CASE 68(a) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

179620 August 26, 2008

psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254. During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.6 Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8 Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.9 She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.12 Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner, vs. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents. DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.: MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.1 This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy. The Facts Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5 After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was

Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity. Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children. He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature.19 This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20 To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.21 Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,22 he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver.23 Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.

RTC Disposition By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition: WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from the beginning; 2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant; 3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and 4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City and Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages. Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued. SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied) The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated: x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).

Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.25 Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.26 Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children. CA Disposition On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27 The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court: It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.

What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal. In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28 Issues Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29 Our Ruling I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.

Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.31 Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise: Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36 After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:

1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.38 (Underscoring supplied) The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."40 This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated: That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied) Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If

uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise: Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied) Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage. In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated: x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.45 Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.46 Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal. These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright

deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require.47 The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court. In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus: It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.49 (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50 The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson: But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the

power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.53 II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se. Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him. The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54 Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.55 If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations. But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out: As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties. Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual

preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims. Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.57 Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage. Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit: Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.63 To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. 64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove. In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:

Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67 However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board. What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus. The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court: Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x xxxx x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.69 Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence. This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage. III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal property. Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides: Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly. In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CASE 67: Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 47101 April 25, 1941

resultas de este acontecimiento, el demandante abandono a la demandada y no volvio a hacer vida marital con ella. No vemos razon alguna para revocar la sentencia apelada. En efecto, es inverosimil la alegacion del demandante y apelante que el ni siguiera habia sospechado el estado gravido de la demandada, estando esta, como queda probado, en condicion preada muy avanzada. Por lo que no ha lugar a estimar el fraude de que habla el apelante. Lo alegado por este en el sentido de que no ses raro hallar a personas de abdomen desarrollado, nos parece pueril para merecer nuestra consideracion, tanto mas cuanto que el demandante era estudiante de primer ao de derecho. El matrimonio es una institucion sacratisima: es el cimiento en que descansa la sociedad. Para anularlo, son menester pruebas claras y fehacientes. En este asunto no existen tales pruebas. Hallando la sentencia apelada ajustada a derecho, debe ser confirmada, como por la presente la confirmamos, en todas sus partes, con las costas al apelante. Asi se ordena. Avancea, Pres., Imperial, Diaz y Laurel, MM., estan conformes.

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, demandante-apelante, vs. LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, demandada-apelada. D. Feliciano Leviste, D. Tomas P. Panganiban y Doa Sotera N. Megia en representacion del apelante. Doa Luida Mangonon de Buccat en su propia representacion. HORRILLENO, J.: Este asunto se ha elevado a esta Superioridad por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Baguio, ya que solo suscita una cuestion puramente de derecho. El 20 de marzo de 1939 el demandante inico la presento causa, en la que no comparecio la demandada, no obstante haber sido debidamente emplazada. Por lo que, permitido el demandante a presentar sus pruebas, el Juzgado inferior fallo el asunto a favor de la demandada. De ahi esta apelacion. El demandante pide la anulacion de su matrimonio habido con la demandada Luida Mangonon de Buccat el 26 de noviembre de 1938, en la Ciudad de Baguio, fundandose en que, al consentir en dicho matrimonio, lo hizo porque la demandada le habia asegurado que ella era virgen. De la decision del Juzgado inferior se desprenden los siguientes hechos: El demandante conocio a la demandada el mes de marzo de 1938. Despues de varias entrevistas, ambos quedaron comprometidos el 19 de septiembre del mismo ao. El 26 de noviembre de igual ao, el demandante contrajo matrimonio con la demandada en la catedrla catolica de la Ciudad de Baguio. Desoues de convivir maritalmente por espacio de ochenta y nueve dias, la demandada dio a luz un nio de nueve meses, el 23 de febrero de 1939. De

CASE 70 [G.R. No. 129339. December 2, 1999] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO SANTIAGO, alias Payo, accused-appellant. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Accused-appellant appeals from the Decision of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija dated March 5, 1997i[1] in Criminal Case No. 1217-G, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Mario Santiago alias Payo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the complaining witness Michelle Mana the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. SO ORDERED.ii[2] The accusatory portion of the Information to which accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, and under which he was tried and convicted, states: That on or about the 7th day of July, 1994, in the Municipality of Guimba, Province of Nueva Ecija, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Michelle C. Mana, against her will. CONTRARY TO LAW. During the trial, the prosecution established that between 12:00 to 12:30 in the early morning of July 7, 1994, complainant Michelle Mana was in bed with her daughter, then aged one year and seven months, on the second floor of their house at Barangay Triala, Guimba, Nueva Ecija when she heard a

noise downstairs. She went downstairs and noticed that the back door of their house was left open. Thinking it was her husband, she called to him but when no one answered, she returned upstairs and saw the accused follow her. Michelle screamed, and tried to grab something by which she can defend herself. Accused-appellant, however, poked a lingkaw, or scythe, on her neck and pinned her against the wall with his left hand. Michelles daughter woke up and cried. Accused-appellant ordered Michelle to get the child from the bed and place her on the floor, which she heeded. With the scythe still pointed at her neck, accused-appellant ordered the victim to remove her walking shorts and underwear and when she resisted, threatened to kill her and her daughter. On cross-examination, Michelle stated that it was accusedappellant who pulled down her walking shorts and underwear with his left hand while leveling the scythe on her daughter with his right hand.iii[3] Accused-appellant started kissing her, then went on top of her and performed the sexual act for about five minutes. Before accused-appellant left, he threatened Michelle that if she told anyone about what happened, her whole family will be killed. Bringing her daughter along, Michelle went to the house of her parents-inlaw, also in Barangay Triala, and told them of what happened. Her father-inlaw fetched Michelles husband, who was then working in their ricefield. After being told of what happened, her husband and her mother-in-law accompanied her to the barangay captain to report the incident. In the morning of July 7, 1994, the barangay captain, together with a councilman and a barangay tanod, arrested accused-appellant, after which he was escorted by a police officer to the municipal police station for investigation. The other prosecution witnesses consisted of the following: Wilfredo Mana, the husband of Michelle; Lydia Bautista Mana, the mother-in-law of the victim; Dr. Antonio Boado, Jr., who examined Michelle after the incident; and SPO2 Virgilio de Guzman, who retrieved accused-appellant from the custody of the barangay captain and brought him to the police station. In his testimony, Dr. Boado stated that his examination of Michelle bore a negative finding of spermatozoa. There were also no injuries noted on Michelles body. Dr. Boado attested that his findings are not conclusive as to whether the victim had in fact engaged in sexual intercourse. The testimonies of Wilfredo Mana, Lydia Mana and Virgilio de Guzman support complainants account as to the events which transpired after the rape. Wilfredo Mana and Lydia Mana knew of the incident only after the victim herself told them. Virgilio de Guzman came to know about it when

the barangay captain of Triala sent for him to arrest accused-appellant. While in his testimony, de Guzman stated that he heard accused-appellant state to a certain Inspector Paras at the police station that complainant was his girlfriend and that they had sexual intercourse with her consent,iv[4] this statement was not set into writing.v[5] For his part, accused-appellant denied the rape and stated that at the time he was alleged to have raped Michelle, he was asleep in their house, also in Barangay Triala. The defense also presented accused-appellants mother, Paula Santiago, to corroborate his alibi. Accused-appellant stated that he went to bed at about 9:00 in the evening of July 6, 1994 and woke up at 6:00 the next morning. He came to know of the accusation against him only when his mother, who heard about it at a nearby store, told him. He then decided to go to the house of the barangay captain to clarify the charges. On his way there, he saw the barangay captain and Virgilio de Guzman, who arrested him and brought him to the police station. Paula Santiago corroborated all aspects of her sons story, especially concerning the part of his being in bed on the night of July 6, 1994. She stated that she even woke up at around 12:30 a.m. and saw accused-appellant sleeping on the mat next to hers. The trial court rejected the defenses of denial and alibi interposed by accused-appellant in the face of complainants positive identification of him as the assailant. The trial court also found no reason to doubt the forthright statements of complainant considering that her re-telling of the incident in question necessarily brought shame and embarrassment on her and her family. Accused-appellant comes before us with this lone assignment of error: that the court a quo has erred in finding that his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He would have us reconsider his evidence on alibi, and how it would have been physically impossible for him to have committed the rape when he was clearly at a different place at the time. It is well-settled that alibi is a weak defense. For it to prosper, the accused must establish that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.vi[6] Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the alibi seldom will hold water.vii[7]

It is accused-appellants testimony that at about 12:00 to 12:30 in the morning of July 7, 1994, he was asleep in his house. His claim is buttressed by the testimony of his own mother, who affirmed that he was indeed sleeping next to her at the time in question. Also according to accusedappellants mother, the house of Michelle Mana was about 400 meters away from the house of the victim.viii[8] We are hard put to treat the foregoing as credible and convincing proof that he could not have been at the scene of the crime. Considering that alibis are so easy to fabricate with the aid of immediate family members or relatives, they assume no importance in the face of positive identification, as in the instant case by the rape victim herself. In People vs. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335,ix[9] the Court enumerated three settled principles in the review of rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. It will be remembered that the findings of the medical examination of Michelle Mana, as admitted by Dr. Boado himself, are not per se indicative of whether she had been through sexual intercourse, much less whether such had been committed against her will. These findings, however, do no damage to the prosecutions case for it is now settled that a negative spermdetection test is immaterial to the crime of rape, it being firmly settled that the important consideration in rape is penetration and not emission.x[10] The absence of spermatozoa in the complainants vagina does not disprove the commission of rape, because there may be a valid explanation for such absence, as when the semen may have been washed away or when the rapist failed to ejaculate.xi[11] Nor does the absence of physical injuries on the victims body negate rape, because this crime can also be committed through intimidation, such as by threatening the victim with a scythe,xii[12] as in this case. Thus, the instant rape case is one of multifarious cases where there are no identified witnesses, and where the evidence effectively boils down to the complainants word against the accuseds. However, a pronouncement of guilt arising from the sole testimony of the victim is not unheard of, so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility.xiii[13] This is especially true in

the crime of rape the evidentiary character of which demands so much on the part of the victim --- it entails her to submit to an examination of her private parts, and to subject the sordid details of her story to a public trial and against a given presumption of the accuseds innocence. Hence, it is not unusual for lower courts in cases of rape to convict on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim, upon an ascertainment that she is motivated solely by the desire to have her honor avenged and for the culprit to meet his just punishment. As this Court succinctly stated in People vs. Borja, 267 SCRA 370, a victim who says she has been raped almost always says all there is to be said. We affirm the trial courts finding upholding the cr edibility of the testimony of complainant Michelle Mana and agree that her accusations bore no apparent ulterior motive other than to tell the truth and seek justice for herself. Her positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the rape is well-taken, her vision during the incident having been aided by the light of a lamparaxiv[14] and also because she knew accused-appellant for quite some time.xv[15] We also find entirely plausible the fear which forced her to succumb to accused-appellants heinous wishes, as her life and even her daughters were being threatened. Having scrutinized the records and weighed the evidence anew, we are left convinced, contrary to the assailment in accused-appellants lone assignment of error, that the guilt of accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, as we have invariably held, does not mean such degree of proof, as excluding the possibility of error, as to produce absolute certitude, but only requires moral certainty.xvi[16] The evidence having established that the rape was committed by the use of intimidation, we find the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to be in accord with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.xvii[17] We also affirm the award of civil indemnity, in the amount of P50,000.00, consistent with present case law which treats the same as mandatory upon the finding of fact of rape.xviii[18] Further in accordance with recent jurisprudencexix[19] to grant moral damages to victims of rape without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof, we modify the trial courts ruling to add an award of P50,000.00 as and for moral damages. For, as this Court stated in People vs. Ignacio, 294 SCRA 542, any victim of rape, regardless of age, status, social or professional position, religious orientation, or sexual preference, would suffer physical pain, emotional outrage, mental anxiety

and fright. The rape victims testimony, once found credible, speaks for itself. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija finding Mario Santiago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay Michelle Mana the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to pay Michelle Mana moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur

CASE 52: [G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision. "SO ORDERED."

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent. DECISION

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: PANGANIBAN, J.: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F). "Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. "They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. "After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single. "After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decisionxiii[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."xiii[2] Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration. Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus: "WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. "All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation. "The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. "On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153). "Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver. "At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. "In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not. "The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."xiii[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise: "Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision. "In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was

assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."xiii[4] Hence, this Petition.xiii[5]
Issues

In her Memorandum,xiii[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues: "I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation. II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."xiii[7]
The Court's Ruling

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state. xxx xxx xxx

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests. In Republic v. CA and Molina,xiii[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Codexiii[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:

procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxx xxx xxx

root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."xiii[10] The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:xiii[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the

violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.xiii[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.