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Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK

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ELSEVIER PUBLISHERS

COMPREHENSIVE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY


Volume 1


The Structural Integrity Of Oil And Gas Transmission
Pipelines

by Phil Hopkins, Penspen Ltd., UK.

























Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 2 of 62
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
2. PIPELINES
2.1 Pipelines A Brief History
2.2 Pipelines Types
2.3 Pipeline Design, Regulation and Materials
2.4 Design Stresses, Hydrotesting, and Location
2.4.1 Design Stresses
2.4.2 Hydrotesting Pipelines
2.4.3 Location of Pipelines
2.5 Pipeline Operation, Inspection and Maintenance
2.5.1 Operation and Leak Detection
2.5.2 Pipeline Protection
2.5.3 Pipeline Inspection and Maintenance
2.6 Why Do Pipelines Fail?
2.7 Ageing Pipeline Assets
3. PIPELINE INTEGRITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
3.1 Pipeline Integrity and Integrity
3.2 Integrity Management and the Movement to Standardise
3.2.1 Legislation on Pipeline Integrity Management
3.2.2 Response to Legislation by Codes and Standards
3.2.3 Intent of Legislation and Code
3.3 Risk Management
3.3.1 Risk Management in Law
3.3.2 Corporate Responsibility
3.3.3 The Move to Risk Management
3.3.4 Structural Integrity in Risk Management
3.3.5 Risk and Gain
3.3.6 Risk Management and Risk Analysis
4. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF OIL AND GAS PIPELINES
4.1 How a Pipeline Fails
4.1.1 Mode of Failure
4.1.2 Running Fractures
4.1.3 Ductile Fracture
4.2 Failure Process
4.3 Fitness For Purpose (FFP)
4.3.1 Generic FFP
4.3.2 Pipeline-Specific FFP
4.3.3 Legal Note
4.4 History of Pipeline Defect Assessment Methods.
4.4.1 The Very Early Days
4.4.2 The Pioneers
4.4.3 The Basic Equations
4.4.4 Summary Curves
4.5 Structural Assessment of Defects in Pipelines
4.5.1 Safety Factors
4.5.2 Defect-Free Pipe under Internal Pressure
4.5.3 Axially-Orientated Gouges or Similar Metal Loss Defects
4.5.4 Dents
4.5.5 Corrosion
4.5.6 Environmental Cracking
4.5.7 Material Defects
4.5.8 Construction Defects
4.5.9 Defects in Girth Welds
4.5.10 Other Fitness -For - Purpose Methods For Transmission Pipelines
4.5.11. Sub-sea Pipelines
4.5.12. Repair and Rehabilitation
4.5.13. Other Components of a Pipeline System
5. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENTS OF
PIPELINES
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Acknowledgements
References
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
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THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF OIL AND GAS TRANSMISSION
PIPELINES
1. INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas provide 60% of the worlds primary fuel. Therefore, it is not surprising to
discover that there are over 1 million tonnes of oil and 250 million cu metres of gas
consumed every hour around the world.

Most of this oil and gas is transported in pipelines. The larger of these pipelines are
called transmission pipelines (Figure 1); the general public will not normally see
these lines as they are either under the sea, or buried on land, but they are the main
arteries of the oil and gas transportation systems.








Figure 1. Transmission Pipelines being Constructed in the Far East and Europe
(Images copyright of Penspen Ltd., UK).

They are usually large diameter and operate at high pressures to allow high
transportation rates. They are designed, built and operated to well- established
standards and laws, because the products they carry can pose a significant hazard to
the surrounding population and environment, but the combination of good design,
materials and operating practices has ensured that transmission pipelines have a good
safety record.

All pipelines must ensure:

i. Safety - the system must pose an acceptably low risk to the surrounding
population,
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
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ii. Compliance with Codes and Legislation the system must satisfy local
and national standards and laws,
iii. Security of Supply - the system must deliver its product in a continuous
manner, to satisfy the owners of the product (the 'shippers') and the
shippers' customers (the 'end users'), and have a low risk of supply failure,
iv. Cost Effectiveness - the system must deliver the product at an attractive
market price, and minimise the risk of losing business.

These are achieved by ensuring our pipeline is correctly designed and does not
experience a structural failure due to:

- burst,
- puncture,
- overload,
- structural collapse (buckling),
- fatigue, and
- fracture,

and we do not want our pipeline to become unserviceable due to:

- ovalisation,
- blockages,
- distortions, and
- displacements.

Therefore, the structural integrity of pipelines commences with good design and
construction practices, which will eliminate most of the above potential failure modes,
but as pipelines can operate in hostile environments (underground or subsea) they are
constantly threatened by defects and damage that occur in-service. These in-service
defects are the major cause of pipeline failures; therefore to understand and control
structural integrity, in-service defects must be understood and controlled.

The occurrence and behaviour of defects in pipelines has been the subject of extensive
research and development for over 35 years, and this chapter presents an overview of
this work, detailing the current best practices in their structural assessment. The
chapter also covers some of the key design aspects of a pipeline that affect structural
integrity.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 5 of 62
2. PIPELINES
2.1 Pipelines A Brief History
Our ancestors used wood and clay pipes many centuries ago; the Chinese used
bamboo pipe to transmit natural gas to light their capital, Peking, as early as 400 BC,
and 1000 years ago, tired Iraqi women forced their men folk to build pipelines to save
them carrying water from the wells. The Romans used lead pipes to distribute water in
highly developed towns in 500 BC, and the use of steel or iron pipelines started in the
UK in 1820 when cast iron musket barrels left over from wars were used to transport
gas made from coal.

At the same time (1821), hollowed out logs were used in the USA to transport natural
gas used for lighting, but it was not until 1843 that iron pipe was used to reduce the
obvious hazards.

The oil and gas industry first started using steel pipelines in the USA in the mid-
1800s. In those days oil was transported in barrels on rivers by horse-drawn barges;
this was dangerous because weather and labour disputes often disrupted flow. The
railway relieved this, but the oil was now controlled by the rail bosses and their
teamsters.

In 1879 a 173km (108 mile), 152mm (6in) diameter line was built in Pennsylvania to
transport crude oil, to tank cars for the New York market and 12 years later the first
high pressure, long distance pipeline was built. The pipeline reduced the transport cost
of oil from $3 to $1 per mile.

Figure 2. Pipeline under Construction in the UK (Image copyright of Penspen
Ltd., UK).
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 6 of 62

Initially, all steel pipes used to construct the pipeline had to be threaded together. This
was difficult to perform for large pipes, and they were liable to leak under high
pressure. The application of welding to join pipes in the 1920s made it possible to
construct leak-proof, high-pressure, large diameter pipelines.

Long distance pipelines were pioneered in the USA in the 1940s due to the energy
demands of those war years, and now most countries ar ound the world have a
transmission pipeline system in place. These systems range from relatively small (the
UK has 30,000 km of transmission oil and gas pipelines) to very long (the USA has
over 500,000 km of natural gas transmission pipelines). Figure 2 shows a modern
transmission pipeline under construction.

2.2 Pipelines - Types

There are many types of oil and gas pipelines:

i. FLOWLINES & GATHERING LINES These short distance lines
gather a variety products in an area and move them to processing facilities.
They are usually small diameter (50mm (2in) to 305mm (6in)).
ii. FEEDER LINES - These pipelines move the oil and gas fluids from
processing facilities, storage, etc., to the main transmission lines. They can
be up to 508mm (20in) in diameter.
iii. TRANSMISSION LINES These are the main conduits of oil and gas
transportation. They can be very large diameter (Russia has 1422mm (56)
diameter lines) and very long (the USAs liquid pipeline system is over
250,000 km in length). Natural gas transmission lines will usually deliver
to industry or a distribution system, whereas crude oil transmission lines
carry different types of product, to refineries or storage facilities.
iv. PRODUCT LINES - Pipelines carrying refined petroleum products from
refineries to distribution centres are called product pipelines.
v. DISTRIBUTION LINES - These allow local, low pressure, distribution
from a transmission system. Distribution lines can be large diameter, but
most are under 152mm (6in) diameter.

This chapter focuses on steel (lin epipe see next Section) product, transmission,
feeder, flowlines and gathering lines; it does not cover distribution lines as they can
be made out of differing materials to steel (e.g. cast iron, plastic).

Finally, it should be noted that a pipeline is part of a very large and complex system
that includes the linepipe pumps, storage facilities, valves, etc.. This chapter considers
the pipeline, and not the associated plant.

2.3 Pipeline Design, Regulation and Materials
The prime role of pipeline design is safety. Most transmission pipelines are designed
to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standards (ASME B31.8
for gas lines and ASME B31.4 for oil lines) or standards based on these. The design
and operation of pipelines is usually regulated or subject to local laws. In the UK,
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 7 of 62
pipelines are covered by the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996, which detail design,
construction, operation and maintenance requirements for pipelines.

The pipelines are made by welding together lengths of steel pipe (called linepipe),
typically bought to the American Petroleum Institute standard API 5L, Figure 3.



Figure 3. Pipeline Welding Crews on a Pipeline in the Americas (Image
copyright of Penspen Ltd., UK).

The linepipe is known by its diameter, wall thickness, weld type (either longitudinally
welded, spiral welded, or seamless), and grade; grade X60 has a minimum specified
yield strength of 60,000 lbf/in
2
(414N/mm
2
). Figure 4 gives some typical yield
strengths in operating pipelines in the US A. The highest grade in use today is X80.

The toughness (ability of the steel to withstand the presence of cracks) is also
important. Modern steels can be purchased with Charpy toughnesses of 300J
(221ftlb), but older steels can have much lower toughnesses, Figure 4.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 8 of 62


Figure 4. Variations in Yield Strength and Impact Toughness of Older Linepipe
Steels in the USA [Eiber et al, 2000]
1


2.4 Design Stresses, Hydrotesting, and Location

2.4.1 Design Stresses

Pipelines must be able to withstand a variety of loads, ranging from the high loads
they see during construction (e.g. during laying offshore) and during operation (e.g.
due to frost heave).

However, the major stress in most pipelines is that caused by the internal pressure
2
,
and this hoop stress is usually the major design consideration. Most design codes use
the following equation for calculating the hoop stress:

Hoop stress =
h
= PD/2t =
y =
SMYS (1)

P = pipeline pressure,
D = outside pipe diameter,
t = pipe wall thickness,
design factor (see below),

1
These are approximate values. See Eiber et al, 2000 for details. This figure shows his torical data, and
therefore the old units are retained. Toughness: 1J=0.738ftlb. Strength: 1lbf/in
2
= 0.006895N/mm
2
.
The pipeline business started in the USA, and it has retained many USA stress units: 1 ksi = 1000 psi =
1000 lbf/in
2
= 6.89 MPa = 6.89 MN/m
2
= 6.89N/mm
2
.
2
Pressure is the force per unit area exerted by the medium in the pipe. There is often confusion over
pressure terminology around the world you may often see pressures written as gauge pressure or
absolute pressure, or psia or psig. Atmospheric pressure (P
atmos
) is the pressure due to the
weight of the atmosphere (air and water vapour) on the earth's surface. The average atmospheric
pressure at sea level has been defined at 1 bar (=10
5
Pa or 14.5 lb/in
2
) absolute. Pressure absolute (P
a
)
(denoted psia in imperial units) is pressure in excess of a perfect vacuum. Absolute pressure is
obtained by adding gauge pressure to atmosphere pressure: P
a
= P
g
+ P
atmos
. Pressures reported in
Atmospheres are usually taken to be absolute. Pressure gauge (Pg) (denoted by psig in imperial
units) is the pressure above atmospheric pressure. Gauge pressures below atmospheric pressure are
called vacuum. In the pipeline industry, gauge pressure is in common use.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h

(
l
b
f
/
i
n
2
)
30 35 42 52 60 70
Grade
Min Ave Max
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
T
o
u
g
h
n
e
s
s

(
f
t

l
b
)
35 42 52 60 70
Grade
Min Ave Max
axial
hoop
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 9 of 62

y
= the yield strength of our linepipe (the linepipe is purchased to the
manufacturers specified minimum yield strength (SMYS)).

Most pipeline design codes use outside diameter in the hoop stress formula. This
gives a conservative stress. The more accurate cylinder hoop stress formula (using
both internal and outside diameter) gives values of hoop stress within 5% of the above
simple formula for D/t>20.

ASME uses nominal (specified) wall thickness in its design stress calculation, but
other codes in other countries may use minimum wall thickness.

The pressure also causes both a hoop stress and an axial stress, that tries to elongate
the pipeline. This can be visualised by a long thin balloon being inflated - its diameter
and length expands. The magnitude of this axial stress is:
- 0.3xhoop stress if expansion of the pipe is restricted, e.g. it is buried and
restrained by the surrounding soil,
- 0.5xhoop stress if the pipe is capped and free to expand, e.g. at bends.

The maximum hoop stress in pipelines around the world is 72% SMYS (giving a
design factor (hoop stress/SMYS) of 0.72), although there are some pipelines
operating at higher factors (e.g. the maximum design factor in Canadian pipelines in
0.8). Note that most pipeline codes allow overpressures of typically 10% over this
maximum stress; therefore, a pipeline at 72% SMYS can experience an overpressure
to 79% SMYS.

The Design Factor is a safety factor and allows for:
- variability in materials,
- variability in construction practices,
- uncertainties in loading conditions,
- uncertainties in in-service conditions.

