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Thomas Kuttner

Russian jaddism and the Islamic world : Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908.
In: Cahiers du monde russe et sovitique. Vol. 16 N3-4. Juillet-Dcembre 1975. pp. 383-424.

Rsum Thomas Kuttner, Le djaddisme russe et le monde islamique. Ismail Gasprinskii au Caire, 1908. La publication phmre d'un journal en arabe, al-Nahdah, par Ismail Bey Gasprinskii pendant son bref sjour au Caire, en fvrier-mars 1908, est passe inaperue jusqu' ce jour. Pourtant elle revt une grande importance car elle souligne le rle considrable que le djaddisme et les penseurs djaddistes jourent dans la modernisation de l'Islam. Al-Nahdah servit de vhicule aux ides socio-cono miques de Gasprinskii. En outre, pour la premire fois, il s'aventurait dans le domaine du commentaire politique, un domaine auquel il n'avait jamais touch encore, en raison du svre contrle que le gouvernement exerait sur la presse musulmane de Russie. Enfin, grce al-Nahdah, Gasprinskii put diffuser sa proposition d'un Congrs islamique universel, proposition qui fut boude par les cercles officiels et qui ne devait jamais se raliser. Abstract Thomas Kuttner, Russian jaddism and the Islamic world Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908. The short-lived publication by Ismail Bey Gasprinskii of an Arabic newspaper, al-Nahdah, during his brief sojourn in Cairo in the months of Feb.-March, 1908, has hitherto gone unnoticed. However, the appearance of al-Nahdah is of no little significance, for it underscores the important role which Russian Jaddism and the Jaddist thinkers played in the development of Islamic modernism. Al-Nahdah served as a vehicle for Gasprinskii's socio-economic ideas and was his first outright venture into the field of political commentary, an area in which he had not hitherto entered, due to the stringent government control of the Russian Muslim Press. Finally the newspaper served as an organ to broadcast Gasprinskii's proposal for a Universal Islamic Congress, a proposal frowned upon in official circles and one which never came to fruition.

Citer ce document / Cite this document : Kuttner Thomas. Russian jaddism and the Islamic world : Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908. In: Cahiers du monde russe et sovitique. Vol. 16 N3-4. Juillet-Dcembre 1975. pp. 383-424. doi : 10.3406/cmr.1975.1247 http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cmr_0008-0160_1975_num_16_3_1247

Problmes de nationalits en Russie et en





A call to the Arabs for the rejuvenation of the Islamic world

I Introduction* In a brief seven-day period covering the final days of February and the initial days of March 1908, an unpretentious yet remarkable Arabic language newspaper styling itself as "sociological, political, progressivereformist, and literary" in content appeared in Cairo: al-Nahdah /La Renaissance.1 Certainly, the radiantly shining rising sun boldly em blazoned across its masthead and serving as a visual image of its message suffered an abrupt eclipse, for some sixteen issues had been envisioned of which only three saw the presses: those of Friday February 28th, Tues day March 3rd and Friday March 30th.2 Ephemeral as its existence may have been, al-Nahdah proves to have been a periodical worthy of note by virtue both of the particulars of its publication and of the mater ials which it contained. What distinguished al-Nahdah above all else was the person of its editor-publisher and chief contributor, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, Crimean Tatar educator, journalist, and crusading politician an acknowledged leader of the Islamic modernist /reform movement (Jaddism) in Muslim Russia.3 To be sure, Gasprinskii's was not the first journal in Cairo to be edited by a non-Arab Muslim already for several years Turk, a controversial periodical of high quality, had been published there by a group of Ottoman Turk political exiles who, like many of their co-reli gionists of radical persuasion elsewhere in the Islamic body politic, found Cahiers du Monde russe et sovitique, XVI (3-4), juil.-dc. 1975, pp. 383-424.



in British occupied Egypt a place of refuge. But in two respects Gasprinskii's small project differed significantly from this and other more grandiose endeavors: Gasprinskii himself was not a political exile, but rather a Tatar national figure admittedly if begrudgingly respected by the Russian authorities; and, unlike its counterparts al-Nahdah was published in Arabic rather than in Turkish (despite Gasprinskii's own lack of knowledge of this language), belying its appeal to quite another audience. It is this dual uniqueness which lends to al-Nahdah its special interest to the scholar. Viewed from one perspective al-Nahdah might appear to be nothing more than what it was most probably consciously intended to be by its editor: a distillation in highly concentrated form for the benefit of an Arab audience of his social message to the Turkic world in particular and to the Islamic world in general. Often propounded elsewhere, this message proclaimed the need for the Westernization of Muslim society to be effected by the implementation of various cultural and socio-economic reforms. But here unconsciously, and one suspects perhaps not so unconsciously, Gasprinskii has taken the opportunity to expand in a new direction and to express his ideas, tentative and contradictory though they may be, on the very critical question of the political relationship between Islamic and Western societies in general and on the political situation in Russia in particular. That he should have done so is in retrospect not surprising. Gasprinskii like the majority of the Russian Muslim leaders of his generation, was in outward appearances a political conservative, stu diously correct in his show of loyalty towards the Tsarist regime.4 This attitude was of course necessitated by force of circumstance, yet it had the net effect of casting him in an unfavorable light in the eyes of his younger contemporaries, especially towards the end of his career. The brief respite from political repression afforded by the 1905 Revolution, and more importantly the wave of enthusiasm which had swept across Asiatic Russia after the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), fired these younger men with an impetuousness and desire for action which was intolerant of the cautious attitudes and hesitant actions so long pursued by their mentors. They chose to ignore the severe disabilities under which these latter had been forced to live. Testimony of this fact is to be seen in the short reminiscence of the Bashkiri nationalist Zeki Validov (Togan): 'I remember saying to him that Ismail Bey (Gaspirali) had been too servile [. . .] It was dangerous for us to encourage the Russians to approach us in the guise of a big brother [. . .] make love to us in order to betray us. It was better for the future of the colonial peoples to refrain from close mingling, as the English did. . . Ebubekir replied, "The ideas of that period were different; moreover, had Ismail Bey said that, his book would never have passed the censorship. In bad times he brought us at least some comfort". . .'5 Indeed the key to understanding Gasprinskii's political quietism is to be found in the issue of censorship. In many ways Gasprinskii's most remarkable feat was his success at publishing in Bahesaray his provoca tive, widely read and influential paper Terjumdn (The Interpreter) continuously and uninterruptedly for some thirty years from 1883 until



