of representation, and that ultimately underpin our relation to, and invention of, space and habitat. For Virilio, hence, any representation of spaciality, such as exposed in the legendary image of another 'Pearl Harbor' in space, is necessarily given a priori to it; what we 'see' in outer space is not spatially organised in and of itself, rather, the 'seeing' is made possible through the effects of technology in its production of space (or, one reality of it) and its subsequent authorisation of spatially contingent action (the defence of 'our space'). I argue that such connection between technology and space is tantamount for explaining
According to Virilio, and here with an eye on what informs
2

the modalities and limits of, and possibilities for, space weapons in that any spatial production of outer space always-already comprises an exploration of the logic of military technology. In

the invention of military technology occurs simultaneously with the invention of a space to be defended and secured, invaded and colonised, weaponised and commercialised. In other words, in order to grasp the modes of representation that underpin outer space weaponisation we must turn to the technologies that provide the condition for visualising the need to weaponise, colonise, secure, and so forth. The work of Virilio can thus open some valuable insights, I believe, for understanding the weaponisation of outer space by drawing upon the, mostly overlooked, relationship and interaction of technology, spatiality and outer space as military space. By so doing, a Virilian reading offers not only a stringent critique of the ways in which current space policies are rendered meaningful but it also provides us with a tool for unpacking the very spatial (reconstructions of outer space that are presented to us as seamless and common-sensical. Why should this matter? In this chapter I want to point
Virilio's view, towards two significant arguments in support for a renewed interest in questioning and criticising modes of spatiality - and that which informs them. The first argument is concerned with the logic of spatiality and the practices it claims to render meaningful. The second one has to do with the new military technologies in their role of conducting space warfare and the modes of

only by unbundling the processes which lead to the creation of seeing and inventing outer space as a sphere of permanent crisis and its 'in-built' logic of the need to weaponise that sphere can we bring back the, hitherto, marginalised possibility of an alternative process of organising outer space (e.g. peacefully). In other words, it must be understood that it is the invention of space as a place of crisis and combat which precludes the peaceful use of space. Second, the interrelation of technology and space composes some pressing questions regarding the new modes of destruction and warfighting that it gives possibility to. The projection of outer space as a battlefield ('earth-bound' albeit in cosmos) is constitutive of certain 'qualities'. Space-based weapons that are designed to target threats in space as much as on Earth lead first and foremost to a loss of certain known geo-strategic reference points: the possibility of a space-based laser that shoots down targets 'anywhere' is such that every place on Earth and in space can be considered a virtual frontline. There is a duality of proximity at work that is puzzling: on the one hand, the
automated fighting and killing that they appear to evoke. To begin with the first point, it seems clear to me that
3 4

placement of weapon systems close to their target is no longer needed. On the other hand, and while the possibility of fighting against thteats and engaging in conflicts is therefore brought

the battlefield on which the fighting takes place remains nonetheless 'distant from us'; virtual and non-visible in, from and through outer space. Furthermore, and closely related, it is not only the necessity of geographical proximity of combat that is dwindling, so is the proximity of violence and destruction. While the targeting and killing becomes possible at alt times and anywhere, the virtual shooting down of enemy missiles and the use of space-based lasers against hostile attack from space removes us ourselves - from the battlefield, the bodily violence and the experience, pain, and memory thereof. Space technology promises to offer an automated, clean and sanitised mode of destruction and killing. It is a process that Virilio (1999) sums up in his notion of an 'aesthetics of disappearance' by which the author means to suggest the following: in the same way in which technology leads to a destruction of physicality and matter (and all the way to its disappearance), weapon technology leads to a disappearance of our modes of relating and referring to that space .
'close to us',
5,6 7