2.4.2 Hydrotesting Pipelines

When the as-built condition of a structure cannot be proven it will have a low design
factor (e.g. bridges, ships cannot be proof tested, so their design factor is ~0.6. If the
structure may buckle, the factor is reduced to ~0.5 [Leis & Thomas, 2001]). However,
if the structure cab be proven prior to service, or if it has a high redundancy in the
structure, it can tolerate higher design factors.

Structures have been proof tested for many centuries. In our own experience we know
as children, - that if you want to go ice-skating on a frozen pond, it is best to send
the fat kid onto the thin ice first. If the ice holds, we go skating, if the ice fails, we
lose the fat kid.

In the middle ages, civil engineers would build bridges, but would not be able to
calculate their true strengths. Therefore, they would invite the local army battalion to
open the bridge by mar ching across it with its horses, cannons, etc.. The army
thought they were part of a celebration in fact they were the proof load.

Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 10 of 62
Pipelines can be proof tested by pumping them full of water to a high stress; therefore,
they can tolerate higher design factors. This proof test takes the form of a hydrostatic
test prior to service, to a high stress levels (e.g. 100% SMYS for gas lines in the
USA).

The proof test ensures we have a guaranteed margin of safety on entering service,
Figure 5.
Figure 5. Margin of Safety
3
at Start of Life for a Pipeline

The concept and value of hydrostatic testing of transmission pipelines started in the
early 1950s when Texas Eastern Transmission Company in the USA wanted to
rehabilitate their War Emergency Pipelines and convert them to gas [Kiefner and
Maxey, 2000]. Before any testing, these lines failed frequently in-service because of
original manufacturing defects in the linepipe. Battelle Columbus Laboratories in the
USA suggested that these lines should be hydrotested prior to conversion. The lines
failed 100s of times on test, but never in-service from manufacturing defects
4
.

Typically a pre- service hydrotest will be conducted at a pressure of 1.25 times the
maximum design pressure. The hydrotest is now widely accepted as a means of:
checking for leaks,
proving the strength of the pipeline,
removing defects of a certain size (the higher the stress level in the test, the
more defects likely to fail),
blunting defects that survive, and this increases subsequent fatigue life,
reducing residual stresses, and
warm prestresses defects that survive, and this improves their low
temperature properties.


3
Failure stress of defect -free linepipe is at least 1.25xSMYS but cannot exceed UTS [Leis and
Thomas, 2001].
4
It is interesting to note that many 1000s kms of pipelines have since been tested, and there has never
been a subsequent in-service rupture from manufacturing/construction defects [Kiefner and Maxey,
2000].
0.72
Design Hydrotest Failure
0
0.5
1
1.5
D
e
s
i
g
n

F
a
c
t
o
r
Safety Factor
based on
hydrotest
Safety Factor
based on
failure
Actual failure stress of defect free
linepipe is UTS or >1.25xSMYS
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 11 of 62
The hydrotest was originally used to detect (by failing) original manufacturing
linepipe defects, but modern linepipe is usually free from these older type defects, and
linepipe is now highly quality assured before delivery to site. Therefore, the prime
role of the hydrotest today is a leak test, not a strength test.

2.4.3 Location of Pipelines

Most countries have laws or regulations that require pipelines carrying hazardous
products to be built in areas either away from local population, or in low population
density areas. This ensures that the pipeline operates in a safe corridor and the
consequences of any failure are limited.

Pipeline codes treat oil and gas pipelines different. For oil pipelines:
- no account is usually taken of population density in the location of the
pipelines (but note the new movement in USA in Section 3.2, later),
- there is no specified distance to occupied buildings,
- you can generally build an oil pipeline with a high design factor (design
factor is hoop stress/material yield strength) of 0.72 in most locations.

However for pipelines carrying a more hazardous product such as natural gas (Figure
6) :
- account is taken of population density,
- a minimum distance (a proximity) from occupied buildings is specified,
- design factor is lowered in populated areas (0.3 in UK, 0.4 in USA).


Figure 6. Locating Pipelines Carrying Hazardous Products in Populated Areas

2.5 Pipeline Operation, Protection, Inspection and Maintenance

Pipeline operation and maintenance is both comprehensive and diverse. The following
section gives some key elements that relate to pipeline integrity.

C
o
r
r
i
d
o
r

W
i
d
t
hProximity
No restriction in this zone
Prevent, or severely limit,
building in this zone
Prevent, or severely limit,
building in this zone
Limit building
in this zone
Limit building
in this zone
No restriction in this zone
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 12 of 62
2.5.1 Operation and Leak Detection

Modern long-distance pipelines are operated mainly automatically by a computer at
the headquarters of the pipeline company. The computer monitors the pressure, flow
rates, and other parameters at various locations along the pipe, performs many on-line
computations, and sends commands to the field to control the operation of the valves
and pumps. Manual intervention is frequently needed to modify the automatic
operation, as when different batches of fuels are directed to different temporary
storage tanks, or when the system must be shut down or restarted.

The pipeline will be fitted with some type of leak detection system, to allow for a
rapid response should the pipeline fail. There are various types of system:

i. Simple Systems (Seeing or Smelling) - The simple systems involve
flying, driving, walking along or surveying a pipeline and looking for
evidence of discoloured vegetation around the pipeline, or hearing or
smelling (if the fluid is odorized) a discharge. Unofficial pipeline leak
detection is performed by members of staff working near a pipeline
(e.g. on an offshore platform) or members of the public living near, or
passing, pipelines.
ii. Flow Balance (What goes in, must come out) - Simple line flow
balances can be used to detect leakages. This involves measuring
inputs and outputs of a pipeline. A loss of product is determined as the
difference between the steady state inventory of the system and the
instantaneous inlet and outlet flows.
iii. Acoustic Methods (Leaks are noisy) - Noise associated with a leak
can be detected. These frequencies, caused by vibration, can have
frequencies in excess of 20 kHz. Transducers can be clamped to a
pipeline, and by noting signal strength, the source of the leak can be
pinpointed.
iv. Pipeline Modelling (Theory versus Operation) - Real time pipeline
modelling, which simulates the operation of the pipeline and
continually compares the expected with the actual, can offer both
detection and location of leaks. There are commercial packages on the
market that may be appropriate to certain pipeline operations. The
model is a mathematical representation of the pipeline and will include
such features as elevation data, valve and pump locations, etc.. The
model can then calculate the expected pressures, flows etc., and
compare them with what the measurements are showing. Any
discrepancy may be a leak, and leak alarms can be triggered if this is
the case.

Leaks can be difficult to both detect and locate due to transients in the control systems
and the product flow.

2.5.2 Pipeline Protection

Pipelines are designed to be protected from the environment as follows:

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i. EXTERNAL CORROSION - The pipe steel must be separated from the
soil or water environment otherwise it will corrode. Usually, there is no
corrosion allowance (increase thickness of linepipe specifically to allow
for predictable corrosion wastage) for external corrosion in pipelines.
Hence the outside surface of the linepipe is protected by using a pipe
coating (e.g. coal tar) as the primary protection, and a corrosion protection
system is the secondary protection.
ii. INTERNAL CORROSION A corrosion allowance to accommodate in-
service, predictable, corrosion can be introduced at the design stage;
however, it is preferable to prevent internal corrosion by: treating the
product prior to entry into the line, and checking quality, cleaning the line,
mixing chemicals to inhibit any corrosion.
iii. EXTERNAL DAMAGE Pipelines can be protected from third parties
by: thicker pipe wall, deeper cover (but beware of overburden), locating in
remote regions, regular patrols or surveys of the line, clear markings, good
communications with third parties including the general public, protective
measures such as concrete casings
5
, and damage detection equipment.

2.5.3 Pipeline I nspection and Maintenance

Pipeline regulations and codes require an operator to maintain and inspect their
pipeline to appropriate standards. Maintenance of a pipeline is an essential part of
maintaining the overall integrity of the entire pipeline system. Therefore, pipelines are
routinely inspected and monitored using many direct and indirect techniques. The
methods aim to ensure that:

a) pipelines do not become defective or damaged ('proactive' (P in Table 1 below)
methods),
b) damage or defects are detected before they cause serious problems ('reactive' (R
in Table 1 below) methods).

Courtesy of Tuboscope Services UK
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 14 of 62
Figure 7. A Pipeline Inspection Tool The Intelligent Pig (Image copyright of
Tuboscope Services, UK).

An operator should assess the greatest damage/defect risk to his /her pipeline, then
select a monitoring/inspection method to reduce that risk. Hence, pipeline operators
use a variety of methods to ensure their pipelines are not damaged, or that damage is
detected before it poses a problem. Some of these methods are now summarised in
Table 1. It should be noted that the methods used are simply to either prevent or
detect damage to the pipeline; examples are given below:

i. Patrols Aircraft, road and walking patrols along pipeline routes can
check for unwanted or unplanned excavations around the pipeline,
encroachment of population/buildings. Sub-sea pipelines are regularly
surveyed using a survey boat and associated equipment to check the
pipeline route.
ii. Internal Inspection Pipelines can now be inspected from the inside,
without serious disruption to the product flow by intelligent
6
pigs, Figure
7. The pigs are sophisticated machines that usually travel with the
product and via arrays of sensors record data on the condition of the pipe.
These pigs (named pigs because early pipeline engineers thought the
noise they made as they passed through the pipeline resembled a pig
squealing) can measure metal loss (e.g. corrosion), and geometry
abnormalities (e.g. dents). More specialised pigs can map the pipeline, and
others can detect cracks.
iii. Above Ground Inspection The condition of the pipelines corrosion
protection system, and its coating can be determined remotely using above
ground measurements. Sub-sea pipelines can have similar surveys
conducted using remotely oper ated vehicles (ROVs).
iv. Leak Surveys Leaks in pipelines can be detected by on-line systems (see
above), and also by patrols that may see discoloured vegetation (in onshore
lines), or traces of product (in sub-sea lines).
v. Specialised Surveys Pipelines can be subjected to detailed geo-technical
surveys to detect subsidence, etc., and can be fitted with strain gauges to
detect excessive stressing.
vi. On-line Quality Monitoring Product quality control, and on-line
measurement of product properties can help control internal corrosion and
erosion.
vii. Hydrotesting - Some pipelines are periodically hydrotested in- service to
prove integrity (see Section 2.4.2).
viii. Public Awareness Pipeline operators will liaise with farmers, fishing
organisations, etc., to ensure that organisations that may be working
around their pipelines, are aware of the location of the lines, and do not
damage them. There is an increased use in one call systems in onshore
pipelines where contractors and utilities call a telephone help line before

5
Sub- sea pipelines are often encased in concrete. This concrete coating is primarily a weight coating
it prevents the pipeline floating; however, it additionally offers protection against impact from, e.g.
anchors.
6
Intelligent pigs are known as smart pigs in the USA. Pigs have been used for over 100 years in the
pipeline business, primarily to clean a line, or prove its shape. However, when a pig collects data on-
board, it is classed as intelligent.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 15 of 62
they carry out excavations. This call allows a central organisation to check
for the presence of sub-surface utilities such as pipelines, and either
prevent the excavation, or supervise it.




DEFECT/DAMAGE
SURVEILLANCE/INSPECTION METHOD

AERI AL/
GROUND
PATROLS
7
I NTELLI GENT
PI GS
PRODUCT
QUALI TY
LEAK
SURVEYS
GEOTECH
SURVEYS
& STRAI N
GAUGES
CP &
COATI NG
SURVEYS
HYDRO-
TEST
3rd Party Damage P R R
Ext. Corrosion

R

P R
I nt. Corrosion

R P

R
Fatigue/Cracks R R
Coatings

P

Materials/Construct
Defects

R

R
Ground Movement

R

R

Leakage R P

R

R
Sabotage/Pilfering P

(Visual examinations and public awareness are not included)

Table 1. Some Examples of Pipeline Inspection and Monitoring Methods

2.6 Why Do Pipelines Fail?

Pipelines are a very safe form of energy transportation; however, like any other
structure they do fail. The major causes of failure, in both onshore and offshore
pipelines are:
outside force (sometimes called third party damage, mechanical damage or
external interference), such as caused by a farmer ploughing a drainage ditch,
or a supply boat dragging its anchor around an offshore platform,
corrosion of the pipe wall, either internally by the product or externally by the
surrounding environment.

Figure 8 shows the main causes of pipeline failures in the USA. Outside force and
corrosion are the major failure causes, followed by construction/material defects,
equipment/operator error, and other failure causes (e.g. leaking valves).

These failures can cause casualties; and there have been some tragic pipeline incidents
in recent years on both oil and gas lines [Anon., 2002a].



7
Sub-sea pipelin es are surveyed by a variety of means. The pipeline will often be flown using a
remotely operated vehicle (ROV) which can be equipped with a variety of tools to visually inspect the
pipeline and also check its condition.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 16 of 62
Figure 8. Onshore Pipeline Data from Office of Pipeline Safety, USA, 2000
[Anon., 2002a].

Some benchmark figures for the frequency of pipeline incidents are:

INCIDENT Frequency (incidents/1000km year)
Incident Requiring Repair 4
Failure (loss of product) 0.6
Failure (casualties and/or high costs) 0.16

Table 2. Benchmark Incident Rates for Western World Pipelines [Hopkins,
1994]

2.7 Ageing Pipeline Assets

One of the biggest problems facing the pipeline industry is the fact that the worlds
pipeline infrastructure is ageing. For example:

i. over 50% of the 1,000,000 km USA oil and gas pipeline system is over 40 years
old,
ii. 20% of Russias oil and gas system is nearing the end of its design life. In 15
years time, 50% will be at the end of its design life.