his death in 1914.* He was a master at deftly outmanoeuvring the heavy hand of the censor, but the price he paid was silence and the abdication of the right to a forthright exposition of his political views. Now sud denly for a brief time he found himself free from this burdensome weight and, casting aside his accumulated inhibitions, he ventured gingerly into the arena of politics. Al-Nahdah then affords to the reader the unique opportunity of read ing material limited and ambiguous though it may be written or edit edby a Gasprinskii unhampered by the threat of the political censor. That he miscalculated in assessing the freedom of expression which Cairo as a locale for broadcasting his views afforded, is borne out by the hasty suppression of the organ. Whether this action was taken independently by the British censor admittedly more liberal than his Russian counter part but ever present all the same or under pressure from some outside power, either the Ottoman Government which was at the time hostile towards Gasprinskii's proposed project for an Islamic Congress, or the Russian Government which was portrayed most disparagingly in the paper, cannot be determined. Be that as it may, a hastily insert notice in the third issue of the paper announced its immediate suspension of operation, optimistically termed "temporary," but as events proved to be, permanent, due to the "indisposition" of the editor whom physicians advised to "refrain from mental exertion."7 Nevertheless, Gasprinskii managed in the short week of freedom allot tedhim to reveal a political thinking which if somewhat ambiguous was definitely more radical than that propounded by him in his Russian based journal. These writings, in many cases only brief and oblique references, and more importantly several longer exposs of Russian domestic and foreign politics chosen for publication by Gasprinskii although written by an anonymous correspondent in Petersburg, illumine for us hitherto hidden aspects of the man's thinking. From the Arab viewpoint too al-Nahdah was unique. Even if the more blatantly political articles were immediately of interest to the Turkic Muslim populace of Russia, their impression on the Arabs must have been considerable as well. Gasprinskii wanted to broaden the consciousness of his Arab readers social, cultural, historical and political to intensify their awareness of the tremendous diversity present in the Islamic world which had the potential for coalescing into a dynamic cultural unity. The healthy tension inherent in this "diversity in unity" was Gasprinskii's answer to the crushing uniformity of cultural and socio-economic decay then besetting the Islamic world. The Arab reader here viewed Muslim history, culture, geography, ethnography and literature as through a kaleidoscope whose focus was in the hands of the Crimean Tatar. The effect could not have been but startling. The extent to which Gasprinskii's very mode of expression had been heavily influenced by Russian political concepts then current a phenom enon most probably unrecognized by him but effected over a period of time by a type of cultural osmosis is most strikingly evident in a long article entitled: "To the dear Egyptian peasant."8 This open letter is in effect a joint panegyric celebrating the worth and achievements of the Egyptian fellah and a clarion call bidding him rise up and assert his



dignity and inherent right to full possession of the land and its fruits, all done in the best tradition of Russian populism. Small wonder then that one French observer cautiously referred to it as written "dans un style nouveau pour le journalisme arabe."9 To the typical Arab reader, a literate and articulate member of the urban middle and upper classes for whom the fellah was lower on the scale of human values than a good pack animal, the message conveyed and not just the style was outrageous if not revolutionary. This then wul be the dual perspective through which we wish to ana lyze the contents of al-Nahdah in depth, ever conscious of the particular background of its editor destined to influence the choice of content of the paper as well as the manner of its presentation, and equally conscious of the audience to which he addressed himself and of the response which the paper must have evoked from it.

II "al-Nahdah": Description In physical characteristics al-Nahdah was a modest venture, attracti vely and simply laid out and modestly priced. Subscriptions were encour aged and at ten Egyptian piastres for sixteen issues more than reason able; unsolicited copies sold for less than this amount at one-half piastre apiece or a total of eight piastres for all sixteen issues.10 Gasprinskii used his lodgings in the Hotel Minerva in the European quarter of Cairo as his business office, to which was directed all correspondence as well as subscription inquiries. Al-Nahdah was scheduled to appear twice- weekly on Fridays and Tuesdays. Of the three issues printed each consisted of four pages of which the last was composed entirely of advertisements and political cartoons. These latter were taken either directly or via Terjumn from well-known papers published in Muslim Russia those from the Azeri satirical review Molla Nasreddin (published at Tiflis) being the most easily identifiable.11 Apart from these cartoons, six in number, al-Nahdah was liberally illustrated throughout boasting seven accompanying photo graphs for several different articles no mean feat for a publication of its size. These are as varied as a portrait of a contemporary Muslim ruler, a map of the Eastern hemisphere, and photographs of several Islamic architectural masterpieces, a Muslim handicraft display and the summer residence of an Islamic potentate. In the space of these three issues a total of some twenty major articles and numerous lesser notices, announcements and editorial comments were printed. These could be roughly broken down into five major categories. Two major articles dealt with the on-going plans for Gasprinskii projected Universal Islamic Congress tentatively scheduled to be held in the following year, and these occasioned numerous letters of response from throughout the Islamic world primarily Asiatic Russia as well as editorial com ment from several Egyptian dailies reprinted for the benefit of the reader.



By far the greatest amount of space was allotted to five major articles outlining in some detail the editor's major criticisms of the socio-economi c and cultural dereliction then prevalent in the Islamic world and his suggestion for remedying this state of affairs. Political news and commentary was of two sorts. The political situation in several Islamic countries was generally discussed in four articles and as mentioned above, of especial interest were the three lengthly and highly detailed accounts of the contemporary domestic and foreign political scene in Russia. A further five articles dealt with the social and cultural aspects of several contemporary Muslim societies seldom heard of among the Arabs. These were in the form of historical accounts, ethnological studies and travelogues. Finally, apart from short miscella nea was the literary supplement, a three-part serialization in Arabic trans lation of the introductory pages of Gasprinskii's Utopian work Rihlah Gharbiyah (Sojourn in the West). Thus the several areas of interest claimed by the paper as within its purview were each adequately repre sented. But the reader is advised that such schematization serves merely as a convenient and somewhat artificial mode of outlining the scope of al-Nakdah's contents. Such fractionalization tends to obscure the very real integration and unity of theme which actually characterized the substance of al-Nahdah due to the fact that seventeen out of the twenty major articles of the paper (85%) were penned by the hand of Gasprinskii himself. Because of his lack of fluency in Arabic Gasprinskii depended on his fellow Tatar national Musa 'Abd Allah al-Oazani,12 at the time resident in Cairo and a student at the al-Azhr University, to translate into Arabic his own articles and the correspondence received in Tatar or Russian. Interestingly, the language employed is often of the highest classical style only rarely exhibiting a stiffness of phraseology or lack of correct idiom which one might expect from a non-native adept. The printing house entrusted with putting out the paper was the Matba'at al-W'z (al-Wu'z Press) which advertised itself in each issue as a "printer of newspapers, journals, scientific and literary books, cards and invoices."13 Gasprinskii appears to have met the printing costs incurred partially by giving the printer unlimited advertising space in al-Nahdah. Of the seven advertisements carried on the last page of each issue six are of the printer and these publicize various works from his press. They are chiefly works of a pedagogical nature, some devoted to traditional subjects rhetoric, style and literary criticism and others to those of a more modern curriculum the biological and physical sciences. Featured as well in contrast to these was lighter material games and puzzles. The seventh advertisement was for Gasprinskii's own publishing house in Bahesaray, for which he had an Egyptian agent.


THOMAS KUTTNER III "al-Nahdah": Analysis

As Ismail Gasprinskii wrote in his introductory editorial to al-Nah dah, ,u its purpose was expressed by its very title: to arouse in the reader a spirit of endeavor. But this role of the paper as a gad-fly on society was to be a dual one. On the one hand it was to provide a forum in which the important issues then besetting Muslim society were to be openly and fully discussed. For Gasprinskii this involved a three-fold logical process. First Islamic society, the ummah, had to take the crucial step of acknowledging to itself its critical state of impotence and its consequent need for full rejuvenation a renaissance. Once this was achieved then the community could examine objectively and dispassionately the retro gressive elements imbedded within its heritage and the self-delusions so long rampant in the vociferous justification of that heritage which together hindered the community from development and condemned it to permanent stagnation. This done the community could then explore and adopt ways to hasten into effect its full and complete rebirth as a progressive component in modern civilization. Secondly al-Nahdah was to function as the chief organ of propagation for Gasprinskii's proposal to convene a Universal Islamic Congress. It was due to this, its pragmatic role, that al-Nahdah was envisaged as a type of itinerate journal, published periodically at different locations within the Islamic world and in whatever language was locally prevalent. To en sure continuity of form and content its editorship had to remain constant, so Gasprinskii proposed for himself a tour of the major regions of the Islamic world, Egypt being but the first of several stops. l5 The premature demise of al-Nahdah at this, its first-way station, apparently dampened the enthusiasm of its editor, for its anticipated reincarnations failed to mater ialize. The proposed Congress itself also failed to materialize so that in retro spect this, the primary reason for the publication of the paper, looses its significance. However, as the general aims of al-Nahdah and the par ticular aims of the Congress were identical, Gasprinskii did succeed in promulgating his views on those subjects which were to have been discuss ed in the Congress through the medium of the paper. We shall examine these views in some detail in the next pages of this study, for convenience sake dividing them into several categories: those dealing with social and cultural problems and their remedy; those dealing with the economic situation; and those touching on the political realities of the day. A. Social and cultural reform The programme of social and cultural reform advocated by Gasprinskii throughout the several issues of al-Nahdah mirrored for the most part that which he had promoted unceasingly for over a quarter of a century