[ ] Their representations of space independently foster a politics for the possibility of weaponization Duvall & Havercroft 6Raymond Duvall, Prof Political Science at Univ. of Minnesota AND Jonathan
Havercroft, Prof Political Science at Oklahoma Univ., "Taking Sovereignty Out of This World: Space Weapons and Empire of the Future," Cambridge Journals The placing of weapons in orbital space has an intimate relationship to space exploration, in that the history of the former is embedded in the latter, while the impetus for space exploration, in turn, is

embedded in histories of military development. Since the launch of Sputnik, states that have ability to accessand hence to exploreorbital space have sought ways in which that access could improve their military capabilities. Consequently, militaries in general and the U.S. military in particular have had a strong interest in the military uses of space for the last half century. Early on, the military interest in space had two direct expressions: enhancing surveillance; and developing rocketry technologies that could be put to use for earth-based weapons, such as missiles. Militaries also have a vested interest in the dual-use technologies that are often developed in space exploration missions. While NASA goes to great lengths in its public relations to stress the benefits to science and the (American) public of its space explorations, it is noteworthy that many of the technologies developed for those missions also have potential military use. The multiple interests that tie together space exploration and space weaponization have been vigorously pursued and now are beginning to be substantially realized by a very small number of militaries, most notably that of the United States.

Extinction Mitchell 1 Assistant Prof Communications at Univ. of Pittsburgh, member of the CSIS Working Group
on TMD, Author, cites disarmament experts (Gordon, Japan-U.S. Missile Defense Collaboration: Rhetorically Delicious, Deceptively Dangerous, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 25(1))
Any clear-cut distinction between offensive and defense in the TMD context is hopelessly muddied when one realizes that plans for the NTW system include a substantial space component.

An elaborate network of space satellites (as well as spaceborne forces to protect them) would be essential features of any robust NTW system, providing early warning data of enemy missile launches, as well as tracking information designed to guide SM-3 interceptors to their targets in mid-flight. It is instructive to
note that politically powerful missile defense proponents such as U.S. Senator Bob Spaceman Smith (R -NH) envision NTW integrated into an overall space force that would pursue both defensive and offensive military missions.49 We need to incorporate forward-deployed capabilities like the Navy Theater Wide program and the Air Force Airborne Laser as space-based missile defense programs to ensure *that+ we can stop missiles in their boost phase, dropping the debris fallout over our adversarys homes, not ours*S+pace offers usthe prospect of inflicting violenceall with great precision and nearly instantaneously, and often more cheaply. With credible offensive and defensive space control, we will deter our adversaries, reassure our allies,

This full-throated call for a robust blend of offensive and defensive space weaponry reflects a strategic principle elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand.51 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent dual capability of spaceborne weapon components. To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting death stars, capable of sending munitions hurtling through the earths atmosphere at dizzying velocities.52 As Marc Vidricaire, a member of the Canadian Delegation to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, explains: If you want to intercept something in space,
and guard our nations growing reliance on global commerce.50 you could use the same capability to target something on land.53 Furthermore, spaceborne BMD components can be used for offe nsive attacks in outer space itself, where orbiting space assets belonging to adversaries could be targeted for destruction. According to defense analyst James E. Oberg, the benign, defensive nature of a ballistic missile killer is not the only facet of such a systemit also has inherent offensive capability against satellites.54 This dual capability of BMD systems provides one rationale f or why space weapons advocates such as Senator Smith propose to make offensive attack weapons part of missile defense. In a world where deployment of purely offensive space weaponry might be difficult to justify as a stand-alone military initiative, Oberg speculates, the means by which the placement of space-based weapons will likely occur is under a second U.S. space policy directivethat of ballistic missile defense.55 Although these death star scenarios might seem like they come straight out of Hollywood special effects studios, it is wort h noting that the U.S. Space Command is on record endorsing military strategy that favors weaponization of space as a force multiplier for offensive attack missions. An official planning document entitled Vision for 2020 foresees space-based strike weapons as part of global engagement capabilities designed to enable application of precision force from, through, and to space.56 Aggressive pursuit of these strike weapons is imperative, according to Space Command officials, because space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield success and future warfare.57 Arguing that it is inevitable that mankind will weaponize space, Air Force Lt. Col. Thomas D. Bell claims in a 1999 paper that, The U.S. ability to conduct combat operations in this envir onment will provide the technical asymmetry that the U.S. will need to win the next war, just as it used strategic bombers and the atomic bomb to win World War II and stealth technology and precision guided munitions to win the Gulf War.58 These plans recently received concrete expression in comments from Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, Air Force Space Command Commander. While addressing a group at the Joint Tactical Ground Station in South Korea, Eberhart declared that *s+pace is the ultimate high groundNot only do we have to us e it, we have to be able to defend it and deny our enemy the use of space if we are at warwe have to ensure space superiority for our commanders and men and women who rely on it during the fight.59 Although missile defense advocates frequently trumpet the purely defensive nature of BMD, such systems exist in a strategic framework that ineluctably includes offensive space weaponry. The PR spin is that the U.S. military p ush into space is about missile defense or defense of U.S. space satellites. But the volumes of material coming out of the military are concerned mainly with offense with using space to establish military domination over the world below, notes professor Karl Grossman.60 Such a suggestion carries particular significance for Japan, since as Frank Umbach, Senior Research Fellow at the German Society of Foreign Affairs, explains, a possible Japanese TMD deployment may require an integration of the anti-missile defense command and control (C-2) systems of Japan and the U.S., which could have far-reaching implications for both sides.61 Eventual deployment of a joint Japan-U.S. TMD system could saddle Japanese officials with the sober responsibility of making command decisions regarding use of spaceborne weapons for offensive military missions. It is tempting to take comfort in the idea that JDA leaders would not permit a joint missile defense system such as NTW to evolve into a platform for offensive space power, especially since such a development would flout Japanese legal and constitutional prohibitions against such military adventures. However, in a joint command situation, it is not clear that such constraints would hold up, especially in light of intimidating comments by space power enthusiasts such as