This is a real problem when one considers that there is 50 years of proven oil & gas
supplies in the world, and the existing pipeline infrastructure will be expected to carry
much of this.

Therefore, care for our ageing assets is a major engineering challenge facing us, and
structural integrity assessments will be a key tool we will use.
Corrosion
23%
Outside Force
25%
Failed
pipe/weld
12%
Other
30%
Op./Equip.
Error
10%
Corrosion
39%
Outside Force
25%
Const/Mat
Defect
9%
Other
27%
LIQUID
GAS
25%
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 17 of 62

3. PIPELINE INTEGRITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT

Most industries have methods available for the assessment of structural integrity.
These methods vary from previous good practices to sophisticated analytical methods,
but to understand what is required in a pipeline integrity assessment, an appreciation
of what we mean by integrity is first needed.

3.1 Pipeline Integrity

A structural integrity assessment (see Section 4.2) of a pipeline defect will not, on its
own, ensure continuing pipeline integrity. This is because pipeline integrity is
ensuring a pipeline is safe and secure. It involves all aspects of a pipelines design,
operation, inspection, management and maintenance. This presents an operator with a
complex jigsaw to solve if they are to maintain high integrity, Figure 9.



Figure 9. Key Elements of Pipeline Integrity [Hopkins, 2001a].

The key elements include [Hopkins 2001a, Hopkins 2001b]:
a highly trained workforce,
good engineering, design, operation,
inspection and maintenance,
fitness for purpose assessment, and
an appreciation of the risks associated with a pipeline, particularly as it ages.
These key elements are all contained and controlled via a formal pipeline
management system [Hopkins, 2001b].

Finally, pipeline failures are usually related to a breakdown in a system, e.g. the
corrosion protection system has become faulty, and a combination of ageing
coating, aggressive environment, and rapid corrosion growth may lead to a corrosion
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 18 of 62
failure. This type of failure is not simply a corrosion failure, but a corrosion
control system failure. Therefore, an holistic approach to pipeline integrity is
needed, where an engineer must appreciate the system in order to prevent failure;
understanding the equation that quantifies failure pressure is just one aspect.

3.2 Integrity Management and the Movement to Standardise

Pipeline integrity management is the management of all the elements of this complex
jigsaw; the management brings all these pieces of the jigsaw together. This is now an
essential part of pipeline management.

3.2.1 Legislation on Pipeline Integrity Management

Recent major and tragic pipeline failures in the USA (see Section 5) has resulted in
pipeline integrity management legislation in the USA. In 2000, the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT) proposed regulations that will require the integrity validation
of liquid pipelines that run through or near high consequence areas (HCAs)
8
, through
formalised inspection, testing, and analysis [Anon., 2002a]. Similar legislation for gas
lines is expected.

3.2.2 Response to Legislation by Codes and Standards

The American Petroleum Institute (API) has responded to this legislation and
developed an industry consensus standard that gives guidance on developing Integrity
Management Programmes [Anon., 2001] for pipelines carrying liquids. Additionally,
ASME will publish an appendix with similar guidance for its gas pipeline design code
(ASME B31.8) in 2002 [Leewis, 2001].

3.2.3 Intent of Legislation and Code

The legislation in the USA has created formalized pipeline integrity management. It
has the intention of [Anon., 2002a]:

accelerating the integrity assessment of pipelines in areas where failures would
have a high consequence,
improving operator integrity management systems,
improving government's role in reviewing the adequacy of integrity programs
and plans, and, and
providing increased public assurance in pipeline safety.

The operators of pipelines in the USA carrying hazardous liquids now have to
develop and implement a written integrity management plan. This plan must:

i. identify all pipeline segments that might affect a high consequence area,
should there be a failure,
ii. plan to perform a baseline assessment
9
of pipeline system,


8
High consequence areas are high population areas, busy commercial navigable waterways, and environmentally-sensitive
areas.
9
This assessment includes conducting internal inspections or hydrostatic tests to determine the condition of the line.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 19 of 62
by specified dates.

3.3 Risk Management

The publication of API 1160 [Anon., 2001] is part of a continuing process to move
pipeline safety and management away from prescriptive codes and guidelines to risk
management, where clear safety goals are set, and must be met by pipeline operators
and owners. This involves the operator identifying all pipeline hazards and assessing
their associated risk. Then the operator must put in place measures to both control and
mitigate these risks.

3.3.1 Risk Management in Law

In law, engineers must be aware of two fundamental principles [Wong, 2002]:

1. The concept of a general duty of care for all persons, i.e. workers, operators,
customers, users, etc.,
2. Goods and services must be fit for purpose and not result in any danger to
health and safety when used for the purpose intended.

In the European Union, reasonable care (see also Kardon, 2002) can be
demonstrated when the following actions have been carried out:

i. Risk assessment to identify hazards and risks to health and safety,
ii. Reducing the risk to as low as reasonably practicable,
iii. Maintenance to ensure safety in operation and the provision of information,
iv. Action to measure, monitor and control.

Fitness for Service is a contractual issue (see also Section 4.3.3), and subject to civil
proceedings. However, if the goods or services affect the health and safety, criminal
law may apply. For example, a valve that breaks down and causes injury may be
subject to both criminal and civil proceedings.

3.3.2 Corporate Responsibility

Risk should be identified and managed at all levels in a company, but it should be a
partnership [Wong, 2002]:

i. Risk management starts with corporate management, as the senior executives
enable policies and projects, control finance, and set objectives and assign
responsibilities,
ii. Designers will conceive ideas and turn them into either concepts or detailed
drawings and specifications,
iii. Engineers turn these detailed drawings and specifications into plant and
equipment,
iv. Operators and users put the plant and equipment to useful purpose.

Therefore, risk management starts at the top, with corporate management. However
this is not straightforward; risk can only be managed if they are recognised as a threat
and there is a fear of their consequences. Unfortunately, many boards and senior
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 20 of 62
management lack the imagination or experience to recognise risk. Engineers and
operators are closer to the risks, and they need to have processes in place and a culture
that allows them to learn to educate management in these risks

3.3.3 The Move to Risk Management

The move to risk management is international [Hopkins, 1998]:

- In the USA, the Office of Pipeline Safety has a risk demonstration programme,
and sees risk management as a potential method of producing equal or greater
levels of safety in a more cost effective manner that the current regulatory
regime.
- In the UK, the Pipelines Safety Regulations issued in 1996 are goal setting,
not prescriptive. Their starting point for a good pipeline design and operation
is a recognised design code, and good, proven operational practices, but
operators are not limited to these. The Regulations require a major accident
prevention document, where all risks are identified, and also require a safety
management system.
- The European Commission is reviewing major accident pipelines, and
by about 2007 is likely to enforce legislation requiring operators to have a
major accident prevention policy and a pipeline management system that
ensures the policy is applied.

3.3.4 Structural Integrity in Risk Management

Risk is calculated by combining the likelihood of a hazardous event, with its
consequences (Risk = a function of (Probability, Consequence)). Structural
assessments are usually aimed at reducing the probability of failure, but it is
impossible to reduce this probability to zero. Therefore, the consequences of failure
should also be considered in structural assessments, as there is always a chance of a
wrong answer.

3.3.5 Risk and Gain

In risk management it is important to balance risk with any accrued gain. For
example, if risk analysis/management shows that a reduction in maintenance costs is
justifiable, with only a slight increase in risk, then the operator gains by decreased
maintenance budgets, but it is the public who must carry the increased risk.

3.3.6 Risk Management and Risk Analysis

Finally, risk management should not be confused with risk analysis. Risk assessment
is an analytical process to identify all potential hazards to a pipeline and consequences
of any adverse effect caused by these hazards. It helps in decision- making, but risk
analysis should not be relied on solely to assess the overall integrity and safety of a
pipeline. Risk management should be used as this is an overall programme that
includes risk assessment but also includes mitigation methods, measuring the
performance of the mitigation methods, organisation of risk controls, etc..
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 21 of 62

4. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF OIL AND GAS PIPELINES

4.1 How a Pipeline Fails

A transmission pipeline can fail in a variety of ways: by internal pressure bursting the
pipe, by axial overload caused by earthquake, etc.. However, the most common
failure (Figure 8) is by internal pressure loading on a part wall defect or pipe damage.

4.1.1 Mode of Failure

Most pipelines are made from linepipe steel that is purchased to a specification that
ensures it is ductile. This inherent ductility ensures a defect in the pipeline will not fail
by brittle fracture; it has sufficient toughness to ensure that the failure of a defect in
the linepipe will be governed primarily its tensile properties rather than toughness.

The linepipe material has its toughness (resistance to the presence of cracks) tested at
the pipe mill to ensure ductile behaviour. This is necessary, as some materials such as
linepipe steel undergo a transit ion from ductile to brittle behaviour, under conditions
of decreasing temperature, or increasing loading rate. Three basic factors contribute
to brittle fracture: triaxial state of stress (e.g. a notch), low temperature (i.e. below the
transition temperature), and a high strain rate. Therefore, impact tests on a specimen
containing a notch, over a range of temperatures, is a good method of measuring
toughness.

4.1.2 Running Fractures

Historically, two tests have been conducted on linepipe steel to give a measure of it
toughness [Maxey et al, 1972; Kiefner et al, 1973; Anon., 1965]:

i. The Drop Weight Tear Test (DWTT
10
), to ensure the pipe material is not
brittle,
ii. The Charpy V Test (Cv
11
), to ensure the pipe material has sufficient
ductility.

These tests are simple specimens containing notches, made from the linepipe steel,
and hit by a pendulum. The energy absorbed by the specimen is a measure of the
materials toughness, and the percentage shear area on the fracture faces is a measure
of ductility.

These tests were originally implemented to prevent long running fractures in the
pipeline (see Section 4.5.10.1, later), known as propagating fractures, Figure 10, and
to ensure the linepipe toughness was sufficient to stop (arrest ) these fractures.

10
A plate specimen using the linepipe thickness and a length of 305mm and depth 76mm, containing a
5mm deep pressed notch.
11
A full size Charpy V-notch impact test specimen has a square cross-section with 10 mm sides, and a
length of 55 mm, with a 2 mm deep machined V-notch. Sub-size specimens are used for thin wall
linepipe.

Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 22 of 62

Brittle fracture propagation was prevented by specifying a minimum toughness to
ensure that the line pipe steel is on the upper shelf of the transition curve at the
minimum operating temperature, i.e. the fracture propagation transition temperature
(FPTT) of the steel was less than the minimum operating temperature.



Figure 10. Long Propagating Fracture
12
in a Methane Gas Pipeline with
Preceding Fireball inset (Images courtesy of and copyright of Advantica, UK).

A large amount of correlation with full-scale behaviour concluded that the FPTT
could be taken to correspond to the temperature at which a DWTT specimen exhibits
an 85% shear area fracture, Figure 11. This requirement ensured that the line pipe
steel would not sustain a propagating brittle fracture.

The correlation with full-scale behaviour was necessary, as small-scale specimens do
not accurately model full-scale behaviour, and non-conservative predictions can be
obtained, Figure 11.

Meeting this DWTT requirement will ensure no propagating brittle fractures, but it
will not necessarily prevent a propagating ductile fracture. The Charpy V-Notch
impact energy is related to the ductile toughness of a pipeline, and following more
research work and full scale test validation, a number of empirical and semi-empirical
criteria were developed to estimate the minimum required arrest toughness (see
Section 4.4.10.1, later).


12
These are photographs of a full scale test on a pipeline, conducted at Advanticas Spadeadam Test
Site in the UK.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 23 of 62

Figure 11. Ductile Brittle Behaviour of Pipeline Steels

4.1.3 Ductile Fracture

The above DWTT and Cv requirements will ensure propagating fractures arrest
quickly. But we also need to ensure that any defect failure will initiate in a ductile
mode, and its failure stress will be primarily governed by the tensile properties of the
linepipe rather than the toughness.

4.1.3.1 Ductile Initiation
Empirical research work [Eiber et al, 1993] has indicated that for most pipelines the
temperature for 85% shear area on a DWTT specimen corresponds to a fracture
initiation transition temperature (FITT), where the fracture initiation mode changes
from ductile to brittle as the temperature decreases below the FITT, Figure 12a. It
should be noted that the FITT, and its empirical base, depends on many parameters,
including:

- type of defect (Figure 12b),
- thickness of the structure (Figure 12c),
- loading rate on the defect (Figure 12d).

Therefore, this correlation with DWTT may not be valid for newer materials (e.g.
high grade steels), thicker linepipe, or lower temperature operation.

4.1.3.2 Ductile Failure (governed by UTS)
Finally, work by Battelle [Leis and Thomas, 2001] has shown that to ensure failure of
a defect is governed by the ultimate tensile strength (UTS) of the material, a typical
toughness (full size Charpy) of 80-100J (60-75 ft lb) is needed. Note that these levels
need to be calculated, and that they will ensure collapse at the UTS (which is higher
than the conventional flow stress that is used in the equations that follow).
Energy
Absorbed
Temperature
DWTT or
Charpy
Specimen
Structure
The specimen may behave in
a ductile manner (i.e. 0
percent cleavage area), but
the structure could behave in
a brittle manner at the same
temperature.
Hence we need to
CALIBRATE our small DWTT
or Charpytests with full scale
behaviour
Energy Absorbed or
% Shear
Temperature
Ductile
85%
Brittle
Operate
Pipeline
above
this
FPTT
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 24 of 62

Energy
Absorbed
Temperature
Energy
Absorbed
Temperature
Energy
Absorbed
Temperature
Dynamic Loading
Static Loading
Part wall defect
Thro-wall defect
Decreasing thickness
in Charpy or
DWTT specimen
%

o
f

d
u
c
t
i
l
e

f
a
i
l
u
r
e

p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
Temperature
FITT
%

o
f

d
u
c
t
i
l
e

f
a
i
l
u
r
e

p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
Temperature
FITT
a. b.
c.
d.


