Jrn Hokland, Siv.Ing., Dr.Scient., Cand.Psychol.

Accra, 26th Oktober 2011

To Dean Jan Morten Dyrstad, SVT-Faculty, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

Remarks to the evaluation of the thesis Principia Psychologica

I thank the three committee members, Dr. Pl Johan Karlsen, Oslo, Professor Ruud van der Weel (administrator), Department of Psychology, NTNU, and Professor Aaro Toomela, Tallinn University, for taking on the challenging task of evaluating Principia Psychologica (PP) for the defense for the degree of dr.philos. at NTNU. The committee is divided in a majority of two members who accept PP as a thesis to be defended for dr.philos., and a minority of one who does not. I appreciate the committees positive recognition, by all three members: The project as a whole is the most ambitious for any doctoral thesis the committee have come across. The unusual fundamental focus of the project justifies, in our opinion, several of the unusual qualities of the thesis. [] The author of the thesis demonstrates extensive knowledge; this extensive knowledge is organized according to basic principles he proposes. In that perspective, the thesis goes beyond the limitations of modern textbook accounts of psychology (and human mind). the majority: [T]he thesis demonstrates knowledge and understanding of psychology far beyond usual theses where some very local problems are dealt with. the minority: The third committee member [] appreciates the candidates immense knowledge of the literature of history of ideas, but concludes on the basis of the arguments presented []

I also thank the committee for their valuable comments. Each and every one of their critizisms are addressed below, in 43 remarks. I am prepared and look forward to the opportunity to defend my thesis. Page numbers in PP will be referred to as e.g. PP:322-328 (pages 322 til 328). --The committee first writes that it [...] must always be possible to answer the questions such as: How do you know? Why do you think in this way? Or Why are you writing this idea here? In our view, these questions are absolutely essential for science, but are only sparsely addressed in the thesis. Remark 1: A general strategy in academic writing is to back up ones claims with reference to statements made by other academicians (PP31-41). This is true for most publications and their paragraphs/statements/claims. Only when they come to present their original idea(s), will authors use fresh facts, original illustrations, new examples and logic. Since PP uses these established strategies, I disagree that How do you know? is sparsely addressed. On the contrary, I back up my knowledge with 4000 quotes, and I offer original synaptic learning rules and equations, new neural net diagrams, a fresh domino analogy; images, movies, etc.
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Remark 2: In a compilation, paragraph = quote, and intellectual gaps between paragraphs are thus greater than in a single-minded text. PPs carefully selected quotes are thematically organized (according to the proposed connectionist theory) in chapters and subchapters, within which ideas are arranged to minimize gaps. In other words, each idea is thematically more closely related to the ideas just preceding and just following it, in answer to Why are you writing this idea here? The plurality of intellect still makes the text challenging, and the committee appreciates that it is partly for educational reasons: Reading a text in this format forces the reader [] to pay special attention to the ways information is selected and pushes to look for justifications by oneself. In mainstream psychology texts, the format sometimes is superficially convincing and helps in this way to hide weak points of the presentation. Another reason for chosing the method of compilation is that otherwise, either PP would not be such a rich source of psychological principles, or PP would not be only 700 pages. Remark 3: I disagree that it must be possible to answer Why do you think in this way? To make this a requirement would be to make rational science and justification impossible. Why goes both to motive why people want what they want and to cause: how people have come to think the way they do. Psychical causes are explained in chapter 2 to have also genetic factors e.g. the philosophical rationalist may think the way he does because he is of William James tender minded type (PP:11) and/or because he is innately close-minded (PP:158) and dogmatic (PP:322-328). Psychical causes are explained in PP also to have learned factors the rationalist may be so because he has developed an obsessive defense (PP:597). Causes of motives are explained in chapter 9. People often construct good reasons to disguise the less accepted of the converging (un)conscious motives driving their acts (PP:465-466). E.g., some rationalist may answer that I think the way I do because of my superior first principles and logic, but his stronger motive may rather be the one given by the two majority members; A safe way of producing a thesis with positive results would be to repeat