Yaokasin (pet.) v Commissioner of Customs et. al. (resp.) G.R. No.

84111, December 22, 1989 180 SCRA 591 FACTS: On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the seized sugar to the petitioner Yaokasin. On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to release the seized sugar since it is still subject for review by the Commissioner of Customs since it is adverse to the government citing the Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, dated September 24, 1972. This section 12 states that a decision of a Collector of Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government is subject to review by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by either commisioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall become final and executory. The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of the reorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: Is the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when these laws have not been published in the Official Gazette? DECISION: Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no general applicability therefore need not be published in the Official Gazette.

Bagtasing vs. Ramirez L-41631 December 17, 1976 (mike's version) Facts: On June 12, 1974, the Municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance no. 7522 "An Ordinance regulating operation of Public Market and Prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof and for other purposes". The City Mayor then approved the said ordinance on june 15, 1974. On February 17, 1975, the Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. filed a civil case (no. 96781) seeking for the nullity of Ordinance no. 7522 for the following reasons (1) The publication under the revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied, (2) The Market committee was not given any participation in the enactment, (3) the anti-graft and corrupt practices act has been violated, and (4) the ordinance would violate presedential decree no. 7 of September 30, 1972, prescribing the collection of fees and charges on live stock and animal products. On August 29, 1975 the judge declared the nullity of Ordinance no. 7522 on the ground that it did not follow the revised City Charter (which requires the publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval). The Mayor of Manila Petition for reconsideration of the adverse decision on the ground that the local tax code only requires a publication after approval. Issue: Which law shall govern, The local Tax Code or the Revised City Charter. Held: Since the Local Tax Code is a General Law and the Revies City Charter is a Special Law. Then the Local Tax Code applies because it applies universally to all local government. Ordinance no. 7522 is valid and in-effect because the Local Tax Code only requires publication after approval.

Bagatsing vs. Ramirez GR L-41631, 17 December 1976 (Anjie's Version) Facts: In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others the non-compliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Issue: Whether the publication requirement was complied with. Held: The Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code id a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Section 17 of the Charter speaks of ordinance in general. Whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. Whil e the Charter

requires publication, before the enactment of the ordinance and after approval thereof, in two daily newspapers of the general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Being a general law with a special provision applicable in the case, the Local Tax Code prevails.

People v. Sumilang 77 SCRA 764 (1946) FACTS: Petitioner Guillermo Sumilang was convicted of the crime of arson by the CFI of Laguna. Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence. A petition for certiorari was filed but denied by the Supreme Court. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision for certiorari was also denied on July 17, 1944. The copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed on the same date, July 17, 1944, to the address of the petitioners attorney. The attorney now alleged that he did not receive the notice because he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerrilla officer of the Markings guerilla. Hence the prayer for petition to file pleading or motion to the Court with a bas is of the suspension, through a resolution of the Court dated October 1, 1945, of Sec 8 Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. The resolution provides that judgment shall be entered upon expiration of the fifteen days from notice of such judgment to the parties in accordance with the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Should the resolution of the Court dated October 1, 1945 be given retroactive application to decision made on July 17, 1944 thus allowing petitioner to file a motion or pleading? DECISION: No. The decision of the Court on July 17, 1944 already became final before the resolution took effect on October 1, 1945. Procedural laws, of which the Rules of Court and the resolution are examples, are retroactive in the sense and to the extent that it applies only to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Manila Jockey Club v Games and Amusement Board 107 Phil 151 (1960) FACTS: RA 1502 increased the sweepstake draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. Respondent GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by 6. Petitioner Manila Jockey Club protested as they claim they have the right to the unreserved Sundays stated in Sec 4. of RA 409, as later amended by RA 983. ISSUE: Does the petitioner have a vested right to the unreserved Sundays? DECISION: No. The wordings of Sec 4 RA 309 as amended by RA 983 are merely permissive since the GAB reserves the right to determine the holding of any event thus they have no vested right to the unreserved Sundays. The claim by petitioner that RA 1502 is intended by Congress to be run on the same Sunday cannot be supported by the Legislative debates since these debates are only expressive of the views and motives of the individual members and not the whole Congress.

People v. Tiu San G.R. No. L-7301, April 20, 1955 FACTS: Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court due to his conviction on April 25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon that occurred during the intervening two years from promulgation of the decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950 pursuant to R.A. No. 530. The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause (3), this provision is not applicable to the case at bar since the violation of the aforementioned ordinance occurred prior to the enactment of the said R.A. No. 530. ISSUE: Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect? DECISION: Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, the said Act was meant to have a retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides: This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship... Title BUYCO vs PNB GR No. 14406, June 30, 1961

Facts: The petitioner was indebted to respondent which was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate that is more than sufficient to cover the loan which he offered as payment for the deficit on April 24, 1956. Respondent denied the offered payment due to its amended Charter which provides that "...the authority herein granted shall not be used as regards backpay certificates", enacted on June 16, 1956 as RA 1576. Petitioner filed this case praying that the respondent be compelled to accept his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate as payment of his obligation.