Figure 12. Fracture Initiation Transition Temperature and Influencing
Parameters

4.2 Failure Process

A part wall defect in ductile linepipe fails as follows:

PART WALL DEFECT:
o The defect bulges as the pressure in the pipeline is increased.
o The ligament below the defect plastically deforms.
o Stable crack growth may start, as the pressure continues to increase.
o Unstable crack growth, through the wall, leads to the creation of a
through wall defect.
o THROUGH-WALL DEFECT:
This through-wall defect can fail either as a:
LEAK (its length does not increase) or
RUPTURE
13
(its length does increase), depending on its
initial length and the pipeline pressure (see Figure 17,
later).
o The rupturing defect can either:
ARREST (the rupturing defect quickly
stops increasing in length).
PROPAGATE (the rupturing defect
continues to increase in length to create a
propagating fracture).

Figure 13 presents a schematic of the above failure process.

13
Sometimes called a break.
Comment: leads
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 25 of 62

Figure 13. Ductile Failure of a Defect in a Pipeline under Pressure Loading.

4.3 Fitness For Purpose (FFP)

During the fabrication of a pipeline, recognised and proven quality control (or
workmanship) limits will ensure that only innocuous defects remain in the pipeline at
the start of its life. These control limits are somewhat arbitrary, but they have been
proven over time. However, a pipeline will invariably contain larger defects at some
stage during its life, and they will require an engineering assessment to determine
whether or not to repair the pipeline. This assessment can be based on fitness for
purpose (see 4.3.3), i.e. a failure condition will not be reached during the operation
life of the pipeline.

Engineers have always used fitness for purpose in the early days an engineers
intuition or direct experience could help when a defect was discovered in a structure,
and there were many rules of thumb developed. We are now better positioned in
structural analysis, and we have many tools available that can help us progress from
these early days. And remember that rule of thumb was derived from a very old
English law that stated that you could not beat your wife with anything wider than
your thumb.

The fitness for purpose of a pipeline containing a defect may be determined by a
variety of methods ranging from previous relevant experience, to model testing, to
engineering critical assessments, where a defect is appraised analytically, taking
into account its environment and loadings [Anon., 1999a; Anon., 2000]. It should be
noted that fitness for purpose is not intended as a single substitute for good
engineering judgement; it is an aid.

4.3.1 Generic FFP

There are various technical procedures available for assessing the significance of
defects in a range of structures. These methods use fracture mechanics; for example,
the British Standard BS 7910 [Anon., 1999a] contains detailed engineering critical
assessment methods, and can be applied to defects in pipelines. Also, there is API
l
d
t
b. If the stress in the Pipeline is above a critical value,
then the remaining ligament below the Part Wall Defect
fails and produces a Through-Wall Defect
a. Pipeline contains a Part Wall Defect
g. The Through Wall Defect ruptures, and Propagates
if the pressure is high, and/or if the pipe has a Low
Toughness.
d. The through Wall Defect causes a Leak
if the defect is Short, or if the pressure is Low.
c. A Through Wall Defect in a
Pipeline.
e. The Through Wall Defect causes a Rupture
if the defect is Long, or if the pressure is High.
f. The Through Wall Defect ruptures, but
Arrests if pressure is low, and/or pipe is
High Toughness, or if product is a liquid.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 26 of 62
579 [Anon., 2000] which has similar methods, but with a bias towards their use in
process plant.

4.3.2 Pipeline-Specific FFP

The above standards (API 579 and BS 7910) are generic; they can be conservative
when applied to specific structures such as pipelines. Therefore, the pipeline industry
has developed its own fitness for purpose methods over the past 35 years. However,
it should be noted that they are usually based on experiments, with limited theoretical
validation (i.e. semi-empirical). This means that the methods may become invalid
or unreliable if they are applied outside these empirical limits.

The pipeline industry has used their fitness for purpose methods to produce generic
guidelines for the assessment of defects in pipelines. These methods and guidelines
are based on pioneering work at Battelle Memorial Institute in the USA on behalf of
the Pipeline Research Council International[Anon., 1965; Maxey et al, 1972; Kiefner
et al, 1973], with the more recent additions of ad hoc guidelines for the assessment of
girth weld defects, mechanical damage and ductile fracture propagation produced by
the European Pipeline Research Group [Re et al, 1993; Knauf & Hopkins, 1996; Bood
et al, 1999].

Best practices in structural assessments of defects in pipelines are now emerging
(e.g. Hopkins and Cosham, 1997; Cosham and Kirkwood; Cosham and Hopkins,
2001; Cosham and Hopkins, 2002), and a Joint Industry Project sponsored by 14
major oil and gas companies will produce a state-of-the-art Pipeline Defect
Assessment Manual in 2002 [Cosham and Hopkins, 2001; Cosham and Hopkins,
2002].

4.3.3 Legal Note

It is important to note that in structural assessments of defective structures, FFP is
defined as when a particular structure is considered to be adequate for its purpose,
provided the conditions to reach failure are not reached (see BS 7910). This is a
technical definition, but fitness for purpose may have a legal and contractual
meaning in certain countries.

For example, in the UK, a consultant engineer is expected to exercise reasonable skill
and care in his/her work; however, a contractor carrying out a construction has a
fundamentally different obligation he/she is obliged by law to warrant that the
completed works will be fit for their intended purpose. This will be implied in his/her
contract it does not have to be stated explicitly.

Therefore, if a consultant gives a warranty (guarantee) for fitness for purpose (on the
completed works) and they are not, he/she will be liable even if he/she has used all
reasonable skill and care. The damages awarded following a breach of warranty are
different from those of negligence:
i. Warranty costs of making the works fit for purpose, i.e. the work has to
be perfect.
ii. Negligence you pay for anything that could have reasonably been
foreseeable, i.e. the work does not have to be perfect.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 27 of 62
Engineers should check with their professional indemnity insurance what is covered
as a company/professional? Usually, professionals/consultants are not covered for
warranties.

4.4 History of Pipeline Defect Assessment Methods.

4.4.1 The Very Early Days

Fracture mechanics provides the scientific understanding of the behaviour of defects
in structures. The effect of defects on structures was studied as long ago as the 15th
century by Leonardo da Vinci, but prior to 1950, failure reports of engineering
structures did not usually consider the presence of cracks; cracks were considered
unacceptable in terms of quality, and there seemed little purpose in emphasising this.
Additionally, it was not possible to apply the early fracture mechanics work of
pioneers such as Griffith to engineering materials since it was only applicable to
perfectly elastic materials, i.e. it was not directly applicable to engineering materials
such as linepipe, which exhibit plasticity.

The 1950s and 1960s was a period where the safety of transmission pipelines was of
interest, primarily in the USA. Early workers on pipeline defects were faced with
problems; pipelines were thin walled, increasingly made of tough materials, and
exhibited extensive plasticity before failure. The fracture mechanics methods (using
stress intensity factor, K) at that time used linear elastic theories that could not
reliably be applied to the failure of defective pipelines as they would have needed:

- quantitative fracture toughness data, including measures of initiation and
tearing (only simple impact energy (e.g. Charpy V-notch) values were
available),
- a measure of constraint (this concept was not quantifiable in the 1960s, other
than by testing),
- a predictive model for both the fracture and the plastic collapse of a defect in a
thin-walled pipe.

4.4.2 The Pioneers

Workers [Anon., 1965; Maxe y et al, 1972; Kiefner et al, 1973] at the Battelle
Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio decided to develop methods based on existing
fracture mechanics models, but they overcame the above deficiencies in fracture
mechanics knowledge by a combination of expert engineering assumptions and
calibrating their methods against the results of full-scale tests.

Over a 12-year period, up to 1973, over 300 full-scale tests were completed, but the
main focus was on:
- 92 tests on artificial through wall defects, and
- 48 tests on artificial part wall defects (machined V-shaped notches)




Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 28 of 62

Figure 14
14
. Summary [Cosham and Hopkins, 2001] of the early work at Battelle,
USA.

The workers noted that linepipe containing defects tended to fail in a ductile manner,
and final failure was by collapse, although very low toughness linepipe could fail in a
brittle manner, Figure 14 (inset). The Battelle workers concluded that two basic
distinctions could be made, Figure 14:

i. Toughness dependent these tests failed at lower stresses (pressures).
To predict the failure stress of these tests a measure of the material
toughness was required (e.g. critical stress intensity factor, Kc, or an
empirical correlation based on upper shelf Charpy impact energy).
ii. Strength dependent these tests failed at higher stresses. To predict the
failure stress of these tests only a measure of the materials tensile
properties was needed.

4.4.3 The Basic Equations

The work at Battelle led to the development of a strength (flow stress, see Figure15)
dependent and the toughness dependent, through-wall and part-wall NG- 18 equations.

Figure 14 presents a summary of the early test data and the Battelle failure criteria
15

for axially-orientated defects in linepipe:


14
Predicted failure stress is that predicted using Equations 2 and 5. Normalised flaw size is
2
s c 8
Ep
A
12
v
C
.
15
Toughness dependent Equations (2) and (5) are for imperial units, and these units are retained in this
section of the Chapter as they are historical equations. Note that a variety of Folias factors (Equation
(3)) are used. See original references [Anon., 1965; Maxey et al, 1973; Kiefner et al, 1973].
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Normalised flaw size
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
A
c
t
u
a
l

f
a
i
l
u
r
e

s
t
r
e
s
s
/
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d

f
a
i
l
u
r
e

s
t
r
e
s
s
Through-wall Defect, Eq. 2
Part-wall Defect, Eq. 5
DEFORMATION
BRITTLE
FAILURES
x
x
COLLAPSE
FAILURES
Strain
Stress
x
x
x
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 29 of 62
Through-wall defect:

,
_


2
sec ln
8
12
8
2 2
2
M
c
E
A
C
c
K
v
c
toughness dependent (2)
2 2
2
80 . 0 1
2
40 . 0 1

,
_

,
_

+
Dt
c
Rt
c
M (3)

1
M strength dependent (4)

For part wall defects:

,
_


2
sec ln
8
12
8
2 2
2
P
v
c
M
c
E
A
C
c
K
toughness dependent (5)
1
1
1
1
]
1

,
_

t
d
M t
d
M
P
1
1
1
(6)
1
1
1
1
]
1

,
_

M t
d
t
d
1
1
1

strength dependent (7)



D Outside diameter of pipe (R=D/2=radius)
t pipe wall thickness
E elastic modulus
M Folias factor
R radius of pipe
d part wall defect depth

hoop (circumferential) stress at failure (or


f
)
2c defect axial length
Cv Upper shelf Charpy V-notch impact energy
A Area of Charpy specimen fracture surface
flow stress (function of
U
(ultimate tensile strength) and
Y
(yield strength))

Flow stress was a concept introduced by Battelle to help model the complex plastic
flow and work hardening associated with structural collapse. Flow strength is a
notional material property with a value between yield strength and ultimate tensile
strength, Figure 15.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 30 of 62
Figure 15. Flow Stress Modelling of Stress -Strain Behaviour in Pipe lines

It is important to note that:

i. The original work and models accommodated the very complex failure
process of a defect in a pipeline, involving bulging of the pipe wall, plastic
flow, crack initiation and ductile tearing. These pioneering models were
safe due to inherently conservative assumptions and verification via
testing, but they were limited by their experimental validity range
(generally, thin walled (plane stress), lower grade, low yield to tensile ratio
line pipe), and
ii. the strength dependent formulae cannot be applied to low toughness
material; for example, it has been concluded [Cosham and Hopkins, 2001]
that Equation 7 cannot be applied to gouges in linepipe unless the linepipe
has a 2/3 Charpy toughness of 21 J (16 ftlbf).

This work has formed the basis for the development of many current pipeline defect
assessment methods such as those detailed in ASME B31G [Anon., 1984] and DNV
RP 101 [Anon., 1999b].

More recent work (mainly experimental or numerical) has shown these old methods to
still be applicable to many newer pipeline applications, but it is unreasonable (and
dangerous) to expect that 30 year old methods will be applicable to newer (e.g. X100
grade) steels, thicker wall (e.g. deep water pipelines approaching 50 mm in thickness),
and higher applied strains (deep water and arctic conditions will give rise to greater
than 1 percent strains).

4.4.4 Summary Curves

The above equations can be summarised easily:

4.4.4.1 Part Wall Defects (Defect fails to become a through-wall defect)
Figure 16 (Equations (3) and (7)) can be plotted to give a complete set of assessment
curves for part wall defects in ductile linepipe. These curves assume strength
typical engineering stress-
engineering strain curve for
linepipe steel
yield
strength
ultimate
tensile
strength
engineering strain
()
engineering stress
()
flow stress ()
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 31 of 62
dependent behaviour, and can be considered universal assessment curves; a defect of
depth (1-(d/t)) and length (2c/(Rt)
0.5
) will fail if the pipeline hoop stress falls above
the relevant curve.


