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W hile the two major publications deriving from the 1920s Cartesian Meditations and Formal and Transcendental Logic incorporate the results of Husserls reflections on time-consciousness and passive synthesis, they remain focused on the nature of theoretical knowledge and the objectivity appropriate to it. T hey point to the need for regressive inquiries into the constitution of sense, inquiries that reveal the layering of sense over time and its development in intersubjective communities of inquirers. However, they continue to neglect in large part the historicality of the experiences themselves. Husserl addresses this question of the historicality of experience most explicitly in his last work, Die Krisis der europischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phnomenologie (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology), published in 1936, as well as in the texts collected and published posthumously in Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (19181926) (included in the translation Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic ) and Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and Judgment). The Crisis emphasizes how scientific experience, especially in the natural sciences, is fo rm ed on the basis o f an imm ed iately exp erienced wo rld comprising descriptive, affective, functional, evaluative, and motivational moments as well as within the context of living traditions that shape our apprehension of this immediate experienced world. In the context of this discussion, Husserl identifies the important notion of the life-world, but his account of the life-world is amb iguous. It means at different times: an abstractly conceived world on which higher meanings of the sort belonging to science, philosophy, and culture in general are grounded; and the concrete world that is already pre-given and taken for granted in our experience, a world that already includes the sedimented deposits of the history of science, philosophy, and culture. The first sense captures Husserls idea that different levels of experience are built on more fundamental levels, and this abstract notion of the life-world is the meaning-fundament on which higher levels of sense are built. The second sense captures the idea that experience of the world is already historically formed in secondary passivities before someone co m es to think actively ab o ut that wo rld. T his world is already rich in emotional dimensions, functio nal and p ractical d im ensions, theoretical dimensions, as well as cultural dimensions. New experiences new ways of making sense of the worldboth depart from this world and contribute to it. Although the Crisis describes the historicality proper to all experience, this d o es no t neg a te H u sse rls view that the ideal meanings co nstituted in experience can be trans-temporal in character, and in certain cases, such as logic and mathematics, are always trans-temporal in character. The concrete historicality of experience also plays an important role in Husserls ethical reflections. Husserls earliest ethical reflections are organ-