in his newspaper Terjuman as well as in his various other writings. In brief this programme has been described as entailing the following: an educational reform based on European models; the emancipation of the Muslim woman; the establishment of broadly based philanthropic societies which could direct, co-ordinate and underwrite all activity aimed at the realization of the first two goals; the creation of a common Turkish liter ary language.16 This last aspect of the programme aimed as it was at the creation of a viable medium for the channelling of a nascent panTurkic nationalism was of no interest to Gasprinskii's Arab audience and as such was totally ignored in al-Nahdah, whose raison d'tre transcended purely national concerns. This willingness on the part of Gasprinskii to forego what to many of his contemporaries was the lynch-pin of his reformist proposals is of signifiance, for it reveals the essentially universalistic character and appeal of his thought. He was no pan-Islamist in the pejorative sense of the term then current,17 but neither was he a committed Turkish nationalist of the Akura mold, and the ease with which he adapted his well-integrated reform programme for this nonTurkic, Arabic speaking Muslim community without sacrificing in any way its essential characteristics is witness to this.18 1. Education For Gasprinskii education was a double-edged sword in the service of national revival. On the one hand, once given the initial impetus it would of its own effectively loosen the stranglehold which the traditional religious lite, pinioned under the weight of its own obscurantist doctrines, had on the formation of the Islamic community. On the other hand, an enlightened community schooled in an advanced pedagogical system of the European type would possess that maturity of spirit and the technol ogical-scientific facility demanded of it to acquire viable political and economic independence. Education then is the keystone of the new society envisioned by Gasprinskii a society which, while true to its tradi tions and culture, takes its place proudly among the most advanced societies of the West. Gasprinskii had himself pioneered just such an educational reform, the usul-i-jadid, in Russia and its phenomenal expansion (over 5,000 jadid schools in Russia by 1916) attested to its success. Although possessed of a ready model then by which to edify the Egyptians, Gasprinskii chose not to outline in detail a tested system for them to emulate.19 Rather, he used al-Nahdah as a platform from which to broadcast the philosophy which lay behind the concrete reforms. In numerous articles he force fully presented his viewpoint that education provided the means whereby the Islamic revival was to be achieved; without it all hope for such a revival was in vain. Gasprinskii outlined his philosophy of education most broadly for his readers in a lengthy article entitled "Causes of progress and develop ment."20 He postulated his theories on the basic premise that true education is a two-fold process comprising the unstructured years of a child's early rearing and upbringing followed by the more structured period of formal pedagogy. Given the two institutions of family and



society, Gasprinskii assigned a critical role to a component of each, in the first instance the wife /mother and in the second the school. Content with reminding the reader of the responsibility of society to innovate and implement "developed programmes" within its school system, Gas prinskii devoted the bulk of the article to the educational function of the mother within the family. Gasprinskii never tired of reiterating for the benefit of his readers the idea that women played a pivotal role in the modernizing process. He viewed the sexist chauvinism so glaringly apparent in this male dominated society as the cankerous "malady of the East." The domi nant view that woman is to serve as the passive vessel of man's repro ductive drive, active only in his physical birth and growth but not in any way in his spiritual development, was bitterly criticized by Gasprins kii. In opposition he forthrightly proclaimed that woman is the "touchstone of a progressive society" and indeed "Egypt will be rescued from her debility only by an educated, modern, knowledgeable woman hood aware of its spiritual and temporal duties." This intimate linking of Egypt's future with the heretofore unrealized education of her women was for Gasprinskii axiomatic shocking as it must have been for his readers. Passionately committed to his position, he put forward various arguments to convince his readers of its validity. On the one hand he appealed to the common sense of his reader, insisting that if he was willing to train an animal of limited potential in order to increase its productivity, how much more so should he be willing to invest time, money and energy in the actual education much less the training of women whose potential was unlimited and whose benefit to society was unmeasurable, not only in terms of themselves but in terms of the enlightened generation of children which they would raise. In another tack Gasprinskii sought historical justification for his contentions. In an interesting sociological excursus Gasprinskii attributed the German victory over the French in the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-71 to their enlightened feminist position. The reputed high level of edu cation attained by German women coupled with their higher birth rates had provided Prussia with an unusually competent generation of young men beside whom their French counterparts were decidedly inferior. Elsewhere throughout the newspaper while dealing with other issues, Gasprinskii makes references to education and these underscore the impor tance he attached to it as the primary factor in a successful modernization of the East. Thus after painting a bleak picture of the state of dereliction to which cultural life in Samarkand had descended, he informs the reader that in its educational system, the classical curriculum of grammar, syntax, morphology, rhetoric and ethics is still rigidly adhered to.21 Though such an education is not intrinsically retrogressive, it becomes so if given exclusive of the Western sciences. In his allegorical novel, Sojourn in the West, this attitude towards traditional education is borne out in a humorous vein when 'Abbas the narrator, educated first in Samarkand in the traditional subjects and then later in Paris in the modern sciences, chemistry, physics, mathematics, and engineering, addresses the twelve houri whom he has inadvertently stumbled upon. These sophisticated damsels react but mutely to the



poetic raptures with which he describes his home country in classical lite rarystyle, considering such outbursts to be "quaint" and a reflection of his rather backward ways.22 'Abbs's saving grace was his versatility in the Western sciences, but unfortunately it was in the vested interests of the religious establishment to see to it that the spread of such knowledge remained severely restricted. In two political cartoons devoted to this subject Gasprinskii villifies this class first as the culprits most directly responsible for the exclusion of young girls from any formal education whatsoever,23 and secondly as unprincipled charlatans employing the veil of obscurantism to mulct the ignorant masses of what meager returns their harsh toil might have earn ed.24 In the first, a bearded and turbaned sheikh, young maiden in tow, responds to her inquiries as to the purpose of the building before which they stand: 'It's called a "school" but there's nothing of interest here for you now run along my girl.' In the second, a corpulent mulld, well-dressed and with bejewelled fingers, sits complacently and bemoans: "We are impoverished from worrying over the affairs of the ummah and striving for its improvement." Many problems indigenous to Muslim society could be tackled only by the systematic implantation and regulation of a reformed school pro gramme. It was for this reason that the first concerted action of the Islamic faction in the third Duma was directed at the passage of a school reform bill.26 In Egypt itself the elimination of many vices which beset the society could be accomplished only by the establishment of a strong educational system. Decrying the high incidence of alcoholism and hashish addiction found in Egyptian society, Gasprinskii, though advocat ing the enactment and enforcement of legislation aimed at curbing these ills, warned his reader that such measures would be efficacious only if accompanied by a concurrent spread of education.26 2. The position of women in Islamic society and their emancipation The emphasis which Gasprinskii placed on the need for educated women to play their proper role in society was in fact the key element in his advocating the immediate emancipation of the Muslim woman. Once universal education was established, a new woman would emerge, freed from the bonds imposed on her by a male dominated society. Gasprinskii again spent little time outlining a detailed programme of female emancipation replete with platforms, slogans and demands, because he rightly foresaw the inevitability of this phenomenon develop ing of its own accord once the basic requirement had been met: education. Rather, in two scathing articles entitled, "Causes of progress and develop ment"27 and "Enlightened Islamic societies,"28 he indicted Islamic society as a whole for the "crime" not only of passive neglect of its women, but of active oppression of them as well. Gasprinskii viewed the material and moral degradation of the Islamic world as well as its occupation by various foreign powers as in a sense, "just recompense" for its total disregard of Natural Law, interpreted here as equivalent to Islamic Law (the Shar'ah) and Islamic Tradition



