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2010 Report

Are we on the verge of the decade of Latin America? That is a question we can ask today in view of the regions clear progress in the consolidation of democracy. From the point of view of the state of its democracies and economies, Latin America is doing better than at any other time in the past 15 years. Brazils role as a world power puts the region on a different footing internationally. The election of two women presidents as well as efforts to reduce poverty show how the region is catching up beyond and despite international economic crises. The weakness of politics and mistrust are, on the other hand, the Achilles heel of the consolidation of democracy.

December / Santiago, Chile

CONTENTS LATINOBARMETRO CORPORATION ...................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 4 ECONOMIC SNAPSHOT OF LATIN AMERICA, 2009-2010 -- ECLAC .................................... 5 THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA .................................................... 6
UNEMPLOYMENT AS THE REGIONS MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM: SPONTANEOUS ANSWER .................................................................... 7 The countrys economic situation ................................................................................................................................. 8 Subjective income and fear of unemployment............................................................................................................ 10 CRIME AS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM: SPONTANEOUS ANSWER .............................................................................................. 11 Victimization and crime rates ..................................................................................................................................... 12 THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM BY COUNTRY ........................................................................................................................... 14 SUMMARY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM: ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND CRIME ........................................................................ 15

ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS ....................................................................................................... 17


DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ...................................................................................................................................................... 18 EXPECTATIONS ABOUT CHILDRENS FUTURE WEALTH .................................................................................................................... 19 FUTURE ECONOMIC SITUATION ................................................................................................................................................ 19 INDEX OF ECONOMIC SENTIMENT ............................................................................................................................................. 20

DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS INDICATORS ................................................ 21


COMPARISON OF INDICATORS OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY ......................................................................................................... 26 INDEX OF DEMOCRACY ........................................................................................................................................................... 27 Legitimacy of political parties ..................................................................................................................................... 28 ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY........................................................................................................................................... 30 Interests of the majority.............................................................................................................................................. 31 Attitudes towards the media ...................................................................................................................................... 32 Attitudes towards authoritarianism ........................................................................................................................... 33 The last military government ...................................................................................................................................... 34

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMY .............................................. 36


SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY ............................................................................................................................................. 36 SATISFACTION WITH THE ECONOMY .......................................................................................................................................... 39

DEMOCRACY AND CHANGE OF POWER: THE CASE OF CHILE ..................................... 40


SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND CHANGE OF POWER IN CHILE, 2010 .............................................................................................. 42 SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMY: THE CASE OF CHILE....................................................................................... 45 Churchillian democracy: The case of Chile .................................................................................................................. 47 CAPACITY OF THE STATE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................................. 48

POLITICS ........................................................................................................................................... 49 POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL OVERVIEW, 2010 - DANIEL ZOVATTO IN COLLABORATION WITH ROGELIO NUEZ ........................................................................... 49
INTEREST IN POLITICS ............................................................................................................................................................. 57 POLITICAL CYNICISM .............................................................................................................................................................. 58 THE VOTE AND THE FEELING WHEN VOTING ................................................................................................................................ 59 PERCEPTION OF PLURALITY: CAN MY IDEAS GET INTO POWER? ....................................................................................................... 60 LEFT-RIGHT SCALE ................................................................................................................................................................. 63 SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL MATTERS................................................................................................................ 65 Strategies for obtaining information .......................................................................................................................... 67

TRUST ................................................................................................................................................. 68
INTERPERSONAL TRUST .......................................................................................................................................................... 69 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS .......................................................................................................................................................... 70

GOVERNMENT APPROVAL ......................................................................................................... 72


Four women presidents............................................................................................................................................... 74 Approval of policy on public safety ............................................................................................................................. 75

THE STATE........................................................................................................................................ 78
DOES THE STATE HAVE THE MEANS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS? ............................................................................................................. 79 MINIMUM SOCIAL SECURITY ................................................................................................................................................... 80 SATISFACTION WITH STATE SERVICES ......................................................................................................................................... 81 Public services provided by central government ......................................................................................................... 81 PUBLIC SERVICES PROVIDED BY REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS ....................................................................................... 81

PUBLIC POLICIES ........................................................................................................................... 82


FISCAL MORALITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS TAXES ..................................................................................................................... 83 WORKPLACE MORALITY.......................................................................................................................................................... 85 SOCIAL MORALITY ................................................................................................................................................................. 86 PUBLIC SAFETY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 87 Quality of public safety ............................................................................................................................................... 87 Equality of treatment by the police ............................................................................................................................. 88 Perception of personal insecurity ................................................................................................................................ 91 Combating crime ......................................................................................................................................................... 92 CORRUPTION ....................................................................................................................................................................... 94 USE OF INTERNET IN LATIN AMERICA ........................................................................................................................................ 96 Prevalence of Internet ................................................................................................................................................. 96 Use of Internet every day ............................................................................................................................................ 97 Most frequent purpose of Internet use ....................................................................................................................... 98 Use of social networks ................................................................................................................................................ 99

THE MARKET ECONOMY AND PRIVATIZATIONS ............................................................. 100


THE MARKET ECONOMY AND PRIVATE COMPANIES..................................................................................................................... 100 PRIVATE COMPANIES ARE INDISPENSABLE ................................................................................................................................ 102 BENEFITS OF PRIVATIZATIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 103 SATISFACTION WITH PRIVATIZED SERVICES................................................................................................................................ 105

LEADERSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA .......................................................................................... 107


FAVORABLE OPINION OF OBAMA, LULA AND CHVEZ................................................................................................................. 107 INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA....................................................................................................... 109 POSITIVE INFLUENCE OF VENEZUELA ....................................................................................................................................... 109 IMAGE OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: THE PERCEIVED DEGREE OF DEMOCRACY ...................................................... 110 HOW DEMOCRATIC IS CUBA? ................................................................................................................................................ 113 EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA .................................................................................................................................................... 115 IMAGE OF PRESIDENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LEADERS................................................................................................................. 116

VALUES FOR THE NEXT GENERATION................................................................................. 120 TECHNICAL DATA BY COUNTRY, 2010 .................................................................................. 122

LATINOBARMETRO 2010
TECHNICAL DATA 2010. 20,204 personal interviews were conducted in 18 countries between September 4 and October 6. In each country, the sample of 1,000-1,200 cases is representative of 100% of the countrys population, with a margin of error of approximately 3% for each country. (For more details, see Technical Data by Country.) Organization responsible for the survey: Corporacin Latinobarmetro, Santiago, Chile.

LATINOBARMETRO CORPORATION
The Latinobarmetro survey is produced by Latinobarmetro Corporation, a non-profit NGO based in Santiago, Chile. Latinobarmetro Corporation is solely responsible for the data. The fieldwork for the first Latinobarmetro survey was carried out in 1995, covering eight countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. As from 1996, the survey was extended to 17 countries and, following the incorporation of the Dominican Republic in 2004, now covers the 18 Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba where, in 2010, Latinobarmetro again asked the government for permission to apply the survey. To date, 15 annual surveys have been carried out, with a total of 277,406 interviews. The 2010 survey involved 20,204 interviews between September 4 and October 6, constituting representative samples of 100% of the population of each of the 18 countries. As a result, the survey is representative of the regions more than 500 million inhabitants. Online data bank: Latinobarmetros opinion data bank is the first in Spanish as well as the first in Latin America and, indeed, the southern hemisphere. Thanks to its latest-generation technology, it can be accessed without statistical software or expert knowledge. The system is operated by Madridbased JDS System. The 2010 survey received support from a number of international organizations and governments: the Organization of American States (OAS), the Corporacin Andina de Fomento (CAF), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Agencia Espaola de Cooperacin Internacional (AECI) and the U.S. Department of State. In October 2010, Latinobarmetros International Advisory Council met under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to define its research strategy, debating the road that Latinobarmetro should follow over the next ten years.

INTRODUCTION In Latin America, 2010 opened on January 20 with a change of power in Chile where the right, with Sebastin Piera at the head of the Alianza coalition, returned to power after 50 years, replacing the Concertacin de Partidos por la Democracia which had governed for the previous 20 years. The year ended in Brazil with the election of Dilma Rousseff, the political heir and successor of President Lula, in a very comfortable second-round victory. After the turbulence of 2009, with the coup in Honduras, 2010 was a good year for the region. Despite the confused incident that occurred in Ecuador, it was, indeed, perhaps the best year from the point of view of the state of democracy since Latinobarmetro surveys began in 1995. Moreover, in 2010, two countries - Costa Rica as well as Brazil - elected women presidents. Costa Rica is one of the regions most democratic countries and Brazil, its largest and most powerful, has become a world power. In all, four women have been elected as their countrys president since 2006 starting with Michelle Bachelet in Chile. Looking forward with great optimism, the Inter-American Development Bank has suggested that the 2010s will be the Decade of Latin America. Some data, in fact, appears to suggest that the regions decade began in 2003 when it emerged from the Asian crisis, rather than now with its recovery from the crisis that began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2007). The 2008-2009 economic crisis did not interrupt the regions growth path permanently nor, indeed, knock it so much off course as to prevent it from returning to that path after a brief pause. The numbers reveal a setback in a number of variables but, at the same time, its impact was mitigated by high production of political goods (with countercyclical economic policies), creating a greater perception of protection and stability than had ever before been seen in the region. The decade of Latin America may well, in other words, have started in 2003. The limited impact of the 2008-2009 economic crisis is the result not only of the regions greater economic strength, with better economic management and healthier fiscal accounts, but also of the fact that governments were more receptive and sensitive to peoples demands. Presidents and governments were capable of responding with countercyclical economic policies and of reducing the impact of the crisis among those worst affected by it. In other words, governments - in one way or another - interpreted popular demands more accurately. This is a paradox in that, on the one hand, it means they represented peoples demands better while, on the other hand, there is a wealth of evidence of a crisis of representation by political parties. Governments have learnt to create abundant political goods. This report starts, as in the previous four years, with an economic snapshot prepared by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

ECONOMIC SNAPSHOT OF LATIN AMERICA, 2009-2010 -- ECLAC In 2009, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean were affected by the global financial crisis, which reached its maximum intensity in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. As a result, regional GDP contracted by 1.9% while per capita income fell by 3%. This, in turn, had an impact on the performance of the regions labor markets and ECLAC estimates that regional unemployment rose from 7.3% in 2008 to 8.2% in 2009. Despite the marked drop in activity in late 2008 and early 2009, most of the regions countries were beginning to see a recovery by the second half of 2009 and 2010 brought consolidation of this rebound. Regional GDP is estimated to have expanded by 5.2% in 2010 and, in terms of per capita income, this would mean a 4.1% increase. Similarly, throughout 2010, stronger activity had a positive impact on the capacity of the regions economies to create jobs and the unemployment rate is estimated to have dropped to 7.8%. This positive performance was the result of both internal and external factors. The former include the implementation of countercyclical public policies in a number of countries. The solid macroeconomic fundamentals seen in the majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries in the years prior to the international crisis made an important difference as compared to the habitual financial difficulties which the region had tended to face in previous crises. Unlike previous occasions, they took advantage of this exceptional boom in the economy and international financial markets to put their fiscal accounts on a healthier footing, reduce their borrowing and improve its profile and increase international reserves. As a result, they found themselves better able to implement public policies to counteract the negative impact of the deterioration in the external economic context. Programs of fiscal and monetary stimulus in a context of diminishing uncertainty, a relative normalization of financial markets and improved access to credit, along with the strengthening of the international economy, meant a gradual recovery of activity, driven by consumption, investment and, to a lesser extent, exports. The external factors that contributed to the regions positive performance in 2010 included the ongoing dynamism of some Asian economies and their sustained demand for the raw materials produced by many Latin American countries. This led to an important recovery in export prices and volumes, principally in metals, minerals, oil and some cereals, that benefitted particularly the South American economies. Similarly, the recovery of the U.S. economy, albeit slow, helped to improve the outlook for Mexico and the Central American countries in terms of both higher exports and a recovery in remittances from migrants which play an important role in financing private consumption. The different episodes of economic crisis that have affected Latin America and the Caribbean show that they have the greatest impact on poor and vulnerable households, and the recent crisis was no exception. However, although the 2008-2009 global crisis marked the end of a period of sustained improvement in the regions poverty and income distribution indicators, it did not undo the great progress achieved in the previous six years. The partial information so far available about the performance of wages indicates that the drop in GDP was not automatically transmitted to families income from work. The maintenance of their purchasing power in this situation is explained by a drop in inflation rates as compared to 2008 and the fact that they have remained relatively low. However, it 5

also reflects the implementation of social policies that helped to mitigate the impact of the crisis on an important part of the population. Nonetheless, ECLAC estimates that, in 2009, the regions poverty rate rose to 33.1%, up from 33% in 2008, and, in the case of extreme poverty, to 13.7% up from 12.9%. However, in 2002, poverty reached 44% while extreme poverty was running at 19.4% and, despite the magnitude of the international crisis, its impact on the regions poverty indicators was, in aggregate terms, less than in previous crises. Despite the dynamism of Latin American and Caribbean economies in 2010, it is important to bear in mind that this favorable performance was due in part to a number of temporary factors that are unlikely to be repeated in 2011. The region was able to respond dynamically to external demand and countercyclical stimulus by taking advantage of idle capacity that may be exhausted during the current recovery. Similarly, governments have seen a reduction in their capacity to maintain previous policy measures and introduce new stimulus without endangering the achievements of recent years as regards macroeconomic equilibrium. Moreover, although recovery has been quite fast, there remain important questions about the performance of the world economy that may affect the regions medium-term outlook. As well as the slow U.S. recovery, the crisis being experienced by some European countries may affect the regions export prices and volumes and remittance levels in some Latin American and Caribbean countries and increase the volatility of international markets. In this context, the regions countries face important challenges. In addition to the need to persevere in maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium, they will need to increase investment in infrastructure and production capacity in order to permit gains in productivity and wages. At the same time, they also face the challenge of maintaining public policies that seek to protect vulnerable sectors of the population and strengthen the link between growth and equality. In order to achieve these goals, it will be necessary to redefine the prevailing equation between the state, the market and civil society.

THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA This report on the results of the 2010 survey begins by analyzing the regions most important problem. There can be no doubt that this is inequality which, measured as the Gini coefficient, is greater than in any other region of the world. Official statistics demonstrating the degree of inequality and inequity in the region are set out in the 2010 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and in Our Democracy, a report issued by a number of multilateral and regional organizations (UNDP and OAS) and financed by the Agencia Espaola de Cooperacin Internacional (AECI) and Canadas Technical Cooperation Program. The results of Latinobarmetro surveys complement these studies by tracking over time the impact on the perceptions of the regions inhabitants. A book published by Latinobarmetro and ECLAC in 2010, Latin America in the Mirror, compares the objective data with the (subjective) results of Latinobarmetro surveys and shows brutal evidence of the gap between what the regions citizens 6

understand as reality and the reality measured by governments when designing policies. These inconsistencies between reality and perception and the gap in the interpretation of phenomena are what studies like Latinobarmetro have been able to observe and now measure. In measuring Latin Americas most important problem, it is, as discussed below, precisely this gap that we observe. Unemployment as the regions most important problem: spontaneous answer For over a decade, the regions most important problem was unemployment, according to an openended question to which interviewees effectively answer with the word unemployment. Economic growth during the regions virtuous five-year cycle (2003-2007) - a period of economic stability that the region had not seen for decades - brought important changes in peoples perceptions and economic expectations. Above all, it appears to have produced a definitive drop in the number of Latin Americans who report great difficulty in getting to the end of the month. Both unemployment and fear of job loss drop and so too do great economic difficulties as is decisively shown by the opinion data. At the same time, the data also shows that the economic crisis which began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2007 does not have the same negative impact as the Asian crisis. Although the effects vary by country, we can say that, on average, the recent crisis represented a setback in the good results of the previous five years as regards perception of unemployment as the regions most important problem (which increased from 15% in 2008 to 21% in 2009), expectations and fear of job loss but did not undo previous progress. In 2010, unemployment as the principal problem drops back to 19%, returning rapidly to a level close to that seen in the regions best moment of the past 15 years.

MAJOR PROBLEMS: CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1995-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010 FOR CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Q. In your Opinion, which one is the most important problem in the country? * Here only 'Unemployment' and Crime.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010.

The countrys economic situation In 2010, Latin America recovered from the economic discontent seen in 2008 and 2009, with a drop from 40% to 35% in the percentage of interviewees judging their countrys current economic situation to be bad or very bad. The effect of the economic crisis of the previous two years had been reflected in an increase in the percentage of people with a negative evaluation of their countrys economic situation (bad or very bad). This rose from 28% in 2007 to 35% in 2008 and 40% in 2009, an increase of 12 percentage points. However, favorable evaluations of the economic situation reached 17% in 2010, up from 16% in 2009, and the perception of crisis appears to be beginning to recede. This followed a drop in 2009 from 18% in 2008.

CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1996 - 2010.
Q. In general, how would you describe the countrys present economic situation? Would you say it is...? very good, good, About average , bad or very bad ? * Here 'Very good' and 'Good' / about average' / 'Bad' and 'very bad'. 80

70
61

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

57 53 47 36 41 38

54

56

59 54 47 47 35 28 18 18 21 16 17 50 47 43 35 40 47

37 32

36

38 33 42

35

10

11

1996

1997

1998

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Very good and good


Source: Latinobarmetro 1996-2010.

About average

Very bad and bad

The regions deep inequalities, however, persist and, beyond its currently positive situation, this is the starting point. Opinions about the current state of the economy are most favorable in Brazil and Uruguay where 38% and 36%, respectively, say it is good or very good. By contrast, there are five countries in which this view reaches only a single digit: Nicaragua (9%), El Salvador (9%), Mexico (8%), the Dominican Republic (7%) and Guatemala (5%). The average for the region is 17% and ten of the 18 countries are below this average. Even in the economic crisis, the percentage of the regions inhabitants taking a positive view of the economy did not drop below 16% as compared to the single-digit figures that prevailed between 1996 and 2004 (with the exception of 1997 when the figure reached 10%). In relative terms, this is a very good time for the region and never before have so many people taken a positive view of the economic situation during so many consecutive years. 8

CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1996 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. In general, how would you describe the countrys present economic situation? Would you say it is...? Very Good, Good, About average, Bad, Very Bad? * Here only 'Very good and good'.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1996-2010.

The downside of this situation is apparent in the number of people with a negative evaluation of their countrys economic situation. The 2009 Latinobarmetro Report warned of the severe impact of the economic crisis in some countries, particularly Honduras and Nicaragua. However, in 2010, we find a significant reduction in the percentage of those countries inhabitants who describe the economic situation as bad or very bad. This drops from 66% to 58% in Honduras (a difference of eight points) and from 66% to 48% in Nicaragua (a difference of 18 points). This means that, although the perception of difficulties remains widespread, economic conditions in both countries are now seen as less harsh. In Argentina and Mexico, there is also an important drop in the percentage of people with a negative view of their countrys current economic situation. This drops by 19 and 14 percentage points, respectively, between 2009 and 2010. In Ecuador, the reduction reached ten points and, in Brazil - as in Honduras - eight points. These six countries (including Nicaragua) are the most important factor in explaining the five-point reduction since 2009 in the regional average of those with a negative view of their countrys economic situation. The only countries in which this indicator increases, albeit slightly, are Bolivia (up by five points) and Uruguay and Panama (both up by one point). As shown in the graph below, two-thirds of interviewees in the Dominican Republic described their countrys economic situation as bad or very bad. This was the highest figure in the region. Differences in perceptions of the state of the economy are larger than for the state of democracy. In Uruguay and Brazil, only 14% describe their countrys economic situation as bad or very bad.

CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1996 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. In general, how would you describe the countrys present economic situation? Would you say it is...? Very Good, Good, About average, Bad, Very Bad? * Here only Bad and Very Bad'.
Repblica Dominicana Honduras Guatemala El Salvador Mxico Nicaragua Paraguay Argentina Venezuela Bolivia Colombia Per Costa Rica Ecuador Panam Chile Brasil Uruguay Latinoamrica 0 10 20 30

66 58 56 52 49 48 40 36 33 31 29 29 24 24 22 16 14 14 35
40 50 60 70 80

Bad and Very Bad


Source: Latinobarmetro 1996-2010.

Subjective income and fear of unemployment As well as in evaluations of the countrys economic situation, there is also a positive trend in other important indicators. In the case of subjective income, we find a reduction in the percentage of the regions inhabitants who report great difficulty in getting to the end of the month. This drops from 15% in 2009 to 13% in 2010, returning to its level in 2007. There are, however, important differences among countries and the figure ranges from 5% in Argentina to 29% in the Dominican Republic.

SUBJECTIVE INCOME
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1995-2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY2010.
Q. Does the salary you receive and your total family income allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner? Which of the following statements describes your situation?*Here only Its not sufficient and we have major problems.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010.

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REDUNDANCY INDEX
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2002-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. How concerned would you say you are that you will be left without work or unemployed during the next 12 months or you dont have job? *Here only Very concerned and concerned.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002-2010.

Fear of unemployment is the clearest indicator of the impact of the regions five-year cycle of growth and the subsequent economic crisis. We find that the crisis has almost no effect on this variable which shows a small increase from 40% in 2008 to 41% in 2009 but drops to 38% in 2010, its lowest level since Latinobarmetro began to measure the indicator 15 years ago. The figures in 2010, however, range from 62% in Guatemala to 21% in Uruguay. Crime as the most important problem: spontaneous answer Another important spontaneously mentioned problem is crime. Since 2004, the percentage of the regions inhabitants who identify it as the most important problem has increased without interruption, rising from 9% to 27% in 2010, its highest level since Latinobarmetros measurements began.

PROBLEM OF CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION RATE


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1995-2010
Q. In your Opinion, which one is the most important problem in the country? * Here only 'crime'. Q. Have you been or relative assaulted, attacked, or victim of a crime in the last twelve months? * Here only 'Yes'.

The difference decreases from 19 points (2009) to 4 points in 2010.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010.

11

Victimization and crime rates The victimization rate - that is the number of interviewees who report having been the victim of a crime - has shown important variations since 2004. It is, however, significant that it peaked in 2001 (43%) and 2005 (41%) - the former a year in which the regions economic performance was poor, reflecting the impact of the Asian crisis, and the latter, which formed part of the regions virtuous five-year cycle, one of its most prosperous. The crime rate, in other words, may have little to do with the swings of the economy and be determined by factors intrinsic to societies, not their economic performance. At 31%, the victimization rate in 2010 was one of the lowest since Latinobarmetro began to measure it in 1995. This is at odds with the sustained increase in the perception of crime seen in recent years. This apparent divergence is due principally to the fact that while the victimization rate has historically been higher than the perception of crime, the gap between the two indicators has closed in recent years.

HAVE YOU BEEN VICTIM OF A CRIME?

TOTAL AMRICA LATINA 1995 - 2010 - TOTALES POR PAS 2010.


Q. Have you, or relative, been assaulted, attacked, or victim of a crime in the last twelve months? *Here only Yes

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995 - 2010

It is particularly interesting that, after a period of 15 years in which there was a very large divergence between the victimization rate and perception of crime, the former is now for the first time consistent with the perception of crime as the regions most important problem. In 1995, there was a difference of 25 percentage points between the two indicators and, in 2001, this peaked at 35 points but dropped to just four points in 2010, although with significant variations between countries.