Issue: Can RA 1576 be applied retroactively?

Decision: NO. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code). This has bearing on the case at bar inasmuch as the herein mentioned Act does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity. Therefore, the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. Title: CHAVEZ vs COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS GR No. 17814, Oct. 31, 1963

Facts: Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland with the intention of working it himself but he could not take possession of the land because the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, did not want to surrender the land to its new owner. According to Pablo Chavez his son Eugenio Chavez was working the land for him, he was 74 years of age already. Aquilino de los Reyes filed a petition with this Court against Pablo Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said tenant but suit was dismissed. Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21, 1958. When he died the law governing tenant and landowner relation is Republic Act No. 1199. Under this statute the tenancy relationship between the petitioner Chavez and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death. On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed a petition, this time R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No. 1199, he amendment provides for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenants death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of the tenants immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity an d who shall cultivate the land himself personally . Issue: Can R.A. No. 2263 be applied retroactively? Decision: NO. Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied retroactively. Since the law in force on October 21, 1958, when the tenant Pablo Chavez died, was Republic Act 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner any successional right to continue as tenant. In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that The amendment to section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenants death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of th e tenants immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally which took effect on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively. To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already become vested.

TAC-AN vs. CA G.R. No. L-38736, May 21, 1984 FACTS: Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to Tac-an through a document entitled Deed of Quitclaim as payment for legal services. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-an that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services and that they had hired another lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-an continued to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio Acopiado sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario. On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim. And on October 7, 1964, he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers, Paghasian and Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga del Norte praying that he be declared the owner of the land and that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and Libetario be annulled and he be paid for damages, atto rney s fee, etc. The CFI decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the Acopiados, et.al appealed to CA. The CA voided the transfer of the land to Tac -an applying section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu Contracts w/ Non-Christians Requisites. On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in the trial court, the Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, revoked his approval to the deed of quitclaim for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiados as non -Christians. The petitioner asserts that the revocation of the approval which had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot affect his right to the land which had already vested. ISSUE: Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao & Sulu still necessary when it is already repealed by RA 4252? HELD: Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. All requisites are still necessary. Eugenio v. Drilon G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment b asis from Petitioner, two lots.Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spousesRelevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed forannulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 TheSubdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human SettlementsRegulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstatePrivate Respondents purchase contr act over one lot

and immediately refund him ofthe payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitionerclaims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not beengiven retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-paymentof the amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse ofdiscretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even thosecontracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly providefor retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakableintent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law. Title: ASTORGA vs VILLEGAS GR No. 23475, April 30, 1974

Facts: In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3 rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment.

Issue: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted. Decision: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. Enrique Morales (pet.) v. Abelardo Subido, Comm. of Civil Service.(resp.) G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968 26 SCRA 150 (1968) Facts: The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He rose to the rank in the said police force despite his having no college degree. He was provisionally appointed as chief of police of Manila which became vacant upon the resignation of the former chief of police, Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968. The resp. Comm. of the Civil Service, Abelardo Subido, approved his designation but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. The pertinent rule cited is that of sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864). The resp. instead certified other persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the Mayor of Manila to fill the vacancy within 30 days as required by sec. 4 of the Decentralization Act. The pet. requested for a mandamus from the Court to compel the resp. Commissioner to include him in the list of eligible persons to the post of Chief of Police of Manila for the consideration of the City Mayor. He contended that he is qualified despite lacking a college degree under the statement of the aforementioned rule: "has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years" Issue:

Whether the petition for mandamus be granted due to a different interpretation of the respondent and the petitioner of Sec 10 of the Police Act of 1966. Decision No. The petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to include the name of the petitioner will not be granted since taking the present state of the law, he is neither qualified nor eligible. Even if ,as noted by the Court, there may be a possibility of ommision of a phrase, when the bill was passed by the Congress to the Senate, that may permit the interpretation that he is qualified, the enrolled bill in possession of the legislative secretary of the President, is signed by the Presidents of both the Lower and Upper Houses together with their respective secretaries and the President and therefore must be deemed valid and binding to the Court. No inclusion of other enlargements, no matter how sound they are, should be used in the interpretation of an already enrolled bill.