(the Sunnah). Nowhere was this disregard more blatant nor more in need of remedy than in the prevalent attitudes toward and treatment of women. Whereas Qur'an itself enjoined the believer, regardless of sex, to walk in the path of righteousness and whereas both men and women were made subject to the same law, in actuality Islamic society refused to grant to the latter equal status. Gasprinskii's accusations are harsh and blunt for in his opinion, not only is woman's equality of rights denied but even more, she is regarded in a sense as sub-human, devoid of those charact eristics normally attributed to man. Not only does Islamic society refuse to her a role and a share in its life, but it consciously denies to her the opportunity ever to gain the capability to do so. In a rhetorical jibe Gasprinskii remarks: 'Not to educate one's sons is considered by Islamic society as inexcusable yet do not one's daught ers too need "to know" themselves?' This denial of the very existence of the female intellect was for Gasprinskii morally reprehensible. Denyi ng to their women the "jewels" of knowledge and culture, Muslim men were content to adorn them with "baubles" of gold and silver as if that should satisfy them. The veil was for Gasprinskii the symbol par excellence of the oppressed status of women. Though fallen into general disuse among the Tatars and other Russian Turks, it still constituted an essential feature of urban Arab society. The idealized houri in Sojourn in the West walked about unconcernedly in the company of a strange young man, and of course with faces exposed.29 Polish Muslims of his day went about unveiled and Gasprinskii observed: "Yet they are virtuous and no harlots!"30 It was the conservative traditionalist lite whom Gasprinskii branded as most blatant in their discrimination against women. Again through the use of several well-chosen cartoons, this was graphically portrayed for the reader.31 In one, a sheikh in traditional garb, seated on a donkey and riding-whip in hand, journeys contentedly while his two wives and numerous children trudge alongside the road, loaded down with fuel and furniture. The subscript: "This sheikh has certainly received his share of good fortune for he owns a donkey and two wives;" and the order in which his goods are enumerated is not insignificant. A second cartoon with the suggestive subscript: "This needs no explanation. ..." must have been much more shocking for the average reader. It depicts a rather frail-looking elderly mulld seated on his divan, lasciviously fondling a nubile young maiden on his knee. Now this insinuation of outright sexual immorality on the part of the traditional religious lite is in itself most daring but Gasprinskii meant thereby to say much more. This degradation of woman, despite pious justifications continuously voiced, stemmed in fact, so Gasprinskii maintains, from the conscious effort on the part of one class to exploit another. Now what Gasprinskii found most discouraging and indeed the greatest stumbling block in the realization of his reform goals, was a phenomenon which social reform ers both before and after him so often faced. As he put it, the very class which is oppressed in this case women has become "conditioned" not only to accept its status, but indeed to be satisfied with it as well. Women were content to be "begettors of two-legged primates capable



of standing upright," and in so doing they forfeited the case for their emancipation to that class in whose vested interest it was to ensure their oppression. The innocent victims of this vicious cycle would be of course the children, consigned to an upbringing devoid of any value. But this traditional class is not alone in its oppression of women. Indeed, just as callous in their attitude is the newly westernized lite men who through casual contact with Europeans resident in the East, have adopted a veneer of Western sophistication, reveling in the newly discovered virtues libert and galit. This superficially westernized man has been well described by Vambry as possessed of the following attri butes: "(i) a suit of the finest broadcloth, after the latest cut and fashion; (2) tight patent leather shoes; (3) a small, jaunty fez, rakishly worn on one side of the head, and, as a matter of course, gloves too; (4) an easy, graceful step, accompanied by a fashionable carriage of the arms and hands; and (5) French conversation."32 Just such a "gentleman" is portrayed in one of Gasprinskii's cartoons, a rather gaudy-looking young "mademoiselle" in European attire on one arm, instructing his servant: "Muhammad, I'm going for a walk in the park. See to it that the woman of the house [his wife] does not glance out of the window it would offend public taste." So much for his espousal of the cause of female emancipation.33 Gasprinskii decried the position to which women in Islamic societies were condemned for broader reasons than merely concern for their welfare. He was convinced that their emancipation was crucial for the future of the entire society. As he told his reader, the progress and advances achieved by the women of the West had been the critical factor in the pro gressively raised standards of living there. Where such advances were accomplished among Muslim women, similar developments in the society as a whole occurred. Poland afforded adequate proof. The Muslim women of Poland34 were distinguished by the level of accomplishment to which they had attained in the social sphere. Indis tinguishable from their Russian and Polish Christian compatriots in dress, language, or behavior, they were educated in the same schools. One found them economically productive as well, actively engaged in govern ment service as employees in the postal service and the telegraph and telephone exchange. Many worked as well as secretaries, governesses or school teachers the latter in the State system as specialized Muslim schools did not exist. As Gasprinskii pointed out elsewhere,85 the progress achieved by the women of the West in the realization of their emancipation had been one of the critical factors in the rise of national standards of living, and the concomitant strengthening of the Western nations. Were the East to follow the West in this regard it could be assured of a vigorous life too, for in essence enlightened society was dependent on a changed atti tude towards, and treatment of, its women. In short, Polish Muslim women served to illustrate this conviction; they were an advanced, pro-



ductive element in an enlightened Polish society, by far the most progres sive group of women within the Islamic world and a model to be emulated by all. 3. Social responsibility and community organization In the lengthy article just cited, "Enlightened Islamic societies," Gasprinskii broadly outlined the direction in which he felt Islamic society must go if it were to overcome obstacles entrenched within itself, which hindered the realization of his programme of reform. A modernized educational establishment and an emancipated womanhood, the hal lmarks of the progressive society, seemed almost unattainable in the East due to the monolithic nature of Islam as lived by the masses. Popul ar Islam was for him characterized by two features a "maze of super stition" which entrapped the hapless believer and the "shackles of taqld" (lit. "imitation"), the doctrine enjoining blind obedience to the mores and practices of the past not in spirit but in form. To cut through this maze of superstition Gasprinskii proposed the sharp-edged sword of education, but to loosen the chains of taqlid would require the displacement of the entrenched clerical classes from their position of authority in traditional society. As he pointed out, to accomp lish the first without the second would result only in a Pyrrhic victory, for the forces of tradition, if left untouched, would ultimately triumph. The spearhead of Islamic reform had to be a two-pronged weapon, which would provide a new educational basis on which to forge a viable, rena scent society, and at the same time which would destroy the decaying edifice of traditionalism, housing only a brittle and fragmented society. But how was this reform to be effected? Again as was his want, Gasprinskii did not provide a detailed blueprint, but rather suggested a broad framework on which the new society would be built. Central to his view of a re-built Islamic society is the concept of social responsib ility. The inculcation of this sense in the consciousness of the individ ual member of society, especially from among its upper classes, is a sine qua non for Gasprinskii; and worthy of mention and emulation when evidenced. It is for this reason that he took pains to report of the "hand some donation" of Prince Hussein Pasha Psh Kaml of 500 E.L. to the Child Welfare Society and his pledge to donate a further 100 E.L. annually. Others of his wealth and status were exhorted to do likewise for the less fortunate.36 But if such largesse is to be effective it is essential that it be properly channelled, and as such Gasprinskii advocated that private social responsib ility be co-ordinated in programmes sponsored by structured commun ity organizations. Of significance is the fact that Gasprinkii envisaged such organizations as springing up spontaneously among groups of likeminded individuals committed to the new society, rather than as offshoots rooted in the traditional charitable institution of established Islam, the Waqf. Despite distinct elements of populism in his philosophy and even tinges of egalitarianism, Gasprinskii basically accepted the class basis of society and projected his sociological ideas upon it. Doubtless he was