Table N 1: Comparison of victimization rate and crime as the most 12

1995 1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

important problem Victim of crime Crime as most important problem 29% 5% 36% 7% 40% 7% 42% 8% 43% 8% 39% 9% 35% 7% 33% 8% 41% 9% 32% 14% 38% 16% 33% 17% 38% 19% 31% 27%

Difference 24 29 33 34 35 30 28 25 32 18 22 16 19 4

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

In Nicaragua, as discussed later in this report, the problem of crime is not seen as relevant (1%) as compared to economic difficulties. However, 29% of the countrys citizens report having been the victim of a crime, giving a difference of 28 points with perception of its importance. Crime does not figure as a problem of the country not because it does not exist but because it is overshadowed by Nicaraguas extreme economic difficulties. Similarly, in El Salvador, 71% report having been the victim of a crime while 43% identify it as their countrys most important problem, also giving a difference of 28 points. Crime is, in other words, not only a problem of the country but of seven in ten of its inhabitants. In Bolivia, 30% report having been victim of a crime but only 5% say it is the countrys most important problem. In all, there are 11 countries in which there is a divergence of some size between perception of the importance of crime as a problem and the number of people who have, in fact, suffered a crime. This implies that even people who have been victims of a crime do not identify it as their countrys main problem. In the other seven countries, we find the opposite situation, with people who have not been victims of a crime identifying it as the main problem. The most extreme case is Venezuela where 64% identify crime as their countrys most important problem but only 27% report having been victim of a crime, giving a difference of 37 points.

13

Table N 2: Comparison of victimization rate and crime as the most important problem by country, 2010 Victim of crime Crime as most Difference important problem 29% 1% Nicaragua 28 71% 43% El Salvador 28 30% 5% Bolivia 25 32% 13% Colombia 19 25% 10% Brazil 15 31% 20% Dominican Rep. 12 Peru Ecuador Paraguay Honduras Chile Argentina Guatemala Costa Rica Mexico Uruguay Panama Venezuela Latin America
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

29% 35% 29% 31% 25% 36% 33% 34% 30% 19% 19% 27% 31%

18% 24% 22% 25% 19% 37% 35% 38% 35% 28% 46% 64% 27%

11 11 7 6 6 -1 -2 -5 -5 -10 -27 -37 4

Spontaneous identification of crime as the countrys most important problem is, therefore, relative and depends on the importance of other problems as well as on the countrys agenda and the evolution of crime in that country. The impact of crime is analyzed in greater detail below. The most important problem by country The table below sets out the most important problem by country, which obviously differs from the regional average presented above. In comparison to previous years, the impact of the increase in the perceived importance of crime is seen in the fact that, in 2010, it is identified as the most important problem in ten countries, up from seven in 2009. At the same time, there is a drop from six to three in the number of countries in which unemployment is seen as the most important problem.

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Table N 3 : The countrys most important problem Countrys most important problem

2010

Unemployment Paraguay Colombia Peru Crime/public safety Venezuela Panama El Salvador Costa Rica Argentina Mexico Guatemala Uruguay Honduras Chile Dominican Rep. Economic problems Nicaragua Ecuador Bolivia Healthcare problems Brazil
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Crime/public safety Economic problems Economic problems Economic problems Healthcare problems

35% 31% 20% 64% 46% 44% 38% 37% 35% 35% 28% 25% 22% 20% 78% 57% 21% 28%

In another three countries, economic problems are mentioned as the most important problem while, in Brazil, it is healthcare. Summary of the most important problem: economic difficulties and crime The spontaneous answers that people give when asked about the main problem or, in other words, the perception of what they say is one thing. Another is the analysis of these answers which implies aggregating them into homogeneous concepts. This leads to the obvious conclusion that, despite the regions progress, economic difficulties remain the most important problem. Crime is the single most important problem mentioned but, if we aggregate unemployment (19%), economic problems (12%) and poverty (7%), economic difficulties as a group reach 38% and, in fact, outweigh crime. In 2010, there is a significant drop in the importance of economic difficulties as compared to 2009 when they reached 44%. Nonetheless, if they are considered as a group, they still lead crime as the most important problem. Moreover, even if the problem of violence, which reached 3% in 2010, is added to crime, the total is still only 30%, below economic difficulties as a group. 15

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN THE COUNTRY


LATIN AMERICA TOTALS 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010 FOR CRIME
Q. In your opinion, which is the most important problem in the country? Open-ended question, here only more than 3%
Crime / Public Security Unemployment Economy / Economic problems / Financial problems Poverty Corruption Violence / Gangs Health problems Political problems Education 0 4 3 3 3 3 50 7 12 19 27
Venezuela Panam El Salvador Costa Rica Argentina Mxico Guatemala Uruguay Honduras Ecuador Paraguay

64 46 44 38 37 35 35 28 25 24 22 22 20 18 14 10 5 1 27
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

38% of citizens in Latin America claim for economic problems, poverty and unemployment

Chile Repblica Dominicana Per Colombia Brasil Bolivia Nicaragua Latinoamrica

Crime / Public Security

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay and Bolivia are the countries in which at least half the population identifies economic difficulties as its most important problem.

SUMMARY: MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN THE COUNTRY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS & CRIME
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2007-2010, TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. In your Opinion, which one is the most important problem in the country? * Here only Unemployment and The economy/economics problems/financial and Poverty and Crime

2010 ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Source: Latinobarmetro 2007 - 2010.

16

Summary: Economic difficulties are the most important problem faced by Latin Americans although the problem of crime and violence has shown a sustained increase, particularly in the last three years.

ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS Despite two economic crises (1998 and 2007), the perception of progress has shown a sustained increase since 1996 in line with the reduction in the regions economic problems. In 2010, this reached 39%, up from 26% in 1996. This was its highest level since 1999 and, in other words, Latin America has never before felt as much progress as in 2010.

IMAGE OF PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRY

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1995 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.


Q. Would you say that this country....? Is progressing, Is at a standstill , is in decline. * Here only 'progress'.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995 2010.

The trend in peoples satisfaction with their life, that is their subjective wellbeing, however, differs from their perception of the countrys progress and there does not appear to be much relation between the two indicators. Peoples satisfaction with their life has increased significantly, rising from 41% in 2000 to 71% in 2010, its highest level since 2003, a year of economic crisis in the region. It has since held fairly steady at around 70%. It is highest in Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela and lowest in Bolivia, El Salvador and Peru.

17

SATISFACTION WITH LIFE


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1997-2010 TOTALS BT COUNTRY 2010
Generally speaking, Would you say that you are satisfied with your life? Would you say that you are....? *Here only Very satisfied and Quite satisfied

Source: Latinobarmetro 1997 - 2010.

Distribution of wealth The distribution of wealth is one of the factors with an important effect on the perceptions of Latin Americans. It was only in 2007 or, in other words, after five years of sustained growth that the view that wealth is fairly distributed reached 21% and it has since showed no change. The impact of the recent crisis as seen, for example, in unemployment was not reflected in this indicator, showing that people do not see it as having had a significant effect on structural factors in the way wealth is distributed.

HOW FAIR IS INCOME DISTRIBUTION


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1997-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. How fair you think that income distribution is In (country)? *Here only Very fair and fair

Source: Latinobarmetro 1997-2010

18

Expectations about childrens future wealth The impact of the crisis is, however, apparent in peoples economic expectations for their children. On a scale of 1 to 10 (where 1 represents the poorest people and 10 the richest), peoples perception of the future wealth of their children dropped from 5.8 in 2007 to 5.1 in 2010.

EXPECTATION FOR FUTURE GENERATION


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2000-2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Imagine a ladder with 10 steps, in which on the first step are the poorest and on the 10th step, the richest. Where would you place your children on this ladder? * Here only 'Average'.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2000-2010.

Brazilians are the most optimistic about the future of their children (6.4) while Nicaragua (3.5) and the Dominican Republic (4.1) are the most pessimistic. Future economic situation Similarly, there was a deterioration in expectations of both countries economic future and that of interviewees themselves. The percentage of Latin Americans who anticipate that their personal situation will be much better or a little better dropped from 49% in 2006 to 44% in both 2009 and 2010. The difference between peoples personal expectations and their expectations for the country holds steady over the years, with the former exceeding the latter by around ten points. Expectations for interviewees personal future are led by Brazil where 70% think this will be better while the most pessimistic countries are El Salvador and the Dominican Republic where only 18% and 26%, respectively, share this view.

19

FUTURE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY AND SELF TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2001- 2010.
Q1. And over the next 12 months do you think that, in general, the countrys economic situation will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than now? Q2. In the next 12 months, do you think your economic situation and that of your family will be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than now? * Here only 'Much better' more 'A little better'. Personal Situation Future 100

90 80 70 60
49

50 40 30 20 10 0
23 25 28 35 37 36

41

43 39

46

46

44

44

38 31 33

30

31

34

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Personal
Source: Latinobarmetro 2001-2010.

Country

Index of economic sentiment When analyzing the index of economic sentiment - built using six questions about the past, present and future of the countrys and individuals economic situation - we see that consistently over the years people perceive their economic situation to be better than that of the country. Table N 4: Index of economic sentiment, 2002-2010 Countrys situation Personal situation 2001 58 67 2002 59 69 2003 60 68 2004 61 71 2005 63 73 2006 68 76 2008 99 110 2009 92 102 2010 98 109
Source: Latinobarmetro 2001-2010

Total 62 64 64 66 68 72 104 96 103

In the index of economic sentiment, there are 11 countries that, in 2010, have over 100 points and are, in other words, economically optimistic. This is the largest number in the three years considered. In 2010, only seven countries have less than 100 points as compared to 11 in 2009.

20

Table N 5: Index of economic sentiment by country, 2008-2010 2008 2009 2010 Brazil 131 116 128 Uruguay 114 106 116 Panama 108 110 115 Colombia 117 100 111 Chile 101 106 111 Paraguay 116 105 110 Costa Rica 98 99 108 Ecuador 111 95 106 Venezuela 114 92 105 Argentina 103 90 103 Peru 91 96 101 Bolivia 100 105 99 Mexico 100 87 97 Honduras 96 86 96 Nicaragua 99 84 95 Guatemala 96 87 93 El Salvador 95 93 90 Dominican Rep.
Source: Latinobarmetro 2008-2010

93

89

85

Summary: Latin Americans economic expectations, which had been showing a sustained increase since 2001 and peaked in 2006, dropped somewhat in response to the economic crisis. Recovery has not brought a renewed increase in expectations although there is a strong perception of progress in the country. The crisis can be said to have moderated the populations expectations of the future but, in 11 of the 18 countries, optimistic economic expectations prevail. DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS INDICATORS Analysis of democracy in Latin America remains a subject of debate, with conclusions of a different nature depending on who does the analysis, using what numbers and from what perspective. The social sciences have not standardized their indicators as has occurred in the economic sciences so different reports can show differing levels of support for democracy depending on the indicator used. The most usual question - developed by a group of researchers that included Leonardo Morlino and Juan Linz to analyze south European democracies when they were emerging from authoritarianism is one with three alternatives: support for democracy, support for an authoritarian regime or indifference to the form of government.
With which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; for people like me, it doesnt matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime.

21

This indicator was subsequently incorporated by Eurobarometer and, then, Latinobarmetro and is today also used by opinion barometers in Asia and Africa. Paradoxically, Eurobarometer no longer includes any questions about support for democracy since authoritarianism has ceased to be an issue there but this particular question has led measurement of support for democracy as a simple opinion indicator, with results for over 90 countries around the world which can, therefore, be compared. A single indicator does not, of course, suffice to measure democracy. Many others with numeric and verbal scales of all types are also employed, including some that do not even mention the word democracy. Questions are asked about the institutions of democracy, trust and the associated civic culture. However, there is not one empirical or theoretical model that standardizes these indicators and converts them into a figure that measures democracy in the way that GDP measures a countrys growth. In this sense, the empirical social sciences have lagged behind. A second indicator commonly used to measure democracy takes Winston Churchills famous phrase to the effect that it is the worst form of government except all the others.
Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement? Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government.

Due to the way in which it is constructed, this question, which allows the interviewee to indicate agreement or disagreement with the statement, necessarily produces a higher result than the previous indicator. In the same country, with the same interviewee, support for democracy will be higher if it is defined as agreement with this statement. In this report, the two results are compared so as to make clear the difference. There are some who have argued that, because of the high percentage of positive answers to this question, democracy in Latin America has no problems. Other indicators measure the perceived degree of democracy on a numeric scale.
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means that (country) is not democratic and 10 that it is totally democratic, where would you place (country)?

Opinion barometers have also used questions about how appropriate democracy is for a country. Although found in numerous studies, these indicators are, however, less frequently used than the two discussed above. The degree of democracy in a country cannot, therefore, be measured conclusively in such a way as to produce a ranking of which countries are more or less democratic. As Robert Dahl noted, democracy may have existed for 200 years but is still in the process of definition. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY This reports analysis of the state of democracy as perceived by Latin Americans begins with the question offering three alternatives. Since 2007, support for democracy has shown a steady increase. From one year to another, there are no sudden changes but, rather, apparently not very significant increases. This is, however, the first time since Latinobarmetro began to measure this key indicator of democracy that the increase has been sustained over four consecutive years. This conclusion is, moreover, borne out by all the 22

surveys other findings which indicate, beyond doubt, that 2010 was the highest point for the development of democracy since 1995. This does not, however, mean that preference for an authoritarian regime has disappeared, diminished or changed in a significant way and this is also true for those who are indifferent to the type of regime. Over the last 15 years, the percentage of Latin Americans with authoritarian attitudes has held steady at around 15% while the percentage indifferent to the type of regime increased to 22% in 2003 and then dropped to 16% in 2010. In other words, increased support for democracy has not yet changed the structure of opinions about the type of regime, although it is evolving in the right direction. This shows how early analysis of democracy was premature in predicting fast changes and strong evolutionary processes. These 15 years of data show rather that changes are slow and can be contradictory. This report itself illustrates the complexity of the analysis of democracy since, in order to produce a sustained increase in support, numerous political, economic and social aspects have had to change as is, in fact, shown in the data. In other words, changes in areas that include civic culture, the legitimacy of institutions and trust in them have been greater than in support for democracy for which they provide the groundwork. These are systemic changes or, in other words, the changes that occur in an important part of democracy's instruments and have, as a result, an increase in support for this form of government.

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY


TOTAL AMRICA LATINA 1995-2010.
Q. With which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; For people like me, it doesnt matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime; DNK/DNA

70
61 63 62 57 48 56 53 53 53 58 54 57 59 61

60 50 40 30 20 10

58

17 16 7

17 16

18

18 16

19 17

21 18 19 15 9 9

22

21

19

20 17 15 17 9
2007

19

18 16 7
2009

16 15 7
2010

17

14 3 3 6
1997 1998 2000 2001

15 13 9

16 8
2008

0
1995

4
1996

6
2002 2003 2004 2005

7
2006

Democracy is preferable
Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010.

Authoritarian regime

Indifferent

DNK / DNA

It is among the most educated that support for democracy is highest (73%), with a difference of 17 points as compared to those with less education (56%). Age does not, however, make a difference. This belies the hypothesis of the importance of socialization because the generations socialized under dictatorships are neither less nor more authoritarian. In fact, research seeking to identify more or less authoritarian generations, according to their period of socialization, has also failed to confirm this hypothesis. 23

By country, support for democracy is highest in Venezuela (84%) and lowest in Guatemala (46%), representing a gap of 38 points. It is paradoxical that support is highest in Venezuela since it is also the country where there is most criticism of the state of democracy. Venezuelans, however, do not share the opinion of analysts of democracy. Clearly, this is where we come up against the question addressed in the book America Latina in the Mirror about the inconsistency between objective and perceived reality. What is democracy for Venezuelans is not the same as for other Latin Americans. In Chile, for example, support for democracy reaches only 63%. Does this mean that democracy in Chile is worse than in Venezuela and, therefore, elicits less support from its citizens? In answering this question, many factors need to be considered: firstly, how critical the countrys inhabitants are as compared to people in other countries; secondly, the original position from which the evaluation starts or, in other words, the perspective from which each countrys citizens view the process; and, thirdly, in what way there is consistency between the expectations of evolution of one country or another, at what speed their inhabitants expect things to happen and at what speed they actually occur. It is quite possible that Chileans expect more and faster and, therefore, consider that progress does not measure up while Venezuelans expect little and only slowly and, therefore, may see the little that happens as great progress while, in another country, this would have no effect at all. Moreover, it is also necessary to take into account the time factor or, in other words, the moment at which events occur. Support for democracy is not a normative indicator, but relative to the development of each particular society.

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010 BY EDUCATION, AGE AND SEX- TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. With which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; For people like me, it doesnt matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime; DNK/DNA. *Here only Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
Superior and less Media and less Basic and less

73 64 56

61 and more 41-60 25-40 16-25

62 63 61 60

Women Men 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

60 63
70 80 90

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010.

In the evolution of support for democracy, there are enormous differences between countries. Paradoxically, the country with the largest improvement between 2009 and 2010 is Ecuador (21 points) where there was a confused incident with the police forces that was described by some as a 24

coup. The country with the second largest improvement in the last two years was Colombia (11 points). Independently of the level of support in different countries, there are five countries in which there is no significant change (less than the countrys 3% margin of error) between 2009 and 2010. There is, however, no country in which support for democracy declines. In all the regions countries, it either increased or held steady between 2009 and 2010. Table N 6: Support for democracy by country, 2009-2010 2009 2010 Difference Ecuador 43% 64% 21 Colombia 49% 60% 11 Peru 52% 61% 9 El Salvador 68% 59% 9 Mexico 42% 49% 7 Uruguay 82% 75% 7 Chile 59% 63% 4 Guatemala 42% 46% 4 Dominican Rep. 67% 63% 4 Paraguay 46% 49% 3 Nicaragua 55% 58% 3 Bolivia 71% 68% 3 Panama 64% 61% 3 Argentina 64% 66% 2 Costa Rica 74% 72% 2 Honduras 55% 53% 2 Brazil 55% 54% 1 Venezuela 84% 84% 0
Source: Latinobarmetro 2009-2010

The last graph referring to this question compares support for democracy and GDP in Latin America. It clearly shows that the drop in GDP growth between 2007 and 2009 did not interrupt the sustained increase in support for democracy. This also serves to confirm the hypothesis that support for democracy has structural components, rather than being related to current events. However, the two indicators showed a greater correlation during the Asian crisis than in the recent crisis. This appears to suggest that, as from a certain level of economic development, the economy begins to lose weight in the consolidation of democracy. In the past decade, Latin America has succeeded in creating different basic conditions for its citizens and they have also been accompanied by new political conditions and freedoms. We understand freedoms as a complex set of options to which citizens have access thanks to instruments such as education, income and political and cultural goods. It is these freedoms, rather than current events, that increase support for democracy.

25

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND PIB PER CAPITA 1995 2010


Q. With which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; For people like me, it doesnt matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime; DNK/DNA. *Here only Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government

70
Support for Democracy

53

53 4.4

53

54

50 40 30 20 10 0
3.8 2.3 0.9

48 4 3 0.4 -1.3 -2.3 4.7 5.5 3.1 4

6 4 2 0 -2 -4

1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Support for Democracy in Latin America PIB per capita

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010

Comparison of indicators of support for democracy A second common indicator of support for democracy uses Churchill's definition of this system of government. We find that this is higher than the support indicator above, with an average 16-point difference in the region. In Uruguay, 91% of citizens agree with the statement that democracy is the best system of government while, in Guatemala, the figure drops to 59%. This is a difference of 32 points while, in the case of the previous indicator, the difference between the countries where support is highest and lowest reaches 38 points.

CHURCHILLIAN DEMOCRACY

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2002 2010. TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.


Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? ? Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government * Here only 'Strongly agree' and agree.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002-2010.

26

PIB per cpita

60

58

61

63

62 57 56

10
58 57 59 61

On calculating the difference between the two indicators, we find that, out of the 18 countries, only three have a difference of less than ten points and, around the region, it ranges from four to 27 points. This illustrates the caution required when analyzing democracy and using a simple question to classify a countrys degree of democracy. The same also holds true for regions when comparing the degree of democracy in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The development of indicators remains a pending task. Table N 7: Indicators of support for democracy and their differences, 2010 Support Churchillian Difference Venezuela 84% 88% -4 Bolivia 68% 75% -7 El Salvador 59% 67% -8 Peru 61% 72% -11 Costa Rica 72% 84% -12 Guatemala 46% 59% -13 Nicaragua 58% 73% -15 Latin America 61% 77% -16 Uruguay 75% 91% -16 Argentina 66% 83% -17 Colombia 60% 78% -18 Mexico 49% 67% -18 Panama 61% 79% -18 Ecuador 64% 83% -19 Paraguay 49% 68% -19 Honduras 53% 74% -21 Chile 63% 85% -22 Dominican Republic 63% 85% -22 Brazil 54% 81% -27
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Index of democracy
In a bid to achieve a more comprehensive measurement of the components of democracy, this report also presents a sturdier index built using not only the question about support for democracy but also questions about the legitimacy of congress and political parties as central institutional pillars of democracy. Legitimacy of congress Since 2001, the legitimacy of the National Congress has shown a sustained increase, rising from 49% to 59% in 2010.

27

WITHOUT CONGRESS THERE CAN BE NO DEMOCRACY


TOTAL LATINA AMERICA 1997 - 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Some people say that without a National Congress there can be no democracy, while others say that democracy can work without a National Congress. Which is closer to your view? *Here only Without a National Congress, there can be no democracy

Source: Latinobarmetro 1997 - 2010.

Legitimacy of political parties Similarly, there has also been a sustained increased in the legitimacy of political parties since 2001. This rose to a peak of 60% in 2009, up from 49% in 2001, before dropping to 59% in 2010.
WITHOUT POLITICAL PARTIES THERE CAN BE NO DEMOCRACY
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1997 - 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Some people say that without political parties there can be no democracy, while others say that democracy can work without parties. Which is closer to your view? * Here only 'Without political parties there can be no democracy.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1997 - 2010.

28

These two results for congress and political parties show how advances in democracy can be sustained over time. They are, however, slow and there are no sudden changes. It could be argued that it is the sum of continuous sustained, but not spectacular, increases over a range of indicators that slowly produces the consolidation of our democracies. In other words, this requires systemic impacts affecting many factors in the way in which society functions. This data shows how premature many analysts were in thinking that a single reform - for example, macroeconomic reform or reform of public policies such as education or justice - could produce discrete effects on the evolution of democracies. Instead, it supports a more evolutionary hypothesis of slow and gradual transformation and consolidation where small setbacks in some areas occur at the same time as progress in others. The index of democracy is based on answers to these three questions which are classified in three categories (high, medium and low) indicating a high, medium or low level of legitimacy of democracy. The high category implies that people not only support democracy but also think that congress and political parties are essential elements. By contrast, those people for whom democracy has a low level of legitimacy do not support it and do not consider congress and political parties indispensable to it. Democracy has low legitimacy among 22% of the regions inhabitants and a medium level among 46% while it reaches a high level of legitimacy among 32%. In the region, the index has an average value of ten points which implies that there are 10% more citizens for whom it has high legitimacy than those whom it has low legitimacy. In 16 out of the 18 countries surveyed, around half the population considers democracy to have a medium level of legitimacy. The countries where most of the population takes this view are, in turn, those where the smallest percentage consider it to have high legitimacy and the largest percentage consider it to have low legitimacy.

When calculating the net value or, that is, the difference between high and low, we find positive results for 12 of the region's countries and negative results for six (Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, Brazil, Guatemala and Ecuador).