earlier work with minor modifications. This is how majority of doctoral theses are written these days. An original psychological theory for how people learn to and do plan for positive results is given in chapter 11. I have read psychology that tells me only that the psychologist wants tenure. That is the only thing expressed in his writing. It is like reading one long job application. Such applications are boring to read. (PP:34) How can I know that some psychologist thinks the way he does only because he wants tenure? I cannot. The gloomy prospect of the nature-nurture controversy warns us that genetic versus learned causes/motives cannot be identified neither by statistics, nor by years on the psychoanalytic bench trying to answer why (PP:194-198). As they say in Ghana when people ask impossible questions, Because wh has a long tail. The committee writes: [T]he source of the basic ideas of the thesis is, even after modern standards of science, relatively unusual. Typically novel ideas are connected to an existing theoretical framework and it is shown how novel questions and propositions emerge from that framework. However, basic principles defended in the thesis originate from subjective experience they are said to result from A-HA moments. Remark 4: The committee here confuses the source of and the defense of ideas. As elaborated below, the proposed three learning rules are indeed connected to an existing theoretical
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framework [connectionism] and it is shown how novel questions [e.g., Do the synaptic rules self-organize in simulations?] and propositions [e.g. single instance and insight learning explained] emerge from that framework. This is partly recognized by the committee in a later statement: The compilation is essentially the theoretical argument for the empirical rules. Remark 5: Academic norm does not require the subjective source of original ideas be stated: A defense suffices. But it is no violation of academic norm to do so we do know the sources of most scientific breakthroughs especially when stated only in a preface, as I do in PP1-2. I did so because my creative process exemplifies the psychology of instability and creativity (PP:103-105) and the psychology of when creative plans click (PP:568-569). The committee claims: The author presupposes (p. 35) that every author who has been able to publish something scientific, and having done so using legitimate methods, has produced something worthy and scientifically valuable. And [] another questionable assumption every theory has something meaningful that must be united in order to build unified psychology.The author of the thesis has tried to take from as different theories as possible Remark 6: PP:35 states that When appropriately trained people have worked systematically in an area and have published something, it must be assumed that it might contain fragments of value. This does not mean blind acceptance, but it also rules out blind rejection. Grand theory must be constructed by the principle of inclusion, rather than the traditional methodology of exclusion. The might is very important. Nowhere in PP do I presuppose that every author has produced something worthy and scientifically valuable. Neither have I tried to take from as different theories as possible. Nor do I ever assume that every theory has something meaningful. On the contrary, I explicitely warn against blind acceptance. The committee goes on to kick in open doors: Furthermore, in the context of the history of science, it is quite obviously not justified to believe that all the scientists by neccessity published something that contains scientifically valuable information. Remark 7: Nowhere in PP do I disagree with this statement I obviously agree. Countless scientists and publications are not mentioned in PP. Remark 8: Nevertheless, I hold that in order to unify psychology, the principle of inclusion must replace the traditional principle of exclusion. Freud, Watson, Piaget, Skinner, Rogers, Mead, Neisser, Tolman, Tomkins, Pavlov, Bowlby, Bernstein, Beck, and Vygotsky have all made original and significant contributions to psychology, and must therefore be included. The committee writes: Already the format of the thesis does not allow going really beyond the limits of psychology today; compilation allows organizing what is already given and in this case the claim for novelty would have required going beyond the limits of the format. Remark 9: The compiler connects texts to new wholes, and adds only what he feels lacking (PP:33). The compiler [] adds only what he feels lacking (PP:34). The compiler [] adds [] what he feels lacking (P:36). [T]he focus here falls [] on the communication of ideas that [] are quite adequately expressed in domino analogy movies and pictures, neural network diagrams, equations, and descriptive headers (PP:33). In a few places [] I had to add my own