aware of the more radical social ideologies then current, especially in post1905 Russia, which had by that time definitely penetrated Muslim Russia in tangible form. Nevertheless, the scheme which he presents to the Arab reader reveals his acceptance of an elitist view of society. As he saw it, advanced societies invariably possessed an upper stratum of intellectuals, influential in counsels, who actively engaged in the reform of social insti tutions and structures, and continually sought for the best means of accomplishing social progress. This class served as a model for all others, and if emulated on its innovative leadersliip, ensured the advancement of the entire society . Now Islamic society as yet possessed no such integrated intellectual leadership. True, a group of enlightened 'ulama (clerics) did exist, but its influence in the circles of authority was at most limited and more usually non-existent. Moreover, members of this group often lacked the strength of their convictions and often displayed an abysmal moral cowardice when confronted by a hostile and powerful opposition. Likewise, there was that group of Muslims who, educated in Europe, return ed to their home countries enamoured of European culture and fired with a spirit of reform. But all too often their adoption of European ways was but a veneer superficially covering an underlying character still deeply entrenched in Islamic traditionalism. From the likes of such as these nothing of permanence could be expected Finally Gasprinskii did acknowledge that enlightened strata did exist in selected places within the Islamic world of which he enumerated three: Baku, Alexandria and Cairo. But unfortunately these lacked a sense of social responsibility and gathered for little else but self-grati fication. Sarcastically he derides their partying circuit, from celebra tions at the end of the Ramadan fast to weddings and funerals. The more Europeanized of them frequent the many Western sporting and social clubs, or hob-nob at the races not exactly the most conducive settings for the implementation of social reform programmes! What was needed for social progress was the creation of multitudes of voluntary associations dedicated to the advancement of every facet of society. The problems of mass poverty, hunger, ignorance, disease, poor hygiene and lack of sanitation each had to be attacked by the concert ed efforts of a group of concerned individuals. (Significantly, the only specific institution recommended for Egypt was a Normal School for Girls to be established in every town and city.) Co-ordinating the work of a plethora of social agencies would be a National Club, established in every city, which would ensure the pursuit of common goals in a spirit of co-operation by the implementation of specific and definite programmes. Tragically, as he noted, no such activity was manifest in Egypt and this was not because of lack of money nor opposition on the part of the occupying British. Rather, dereliction in the social sphere had its roots within Islamic society itself, weak and debilitated after centuries of iner tia. Gasprinskii beseeched his readers, especially those of the newly educated lite: "Your minds have been enlightened and changed, now change the convictions of the heart and the spirit as well. "

THOMAS KUTTNER 4. Models for reform (a) The West There was no doubt in Gasprinskii's mind that if the East were to develop in the manner he envisaged, it would have to integrate itself harmoniously and totally in Western civilization. In an address deliver ed to a large and politically heterogeneous group of Egyptian notables during his first visit to Cairo in the Autumn of 1907, he succinctly stated this view as follows: "Je n'ai d'autre but que de rechercher les causes de la dcadence de la nation musulmane, de sonder les voies des progrs et d'arriver au choix des moyens qui nous permettent d'avoir notre part dans la civilisation occidentale. "37 Just what the phrase "la civilisation occidentale" signified for him, Gasprinskii clearly expounded in an article of utmost importance which he wrote for the third edition of al-Nahdah and entitled "The means to civilization and reform."38 First Gasprinskii defined the West as comprising Europe and Ameri ca,and in both two principal features characterized their societies: modernization and enlightened statecraft. Because of the first, they had come to be reckoned the teachers of the entire world in science and technology. The second was a direct political result of the "lofty ideals" and "outstanding social principles" upon which their societies were based. Technologically and industrially advanced, politically mature and sophis ticated, the West exception." Were represented Western civilization for him "anand example the basis to be on emulated which it without rested to spread to the East, there was little doubt in his mind but that the East would in fact take its rightful place in that civilization. Gasprinskii realized the consternation and more than this, the vigorous opposition which such sentiments would arouse in many of his readers. He attempted therefore to cushion the shock of his statements by rede fining and broadening the concept of "Western civilization," so as to make it less foreign for the East and more acceptable as an archetype. He declared that in reality, what was thought of as "Western civilization" was tantamount to "human civilization," rooted as it was in the great civilizations of the past from which it had gradually but steadily developed. These civilizations included those of Babylon and Egypt, of the Greeks and the Romans, and finally that of Islam. To a certain extent, what Gasprinskii said here foreshadowed similar sentiments expressed by the Turkish reformers. Abdullah Cevdet penned the phrase "Civilization means European civilization" in 1911,39 and of course in the mid-Twenties Mustafa Kemal Ataturk inaugurated the era of full-scale westernization in the Turkish Republic which was to radi cally alter Turkish society. But in some respects Gasprinskii's ideas and their formulation were quite different from those of the Turkish westernizers. For these latter, European civilization was in itself an absolute, whereas for Gasprinskii it was more a guide and model for emulation. Gasprinskii was in fact something of a social Darwinist. On the one hand, Islamic civilization and the societies which developed within it were neither of them ultimate realities which were of supreme value.



Rather, they represented stages in the broader history of human civili zation, which had an unlimited potential for progress and development. Western civilization, which at this time represented the latest and most progressive stage of that continuum, was not an absolute but would also develop into something of greater perfection. Islamic civilization need not be castigated as deviant but rather recognized for what it was, but one stage in this great evolutionary process. Gasprinskii sought in this way to establish a dichotomy between Islam as a philosophical /theological system and Islam as a society and civil ization. Though this dichotomy is never articulated by him here, it is definitely implied, and evidenced by his absolute avoidance of any discus sion of the purely religious issues of the day. If he could but influence his reader to view Islam not as a monolithic structure embracing all aspects of human endeavor, but rather as one with component parts, some of which were eminently changeable, then Gasprinskii felt that the necessary social evolution would occur. It is however interesting to note how his philosophy of social evolution echoes the motif of evolution present in the Islamic doctrine of successive revelation, whereby Islam as a religious system supersedes but does not reject previous dispensations. In his schematization Islam as a society too has taken part in a progres sive evolutionary process but as a transitional development only. Unfort unately, due to the precipitous demise of al-Nahdah Gasprinskii was unable to develop these ideas further in the follow-up article which he had promised the reader. (b) Contemporary Islamic societies "The Easterners yearn for the past, the Westerners look forward to the future."40 This saying epitomized for Gasprinskii the faults of the former and the virtues of the latter. The phenomenon of backward Muslim societies recently outdistanced even by those peoples among them long considered more primitive the Jews in Algeria, the Greeks in Crete, the Bulgarians in Bulgaria and everyone in Russia was lamented by Gasprinskii in an editorial in his paper Terjiimn.*1 In al-Nahdah Gasp rinskii pointed to the Japanese, the Armenians, the Copts, and the Abyssinians (!) as evidence of vitality among Eastern peoples. To those who attributed the continual backwardness of the Muslim people to racial inferiority Gasprinskii countered during his November address at the Continental Hotel that the Finns and the Hungarians, of the same racial stock as the Turks, held their own with the West.42 No, the brilliance of Arab history and of Muslim history in general proves the aptitudes and capabilities of the Arab and Muslim peoples. But to hearken back to the past age of greatness as a refuge and a means of avoiding the challenges currently facing Muslim society was fruitless, for the grandeur of those years was far outweighed by the decadence of the present. Rather what had to be re-discovered in the Islamic past was the wellspring of its material strength, the inner force which propelled its civil ization into the center of the world stage. As he told his listeners, Islam favors spiritual development, not stagnation, and if present Islamic