29

Table N 8: Index of democracy High 59% 54% 44% 41% 40% 39% 32% 32% 31% 30% 30% 28% 26% 23% 23% 21% 21% 20% 20% Medium 35% 34% 42% 47% 41% 45% 43% 46% 45% 46% 49% 51% 48% 48% 49% 47% 49% 55% 55% Low 6% 12% 15% 12% 19% 16% 24% 22% 24% 24% 21% 21% 26% 29% 28% 32% 31% 25% 25% Net (High minus Low) 53 42 29 29 21 23 8 10 7 6 9 7 0 -6 -5 -11 -10 -5 -5

Venezuela Uruguay Argentina Costa Rica Chile Dominican Rep. Honduras Latin America Peru Nicaragua El Salvador Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Guatemala Brazil Mexico Paraguay Panama
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

The two countries in which the largest percentage of the population sees democracy as having low legitimacy are Brazil (32%) and Mexico (31%). In Brazil, this is in marked contrast with the result for the Churchillian indicator of democracy (81%). When other components of democracy such as political parties and congress are considered, Brazil is one of the countries most critical of it, a fact not revealed by the Churchillian definition. Another noteworthy case is Venezuela where a majority of the population considers democracy to have high legitimacy - or, in other words, sees political parties and congress as indispensable - and support is high and, moreover, the net result is the highest in the region. As noted above, Venezuela is the region's most controversial country as regards the quality of its democracy. Each year, however, Latinobarmetro has consistently shown the large percentage of Venezuelans among whom support for democracy is high. These are independent samples taken by different companies over time and the probability that this is an error is negligible since they would all have had to be wrong and with the same bias. Attitudes towards democracy In this section, we examine other important aspects of democracy and analyze a number of different attitudes that, from the point of view of the consolidation of democracy, have evolved in the correct direction.

30

Interests of the majority In 2002, we measured public perception of whether government decisions seek to benefit only a few people and the result was discouraging, with 78% considering this to be the case. However, in 2010, when we again asked this question, the figure dropped to 60%, down by 18 points on 2002. There are, nonetheless, important differences between countries, ranging from a very high 75% in Argentina to 42% in Uruguay.
THE DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT SEEK TO PRIVILEGE THE FEW LATIN AMERICA 2002 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? The decisions of the government seek to privilege the few * Here only strongly agree more agree.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002 - 2010

We also find an identical result in a second question in which 60% of the regions inhabitants say that some people or groups have so much influence that the interests of the majority are ignored.
SOME PEOPLE AND/OR GROUPS HAVE SO MUCH INFLUENCE, THAT THE INTEREST OF MAJORITY IS IGNORED.
TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? Some people or groups have so much influence that the interests of the majority are ignored *Here only strongly agree more agree.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

31

Since 2004, Latinobarmetro has measured perceptions as to whether the government acts for the good of all. This view increased from 24% in 2004 to 33% in 2009 but dropped again to 30% in 2010.

COUNTRY GOVERNED FOR A FEW POWERFUL GROUPS


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2004-2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Generally speaking, will you say that (country) is governed for a few powerful groups in their own benefit, or is governed for the common well of all? *Here only Powerful groups in their own benefit.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2004 - 2010.

Summary: Although the perception that governments act on behalf of the majority has gained ground over the past decade, it still extends to only a minority of the population and the vast majority continues to believe that they do not govern for the good of all. Attitudes towards the media In the case of attitudes towards the media, we find correct views on freedom of expression. In answer to the question of whether the media should be able to publish without fear of closure, 75% in 2009 and 78% in 2010 replied positively. This question was asked given the conflicts that have existed in the region about press freedom and the way in which this is exercised. A number of presidents have had serious conflicts with a particular media organization or with all of them, as discussed by Daniel Zovatto in his chapter below. This has triggered debate about the limits of the media and the population is clearly on their side.

32

MEDIA CAN PUBLISH NEWS WITHOUT BEING AFRAID TO GET CLOSED TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2009-2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? The medias can publish news with out being afraid to be closed. *Here only Strongly agree and Agree.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2009 2010.

In response to a second question about whether the president should control the media, we find that an important minority - around a third of the population - supports this view. This has, however, dropped from 35% in 2008 to 29% in 2010, evolving in the right direction.

THE PRESIDENT CONTROLS MEDIA


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2002 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? The president controls the media *Here only Strongly agree and Agree.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002 - 2010.

Attitudes towards authoritarianism 33

The survey included three questions about authoritarianism of which the results are set out below. The last military government In 2010, Latinobarmetro included for the first time a question on evaluation of a countrys last military government, with answers indicating whether the region's inhabitants have a good or bad opinion of these governments. The date of the last military government varies enormously by country so some experiences and perceptions are, therefore, fresher than others. The date at which democracy was restored is shown in the following table.

Table N 9: Date of transition Year Country 1990 Chile 1989 Panama, Paraguay 1985 Brazil, Guatemala, Uruguay 1984 El Salvador 1983 Argentina 1982 Bolivia, Honduras 1980 Peru 1979 Ecuador, Nicaragua, 1978 Dominican Republic 1977* Mexico 1958 Venezuela 1957 Colombia 1949** Costa Rica
* Mexico had its first elected president in 1977 but its last authoritarian government as such dates back to the 19th century (Porfirio Daz). ** In the case of Costa Rica, 1949 is taken because it is the year, after the Civil War, that is used as the reference for the start of modern democracy, independently of the precedents to this episode. Costa Rica has not experienced authoritarianism with military government.

The country where opinion of the last authoritarian regime is highest is Colombia, with 45% expressing a good or very good opinion, while Bolivia is the country where this is lowest (8%).

34

OPINION ABOUT THE LAST MILITARY GOVERNMENT


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. What is your opinion about the last Military Government? Would you say that it was very good, good, about average, bad or very bad? * Here only very good and good.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

In some countries, there is a certain correlation between positive opinions of the last military government and rejection of this form of government. Rejection is highest in Costa Rica (90%), which has never had a military government, and it is followed by Bolivia (74%) and Uruguay (72%). In other countries, however, correlation between answers to the two questions is not seen.
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES I SUPPORT A MILITARY GOVERNMENT TOTALS LATIN AMERICA 2004 - 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Would you support a military government if things get very difficult, or would you never, under any circumstances support a military government? * Here only never would support.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2004 - 2010

While observing some positive indicators of the consolidation of democracy, we also find setbacks in others. Between 2009 and 2010, there was, for example, an increase from 30% to 39% in Latin Americans who consider that in a difficult situation it's acceptable to bypass the law. These authoritarian attitudes reach a worrying 60% in the Dominican Republic but only 25% in Bolivia. 35

WHEN THERE IS DIFFICULT SITUATION ITS OK TO ACT ABOVE THE LAW


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2001-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? When there is a difficult situation in (country), it is ok if the government acts above the law, the parliament and other institutions to solve the problems *Here only Strongly agree and Agree.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2001-2010.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMY In this section, we examine the evolution of satisfaction with democracy and the economy. The question about satisfaction with democracy is the one that has most often been asked in public opinion studies. It is a standardized indicator and perhaps the only one used extensively by researchers around the world to measure satisfaction with democracy. At any time, results for this indicator can be compared in some 90 countries. Satisfaction with democracy In Latin America, satisfaction with democracy reached a peak of 44% in 2009, its highest level since measurements began in 1995. In 2010, it remains at this high level, confirming its sustained increase since 2001 (a crisis year) when it dropped to 25%.

36

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1995 2010.
Q. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the working of the democracy in (country)?

100 90 80
69

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
1995 1996 1997

65 56 41 60 60 60

66

65

61

56

58

59

59 51 52

38 27

37

36 25 10

38 32 28 29 31

37

37 44 44

4
1998

4
19992000 2001

4
2006

4
2007

4
2008

4
2009

4
2010

2002

2003

2004

2005

DNA/DNK
Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010.

Satisfied

Dissatisfied

In one key result, this indicator shows that, since 1995, there have been an important number of dissatisfied democrats in Latin America. This fluctuated from a peak of 34% of the regions inhabitants in 1996 to a low of 15% in 2009 before rising again slightly to 17% in 2010. In other regions of the world, when comparing support for and satisfaction with democracy, we find that there are around 20% of dissatisfied democrats, a figure that serves as a benchmark.

Table N 10: Dissatisfied democrats, 1995 -2010 Support for Satisfaction Dissatisfied democracy with Democrats democracy 1995 58% 38% 20 1996 61% 27% 34 1997 63% 41% 22 1998 62% 37% 25 2000 57% 36% 21 2001 48% 25% 23 2002 56% 32% 24 2003 53% 28% 25 2004 53% 29% 24 2005 53% 31% 22 2006 58% 38% 20 2007 54% 37% 17 2008 57% 37% 20 2009 59% 44% 15 2010 61% 44% 17
Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010

37

It is, in a way, healthy that there are dissatisfied democrats since this implies that democracy is under constant pressure to improve. The country with the most dissatisfied democrats is Bolivia (36%), followed by Venezuela (35%) and Peru (33%). This last result is a paradox since Peru is one of the Latin American countries that has experienced the highest economic growth in recent years but is, nonetheless, one of the most dissatisfied with democracy. Economic growth has not, in other words, brought political benefits for Peru. This indicator also provides an insight into democrats in Venezuela where, although democracy has a high level of legitimacy, there is also one of the regions highest percentages of dissatisfied democrats.

Table N 11: Dissatisfied democrats by country, 2010 Support for Satisfaction Dissatisfied democracy with democrats democracy Bolivia 68% 32% 36 Venezuela 84% 49% 35 Peru 61% 28% 33 Dominican Rep. 63% 39% 24 Nicaragua 58% 36% 22 Mexico 49% 27% 22 Colombia 60% 39% 21 Guatemala 46% 28% 18 Honduras 53% 35% 18 Latin America 61% 44% 17 Argentina 66% 49% 17 El Salvador 59% 43% 16 Ecuador 64% 49% 15 Paraguay 49% 35% 14 Costa Rica 72% 61% 11 Chile 63% 56% 7 Panama 61% 56% 5 Brazil 54% 49% 5 Uruguay 75% 78% -3
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Finally, analysis of satisfaction with democracy as compared to GDP growth shows that, as from 2007, while the latter decreases, the former increases. By contrast, during the Asian crisis, both indicators moved in the same direction, albeit with a lag. The consolidation of Latin American democracies has progressed a great deal since the Asian crisis. Societies and countries have been transformed in such a way that the aggregate impact of reforms is beginning to have positive effects on democracy's image and the way in which it performs. The 38

sustained increase in satisfaction with democracy provides a positive picture of increased consistency between peoples demands and government response. What this indicator tells us is that there are ever more governments doing a good job. Comparison with Latinobarmetros results since 1995 shows that Latin American countries have been better governed in the past three years. In the midst of an economic crisis, democracy increased its support while evaluation of its performance held steady. In this sense the Inter-American Development Bank was right when it ventured to suggest that this will be Latin America's decade. If things continue as they are, this prophecy could be fulfilled.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH LATIN AMERICA1995 2010
Q. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the working of the democracy in (country)? * Here only 'Very satisfied' and quite satisfied.

Satisfaction with democracy

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

38

41 27 3,8

37 36 2,3 0,9 -1,3 -2,3 25 33

37 38 37 5,5 4,7 3,1 29 4,4 29 31 4 3 0,4

8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999- 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2000 Satisfied Per Capita GDP Growth

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010

Satisfaction with the economy Unlike support for and satisfaction with democracy, satisfaction with the economy reflects the impact of the economic crisis. Both in 2000 and 2001 as between 2006 and 2008 - or, in other words, the two crises in the last 15 years - satisfaction with the economy decreased very significantly, with lows of 16% in 2003 and 22% in 2008. Since 2008 it has, however, begun to recover, reaching 29% in 2009 and 30% in 2010.

39

Per Capita GDP Growth

44

44

10

SATISFACTION WITH ECONOMY

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2002-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010


Q. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the working of the economy in (country)? * Here only 'Very satisfied' and quite satisfied'

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002-2010

Uruguay is the country where satisfaction with the economy is highest (54%), followed by Chile (49%) and Brazil (47%). It is lowest in Mexico (17%) and Guatemala, El Salvador and Peru (all with 18%). Dissatisfaction in Peru is particularly worrying since it has one of the highest average economic growth rates of recent years. At the same time, the perception that wealth is unfairly distributed is among the most prevalent in the region. In other words, Peruvians' complaint is not about the amount of wealth, but rather the way in which it is distributed. As seen above, Peru is also one of the countries with most dissatisfied democrats.

DEMOCRACY AND CHANGE OF POWER: The case of Chile Annual data by country shows that support for democracy is fairly closely linked to the years political, economic and social events in that country. Over the years, Latinobarmetro has tracked the role of economic growth, finding that this has recently been rather relative and, as from the latest crisis, appears to change, with a drop in the impact of economic events on support for democracy. The effect of political events, on the other hand, appears to have increased in recent years. As regards political events, there is, firstly, the impact of elections. Over the past 15 years, Latinobarmetro has often found and recorded in its reports that, when there are elections in a country, support for democracy is boosted, although in most cases only temporarily. In other words, electoral processes have a passing effect in increasing perception of democracy in a country. This explains in part the volatility shown by this indicator. Secondly, there have been structural reforms in some of the region's countries where new constitutions have been written. In these cases, we have seen and recorded the important nontemporary increase in support for democracy that some of these processes have produced. The case of 40

Bolivia stands out. The structural transformations introduced by President Evo Morales have changed the way its citizens view democracy. In Bolivia, support for democracy has risen from 45% in 2004 to 68% in 2010. The case of Ecuador is different because, although there is an increase in support, this is very volatile, indicating that the positive impact is not stable and suffers setbacks from one year to the next. All in all, Ecuador, with its process of approving a new constitution, showed through an uprising in 2010, which some termed coup, that it has important pending institutional issues. These include freedom of expression in the context of a new law on this matter. Paradoxically in 2010 - the same year as this confused incident - support for democracy in Ecuador reached 64%, 13 points above its average for the last 14 years. In Brazil, during President Lula's second term, there was also an increase from a worrying 30% support in 2001, its lowest point, to 54% in 2010. Brazil is one case where, without structural reform, the government was able to change the degree of political and social inclusion of the country's most excluded citizens and this is also reflected in the data. The case of Venezuela has been extensively analyzed in previous reports and is not examined here in particular nor is it this reports purpose to analyze countries like Uruguay, Costa Rica and Argentina which have enjoyed high sustained support for democracy. In this survey, we also observe a third factor that produces a substantial change in attitudes towards democracy. This is the case of Chile where there is a change of power and the right returns to office after 50 years. This factor is additional to the two reasons for definitive advances in the consolidation of democracy discussed above. In summary, these 15 years of data indicate that there are three reasons for which countries change their original position regarding democracy: 1. Processes of structural changes in societies and discreet progress in the rules of the game through constitutional reform and framework laws as, for example, in Bolivia; 2. Leaders that produce political goods in terms of inclusion for a large sector of the population historically excluded from citizenship, whether because of political or socioeconomic factors, as in the case of Brazil; 3. A change of power which, in our view, the case of Chile suggests should also be considered an important instrument for the consolidation of democracy.

41

Table N 12: Support for democracy, 1996-2010


1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Difference 2009 2010 Avera ge 1996 2010 Average difference 2010

Venezuela Ecuador Brazil Colombia Chile Bolivia Peru El Salvador Guatemala Paraguay Honduras Panama Nicaragua Argentina Mexico Costa Rica Dominican Rep.

62% 52% 50% 60% 54% 64% 63% 56% 51% 59% 42% 75% 59% 71% 53% 80% NA

64% 41% 50% 69% 61% 66% 60% 66% 48% 44% 63% 71% 68% 75% 52% 83% NA

60% 57% 48% 55% 53% 55% 63% 79% 54% 51% 57% 71% 72% 73% 51% 69% NA 80%

61% 54% 39% 50% 57% 62% 64% 63% 45% 48% 64% 62% 64% 71% 45% 83% NA 84%

57% 75% 40% 49% 30% 37% 36% 39% 45% 50% 54% 56% 62% 57% 25% 40% 33% 45% 35% 45% 57% 57% 34% 55% 43% 63% 58% 65% 46% 63% 71% 77% NA NA 79% 78%

67% 46% 35% 46% 51% 50% 52% 45% 33% 40% 55% 51% 51% 68% 53% 77% NA 78%

74% 46% 41% 46% 57% 45% 45% 50% 35% 39% 46% 64% 39% 64% 53% 67% 65% 78%

76% 43% 37% 46% 59% 49% 40% 59% 32% 32% 33% 52% 57% 65% 59% 73% 60% 77%

70% 54% 46% 53% 56% 62% 55% 51% 41% 41% 51% 55% 56% 74% 54% 75% 71% 77%

67% 65% 43% 47% 46% 67% 47% 38% 32% 33% 38% 62% 61% 63% 48% 83% 64% 75%

82% 56% 47% 62% 51% 68% 45% 50% 34% 53% 44% 56% 58% 60% 43% 67% 73% 79%

84% 43% 55% 49% 59% 71% 52% 68% 42% 46% 55% 64% 55% 64% 42% 74% 67% 82%

84% 64% 54% 60% 63% 68% 61% 59% 46% 49% 53% 61% 58% 66% 49% 72% 63% 75%

0% 21% -1% 11% 4% -3% 9% -9% 4% 3% -2% -3% 3% 2% 7% -2% -4% -7%

70% 51% 44% 51% 54% 60% 55% 54% 41% 44% 51% 60% 57% 67% 51% 75% 66% 79%

14% 13% 10% 9% 9% 8% 6% 6% 5% 5% 2% 2% 1% -1% -2% -3% -3% -4%

80% 86% Uruguay Source: Latinobarmetro 1996-2010

Support for democracy and change of power in Chile, 2010 The case of Chile is interesting because it shows very clearly the importance of a change of power as an instrument of democratization. Many of democracy's analysts have described Latin American democracies as electoral democracies. The example of Chile shows that it is not elections that make the difference but rather who is elected. The issue is who has power. Chile's case is relevant not only for this debate but also for discussion about whether the word democracy should be used or not to measure it empirically, due to the practical difficulties of knowing what interviewees actually understand by this word. In our view, the population has a quite correct understanding of democracy if its faith in democracy increases when there is a change of power. This is an empirical demonstration that understanding of democracy does not have empirical problems and it may be analysts, rather than the population, that are confused. In 2010, support for democracy in Chile reaches its highest level (63%) since 1995. The survey was carried out ten months after the election that produced the change of power when, in other words, its immediate positive impact had already had time to wane. Support for authoritarianism in Chile has also decreased from a maximum of 19% in 1996 to 11% in 2010. This was its lowest level apart from 2009 (10%) when the survey was carried in September in 42

the midst of the first-round election campaign in the knowledge that, as Latinobarmetro has frequently shown over the years, campaigns generally have a passing positive impact on support for democracy. In this case, however, the result seems to be not so temporary in that the data for 2010 confirms the drop in support for authoritarianism seen in 2009. In the interests of caution, it is always advisable to wait for a third point in a trend before declaring it definitive, but the data already suggests that the next measurement will confirm the trend. A third important indicator is that, in 2010, only 22% of Chileans say they are indifferent to the form of government, down from 25% in 2009. In other words, a year after the election of Chiles first right-wing president in 50 years, support for democracy, at 63%, reaches its highest level while support for authoritarianism reaches only 11% and indifference to the form of government drops to 22%. The quality of Chilean democracy is, in other words, at its highest level since measurements began. This is an extraordinary fact from all points of view since the leaders of the coalition that was elected include figures who participated in Augusto Pinochets authoritarian regime (1973-1990). The suspicion that the authoritarian right, which participated in the dictatorship and is now part of the government, could negatively influence the view Chileans take of democracy is not borne out by these results. It is, without doubt, important in the opposition's discourse and political events but does not have an impact on support for democracy. It is not trivial that the participation of people involved in an authoritarian government does not have an impact because it implies that institutions and their functioning guarantee citizens the proper rule of law. These results are even more important because the government of President Michelle Bachelet (20062010) did not have a positive effect on support for democracy. At the beginning of her government, this reached 56% but dropped to 46% in 2007 (its lowest point since measurements began) before recovering to 51% in 2008 and 59% during the 2009 presidential campaign. In 2007, the survey took place just as the crisis was beginning and its impact on support for democracy was a paradox because it is at odds with the fact that a country with good macroeconomic management and one of the regions most solid economies was on a strong footing to face a crisis. Moreover, it shows clearly that the impact of crises on democracy depends on governments' capacity to react correctly in line with the population's expectations. In 2008 and 2009, countercyclical economic policies clearly meant a relative improvement in citizens economic situation and, at same time, restored the higher support for democracy that had been lost in previous years.

43

Table N 13: Support for democracy in Chile, 1995-2010 Democracy is Authoritarian Indifferent to preferable to any government kind of other kind of government government 1995 52% 18% 25% 1996 54% 19% 23% 1997 61% 16% 20% 1998 53% 16% 29% 2000 57% 17% 26% 2001 45% 19% 28% 2002 50% 14% 30% 2003 51% 14% 32% 2004 57% 14% 27% 2005 59% 11% 25% 2006 56% 13% 26% 2007 46% 21% 29% 2008 51% 14% 30% 2009 59% 10% 25% 2010 63% 11% 22%
Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010

DNK/DNA

4% 3% 2% 2% 3% 8% 5% 4% 3% 6% 5% 5% 6% 6% 4%

When comparing support for democracy with GDP, we find that countercyclical economic policies resulted in growing support for democracy between 2007 and 2009 while GDP growth was decreasing. Chile had already seen a sustained increase in support for democracy between 2001 (45%) and 2005 (59%) but, in this period of GDP growth, had not been able to match the peak of 61% recorded in 1997. In other words, economic growth did not suffice. Moreover, in 2006, a presidential election year, support for democracy dropped, rather than increasing. Everything indicates that, in 2005/ 2006/2007, Chilean democracy was experiencing a bad moment since support dropped to 46%.

44

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND PIB PER CPITA CHILE 1995 2010
Q. With which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; For people like me, it doesnt matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime; DNK/DNA. *Here only Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government

70 60
Support for Democracy
52 54

53

57 50 4.5 45 3.4 2.2 3.9 51

57

56 51 4.6 46 3.7 4.6

8
4.3

50 40 30 20 10 0

5.6

6 4 2 0

-1.5

-2 -4

1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Support in Chile Crecimiento PIB per cpita

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010 CEPAL, 2010. Estudio econmico 2009-2010

The case of Chile is particularly interesting because the development of its economy and the growth rates and reforms which led to the success of 20 years of Concertacin governments, with a decrease in the poverty rate from 40% to 13% and healthy macroeconomic fundamentals, did not achieve what the change of power did in finally convincing a number of potential democrats. Why did support for democracy not increase significantly during 20 years of center-left government? To start with, this data shows that a change of power was a missing ingredient. Nonetheless, beyond this good moment, it is clear that the potential impact of this change of power is limited. Inequalities in Chile still have to be dismantled as this same data shows. Chile still has important pending tasks for the definitive consolidation of its democracy.

Satisfaction with democracy and the economy: The case of Chile We find that satisfaction with democracy increases or holds steady in eight countries. The increase is particularly marked in two countries - Ecuador, with 16 percentage points, and Argentina, with 13 points - whereas, in Bolivia, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, it decreases by 18, 17 and 14 points, respectively, and, in nine countries, remains at its level in 2009. As compared to its historical average for the last 14 years, satisfaction with democracy has increased by between two and 18 percentage points in 11 countries. It can, therefore, be said that, over time, satisfaction with democracy has increased more than support for democracy. On average, out of the 18 countries, the increase reached nine percentage points.

