DIZON vs SUNTAY G.R. No.

L-30817 September 29, 1972 FACTS: Suntay was the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring valued at P5.5k (in 1962). In June 1962, Suntay entered into an agency to sell with Clarita Sison. Unknown to Suntay, Sison pawned the ring to Dizon who owns a pawnshop. Time passed, and Sison failed to sell the ring nor was she able to return the ring to Suntay. Upon knowledge of the pledge, she filed a case of estafa against Sison as well as sent a written demand to Dizon for the return of the ring. Dizon refused. Suntay filed for a replevin suit which she won. Dizon appealed and he lost. He claims that estoppels should be used against Dizon as she left the ring under the custody of Sison who then pawned it to her. ISSUE: Whether or not Suntay can still claim the ring.

HELD: Suntay can recover the ring, under Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides: The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. Suntay who was unlawfully deprived of the ring was entitled to recover it from Dizon who was found in possession of the same. In the present case, not only has the ownership and the origin of the ring misappropriated been unquestionably proven but also that Sison has fraudulently and in bad faith, disposed of and pledged them contrary to agreement, with no ownership, and to the prejudice of Suntay, who was thereby illegally deprived of said jewels. The owner has the right to recover Dizon must bear the burden due to his misplaced confidence. Suntays right over the ring is superior to that of Dizon. Estoppel may not be used against Suntay. She is the rightful owner merely exercising her right to recover. Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to Dizons rescue. He is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be taken, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized