Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No.

4724 April 30, 2003

GORETTI ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOEL M. GRIJALDO, respondent. PER CURIAM: The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession.1 In this administrative case for disbarment, respondent Atty. Joel M. Grijaldo failed to perform his sworn duty to preserve the dignity of the legal profession. Complainant Goretti Ong is a widow residing in Talayan Village, Quezon City. Sometime in the early part of 1996, she engaged the services of respondent, a practicing lawyer in Bacolod City, as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 52843 before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 5, against Lemuel Sembrano and Arlene Villamil for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2 During one of the hearings of the case, the accused offered to amicably settle their civil obligation to complainant by paying the amount of P180,000.00. Complainant accepted the offer on the condition that payment shall be made in cash.

At the hearing held on July 17, 1996, respondent advised complainant to wait outside the courtroom. When he came out, he handed to complainant cash in the amount of P100,000.00 and Metrobank Check No. 0701263862 for P80,000.00, postdated August 16, 1996, drawn by Atty. Roger Reyes, counsel for the accused. Complainant objected to the check payment and refused to settle the case, but he assured her that the check was drawn by a reputable lawyer. Complainant was prevailed upon by respondent into signing an affidavit of desistance, but she instructed him not to file it in court until the check is cleared. Upon presentment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to a stop-payment order from the drawer. Complainant immediately informed respondent of the dishonor, and the latter told her that he will talk to Atty. Reyes about it. Later, when complainant met with respondent in Manila, he relayed to her Atty. Reyes' offer to replace the check with cash. Several weeks passed without any payment of the proceeds of the check, despite complainant's repeated telephone calls to respondent. Sometime in December 1996, she suggested that respondent move for a hearing of the case, but he told her that courts are not inclined to set hearings near the Christmas season. On December 17, 1996, complainant personally went to Bacolod City to inquire about her case. She was surprised to learn that the same was dismissed as early as September 26, 1996.3 Apparently, respondent submitted her Affidavit of Desistance4 and, on the basis thereof, the public prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the case which was granted by the court. When complainant confronted respondent, he admitted to her that he had already received the amount of P80,000.00 from Atty. Reyes but he used the same to pay for his financial obligations. Thus, on April 2, 1997, complainant filed an Administrative Complaint against respondent for disbarment.5

Complainant further alleged in her complaint that respondent represented her in another case, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Norma Mondia," also for violation of B.P. 22, where she was the offended party. Respondent approached the accused, Norma Mondia, and offered to delay the hearing of the case in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00. However, Mondia did not have that amount of money. Attached to the complaint is the affidavit of Norma Mondia attesting to this fact.6 Furthermore, Henry Tiu, a former client of respondent, executed an affidavit, which is attached to the complaint, alleging that he gave respondent the amount of P3,000.00 for the purpose of posting his bail bond, but respondent did not post his bail which resulted in Tiu's arrest.7 Likewise, a certain Luz Dimailig, whose affidavit is also attached to the complaint, averred that respondent represented her as counsel for plaintiff in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 52; that the case was dismissed by the trial court; that the appeal filed by respondent to the Court of Appeals was dismissed due to his failure to file the appellant's brief; and that the petition for review before the Supreme Court was denied for lack of proof of service on the Court of Appeals, late filing and late payment of docket fees. Moreover, Dimailig alleged that she gave respondent the amount of P10,000.00 for settling the said civil case, but she later learned that he did not remit the money to the defendants or their counsel.8 On June 25, 1997, respondent was required to file his comment within ten days from notice.9 Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time, alleging that he has not received a copy of the complaint.10 On February 5, 1998,11 complainant furnished respondent a copy of the complaint. However, despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, respondent still failed to file his comment. On October 19, 1998, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment.12 Respondent filed a Compliance,

stating that the copy of the complaint he received from complainant was not legible. Complainant again furnished respondent with a clearer and more legible copy of the complaint including its annexes; but respondent still did not file his comment. Consequently, on June 14, 2000, another show cause order was issued against respondent.13 Respondent replied by stating that the quality of the copy furnished him by complainant was worse than the first one he received. Dissatisfied with respondent's explanation, ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00, which he November 27, 2000.14 However, he again comment and, instead, moved for additional comment. respondent was complied with on failed to file his time to file said