45

PIB per cpita Chile

61

59

59

63

10

Table N 14: Satisfaction with democracy by country, 1995- 2010 (%)


1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Bolivia El Salvador Dominican Rep. Panama Colombia Guatemala Costa Rica Mexico Uruguay Latin America Nicaragua Brazil Paraguay Venezuela Chile Honduras Peru Argentina 25 26 NA 28 16 16 51 11 52 27 23 20 22 30 27 20 28 34 34 48 NA 39 40 40 68 45 64 41 50 23 16 35 37 50 21 42 34 48 NA 34 24 57 54 21 68 37 27 27 24 35 32 37 17 49 33 22 27 NA 47 27 35 61 37 69 36 16 18 12 55 35 44 24 46 23 16 21 NA 21 10 16 51 26 55 25 24 21 10 41 23 35 16 20 15 24 38 NA 44 11 35 75 18 53 32 59 21 7 40 27 62 18 8 16 25 33 NA 24 22 21 47 18 43 28 31 28 9 38 33 37 11 34 23 16 37 36 35 30 21 48 17 45 29 20 28 13 42 40 30 7 34 14 24 37 43 20 29 28 39 24 63 31 18 22 17 56 43 26 13 34 14 39 25 49 40 33 31 48 41 66 38 26 36 12 57 42 34 23 50 22 41 33 49 38 32 30 47 31 66 37 43 30 9 59 36 31 17 33 35 33 38 47 35 44 27 44 23 71 37 39 38 22 49 39 24 16 34 37 50 60 53 61 42 31 63 28 79 44 35 47 33 47 53 31 22 36 33 32 43 39 56 39 28 61 27 78 44 36 49 35 49 56 35 28 49 49
Average 1996 2010 Average difference - 2010 Difference 2009 - 2010

30 37 45 37 29 30 54 26 62 35 32 29 17 45 37 35 19 36 27

2 6 -6 19 11 -2 7 1 16 9 4 20 18 4 19 0 9 13 22

-18 -17 -14 -5 -3 -3 -2 -1 -1 0 1 2 2 2 3 4 6 13 16

Ecuador 34 31 Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010

Finally, the level of satisfaction with democracy is highest in Uruguay (78%) and Costa Rica (61%). A change of power also affects satisfaction with democracy. In 2010, it reached 56% in Chile, its highest level since measurements began. It has been increasing steadily since 2001 (23%), with a drop in 2007 (36%). Comparison of satisfaction with democracy and a country's per capita GDP shows a certain correlation between these two indicators through to 2007 when the situation changes. From then on, while GDP growth suffers an important drop, support for democracy increases to its highest recorded level.

46

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND PIB PER CPITA


CHILE 1995 2010
Q. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the working of the democracy in (country)? *Here only Very satisfied and quite satisfied.

70

10
56

Satisfaction with Democracy in Chile

60 50 40 30 20 10 0
37 33 28 23 28 33 32 33 4.5 3.4 2.2

8 6 4 2 0

5.6 4.6 4.6 3.7

3.9 41 43 42 36

4.3

39

-1.5

-2 -4

1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Satisfaction with Democracy in Chile Crecimiento PIB per cpita

-6

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010 CEPAL, 2010. Estudio econmico 2009-2010

The number of dissatisfied democrats also drops in Chile from a peak of 27% 1996 to 10% in 2010, following a low of 6% in the 2009 election year. Table N 15: Dissatisfied democrats in Chile Support for Satisfaction with Annual GDP democracy democracy variation 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 52% 54% 61% 53% 57% 45% 50% 51% 57% 59% 56% 46% 51% 59% 63% 33% 27% 37% 32% 35% 23% 27% 33% 40% 43% 42% 36% 39% 53% 56% Dissatisfied democrats 19 27 24 21 22 22 23 18 17 16 14 10 12 6 10

4.5% 3.4% 2.2% 3.9% 6% 5.6% 4.6% 4,6% 3,7% -1,5% 4,3%

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995-2010 CEPAL 2010, Estudio Econmico 2009-2010 y CEPAL, Precios Constantes 2000.

Churchillian democracy: The case of Chile In other indicators of democracy, such as its Churchillian definition, Chile not only leads Latin America in 2010 but also reaches its highest level since measurements started in 2002. Its figure of 85% in 2010 represented an increase of nine points on 2009 and was eight points above the regional average of 77%. 47

PIB per cpita Chile

53

CHURCHILLIAN DEMOCRACY
CHILE 2002 2010. TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements? ? Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government * Here only 'Strongly agree' and agree.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002-2010.

Capacity of the state to solve problems The change of power has a positive effect across many areas. These include the image of the state with an increase to 20% in 2010, up from 8% in 2009, in those who believe that the state can solve problems. THE STATE CAN SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS
CHILE 1998-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. It is said that the state can solve the problems of our society because it has the means to do it. Would you say that the state can solve ...? All problems, Most problems, Enough problems, Only a few problems, The state can not solve any problem? *Here only All problems.

25 20 20 17 15 13 12

10

8 7

11 8

0
1998 2000 2003 2005 2007 2009 2010

Chile

Latin America

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998-2010.

Summary: In many areas, Chile demonstrates the impact of a change of power, reaching its best moment as regards the legitimacy of democracy since Latinobarmetro measurements began. In our view, this case shows that a change of power can be added to structural reforms and the creation of political goods as instruments of the consolidation of democracy. There would, therefore, be three factors which, according to empirical evidence, contribute to the consolidation of democracies: structural reforms, political goods and change of power. 48

POLITICS As has become traditional, this section of the report begins with an introduction by Daniel Zovatto, a member of Latinobarmetros Advisory Council and director for Latin America at International IDEA. It provides the context for analysis of the impact of politics in the light of events during 2010. POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL OVERVIEW, 2010 - Daniel Zovatto in collaboration with
Rogelio Nuez

Pragmatism, moderation and continuity I. INTRODUCTION Between 2009 and 2012, all the regions countries, except for Paraguay, celebrated or will celebrate presidential and legislative elections. In particular, 2010 was a very intense year, with 13 electoral processes, including four presidential elections: 1. Chile, second round, January 17 2. Costa Rica, February 7 3. Colombia, first and second round, May 30 and June 20 4. Brazil, first and second round, October 3 and 31. There were, in addition, three legislative elections that did not coincide with presidential elections: in Colombia on March 14, two months before the first round of the presidential election; in the Dominican Republic on May 16; and, in Venezuela where mid-term elections took place on September 26. In the other six cases, the elections were municipal and/or regional: Bolivia (April 4), Uruguay (May 9), Peru (October 3), Paraguay (November 7) and Costa Rica (December 5) as well as the 13 state elections held in Mexico in July. It should be noted that municipal elections, particularly those in capital cities, are acquiring ever more national importance, with a significant political impact, since election as mayor in a capital city serves as a stepping stone for a future presidential candidacy. A. Shift to the center The elections held in 2010 took place in a context characterized by: 1. A positive economic situation that favored pragmatic and moderate proposals located in the center of the political spectrum. Although regional GDP fell by almost 2% in 2009, growth is expected to reach over 5% in 2010 and between 4% and 5% in 2011, according to ECLAC and the IMF. 2. Both presidential and legislative elections took place in countries whose presidents mostly enjoyed or enjoy a high level of popularity which generally benefitted the candidates of the incumbent party or coalition. The elections of 2010 must, however, also be analyzed in the light of events in 2009, which was marked by: 1) the consolidation of the so-called shift to the left and 2) the advance of center-right alternatives. The shift to the left persisted in 2009 thanks to the re-election of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia as well as the victories of Jos Mjica in Uruguay and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador and of Venezuelas Hugo Chvez in the referendum on the indefinite re-election of the president, lower-house representatives, governors and mayors. 49

In 2009, Latin Americas characteristic political diversity was also apparent and this goes beyond the so-called shift to the left. Firstly, the shift to the left is itself very plural (Mjica or Funes represent a very different type of left from Chvez, Morales or Correa). Secondly, there are a number of processes in the region that correspond to a center-right tendency such as the PAN governments in Mexico (as from 2000) or Uribism in Colombia (as from 2002). In 2009, in addition to these two phenomena, there were the victories of the right-wing Ricardo Martinelli in Panama and the conservative Porfirio Lobo in Honduras. This shift to the right, or shift to the center as it has also been called, continued in 2010 with the victories of Sebastin Piera in Chile, Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia and Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica. Again, however, generalizations are misleading in Latin America since Dilma Rousseff, the political heir of Lula da Silva and the candidate of the left-wing PT, won the second round of the elections in Brazil on October 31. In other words, we again see, as stated in our 2009 report, that in Latin America, political pragmatism and the circumstances of each country appear to prevail over dogmatism.
B. Results in presidential elections

In the six elections that took place in 2009, there was a second round only in Uruguay. However, in 2010, this was required in three of the four presidential elections - Chile, Colombia and Brazil while, in Costa Rica, the contest was decided in the first round. In 2009, there were clear signs of both political continuity and change. Presidential continuity was seen in the re-election of Morales and Correa as well as in the Venezuelan referendum authorizing the indefinite re-election of the president and, in the case of party continuity, in the victory of the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, which had also triumphed in 2004. At the same time, however, there were also significant changes such as the end of the ARENA era (1989-2009) in El Salvador, with the victory of the former guerilla FMLN and its candidate, Funes, in the presidential election there, as well the victories of Martinelli in Panama and Lobo in Honduras. In 2010, on the other hand, although there were not re-elections equivalent to those seen in 2009, continuity was apparent in Uribism in Colombia, the PLN in Costa Rica and the PT in Brazil. Government candidates (Santos in Colombia, Chinchilla in Costa Rica and Rousseff in Brazil) triumphed in presidential elections with support from their countries incumbent presidents (lvaro Uribe in Colombia, scar Arias in Costa Rica and Luiz Incio Lula da Silva in Brazil). In this context, it is, however, important to note the failure of Uribes attempt to seek re-election for a third consecutive period and Lula da Silvas decision to renounce any temptation to bend the constitution so as to be able to run again. Chile was the only country in which there was a change of power in 2010. The right returned to office after 50 years since this was the first time it had won an election since 1958, putting an end to 20 years of government by the center-left Concertacin coalition. Sebastin Piera defeated Eduardo Frei in the second round, taking 51.6% of the vote to his rivals 48.3%. This followed a first round that included three candidates from the ranks of Concertacin, two who had previously resigned from their parties as well as the official nominee. This divided the vote with 20% for one of the outside candidates (Marco Enrquez-Ominami) and 29% for Frei. 50

The second presidential election of the year took place in Costa Rica in February when Laura Chinchilla, the political heir of President scar Arias (2006-2010) took 46.7% of the vote in the first round, defeating the two candidates who represented change: Ottn Sols of the center-left Partido Accin Ciudadana, (PAC), who took 25.17%, and Otto Guevara of the right-wing Movimiento Libertario, with 20.82%. The third presidential election of 2010 was held in Colombia. Until February, there was a possibility that President lvaro Uribe would run for a third term, after his election in 2002 and re-election in 2006. However, the countrys Constitutional Tribunal rejected the Referendum Law that would have allowed him to stand. Juan Manuel Santos, Uribes former defense minister and the heir to Uribism, then launched a new campaign for the election in May. The big surprise of the campaign was Antanas Mockus of the Partido Verde who rose to second place in the polls ahead of the conservative Noem Sann, who had been widely expected to be Santoss main rival. In the space of two months, Mockus rose from a mere 3% in the polls to over 20%. As the election approached, however, he lost momentum but still forced a second round, taking 21.5% of the first-round vote to the 46.6% that put Santos just short of outright victory. In the second round, Santos took an overwhelming 69% while Mockus, who had refused to establish alliances for the run-off, obtained 25.5%. It should be noted that, in Colombia, polls did not accurately predict the election result because they failed to capture the rise and fall of this outside candidate and, up to the last minute, created an illusion as to the capacity of Mockus to narrow his gap with Santos. In Brazil, President Lula da Silva used his popularity (80%), prestige and charisma in favor of his candidate, Dilma Rousseff, who not only closed her gap with Jos Serra, the candidate of the opposition PSDB, but also defeated him in the first round, taking 46.9% of the vote to his 32.6%. However, because she fell short of 50%, a second round was required on October 31 in which she obtained over 55% to Serras 44%. She is the first woman to be elected as president of Brazil and, in her first speech, noted that it is a sign of the countrys progress that, for the first time, it will be led by a woman. She was also the second woman to be elected in 2010 after Chinchilla in Costa Rica and, including Argentina and Chile, this means that four women have been elected during the present decade. C. Legislative elections In three countries, there were legislative elections that did not coincide with presidential elections. In Colombia, Uribism gained ground with a victory in the legislative elections of March when its parties (Partido de la U, Conservador and Cambio Radical) obtained 54% of the vote. The left-wing opposition (Polo Democrtico Alternativo) lost seats while two small forces obtained their first seats: the PIN, a group formed by relatives of those sentenced in the parapolitical scandal, and the Partido Verde, led by three former mayors of Bogot, which chose Antanas Mockus as its presidential candidate. In May, the Dominican Republic held mid-term legislative elections in which the party of President Leonel Fernndez (PLD) obtained a large majority. The results were an important setback for the main opposition party (PRD) and consolidated the predominance of the government party. Venezuelas legislative elections (ahead of the presidential election that will take place in 2012) were marked by polarization and the use of the figure of the president as a factor in mobilizing the Chavist election campaign. This transformed the election into a form of plebiscite on the figure of Chvez and 51

the future of his regime as the president himself admitted: We are not fighting here for seats. No, this is a matter of life or death [] What happens on September 26 will have a powerful impact on what happens in the 2012 presidential election''. In 2005, the opposition boycotted the legislative elections and did not present candidates, giving Chavism total control of the National Assembly. In 2010, it managed to unite around the Mesa de Unidad Democrtica (Democratic Unity Roundtable) which brought together both traditional parties (Accin Democrtica, Copei and La Causa R) and new forces (UNT, Primero Justicia, Podemos and Proyecto Venezuela). The government adopted a strategy of running important figures from the regime - either with important government posts or close to Chvez - as its candidates. A third alternative was offered by the center-left Patria Para Todos (PPT), a former government ally, which sought to capture the votes referred to as ni-ni (not one or the other) or, in other words voters considered neither Chavist nor anti-Chavist. As well as its polarization, the campaign was characterized by the use of highly bellicose language. Chavism obtained 46.4% of the vote to the anti-Chavists 48% while the ni-ni vote reached only 2.91%. The PSUV won an absolute majority but the opposition obtained enough seats to prevent Chavism from obtaining the two-thirds of seats (110 representatives) that had been Chvezs declared aim. The results were affected by the Voting and Political Participation Law, passed in December 2009, which gave greater weight to the rural vote - presumably more favorable to the government - as compared to the (more critical) urban vote. As a result, the PSUV electoral alliance took 59% of the seats with 48.5% of the vote. D. Municipal, regional and state elections Bolivia, Uruguay and Peru held municipal and regional elections in 2010. In July, elections also took place in 13 Mexican states in ten of which the Partido de la Revolucin Democrtica (PRI) was victorious. However, in the other three states (Oaxaca, Puebla and Sinaloa), it lost to a coalition formed mainly by the government PAN (center-right) and the opposition PRD (left-wing). At the time of writing this report, municipal elections were still pending in Paraguay (November 7) and Costa Rica (December 5). In Bolivia, the government MAS party achieved an important victory in April when it took six of nine governorships and three of the ten most important mayorships, but lost in La Paz and Santa Cruz. In Uruguay, the government Frente Amplio maintained control of the intendencies of the countrys six most important departments (including Montevideo and Canelones) while the opposition Partido Nacional won the majority of intendencies in the interior of the country (11) and the Partido Colorado obtained only two. In Perus municipal elections, attention focused on who would win in Lima and succeed Luis Castaeda Lossio, the poll frontrunner for the 2011 presidential election, as the citys mayor. In the polls for this municipal election, Lourdes Flores Nano had been in the lead for months, ahead first of Alex Kouri, who was subsequently disqualified, and then of the center-left Susana Villarn. However, in the last month before the election, Villarn climbed spectacularly, reaching Flores Nano and, a week before the election, passing her. The results (a victory in most departments for local movements

52

and parties created exclusively to compete in these elections) show that Peru still lacks a system of structured ideological parties that have a national reach and are firmly implanted. E. Honduras, Cuba and Ecuador In the Latin American context, political events in Honduras, Cuba and Ecuador in 2010 were important for their implications both within and beyond the region. In Honduras, the government of Porfirio Lobo, who was elected in November 2009 and took office in January 2010, was recognized by the UN, Spain and France as well as the majority of the regions countries, which had broken relations with the de facto regime of Roberto Micheletti that took power in the coup against President Manuel Zelaya in June 2009. The reincorporation of Honduras into regional fora has, however, proved a more difficult process since, at the time of writing this report, it remained outside the Organization of American States (OAS). However, the OAS High-Level Commission presented a favorable report noting the normalization of democracy and improvement in human rights seen in Honduras under Lobo. In response to this report, the governments of Mexico and Chile, among others, announced that they would restore formal diplomatic relations with Honduras. However, in October, the OAS secretary general, Jos Miguel Insulza, indicated that Honduras would not be reincorporated into this organization until the Lobo government guaranteed the return of Zelaya to the country and due guarantees of human rights were in place. According to Insulza, there is not total certainty about what would happen to him [Zelaya] if he decided to return to his country. It does not seem reasonable that the main victim of the coup in Honduras is the only person who cannot return to the country without fear of being put in prison. Honduras has, on the other hand, returned to the Central American System of Integration (SICA), despite the opposition of Nicaragua, but continued to face the veto of the member countries of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) - Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela - as well as the adverse vote of Argentina and Brazil. For Cuba, 2010 was a very complex year, both politically and economically. Politically, the death of the imprisoned dissident Orlando Zapata after a hunger strike caused serious difficulties for the Castro regime. The European Union, the United States and Amnesty International condemned his death and a further five dissidents, led by Guillermo Farias, went on hunger strike. Dialogue with the Cuban church then began and led to the release of numerous political prisoners who were received by countries that included Spain and Chile. Internally, changes continued in the regimes structure with the exit from government of important figures such as General Rogelio Acevedo. These transformations in the regimes internal equilibria form part of the important changes that have occurred in recent years, particularly the fall from favor of Carlos Lage and Felipe Prez Roque in 2009. Economically, 2010 brought the most important economic reforms since Ral Castro took power in 2006. In 2011, over 500,000 public jobs are scheduled to be eliminated, rising to one million (25% of all public employees) by 2013. In addition, around 200 forms of self-employment, both private and cooperative, were legalized. Finally, on September 30, Ecuador saw the events described by President Rafael Correas regime as a coup. It was, in fact, a police uprising that degenerated into serious incidents that included an 53

unacceptable and reprehensible attack on the physical safety of the president himself. Independently of differences as to whether this constituted a coup, these events in Quito highlighted the serious problems that Ecuador still faces in the consolidation of its democratic institutions and an excess of personalism - hyperpresidentialism - as well as a high level of political tension and polarization. F. War on drug trafficking, violence and insecurity After what was considered Mexicos annus horribilis in 2009 - an economic crisis with a 7% drop in GDP, AH1N1 influenza, drought and a sharp drop in incoming remittances and tourism - the country continued in 2010 to grapple with the offensive against drug cartels launched in 2006 by President Felipe Caldern. The war between cartels (particularly the fight between and Chapo Guzmn, the latter the leader of the Sinaloa cartel) and clashes between drug traffickers and the security forces have resulted in over 28,000 deaths in recent years, mostly (90%) members of the cartels. Mexicos celebration of its Bicentenary was overshadowed by fears of acts of terrorism by drug traffickers. They were, indeed, a factor in the local elections of July 2010 when they assassinated a candidate for governor in the state of Tamaulipas. The cartels operations are not confined to Mexico but have a regional scope. They are particularly relevant in Central American and Caribbean countries where drug trafficking has ever greater penetration due, among other reasons, to the weakness of these states. Along with drug trafficking, lack of safety also continued to be an important regional issue. It is a concern, to a greater or lesser extent, in all the regions countries and, in all of them, has a central place in the national agenda. This was apparent in the elections held in Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and, even, Brazil. Venezuela - and, particularly, its capital Caracas - has emerged as the regions most unsafe country, with a murder rate of 75 per 100,000 inhabitants (233 per 100,000 in Caracas), figures well above those of Colombia (38 per 100,000) or Mexico (8 per 100,000). G. Freedom of expression In 2010, there was a clear deterioration in the relations of some governments with the media and this added to concern about the state of freedom of the press in the region. In Bolivia, for example, President Evo Morales introduced an anti-racism law that the countrys press considered a form of censorship while, in Venezuela, President Hugo Chvez persisted in his fight with Globovisin as a result of which its two main shareholders, Nelson Mezerhane and Guillermo Zuloaga, were forced to flee to the United States. The Venezuelan state then went on to take over 40% of the private news channels shares after intervening various companies. In Argentina, the government of President Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner entered into a serious dispute with the Clarn group and media such as La Nacin which it accused of having seized the Prensa Papel paper producer in the 1970s, taking advantage of the harassment of its owners by the military regime then in power. In addition, both Kirchnerism and President Rafael Correa in Ecuador introduced press laws that were considered harmful to the press in their countries. Finally, during Brazils election campaign, there was a bitter dispute between President Lula da Silva and media such as O Estado de So Paulo, Folha de So Paulo or the Veja magazine which he accused of inventing stories (in reference to the corruption case involving Erenice Guerra) and of distilling hatred: We are going to defeat some newspapers and magazines that behave as if they 54

were political parties and do not have the courage to say they are a political party and have a candidate. RESULTS, TRENDS AND CHALLENGES Elections have gained strength in the region as the only mechanism for legitimate access to public posts. Over the past decade, elections have, with only very few exceptions, taken place regularly, in a totally normal way and at the scheduled date and their results have been accepted as legitimate by all sides. At the same time, the quality, credibility and legitimacy of election processes has increased significantly. Today, almost all Latin American countries are electoral democracies and, during the present decade, participation in elections has remained at historic averages. Attention has, as a result, turned to mechanisms to guarantee equitable conditions in election contests. Key issues on this new agenda include: 1) campaign and party financing; 2) the threat of penetration of money from drug trafficking and organized crime and the danger of capture of the state; 3) guaranteeing transparency and accountability in the use of money in politics; 4) abusive use of fiscal resources and clientelist use of social programs during election campaigns; 5) the access of parties to fair conditions in the media and its relation to freedom of expression; and, 6) the growing use of new technologies (Facebook, blogs, social networks, Twitter) in election campaigns and difficulties in their regulation and control by the electoral authorities. Election trends in 2010 As regards elections, two trends stood out in Latin America during 2010: The first, with the exception of Chile, was in favor of continuity, as seen in the victory of incumbent parties in Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela - although with important opposition gains - and Brazil. In contrast to 2009, this was, however, continuity without re-election since no head of state opted to remain in the presidency. A change of power in a presidential election was seen only in Chile where the center-left Concertacin coalition was defeated by the center-right Alianza coalition. The second main trend was in favor of political pragmatism, moderation and center options with rejection of extremes on both the right and the left. As seen above, in 2010, the region tended towards moderate center options including the center right (Piera in Chile, Santos in Colombia and the opposition gains in Venezuela), the center (Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica and the PLD in the Dominican Republic) and the center left (Dilma Rousseff in Brazil). This shows that electoral behavior was pragmatic, avoiding radical options and preferring in general (in three out of the four presidential elections or, in other words, 75% of cases) a continuity that guaranteed stability and economic progress. Other important election trends in 2010 were: 1. Strong parliamentary support. In most cases, these new governments also have a sufficient majority in their respective legislatures (Hugo Chvez, Leonel Fernndez and Juan Manuel Santos obtained absolute majorities) although the coalition led by Santos, which controls almost 80% of congress, is very heterogeneous and Chvez failed in his aim of obtaining a two-thirds majority. In Chile, by contrast, the Piera government does not have a sufficient majority and has been obliged to 55

negotiate with the opposition. This is also the case of Chinchilla in Costa Rica who has had to reach agreements with the opposition Movimiento Libertario. Rousseff in Brazil will have a comfortable majority since the coalition that supports her increased its seats in both the senate and congress. 2. Public safety as priority. Public safety emerged as the central issue in Latin American elections. In all the elections held in 2010, this was a feature of the campaigns not only in countries with high levels of violence, such as Colombia or Venezuela, but also in Chile and Costa Rica which have the regions highest safety indicators. 3. Impact of new technologies. Election campaigns in 2009 and 2010 made ever greater use of Internet and social networks (Facebook, Twitter). The first 2.0 election debate (only on Internet) took place in Brazil; Antanus Mockus relied on digital media in his campaign; Hugo Chvez used his Twitter account to send election messages as also did Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner to express her political opinions and send messages to her followers. 4. New leaders. In some of the regions countries, a new political phenomenon also appears to be emerging (represented in Chile by Marco Enrquez-Ominami, in Colombia by Antanas Mockus and, in Brazil, by Marina Silva) that seeks to renew the political system and rejects the party machines that have not perhaps been successful in capturing new sectors of voters. These new leaders appeal to a vote that is clearly juvenile, urban, without defined ideological loyalty, linked to new technologies and with higher education. As well as these trends, it is also important to add a final one: the important (although still insufficient) progress seen in recent years in the participation and representation of women in the regions political and electoral life (women hold around 20% of seats in Latin American parliaments, thanks mainly to gender quotas). Moreover, for the first time in the regions history, 50% of the four presidents elected in 2010 were women: Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil. Challenges These positive results for electoral democracy in Latin America, precisely in the year when the region celebrated its Bicentenary and three decades after the start of the Third Wave, should not allow us to lose sight of the kaleidoscopic reality of the region and the important challenges it still faces. The 18 presidents who, over the past 30 years, were unable to complete their term of office are a warning sign. Indeed, although Latin American democracies have shown their resilience, belying forecasts that they would be short-lived, and have demonstrated unprecedented electoral vitality, it remains true that their consolidation is a far more complex matter requiring a much longer time than originally thought. It is, therefore, important to advance firmly in two directions: on the one hand, creating citizenship (political, civil and social) and, on the other, strengthening the institutional framework of democracy in order to have institutions that are representative, legitimate and effective and players who are committed to them. In other words, both institutions and political leaderships matter, and a great deal, not only for the survival of democracy but also for its quality. This points to the importance of a mixed approach that combines the institutional dimension and the behavior of players since, without doubt, the cultural context and leaderships matter not only when designing institutions but also when managing them and making them work. Strong and representative 56

institutions, accompanied by high-quality leadership and a democratic culture, are the best barrier against anti-politics. As Natalio Botana has warned, many of our democracies have, after three decades of transition, still to lay down roots in the state, society and political parties. We have advanced, with some limitations, to the first threshold, the electoral dimension, where most progress has been achieved. However, there is still a long way to go in consolidating the Republic, the balance of powers and the rule of law. That is why, if we want to advance towards a democracy of quality, it is not enough for governments to be elected democratically but is also important - and very important - that they govern democratically as well. Elections in Latin America, 2010-2012 Country Date of election 2010 Chile January 17 Costa Rica February 7 Colombia March 14 Bolivia April 4 Uruguay May 9 Dominican Republic May 16 Colombia, 1/2 rounds May 30, June 20 Venezuela September 26 Brazil, 1/2 rounds October 3 and 31 Peru October 3 Paraguay November 7 Costa Rica December 5 2011 Peru April Argentina October Guatemala November Nicaragua December Mexico February July-September October-December 2012 Dominican Republic May Mexico July Venezuela December Type of election Presidential Presidential and legislative Legislative and regional Municipal and regional Municipal Legislative Presidential Legislative Presidential and legislative Municipal and regional Municipal Municipal Presidential and legislative Presidential and legislative Presidential and legislative Presidential and legislative Quintana Roo, Baja California Sur and Hidalgo Distrito Federal, Nayarit (July), Coahuila (Sept) Guerrero (Oct), Michoacn (Dec) Presidential Presidential and legislative Presidential