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words (PP:40). I added my own chapter paragraphs and my own appendix paragraphs. [I]n chapter endnotes I included my own remarks (PP:38). And I added my own footnotes. Thus the format of PP does indeed allow going really beyond the limits of psychology today. The claim for novelty does not require going beyond the format of the compilation. The minority member writes: It is frustratingly difficult to seek out and identify the original argument here. Remark 10: As far as I know, there is no mention in the literature of the following elements of my theory: The domino analogy used as a didactic tool for conveying (PPs) connectionism. If Spike-Timing Dependant Plasticity works to keep things on our mind (describing working memory, not long-term memory as is often assumed), it may solve the binding problem (PP:66). If PPs proposed class of three synaptic plasticity mechanisms exists (PP:179-182), this may explain single instance and insight learning (PP:182,224,286,486,569). If Skinner rule synaptic plasticity exists (PP:222-225), it may explain how the various need drives learn to transform into wishes (PP:227-230,PP:357-363,PP:417-433,PP535-536). If Golgi tendon organs provide need drive, via Skinner synapses, this may explain how animals shape into smooth, energy-efficient behaviors (PP:251-252). If touch of soft skin, sight of human face, and sound of human voice generate reduced need drive, via Skinner synapses, this may explain how human beings form attachment behaviors (PP:253-261,PP:384). If genital receptors provide need drive, via Skinner synapses, it may solve Freuds economic problem (PP:261-262). If inconsistencies between the expected and the presented provide a consistency need drive (PP:266-269), via Skinner synapses, it may explain intellectual curiosity (262-266,PP:269-271), attention (PP:322-328), and what drives interests (PP:363-365). If discrepancies between the wanted and the possible produce a consistency need drive, this may explain loss and what drives sadness (PP:391). What drives word acquisition? Is there between the clusters of object-concepts and the clusters of wordconcepts a maturational phase of axonal sprouting which expands objects into a diffuse landscape of words, so that when exposed to some object, due to such diffuse discrepancies, drive-patterns do not completely assimilate, but rather make the consistency need curiously express: Whats the name of that? (PP:270) Conceptualize your models behavior, then adapt your own behavior so it consistently assimilates into your conceptualized model. This may explain how the consistency need drives imitation learning (PP:433-440). If Pavlov rule synaptic plasticity exists (PP:284-287), it might produce not only feed-back (top-down) but also feed-forward (bottom-up) neocortical anticipation (PP:337). If Pavlov-Skinner affect neurons exist (PP344-363), this may explain how motivation grows in affect-concept loops (PP417423). If Hume rule synaptic plasticity exists (PP:484-487), this may explain how objects and phenomena are conceptualized and grasped as they move (PP:482-483). If Hume rule synaptic plasticity exists, it may explain how neurons learn to compete for earliest warning (PP:486). If Hume rule synaptic plasticity exists, this may explain how effects learn to drive their causes, essentially making a new theory for planning and cognition (PP:535-551). If Pavlov rule habituation exists (PP:582-584), it may explain therapeutic desenzitiation (chapter 12). On the ethics of simulated self-organization: Brilliant enough to do it and wise enough not to tell (PP:634-641).

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Accra, 26th Oktober 2011

The committe writes: One could also argue that the thesis is dangerously complex. That is to say, it is possible to defend too many prepositions, including mutually exclusive ones, by relying on different sets of facts selected from the thesis. Remark 11: Chapter 1 defends Freuds connectionist principle that brain-psyche consists of memory and I, of which memory learns to represent attractors between which I choose. I have not been able to identify on which sets of facts selected from PP it is possible to defend prepositions that contradict this core principle. Remark 12: Chapters 2 and 3 address the nature-nurture controversy. This ancient debate about human nature has normative/political implications and thus is dangerously complex. Remark 13: Chapters 4 to 6 defend the controversial principles that brain-psyche is a cybernetic system aiming to minimize conflicting need drives, furthemore that the new and original Skinner rule shapes attractors for this purpose, and that need drives include not only biological but also social and intellectual needs. The committee does not supply sufficient information to show on which sets of facts selected from PP it is possible to defend prepositions that contradict these core and consistent principles. Remark 14: Chapter 7 defends the behaviorist principle that brain-psyche, in the service of minimizing need drives, by the forgotten synaptic Pavlov rule shapes attractors to anticipate future situations and events, and by the Pavlov rule builds habits, including language habits. I have not been able to identify on which sets of facts selected from PP it is possible to defend prepositions that contradict this core principle. Remark 15: Chapter 8 defends the psychodynamic principle that brain-psyche, in order to minimize need drives that might occur in the future, amplifies and by the Pavlov rule learns to anticipate needs by the neuronal systems known as affects. The committee does not supply sufficient information to show on which sets of facts selected from PP it is possible to defend prepositions that contradict this core principle. Remark 16: Chapter 9 defends the romanticist principle that affects, via Skinner synapses, drive wishes and goals, including self-standards, thus making self-gratification possible. This chapter also proposes an original connectionist theory as to how imitation learning builds selfstandards and goals. I have not been able to identify on which sets of facts selected from PP it is possible to defend prepositions that contradict these core and consistent principles. Remark 17: Chapter 10 defends the forgotten principle that spatial phenomena, by the new and original Hume rule, are conceptualized and grasped as they move (not, as is claimed by the current paradigm (PP:661-670); when phenomena are static they never are). The so learned concepts concrete and near in time, or abstract and far from now become part of attractors that represent the combination of future possibilities (chapter 7), wishes for the future (chapters 8 & 9), and retrospective action plans (chapter 11). The committee does not supply sufficient information to show on which sets of facts selected from PP it is possible to defend prepositions that contradict these core and consistent principles.

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Remark 18: Chapter 11 defends the original idea that plans are learned by the Hume rule to be chains of effects driving their causes so that later, a desired (wished for) effect may be achieved by recreating what will cause it. This chapter basically presents a new theory for neocortex and cognition. I have not been able to identify on which sets of facts selected from PP it is possible to defend prepositions that contradict it. Remark 19: Chapter 12 defends the painful idea that desensitization, learned by habituation in the Pavlov rule, is the major effective principle in all of psychotherapy. The committee does not supply sufficient information to show on which sets of facts selected from PP it is possible to defend prepositions that contradict this core principle. Remark 20: PP from page 1 to 53 claims that the core connectionist principles of chapters 1 to 12 make one consistent and original overall connectionist theory of brainpsychology. These principles thus deserve qualified attention, theoretical evaluation, and extensive testing. The committee writes: [A] weak point of the proposed research program is, following the axioms that underlies the thesis itself, that it emphasizes the individual and the properties of the individual nervous system over the environment. It is true, that the research program includes suggestions that individuals should be mathematically modeled as situated in the environment. Yet, there is no theory of the environment whatsoever. Remark 21: It is not true that there is no theory of the environment whatsoever. PP refers to physical models of organisms biomechanics and ecological niche (PP:625). The committee continues: As if it is secondary even though already with works of Uexkll it became clear that physically identical environments are qualitatively fundamentally different for different organisms. Psychology only adds that, in some sense, every human individual lives in a different environment. Remark 22: The latter is uncontroversial. PP:94-102 explains how brain-psyche constructs its own perceptions of environments. But if we agree that any two individuals have qualitatively different perceptions of the same physical environment, must not these perceptions then be aspects of their psyches/brains, and not of their environments which we agree are identical? And are not environments then secondary to how psyche produces different perceptions? The committee writes: [O]ne of the central arguments of the thesis is that study of mind should start from the study of the brain. At the same time, however, the thesis also cites several passages from Vygotskys theory without realizing that Vygotskys ideas cannot be translated into such an axiomatic base. Vygotskian approach rests on the principle that individual (biological and psychological) and environment constitute unity that cannot be broken without losing the defining qualities of the psyche. Remark 23: The committee here seems to claim that, logically; either PP should not have cited any passages from Vygotsky, or since PP:113-122, PP:520-523, etc. do cite some of Vygotskys ideas PP must accept the Vygotskian Approach Principle (VAP): that basic properties of brain-psyche change with varying environments. I do not agree with this logic. I claim both that I can quote ideas from Vygotsky and that the VAP is false.