On August 13, 2001, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.15 The records of the IBP show that respondent has not filed his comment to the complaint. On January 18, 2002, the Investigating Commissioner, Manuel A. Tiuseco, submitted his report recommending the disbarment of respondent.16 However, in its Resolution No. XV-2002-553 dated October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty of disbarment and recommended instead respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law for grossly immoral conduct and deceit.17 After a careful review of the records of this case, we find the recommendation of Commissioner Manuel A. Tiuseco well-taken. It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client, the complainant. Were it not for complainant's vigilance in inquiring into the status of her case, she would not have known that the same had already been dismissed on September 26, 1996. Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from her, notwithstanding that she talked to him sometime in December 1996.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state: Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. Respondent breached his duty to his client when he failed to inform complainant of the status of the criminal case. His negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence required of every lawyer.18 His infraction is rendered all the more deplorable by the fact that complainant is a resident of Quezon City and the case was filed in Bacolod City. It was precisely for this reason that complainant engaged the services of respondent, a Bacolod-based lawyer, so that her interests in the case may be amply protected in her absence. Respondent's failure to look after his client's welfare in the case was a gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust and confident which was reposed in him. In a similar case, we held: It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his client's request for information. Respondent's failure to communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case.19

Worse, when respondent used the money which he received from Atty. Reyes to pay for his own obligations, he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Furthermore: Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. Respondent's misappropriation of the money entrusted to him and his refusal to account for it to his client despite repeated demands were competent proof of his unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him. His acts showed a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. He held the money in trust for his client as settlement of the case he was handling. Upon receipt thereof, he was under obligation to immediately turn it over, in the absence of a showing that he had a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should have been scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted.20 A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his client that has come into his possession. He should not

commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. Respondent, by converting the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent, was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. Not only did he degrade himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession.21 Aside from violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent's failure to promptly turn over the money to his client and his conversion of the same for his personal use rendered him liable for contempt under Rule 138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. Furthermore, respondent violated his oath of office and duties as counsel when he approached his client's opponent and offered to delay the case in exchange for money. His offer to delay the case would have frustrated the interests of his client which he had sworn to protect. As a lawyer, respondent should avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent the speedy, efficient and impartial adjudication of cases.22 Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any

and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.23 Respondent's act of propositioning his client's opponent and offering to delay the case against her was intended to benefit the latter. Hence, such act amounted to double-dealing and conflict of interest, and was unethical practice of law. Attorneys, like Caesar's wife, must not only keep inviolate their client's confidence, but must also avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.24 Finally, respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the directives of this Court to file his comment constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A resolution of this Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.25 Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of our lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is especially so, as in the instant case, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.26

All told, respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not only to complainant, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.27 He has proved himself unworthy of membership in the legal profession and must, therefore, be disbarred. WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior, respondent ATTY. JOEL GRIJALDO is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to PAY complainant Goretti Ong the amount of P80,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision. This Decision shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur. Quisumbing, J ., is on leave. SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 5417 1 . March 31, 2006.]

AMADOR Z. MALHABOUR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTI R. SARMIENTO, respondent. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p: Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Amador Z. Malhabour against Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento. Complainant was private respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, "HY2LB Shipping & Management Services, Inc. and New Ocean Ltd. v. The National Labor Relations Commission and Amador Malhabour." Respondent, then a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), was complainant's counsel in National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Case No. 009719-95. After the respondent retired from the PAO in March 1997, complainant asked him to continue assisting him in said labor case. The facts are: On May 29, 1993, HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., (HY2LB Shipping), a local manning agency, hired complainant as electrician for M/V Gold Faith, a vessel owned by New Ocean Ltd., a foreign principal based in Hongkong. The employment contract was for a period of 12 months and that complainant's monthly salary would be six hundred US dollars ($600.00). He had to work 48 hours a week with 30% overtime pay. Complainant rendered service on board the vessel for four months and nine days only. On August 5, 1993, HY2LB Shipping asked him to disembark on the ground that the foreign principal was reducing its personnel. Thus, complainant filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration Office