Interest in politics After this interesting electoral overview by Daniel Zovatto, the report continues with the analysis of interest in politics. Despite all the positive developments for democracy, we cannot, in the light of this indicator, say that it is at a good moment. The interest of Latin Americans in politics has remained low ever since Latinobarmetro began to measure it. From 31% interest in 2007, the figure dropped to 30% in 2009 and 26% in 2010. In other 57

words, neither governments good performance nor satisfaction with democracy and the economy have served as a base for improving the image of politics. There are important differences between countries with greater interest in politics in Venezuela (35%), Uruguay (34%) and Brazil (34%) than in Guatemala (17%) where it is the lowest in the region.

INTEREST IN POLITICS
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1995 - 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. How interested are you in politics? Very interested, some interested, few interested, not at all interested. *Here only Very interested and some interested.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995 - 2010

Political cynicism In line with the above, we also see that the indicator of political cynicism, defined as those who say politics in complicated you cant understand it, increases from 51% in 2007 to 54% in 2010. One of the countries where this distance between the population and politics is largest is Bolivia (60%) while it is least in Venezuela (47%). This is one of the indicators showing little variation among countries - just 13 points - and there is, in other words, greater consensus on this point among the inhabitants of different countries.
POLITICAL CYNICISM / POLITIC IS COMPLICATED
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1995 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Some people say that politics is so complicated that people like us often cannot understand what is going on. Others are of the opinion that it is not so complicated and that they can understand what is going on. Which statement is closest to your way of thinking? *Here only politic is compllicated

Source: Latinobarmetro 1995 - 2010

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The vote and the feeling when voting The Asian crisis was the period in which Latin American voted least for a party and this second crisis appears to have had a similar effect in that we see an increase in those who do not vote for any party. This rises from 50% in 2008 to 54% in 2010. This is one of the aspects of attitudes towards politics in which indicators have not improved, highlighting a crucial area of the development of democracy in which there is still an important deficit. As seen above, there is an evident unsatisfied demand for representation of the interests of the majority that is related to this attitude towards parties.

VOTE FOR A POLITICAL PARTY


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1996 - 2010
Q. If elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?

100 90 80 70 60
51 53 52 48 54 55 54 58 51 49 42 44 56 51 49 50 52 48 54

50
49

40 30 20 10 0
1996

47

46

45

46

46

1997

1998

2000

2001

2002

2003

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Votes for a party


Source: Latinobarmetro 1996-2010.

Do not vote for a party

In the case of attitudes towards the vote, we find that 49% of the regions citizens vote because it is a duty and 27% for satisfaction while 11% say they do not feel anything in particular when voting and 6% say they find it a bother. Those who vote with satisfaction are a minority in the region and, in the best of the cases, reach a third of the population. The remainder do not vote with satisfaction but for other reasons. How many things in the world today would continue to exist if only a third of people were satisfied with them? What is the state or the government doing to increase citizens satisfaction when they go to vote? Is it not the social responsibility of the government and the state to ensure that citizens feel satisfied when they go to vote? These are questions that anyone in any area of the life of society would ask in todays world. Do states and governments also ask these questions? Or is voter satisfaction a matter left to political parties?

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FEELING WHEN YOU GO TO VOTE

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010


Q. Which of the following statements is the closest to your feelings, when you go to vote? *Here only I have a feeling of satisfaction.

SATISFACTION

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Perception of plurality: Can my ideas get into power? Only 53% of the regions citizens think their political ideas could get into power. The crisis of representation affecting political parties is evident. On average, only half the regions inhabitants feel represented. There are, however, wide differences between countries and results range from 69% in the Dominican Republic to 42% in Peru.
OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL IDEAS TO COME TO POWER TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1996 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Do you relieve that the political sector that you support has the same opportunities to get to the power that the others or you dont think they have the same opportunities? *Here only Have the same opportunities

Source: Latinobarmetro 1996-2010

Plurality is also related to the socialization to which the population is subject and the question below seeks to examine the type of socialization seen in todays Latin Americans. According to 26% of the regions inhabitants, they had an opportunity as children to express their views in debates or discussions. This ranges from 38% in Honduras to 18% in Bolivia. 60

OPPORTUNITY THAT KIDS HAVE TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. In some schools kids are encouraged to discuss and debate on political and social topics, and to develop their own opinion. When you went to school, before secondary, how much opportunity did kids have to express their opinions in debates or discussions? *Here only A lot and some.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

In addition to the perception of how difficult it can be for ones ideas to get into power, it is also important to look at what people do to influence decisions. In answer to a question offering a series of alternatives (taken from Almond and Verbas study of civic culture), 32% of interviewees say they would seek to attract other people interested in the issue and form a group, 27% say they would use personal contacts, 22% would write to government officials, 19% would organize a protest and only 15% would work through a political party.

WHAT TO DO TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT DECISIONS TOTALS LATIN AMERICA 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Here is a list of things one can do in order to influence a Government decision. Which one do you think is the more effective? * Multiple choice question, total is more than 100%**Here only Attract people with the same interest in the subject and form a group FORM A GROUP

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

61

WHAT TO DO TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT DECISIONS. Work through a Political Party


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Here is a list of things one can do in order to influence a Government decision. Which one do you think is the more effective? *Here only Work through your Political Party

Guatemala Brasil Paraguay Repblica Dominicana Costa Rica Uruguay Venezuela Mxico Argentina Bolivia Ecuador Colombia Nicaragua Chile El Salvador Honduras Panam Per Latinoamrica
0

20 19 19 18 18 17 16 15 15 15 15 13 12 11 8 8 8 15
10 20

22

30

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

This is a further symptom of the crisis of political parties. Willingness to participate in a political party as a means to influence decisions is very low and there are only six or seven countries in which it reaches around 20%. Political party financing At the request of the UNDP, the 2010 Latinobarmetro survey for the first time included a question about the financing of political parties. Opinions are divided, with 45% saying they should be financed through private donations/contributions while 37% say they should be financed by the state. Support for the latter option varies from 57% in the Dominican Republic to 15% in Peru.

POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. According to the Constitution, parties need funding to carry out their mission. How do you think parties should be funded? With the contribution of the State or with donations from the private sector or companies? *Here only With the contribution of the State.

STATE

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

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This result is particularly interesting in a region where there is important criticism of private activity and levels of statism are high. The fact that a large percentage of citizens would prefer parties to be financed through private contributions shows their remoteness from a people which demands that all other services be provided by the state. Left-right scale Looking beyond the evolution of the left-right scale which we have analyzed in previous reports, we examine its composition this year. We find that most people place themselves in the political center. In countries with left-wing governments such as Ecuador, half the population places itself in the center while 23% do not place themselves in any part of the spectrum and 9% dont answer. In other words, in Ecuador, a total of 32% of citizens do not place themselves anywhere in the political spectrum implying, by default, that the government was elected with center votes since only 8% identify themselves as being on the left. Similar conclusions can also be drawn in most other countries. In Chile, where there was recently a change of power and the right returned to office after 50 years, 29% do not place themselves on the scale and only 16% do so on the right while 39% put themselves in the center. There are, however, some countries in which the center does not predominate. In Venezuela, 25% put themselves on the left, 25% on the right and 28% in the center while 22% do not place themselves. Venezuela is, in other words, a country divided almost equally between the center, the left and the right. In Nicaragua, the left predominates with 25% while the center and the right each reach 20% and 35% do not place themselves. In Uruguay, the left reaches 30% and the center 41% while the right has 18% and 11% do not place themselves. There are also countries in which the right predominates or is very important as in the Dominican Republic where it reaches 37%, Honduras (46%) and Colombia (37%). These are the three countries in which the right is the most important although the only country in which it outweighs the center is Honduras. In other words, the position of the electorate on the left-right scale clearly has little to do with the ideology of many countries governments. They are not elected primarily with the votes of the left or the right but rather with center votes that are captured by leaders of all positions. In order to be elected president, it is essential to win the votes of the center. The importance of the center must be taken into account when classifying countries as left or right. Electorates are not always either one or the other. Once again, it appears that analysts were too hasty in interpreting the election of left-wing governments as a shift to the left in the region as if the electorate had changed. Successive elections have shown that there is not such a shift, but rather a very heterogeneous mixture of victories of the left and the right that represents a search by citizens for better governments.

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Table N 16: Left-right scale None Ecuador 23% Bolivia 13% Argentina 18% Uruguay 3% Dominican Rep. 1% Paraguay 6% El Salvador 11% Mexico 6% Chile 20% Peru 17% Colombia 6% Costa Rica 6% Brazil 14% Honduras 0% Panama 9% Venezuela 9% Guatemala 5% Nicaragua 19%
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

DNK/DNA 9% 14% 5% 8% 3% 21% 16% 14% 9% 19% 13% 24% 21% 5% 25% 13% 33% 16%

Left 8% 14% 12% 30% 18% 7% 19% 19% 16% 11% 8% 11% 11% 15% 18% 25% 17% 25%

Right 10% 10% 20% 18% 37% 25% 14% 22% 16% 14% 37% 25% 20% 46% 20% 25% 21% 20%

Center 50% 49% 46% 41% 41% 40% 40% 39% 39% 39% 37% 35% 35% 34% 29% 28% 25% 20%

COUNTRIES ORDERED BY LEFT- RIGHT SCALE


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. In politics, people normally speak of "left" and "right". On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself? *Here only Left and Right. ** Recoded scale (0-3= left; 4-6= center; 7-10= right)

COUNTRIES ORDERED BY THE LEFT


Uruguay Venezuela Nicaragua El Salvador Mxico Repblica Dominicana Panam Guatemala Chile Honduras Bolivia Argentina Costa Rica Brasil Per Colombia Ecuador Paraguay 0

COUNTRIES ORDERED BY THE RIGHT

30 25 25 19 19 18 18 17 16 15 14 12 11 11 11 8 8 7
10 20 30 40 50

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

64

Sources of information about political matters

The structure of the populations sources of information has changed over the last decade. There has been a marked drop in the importance of newspapers and an increase in that of informal channels such as family and friends (as well as the obvious surge in the importance of Internet). This is related to the regions prevalent mistrust and people prefer legitimate sources that end up being the reference group in which they live.

HOW DO YOU INFORM YOURSELF ABOUT POLITICS?


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1996 - 2010.
Q. How do you inform yourself about politics? With family, friends, coworkers, my fellow students, on the radio, for newspapers / magazines, Internet, TV, Other or None * Multiple, the percentages total more than 100%.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1996 - 2010.

Between 1996 and 2010, the importance of the family as a source of political information increased from 25% to 44% and, in Venezuela and Ecuador, reaches 64% but only 25% in Nicaragua.

65

HOW DO YOU INFORM YOURSELF ABOUT POLITICS? FAMILY LATIN AMERICA1996 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. How do you inform yourself about politics? With family, friends, coworkers, my fellow students, on the radio, for newspapers / magazines, Internet, TV, Other or None * Multiple, the percentages total is more than 100%. **Here only With the family.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1996 - 2010.

49

The importance of friends as a source of information increased from 31% in 2009 to 36% in 2010. In the Dominican Republic, it reaches 60% but only 20% in Mexico.
HOW DO YOU INFORM YOURSELF ABOUT POLITICS? FRIENDS LATIN AMERICA1996 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. How do you inform yourself about politics? With family, friends, coworkers, my fellow students, on the radio, for newspapers / magazines, Internet, TV, Other or None * Multiple, the percentages total is more than 100%. **Here only Friends.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1996 - 2010.

50

Internet is used as a source of information about political matters by 16% of the regions inhabitants but ranges from 26% in Argentina to 7% in Guatemala. There are a total of five countries in which a fifth or more of the population uses this source of information. Its use is lowest in the Central American countries. 66

HOW DO YOU INFORM YOURSELF ABOUT POLITICS? INTERNET LATIN AMERICA 2008 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. How do you inform yourself about politics? With family, friends, coworkers, my fellow students, on the radio, for newspapers / magazines, Internet, TV, Other or None *Multiple, the percentages total is more than 100%. **Here only Internet. 30
Argentina Uruguay Colombia Venezuela Chile Repblica Dom.

26 23 21 20 20 18 18 17 16 16 13 12 11 10 10 10 8 7 16

20

Brasil

16 14 12

Costa Rica Per Mxico Panam El Salvador

10

Bolivia Honduras Paraguay Ecuador Nicaragua Guatemala

0 2008 2009 2010

Latinoamrica

10

20

30

Source: Latinobarmetro 2008 - 2010.

Strategies for obtaining information The question below is particularly interesting because, instead of enquiring about the source of information, it asks people where they search for information when they need it.
Imagine a subject thats very important to you but which you dont completely understand. What would you do to obtain more information about this subject?

The result is hardly surprising in view of the rather generic nature of the (regular) source of information seen above. When they need information, one in two of the regions citizens look to a friend. This is a source that is reliable, accessible and credible, with a use that ranges from 67% in the Dominican Republic to 30% in El Salvador.

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WHERE TO LOOK FOR POLITICAL INFORMATION


TOTALS LATIN AMERICA 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Imagine a subject that is very important to you that but you do not fully understand. What would you do to find more information about it? * Multiple, the percentages total more than 100%. **Here only Talk to friends TALK TO FRIENDS

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

The three decades that have passed since the inauguration of democracy have only crystallized use of informal, rather than institutional, sources of information. This again reinforces the mistrust of power and politics that is the Achilles heel of the consolidation of democracy in Latin America. TRUST Trust is one of the most critical indicators in the analysis of democracy. It is a matter that is not subject to public policy, belongs to the domain of peoples cultures, is forged by history and experiences and seems to be the stumbling block for many transformations. There is no objective indicator of trust which is subjective. There are no economic indicators that tell us about the cost of mistrust and there are no techniques on trust nor experts as on crime, drugs, education, etc. There should be, however, because it appears to be the Achilles heel of Latin Americas development. While China and India grow at rates of over 10%, Latin America has never achieved such rates. Is it the regions prevalent mistrust that is to blame for this difference? Over the years, Latinobarmetro has used many indicators in a bid to gain an insight into the problem of trust. We have analyzed the role of experience and the importance of networks, designing new questions and measuring the level of trust in a wide range of players and institutions. The results are not auspicious in that, over the 15 years, we have not seen any structural changes. There are changes but none which suggest a dismantling of the mistrust that characterizes our societies. This is, moreover, an issue that is confined to intellectual debate and is not reflected in state policies. The practices of Latin American states are profoundly mistrustful and only confirm and increase mistrust. There is no state policy designed to increase the populations trust in the state. There is a total absence of public policy in this sphere and the reforms implemented in the region in these 30 years of democracy show that the transformation of different sectors has had zero impact on levels of trust, making it obvious that a specific policy is required. 68

Interpersonal trust Interpersonal trust is an indicator designed by Ronald Inglehart as part of the World Values Study and has been able to demonstrate the existence of a relationship between countries development and their level of trust. The paradox in Latin America is that the region can grow while, at the same time, being mistrustful. It is, in other words, at odds with Ingleharts hypothesis that economic growth is associated with higher levels of trust. However, Latin Americas capacity growth also appears to have a ceiling as compared to other regions and we do not know to what extent the prevailing mistrust is a factor in this problem. Our societies function with networks of trust in which, as we saw in the case of the media, friends and family are the sources of information for the regions inhabitants. Our societies are relatively segmented by these networks of trust while, in our cities, rich and poor live in different neighborhoods that do not interact at all. This is also the case of businesspeople, the military, politicians, etc., each of which has their own area of operations and interaction is limited and confined to only a few other groups of society. This explains why, over the 14 years in which we have measured interpersonal trust, this indicator has shown no significant variation and fluctuates around 20%. This does not mean that trust is absent in our societies but that it is restricted to people who know each other. This basic characteristic of the way Latin American societies function - so different from those in other regions of the world - affects the way they evaluate democracy. As shown below, it also has an impact on the populations attitudes towards institutions since these are, by definition, outside the scope of individuals direct relations. Trust in something that is not familiar is at odds with the segmented social structure of Latin American societies.

INTERPERSONAL TRUST
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1996 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others? * Here only "One can trust most people .

Source: Latinobarmetro 1996-2010.

69

This is, in other words, a crucial aspect of our cultures that democracy has to overcome, breaking through the barrier of trust based on personal experience and creating broader trust based on confidence in rules and the states ability to enforce them. As seen above, it is precisely this issue - whether governments work or not on behalf of the majority that is most critical. If they can instill a belief that institutions are there for the majority, they could also defeat mistrust. The challenge is to produce evidence of compliance with this fundamental requirement. Trust in institutions In 2010, there were very large differences between countries in trust in institutions. Results for the key institutions of democracy - congress, political parties, the judiciary and the government - are set out below. There was a significant increase in trust in Argentina (11 points for congress, 9 points for the judiciary and 12 points for the government) and in Brazil (12 points for congress, 9 points for the judiciary and 8 for the government). Similarly, in Honduras, we see an increase of 14 points for congress, 7 for the judiciary, 15 for the government and 5 for political parties while, in Venezuela, we find an increase of 7 points for congress, 4 for the judiciary and 6 for the government. In Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Colombia, on the other hand, there was no change as compared to 2009 while, in Chile, Nicaragua and Ecuador, there were both increases and decreases depending on the institution. In Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, trust dropped across all the institutions of democracy. This was most significant in El Salvador (between 6 and 17 points) and Guatemala (between 5 and 8 points). Moreover, beyond the variations seen in countries over the last 12 months, there are enormous differences in their levels of trust in different institutions. In El Salvador, for example, trust not only drops but was already at a low level while, in Uruguay, there was no change over 2009, but trust is the highest in the region. The evolution of trust in institutions requires analysis disaggregated by country and institution and regional averages merely show the state of the level of trust without revealing at all what this implies as to whether a country is on the road to consolidating its democracy. Honduras serves as a good example. Trust there increased significantly, reaching an intermediate level. In the light of last years coup, it could be assumed that the annual average would indicate a critical situation whereas the countrys evolution over time shows progress in the right direction. When analyzing opinion data and drawing conclusions about its implications, it is useful to look first at these dimensions in order to ensure a more balanced evaluation.

70

Table N 17: Trust in institutions of democracy, 2010 (%)


CONGRESS POLITICAL PARTIES JUDICIARY ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENT

Uruguay Venezuela Costa Rica Brazil Chile Honduras Argentina Panama Latin America Colombia Dominican Rep. Paraguay Bolivia Mexico El Salvador Ecuador Nicaragua Guatemala Peru
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

62 49 47 44 41 41 39 37 34 33 32 28 28 28 25 24 21 17 14

45 43 23 24 23 22 21 29 23 23 22 23 17 19 16 20 17 14 13

58 38 46 51 38 34 34 34 32 34 28 27 24 28 22 21 22 17 15

41 49 0 63 59 36 37 0 45 58 33 49 38 55 54 53 25 31 35

71 52 45 55 58 41 36 60 45 48 34 47 42 34 57 49 37 24 25

Trust in institutions in general When trust in institutions in general, including those of the economy and society and the media as well as the institutions of democracy, is compared, a clear phenomenon becomes apparent. Latinobarmetro has not measured every institution each year and the averages shown are only for the years in which measurements were taken. For these years, we see that trust in the Catholic church declines systematically from an average of more than 70% in the 1990s to just over 60% in the 2000s, with a difference of ten points as compared to the end of the 1990s. By contrast, trust in banks has increased since it was first measured in 2002 and, for the third consecutive year, reaches over 40% (44% in 2009 and 2010). Similarly, trust in private companies (42%), municipal governments (40%) and the central government (45%) has increased in recent years and shows a significant gain as compared to when it was first measured. The government and banks, indeed, stand out as institutions in which trust has shown the greatest systematic increase. Trust in television shows important fluctuations over the 14 years in which it has been measured, with a peak of 64% in 2006 and a low of 42% in 2000 and, in 2010, was running at 55%. This indicates a clear relation to the swings of the economy since its low in 2000 coincided with the worst point of the 71

Asian crisis and its peak in 2006 with the highest point of the sustained growth of Latin Americas virtuous five years. Trust in congress, which peaked at 36% in 1997, was running at 34% in 2010 while trust in political parties, which also peaked in 1997 (28%), dropped to 23%. Table N 18: Trust in institutions of democracy and society, 1996-2010 (%)
1996 1997 74 46 42 1998 78 45 38 28 36 19992000 77 42 43 2001 72 49 38 2002 71 45 30 25 32 2003 62 36 40 24 30 2004 71 38 42 30 42 38 31 32 36 30 33 27 36 36 36 32 32 27 21 29 34 28 20 30 27 24 19 33 25 23 14 27 29 20 17 11 34 41 37 32 24 18 37 39 37 31 28 18 37 36 27 22 39 30 29 20 42 41 41 36 45 37 28 31 21 42 39 44 34 32 34 24 42 40 44 35 32 34 23 2005 71 44 44 36 2006 71 64 51 43 2007 74 47 45 39 2008 66 51 45 43 2009 68 54 45 45 45 2010 67 55

Church Television Armed forces Government Large companies Private companies Municipal governments Banks Police Judiciary Congress

76 50 41

Political parties 20 28 Source: Latinobarmetro 1996-2010

In other words, we find that trust in institutions varies by country but also changes from year to year and from institution to institution and that there is, moreover, the issue of its level which is independent of either of these two aspects. Summary: A key conclusion for analysis of the consolidation of democracy is that, despite progress in individual countries at specific moments, the nature of trust has not changed. In other words, regardless of these changes, trust remains one of the Gordian knots for the development of Latin American societies. GOVERNMENT APPROVAL Government approval has shown a steady increase from 36% in 2002 to 56% in 2010. However, this latter figure represented a drop from 60% in 2009. In 2010, it was highest in Brazil (where the survey took place at the height of the election campaign in which President Lula was openly supporting his successor, Dilma Rousseff) and, at 86%, was also the highest ever recorded by Latinobarmetro. In all, the governments popularity reached over 50% in 11 of the 18 countries included in the survey. It was lowest in Peru (30%) and Argentina (40%). (The survey took place before the death at the end of October 2010 of Nstor Kirchner, the former president and husband of President Cristina Fernndez, which meant an evident increase in her popularity and that of the government that is not reflected in these results.)