society would but affirm its potential for development as had past Islamic societies, then it would open itself up to the positive aspects of Western civuization. It is with this world-view that Gasprinskii provided the Arab readers of al-Nahdah with a series of articles on other Islamic societies, past and present. These included a pot pourri of material ranging from histor ical essays and travel accounts to a Utopian novel and photographs of Islamic monuments. In all however, the stress was not on nostalgic longing and reminiscing but rather on delineating the inner strength which occasioned these societies, thereby broadening and deepening the Arab awareness of their own potential for development. Gasprinskii used the convention of reporting his travels to different regions of the Islamic world in order to present to his readers a picture of two Muslim societies which, because of historical circumstances and their responses to these, had developed into two radically contrasting societies. The one, the Central Asian Emirate of Bukhara, possessed of a past of splendor and of strength, had betrayed that past and so presented to the contemporary world nothing but a squalor and decadence of immeasurable proportions. The other, the small community of Muslims Tatars in Poland, despite its paucity in numbers and its geographical dispersion, by remaining faithful to the creative spirit of its past, had succeeded in developing into a community vibrant and responsive to the modern age. It is Gasprinskii's description of this community to which we will first turn. (b.i) The Muslims of Poland. Gasprinskii opened his article "The Mus lims in Poland"43 with the observation that this small community, numbering only some 14,000 persons and dispersed over the seven Western most provinces of the Russian Empire, was a group unique in the Islamic world.44 He displayed a familiarity with its earlier history, extending back into the fifteenth century, and despite a certain factual inexacti tude he did convey the main motifs of that history. Recruited as body-guards and warriors by the early kings of Lithuania and in a later period those of Poland, bands of Tatar cavalry or Oglanlar (still called Olan by the Slavic peoples), once dreaded marauders, became an integral component of the Polish State. They gradually acquired for themselves various privileges, including entrance into the Polish nobility and hereditary title to landed estates. Settlement on the land led eventually to assimilation into the society, both biological and cul tural. Despite the loss of many of its members to the dominant Christian community, as well as the extinction of its language and mores, a hardened and tempered core of this group did retain that one essential its Islamic faith, the traditions of which it preserved in its adopted language, Polish or Russian. Turning to the present-day Muslim community of Poland Gasprinskii first discussed its religious life. Mosques with resident imam were exis tent in Vilna, Novogrudok, Minsk and several other of the larger towns. However, no religious schools of the primary or secondary type (kuttb and madrasah) existed, and instead, itinerant teachers traveled from com munity to community instructing the youth. Some few youths were



sent to other regions of Islamic Russia to attend religious schools, but the only Muslim-funded high school, that of Minsk which was established by Kazan' Tatars, was secular. The great number of Polish Muslims attented state-run schools of either the Polish or Russian type, together with their Christian countrymen. In their mode of life there was little to distinguish the Polish Tatars. There was no differentiation between them and Christian Poles in dress, lan guage or mores. True, despite a marked degree of biological assimilation, a number of them still exhibited racial characteristics of the mongoloid type of which Gasprinskii noted facial features, a yellowish complexion and the epicanthal fold of the eyes. But this in no way affected their social integration into greater Polish society. Means of livelihood were varied with most engaged as tillers of the soil, craftsmen or in the government service either civil or military and a few in commerce. Their role in government service was a traditional one made possible by their non-partisanship in Russian- Polish friction and the trust and confidence that they enjoyed in both these communiti es. It was not at all uncommon to discover Tatars in positions of highest authority including the general staff often closed to Polish citizens of the Empire for religious reasons. We have earlier discussed the high level of achievement attained by the women of this Muslim community. In general what Gasprinskii describes to his Arab reader is a Muslim community which, faithful to the essentials of its Islamic past, has inte grated itself fully into the society in which it lives and moreover, contrib uted to the advancement of that society. The implication is clear Polish Islam, forced to give up not just mores and dress but even its language and racial exclusivity, in its adaptation to Western civilization, was to serve as a beacon to the remainder of the Islamic world. Without undergoing the great sacrifices its Polish counterpart had to undergo, that world too could enter into the mainstream of Western civilization by adoption of the social principles on which it was based, without negating thereby the essential elements of its past namely, its Islamic faith. (b.ii) The Muslims of the Emirate of Bukhara. In stark contrast to this most vibrant of Islamic societies stood that of the Emirate of Bukhara, in a state of debilitation and utter ruin. In a series of articles entitled "My visit to the Emir of Bukhara" Gasprinskii described to his readers, in a vivid travelogue style, his journey to that backwater of Islamic civilization made in May, 1893. 45 His visit seems to have been a semio fficial one, as his initial reception by the Russian political agent resident in Bukhara, Messr. Kilm would indicate. He traveled as a personal guest of the Emir who, absent from the capital, saw to it that he was properly received by an official entourage comprising the Grand Wazr, Jn Mirz, the Chief Qd, and the Minister of Finance.46 These provided him with all the amenities of life commensur ate with the dignity of one of his status so, much to his amusement Gasprinskii acquired a retinue comprised of a valet, two manservants, a courier and guard, three maidservants, and horsedrawn carriage. He



was of course billeted in great style. Though he obviously enjoyed hims elf, Gasprinskii was quick to point out the great disparity between his own luxurious treatment, accorded in the tradition of Eastern potentates, and the general situation of the country. As in his account of Poland, he spends some time detailing the history of the region. In the age of Timurlane and his immediate successors Samarkand had been the intellectual capital of Asia. It had reached its heyday under the reign of Ulugh Bey (1393-1449), grandson of Timur, whose greatest claim to fame rested in his erection of the astronomical observatory of Samarkand.47 How ironic that five centuries later stu dents in this same city were condemned to the study of Arabic grammar, syntax, morphology and rhetoric, and rote memorization of the theo logical sciences. This contrast between past and present Gasprinskii saw graphically displayed in the state of ruin to which many of the great medieval archi tectural monuments had sunken. He caustically remarks that the Waqf foundations entrusted with the care of these priceless monuments had "as everywhere in the Islamic world" utterly neglected their duty. As a result it was left to the alien Russians to restore these edifices to their former state of grandeur which they had proceeded to do immed iately upon conquest in the late nineteenth century. He provides us with the photographs of two such monuments the interior of Timur's tomb and the facade of the Shir-Dar Medreseh, both at Samarkand.48 As mentioned earlier, these articles are cast in the mold of travelogues and throughout one senses his disappointment at the country's state of affairs. Unlike his report on Poland he is reduced to producing a diary account of his most mundane affairs, but with brief references to the society around him. He refers to the modern living quarters of the Russians in Samarkand and his silence as regards the Muslim quarter in contrast to these speaks more than words. Elsewhere, he describes the tomb of Muhammad ibn Muhammad Naqshband (1317-1389), founder of the Naqshband Sufi order, now a place of pilgrimage for his followers and devotees. Again, his silence as regards any other facet of religious life in Bukhara other than this manifestation of external piety betrays his disappointment. With these brief references thenthe negligent Waqf authorities, the ruined monuments, pietistic pilgrimages and a hollow education system, coupled with the pomp of his own reception, and all contrasted with the past grandeur of the medieval Timurid Empire Gasprinskii has presented his reader with a society diametrically opposed to that of the Polish Muslims. Isolated from greater Islamic society as was its Polish counterpart, we see here the material decline of a society which, unlike that counterp art, has betrayed the spiritual basis of its past. The great danger now was that greater Islamic society, already stagnant, would also go the way of this most debilitated of Muslim societies. A return to the spirit of the past, as evidenced in the creative openness of the Timurid Empire, not one to the antiquated forms of the past, would ensure the reversal of this disintegrating process. Polish Muslim society had done just this, Bukharian Muslim society had not.



(b.iii) The Muslims of the Abode of Tranquillity. In the same spirit as the above articles Gasprinskii published a series in quite another genre, that of the Utopian novel. Each issue of al-Nahdah contained a li terary section entitled "Rafraf al-Nahdah" /Feuilleton of al-Nahdah),*9 in which there appeared the first three instalments of a projected fullscale serialization of his work "The Muslims of the Abode of Tranquillity A sojourn in the West."50 Despite the limited portion of the work which was printed, enough did appear to convey the general gist of the plot and the theme which the author wished to develop. Set in the early years of the last century, the story is narrated by a young man of Tashkent, 'Abbas by name, who having been schooled in the traditional Islamic subjects at Bukhara and Samarkand, had gone to the great centers of learning in Europe as well, to study the Western sciences. Anxious to visit the sites in Europe in which Islamic civil ization had once flourished, he journeyed to Southern SpainAndalus to the Arabs and the fabled cities of Cordoba and Granada. The setting of the story marvellously depicted by a photograph of the interior of the great mosque at Cordoba51 was particularly fitting for an Arab audience, for whom Andalus conjures up the image of a golden age of greatness and splendor, Islamic civilization at its pinnacle. Drunken with ecstasy at the sight of the al-Hamrd fortress (AlHambra), where he was wont to spend his days, 'Abbas wakens one day from his reverie to discover himself in the presence of twelve beautiful maidens Arabic-speaking houri in traditional Arab garb. He approaches them and they flee from him startled, but at that instant are stayed by the appearance of another figure, their guardian Sheikh Jall whom 'Abbas recognizes from his student days in Paris. With Sheikh Jall as guide and mentor and the marvellous maidens as entourage, 'Abbs is led through a series of tunnels and dark chambers to a subterranean kingdom The Abode of Tranquillity. The story breaks off just upon his arrival at this most amazing of places, but during the course of his downward journey we learn enough of its life to grasp the significance of the narrative. The Abode of Tranquillity is an idyllic land peopled by a Muslim society directly descendant from that of medieval Andalus. Unlike its terrestrial counterparts, this society has continued to develop in all of the spheres of human activity. It is possessed of a technology equal to that of the West as is exhibited by the electric lamps used by the houri to light the way through the twisting tunnels. Its educational system is of the most progressive and modern type, with its students steeped in the knowledge of the pure sciences. And the houri themselves are proof of this, and of the advanced social principles on which the society is based its women are of equal status to its men. Worthy of note are the many Our'nic references liberally interspersed in the text of the narrative. The Abode of Tranquillity itself is reminis cent of the Muslim paradise, verdant and fruitful, watered by icy mount ain streams, as are the houri a variant of those doe-eyed maidens who are said to minister there. The work is highly romantic and definitely Islamic in essence and in style. Yet it is more than a tale of the Thousand and One Nights' variety.



For again Gasprinskii wishes to convince his reader of the inherent valid ity of this idealized Muslim society. Significantly, he is projecting his image of the progressive society on a Muslim community which has been so to speak, hermetically sealed off from the world, both Islamic and Western. Once again, he is affirming his belief in the evolutionary concept of society. In the first two examples, Islamic societies were faced with the chal lenge of the West to which they had to respond if they were to survive (the Polish), or failing this to perish (the Bukharian). Finally, here he has stressed the absolute nature of this evolutionary process, for the ideal ized society of the Abode of Tranquillity has also developed despite its total isolation. His vision of Andalus is of a vibrant and continually creative Islamic society, not the fossilized relic so yearned for in Arabic literature. All three examples have served to illustrate Gasprinskii's conviction that Islamic society must be viewed as something separate and distinct from Islam as a religious system. The former is eminently changeable and of the latter he does not speak.

B. The economic situation in the East Gasprinskii, a keen social observor and activist, made no pretences to being an economic theoretician. He revealed however, in al-Nahdah and elsewhere, an understanding of the problem of the economic disin tegration and stagnation of the East and of the complex inter-relation ships between this phenomenon and the economic policies of the indus trialized West. As in other spheres, he offered no simple panacea to resuscitate a debilitated economic structure nor a detailed plan for economic reconstruction. Rather, he suggested that a reversal of the current downward economic trend would follow pursuant to the accep tance and adoption of Western economic principles and techniques. In the Continental Hotel address already referred to62 Gasprinskii, with brutal frankness, described the abysmal depths to which Muslim industry and commerce had descended. Domestic industry had become totally paralyzed in competition with the West and had been in a state of progressive deterioration for over one century. He made reference to geo-political and technological factors which had unquestionably contributed to this development: the discovery of America, industrial ization and mechanization. He revealed thereby his understanding or at least acquaintance with economic developments at work in the nine teenth century to the disadvantage of the Muslim East and partic ularly the devastating effect of Western production methods. The WTestern industrial establishment was characterized by mechanization and the division of labor, whereas in the East total production from procurement of materials to marketing of products was characteristic of its dominant cottage industries. But despite this critical external factor, Gasprinskii was not content to acquit the native industries from responsibility in their own demise. Rather he again berated the East for its inexcusable ignorance, its adherence to outmoded concepts of



manufacturing and marketing and its refusal to adapt itself to the changed economic realities. Summarizing the field of commerce and finance, Gasprinskii sketched essentially the same picture of stagnation and decline. Despite a Muslim world population totaling some 300,000,000 Muslims (an over-estimation by some 100,000,000), Muslim financiers could claim not a single bank with assets in excess of 5 million Pounds, nor a single shipping firm with a fleet of over thirty vessels. Of oriental merchants active in the exportimport trade, whether in the East or the West, almost none were Muslims but rather Levantines of Greek or Armenian nationality, or Indians or Chinese. Domestic trade as well was largely dominated by foreign con cerns, Muslim Easterners being reluctant to develop their home resources in any but the most exploitative of ways. The theme of rapacious exploitation of the land, rather than of its economic development Gas prinskii deals with in al-Nahdah as well. Elsewhere Gasprinskii again referred to the preponderance of minori ty group peoples engaged in the financial sphere in Muslim societies Armenians, Copts, Christian Arabs and Jews.53 The contrast afforded by these "progressive" minority groups who have adapted themselves to economic realities, served to strengthen the image he wished to convey of a Muslim financial structure rigidly adhering to financial forms long outdated. But Gasprinskii realized that external forces did serve to drastically inhibit any contrary developments among Muslims at that late date. In one of his more provocative articles entitled "The Islamic world and foreign aggression," Gasprinskii outlined his analysis of the current challenges facing the Islamic world in the economic sphere.54 Gasprinskii provided the reader with a map of the Eastern hemisphere, which graphically depicted his schematization of the world economic system then dominant. In brief, he posited a geo-political and religious envision of the world into three economic spheres, the first comprising Europe, the Christian portions of Asiatic Russia, and Australia; the second made up of Hindu India, South-East Asia, the East Indies, Japan, China, and pagan Africa; and the third comprising all the Islamic regions inbetween, North Africa, the Near East, Central Asia and Indonesia. His basic premise was that this last zone was so situated as to receive the brunt of the dual expansionist thrust which so characterized the first two: economic exploitation and territorial aggrandizement. In his words, the Islamic lands "fit all the requirements necessary to be the field of economic competition for the peoples of the West and the Far East. They comprise a ready market for the merchants of the Orient and the Occident, and are an excellent area for the settlement of emigrants from these regions." Gasprinskii was well aware of the insatiable demands of the burgeon ing Western industrial establishments for ever-expanding markets in which to unload their consumer products, as well as for new and untapped sources of raw materials. The Muslim East provided both. Indeed, already the whole of the trade of the Muslim East had been captured by the West "lock, stock and barrel," and the results had been the almost total annihilation of the traditional domestic manufacturing establishment of which only a ruined hulk remained.