Force cannot or will not embrace spacepower, we in Congress will have to drag them there, kicking and screaming if necessary.62 Another possibility is that Japanese objections against incorporation of offensive space power into a joint missile defense program could be rendered moot by strategic deception. Part II of this essay explored cases where U.S. missile defense advocates deployed subterfuge to camouflage the actual purpose of BMD programs, in order to insulate the program from political criticism. A similar
Senator Smith, who vows to use his position on Capitol Hill to ram space weaponry down the throats of opponents, regardless of how vocal they are: If the Air

approach would seem politically attractive for public affairs officers dealing with the sensitive issue of a Japanese TMDs offensive
military capabilities. Since such capabilities would clearly prove to be public relations liabilities for missile defense advocates attempting to justify TMD to Asian publics, there could be great institutional inertia to pursue a Pentagon-style public relations strategy of hiding such capabilities behind layers of secrecy, classification, and obfuscation, then dominating public debate with talk of purely defensive BMD systems. However, back door deployment of offensive space weapons would pose grave security ri sks, given the potentially disastrous consequences of an unconstrained arms race in space. Lt. Col. Bell provides a glimpse of some of the varieties of space weapons that might be pr oduced in such a scenario: A mix of space weapons will offer the capability to destroy various types of surface and sub-surface targets with three types of weapons: continuous lasers that use heat to melt structures and destroy them; pulsed lasers that vaporize material and penetrate the structure; and kinetic energy weapons that provide the capability to a ttack targets hundreds of feet under the surface of the earth.63 According to

advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative ran an effective television spot featuring children being saved from nuclear attack by a shield represented by a rainbow. If we weaponize space, we will face a very different imagethe image of hundreds of weapons-laden satellites orbiting directly over our homes and our families 24 hours a day, ready to fire within seconds. If fired, they would destroy thousands of ground, air, and space targets within minutes, before there is even a chance of knowing what has happened, or why. This would be a dark future, a future we should avoid at all costs.64 A buildup of space weapons with capability to execute offensive missions might begin with noble intentions of peace through strength deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that the presence of space weaponswill result in the increased likelihood of their use.65 Military commanders desiring to harness the precision strike capability afforded by spacebased smart weapons might order deliberate attacks on enemy ground targets in a crisis. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense use or lose pressure into strategic calculations, with the specter of split-second laser attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting death stars with automated hair trigger devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit
Senator Charles S. Robb (D-VA), space weaponization could transform Reagans hopeful Star Wars vision into an ominous death star future. During the Re agan years, violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has

which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each others flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. He further explains, *t+he odd term normal accident is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable.66 Deployment of space weapons with predelegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to normal accidents. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to Bowman, even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damageeven more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!67 In the same laser technology touted by President Reagan as the quintessential tool of peace, David Langford sees one of the most wicked offensive weapons ever conceived: One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people.68 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to a space weapon attack would escalate by retaliating with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.
analyzed complexly interactive, tightly coupled industrial systems,

2NCTrade DA
Our trade policies always fall under ridiculous double-standardsthe aff's delusion that a single policy which alters how much soil is in our ports controls the internal link to global nuclear conflict is ludicrous and trades off with long-term productive solutionslike ending xenophobic policies of China bashing or thumbing our nose at the WTO

2NCOrientalism DA
Their essentialist representation of international insecurity relies on a flawed, racist construction of othernessthat's a decision rule Batur 7Pinar Batur, Professor of Urban Studies @ Vassar, "The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War,
and Genocide," Handbook of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations) Albert Memmi argued that We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what happened as a result of it(Memmi, 1965: 114). Events surrounding Iraq and Katrina provide three critical points regarding global racism. The first one is that segregation, exclusion, and genocide are closely related and facilitated by institutions employing the white racial frame to legitimize their ideologies and actions. The second one is the continuation of violence, either sporadically or systematically, with single- minded determination from segregation, to exclusion, to genocide. The third point is that legitimization and justification of violence is embedded in the resignation that global racism will not alter its course, and there is no way to challenge global racism. Together these three points facilitate the base for war and genocide In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that the clash of civilizations will domi- nate global politics(Huntington 1993: 22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntingtons end of ideology meant the West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic other. Huntington intoned Islam has bloody borders, and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the Confucian Islamic civilizations, by exploiting the conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with September 11. The new color line means we hate them not because of what they do , but because of who they are and what they believe in . The vehement denial of racism, and the fervent assertion of democratic equality in the West, are matched by detestation and anger toward Muslims, who are not European, not Western, and therefore not civilized. Since the context of different and inferior has become not just a function of race or gender, but of culture and ideology, it has become another instrument of belief and the self- righteous racism of American expansionism and new imperialism. The assumed superiority of the West has become the new White Mans Burden, to expand and to recreate the world in an American image. The rationalization of this expansion, albeit to
protect our freedoms and our way of life or to combat terrorism, is fueled by racist ideology, obscured in the darkness b ehind the faade of inalienable rights of the West to defend civilization against enemies in global culture wars. At the turn of the 20th century, the Terrible Turk was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretch- ing from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met

Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the Oriental otherEastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific Occidental Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe
with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union

orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no race. It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the right ideological and cultural framework. It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet other. Orientalisms global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the inferior other.
existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the Terrible Turk to that of the Barbaric Russian Bear. In this context,

2NR Materials

Overview
Our K takes out the case on 2 levels 1) Security begets insecurity - whenever nations search for security, they constantly create new crises to respond to in a threatening manner - for example we invaded Iraq in the Gulf War because the Cold War was over and we had to create enemies. Threats are the product of the psychological anxiety that other threats produce. When we operate under this mindset of endless securitization, we seek to protect ourselves against every possible threat, striking violently at the slightest chance of attack, antagonizing foes and starting wars, thereby constructing the very threats we tried to avoid thats Burke 7 2) Second - we take out solvency on a discursive level - you shouldn't evaluate "whether or not the plan solves " in a vacuum because their authors will always claim that just increasing funding "once" will solve - under our framework, you should evaluate their approach and consider whether the response we use has the correct methodology. Under this role of the ballot, the question is "is it worth stepping onto a path that deliberately sacrifices freedom for national security." That's the crux of our argument - it's not about which policies to create- it's about how to create policies.
Securitization causes hyper-militarization and aggression in foreign policyour discussion of existential impacts creates a bad framework for social analysis which constantly justifies short-sighted policies like the affirmativevote negative to reject this framework They said that apocalyptic reps are needed but extend Quinby 94, the plan prevents action because people become numbed to their endless warnings of apocalypse. There is only empirical support for our argumentssecurity has been the driving force behind every geopolitical interventionVietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, the Bay of Pigs invasionall of them were based on the idea that a certain problem threatened international stability and that the US had to arbitrateeven if they offset violence in the short-term, they remain on the long-term structural path of enemy creation which causes extinctionwhen we tried to "free" Iran from Shah Palavi we ended up putting in the current government which hates uswhen Russia invaded Afghanistan we basically sent arms for the Talibanthis proves that even if the affirmative is good in the short term their caricature of international security will be co-opted for geopolitical interests later rather than sustainable long-term security. Also, their mindset of securitizing the environment TURNS THE CASE Framing warming as