72

GOVERNMENT APPROVAL

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2002 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.


Q. Do you approve or not approve of the government led by President (name) ...? * Here only 'Approves'.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002 - 2010.

In Chile, an event subsequent to the survey also had an important impact on the popularity of the president and the government, which was boosted by the successful rescue of 33 miners trapped in the San Jos mine for 69 days at a depth of 700 meters. This put Chile in the international headlines and was applauded around the world. Never in its history had Chile had such prominence in the international news and the rescue was broadcast live to the entire world. At the time of publishing this report, government approval in both Argentina and Chile was, therefore, higher than when the survey data was collected. When government approval is analyzed by country and year, the importance of these extraordinary events diminishes in the longer-term context in which large changes are seen from one year to the next. For different reasons, there are important changes in government approval in seven countries. The largest is in Chile where President Michelle Bachelet ended her term with an 85% approval rating and the change of power that brought President Sebastin Piera into office produced a 30-point reduction. The right is elected with the approval of its voters but without the goodwill approval of opposition voters achieved by Bachelet. Thanks to the miners rescue, Pieras popularity increases but not to the levels of Bachelet. In Costa Rica, government approval drops by 22 points between 2009 and 2010 while, in Paraguay, it drops by 14 points. At the same time, we see that there are countries which, independently of the ratings of recent years, have historically had high levels of government approval. This is the case of Argentina where, between 2003 and 2006 or, in other words, under Nstor Kirchner, approval ratings were high but, under Cristina Fernndez, have dropped sharply and are down by at least 30 points on her husbands government. An opposite trend is seen in Ecuador where, as from 2007, approval of the government and President Correa rises by at least 30 to 40 points. Although Ecuadors average for the period is low, it has been high for the past four years but, over the last two years, has dropped from 74% in 2007 to 58% in 73

2010 (as compared to 20% in 2004). This volatility in government approval in Ecuador is a sign of the changes and conflicts experienced by this country over the past decade. Brazil is also an emblematic case in that it shows how President Lula changed approval of the government during his second term. This was also undoubtedly a factor in the election of his political heir, Dilma Rousseff, as the countrys first woman president. Four women presidents Dilma Rousseff is the fourth woman president to be elected in Latin America since Michelle Bachelet in Chile in 2006. Over a period of four years, four women have been elected in the region: Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Cristina Fernndez in Argentina, Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil. This is, moreover, the first time that three women presidents have held office simultaneously (Bachelet completed her term in March 2010). Table N 19: Government approval (%)
Argentina Colombia Chile Brazil Venezuela Honduras El Salvador Mexico Bolivia Dominican Rep. Costa Rica Nicaragua Uruguay Ecuador Panama Guatemala Paraguay Peru 2002 14 13 50 34 51 57 35 47 42 52 84 30 30 23 12 5 23 2003 86 64 54 62 35 52 48 46 24 37 32 16 27 14 15 8 10 2004 73 75 64 53 43 44 57 41 48 21 50 30 12 20 20 36 57 8 2005 71 69 66 47 65 39 58 41 60 62 32 32 72 24 39 44 39 16 2006 73 70 67 62 65 57 48 60 54 61 56 23 63 23 57 45 33 57 2007 52 68 55 58 61 56 54 60 60 46 55 54 61 74 37 28 17 29 2008 34 75 59 79 48 35 51 58 53 50 45 32 61 66 41 46 86 14 2009 25 72 85 84 45 83 52 57 47 75 37 74 59 80 52 69 26 2010 40 75 55 86 47 51 71 59 46 45 53 58 75 58 59 47 55 30 Total 62 60 59 53 53 51 50 49 48 48 47 43 42 33 32 30 27 24

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002-2010

Summary: Government approval reflects current events in individual countries as well as serving as a mechanism through which their inhabitants punish or reward their rulers through opinion polls. Surveys of government approval in Latin America often have an exaggerated importance. There has, indeed, been talk of administrations that govern in order to achieve high approval ratings, rather than providing leadership on issues that are crucial for their countrys future. These two goals - a high level of support and achievement of necessary aims can sometimes be at odds. Leadership, in other words, also involves being able to persuade people to modify their views and governing is not only a matter of validating and trying to satisfy their demands. The result otherwise may be compliance on short-term matters while leaving aside longer-term matters on which public opinion cannot judge. If they govern with an eye on public approval as reflected in opinion polls, governments may, in other words, seek immediate results at the expense of their countrys development. The experience of Europe has shown that forging agreements, such as the European Union, calls for much leadership and, above all, the ability to change public opinion. 74

Approval of policy on public safety

In a context in which crime is identified as the most important problem in the majority of Latin American countries, approval of policy on public safety differs widely from government approval. On average, it reaches 37% as compared to 56% government approval.

SECURITY/CRIME POLICY APPROVAL


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. And do you approve or disapprove the way how the government manages the security/crime issue? Here only Approve

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

There are only four countries - Nicaragua, Mexico, Costa Rica and Chile - in which these two indicators are aligned. The latter three countries are also those in which the victimization rate and perception of crime are most consistent, although in very different national circumstances. In Nicaragua, however, these two rates are very different but because, as seen above, its economic problems dwarf all other problems.

75

Table N 20: Government and public safety policy approval Approval of Approval of public safety Country government policy Brazil 86% 47% Uruguay 75% 41% Paraguay 55% 28% Argentina 40% 14% Guatemala 47% 22% El Salvador 71% 48% Ecuador 58% 35% Panama 59% 39% Honduras 51% 33% Peru 30% 12% Venezuela 47% 31% Bolivia 46% 30% Colombia 75% 61% Dominican Rep. 45% 32% Chile 55% 47% Costa Rica 53% 47% Mexico 59% 54% Nicaragua 58% 58%
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Difference 39 34 27 26 25 23 23 20 18 18 16 16 14 13 8 6 5 0

Above all, realism and consistency between perception of crime and the victimization rate are, therefore, required for a government to be well evaluated on public safety. In those countries where there is a large distance between these two indicators, approval of public safety policy is poor despite positive evaluations of the government in general. This is a sign of the rationality of public opinion. When the population realizes that there is not only a problem but also a large distance between their daily experience and the importance given to this problem in the life of the country as a whole, they take a rather negative view of political performance in this area. As shown by this example, a candid agenda that reflects peoples daily experience is an instrument that works to the favor of governments, not against them. Who has most power? In this question, which Latinobarmetro has asked since 2003, the government retains first place with 58% and large companies take second place with 48%. They are followed by political parties and congress with 26% and 25%, respectively, although at a distance over 20 points.

76

WHO HAS MORE POWER?


LATIN AMERICA 2003 - 2010
Q. Which of the following is the most powerful in (country)?

Source: Latinobarmetro 2003 -2010

We live in societies in which congress and political parties not only inspire a low level of trust but are also perceived to have much less power than companies, which represent no-one. It is hardly surprising that there is a crisis of representation if companies, which are seen by one in two Latin Americans as having great power, do not represent the populations interests and those who are responsible for representing them have much less power. Moreover, the power of large companies increased from 40% in 2003 to 48% in 2010 while the power of political parties dropped from 39% in 2003 when we began to measure in to 26% in 2010. The power of congress, however, increased from 22% to 25% over the same period.

77

WHO HAS MORE POWER?


LATIN AMERICA 2003 - 2010
Q. Which of the following is the most powerful in (country)? Name three. * Multiple, the percentages total more than 100%. **Here only Government

GOVERNMENT

60 50

57 52 49 45 40 36 39 46 44 34 31 26 27 24 24 25 59 58 48

40 30 20 10 0
2003

22

2004

2005

2006

2010

Government Political Parties

Big business Congress

Source: Latinobarmetro 2003 -2010

THE STATE In this chapter, we look at attitudes towards the state. Capacity of the state to solve problems Since 1998, Latinobarmetro has measured the capacity of the state to solve problems. The percentage of Latin Americans who think it cannot solve problems fell from 13% in 2003 to 4% in 2010 while the percentage who think it can only solve some problems dropped from 33% in 2009 to 28% in 2010, its lowest level since measurements began. At the same time, those who say the state can solve all problems increased from 9% in 1998 to 17% in 2010 while those who say the state can solve most problems rose from 24% to 28%. This marks a clear trend. The crisis of Lehman Brothers in 2007 strengthened peoples perception of the role of the state; they now see it as more powerful than before and with a greater capacity to address and solve problems.

78

THE STATE CAN SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1998-2010
Q It is said that the state can solve the problems of our society because it has the means to do it. Would you say that the state can solve ...? All problems, Most problems, Enough problems, Only a few problems, The state can not solve any problem?

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998-2010

THE STATE CAN SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS TOTAL LATIN AMERICA


1998-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q It is said that the state can solve the problems of our society because it has the means to do it. Would you say that the state can solve ...? All problems, Most problems, Enough problems, Only a few problems, The state can not solve any problem? * Here only All problems.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998-2010

Does the state have the means to solve problems? According to 71% of the regions inhabitants, the state has the means to solve problems. This view is most prevalent in Costa Rica (86%) and least prevalent in Bolivia (54%). This question is new and was included in the survey for the first time. The results indicate an important basis for the demands that citizens make on the state. At least one in two Latin Americans believes that it has the means to solve problems. 79

RESOURCES OF STATE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Do you think the State has the resources to solve the problems of our society, or you think the State do not have the resources to solve them? *Here only Has the resources.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Minimum social security A second new question about the state refers to the minimum level of social security that people expect it to guarantee. If it has the capacity to address societys problems, what are the most important things it should guarantee? Half the population identifies education, healthcare and protection against crime as the main guarantees they expect. They are followed by jobs and protection of private property, which are demanded by a third of the population, while a fifth wants pensions and protection of the environment. Finally, 15% or less mention unemployment insurance and subsidies for the poor. It is interesting that the poor come last, rather than first.

MINIMUM SOCIAL SECURITY GUARANTEED


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010
Q. Which would you say is the minimum level of social security that you expect the State to guarantee. From the following list, pick no more than three. *Multiple choice question, total is more than 100%

Education Health Protection against crime Opportunity to get a job Private property protection Retirement / Pension Enviromental protection Unemployment Insurance Subsidy for poorest DNA/DNK
0

48 48 45 30 28 18 18 15 14 4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

80

Satisfaction with state services Latin American states are organized very differently so there are also differences across countries in the type of state body that provides specific services. We have divided public services into two broad categories simply in order to distinguish those that reflect central public policies and those that are the result of local policies. Public services provided by central government Firstly, we examine satisfaction with public services that are determined by central public policy. The state service that receives the best evaluation in the region (58%) is the civil registry defined as the place which issues identity documents. It is followed by education (54%), public hospitals (47%), the police (34%) and the judicial system (31%).

SATISFACTION WITH CENTRAL PUBLIC SERVICES TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2009-2010


Q. Would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied, with the way (ITEM) works...? *Here only very satisfied and fairly satisfied.

70
Public Education
Place where you get the identification document 58

60 50

57 54 46

58 54 47
Police Public Hospitals
Public Education 54

40 30 20 10 0
2009
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

34 33

34 31
Judiciary

Public Hospitals

47

Police

34

2010

Place where you get the identification document

Judiciary

31

20

40

60

80

Public services provided by regional and municipal governments Satisfaction with public services provided by local governments (of different types) fluctuates between 41% and 50% and is lower than for education or the civil registry but higher than for the police or the judicial system.

81

SATISFACTION WITH LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2006 - 2010.
Q. Would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied, with ... (ITEM) or not have these services where you live? *Here only very satisfied and fairly satisfied.
50

Garbage collection

The availability of green areas and public spaces


40

53 52 51 51 52 52 50 48 51 48 45 43 45 44 47 44 45 45 46 47 44 42 44 41 45 40 38 41 0 10
2009 2008

Public Transport

The sewage

Local Government Services

Roads and Paving


20
2007

30
2006

40

50

60

70

2010

Source: Latinobarmetro 2006 2010.

Summary: The state is increasingly perceived as having the power to solve problems. It role strengthened in the wake of the Lehman crisis. Seven in ten Latin Americans see the state as having the means to address issues and five in ten demand a minimum level of social security: healthcare, education and safety. These are, however, the areas perceived to offer the least guarantees. Civil and political guarantees are seen as being greater than social and economic guarantees. PUBLIC POLICIES In this section, we examine a number of issues related to public policies, starting with a new question about expectations of public policies and their credibility. According to 44% of the regions inhabitants, public policies improve living conditions, with figures ranging from 71% in Uruguay to 25% in Guatemala.

82

PUBLIC POLICIES IMPROVE LIFE CONDITIONS


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. How much do you think that public policies conducted by the Government improve the life conditions of the (nationals)? *Here only A lot and some

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

We start our analysis of specific public policies with the issue of taxes which is central to the functioning of the state. Fiscal morality and attitudes towards taxes Since 1998, we have measured fiscal morality on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means that tax evasion is not at all justifiable and 10 that it is "totally justifiable". At 2.5 points, fiscal morality is now lower than in 1998 (2.2) and 2003 (1.9).

TAX MORAL
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA1998 - 2010 TOTAES BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means "not at all justifiable" and 10 means "totally justifiable", how justifiable do you believe it is to evade paying taxes? *Here only Average.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998 2010.

83

During the regions period of highest economic growth, fiscal morality deteriorated from 1.9 points in 2003 to 3.5 points in 2008 before showing a partial recovery to 3.2 points in 2009 and 2.5 points in 2010. The legitimacy of the state and the way in which it operates, including the issue of corruption, conditions peoples ability to see paying taxes as a legitimate duty. To the extent that societies are not able to endow this duty with a high degree of legitimacy or, in other words, achieve a high level of fiscal morality, the functioning of the state will suffer from a volatility that puts it at the mercy of the goodwill of those who do pay their taxes. There are countries in which fiscal morality is particularly low. In Nicaragua, for example, 71% identify economic difficulties as their countrys most important problem but, at 3.4 points, justification of tax evasion is the highest in the region. Similarly, in Guatemala where many indicators reveal a critical situation, this is reflected in low fiscal morality. At the other extreme, justification of tax evasion in Ecuador and Argentina reaches just 1.9 and 2.1 points, respectively. A second question about taxes, however, reveals progress in the right direction, which is encouraging as compared to deteriorating fiscal morality. As in the case of the previous indicator, this indicator of the number of people who manage to pay less taxes than they should first shows an improvement before deteriorating and then recovering again. Between 1998 and 2010, it drops from 29% to 19% but with an increase to 25% in 2009.

AVOID PAYING TAXES


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1998-2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Could you tell me if recently you know of someone or have heard someone you know who managed to avoid paying all his taxes? *Here only yes

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998-2010

The country where the largest number of people manage to pay less taxes is Paraguay, with 41%, and is lowest in Ecuador, with 5%. 84

In a third question, we look at taxes through an indicator phrased in positive terms, asking on a scale of 1 to 100 how many people pay their taxes correctly. Between 1998 and 2010, the average drops from 56% to 52%. The figure is highest in Chile (65%) and lowest in Paraguay (43%). The fact that approximately half the regions population is perceived to pay taxes correctly implies that the other half does not do so. This is the main problem for public policy. The state is seen as having the power to solve problems but cannot solve its own main problem which is to convince its citizens that, without taxes, it does not have this power. This is an impossible situation because the state faces the demands of the population but without their willingness to pay the taxes required to satisfy these demands.

PROPERLY TAXES PAYMENT

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1998 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.


Q. As you know or have heard, on a scale of 1 to 100, with "1" is "none" and "100" is "all," How many (nationality) have paid taxes properly?

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998 - 2010

Summary: Although fiscal morality drops in democracy, rather than strengthening, there is a perception that people are paying more taxes than before. In other words, the state is somehow improving tax collection despite declining fiscal morality. Workplace morality A second key issue for public policies is workplace morality. Interviewees were asked to say how justifiable it is to feign illness in order to miss work, using a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means that it is not at all justifiable and 10 that it is "totally justifiable". The results speak for themselves; the average reached 4.1 in 2010, up from 2.2 in 1998 and 1.9 in 2003, and has shown a sustained increase since 2003. Workplace morality is lowest in Bolivia where 6.7 people out of ten consider feigning illnesses is justifiable and in El Salvador (6.2). It is highest in Colombia (2.1) and Venezuela (2.3). 85

WORK ETHICS

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1998 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.


Q. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means "not at all justifiable" and 10 means "totally justifiable", how justifiable do you believe it is to pretend to be ill in order not to go to work? *Here only Average

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998 - 2010

Latin Americas low level of workplace morality and the trend in fiscal morality show that the region has pending moral issues that significantly affect the functioning of the state and society. Social morality Latinobarmetro also looks at social morality. Using the same scale as in the above indicator, interviewees are asked how justifiable it is to buy something you know has been stolen. It is no secret that, in Latin America, pirating of music and films is among the highest in the world and this is one of the most evident signs of a social morality that also has numerous other important consequences for the region. Answers to the question asked here have shown a trend similar to that in workplace morality, with justification of buying stolen goods rising from 1.6 in 2003 to 3.9 in 2010 and indicating a deterioration in social morality. The figure is highest in Bolivia (7.5) and lowest in Colombia (1.8). Results are consistent in that we find that all three types of morality - fiscal, workplace and social are highest in some countries and lowest in others. Like trust, morality is a cultural trait of societies and no public policies are in place in a bid to change it. It is, instead, treated as a result or consequence.

86

SOCIAL MORAL

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2002 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.


Q. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means "not at all justifiable" and 10 means "totally justifiable", how justifiable do you believe it is to buying something you know is stolen? *Here only Average

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002 - 2010

Summary: The adverse trend in fiscal, workplace and social morality in Latin America is worrying because it affects the rule of law, perception of equality before the law and, ultimately, attitudes towards democracy. Public safety Public safety is a broad and complex subject. Earlier in the report, we looked at the issue of crime as the most important problem and the victimization rate and then at approval of the governments performance in this area. Here, we look at public safety as regards its quality and the perception of insecurity both in the country and peoples own neighborhood as well as fear of crime, concluding with the policies that citizens would favor in order to address the problem. Quality of public safety In 2010, Latinobarmetro included a number of new indicators relating to public safety. The first is a general evaluation of the state of public safety in the country and it is no surprise that only 16% of the regions inhabitants consider it very good or good. In Nicaragua, the figure reaches 32%, but only 6% in Peru. Table N 21 below compares rates of perception of crime and victimization and the differences between the two. Nicaragua is the country where perception of crime as the most important problem is lowest and where there is also a large difference (28 percentage points) with the victimization rate (29%). It appears that the low perception of crime as the most important problem, despite a high victimization rate, works in the governments favor because the countrys public safety policy is well evaluated by 58% of its inhabitants. As shown by this case, evaluations of public safety have little to do with the number of victims but rather reflect the position it occupies in a countrys communications agenda. 87

In El Salvador, 71% of the population reports having been the victim of a crime and, therefore, only 15% have a positive evaluation of the quality of public safety but 48% say they approve of the governments management of the issue, even though 43% identify it as the most important problem. Each case, in other words, has its own particular characteristics.

PUBLIC SECURITY IN COUNTRY


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. How would you rate public security in the country. Would you say that it is Very good, good, average, bad, very bad? *Here only Very good and good.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

Equality of treatment by the police In the next question, we look at the extent to which people consider they receive equality of treatment from the police. Only 27% say they would be treated equally and 33% say they would not while 35% say it depends. There is, in other words, a very important suspicion of unequal treatment by the police. Uruguay is the only country in which a majority (56%) say they would receive equal treatment and the figure is lowest in the Dominican Republic (14%).

88

POLICE TREATMENT TOWARDS CITIZENS


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. If you have some problem with the police, perhaps a traffic offence or you are accused of a minor offence, do you think you will receive an egalitarian treat, that is you will be treated as any other person? *Here only yes

Depends

35

No

33

Yes

27

DNA/DNK

Other

1
0

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

Summary of attitudes on public safety The table below summarizes attitudes towards crime as discussed in different parts of this report. We find a very heterogeneous picture of how each country sees the different aspects of crime that indicates the complexity of perceptions and their divergence from reality. Table N 21: Summary of attitudes towards crime by country, 2010
Victim of crime Crime as most important problem Difference between the two rates Approval of public safety policy Evaluation of quality of public safety Equal treatment by police

El Salvador Nicaragua Bolivia Colombia Brazil Dominican Rep. Ecuador Peru Paraguay Chile Honduras Latin America Argentina Guatemala Costa Rica Mexico Uruguay Panama Venezuela
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

71% 29% 30% 32% 25% 31% 35% 29% 29% 25% 31% 31% 36% 33% 34% 30% 19% 19% 27%

43% 1% 5% 13% 10% 20% 24% 18% 22% 19% 25% 27% 37% 35% 38% 35% 28% 46% 64%

28 28 25 19 15 12 11 11 7 6 6 4 -1 -2 -5 -5 -10 -27 -37 89

48% 58% 30% 61% 47% 32% 35% 12% 28% 47% 33% 37% 14% 22% 47% 54% 41% 39% 31%

15% 32% 8% 23% 21% 7% 20% 6% 20% 19% 25% 16% 10% 11% 15% 11% 18% 18% 11%

22% 23% 15% 31% 40% 14% 27% 21% 22% 35% 17% 27% 40% 21% 29% 22% 56% 17% 23%

In the next section, we examine perceptions of insecurity and citizens policy recommendations which offer a broader view of the problem. Insecurity in neighborhood and country For the past four years, we have measured the level of safety perceived to exist in both the country and peoples neighborhood. In the case of the country, it is low and, in 2007, the perception of insecurity reached 63%, although it dropped to 58% in 2008, a level at which it held steady through to 2010.

SECURITY IN COUNTRY
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2007 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. In general, can you say that living in (country) is getting safer, as safe or less safe? *Here only less safe.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2007 2010.

In Guatemala, 77% perceive their country as being unsafe while, in Nicaragua, the figure drops to 36%. Similarly, only 17% perceive their neighborhood as being safe. This figure increased from 9% in 2007 to 19% in 2009 before dropping again to 17% in 2010. The country where most people see their neighborhood as being safe is Nicaragua (37%) and is lowest in Venezuela (5%).