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Remark 24: Several critical paragraphs in the evaluation seem to be based on the VAP. If the VAP is true, then PPs approach is wrong. Thus the only way to defend PP is by falsifying the VAP. The committee does not justify VAP, but A.Toomela (ed., 2003), in Cultural Guidance in the Development of the Human Mind, does: There is an extremely important principle to be understood: When a component is included into a system, both the properties of the new whole and the properties of the component change (Hobhouse, 1901; Koffka, 1935; Khler, 1947). An example, used by Gestalt psychologists and Vygotsky many times, is that of the molecule of a water. Elements of the molecule, hydrogen and oxygen, burn or support burning. The composite whole, H2O, however, can be used for extinguishing fire. The components after inclusion into a molecule cannot behave in a way they could before the inclusion into a whole. This chemical example/justification is fundamentally flawed. The mistake is in Elements of the molecule [] burn or support burning. They do not. Elements of the molecule are atoms, and atoms do not burn. Molecules burn. Vygotsky is confusing elements and wholes. It is true that H2 and O2 molecules can be said to burn or support burning, and that H2O molecules extinguish fire: Properties of the old and new wholes are different. However, it is not true that basic properties of their components hydrogen and oxygen atoms change. Before or after any chemical reaction, each hydrogen atom has one proton, no neutrons, and obeys unchanging principles for atom-atom interaction. Similarly for oxygen atoms and for all other atoms: Properties of components do not change (unless their subcomponents change). This holds generally. Ergo VAP is false, and brain-psychological change principles (next remark) can safely be studied without any theory of the environment. Psychological principles do not change, but psychical states do (remarks 21-22). Such states, however, are ephemeral and secondary. Our topic is scientific Psychological Principles , not the myriad of Psychical States. The minority member writes:This is clearly an unusual [] thesis [] in terms of research questions. Remark 25: PP:45 asks the fundamental connectionist research question: What is the simplest set of neuronal spiking principles and synaptic learning principles from which all behavioral and psychological phenomena emerge? As shown in the endnotes to page 45, this is not an unusual research question among two winners of the Nobel Prize in Physiology & Medicine, E.R.Kandel and G.Edelman, nor among the physicists J.A.S.Kelso and C.Koch, nor among psyhologists S.Freud, W.Khler, J.L.McClelland, J.L.Elman, E.A.Bates, A.Karmiloff-Smith, D.Parisi, M.H.Johnson, K.Plunkett (and countless others next remark). The two committee members who accept PP agree that this research question is important: The thesis pushes to answer fundamental questions [] It is definitely important to understand how exactly learning takes place in the brain. The minority member continues: To judge [this thesis] is to be confronted by ones own limits and to experience doubt and self-doubt. [] Ideally, I believe this work rather should have been judged by a group of cognitive scientists. Remark 26: PP presents a specific connectionist theory. Connectionism has been a growing subfield of cognitive psychology since the publication of Parallel Distributed Processing:
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Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition (1986): We do not classify our enterprise as reductionist, but rather as interactional. We understand that new and useful concepts emerge at different levels of organization. We are simply trying to understand the essence of cogniton as a property emerging from the interaction of connected units in networks. (PP:21) A decade later, connectionism is also established as a subfield of developmental psychology, e.g. Rethinking Innateness: A Connectionist Perspective on Development (1996): Although mathematical models are common in some areas of psychology, and computer simulations have a long tradition in fields such as artificial intelligence, many developmentalists may find the methodology of computer simulation of models to be strange. Yet such simulations play a central role in connectionism, and we deem them important. Why? First, these simulations enforce a rigor on our hypotheses which would be difficult to achieve with mere verbal description. Implementing a theory as a computer model requires a level of precision and detail which often reveals logical flaws or inconsistencies in the theory. Second, although connectionist models often appear simple they are, after all, merely collections of simple neuron-like transformation elements, wired together their simplicity is deceptive. The models possess nonlinear characteristics, which makes their behavior difficult (if not impossible) to predict. The use of distributed concepts also means that the models exhibit emergent behaviors which can usually not be anticipated. The simulation therefore plays the role of an empirical experiment in allowing us to study the