apocalyptic trades off with other ecological disastersgrant the aff zero risk of solvency.even
if they can solve warming this time, their mindset of security justifies endless environmental destruction. of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is almost certainly a ruse to make the continuance of business as usual seem acceptable. If we go down the CCS path, we excuse our behavior rather than try and correct it, and this causes even more environmental destruction in the future thats Lack 11 and Crist 7. We also turn Econ - Apocalyptic representations fundamentally cede social institutions to

technocratic management - this allows the state to decides who lives or dies - ensures

massive state-sponsored violence and corporate greed. This forecloses any way for human ingenuity to solve the impacts that they invoke thats Hedges 12.

Kritik outweighs and turns the case.


1. Threat construction - the idea that the environment is in crisis due to warming shuts out alternative views of the environment-in-crisis - this framing is untrue and focuses on technologized solutions to manage the environment's response to consumptive practices rather than alter those practices
YOU MUST VOTE NEG TO REFRAME POLICIES AWAY FROM APOCALYPTIC REPS AND THE THREATS THAT THEY CREATE thats Foust 8. frame analysis can help foster common ground between humanities scholars, social scientists, and climate scientists, concerned about global warming. Frame analysis can also be a valuable tool in identifying the troubling aspects of how a discourse evolves and is communicatedand in so doing, it can lead to more effective communication . Deconstructing the harmful effects of an apocalyptic frame, we feel some responsibility to try to offer alternative frames which might balance the need to communicate the urgency of climate change, without moving people to denial and despair we may expand the common ground needed to build a political will for dealing with climate change.

Value to Life
They've mishandled the ethics and value to life argumentsthe affirmative destroys value to life and causes state-sponsored violenceour argument is not that individuals stop wanting to liveour argument is that the state considers life useful only insofar as it benefits geopolitics and strategythat results in indiscriminate violence against individuals who supposedly threaten national securitythat's Chernusempirically proven by things like torture and extraordinary rendition and waterboarding and killing innocent civilians in Iraq

Framing issues as matters of "national security" writes a blank check for whatever violence is considered legitimate. There is a low quality of life in a world where we foreclose all ethical and moral considerations - our Reid evidence indicates that critical infrastructure protection projects ignore issues of quality of life and instead focus on bare existence - that literally turns global politics into a chessboard where we can always sacrifice bishops or rooks for a larger geostrategic goal It's not a question of life vs. value to life - that assumes the two are distinct - it's a question of what framework is best to advance human becoming - under their framework, life is reduced to meaningless existence and dots on a page - pure util calculus authorizes failed policies like the Iraq intervention because util creates "collateral damage"

2NRFramework
Framework debate You are an intellectual deciding on frameworks for interpreting politicsthe affirmative framework for interpreting the world is flawed and results in endless interventions and global destructiondeciding how to view the world is a pre-requisite for coherent and effective policymaking If we win our framework, you should reject claims why the plan is goodthe ostensibly positive results of the plan are the affirmative's attempt to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanictheir case doesn't address the structural causes of conflict - [Trade = China Bashing, WTO snubbing, protectionist legislation OR Hegemony - threat construction makes hegemony unsustainable OR Econ - aff remedies a short-term symptom of economic decline but still props up the military which is the biggest cause of deficit spending]our framework solves the aff Andtheir insecurity framework makes all policies to faileven if the plan happened tomorrow, security strategists would claim another international crisis threatened humanitythat destroys value to life because it makes life a meaningless way to elude deaththe affirmative only considers life in terms of logistics and chess pieces that they don't want to lose which justifies going to war in the first placeas proven by the framework of preventative conflict in Iraq

2NR XTBruce/Dean
We don't need an 'alternative' besides our framework of analysisquestioning the 1AC is a refusal to neatly package policy solutionsthat's Brucethe alternative injects uncertainty into the debatethat allows us to reframe the terms of reference and move towards alternative approaches towards securitythe argument that we don't have an alternative approach is non-sequiturto claim that there is a final solution to all of the world's problems without a reevaluation of the structural causes of war like the affirmative is what we criticizethe alternative overcomes their questions about what is 'inevitable' to policymakers because it provides a starting point for new political and ideological orientationthat means you should kick the alternative for us as long as you think our framework will produce better policies

2NRAT Specificity/Solvency
Even if they resolve a particular instance of insecurity, threats and events flow on a deeper bedrock of strategic reasonwhen the Cold War was over, we attacked Iraq in the Gulf War because Islam, not the Russians was the next great enemyrejecting the framework of specific solutions means that we create a more genuine relationship to security which means we stop responding in an escalatory security frameworkthey will always claim that they have specific solvency evidenceyou should distrust all aff evidence and truth claims because it's manufactured and biasedthat's Pieterse

2NCPsychoanalysis
The way you should be framing the impact debate is not a question of our impacts v. theirs, but a question of our conceded psychoanalysis arguments compared with their advantage claims2NC Mack and 1NC Chernus says threat construction makes nuclear conflicts inevitablethey are justified as conflicts of necessity' and of survival because we lend the state credibility to remove difference even if threats are real, approaching situations with insecurity breeds military responses the fog of war and pre-emption make nuclear conflict inevitable The impact is endless warfareour focus on preventing large wars via policy action remains within a frame of enemy constructionthis results in untold state-sponsored violence and constant war-waging to prevent catastrophic impactsit also results in negative peace because we build up military arms instead of focusing on the causes of conflictleads to extinction, that's Sandy and Perkins

2NRCede the Political


Cede the political doesn't link to our specific criticismour K is a link turnven if the political is ceded the alternative is the only hope at reclaiming politics because it creates a more genuine relationship with security that accepts uncertaintythe affirmative's violent attempt at control locks civilians out of the political and results in conservative takeover because all issues are discussed in terms of defense and national securitytheir argument is also incoherent and empirically deniedit's an excuse manufactured by the state to abandon political reformismempirically attempting to change ideologies via international affairs scholarship has translated into effective changeCold War proves that there is no such thing as the political and securitization prevents effective solutions from the political because it causes hyper-exxageration and overreactions Also extend Schlagfiat is illusory which means there's only uniqueness for our impactsthe question you should be asking yourself is 'how' do we approach policy, not 'what' policies we usethe ballot is a question of our scholarship versus their scholarshipnot plan versus status quo

2NRCompetitiveness KLink
Rhetoric supporting the theory of competitiveness is bad and a voter thats Bristow A. Big Biznis lobbyists manipulate policymaking through coordinated action for personal gain. Policy makers knowledge and evidence are selected normatively to justify policy choices. Competitiveness is a pseudoscientific theory that depoliticizes violence into unquestionable statements about GDP. Err negative because their evidence is derived from a suspect psychological basis. B. Oversimplification - competitiveness portrays nation state struggles as being linearly related to firm competition, this allows apparent sophistication without the drudgery of complex understanding. "Battles" and "wars" have intuitive emotional appeal that bypass logical assessment. This levels of analysis problem is meaningful- there is no empirical basis for their economic theory. C. Bureaucracy - competitiveness provides technical assessments of performance bureaucratizing output. Feeling control over the economy buttresses policy makers against the fear of insecurity and encouraging top down control of production. Obsession with performance brings blindness to sustainability and equity concerns D. Outweighs case and turns the perm - extreme actions can be justified through reference to a rival by making violence seem inevitable due to the structure of the international system. Alternative cooperative economic systems are possible- the violent, exclusionary assumptions of competitiveness rhetoric delegitimize other systems.