TUMALAD vs.

VICENCIO FACTS: On 1 September 1955 Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Tumalads over their house of strong materials located at Quiapo, Manila, which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The mortgage was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila on 2 September 1955. The mortgage was executed to guarantee a loan of P4,800.00 received from the Tumalads, payable within one year at 12% yearly. Monthly payments are to be made starting September 1955 to July 1956, and the lump sum of P3,150 was payable on or before August 1956. It was also agreed that default in the payment of any of the amortizations would cause the remaining unpaid balance to become immediately due and payable, the Chattel Mortgage enforceable, and the Sheriff of Manila authorized the to sell the property in a public auction for payment of debt. When Vicencio and Simeon defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder, the Tumalads were issued the corresponding certificate of sale. On 18 April 1956, the Tumalads commenced civil case in the MTC of Manila, praying that the house be vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for Vicencio and Simeon to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the time the possession is surrendered. On 21 September 1956, the municipal court rendered its decision in favor of the Tumalads. Vicencios appealed to the court a quo which also rendered a decision against them. On appeal, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals for the reason that only questions of law are involved. Tumalads failed to file a brief and this appeal was submitted for decision without it. Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been demolished on January 1957 by virtue of a decision obtained by the lessor of the land on which the house stood. ISSUE: Whether or not the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only personal properties can be subject of a chattel mortgage? HELD: The inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (art. 415, New Civil Code) could only mean one thing that a building is by itself an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. Certain deviations, however, have been allowed for various reasons; if parties to a contract by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property. In the contract now before Us, the house on rented land is not only expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage the property together with its leasehold rights over the lot on which it is constructed and participation ..." Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage Vicencios could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which Vicencios merely had a temporary right as lessee, and although this can not in itself alone determine the status of the property, it does so when combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties, particularly the mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty. Finally unlike other jurisprudence wherein third persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage, it is the Vicencios themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants, having treated the subject house as personalty.

TUMALAD V. VICENCIO Although a building is an immovable; the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature is a real property however they are estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. FACTS: Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon received a loan of P4, 800 from Gavino and Generosa Tumalad. To guaranty said loan, Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Tumalad over their house of strong materials which stood on a land which was rented from the Madrigal & Company, Inc. When Vicencio defaulted in paying, the house was extrajudicially foreclosed, pursuant to their contract. It was sold to Tumalad and they instituted a Civil case in the Municipal Court of Manila to have Vicencio vacate the house and pay rent. The MTC decided in favor of Tumalad ordering Vicencio to vacate the house and pay rent until they have completely vacated the house. Vicencio is questioning the legality of the chattel mortgage on the ground that 1) the signature on it was obtained thru fraud and 2) the mortgage is a house of strong materials which is an immovable therefore can only be the subject of a REM. On appeal, the CFI found in favor of Tumalad, and since the Vicencio failed to deposit the rent ordered, it issued a writ of execution, however the house was already demolished pursuant to an order of the court in an ejectment suit against Vicencio for non-payment of rentals. Thus the case at bar. ISSUE: Whether or not the chattel mortgage is void since its subject is an immovable HELD: NO.Although a building is by itself an immovable property, parties to a contract may treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property and it would be valid and good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. By principle of estoppel, the owner declaring his house to be a chattel may no longer subsequently claim otherwise. When Vicencio executed the Chattel Mortgage, it specifically provides that the mortgagor cedes, sells and transfers by way of Chattel mortgage. They intended to treat it as chattel therefore are now estopped from claiming otherwise. Also the house stood on rented land which was held in previous jurisprudence to be personalty since it was placed on the land by one who had only temporary right over the property thus it does not become immobilized by attachment. [Vicencio though was not made to pay rent since the action was instituted during the period of redemption therefore Vicencio still had a right to remain in possession of the property]