behavior of our theory in detail. Of course, it remains to be demonstrated that the model and human that it simulates do things the same way; but the model can be a rich source of hypotheses and constraints which we might not have stumbled across in human experimentation. Indeed, the conceptual role played by these models, in giving us new ways to think about old problems, is for us one of the most exciting and profitable reasons to do connectionist simulations. (PP:622-623) Today scientists belonging to the connectionist camps publish in thriving journals including Cognitive Neurodynamics, Biological Cybernetics, Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience, Frontiers in Neuroinformatics, Journal of Mathematical Neuroscience, Neural Computation, Neural Networks, Journal of Computational Neuroscience, Network: Computation in Neural Systems, Computation in Neural Systems, Neurocomputing, Journal of Neural Engineering, and PLoS Computational Biology. The lengthy process of having PP evaluated for the doctoral degree has shown that, unfortunately, connectionism is not yet the central paradigm of psychology. The committee writes:[P]roblems in the thesis emerge because of what exactly has been chosen from the myriad of facts and speculations of psychology. [] Unfortunately the synthesis did not emerge. Remark 27: Connectionism is a general language for expressing specific psychological theories, and PP is not a general introduction to connectionism (but see the two titles named in remark 26). From the myriad of facts and ideas of psychology, in PP is chosen exactly those consistent with my specific connectionist theory: spread over chapter beginnings (PP:24). In cases where the synthesis unfortunately does not emerge, this may be due to a lacking appreciation of the connectionist rationale. My core psychological principles, my basis for judgment [of what ideas to include and what ideas to exclude], are choice (the integrative

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action of the nervous system), gratification (learned by the Skinner Rule), anticipation (learned by the Pavlov Rule), and conceptualization (learned by the Hume Rule). (PP:37) After reading this justification for my choice of ideas, the committee holds: It appears the choice [of ideas] has been made on subjective and largely rationally unjustified grounds (cf. [PP:]37); the author has selected what he felt to fit his theoretical worldview and has rejected information that does not fit without any justification, otherwise known as selective quoting Remark 28: See previous remark for justification of what has been selected. Regarding what has been rejected, PPs specific connectionist theory contradicts and justifies the rejection of Skinners anti-mentalism (PP:647-648), Kants philosophical rationalism (PP:497-504), the information-processing paradigm and artificial intelligence (PP648-655), Aristoteles associationism and Hebbs rule (PP:661-666), Lockes tabula rasa (PP:504-511), Sejnowskis information-theoretic psychology (PP673-676), and more, see the main text. Furthermore, in endnotes, PP justifies the rejection of Heads storehouse memory (P:136), Hawkins philosophical realism (PP:139), Searles lack-of-consciousness-theories hypothesis (P:142), McCrae & Costas anti-neuronal personality theory (PP:171), Plomin & Daniels statistical research program (PP:205), Trolands beneceptor hypothesis (PP:216+276), Freuds secondary drive theory (PP:277), Freuds castration anxiety and penis envy (PP:478), Dayan & Abbots temporal redundancy hypothesis (PP:530), Churchlands philosophical materialism (PP:533), Kandel, Jessell, & Sanes data fitting (PP:670), Schmajuks rejection of the domino analogy (PP:670), Pinkers stone soup brain (PP:680), and more. I do not understand what the committee means by selective quoting. The committee writes: [T]he thesis is a theoretical work that leads to what the author calls a Research Program. The shortcomings of the thesis become more obvious here. [] First, the aim of the research program has been declared to mathematize psychology as a remedy of fragmentation. This suggestion alone is rather questionable as the last decade or two provide increasing evidence that psychological attributes may not be measurable in principle. [] The author of the thesis also makes it clear that modeling is about variables without recognizing that variables can be meaningfully interpreted only if their content is fully understood. Full understanding of variables, however, implies measurement. And psychological attributes may not be measurable. Remark 29: PP never declares that its aim is to mathematize psychological attributes, nor that it is to measure and interpret psychological variables. On the contrary, and consistent with the committees view, PP argues against certain use of statistics in psychology (PP:194-198). Remark 30: PP does however declare that one of its aims is in a certain sense to mathematize psychology, namely, to describe quantitatively the neuronal-synaptic self-organization that underlies the emergence of all psychological phenomena. I think such a mathematization is not a sufficient but a necessay step in the development of psychology and neurophysiology as a science. In connectionist models, it is neuronal and synaptic variables not psychological variables that are modeled. It may be true that psychological variables can be meaningfully interpreted only if their content is fully understood, and that psychological attributes may not be measurable. But it is not true that neuronal and synaptic variables cannot be measured