Figure 16. Failure Stress of Part Wall Defects in Ductile Linepipe (no safety
factor included).

4.4.4.2 Through-wall Defect (Defect fails to become a leak or a rupture)
Figure 13 shows that a part wall defect can either leak or rupture. The above
Equations ((2)-(4)) allow the hoop stress (
f
) at which a through-wall defect will
either leak or rupture to be calculated. Figure 17
16
is a simple summary of Equations
(3) and (4), showing the leak-rupture boundary.



16
Assuming a flow stress of 1.15x yield strength.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2c/(Rt)^0.5
F
a
i
l
u
r
e

S
t
r
e
s
s
/
Y
i
e
l
d

S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
RUPTURE
LEAK
2c

f
M
1
This boundary is not sensitive to pressurising medium
2c or l
t
This boundary is not sensitive to pressurising medium
2c or l
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2c/(Rt)^0.5
F
a
i
l
u
r
e

S
t
r
e
s
s
/
Y
i
e
l
d

S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
1 - (d/t) = 0.6
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.05
0.4
1 - (d/t) = 0.6
2c (l )
d
t
2
2
40 . 0 1
,
_

+
Rt
c
M
Flow strength = 1.15y
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 32 of 62
Figure 17. Leak/Rupture Behaviour of Through- wall Defects in Ductile Linepipe
(no safety factor included).

4.5 Structural Assessment of Defects in Pipelines

This Section gives a summary of the fitness-for-purpose methods available to assess
the variety of defects that may occur in a pipeline. Failure due to internal pressure is
the only failure mode considered, as this is the major cause of in-service failures,
Figure 8. If a pipeline is subjected to external loads (e.g. due to landslide), thermal
stressing (e.g. a high temperature, high pressure offshore pipeline) or external
pressure (e.g. deepwater lines), they will require special considerations.

4.5.1 Safety Factors

It should be noted that safety factors are not given or recommended in the following
Sections. They will be dependent on:

i. the type of defect,
ii. the reliability of the data used in the assessment,
iii. the reliability of assessment method,
iv. material and geometry variations and tole rances,
v. time dependent effects (defects can grow to failure at constant
stresses/pressures. Historically an allowance of 5% of failure pressure is
used for part wall defects),
vi. overpressures in the pipeline (pipeline pressures are never constant -
pipelines are typically allowed a 10% (of maximum allowable operating
pressure ((MAOP)) overpressure during operation therefore the
maximum pressure a defect might see is 1.1xMAOP),
vii. subsequent growth (e.g. fatigue. corrosion),
viii. pipeline operational control (the accuracy and tolerances on pipeline
monitoring and control),
ix. the consequences of a defects failure.

It is the responsibility of the engineer conducting the assessment to derive a safety
factor. It is becoming customary in the pipeline business to only allow defects to
remain in a pipeline if they can withstand a hoop stress to the stated pre-service
hydrotest level, e.g. 100%SMYS. This leads to a safety factor of at least 1.39 (100/72)
on predicted failure stress on a defect in a pipeline designed to oper ate at 72% SMYS.

When summarising fitness-for- purpose methods, it is best to start with an assessment
of the failure stress of a defect-free pipe. This gives a benchmark failure stress for
any pipeline.

4.5.2 Defect-Free Pipe under Internal Pressure

4.5.2.1 Static Failure
Most grades of steel (<X80) will deform (strain) a large amount before reaching UTS
and failing (e.g. strain at failure > 10%). However, the newer high grade steels
(>X80) will not reach these high strains, and may only reach 3 to 5% at UTS. This is
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 33 of 62
significant if you are basing your pipeline design on strain rather than stress, as your
margin of safety on strain will decrease with increasing grade of linepipe.

However, most pipelines are still designed on stress In general, the simplest and most
conservative formula for the range of transmission pipeline D/ t ratios is given by
using
U
and the mean pipeline diameter (D-t) in the simple Barlow equation
(although it becomes increasingly conservative for thicker walled pipe):
( ) t D
t
P
U
f

2
(8)
Pf = failure pressure

There are more accurate analytical methods [Stewart et al, 1994] incorporating
material work hardening and large displacement theory, and they are accurate over a
wide range of D/t ratios.

4.5.2.2 Cyclic Failure
The fatigue strength of (notionally defect-free) welded linepipe subject to cyclic
internal pressure will be governed by the fatigue strength of the weld, and the fatigue
strength of seamless line pipe will be governed by local surface imperfections.
Similarly, the fatigue strength of the girth weld will govern under cyclic axial or
bending loads. Fatigue strength curves (S-N curves) are given in BS 7910 [Anon.,
1999a] and API 579 [Anon., 2000].

4.5.3 Axially-Orientated Gouges or Similar Metal Loss Defects
17


4.5.3.1 Basic Equations
External interference during operation, or damage during construction, can cause
gouges or scratches on the pipes surface, Figure 18. These metal loss defects may be
accompanied by local plastic deformation. If this deformation caused a dent, then the
gouge must be assessed using sophisticated fracture mechanics methods (see later).



Figure 18. Damage on a Pipeline Failure in Louisiana, USA (Image courtesy of
National Transportation Safety Board, USA)


17
See Section 4.4.9.2 for methods for assessing the fatigue life of these type of defects.
Image from National Transportation
Safety Board website: www.ntsb.gov
Comment: delete
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 34 of 62
In ductile linepipe, the failure stress of an axially-orientated gouge subject to internal
pressure loading is described by Equation (7):
2c
R
d
t
Defect Dimensions

It has been recommended that [Cosham and Hopkins, 2001]:
2
U Y

+
(9)

2 2
2
52 . 0 1
2
26 . 0 1
,
_

+
,
_

+
Dt
c
Rt
c
M (10)

for use in Equation 7, and D = outside diameter to be used in the equations. Note that
these equations are only validated for pipewall thicknesses up to 22mm and
toughnesses of 21J (2/3 Charpy) [Cosham and Hopkins, 2001].

Figure 19
18
, shows the accuracy of using Equations 7, 9 and 10 to assess gouge or
gouge-like defects in linepipe.

4.5.3.2 Note on Structural Assessment of Gouges
If a gouge is detected in the field, an engineer needs to check:

- FOR SURFACE CRACKING - There may be some crack-like indications
(spalling) caused by the damaging object. If the cracking is deep, it may be
indicative of a gouge that has cracked due to denting (the denting may not be
visible, as it may have been pushed out [Hopkins et al, 1989; Hopkins et al,
1992]. This is severe, and requires repair.
- FOR EVIDENCE OF DENTING - The impact may have also dented the pipe.
Residual denting around a gouge is severe see later.

Gouges can be assessed using the above equations, providing your pipeline has a
toughness >20J [Cosham and Kirkwood, 2000; Cosham and Hopkins, 2002]. Note
that a gouge needs to be checked for possible fatigue crack growth in some pipelines
(e.g. some liquid lines).


18
See Hopkins and Cosham, 2001 for data used in Figure 19.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 35 of 62
Allowance (e.g. adding 0.5mm to defect depth) for the hard layer or sub-surface
cracking is advisable, if they are to be left in the pipeline, but there should be no risk
of environmental cracking, and no residual denting, and no problems from cyclic
loading.

Figure 19. Predicted Failure Stresses of Full Scale Burst Tests on Vessels
containing Gouges or Similar Defects.

Finally, an engineer should always think carefully of the consequences of getting
things wrong. If damage is in a pipeline in a high consequence area, the damage
should be inspected closely before assessment, and appropriate safety factors included
in the assessment.

4.5.4 Dents

4.5.4.1 Burst Strength of Plain Dents
Dents in pipelines are assessed using data derived from full scale tests, and large dents
can be tolerated, although their behaviour under cyclic loads, or when they coincide
with seam welds, remain a problem [ Hopkins et al, 1989; Hopkins et al, 1992; Fowler
et al, 1994; Hope et al, 1995; Kiefner et al, 1996; Kiefner & Alexander, 1997;
Bjornoy et al, 2000; Rosenfield, 1998; Roovers et al, 2000].

The effect of a plain dent (i.e. one with no associated loss of wall thickness defect,
and of smooth shape) is to introduce high localised stresses and cause yielding in the
pipe material. The high stresses and strains caused by the dent are accommodated by
the ductility of the pipe. Full scale test results have confirmed this by showing that
plain dents do not generally affect the burst strength of the pipeline [Hopkins et al,
1989; Kiefner et al, 1996; Kiefner & Alexander, 1997]. On pressurisation the dent
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Failure Stress/Yield Strength, percent
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d

F
a
i
l
u
r
e

S
t
r
e
s
s
/
Y
i
e
l
d

S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
,

p
e
r
c
e
n
t
CONSERVATIVE
UNCONSERVATIVE
See original reference
for test details
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 36 of 62
attempts to move outward, allowing the pipe to regain its original circular shape.
Provided that nothing restricts the movement or acts as a stress concentration (e.g. a
gouge or a kink), then the dent will not reduce the burst strength of the pipe.

Empirical limits for plain dents under static internal pressure loading have been
derived from extensive full scale testing. It should be noted that all of the dent depths
(usually measured as % pipe diameter) in the full scale tests were measured at zero
pipeline pressure. Based on these full scale tests [Hopkins et al, 1989; Hopkins et al,
1992; Fowler et al, 1994; Hope et al, 1995; Kiefner et al, 1996; Kiefner and
Alexander, 1997; Rosenfield, 1998; Roovers et al, 2000; Bjornoy et al, 2000], a
variety of dent sizes have been quoted as acceptable dents of depth
19
up to 10%
pipe diameter have little effect on the burst strength of pipe. Additionally, there is an
API publication [Kiefner and Alexander, 1997; Anon 1997] specifically on the
assessment of dents caused by rocks in pipelines. The reader is directed to these
references for more detailed information.

In full scale tests on plain dents on welds very low burst pressures have been
recorded. Therefore, the burst strength (and the fatigue strength) of dents containing
welds cannot be reliably predicted, and caution is recommended with this type of
damage.

It should be noted that a dent of depth 10% the pipe diameter might be associated with
surface damage, which makes it a severe defect. Also, this deep dent may restrict both
product flow, and the passage of pigs in the pipeline. Finally, this depth may be
acceptable in some pipelines under static pressure loading, but it will be reduced
significantly if the pipeline is subjected to cyclic loading (see next).

4.5.4.2. Fatigue Life of Plain Dents
Large cyclic stresses and strains are localised in a dent under cyclic pressure loading.
The depth of a dent changes with internal pressure, meaning that the magnitude of the
stress concentration changes as dents can reround under cyclic internal pressure
loading.

Full scale fatigue tests [Eiber et al, 1981; Wang and Smith, 1988; Hopkins et al, 1989;
Hopkins et al, 1992; Fowler et al, 1994; Hope et al, 1995; Kiefner and Alexander,
1997; Roovers et al, 2000] on plain dents indicate that they reduce the fatigue life
compared to plain circular pipe. The greater the dent depth the shorter the fatigue life.
No fatigue failures occurred in those tests where the pipe was hydrotested prior to
fatigue cycling, because the dent was permanently pushed out (rerounded), reducing
the stress concentration.

A number of semi-empirical or empirical methods for predicting the fatigue life of a
plain dent subject to cyclic pressure loading have been developed [ Fowler et al, 1994;
Hope et al, 1995; Kiefner and Alexander, 1997; Rosenfield, 1998; Roovers et al,
2000]. One of the relationships, developed by SES in Houston [Fowler et al, 1994;
Kiefner and Alexander, 1997], is:

19
The literature indicated that the key dent parameter is the depth, with length and width secondary.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 37 of 62
74 . 3
6
11400
1
10 0 . 2

,
_

1
]
1

p
p
N

(11)
where:
N number of cycles to failure
1
]
1


stress intensification factor (obtained from original references)
p cyclic pressure (psi)

This fatigue model is based on an S-N curve, modified for the stress concentration
due to the dent. The stress intensification factor was derived from non-linear
elastic- plastic finite element analyses to account for the stress concentration due to the
dent. The reader is directed towards the original references if they wish to apply the
various fatigue methods.

4.5.4.3 Plain Dent Containing a Defect

4.5.4.3.1 Burst Strength
The failure behaviour of a dent containing a gouge is complex. A dent and gouge is a
geometrically unstable structure. Outward movement of the dent promotes initiation
and growth of cracking in the base of the gouge, changing the compliance of the dent.
The failure of a dent and gouge defect involves high plastic strains, wall thinning,
movement of the dent, crack initiation, ductile tearing and plastic flow [Leis et al,
2000].

Empirical relationships for predicting the burst strength of a smooth dent (of depth H)
containing a gouge have been proposed by British Gas [Hopkins et al, 1989], the
EPRG [Roovers et al, 2000], and Battelle [Mayfield et al, 1979; Maxey, 1986].

The Battelle model is:

( )
90
300
6 . 0

Q
f

... (12) e
( )
,
_

,
_

t
d
c
R
H
C
Q
v
2
2
..(13) (13)
10000 +
Y
psi

A semi-empirical fracture model for assessing the burst strength of a dent-gouge
defect has been developed by British Gas [Hopkins, 1992], and has subsequently been
included in the EPRG recommendations for the assessment of mechanical damage
[Bood et al, 1999].

The fracture model is based on tests in which the damage was introduced into
unpressurised pipe; therefore, the dent depth measured at zero pressure must be used
H
R
D
t
d

Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 38 of 62
or corrected for any internal pressure [Hopkins et al, 1992; Roovers et al, 2000;
Rosenfield, 1998].