(POEA), a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation. On June 14, 1995, the POEA Adjudication Office rendered judgment in favor of complainant, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., New Ocean Ltd. and Premier Insurance are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay complainant or in Philippine Peso at the exchange rate prevailing during actual payment, the following: IaAHCE 1. The sum of US$4,680.00 representing the unexpired portion of the contract; 2. The sum of US$220.00 representing the unpaid salary of complainant; and 3. The sum of US$774.00 representing the fixed overtime pay of complainant. No other pronouncement. SO ORDERED. On appeal by HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation, the NLRC rendered its Decision affirming the POEA judgment. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. HY2LB Shipping then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari against NLRC and complainant. In its Decision dated June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed HY2LB Shipping's petition, holding that in affirming the POEA judgment, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion.

HY2LB Shipping filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. 2 The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of February 15, 2000, modified the NLRC Decision, in the sense that complainant is entitled to only three (3) months' salary "considering that this is the lesser amount of his one year employment contract;" 3 and overtime pay since this was provided in the parties' contract of employment. Immediately upon receipt of the Court of Appeals' Resolution, complainant requested respondent to file a motion for reconsideration. But the latter merely filed a "Notice to File Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to File an Appeal in case Same is Denied." 4 Respondent advised complainant "to accept" the Decision of the Court of Appeals and that filing a motion for reconsideration will just prolong the litigation. Complainant did not heed respondent's advice and filed the motion for reconsideration himself. But it was denied by the Appellate Court for being late by 43 days. 5 At this point, complainant urged respondent to file with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Respondent agreed but delayed its filing. On July 24, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution 6 denying complainant's petition for being late. Meantime, unknown to complainant, respondent sent a letter dated April 7, 2000 to the NLRC stating that complainant gave him a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to receive the "judgment award." Respondent then filed a Motion for Execution alleging that complainant decided to terminate the case and will no longer file a motion for reconsideration of the February 15, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. 7 On June 16, 2000, respondent received from the NLRC a check 8 dated June 14, 2000 in the amount of P99,490.00 which he deposited with the Ecology Bank, Banawe Branch, under his personal account. Subsequently, complainant came to know of the NLRC Order dated June 6, 2000 directing the NLRC cashier to release to

respondent the sum of P99,490.00 representing the money judgment. Thereupon, complainant sought the assistance of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force. 9 Then he filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document. The NBI referred the matter to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. caCEDA During their confrontation at the NBI, respondent paid complainant P40,000.00 as partial payment of the P60,000.00 awarded to the latter. Later, or on January 30, 2001, 10 respondent paid complainant only P10,000.00, leaving a balance of P10,000.00. This prompted complainant to file with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment. In his Comment dated June 1, 2001, respondent alleged inter alia that this case arose from "a quarrel between a client and his counsel;" that after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, HY2LB Shipping filed with this Court a Petition for Review of Certiorari; that at this time, he (respondent) filed with the NLRC a Motion for Execution; that the NLRC partially granted his motion by issuing a check in the amount of P100,000.00 "by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney signed by complainant;" that pursuant to their agreement that their shares in the award is on a "40-60 ratio," he (respondent) kept complainant's share of P60,000.00; and that he was ready to give complainant his share but he did not make any demand and refused to receive the balance on June 30, 2001. On August 27, 2001, this Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In its Report and Recommendation 11 dated April 15, 2002, the IBP through Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, made the following findings:

It was apparent that the complainant did not agree with the modified decision of the Court of Appeals and instructed respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. All the while and without his knowledge and consent, respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the NLRC who awarded complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Respondent admitted that he was able to encash the check awarded to complainant by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney which complainant denies having executed. . . . . . . . . When respondent received the amount of money awarded to complainant by the NLRC, he took it upon himself to divide the money into 60-40 ratio because complainant owed him his attorney's fees; however, he failed to inform complainant beforehand of his plan, and only when complainant filed a criminal complaint against him that respondent paid complainant and on installment basis at that. Respondent in fact still has a balance of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Respondent claims that complainant exceeded and abused his goodness and kindness but it is the other way around. and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for one year. On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-397 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Maala. We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondent failed to comply with the above provisions. Records show and as found by Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed deceit by making it appear that complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him (respondent) to file with the NLRC a Motion for Execution and to collect the money judgment awarded to the former. Worse, after receiving from the NLRC cashier the check amounting to P99,490.00, he retained the amount. It was only when complainant reported the matter to the NBI that respondent paid him P40,000.00 as partial payment of the "award." In fact, there still remains an outstanding balance of P10,000.00. Moreover, as correctly found by IBP Commissioner Maala, respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally his lawyer's lien 12 by dividing the money into 60-40 ratio. Obviously, such conduct is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. 13 He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right. EDCcaS It bears stressing that as a lawyer, respondent is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 14 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 15 This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession 16 and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. 17 Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. 18 And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. 19 Respondent's conduct blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. His

conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.

Accordingly, administrative sanction against respondent is warranted. In Lao v. Medel, 20 we considered a lawyer's violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in this case, as an act constituting gross misconduct. In line with Lao, citing Co v. Bernardino, 21 Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr., 22 and Saburnido v. Madroo 23 which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year sufficient. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for his distribution to all courts of the land, the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED. Puno, Corona, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur. EN BANC [A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003.] ATTY. RAMON P. REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG, JR., respondent. SYNOPSIS

Atty. Ramon Reyes sought the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr. for Violation of the Lawyer's Oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Supreme Court agreed with the IBP's recommendation to suspend Atty. Chiong, Jr. from the practice of law for two (2) years because he filed a collection suit for damages against one Pan and Xu, impleading Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga. The Court held that the inclusion of the prosecutor and Atty. Reyes in the civil case had no justification since they had never participated in the business transactions between Pan and Xu. The suit was filed to obtain leverage against an estafa case filed against respondent's client. The Court held that lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. SYLLABUS 1.LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTORNEYS; DUTY TO USE LEGAL PROCESS TO RENDER JUSTICE TO PARTIES, NOT TO HARASS THEM; CASE AT BAR A VIOLATION OF. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Respondent's actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture." It had originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. The Lawyer's Oath exhorts law practitioners not to "wittingly or willingly promote

or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same." acSECT 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, DIGNITY AND CIVILITY TOWARD PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES. Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J p: Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. The bickering and the hostility of their clients should not affect their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and members of the bar. The Case Before us is a Sworn Complaint 1 filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyer's oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to suspend him as follows:

". . . [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him in the obligation that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground to do so, respondent violated his oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years." 2 The Facts In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, 3 a ChineseTaiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the former discovered that the latter had not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked for his money back, Pan became hostile, making it necessary for the former to seek legal assistance. Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was represented by respondent. The Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint 4 for estafa against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 5 On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest 6 against Pan.

Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest. 7 He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga. When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had decided to institute the civil action against Atty. Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil case, if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a settlement. In his Comment 8 dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as codefendant in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to conclude that the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact vengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically, Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency of Pan's Motion for an Opportunity to Submit CounterAffidavits and Evidence, 9 of the appeal 10 to the justice secretary, and of the Motion to Defer/Suspend Proceedings. 11 On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa case, which the former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainant's connivance therein were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit. The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. 12 Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution. 13

Report and Recommendation of the IBP In her Report and Recommendation, 14 Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they had filed against respondent's client. In his Comment, respondent himself claimed that "the reason . . . was . . . the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and consequent damages." Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had been filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa case, in which respondent's client was the defendant. There was no need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated in the business transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and highly questionable was the inclusion of the prosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on the alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass complainants and Prosecutor Salanga. Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating commissioner's recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. This Court's Ruling We agree with the IBP's recommendation. Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. 15 Membership in the bar imposes upon them

certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel." DaIACS Respondent's actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture." It had originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. The Amended and Supplemental Complaints 16 alleged the following: "27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately refused and failed to perform his duty enjoined by the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by violating his rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made a Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and plaintiff (was) duly informed of the charges against him but did not answer; he maliciously and . . . partially ruled that there was probable cause and filed a Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were fatally defective and null and void; . . .; "28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and motion to defer for the valid grounds stated therein deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of said plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of arrest. "29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the latter to harass and extort money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner contrary to law, morals and

public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.]" 17 We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper remedies strengthen complainant's allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against the estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga's resolution, they should have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga's decision to file an information for estafa. In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that the estafa case was filed without basis. Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no justification. The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 18 Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.

Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession, 19 but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action. Furthermore, the Lawyer's Oath exhorts law practitioners not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same." Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. 20 Their rendition of improper service invites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law. 21 The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers in the esteem of their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable performance of professional duty. 22 WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effectively immediately. SO ORDERED. SEIDAC Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Austria-Martinez, J., is on leave.

investigated, it was discovered that Panadero had also died long before. 5 EN BANC [A.C. No. 6249. October 14, 2004.] [Formerly AC CBD No. 232 ] SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, complainant, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J p: In a Verified Complaint 1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on January 25, 1993, complainant Social Security Commission (hereafter the Commission, for brevity) sought to disbar respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral for preparing, notarizing, and filing with the Commission's Regional Office in Bacolod City two complaints allegedly executed and verified by people who have been long dead. The Commission alleged that respondent filed the first spurious complaint 2 on April 18, 1986, on behalf of one Hermogenes Bareno. The complaint was signed by respondent himself, but appeared to have been verified by Bareno with a thumbmark and acknowledged before respondent on April 16, 1986. Later, upon investigation, it was discovered that Bareno had died two years earlier. 3 The second spurious complaint, 4 for its part, was filed on September 10, 1987, on behalf of one Domingo N. Panadero, under similar circumstances. The complaint was likewise signed by respondent himself and likewise appeared to have been verified by Panadero with a thumbmark and acknowledged before respondent shortly prior to filing. When this complaint was Adding to these charges, the Commission filed on May 16, 1994, a Supplemental Complaint. 6 The Commission added that on July 12, 1990, respondent had filed a third similarly spurious complaint. 7 Like the other two complaints, the third complaint was signed by respondent himself and likewise appeared to have been subscribed and sworn to before him in Bacolod by the purported complainant, one Catalino de la Cruz, who, upon being investigated, declared in an affidavit that he had never been to Bacolod City for the last ten years, that he had never verified any such complaint, and that he did not even know who respondent was. 8 Claiming that respondent was liable for misconduct and unethical practice of law, the Commission prayed in both its Verified Complaint and Supplemental Complaint that respondent be disbarred and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys. In his Comment, respondent argued that since Hermogenes Bareno's impostor had Bareno's Social Security System (SSS) card, Domingo Panadero's impostor had Panadero's SSS FORM E-1, and Catalino de la Cruz's impostor had an ID, he could not be faulted for not investigating further into their identities. He argued he had sufficiently complied with his obligations as notary public when he relied only on what they had presented, especially since they sought only the preparation of simple, but justified, complaints for remittance of unpaid SSS premiums. 9 After investigating the matter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued on September 27, 2003, Resolution No. XVI-2003-175 recommending that respondent be disbarred. The IBP resolution reads: RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-175 CBD Case No. 232 Social Security Commission vs.

Atty. Napoleon Corral RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering Respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by failure to fulfill his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as a Notary Public, Atty. Napoleon Corral is hereby DISBARRED. 10 The Resolution, now before the Court for final action pursuant to Sec. 12 par. (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, 11 is well taken. DaCEIc Respondent failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his duty under Section 1(a) of Public Act No. 2103, 12 which requires a party to any document notarized by a notary public to personally appear before the latter. 13 Bareno, Panadero, and de la Cruz did not personally appear before respondent. The death certificates presented show that both Bareno and Panadero had long been dead, while de la Cruz's unrebutted affidavit proves he had never been to Bacolod City where he supposedly verified the complaint. It is a mystery, then, how respondent, in notarizing the complaints, could have certified that Bareno, Panadero and de la Cruz personally appeared before him and swore to the truth of the facts stated in the complaints. Respondent did not clarify whether the forms of identification presented to him and on which he relied were valid IDs. He never expounded on what documents Bareno's impostor presented or on what kind of ID de la Cruz's impostor showed him. An examination of said SSS Form E-1, presented to him by Panadero's impostor, also shows that it is only a statement of a member's beneficiaries and does not, in any way, tend to prove