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and interpreted. Neuronal action potentials (=spIkes) and synaptic efficacies are physical properties that can be measured and interpreted neurophysiologists do so every day. The committee writes: In conclusion, the proposed research program in general is not sufficiently grounded it does not show how the speculations proposed in the thesis must be practically implemented in the models. Remark 31: I agree that the proposed set of three synaptic rules (not four synaptic rules as believed by the committee member who rejects the rules) must be practically implemented in the models. And indeed they are. On page 631, the three learning rules are implemented in the form of three equations. From a modeling perspective, it is difficult to see how the proposed research program could have been any more firmly grounded. The committee [] does not think that a few mathematical formulas would be sufficient to explain anything, including the psyche. Remark 32: I fundamentally disagree. Newtons few mathematical equations sufficiently explain the essence of mechanical dynamics. Maxwells few equations sufficiently explain the essence of electromagnetic dynamics. And for the ongoing quest for the essence of psychical dynamics, see remarks 25-31. A French poem may one day express the essence of love, but in order then to grasp it, one must know French. Overall assessment writes: The committee in general, disagrees with most of the central ideas presented in the thesis; We do not think that the idea of learning rules is sufficient (or even necessary) for unifying psychology; more likely these or such rules are the content of psychology, these rules should be explained and not proposed as final solutions. Remark 33: This assessment seems to contradict the opinion of some of the committee members. First, P.J.Karlsen, in What is Memory? (2008), writes that all forms of memory acquisition and learning happen by synaptic learning rules: Even though the acquisition of factual knowledge, episodic memories, and insight breaks with the learning principles of behaviorism, it is reason to believe that also higher forms of learning rely on different forms of synaptic plasticity. [...] Learning and memory are conditioned by underlying physiological processes in the nervous system, especially in the form of synaptic plasticity (my translation from the Norwegian). And the two members who accept PP states: It is definitely important to understand how exactly learning takes place in the brain. For instance, currently there is no explanation available explaining how in one moment of development humans [] become able to learn from single instances (It is not true that there is currently no explanation available see remark 10). If the committee majority agree that a unified psychology must include explanations of mentioned phenomena, and that these depend on underlying synaptic learning rules, then I do not understand how the committee can state that [] we do not think that [] learning rules [are ] even necessary [] for unifying psychology. Nor do I understand what is meant by; more likely these or such rules are the content of psychology, these rules should be explained and not proposed as final solutions. How, specifically, in the committee members opinion(s), should such rules materialize, if not as proposed hypotheses in answer to PPs research question? (Remark 25)
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Overall assessment continues: The committee also disagrees in the belief that learning rules alone can explain psyche and memory. Remark 34: Regarding memory, see previous remark. Regarding the whole psyche, I have not been able to identify the grounds for thinking that I believe learning rules alone can explain it they cannot. PP builds on the general connectionist and neuroscientific foundation that brain-psyche has primarily two dynamic (changing) states; first, the total spIke state (in PP called I), and second; the synaptic memory (besides which there is no other memory, see P.J.Karlsen in remark 33). Synaptic learning and memory is necessary, but not sufficient, to understand the dynamics of I, and thus of the whole psyche (PP:47). The dynamics of I require in addition the understanding of spIke dynamics (PP:631-632), for which mathematical models Hodgkin and Huxley in 1963 won the Nobel Prize in Physiology & Medicine (PP:57). The majority members write: In the end, we feel, the thesis leads to a dead end. Remark 35: In order for such a lethal conclusion to have been justified, PPs three proposed learning rules and their connectionist theory must have been falsified. So far, they have not, see remarks 11-20. All or some of the three hypothesized rules for synaptic plasticity might be correct (PP:630), and if they are, they will