The fracture model gives more accurate and reliable predictions that the above
empirical relationship of Battelle. The model is defined as follows (in SI units):
1
1
]
1

'

1
]
1


1
]
1

,
_

+
,
_

2
1
2
2 1
2
1
) 738 . 0 ln(
exp 2 . 10 8 . 1 1
5 . 1
113 exp cos
2
K
K C
D
H
t
R
Y
D
H
Y
Ad
E
v o o

(14)
where

,
_


t
d
Y
1 15 . 1 (15)
4 3 2
1
4 . 30 7 . 21 6 . 10 23 . 0 12 . 1
,
_

+
,
_


,
_

+
,
_


t
d
t
d
t
d
t
d
Y (16)
4 3 2
2
0 . 14 1 . 13 32 . 7 39 . 1 12 . 1
,
_

+
,
_


,
_

+
,
_


t
d
t
d
t
d
t
d
Y (17)
9 . 1
1
K
57 . 0
2
K
r o
H H 43 . 1 (18)
The flow stress (Equation (15)) assumed in the dent- gouge fracture model is not
appropriate for higher grade steels (greater than X65), due to the increasing yield to
tensile ratio with line pipe grade.

H
o
dent depth measured at zero pressure (mm)
H
r
dent depth measured at pressure (mm)
K
1
non-linear regression parameter
K
2
non-linear regression parameter

This failure criterion for a dent containing a metal loss defect does not give a lower
bound failure stress. It is a mean predictive model. Additionally, the model is semi-
empirical and therefore limited by the bounds of the original test data, and is prone to
high scatter [Cosham & Hopkins, 2001; Cosham & Hopkins, 2002].

4.5.4.3.2 Fatigue Life
The fatigue life of a dent containing a gouge is difficult to predict. Full scale tests
indicate that the fatigue life of a combined dent and gouge can be of the order of
between ten and one hundred times less than the fatigue life of an equivalent plain
dent [Hopkins et al, 1989]. In some cases even shorter fatigue lives have been
observed during testing.

4.5.4.4 Note on the Assessment of Mechanical Damage
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 39 of 62
Dents and/or gouges in a pipeline are indicative of impact damage. When a dent or a
gouge is suspected in a pipeline, they should be carefully investigated to determine if
they are co-incidental, as the combined dent and gouge is a very severe defect, and
usually requires rapid repair.

4.5.5 Corrosion
20


There are several approaches that have been used to characterise the behaviour of
both through and part wall corrosion defects. The first two methods (approved by
ASME) described below are the oldest and most proven. The most modern and most
accurate (DNV RP 101) is covered last.

4.5.5.1 ANSI/ASME B31G
The most popular document for the assessment of the remaining strength of pipelines
with smooth corrosion has been ANSI/ASME B31.G [Anon., 1984; Anon., 1991].
This supplement to B31 was developed over 20 years ago, based on work in the early
1970s [Kiefner and Duffy, 1973], although it has since been updated [Kiefner and
Vieth, 1989; Anon., 1991].

It is based on an empirical fit to an extensive series of full scale tests on vessels with
narrow machined slots. The basis of the equation used in B31G is relatively simple
and involves:

assuming the maximum pipe hoop stress is equal to the pipe material's yield
strength, and,
characterising the corrosion geometry by a projected parabolic shape for relatively
short corrosion, and a rectangular shape for long corrosion.

The equation used in B31G is a derivative of Equation (7):


f
o
o
A A
A A M

1
]
1
1
1
1
( / )
( /
(19)

where A=cross sectional area of defect in pipewall (for a rectangular, flat bottomed
defect this is 2c.d),
and A
o
=pipe wall area occupied by defect (for a rectangular flat bottomed defect this
is 2c.t).


In the B31G code, a simplified equation is provided which represents the defect as a
parabolic shape:

f
d
t
d
t M

1
]
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
(20)

20
Usually, the most difficult data to obtain when assessing corrosion, is the expected corrosion growth
rate. This is important, because most assessments of corrosion are based on intelligent pig data, where
the defect must be assessed over its whole life, and its size at the end of the pipelines design life
needs to be used in the calculations.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 40 of 62

The flow strength ( ) is defined by 1.1xSMYS. The parabolic shape of the projected
area is used as an approximation to the actual defect, and the Folias (bulging) factor
is:
M
c
Dt
+

_
,
1 0 8
2
2
. (3)
It is stated in the B31G code that the above equations should only be applied to
corrosion defects, which have a maximum depth greater than 10% of the nominal wall
thickness, and less than 80% of the nominal wall thickness. Furthermore, the relative
longitudinal extent should satisfy the following equation:
M
c
Dt
+

_
,
1 08
2
40
2
. . (21)

The above equation limits the use of the parabolic shape formulation because when M
is greater than 4.0 (i.e. long corrosion), the approximation of a parabolic shape is no
longer adequate. Instead a rectangular shape is used. Accordingly, the failure equation
is replaced by the following equation:

f
d
t

1
]
1
1 (22)

4.5.5.2 Modified B31G
The B31G criterion has been used successfully in the pipelines industry for many
years. The method has been proven, in general, to be conservative and as a result an
improved method was developed which modified the existing B31G guidance. The
modified B31.G method [Kiefner and Vieth, 1989; Anon., 1991] has recently been
adopted as the preferred method for the fitness for purpose assessment of corrosion
defects in the ANSI/ASME B31 Code.

The hoop stress at failure is given by:

1
1
1
1
]
1

M t
d
t
d
1
85 . 0 1
85 . 0 1

(23)

with =SMYS + 68.94 MPa (10 ksi)
M = 1 0 6275
2
0 003375
2
2 4
+

_
,

_
,
. .
c
Dt
c
Dt
for
2
50
2
c
Dt

_
,
(24)
M = 0032
2
33
2
. .
c
Dt

_
,
+ for
2
50
2
c
Dt

_
,
> (25)

Equation (23) shows that the representation of the area of metal loss was revised
(A=0.85d(2c)). A simple, arbitrary, geometric idealisation was proposed for hand
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 41 of 62
calculations (a factor of 0.85 rather than the 0.67 in the original ASME B31G was
recommended). Additionally, an effective area method using the measured profile of
the corroded area (A), was also developed to give more accurate predictions. The
effective area method is most commonly known as RSTRENG (Remaining
STRENgth), as this is the name of the software that does the assessment of irregular-
shaped corrosion defects, using the modified equations above.

4.5.5.3 New Methods
New assessment methods are becoming available. These include both in-house
methods from leading research departments [Stewart et al, 1994], and the results of a
large group sponsored projects [Kirkwood et al, 1996; Bjornoy et al, 1997; Bjornoy et
al, 1999; Fu and Batte, 1999; Bjornoy et al, 2000]. The latest corrosion model given
in DNV RP 101 [Anon., 1999b] is:

( )
1
1
1
1
]
1

,
_

Q t
d
t
d
t D
t
P
U f
1
1
1
2
9 . 0 (26)
where
2
31 . 0 1

,
_

+
Dt
l
Q (27)

This is the same form as ASME B31G and the modified ASME B31G, but note that
the flow stress is related to ultimate tensile strength (
U
), which can be estimated
from the materials specified minimum tensile strength (SMTS). The DNV RP 101
methods are considered best practice for corrosion assessment in modern linepipe
steels [Cosham and Kirkwood, 1999; Cosham and Hopkins, 2000].

4.5.5.4 Comparison of Corrosion Assessment Methods
The above methods for assessing corrosion can be compared, Table 3.

METHOD
BASIC
EQ.
(No)
FLOW
STRESS
DEFECT
SHAPE
FOLIAS FACTOR
Original
Battelle
(19)
SMYS +
69MPa
Defect Area
2
) / 2 ( 8 . 0 1 Dt c +
B31.G
Battelle
(20)
1.1SMYS
Parabolic
[2/3(d/t)]
2
) / 2 ( 8 . 0 1 Dt c +
Modified
B31.G
Battelle
(23)
SMYS +
69MPa
Arbitrary
[0.85(d/t)]
4 2
2
003375 . 0
2
6275 . 0 1
,
_


,
_

+
Dt
c
Dt
c

RSTRENG
Battelle
(23)
SMYS +
69MPa
Defect
Profile
4 2
2
003375 . 0
2
6275 . 0 1
,
_


,
_

+
Dt
c
Dt
c

DNV RP-
F101
Battelle
(26)
0.9SMTS
Rectangular
(and Defect
Profile)
2
) / 2 ( 31 . 0 1 Dt c +
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 42 of 62

Table 3. A Comparison of the Bases of Corrosion Assessment Methods.

Clearly, all rely on the original work at Battelle, and the major changes over the past
30 years have centred on the modelling of flow stress, defect shape and the Folias
Factor. Figure 20 compares three of the methods in Table 3 (assuming a rectangular
shape defect, X52 linepipe, and ignoring the 80% d/t cut- off in ASME), showing that
for this grade of linepipe there is little difference between DNV and the modified
ASME B31G method.

4.5.5.5 Notes on the Assessment of Corrosion.
The ASME methods are proven on older linepipe, and hence these methods should be
used on linepipe of circa 60s and 70s vintage. They are also proven on thin walled
linepipe with grades less than X70; hence their applicability to high grade, thicker
walled linepipe must be proven.

The more recent methods have been proven on more modern linepipe. For example,
DNV RP 101s validity range is in linepipe with full size Charpy values above 61J.

Figure 20. Comparison of ASME (B31G and modified B31G) and DNV Methods
of Corrosion Assessment.

4.5.6 Environmental Cracking

4.5.6.1 Internal Surface and Pipe Body Cracking
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2c/(Rt)^0.5
D
e
f
e
c
t

D
e
p
t
h
/
W
a
l
l

T
h
i
c
k
n
e
s
s
B31G
modified B31G
DNV
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 43 of 62
Not all gas is 100% pure gas if a gas contains liquids it is termed rich or wet gas.
Dry or lean gas means the opposite. Additionally, some pipelines carry product that is
sour (high content of hydrogen sulphide). A sweet gas or oil is low in hydrogen
sulphide. If we have these sour, wet environments we can have: corrosion pitting,
sulphide stress cracking and hydrogen induced cracking on the internal surface of the
linepipe, Figure 21.

Figure 21. Environmental Cracking in Linepipe carrying Sour Product.

Cracking in pipelines is not usually a defect assessment problem; it is usually an
indication that operation, product or environment is a major problem.

It is a symptom of something wrong hence the cause needs to be isolated. Therefore
this cracking is treated as a material, product, process or environment problem, and
the cracking problem is solved by changing or controlling product, environment, etc..

Generally, when designing against stress corrosion cracking, e.g. sulphide stress
cracking of carbon steels, three factors contribute to cracking:

material type and microstructure,
applied stress, and
the environment.

Therefore, avoidance of the problem may be achieved through appropriate material
selection or by keeping the stress below the critical level for cracking. Where
practicable, the environment may be modified but this is only occasionally possible.
Consequently, any crack initiation of environmental cracking, such as sulphide stress
cracking of carbon steels, is usually considered unacceptable due to the rapid rate of
subsequent propagation (growth). However, there is some fundamental understanding
of their growth under static loading

Corrosion of pipewall due to
reaction and formation of
iron sulphides and H
2
Two types of cracking can occur
Pipeline Carries Wet, Sour Product.
The solution is to select the correct (resistant)
pipe materials and control product quality
Sulphide Stress Corrosion Cracking
(SSCC)
H
2
can enter steel and cause damage and embrittlement.
SSCC usually occurs in welds because
it needs high stresses and
high yield strengths/hardness
Hydrogen Induced Cracking
(HIC)
HIC is stepwise cracking caused by H
2
diffusing into the steel and entering voids
e.g. around inclusions
HIC
SSCC
weld
Comment: full stop spacing
Comment: full stop
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 44 of 62
Environmental cracks grow due to the environment, but they can reach a size when
they can start to grow by a fracture mechanism. The stress intensity (K
I
) of the crack
at this size exceeds a critical stress intensity for crack growth, K
Iscc
. If the K
i
value of
a crack exceeds K
Iscc
the crack will initiate and grow at a rate dictated by the material,
environment, etc.. The rate of growth (da/dt) will dictate how long the crack takes
to fail the structure. The structure fails when K
i
=K
1c
(the fracture toughness),
assuming that K
1c
>K
Iscc
. K
Iscc
, K
1c
and da/dt can be measured in the laboratory (see
API 579 and BS 7910).

4.5.6.2 External Surface Cracking
21
- Stress Corrosion Cracking
Stress corrosion cracking has been well known for many years in pipelines. The older
type of stress corrosion cracking (high pH) was usually found downstream from
compressors on poorly coated pipelines, where the high and varying temperatures of
the product (after compression) accelerated cracking.

In recent years, there have been an increasing number of pipeline failures caused by a
different type of stress corrosion cracking [Anon., 2002b]; since 1977, SCC has
caused 22 pipeline failures in Canada. These failures include 12 ruptures and 10 leaks
on both natural gas and liquids pipeline systems. This is a 'new' type of SCC that
attacks the external surface of the pipeline, but it can occur at relatively low
temperatures, and in environments with relatively low pH (near neutral) values
[Anon., 2002b]. It again requires:
a potent environment at the pipe surface,
a susceptible pipe material, and
a tensile stress.
No reliable fracture mechanics model has yet been developed, but some basic and
developing models are in the literature [Leis and Mohan, 1993; Jaske and Beavers,
1999]. Therefore, if SCC is suspected, the best plan of action is to mitigate by:

- improve corrosion protection (CP), temperature control and reduced pressure
cycling (this slows down the growth),
- repair and recoat (note that some repair methods such as welded sleeves are
considered acceptable, but others (e.g. some composite wraps) are not yet
considered proven for cracks),
- retest and repair/recoat (a hydrotest (to 110% SMYS) will fail large defects),
- selective replacement (this could be near populated areas, to reduce overall
risk),
- replace or loop affected areas,
- intelligent (smart) pigs (see Figure 7) and selective replacement.

4.5.7 Material Defects

Material defects are defects that are in the body of the linepipe, usually from the
manufacturing or rolling processes. These defects will have survived both a pipe mill
hydrotest and the pre-service hydrotest, and therefore are unlikely to be a problem in-

21
In the old t own gas pipelines, that carried (impure) gas manufactured from coal, there were
incidents of SCC on the internal pipe surface.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 45 of 62
service. However, they can sometimes be detected and they can sometimes pose risk.
The following highlights these problem areas and presents some solutions.

Defects in the parent plate of pipe steels (e.g. laps. slivers, laminations, etc.) can be
assessed using the methods outlined in Section 4.5.3, if they result in a loss in the
cross-sectional area of the pipe. More specific guidance:

i. Inclusions in the pipe body are not considered significant if they have
passed a pre-service hydrotest. However, they may be a site for hydrogen
cracking in sour service pipelines.
ii. Laminations are not usually a problem as most do not cause a reduction in
the cross-sectional area (e.g. a planar, radial-orientated lamination), and
hence they will not cause a reduction in the pressure containment of the
pipe. However some laminations can caus e structural problems:
o Laminations inclined to the plate, or multiple laminations through the
wall thickness may cause a leak path,
o Beware welding onto laminations (the lamination can open up and
cause a leak path)
o Beware of laminations associated/adjacent to weld or other structural
discontinuities - they may lead to failure,
o Laminations that are in a hydrogen-charging environment, can attract
hydrogen and lead to cracking and blisters.
iii. Blisters can occur in pipelines carrying sour product. Guidance for
hydrogen charged blisters and laminations are given in API 579 [Anon.,
2000]. This document gives acceptance limits and conditions to be met for
acceptance.
iv. Hard spots (dollar spots) are local hard zones caused by excessive local
quenching. They are typically <250mm (10in) diameter, and may cause
local out of roundness. The high hardness can lead to cracking if exposed
to a hydrogen charged environment. Generally, they are not a problem, but
they do increase susceptibility to other types of defects.

4.5.8 Construction Defects

Construction defects will generally be gouges, or perhaps dents. The assessment
methods detailed in Sections 4.5.3- 4.5.4 above can be used to assess these
construction defects. Note that API 1156 [Anon., 1997] gives guidance on pipeline
dents caused by rocks. However, it should be emphasised that construction defects
detected prior to operation can be easily repaired, and may be more of a
contractual/legal issue than fitness-for-purpose.

4.5.9 Defects in Linepipe Welds and Pipeline Girth Welds

Linepipe is either made by welding plate into a cylinder shape, or by producing a
seamless tube, the former being the most popular for larger diameter pipelines. This
weld is either longitudinally orientated or is a spiral, depending on the linepipe
manufacturing process.

These sections of linepipe are welded together to form the pipeline. The
circumferentially-orientated welds that join each section are called girth welds.
Comment: Presumably inches
? Most have used mm. Ill check
instructions, but use of is
confusing
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 46 of 62

i. Linepipe welds - Longitudinal or spiral seam welds in linepipe are made
under controlled, good conditions in a pipe mill, and will have survived the
pipe mill test and pre-service hydrotest; therefore, new linepipe should not
contain large (pre-service) defects in their welds. Many years ago, when
weld quality control was not as good as today, and some of the welding
processes in use were relatively new, these welds could be delivered to site
with large defects. Additionally, some types of older welds (electric
resistance or flash welded seam welds) are susceptible to preferential
corrosion (the bond line corrodes preferentially to the surrounding steel)
that can produce a sharp V-shaped notch along the bondline.
ii. Girth welds - Girth welds are manufactured in the field, under more
difficult conditions compared to linepipe welds, and the stresses created by
the hydrotest will be <50% of that experienced by the linepipe seam welds.
Therefore, there is a chance of large, undetected, weld defects entering
service.

4.5.9.1 Pipeline Welding Codes and Defects
All welds will contain some defects, so pipeline welding codes allow reasonable
levels of defects to remain. These levels are often called workmanship levels those
expected when reasonable operators, materials and working practices are followed.

The codes allow some planar and non planar defects. Non planar defects are slag,
porosity, etc., and planar defects are lack of side wall fusion, etc.:

i. Non planar defects are not usually a problem, but indicate poor quality,
and they could mask the presence of more serious defects.
ii. Planar defects can act like cracks, and hence are limited in extent by the
welding codes.

Typically, a surface breaking defect of 25mm (1in) in length
22
, or a 50 mm (2in)
embedded defect is allowed to remain in girth welds by most welding codes. Cracks
are not usually allowed; cracks can indicate bad welding, poor material, poor quality
control, etc., and hence are usually repaired.

These codes, and their acceptance levels, have been shown to be effective; pipeline
girth welds rarely cause problems during service. However, defects are sometimes
detected during service, and they require assessment. Additionally, operators may
wish to set different defect acceptance levels (based on fitness-for-purpose, rather
than workmanship limits) at the construction stage of their pipeline.

4.5.9.2 New Acceptance Limits for Girth Weld Defects
The European Pipeline Research Group, EPRG has published guidelines on the
assessment of defects in transmission, and they constitute the state of the art. The
reader is directed towards these guidelines and their background literature [Hopkins,

22
Pipeline girth welding codes normally only quote defect length in their acceptance charts. This is
because pipeline welds have traditionally been inspected using radiography, which will not give a
measure of through-thickness depth.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 47 of 62
1993, Knauf & Hopkins, 1996]. They can be used on new pipelines (to set weld defect
acceptance levels), but have applicability to existing pipelines.

The EPRG guidelines present three tiers or levels of defect assessment. The first tier
is a simple workmanship level, where short defect lengths are quoted as acceptable.
This tier can be used on new pipeline constructions where there is no need for large
defects to be either assessed or accepted.

The two higher tiers use fracture mechanics, supported by a large experimental
programme, to give very generous defect limits for girth welds. These limits are not
intended for new constructions; modern girth welds should easily meet current
workmanship standards. It is recommended that the new limits in the EPRG
guidelines be used for:

- special applications where longer defects are anticipated (e.g. new processes),
- as a concession by the pipeline operator to avoid unnecessary repairs,
- as an insurance policy for cases where a defect is detected during post-
construction audit or during in-service inspection.


Figure 22 gives the Tier 3 defect limits from the EPRG guidelines. Note that the
guidelines do not take account of fatigue loading, or environmental attack.
Figure 22. Defect Limits for Girth Welds in the EPRG Guidelines (note
conditions apply)

4.5.9.3 Arc Strikes
Welding arc strikes/burns are often found on linepipe. These are areas of localised
melting of the linepipe, usually causing:

- a small depression in the pipewall,
- an area of local hardness (this hardened layer may increase susceptibility to
environmental cracking and possibly small cracks).

8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
MIN. OR MEASURED WALL THICKNESS (mm)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
D
E
F
E
C
T

L
E
N
G
T
H

(
%

p
i
p
e

c
i
r
c
u
m
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
)
T
o
ta
l - A
ll P
la
n
a
r D
e
fe
c
ts
In
te
ra
ctin
g
P
la
n
a
r D
e
fe
cts
Individual P
lanar D
efects
Total - All Defects
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 48 of 62
Welding codes require arc burns/strikes to be removed this is simple and quick
when the pipeline is being welded, and crews are on site.

They are not considered a problem in service as:

- they are not known to be a cause of in-service failures,
- the area hardened/cracked is very small and insignificant,
- the arc strike is usually coated after welding, so it is protected from the
environment,

but good practice is to grind them away, ensuring that the local wall thickness is not
reduced below the minimum specified or calculated by methods such as those in
Section 4.5.3.

4.5.10 Other Fitness-For- Purpose Methods For Transmission Pipelines.

4.5.10.1 Preventing Dynamic Fracture
Running fractures - both ductile and brittle - are a risk in gas and multiphase pipelines
[Anon., 1965; Maxey et al, 1972], Figures 10 and 13. Consequently, design codes
specify toughness requirements, based on impact tests (the drop weight tear test,
DWTT and Charpy, Cv ), for the pipeline material. These fractures can run long
distances (the longest brittle fracture in history ran for 13 km, and the longest ductile
fracture ran for 568m). By ensuring adequate toughness in the linepipe, any fracture
that starts to run along the pipeline will quickly be arrested (Figure 13).

Brittle fractures propagate at very high speeds, in excess of the speed of the
decompression wave of the methane gas (400m/sec (1300ft/sec)). The tip of the
running brittle fracture will experience the full pressure existing in the pipeline at the
time of the incident that caused its initiation, as the gas cannot exhaust from the pipe
at speeds higher than the acoustic velocity. The lower the temperature of the pipeline,
the faster the fracture speeds, so it is essential that the linepipe is not a brittle material.

Ductile fractures run at lower speed; these can be below the speed of the
decompression wave. Hence, the first requirement in preventing any running fracture
in a pipeline is to ensure that any fracture will be ductile; however, despite travelling
at speeds lower than the decompression speed, it is possible for ductile cracks to
propagate indefinitely because of the nature of the decompression process. So, it is
essential to ensure the ductile pipeline has sufficient toughness to arrest a running
ductile fracture

The prevention of propagating fractures in gas/multiphase pipelines is achieved by:

i. specifying a minimum toughness requirement (in terms of DWTT) to
ensure that brittle fracture propagation does not occur, and
ii. specifying a minimum toughness requirement (in terms of Charpy) to
ensure that ductile fracture propagation does not occur.

Pipeline design codes give these specifications, and the levels quoted in, for example,
ASME B31.8 are based on extensive full scale testing in both North America and
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 49 of 62
Europe. The simple Charpy (C
v
) test remains the definitive test for fracture
propagation, and it is the Charpy test that linepipe is assessed against for crack arrest.

A popular relationship used for calculating the required Charpy value for crack arrest
is the Battelle formula:

Cv = 1.5x2.382x10
-5

h
2
(Rt)
1/3
(28)


C
v
= full size Charpy V-Notch Energy, J

h
= hoop stress, Nmm
- 2
D = pipe diameter, mm
R = pipe radius, mm
t = pipe wall thickness, mm

These types of formulae are related to confidence levels, and therefore the original
publications should be consulted prior to use [Anon., 1965, Maxey et al, 1972]. For
modern linepipe toughness requirements the reader should consult the latest EPRG
guidelines [Vogt et al, 1995].

Modern linepipe does not have a brittle fracture problem (i.e. the DWTT requirements
are easily met), and most modern linepipe can easily meet Charpy requirements to
prevent running ductile fractures. However, it should be remembered that equations
such as Equation (28) are empirical and they have not been generally validated on the
higher grade steels (X80 and above), rich gases, pipelines designed to operate at high
stresses and pressures, and the thick walled linepipe (e.g. for use in deepwater).

4.5.10.2 Fatigue Calculations
Pipelines experience changes in pressure due to varying customer demand, or
differing batch flows. This means the pipeline can experience fatigue cracking.

Fatigue cracking is not a major cause of pipeline failure, as pipelines tend not to be
subjected to heavy cyclic loading, but there have been recorded incidents in poor
seam welds, and at damage locations in linepipe. Additionally, some pipelines can be
heavily cycled; liquid pipelines that are carrying batched products, and gas pipelines
that are supplying a variable demand profile customer (e.g. domestic) can see large
cyclic pressure changes. Offshore, pipelines can be subjected to high cyclic stresses
during laying (this will effect the fatigue strength of the girth weld) and thermal
loading.

Therefore, it has been necessary for the pipeline industry to apply fatigue fracture
mechanics [Hopkins and Jones, 1984; Hopkins and Haswell, 1995; Kiefner and
Maxey, 2000]. Loss of wall thickness defects or cracks can be assessed for fatigue
using classic fracture mechanics calculations [Anon., 1999a; Anon., 2000], whereas
damage such as dents has to be assessed using the methods detailed in Section 4.5.4.2.

4.5.11 Sub-sea Pipelines

Most transmission pipelines are onshore, buried to about 1m. However, there are
many 1000kms of offshore (or sub-sea) pipelines. They range from pipelines in very
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 50 of 62
shallow water (a few metres), to very deep: some new pipelines are planned to operate
at many 1000kms below the surface.

These pipelines use the same linepipe, and carry similar products, but their integrity
problems and how we solve them can differ significantly because of their
environment:
- there is limited accessibility for inspection and maintenance (e.g. no human
intervention is possible at depths >300 m); the cost of inspection can be
greater than 10 times the onshore cost,
- the pipeline configuration may prevent external inspection (e.g. pipe-in-pipe
systems, riser caisson assemblies, etc.),
- different types of inspection methods and tools are required,
- most sub-sea pipelines are producers with no redundancy for alternative
route, i.e. potential increased cost of lost production,
- there is an increased cost of remedial works, and therefore more frequently it
is cost-effective to conduct analytical assessments,
- there can be constraints in schedule by the weather and availability of
equipment (e.g. specialized boats),
- other users (fisherman, tankers, etc.) of the sea are continually in the vicinity
of the pipelines creating a high third party damage risk.