that the bearer is the member whose name appears on said form. Respondent did not even state what precautions he took to ascertain the identities of those who appeared before him. He asseverated that it was sufficient that he relied on some form of identification, especially since he was merely notarizing simple complaints for remittance of unpaid SSS contributions. Respondent failed to realize that the complaints he had prepared and carelessly notarized would haul the prospective defendants in those complaints to the Commission and cause them to spend valuable time and incur expenses in their defense. Such jaunty indifference betrays his deplorable failure to heed the importance of the notarial act and observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties as a notary public. It is noteworthy to stress here that a notary public is duty bound to require the person executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same. Respondent is reminded that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. 14 Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. 15 Being a lawyer, respondent has a graver responsibility because of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. 16 He is mandated to discharge his duties, which are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. 17 By recklessly notarizing the complaints without ascertaining that Hermogenes Bareno, Domingo Panadero, and Catalino de la Cruz were indeed personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and truth of what were stated in the complaints he prepared, respondent undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents. He breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral

or deceitful conduct. 18 Serious doubts exist in his fitness to continue as a member of an esteemed and honorable profession. WHEREFORE, for violating Public Act No. 2103, Section 1(a) and the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral's notarial commission, if still extant, is INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED. 19 Respondent is further DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of copy of this Resolution why he should not be disbarred. IcHTAa SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ ., concur. Carpio Morales, Azcuna and Chico-Nazario, JJ ., are on leave. FIRST DIVISION [A.C. No. 5379. May 9, 2003.] WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents. SYNOPSIS Atty. Walter T. Young filed a verified complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer's oath. He alleged that on December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino as counsels of Crisanto Arana, Jr. who was accused of the crime of murder, filed on December 13, 2000 a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the "accused has voluntarily surrendered to

a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention." When in truth and in fact the accused surrendered only on December 14, 2000. And that respondent Susa, as the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the said motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects. In their respective comments, respondents Batuegas and Llantino argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client had voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), while respondent Susa argued, among others, that the inclusion of the said motion in the court's calendar was authorized by the presiding judge. The Court ruled that respondents Batuegas and Llantino fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that the Court strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception. Accordingly, respondents were found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood and were suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However, respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.

SYLLABUS 1.LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER'S OATH; LAWYERS SHALL DO NO FALSEHOOD NOR CONSENT TO THE DOING OF ANY IN COURT. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. 2.ID.; DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS; GROUNDS; MISCONDUCT WHETHER IN PROFESSIONAL OR PRIVATE CAPACITY. The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. AScTaD 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DELIBERATE FALSEHOOD; COMMITTED BY LAWYERS WHO KNOWINGLY ALLEGED AN UNTRUE STATEMENT OF FACT IN THE MOTION FOR BAIL. [R]espondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that

we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYERS NOT EXONERATED BY THE FACT THAT THEIR CLIENT WAS ALREADY UNDER THE CUSTODY OF THE NBI DURING THE HEARING OF THE MOTION. Respondents contend that their allegation of the accused's detention was merely a statement of an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they were able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false. In Comia vs. Antona, we held: "It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date "tentatively" scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court." 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER PENALTY. [R]espondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 6.ID.; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; LAWYERS ARE OBLIGED TO OBSERVE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE. In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation. In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short

notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. HAaDTI 7.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COURT PERSONNEL; CLERK OF COURT; SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO INFORM THE JUDGE IF HE SHOULD FIND ANY ACT OR CONDUCT ON THE PART OF LAWYERS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE. [W]e are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions; although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER PENALTY. [R]espondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. 6.ID.; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; LAWYERS ARE OBLIGED TO OBSERVE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE. In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation. In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers,

they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. HAaDTI 7.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COURT PERSONNEL; CLERK OF COURT; SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO INFORM THE JUDGE IF HE SHOULD FIND ANY ACT OR CONDUCT ON THE PART OF LAWYERS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE. [W]e are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions; although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.