contribute to revolutionize and unify psychology, neuroscience, and the way we look at ourselves. Or the rules might be false we do not know yet. But we do know that the alternative, ruling paradigm is probably false (PP:661-666). Remark 36: Theoretical critizism is only one of three routes to possibly concluding that one or more of of the proposed learning rules are dead ends. The other routes are experimental neurophysiological falsification (PP:322-328 and PP:629), or after decades of widespread modeling efforts, a future lack of modeling success (the research program even states criteria for success; PP:627-628). The journey has just began, and definite conclusions are premature. The minority member writes: The candidate [] fails to argue [] how (theoretically/ empirically) his rules bring about this unification. Remark 37: Throughout PP, I do argue (e.g. chapter 3, appendix B) and examplify (PP182-183, chapters 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12) that within connectionism; specific sets of learning rules make specific brain-psychological theories. And it is PPs specific connectionist theory, laid out in chapter beginnings (PP:3), that provides the necessary content and structure by which, using the method of compilation, a unification of psychological facts, theories, and schools is proposed. The minority member continues: [H]e fails to argue why the unification of psychology should be made through his particular method of subjective sampling. Remark 38: In PP33-41, I do argue why the method of compilation (not subjective sampling, see remarks 1-8 and 27-28) may be a necessary part of achieving psychological unification (but not sufficient remarks 37 and 39). The argument is basically pragmatic. The rationalist may dream about wiping the slate clean, but in reality psychology already exists; in the form of schools, in a state of separatism, and with countless feuds in the psychology department (PP:15-19). The history of psychology is the trace of heroic attempts, by brilliant author(itie)s, to build the critical mass of followers for unification. All failed. Learning from this history, let
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Jrn Hokland, Siv.Ing., Dr.Scient., Cand.Psychol.

Accra, 26th Oktober 2011

us try to include rather than to exclude. Let us encourage the compilers generosity rather than the rationalists dream. And the minority member continues: If we were to accept this view it could, in principle, be argued that any person by using a similar method [] can bring about his own unification very different from that presented in the thesis. Remark 39: True. Using the method of compilaton any person can make his own unification. This method, however, or any method does not guarantee a successful result. Let us not think that every author who has been able to publish something scientific, and having done so using legitimate methods, has produced something worthy and scientifically valuable. The minority member writes: At the superficial level, take the inconsistency between the ambition and the presentation format. When the aim is mathematical simplicity, why offer a 700-page word salad that is incredibly hard to read? Remark 40: PP never claims that mathematical simplicity is the only aim. Mathematical simplicity is only one of several aims and this is why modeling is isolated to chapter 13. Remark 41: Different aims, pursued in chapters 1 to 12, are to provide theoretical support for the three synaptic learning rules; to organize a psychological canon and unification according to the theory expressed by these rules; and to present this connectionist theory using a domino analogy and natural language: Much of the teaching and learning occurs through language at one time, principally through oral instructions, employing verse, collections of adages, or simple explanations; and now, increasingly, through the word in its written form. Despite the evident importance of mathematical equations and symbol systems, language remains the optimal means for conveying the basic concepts in textbooks. In addition, language supplies the metaphors that are crucial for launching and for explaining a new scientific development. (PP:33) A small set of differential equations can accurately and completely express our basic psychical dynamics (chapter 13). But psychology wants it spelled out in natural language. (PP:33) Remark 42: The minority member calls PP a word salad. As a distancing from a compilation one finds too hard to understand, this is not very original. Georg Johannesen (1932-2005), from whom I learned the method of compilation, was once called a salad head. But he was never called a turnip. (G.J., Nytt om Ibsen og andre essays, 2003) The minority member [] but concludes on the basis of the arguments presented above that the candidate does not show research competence at the doctoral level in psychology. Remark 43: I hope to have shown in my above rebuttal that I am fully competent at a doctoral level in psychology and I look forward to further discuss with the committee members PP and our differing opinions in a public defense.

With kind regards Jrn Hokland

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