Sub-sea pipelines can contain all the damage covered by the above assessment
methods, but additionally can contain:
- Pipeline spans these are sections of unsupported pipeline, created by:
construction, scour and seabed movement, changes in local soil properties, and
pressure and temperature effects, Figure 23. They have a tendency to change
year-by-year. The key integrity issues are structural over -stress or fatigue
failure.
- Pipeline exposures these are sections of exposed pipeline found on a
trenched or protected pipeline system. They are caused by seabed movement
or pipeline movement, and can be the pre-cursor to a pipeline span. The key
integrity issues are stability, external damage and possibly thermal
performance.
- Buckling - Lateral (horizontal) and upheaval (vertical) buckling are possible
in sub sea pipelines. Lateral buckling is usually associated with unburied
pipelines at areas where the alignment is curved, whereas upheaval buckling
will be on buried pipelines at overbends, where the profile is convex upwards.
They are caused by temperature and pressure, combined with construction
features or third party interference. They are identified by gross pipeline
lateral or upheaval deflection, usually coupled with soil movement, Figure 23.
The key integrity issues are structural and fatigue failure, short and long-term.
- Risers the pipeline section alongside an offshore platform (the riser) can
have collision damage from supply boats, impact damage from anchors and
dropped objects from the platform. It will also be subjected to large external
loads (wave loading) and corrosion around the splash zone.

The above span and buckling problems can be solved by stress analysis and guidance
given in sub-sea pipeline design codes. However, they will require precise inspection
data, and additional analyses such as hydraulic and process calculations.

Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 51 of 62
Finally, it should be emphasized that the defect assessment methods given above have
been developed primarily for onshore pipelines. This does not invalidate their use in
sub-sea pipelines; however, sub-sea pipelines can be subjected to high external loads
(additional to internal pressure loading), and can be of geometries (thick wall, or low
D/t) that will not have been included in the empirical validation of many of the
methods.


Figure 23. Example of a Free-span (top) and Upheaval Buckle in a Sub-sea
Pipeline.

4.5.12. Other Components of a Pipeline System

There are many other types of plant associated with a pipeline system. This Chapter
has focussed on the pipeline, but there are assessment methods for other plant.

Much of this associated plant is designed to pressure vessel or pipework standards,
and the pipeline industry has applied structural integrity methods to these varied
structures [Hopkins and Haswell, 1995]. In general, the methods detailed in BS 7910
Feed-in Free-span Feed-in
Axial Force
Buckled Position
Buckle
Initial Position
Overbend
Direction of Least
Resistance
Pipeline
Longitudinal
compressive force
from temperature
and pressure effects
Buckled Position
Buckle
Buckled Position
Buckle
Initial Position
Overbend
Initial Position
Overbend
Direction of Least
Resistance
Pipeline
Longitudinal
compressive force
from temperature
and pressure effects
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 52 of 62
[Anon., 1999a], and API 579 [Anon., 2000] can be used to assess defects in these
types of structures.

4.5.13 Repair and Rehabilitation

There will be cases where a defect assessment concludes that a repair is necessary.
There are various repair methods available, but often the choice of the repair method
is a secondary consideration [Hopkins and Bruton, 1999a; Hopkins and Bruton,
1999b]:

i. DRIVERS FOR REPAIR - Many repair or rehabilitation projects are not
driven by the choice of repair or rehabilitation method. They are driven by
economics, urgency or engineering considerations.
ii. COST The cost of a repair method may be a minor element; for example,
the cost of the repair clamp for a damaged offshore pipeline is negligible
compared to the cost of the vessel that has to be hired to install the repair.
Also, it may be cost-beneficial to replace, rather than rehabilitate, a
pipeline - a new, larger, more efficient pipeline can give lower whole life
costs than an ageing, small, inefficient line, albeit rehabilitated.
iii. URGENCY - A catastrophic failure (people or environmental) has such a
devastating effect on public relations, etc., that the least of a companys
worries is the type of repair/rehabilitation. Cost to public image, l ost
revenue and clean up costs are key considerations.
iv. ENGINEERING - The engineering associated with any work on a
pipeline may be the crucial consideration. For example, an offshore line
that has lost its coating, and is floating, or an onshore line that is to be
lifted out of a trench and recoated live.
v. APPROACH - Pipeline rehabilitation is similar to pipeline
construction/overhaul (i.e. retrieval/trenching, section rehabilitation,
backfill, inspection, etc.), and requires the same engineering approach.

There are various repair methods available, including:

Coating Repair,
Grinding,
Weld Metal Deposition,
Full Circumferential Sleeves,
Composite Reinforcement Sleeves,
Patch/Part Sleeve Repairs,
Mechanical Clamps,
Pipe Section or Pipeline Replacement,
External Coatings/Internal Liners,
Combined inspections/repairs/rehabilitation.

Information on these repairs can be found in the technical literature, e.g. Hopkins and
Bruton, 1999a or Hopkins and Bruton, 1999b, but can also be found in commercial
literature on the internet.

Repairs to live pipelines can present hazards. Therefore, safe working procedures
must be in place before approaching or excavating the pipeline. A reduction in
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 53 of 62
pressure to a safe level before repair, in essential, and additional pressure reductions
may be necessary for the selected repair method:
- If the pipeline is severed, or the defect is leaking, the pipeline and surrounding
must be made safe. This will mean immediate pressure or flow reductions (if
necessary) to prevent further damage or leakage.
- For pipe wall defects, the operating pressure needs to be lowered to 80% of
that at which defect was discovered/inflicted, until the defect has been
assessed. This pressure reduction will prevent any time dependent effects
causing the defect to fail under constant pressure. For structural defects (e.g.
buckling), structural assessments will be needed.
- Future pressure reductions may need to be planned depending on the type of
repair or rehabilitation method selected. Some composite repairs require
pressure reductions of 50%.
- Recoating a pipeline may require removal of the pipe from the trench, and the
pressure may be required to be reduced to zero.



Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 54 of 62

5. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
ASSESSMENTS OF PIPELINES

Transmission pipelines are essential for the energy business, but the high energy
content of these structures means that they are a hazard to surrounding population and
environment. A good pipeline design eliminates most structural problems and we
know that it is defects occurring in operation that are our major safety hazards
(Section 2.6).

There has been a number of very high profile, tragic pipeline accidents recently in the
USA. In 1999 an onshore gasolene line (see Figure 24, right) failed and product
leaked into a river; a subsequent ignition killed three young people who were
playing/fishing in the river.


Figure 24. Recent Pipeline Failures in the USA (Images Courtesy of National
Transportation Safety Board, USA)

Unfortunately, it does not stop there another major failure of an onshore gas line in
New Mexico in 2000 killed 12 campers (see Figure 24, left), and these failures have
made the pipeline industry unpopular in the USA.

Our pipelines are growing older, and as engineers we know we cannot expect the
same/more performance without some intervention. Therefore, continued safety will
require management systems that reduce in-service defects either by prevention or
detection.


Image from National Transportation
Safety Board website: www.ntsb.gov


Image taken from National Transportation
Safety Board website: www.ntsb.gov
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 55 of 62
The risk associated with pipelines can be managed by good operational practices. For
example, damage to the pipelines can be prevented by good surveillance, and liaison
with those who might damage them. Also, corrosion can be prevented by effective
corrosion protection systems, and detected by using intelligent pigs, Figure 7.

Indeed, structural integrity assessments are one of the methods we use to control
pipeline risk, Figure 25, after commissioning.

Figure 25. Managing Pipeline Integrity and Risk

Pipeline risk management (see Section 3) starts with good staff and management,
dealing in good quality data, usually accessible from a database. This database can be
accessed by applications such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS), but
structural assessments will also need the data. Overall, these applications and
assessments will be managed by some type of pipeline integrity management system
(PIMS) [Hopkins, 2001b], and the data and analyses can be used to monitor and
control the risk posed by the pipeline to surrounding population and society. Figure 25
shows the position of structural assessments in controlling pipeline risk. The control
of pipeline risk is a complex and wide ranging exercise: it is not simply a risk analysis
software package. Similarly a structural assessment must always be viewed as a part
of the risk control of a pipeline.

Obviously, a team of engineers is needed to carry out all this work in Figure 25, and
the assessment work that follows. Unfortunately some of our pipeline operators have
downsized engineering capabilities and have lost their grey hairs, and may soon
have staffing that is under-strength or under-trained [Hopkins, 2001a] or under-
experienced. It is important to protect both corporate memory, and engineering
objectivity [Hopkins, 2000; Hopkins, 2002] during these changing times.
DATABASE
Store all pipeline data
APPLICATIONS
Use data for GIS,
structural
integrity
assessments,
risk analysis, etc.
PIMS
Manage
your
pipeline
RISK
PIPELINE DATA
PROCESSES
e.g. Inspection
PEOPLE
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 56 of 62
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This Chapter will end by listing some wider issues and general advice for engineers to
consider when conducting a structural assessment of a pipeline:

1. THINK SAFETY Pipeline codes are safety standards, and an engineers
prime role in any industry is to ensure safety. Structural assessments are safety
assessments. Always think safety.
2. CODES ARE DAY 1 CODES Pipeline design codes give us minimum
structural integrity requirements they are the starting point for integrity, not
the end point. A pipeline designed and built to code will be very safe on its
first day in service. However, after day 1 the pipelines management dictates
its safety, not the design code. Therefore, good managers and good
management systems
23
are the key to pipeline structural integrity. This means
a continual appraisal of technical issues such as smart pigging, risk
management programmes, correct routeing etc., to achieve high integrity. But
remember - only good management will guarantee integrity
3. ADOPT AN HOLISTIC APPROACH Pipelines fail for a reason, and most
of these reasons can either be avoided or mitigated by good pipeline
management. Structural assessments must address all elements of the problem
including consequences of failure, and the management systems that need to
be in place to implement any recommendation. Therefore, pipeline integrity
management must consider all aspects of our pipeline system, as it is an
integrated process, where all elements affect safety. Holistic solutions must be
applied [Hopkins, 2001a; Hopkins 2001b]. Pipelines are safe if we adopt an
holistic approach.
4. DO NOT DO THE MINIMUM - Codes. Regulations, etc., are minimum
requirements. Aim to do more than your peers. It makes sense if you do
only one thing more than your peers, his/her pipeline has a higher probability
of failing first. You will learn from their experience, and act accordingly, so it
does not happen to you. They will then copy your practices, but you will then
move one step ahead again and then their pipeline will again fail before
yours!
5. DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY SELECT LOWEST BIDS - Do not
automatically select the lowest bid in engineering: a trained monkey can select
the smallest of three objects. An engineer can select the safest and best.
6. CHANGE IS DIFFICULT It is difficult to change pipeline engineering
practices in companies, because it is difficult to change people [Hopkins,
2000; Hopkins, 2002]. However, as pipelines age we must continually change
our approach to pipeline structural integrity.
7. REGULATIONS AND COMPANY PRIORITY - Your company/work will
be limited by both company codes/practices and your national/state
legislation/regulation. These may not allow fitness for purpose assessments, or
the defects you consider acceptable. You must always check local and national
limits and legislation, before applying fitness for purpose: i) can I apply it,
and ii) can I use the results?
8. ORIGINS Always understand the origin or cause of your structural defect
before you assess it. A structural assessment may not be enough; for example,

23
Management Systems are covered in Hopkins, 1998 and Hopkins, 2001b.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 57 of 62
defects can be due to bad design (e.g. fatigue cracking), and hence the design
will also need changing, and some defects can be due to a hostile environment
(e.g. external stress corrosion cracking), and in this case the pipeline coating
may need replacing.
9. CONSEQUENCES - Always appreciate the consequences of your assessment.
If I have made an error, if the defect measurement is wrong, etc., and the
pipeline fails, what are the consequences? Consequences will dictate your
safety margin on your calculations.
10. NEVER ASSESS A MESS There will be some situations where an engineer
is asked to assess the structural significance of defects, where the defects are
extensive, or the structure itself is in poor condition. Sometimes even the best
surgeon has to pronounce the patient dead.
11. CALCULATIONS ARE NOT ENGINEERING [Kardon, 2000] - Calculations
convey the thought process and design intent, and are an essential part of any
engineering appraisal. The quality, etc. of calculations indicates the level of
care and diligence; however, calculations substantiate, but do not substitute,
for judgement.
12. ENGINEERING RESPONSIBILITY - It is your responsibility to ensure that
any fitness for purpose assessment is correct. Try and use the best possible
practices available. Check calculations, inputs and assumptions. Use all
available data (historical, current and circumstantial) when you assess a defect
inspection data, operations records, maps, etc., may give you more
information about the defect, its cause, etc.. Your appreciation of the wider
practical issues, and your understanding of all engineering aspects of the
problem, are why you have been hired to conduct the assessment, rather than
someone who can simply work out an equation.
13. PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY Engineers performing
structural assessments, where decisions can effect company profits, career
progression, environment, etc., must put safety first, and remember that
engineers have professional (institutional requirements), legal (standard of
care) and ethical (moral) criteria to also satisfy [Anon, 2002a; Hopkins 2002]
in all aspects of their work.



Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank all his colleagues at Penspen Group UK, in particular,
Mr Andrew Cosham, who have contributed to this Chapter.
Phil Hopkins Penspen Group, UK
Final Draft for Editor, May 2002 Keywords Page 58 of 62

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