90

SECURITY IN NEIGHBORHOOD
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2007 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. In general, can you say that living in your neighborhood is getting safer, as safe or less safe? *Here only Getting safer

Source: Latinobarmetro 2007 2010.

Perception of personal insecurity Only 10% of the regions inhabitants think they will never be the victim of a violent crime. The perception of personal insecurity is, in other words, very high in Latin America. A third of the population believe they could be a victim at any moment while a further third think this could happen sometimes and 21% occasionally. We live in a continent that fears crime and, even though the number of victims may have dropped in some countries over recent years, the perception of insecurity is overwhelming.

FEAR OF BEING VICTIM OF CRIME


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2007-2010.
Q. How often are you concerned that you may become victim of a violent crime? Almost all the time, sometimes, occasionally, never? *Here only Never

Source: Latinobarmetro 2007-2010

91

Table N 22: Summary of Safety Perception Safety in the Safety in the country neighborhood Nicaragua 22% 37% Guatemala 4% 31% Panama 15% 27% Uruguay 9% 10% Colombia 22% 29% Mexico 6% 14% Argentina 2% 13% Costa Rica 10% 17% Paraguay 12% 20% Latin America 9% 17% Chile 9% 12% Honduras 12% 22% Dominican Rep. 8% 10% Brazil 9% 23% Peru 5% 13% Bolivia 9% 13% Venezuela 3% 5% Ecuador 5% 7% El Salvador 4% 7%
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Will never be victim of crime 22% 19% 17% 13% 12% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3%

Sum of indicators 81% 54% 59% 32% 63% 31% 25% 37% 42% 36% 29% 42% 26% 39% 25% 28% 13% 16% 14%

Combating crime In this section, we analyze how the population views the problem of combating crime, looking at what they identify as the main problems faced by the police. Two key factors emerge: firstly, corruption which is mentioned by 31% and, secondly, understaffing (22%).

92

MAIN POLICE PROBLEM TO FIGHT AGAINST CRIME


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010
Q. In your opinion, which is the main problem the police faces in order to confront crime? *Here only Corruption.

Corruption Small personnel Low training Not much resources Low civic cooperation Obsolete equipment DNK/DNA
0

31 22 17 13 8 6 4
10 20 30 40 50

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

When asked what are the measures that need to be taken to combat crime more effectively, 56% of Latin Americans say that increasing the number of police would be the most effective. One in two of the inhabitants of all countries except Mexico want more police on their streets. Demand for greater control by the state and more presence of the authorities is evident. Order has been a key issue in recent decades in Latin America where the core promise of a number of authoritarian regimes was to reestablish order. Order is a positive value for the regions inhabitants and, in answers to this question, there is a clear demand for more order and control. Some dictators also argue that democracy means a lack of order and, ultimately, chaos. It is not a coincidence that there was a coup in Honduras, the country in which demand for more police is the highest in the region. The absence of the state on the countrys streets was, without doubt, a factor in this event. Latin America has to address this demand for greater order and the need for a successful public policy like those seen in its macroeconomic transformation, judicial reforms, etc. Demand for order is no longer confined to the political right and is now an issue of democracy that must be given the same priority as poverty. Democracy must be able to guarantee its citizens freedom from fear of crime. Demand for a firm hand is, in this sense, simply a demand for the full enforcement of the rule of law on the streets so as to ensure people freedom of movement. Democracy has convincingly demonstrated that it is not synonymous with chaos but has not taken the problem of crime seriously enough and this remains a weak point. It reflects the weakness of both the state and the government. The consolidation of democracy in Latin America calls for a reduction of the fear of crime felt by the vast majority of the regions inhabitants. Crime which is perceived to be ever more prevalent and as an ever more important problem may be both a consequences and, at the same time, a cause of the low levels of social and workplace morality discussed above. 93

PUBLIC SAFETY POLICIES MORE EFFECTIVE


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010
Q. In your opinion, which are the most effective policies in public security? * Multiple question, the percentages total are more than 100%. **Here only Increase the amount of policemen in the streets EFFECTIVE NUMBER

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Summary: Latin American societies have a problem to which insufficient attention has been paid. They need to recognize that they have a serious problem with public safety. Nine in ten of the regions citizens think they may be a victim of crime and this should be sufficient to prompt a new approach with solutions that have a clear impact, particularly at a time when the region has successfully begun to reduce poverty and extreme poverty and the performance of its governments has, in general, improved. One in two Latin Americans want more police on their countrys streets. Corruption Along with crime, corruption is also an issue that affects democracy and support for democracy in Latin America. The regions inhabitants believe there has been progress in reducing corruption, even if the largest increase in this perception occurred between 2004 and 2007, when it rose from 26% to 39%, and it has since tended to hold steady. In 2010, moreover, it dropped slightly to 37%, down from 39% in 2009.

94

PROGRESS IN REDUCING CORRUPTION


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2004 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. How much do you think there has been progress in reducing corruption in state institutions over the past 2 years? Lot, some, little or nothing. * Here only 'much' more 'Something'.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2004 2010.

Efforts to reduce corruption are most apparent in the indicator of personal knowledge of an act of corruption. This has shown a sustained drop throughout the decade and, in 2010, reached 11%, down from 27% in 2001.
ACTS OF CORRUPTION
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2001- 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Have you, or any relative, heard of any act of corruption in the last twelve months? Here only Yes

Source: Latinobarmetro 2001 - 2010

Again, as in the case of crime, we see a divergence between perceptions and the number of events that actually occur. 95

Use of Internet in Latin America Below we present a series of indicators on Internet use in Latin America. The speed at which it has penetrated is particularly interesting, especially when viewed by country. Prevalence of Internet In Latin America, 59% say they have never used e-mail or connected to Internet while 6% say they have done so but almost never and 20% say they have done so occasionally and 13% say they do so every day. Only 2% do not answer. Chile is the country with the regions highest level of connectivity, with only 42% saying they have never connected. It is followed by Argentina, with 46%, and Venezuela, with 48%. At the other extreme, Paraguay has the lowest level of connectivity, with 74% reporting that they have never connected. It is followed by Nicaragua (71%) and Honduras (70%). In total, there are ten countries where 60% or more of the population has never used Internet.

HAVE YOU EVER USED AN E-MAIL OR INTERNET CONNECTION? TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010 .TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Have you ever used email or connected to the internet? *Here only No, never

NEVER HAS CONNECTED TO INTERNET


Paraguay Nicaragua Honduras 59 Bolivia Guatemala Ecuador 20 Panam Repblica Dominicana El Salvador Mxico 13 Brasil Colombia Per 6 Uruguay Costa Rica Venezuela 2 Argentina Chile 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Latinoamrica 0 10 20 30 40 No, never

No, never

Yes, occasionally

Yes, every day

74 71 70 68 68 65 64 64 64 62 56 53 53 52 51 48 46 42 59
50 60 70 80 90 100

Yes, rarely

DNK/DNA

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

The evolution of the penetration of Internet is interesting because of the speed at which it has taken place. Among the 1,600 variables measured by Latinobarmetro between 1995 and 2010, this is, without doubt, the one that has evolved most rapidly. In the space of just seven years, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela have almost trebled their level of connectivity and it has doubled in most of the regions other countries.

96

Table N 23: Use de Internet by country, 2002-2010 (%) Q. Have you ever used e-mail or connected to Internet? 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 Chile 20 23 35 40 42 Argentina 25 29 29 44 48 Venezuela 18 24 30 40 58 Uruguay 15 21 33 35 41 Costa Rica 20 22 31 33 39 Peru 19 21 34 40 45 Colombia 17 24 33 28 34 Brazil 13 19 28 35 39 Mexico 54 45 44 26 31 Panama 21 22 29 32 35 Dominican Rep. 24 26 33 Ecuador 15 18 24 22 24 Bolivia 14 15 23 32 33 Guatemala 17 9 25 30 14 Paraguay 11 10 12 13 18 El Salvador 11 13 17 17 26 Honduras 10 11 22 25 24 Nicaragua 13 12 19 16 17 Latin America 19 20 27 30 34
Source: Latinobarmetro 2002-2010

2008 48 47 53 37 36 44 46 44 39 29 36 29 34 16 22 24 21 18 35

2009 47 46 49 42 42 47 38 43 32 28 34 26 32 21 19 25 18 21 34

2010 58 54 51 47 47 46 45 42 38 36 34 32 31 26 25 24 24 23 39

Use of Internet every day The percentage of Latin Americans who use Internet every day increased from 11% in 2008 to 13% in 2010. The figure is highest in Chile (24%) followed by Argentina (23%) and Uruguay (21%) while it is lowest in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Bolivia (all with 5%).

97

DO YOU USE E-MAIL OR INTERNET CONNECTION? EVERY DAY


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010 .TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Have you ever used email or connected to the internet? *Here only Yes, every day
Chile Argentina Uruguay Venezuela Costa Rica Colombia Brasil Panam Mxico Per Repblica Dominicana Paraguay Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Bolivia Nicaragua Guatemala Latinoamrica 0 Source: Latinobarmetro 2008-2010.

24 23 21 18 16 16 15 12 12 12 12 8 7 7 6 5 5 5 13
10 20 Yes, every day 30 40

Most frequent purpose of Internet use Internet is used most frequently to search for information (25%). This is followed by its use to access e-mail or Messenger (23%). Argentina is the country in which use of Internet to obtain information is most frequent (43%) while Chile is the country in which its use to access e-mail or Messenger is most frequent (40%) and, in this use, it is followed by Argentina (39%) and Venezuela (36%). The countries in which use of e-mail is lowest are Honduras (8%), Nicaragua (10%) and Guatemala (12%) while the countries in which use of Internet to obtain information is lowest are Honduras (12%) and El Salvador (13%).

98

USE OF INTERNET: INFORMATION AND MAIL


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010. TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Regardless of the place where you access internet, what is the most frequent use you make of it? *Here only Information and Mail/Messenger MAIL / MESSENGER Information
To look for information

25

To access an email account/ messenger

23

For entertainment

16

For study

12

For work

12

Do paperwork

Shopping

DNA/DNK

Not applicable

65
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

Use of social networks Facebook is used by 19% of the regions inhabitants, YouTube by 13% and Windows Live by 9%. In Chile, 41% use Facebook but, in Brazil, only 4%.

USE OF SOCIAL NETWORK

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010. TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.


Q. Do you use any of these social networking services if you use one? Here only Facebook

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

99

Table N 24: Summary of Internet use by country, 2010 (%) Place where Social accessed: networks: home Facebook 30 38 34 30 28 25 24 37 21 29 19 21 26 4 15 14 14 18 12 20 13 19 10 9 10 13 9 11 6 12 4 15 6 10 3 9 16 19

Chile Argentina Uruguay Venezuela Colombia Costa Rica Brazil Mexico Peru Panama Dominican Rep. Paraguay Ecuador El Salvador Honduras Bolivia Guatemala Nicaragua Latin America
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Never 47 46 52 49 56 51 56 62 53 64 64 74 65 64 70 68 68 71 60

For Every day information 22 36 23 43 21 33 18 31 20 31 16 30 15 28 12 20 12 35 12 18 12 23 8 17 7 17 7 13 6 12 5 20 5 14 5 15 13 25

For e-mail /Messenger 39 39 34 35 27 30 25 18 30 15 15 16 14 14 8 15 12 10 23

Summary: Latin America has advanced rapidly in connectivity via Internet. Chile leads the region in this field with the largest percentage of people using the different tools. The Central American countries use Internet least. The speed of progress by country is particularly interesting and three countries have trebled Internet penetration in just seven years. This is the variable that has changed fastest out of the 1,600 measured by Latinobarmetro. THE MARKET ECONOMY AND PRIVATIZATIONS The market economy and privatizations have been important features of Latin Americas return to democracy. Acceptance of the market economy and the role of private companies are part of the process of consolidation of democracy in the region. The market economy and private companies In 2010, we see an important increase in prevalence of the belief that a market economy is the only system through which a country can achieve development. In 2010, this view is held by 58% of the regions inhabitants, up from 47% in 2009. In 2010, moreover, it reaches at least 50% in all countries, up from just six countries in 2009. Support for the market economy as the only system for attaining development was highest in 2005 when, after three years of sustained growth, it reached 63%, up from 57% in 2003. This was a period 100

of unprecedented economic growth and, in 2007, with the start of the economic crisis, it drops to 47% before recovering to 56% in 2008 and dropping again to 47% in 2009. Latin Americans appear to value the market economy during good times but to be less enthusiastic during periods when economic performance is weaker. Rather than taking an ideological position, they view the market economy as a tool. In 2010, faith in the market economy was highest in Paraguay (65%), Brazil (63%) and Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia and Nicaragua (all with 62%) and was lowest in Peru (50%).

MARKET ECONOMY IS THE ONLY SYSTEM TO BE DEVELOPED TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2003 -2010 -TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the phrases that I will read. The market economy is the single system in which (country) can become developed. * Here only 'Strongly agree' and agree'.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2003- 2010.

The 11-point increase in average regional faith in the market economy seen in 2010 reflects an increase of at least 20 points in six countries: Ecuador, Guatemala, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. It also increased in Brazil and Mexico but by less than the regional average while it showed no change in Costa Rica and, in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama, dropped by between one and six points.

101

Table N 25: A market economy is the only system through which a country can achieve development (%) 2003 45 33 51 71 60 50 56 2004 51 59 56 54 50 61 63 64 53 60 63 72 61 70 57 66 70 55 58 2005 59 56 56 56 69 66 74 58 62 63 65 73 64 65 64 64 69 50 56 2007 40 31 36 44 48 41 65 61 41 47 58 52 49 42 54 47 63 47 31 2009 37 36 32 44 41 42 45 46 43 47 53 48 44 57 48 56 62 64 57 2010 61 58 54 65 62 62 62 60 56 58 63 56 50 58 51 56 62 59 51 Diff. 2009-2010 24 22 22 21 21 20 17 14 13 11 10 8 6 1 3 0 -1 -5 -6

Ecuador Guatemala Argentina Paraguay Uruguay Venezuela Colombia Dominican Rep. Chile Latin America Brazil Mexico Peru Honduras Bolivia Costa Rica Nicaragua El Salvador Panama

52 57 69 65 60 75 54 64 73 56 41

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Private companies are indispensable Although the belief that a market economy is necessary for a countrys development is widespread, the idea that private companies are indispensable is even more prevalent.
PRIVATE COMPANY IS NECESSARY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2004-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the phrases that I will read. Private enterprise is indispensable to the development of the country * Here only 'Strongly agree and agree'

Source: Latinobarmetro 2004 - 2010

102

In 2010, 71% of Latin Americans agreed with the statement that private companies are indispensable for the countrys development. The figure was even higher in Ecuador (81%), Venezuela (80%), Paraguay (76%), the Dominican Republic (78%), Chile (76%), Uruguay (77%), Costa Rica (76%), Brazil (75%) and Honduras (74%). The countries in which it was lowest were Bolivia (62%), Nicaragua (61%), Peru (61%) and Guatemala (59%) but, even in these countries, it exceeded 50% In 2010, support for private companies as important for development was the highest since Latinobarmetro first measured the indicator in 2004 and, moreover, represented an acceleration of its sustained growth which had been apparent since 2009. Between 2009 and 2010, the legitimacy of private companies increased by at least ten points in six countries.

Table N 26: Private companies are indispensable for the countrys development (%) 2004 2005 2007 2009 2010 Diff. 2009-2010 Ecuador 66 45 43 44 81 37 Paraguay 58 53 65 57 76 19 Argentina 48 44 46 53 69 16 Colombia 62 63 61 51 67 16 Dominican Rep. 75 63 62 64 78 14 Brazil 61 61 61 64 75 11 Chile 72 72 58 66 76 10 Uruguay 49 66 59 67 77 10 Nicaragua 70 56 69 51 61 10 Latin America 64 59 56 61 71 10 Mexico 65 64 55 59 68 9 Peru 58 51 54 56 61 5 Honduras 75 63 55 69 74 5 Costa Rica 71 76 57 72 76 4 Panama 75 72 62 67 71 4 Bolivia 48 46 51 61 62 1 El Salvador 66 59 51 66 66 0 Venezuela 66 63 61 81 80 -1 Guatemala 56 50 39 61 59 -2
Source: Latinobarmetro 2004-2010

Benefits of privatizations The issue of privatizations has become more complex because Bolivia and Venezuela have been nationalizing public services while, in Uruguay and Costa Rica, no privatizations have taken place. As seen over the years in Latinobarmetro surveys, privatizations have faced an uphill struggle in attempting to recover their initial legitimacy as beneficial (46% in 1998). After this dropped to 22% in 2003, they begin to regain ground year by year until reaching 36% in 2010, with a sustained fouryear increase that was not interrupted by the crisis and suggests further increases can be expected in the coming years. 103

PRIVATIZATION HAS BEEN BENEFICIAL FOR THE COUNTRY


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1998-2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Are you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the phrases that I will read. Privatization of State enterprise has been beneficial for the country Here 'Strongly Agree' and agree.

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998 - 2010

The view that privatizations are beneficial for the country is most widespread in Ecuador (53%) and Brazil (51%). There was a particularly surprising increase in Ecuador as compared to 2009 when, with 26%, it was in one of the lowest positions in the region. In Guatemala, however, the perception of privatizations as beneficial drops by ten points in 2010 to the lowest level in the region. Table N 27: Privatizations of state companies have been beneficial (%)
Ecuador Argentina Dominican Rep. Nicaragua Paraguay Chile Mexico Peru Brazil Colombia El Salvador Honduras Panama Guatemala Bolivia Costa Rica Uruguay Venezuela Latin America 1998 52 39 45 45 51 50 44 50 39 54 47 20 62 49 61 29 51 46 2000 40 26 43 37 32 37 38 32 30 35 42 22 30 35 39 26 54 35 2001 31 17 31 33 43 30 22 39 14 25 21 37 23 24 31 23 48 29 2002 40 14 31 19 22 28 31 38 23 35 34 30 28 23 32 16 38 28 2003 21 12 20 24 29 31 22 33 24 15 25 10 16 19 NA 17 32 22 2005 33 25 31 29 22 37 38 31 41 40 22 31 14 28 26 21 36 44 31 2007 45 19 55 29 22 33 40 32 45 35 38 33 27 26 43 29 NA 47 35 2009 26 18 39 29 29 26 37 28 50 34 40 36 45 33 NA NA NA NA 34 2010 53 30 48 38 37 34 41 31 51 30 35 28 36 23 45 NA NA 43 36 Diff. 20092010 27 12 9 9 8 8 4 3 1 -4 -5 -8 -9 -10

Source: Latinobarmetro 1998 - 2010

104

Satisfaction with privatized services A second question about privatizations asked over the years by Latinobarmetro measures satisfaction with privatized services. As in the case of the benefits of privatizations, this indicator has increased since 2004 when it reached a low of 19%. It peaked at 35% in 2008 and, in 2010, dropped to 30%.
SATISFACTION WITH PRIVATIZED SERVICES
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 20032010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Now that we have privatized state-owned services, water, electricity, etc.. Taking into account price and quality are you now very more satisfied, satisfied, less satisfied or much less satisfied with the privatized services ? Here only A lot more satisfied' and More satisfied'.
Brasil Bolivia Ecuador Venezuela Panam Paraguay Mxico Nicaragua Colombia Argentina El Salvador Repblica Dominicana Chile Per Guatemala Honduras Costa Rica Uruguay Latinoamrica 52 50 45 41 38 35 35 35 32 30 29 28 27 27 18 6 0 0 30

0
Source: Latinobarmetro 2003 - 2010.

20

40

60

Table N 28: Satisfaction with privatized services (%) 2003 2004 2005 2006 20 NA 20 19 13 15 17 13 25 20 35 44 22 20 24 32 9 9 15 22 20 18 30 38 26 26 35 44 28 21 30 30 21 17 33 29 13 24 32 12 15 16 22 15 15 25 28 NA 20 26 27 21 15 24 45 NA NA NA NA 35 32 34 42 NA NA NA NA 33 32 44 42 21 19 27 32 105 2008 30 22 30 21 20 57 51 27 32 35 47 28 NA 49 NA NA NA NA 35 2009 25 27 23 22 36 44 54 30 38 36 38 37 33 NA NA NA NA NA 34 2010 35 35 30 27 38 45 52 27 32 28 29 18 6 50 NA 35 NA 41 30 Diff. 2009-2010 10 8 7 5 2 1 -2 -3 -6 -8 -9 -19 -27

Paraguay Nicaragua Argentina Chile Panama Ecuador Brazil Peru Colombia Dominican Rep. El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Bolivia Costa Rica Mexico Uruguay Venezuela Latin America
Source: Latinobarmetro 2003-2010

-4

A summary of these attitudes is presented in the Table N 29 below. Summary of attitudes towards the economy, 2010 In the table below, we see that Latin Americans do not take a clear line in their attitudes towards different economic issues. The score is highest in the indicator which identifies private companies as key for the countrys development. In the case of the average of these indicators in the countries where the four questions were included, we find that scores are highest in Brazil and Ecuador, both with 60%, while, in Peru and Honduras, they are lowest at only 42%. Table N 29: Summary of attitudes towards the economy, 2010 (%) A market Private Privatizations Satisfaction with Average privatized/nationalized* economy is the companies of state only system are companies have services through which indispensable been beneficial to achieve for the for the country development countrys development Brazil 63 75 51 52 60 Ecuador 61 81 53 45 60 Venezuela 62 80 43 41* 57 Dominican Rep. 60 78 48 28 54 Paraguay 65 76 37 35 53 Bolivia 51 62 45 50* 53 Mexico 56 68 41 35 50 Nicaragua 62 61 38 35 49 Panama 51 71 36 38 49 Latin America 58 71 36 30 49 Chile 56 76 34 27 48 Colombia 62 67 30 32 48 El Salvador 59 66 35 29 47 Argentina 54 69 30 30 46 Peru 50 61 31 27 42 Honduras 58 74 28 6 42 Guatemala 58 59 23 18 40 Uruguay 62 77 N/A N/A N/A Costa Rica 56 76 N/A N/A N/A
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010 N/A = Not applicable because of absence of privatizations. * Nationalization.

Summary: The image of the market economy has been affected by the economic crisis. This is not, however, the case of perceptions of private companies as indispensable for development and represents a response to economic events, rather than ideological considerations. Privatizations have seen a gradual consolidation in attitudes, although with some temporary setback as regards both their benefits and satisfaction with privatized services. Nationalization is a highly ideological issue in some countries as seen in Bolivia where it produces 50% satisfaction with services. 106

LEADERSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA This section analyzes different aspects of leadership within Latin America and the image of countries such as Cuba and Venezuela about which debate is most intense. Latin American country with the most leadership As in previous Latinobarmetro surveys, Latin Americans identify Brazil as the regions leading country (19%) ahead of the United States and Venezuela (both with 9%). In the case of Brazil, this represented an increase from 18% in 2009 while, for the U.S., there was no change and, for Venezuela, a drop from 11% to 9%.

COUNTRY WITH MORE LEADERSHIP IN THE REGION


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2009 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2009 - 2010
Q. Which is the country in Latin America has more leadership in the region? *Open-ended question.
Argentina Uruguay 50 48 32 30 23 23 21 19 19 15 12 6 6 5 5 4 3 2 19 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Brasil 2010

Uruguay Argentina Brasil Paraguay Chile Per Bolivia Colombia Venezuela El Salvador Ecuador Mxico Costa Rica Panam Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Repblica Dominicana Latinoamrica 7 7 6 5 4 3 2 18 27 26 23 22 21 17 15 13 11

49 44

18
Brasil

Brasil Paraguay Chile Colombia Bolivia Per El Salvador Venezuela Ecuador Guatemala Repblica

19

9
USA

11
Venezuela

Mxico Costa Rica Honduras Nicaragua Panam Latinoamrica

9
0 5 10 15 20 25

2009

2010

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Brasil 2009

Source: Latinobarmetro 2009 - 2010.

Uruguay and Argentina are the countries in which Brazil is most widely identified as the regions leading country. Brazil is an immediate neighbor of these countries and is important in their trade. The United States, at a distance of ten points from Brazil in 2010, appears in Latin Americans list of their regions leading countries although, strictly, it doesnt belong there since the question is which country in Latin America has most leadership in the region? The dominance that the U.S. has had in Latin America is no secret and this result merely confirms its persistence. In the first year of the Obama administration, this leadership has, however, declined. Despite having lost two percentage points since 2009, Venezuela is on a par with the U.S. However, this is a weak result and, as seen below, Venezuela does not elicit massive applause in the region and this is confined rather to its most exclusive friends. It is also equally significant that 35% do not answer this question. Favorable opinion of Obama, Lula and Chvez In answer to the question about interviewees opinion of Presidents Barack Obama, Hugo Chvez and Lula da Silva, we find that, in 2010, 73% have a favorable evaluation of Obama, up from 71% in 107

2009. He is followed by Lula with 67%, up from 52% in 2009, and, in third place, Chvez with an increase from 27% to 33%.

OPINION ABOUT LEADERS


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2009 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Now, I would like to ask talk about several foreign leaders. Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of U.S. President Barack Obama, Brasil President Lula Da Silva, Venezuelas President Hugo Chvez, or havent you heard enough to say? *Here only Very favorable and somewhat favorable.
Repblica Dominicana Costa Rica Chile Colombia Brasil Ecuador Panam Honduras El Salvador Per Uruguay Argentina Paraguay Bolivia Mxico Nicaragua Guatemala Venezuela Latinoamrica 0 10 20 30 40 50

93 89 84 81 80 79 77 77 76 74 69 69 64 60 60 60 60 55 73
60 70 80 90 100

Barack Obama
Source: Latinobarmetro 2009 - 2010

The Dominican Republic is the country in which favorable opinions of Obama are most prevalent (93%) while his image is worst in Venezuela where the percentage of the population with a favorable opinion dropped to 55%, down by six points on 2009.

OPINION ABOUT LEADERS


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2009 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. Now, I would like to ask talk about several foreign leaders. Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of U.S. President Barack Obama, Brasils President Lula Da Silva, Venezuelas President Hugo Chvez, or havent you heard enough to say?

Barack Obama

73 17 67

Lula da Silva

16 33
Hugo Chvez

53 0 10 20
Favorable
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

30

40

50
Unfavorable

60

70

80

90

100

108

The weakness of Chvezs leadership is seen in the adverse opinion of him held by 53% of Latin Americans as compared to only 16% and 17% for Lula and Obama, respectively. (The difference between favorable and adverse opinions for each leader and 100% is explained by those who dont answer or dont know). Influence of the United States, Brazil and Venezuela If these results (evaluation of leaders) are compared with perceptions of the influence their countries have in the region, we find a direct relation between the two variables. As in the case of the previous question, Latin Americans consider that the United States has the greatest positive influence (67%) while Brazil, which was included in the question for the first time this year, takes second place (61%). Venezuela, in third place, has 41% which, although a lower figure, represents an increase of seven points on 2009.

INFLUENCE OF COUNTRIES
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2007 2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Now thinking about the role that the USA, Venezuela and Brasil, play in Latin America and considering everything that they do, would you say that, in general, they play a very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative role? *Here only Very positive and fairly possitive.

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
2009 2010

64

67 61 41

34

United States
Source: Latinobarmetro 2009-2010

Venezuela

Brasil

Positive influence of Venezuela Venezuelas image emerges clearly when favorable opinions of Chvez are compared with perceptions of the countrys positive influence in the region.

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IMAGE OF VENEZUELA
TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. I would like to talk you about some foreign leader, do you have very favorable opinion(1), some favorable(2), some unfavourable(3), or very unfavourable(4) of the president Hugo Chavez from the Venezuela, or you havent ear enough to say(5)? * Here only 'very favorable' more 'Some favorable'. Q. Now, thinking in the role played for Venezuela in Latin America, and everything that do, in general will you say that Venezuela have a positive influence or a negative one. Do you think that is very positive, some positive, some negative or very negative? * Here only 'Very positive' and 'Some positive'

Favorable Opinion of Hugo Chvez

Positive Influence of Venezuela

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

As a country, Venezuela has a much more favorable image (41%) than its president (33%). Image of democracy in Latin American countries: The perceived degree of democracy The degree of democracy that the regions citizens attribute to different countries is an indicator of their image since, as has been extensively documented in the past, Latin Americans knowledge of other countries is limited. Latinobarmetro asked interviewees to place their own country on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means not democratic and 10 totally democratic. The same question was then repeated for the U.S., Spain, Honduras, Venezuela, Cuba and Canada (the latter included for the first time in 2010).

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PERCEIVED DEGREE OF DEMOCRACY


TOTAL LATINA AMERICA 2010
Q. With a scale of 1 to 10, please assess how democratic is (country). The "1" means "(country) is not democratic" and "10" means "(country) is totally democratic" Where would you put? *Here Average

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Countries have a high opinion of their own degree of democracy and a more critical opinion of the state of democracy in other countries. On average, the regions countries give themselves a score of 6.5 as compared to 7.0 for the U.S., 6.7 for Canada and 6.6 for Spain. These latter are fully consolidated democracies whereas Latin American democracies are still in the process of consolidation, but this difference does not appear to be totally clear among the regions inhabitants. In the case of Spain, we find a difference of at least 20 points in support for democracy there measured using the same question applied in the opinion barometer carried out there by Madrid-based CIS Centro de Investigaciones Sociolgicas - and the average for Latin America. The score that Latin Americans give their own democracy has increased over time, rising from 5.8 in 1997 to a maximum of 6.7 in 2009 before dropping to 6.5 in 2010.

111

HOW DEMOCRATIC IS COUNTRY?


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 1997-2010 - TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. With a scale of 1 to 10, please assess how democratic is (country). The "1" means "(country) is not democratic" and "10" means "(country) is totally democratic" Where would you put? *Here only Average

Source: Latinobarmetro 1997-2010.

Table N 30: Countries perceived degree of democracy


OWN COUNTRY VENEZUELA Uruguay 7.9 4.9 Costa Rica 7.7 3.9 Brazil 7.2 5.0 Chile 7.1 4.1 Venezuela 7.1 N.A. Panama 7.0 4.0 Dominican Republic 6.7 5.0 Colombia 6.5 3.6 Latin America 6.5 4.3 Argentina 6.5 4.5 Ecuador 6.3 5.1 El Salvador 6.1 4.5 Nicaragua 5.9 5.1 Peru 5.9 3.2 Honduras 5.8 3.3 Mexico 5.7 4.2 Paraguay 5.6 4.3 Guatemala 5.5 4.9 Bolivia 5.4 4.3
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

HONDURAS 5.1 4.3 4.8 4.8 5.8 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.3 4.8 4.6 4.9 4.6 N.A. 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.6

CUBA 3.7 2.9 4.2 2.8 3.1 2.7 3.2 3.0 3.5 3.2 3.8 4.4 4.6 3.3 3.1 3.7 4.0 4.5 3.7

SPAIN 7.2 6.6 5.7 6.9 7.0 6.3 6.7 6.4 6.6 6.5 6.8 6.8 7.2 6.5 7.4 6.0 6.5 6.4 6.3

U.S. 7.1 7.3 7.0 7.4 6.9 7.4 7.4 7.2 7.0 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.0 6.9 7.3 6.6 6.8 6.6 6.1

CANADA 7.4 6.9 6.0 7.2 7.3 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.6 7.4 6.5 7.9 6.4 6.5 6.3 5.9

The first column shows citizens evaluation of the level of democracy in their own country. This is highest in Uruguay (7.9 points) and lowest in Bolivia (5.4) while the average for the region is 6.5 points.

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It is interesting that the highest score that other countries give Venezuela and Cuba (5.1 points for Venezuela in Ecuador and 4.6 points for Cuba in Nicaragua) are below the lowest score that any country gives its own democracy (5.4 in Bolivia). This is also the case for Honduras with the exception of the score of 5.8 points it receives from Venezuelans. There are, in other words, three countries - Venezuela, Cuba and Honduras - whose democracy has a poor image among the regions inhabitants. The table is also interesting in that it illustrates the distance between each Latin American countrys perceived level of democracy and that of three countries with consolidated democracies. Uruguay, Costa Rica and Brazil value their own democracies more than those of these first-world countries. Honduras is harder on itself - or, perhaps, more realistic - in that the distance between the score it gives itself and those it gives to these three countries is one of the largest in the region. This question also provides an insight into cross-images. Cubas image is best in Central America (El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala) and in Brazil. Evaluations of Cuba are less ideological than those of Venezuela in whose case Uruguay, Ecuador and Nicaragua are the countries with the best image of its democracy. Criticism of Cuba is more universal whereas that of Venezuela is more ideological. Chile, Panama and the Dominican Republic are the countries that attribute the highest level of democracy to the United States. This information is very important because it provides a context for the perceptions that countries have of the democracy of others. Democracy in the U.S. is evaluated very differently by different countries, with scores ranging from 6.1 to 7.4 points, while Canadas scores vary from 5.9 to 7.4 points. The largest variation is, however, seen in the case of Spain, with scores that range from 5.7 to 7.4. Moreover, there are countries, such as Brazil, where all three receive a low evaluation. How democratic is Cuba? According to 36% of Latin Americans, Cuba is not democratic in that they give it only one or two points on the scale of 1 to 10 of how democratic a country is. It is interesting to note that this view is most prevalent in Venezuela where it reaches 55%. As discussed in the chapter by Daniel Zovatto, Cuba faced a number of incidents with international repercussions in 2010 involving hunger strikes by political prisoners who were finally freed. The political cost of these problems is reflected in this trebling of the perception that Cuba is not democratic.

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HOW DEMOCRATIC IS CUBA?


TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. With a scale of 1 to 10, please assess how democratic is Cuba. The "1" means Cuba is not democratic" and "10" means Cuba is totally democratic" Where would you put Cuba? *Here only Not democratic 1 y 2; Average
Venezuela Panam Repblica Dominicana Chile Costa Rica Honduras Colombia Argentina Per Ecuador Uruguay Mxico Bolivia Nicaragua Paraguay Brasil Guatemala El Salvador Latinoamrica
0 10

55 51 49 49 45 45 44 39 37 34 33 30 29 23 23 21 19 19 36
20 30 40 50 60 70

Nicaragua Guatemala El Salvador Brasil Paraguay Ecuador Uruguay Bolivia Mxico Per Argentina Repblica Dominicana Venezuela Honduras Colombia Costa Rica Chile Panam Latinoamrica
0 1 2

4.6 4.5 4.4 4.2 4 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.5 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not democratic

Average

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

Table N 31: Cuba is not democratic, 2009-2010 2009 2010 Difference Ecuador 29% 34% 5 Peru 34% 37% 4 Colombia 41% 45% 4 Argentina 37% 39% 3 Chile 44% 46% 2 Honduras 43% 45% 2 Bolivia 27% 29% 2 Paraguay 22% 23% 1 Latin America 37% 36% -1 Brazil 23% 21% -2 Venezuela 57% 55% -2 Uruguay 36% 33% -3 Dominican Republic 53% 49% -3 Mexico 34% 30% -4 Costa Rica 49% 45% -4 Panama 55% 51% -4 Guatemala 25% 19% -6 El Salvador 26% 19% -7 Nicaragua 31% 23% -8
Source: Latinobarmetro 2009-2010

Perceptions of the degree of democracy in Cuba are lowest in Panama (2.7) and Chile (2.8).

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Embargo against Cuba Answers to the question about the U.S. embargo against Cuba reflect a majority view in favor of its lifting (64%) and only 10% consider it should be maintained. Surprisingly, the countries in which support for the embargo is highest are Panama (19%), Costa Rica and Brazil (both with 15%) while, in Ecuador, Argentina and Paraguay, there is almost universal consensus in favor of its lifting, with only 4% or 5% in favor of its maintenance.

FOR OR AGAINST THE EMBARGO ON CUBA


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. Are you in favor of maintaining the U.S. embargo against Cuba, or are you in favor of ending the U.S. embargo against Cuba? *Here only In favor of the Embargo

Ending with the Embargo

64

DNA/DNK

27

In favor of the US. Embargo

10

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

Summary: As seen in previous Latinobarmetro surveys, Latin Americans hold Cuba in considerable affection and perceptions of the level of democracy that exists there reflect this benevolence. The overwhelming rejection of the embargo is a further sign of sympathy for the Cuban people. Only 27% do not answer this question which is not very high compared to other questions. However, this years results also show that this is not an impediment to criticism. Cuba is punished this year by Latin Americans for the human rights incidents involving political prisoners. Latin America understands violations of human rights only too well and does not need to read the news in order to know what they entail. Cuba should not forget that it has a friend in the regions population but there are limits to what it is prepared to accept. Friends need to be looked after and Cuba is not doing so.

115

Image of presidents and international leaders Since 2005, Latinobarmetro has analyzed the image of the regions presidents and a number of overseas leaders, using a scale of 1 to 10 on which 1 means very bad and 10 means very good. We saw above the favorable image of some leaders including President Barack Obama of whom, in 2010, 73% had a favorable opinion while, in this question, he obtains a score of 6.3 points. Lula also receives this same score while, in the question on favorable opinions, he is five points below Obama.

EVALUATION OF LEADERS
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010.
Q. I am going to list a number of leaders of foreign countries. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "very bad" and 10 is very good, or do you not know the person well enough to respond? * Here only 'average; DNA/DNK
Barack Obama Luis Ignacio Lula Da Silva El Rey Juan Carlos I Mauricio Funes Jos Luis Rodrguez Zapatero Felipe Caldern Jos Manuel Santos Jos Mujica Laura Chinchilla Rafael Correa Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner Sebastin Piera Fernando Lugo Alan Garca Evo Morales Daniel Ortega Hugo Chvez Fidel Castro

6.3 6.3 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 5 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.3 3.9 3.8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

El Rey Juan Carlos I Jos Luis Rodrguez Zapatero Laura Chinchilla Felipe Caldern Jos Manuel Santos Fernando Lugo Rafael Correa Alan Garca Mauricio Funes Sebastin Piera Jos Mujica Evo Morales Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner Daniel Ortega Barack Obama Luis Ignacio Lula Da Silva Fidel Castro Hugo Chvez
0 5

10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7
10 15 20

Average
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010.

DNA/DNK (%)

The worst evaluated leaders are Fidel Castro, with 3.8 points (down from 4.0 points in 2009 when he was in penultimate place) and Hugo Chvez, with 3.9 points (the same as in 2009 when he was last), and Daniel Ortega, with 4.3 points (the same as last year when he was also third to last). King Juan Carlos I of Spain again takes third place in the list of leaders, with 5.8 points, and remains within the small range of variations he has shown since 2005. However, along with Jos Luis Rodrguez Zapatero, these two Spanish leaders - in other words, from a country outside the region receive the highest percentage of dont knows.

116

EVALUATION OF LEADERS
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2010.
Q. I am going to list a number of leaders of foreign countries. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "very bad" and 10 is very good, or do you not know the person well enough to respond? * Here only 'average.

2006 Barack Obama Luis Incio Lula Da Silva Rey Juan Carlos I Jos Luis Rodrguez Zapatero Felipe Caldern Mauricio Funes Juan Manuel Santos Jos Mujica Laura Chinchilla Rafael Correa Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner Sebastin Piera Fernando Lugo Alan Garca Evo Morales Daniel Ortega Hugo Chvez Fidel Castro 5,9 5,9 5,6

2007 5,9 5,9 5,6 5

2008 5,7 5,7 5,5 5

2009 7 6,4 5,9 5,8 5,7

4,7

5 4,7 5,5 4,3 4,8 4 4,3 4,2

5 4,8 5 4,7 4,8 4,3 3,9 4

4,6 4,9 4,5 4,3

4,6 4,9 4,5 4,3

2010 6,3 6,3 5,8 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,5 5,4 5,3 5,2 5,1 5 4,9 4,8 4,7 4,3 3,9 3,8

Source: Latinobarmetro 2006 - 2010

EVALUATION OF LEADERS: KING JUAN CARLOS


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2005 2010. TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. I am going to list a number of leaders of foreign countries. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "very bad" and 10 is very good, or do you not know the person well enough to respond? * Here only 'average. 10 Costa Rica 6,9 Panam 6,7 9 Nicaragua 6,6 Repblica Dominicana 6,6 8 Colombia 6,2 Guatemala 6,1 7 Paraguay 6,1 5,9 Mxico 6 6 6 Venezuela 6 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,7 Chile 5,9 5 Uruguay 5,8 4 5,7 El Salvador Bolivia 5,6 3 5,5 Per Honduras 5,4 2 5,2 Argentina Brasil 4,8 1 4,5 Ecuador Latinoamrica 5,8 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

9 10

Source: Latinobarmetro 2005-2010.

In analyzing these results, it is important to consider the number of interviewees who dont answer. As seen in the graphs below, evaluations of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chvez have shown a systematic drop.

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EVALUATION OF LEADERS: FIDEL CASTRO


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2005 2010. TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. I am going to list a number of leaders of foreign countries. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "very bad" and 10 is very good, or do you not know the person well enough to respond? * Here only 'average.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2005-2010.

EVALUATION OF LEADERS: HUGO CHVEZ


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2005 2010. TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010.
Q. I am going to list a number of leaders of foreign countries. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "very bad" and 10 is very good, or do you not know the person well enough to respond? * Here only 'average.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2005-2010.

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Summary of attitudes: U.S.-Brazil In this last question about leaders, we compare attitudes in the United States and Brazil. As shown above, Obamas evaluation drops from 7.0 points in 2009 to 6.3 points in 2010. This is surprising since everything pointed to an increase in the importance and influence of the U.S. under Obama.

EVALUATION OF BARACK OBAMA


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2009 2010 TOTALS BY COUNTRY 2010
Q. I am going to list a number of leaders of foreign countries. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "very bad" and 10 is very good, or do you not know the person well enough to respond? * Here only 'average.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2009 - 2010.

Evaluations of Lula, on the other hand, rise from 5.9 points in 2008 to 6.3 points in 2010.
EVALUATION OF LEADERS: LUIS IGNACIO LULA DA SILVA
TOTAL AMRICA LATINA 2005-2010 TOTALES POR PAS 2010
Q. I am going to list a number of leaders of foreign countries. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "very bad" and 10 is very good, or do you not know the person well enough to respond? * Here only 'average.

Source: Latinobarmetro 2005-2010.

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Not only is Brazil seen as the country with the greatest leadership in the region but Lula also obtains the same evaluation as the U.S. president. Brazil also approaches the U.S. in terms of perceptions of its positive influence, with a gap of only six points, and differs only in the question on favorable opinions of leaders where Obama leads Lula by five points. The difference between these two indicators - one on a verbal scale and the other on a numeric scale - also illustrates the way in which opinions can vary depending on the way a question is asked. This is why all the different issues are examined using far more than one question, giving a result that is not only more complex but also a more balanced reflection of peoples views. Table N 32: Summary of attitudes: U.S.-Brazil U.S. Brazil Leadership 9% 19% Favorable opinion 73% 67% Positive influence 67% 61% Degree of democracy 7% 7,2% Evaluation of leaders 6,3 6,3
Source: Latinobarmetro 2010

Brazil has emerged as a world power not only in terms of its economic importance and role on the international stage but also in the eyes of the regions citizens, competing with the image of the United States and its president. Summary: Without doubt, the regions leader is again Brazil. Its image as a country and that of its president are the best in the region. It is now on a par with the U.S. and its president and, in addition to its international leadership, has emerged as the leader in the eyes of Latin Americans. Favorable opinions of Barack Obama increase but, at the same time, he is more poorly evaluated, dropping on a scale of 1 to 10 from 7.0 points in 2009 to 6.3 in 2010. There is clear criticism of Cuba and the percentage of Latin Americans who think it is not democratic trebles. We interpret this as a punishment for the human rights problems of the Castro regime in 2010. With 3.8 points, Fidel Castro is the regions worst evaluated leader while a majority of the regions population favors the lifting of the U.S. embargo against Cuba. VALUES FOR THE NEXT GENERATION We conclude this report with an indicator of the values that Latin American adults would like to transmit to the next generation. This list of values replicates a question included in the World Values Study and has been asked by Latinobarmetro twice in the past 15 years. We find that, between 2002 and 2010, there has been an increase in the importance of the two values seen as key in that they are the most frequently mentioned: good manners which increases from 84% to 89% and obedience which rises from 74% to 80%. These two values tend to be characteristic of traditional societies.

120

VALUES FOR THE NEXT GENERATION


TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 2002 - 2010
Q. Thinking about the qualities that can be encouraged in kids within the household, if you would have to pick one, which one do you consider is particularly important to be taught to the kids? * Multiple, the percentages total more than 100%. **Here only Obedience

Obedience

Source: Latinobarmetro 2002 - 2010.

In 12 of the regions countries, obedience receives over 80% of mentions while, in the other six, it obtains between 67% and 77%. It is, in other words, a value that is universally regarded as important in all countries. The paradox is that in more modern societies - and there are some 90 with which we can compare - these values show a drastic drop. As shown in the table below, not only is the importance attached to obedience diametrically different in Asian and European countries and the United States, but there is also evidence that, in these countries, it has dropped over time whereas here, in Latin America, it has increased. The importance of obedience as compared to other countries: % 80 32 15 12 4

Latin America U.S. China Germany Japan

(Latinobarmetro) (World Values Study) (World Values Study) (World Values Study) (World Values Study)

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TECHNICAL DATA BY COUNTRY, 2010


Country Company MBC MORI Consultores IPSOS Apoyo, Opinin y Mercado S.A. Methodology Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage probabilistic sample Modified probabilistic sample: conglomerates, stratified and multistage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Four-stage modified probabilistic sample in urban areas and three stages in rural areas, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample, with quotas in final stage Three-stage modified probabilistic sample in urban areas and four stages in rural areas, with quotas in final stage Four-stage probabilistic sample Sample (N of cases) Sampling Error (95% intervals of confidence) +/- 2.8% Representation (% of total population) 100%

Argentina

1,200

Bolivia

1,200

+/- 2.8%

100%

Brazil

IBOPE Brazil

1,204

+/- 2.8%

100%

Chile

MORI Chile S.A. Centro Nacional De Consultora CID-GALLUP

1,200

+/- 2.8%

100%

Colombia

1,200

+/- 3.5%

100%

Costa Rica

1,000

+/- 3.1%

100%

Dominican Republic

CID-GALLUP

1,000

+/- 3.1%

100%

Ecuador

IPSOS Apoyo, Opinin y Mercado S.A. CID-GALLUP

1,200

+/- 2.8%

100%

El Salvador

1,000

+/- 3.1%

100%

Guatemala

CID-GALLUP

1,000

+/- 3.1%

100%

Honduras Mexico

CID-GALLUP Olivares Plata Consultores S.A. CID-GALLUP

1,000

+/- 3.1%

100%

1,200

+/- 2.8%

100%

Nicaragua

1,000

+/- 3.1%

100%

Panama

CID-GALLUP

1,000

+/- 3.1%

100%

Paraguay

Equipos MORI Consultores

1,200

+/- 2.8%

100%

Peru

IPSOS Apoyo, Opinin y Mercado S.A. Equipos MORI Consultores

1,200

+/- 2.8%

100%

Uruguay

1,200

+/- 2.8%

100%

Venezuela

DATANALISIS

1,200

+/- 2.8%

100%

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