Moreover, despite the increased demand for their raw materials to supply these factories, the inhabitants of the exploited regions fared badly. For the price of the finished product which was offered them in return quickly nullified any monetary gains earlier realized. To illustrate the vicious economic circle which had led to the improverishment of the Muslims, Gasprinskii gave one example pertinent to Egypt. The foreign merchant buys an oka55 of cotton at ten piastres which he converts to thread and resells to the grower at forty piastres. Then with the thirty piastre profit he buys up wheat and other raw materials from the hapless grower who is left hungry and in debt, with even less than he started, and the cycle begins anew. One interesting note is Gasprinskii's warning that before long, the Far East as well would join the West in exploiting the Muslim regions. As proof he pointed to the commercial empire which Japan was then carving out in the Pacific, her vessels already active in the ports of India. It was but a matter of time before she too would penetrate the Islamic regions and then "our economic blood-line will be exposed to the sucking of the Eastern leeches as it is now to the Western. " This dire prediction reflects the heightened awareness of Japanese imperialist power which was awakened by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. It is of special interest that Gasprinskii counteracts the almost euphori c sense of victory then common throughout the non- Western world as a result of this first military setback of a Western Christian power by an Eastern and non-christian one.56 He warns of the potential dangers which Japan's entrance into the circle of industrialized nations posed for the still economically under-developed nations of the East.67 Turning to the dangers inherent in the quest for more lebensraum on the part of the industrialized nations of the West and the East, Gas prinskii traced the origins of this drive to the expanding populations in these regions resulting from their higher standards of living. Burdened with an evergrowing mass of starved and impoverished inhabitants, these nations naturally turned to the relatively underpopulated Islamic regions as areas of potential colonization and settlement. It is quite clear that Gasprinskii is here speaking primarily of the experience of Muslim Russia, long subject to the encroachments of the Russian peasant ever in search of land, and most especially so after the i860 Emancipation. Elsewhere in the Islamic world such a process was limited to Spanish and French North Africa and Dutch Indonesia and even in these areas never approached the intensity of colonization reached in Russia. Nevertheless, Gasprinskii's treatment of this most explosive of issues was sure to strike a responsive chord in the hearts of his readers, for the purchase of land in Egypt by foreign concerns, primarily for the cultivation of cotton, was a phenomenon of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Muslim East, so Gasprinskii reminded his reader, had experienced similar incursions from both West and East in earlier periods of its his tory. From the West had come the Crusaders and from the East the Mongols, and both had been repulsed in their time. But this present penetration was a much more insidious one, predicated on economic necessities rather than on ideological convictions, and one which could



not be repulsed simply by force of arms. Indeed, one of the most deceit ful of its stratagems was its ability to gain the acquiescence of the exploited in its insatiable quest for land. Like the down-trodden Muslim woman who accepts her lot as decreed, so the Muslim speculator accomodates the Western investor for the sake of quick financial gain. Gasprinskii cautioned his reader that the only way to combat the West lay in fighting it on its own grounds by developing an economic structure which would first effectively neutralize and then challenge it. But such a structure rested on a sophisticated technology and mechanized industrial establishment which only a modern and progressive society could hope to attain. A changed social structure and modernized educat ional establishment, therein lay the future of the Muslim peoples, and the alternative?. . . A life "as servants to the developed peoples, delec table morsels for them (to feast upon)."58

C. Political realities Gasprinskii was no political activist. This is not to say that he was uninterested in political affairshe himself served as mayor of Bahesaray from 1877 -1882. Moreover, in the period of political ferment following the 1905 revolution he was instrumental in convening the two All Muslim Congresses of Nizhnii Novgorod and that of St. Petersburg held in 1905 and 1906, from which emerged the political coalition Russiia Musulmanlarin Ittifaki (the Ittifak or Union of Russian Muslims).59 However, his role there was decidedly non-political compared to that of some members, and he devoted his energies chiefly to the question of uniform social and educational reforms for Muslim Russia. There is no doubt that Gasprinskii realized the causal relationship between an educate d, progressive and cohesive society and responsible political structures. Yet he left it to a younger generation to effect radical political change. It was inevitable then that Gasprinskii's forthright exposition in al-Nahdah of his ideas on social change and economic reform would have repercussions in the political sphere. Though he disclaimed any interest whatsoever in discussing controversial political topics, in many of the articles which we have reviewed he did indeed hint at needed political reforms. But in addition to these oblique references Gasprinskii did indulge in actual political commentary perhaps emboldened by his temporary escape from the purview of the Russian censor. Judging from the nature of the material it is clear that these articles represent a rather tentative venture into a new field. His ideas were not always clearly formulated and did not rest on such a comprehensive and clearly articulated basis as did his social philosophy. Often they appear anomalous and even contradictory when taken as a whole; and many of them, interspersed in his essays on social, educational and economic issues, are cryptic and elliptical. It would be difficult on the basis of these to arrive at a comprehensive or cohesive synthesis of Gasp rinskii's "political philosophy," analogous to his very clearly stated "social philosophy." 8


But despite these criticisms, Gasprinskii's discussions of political topics are of utmost interest. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, he was greatly inhibited from expressing any but the most innoc uous of political opinions when publishing in Russia. Cairo afforded the freedom hitherto denied him to foray into uncharted territory, the realm of politics. From what he has written two conclusions can defi nitely be drawn. First, any illusions which might be entertained of Gasprinskii as an apologist defending the political status quo or even worse, a collaborator directly involved in perpetuating that structure, can be safely dismissed. Secondly, Gasprinskii reveals a very broad awareness of political events encompassing not only the Russian Empire but the greater Muslim world as well. His familiarity with political groups espousing all manner of political ideologies from the most conservative to the most radical disproves any charge that he had in some way "lost touch" with polit ical realities. Our analysis of these writings will fall into two parts, the first dealing with those articles concerned with political life in the Islamic world, the second with those which consider the political scene in Russia. I. The Islamic world Gasprinskii's probings into the political life of the Islamic world ultimately focus on one crucial issue, the legitimacy of the established government. It is quite clear that this question troubled him, and the wide spectrum of opinions he expressed from the advocacy of democratic populism to the counseling of prudent loyalty to current regimes reveals his own ambivalent attitude. As mentioned in the introduction, Gasprinskii, despite a denial of political motivation, did in fact seek to awaken a sense of political aware ness in the toiling masses of Egypt in an open letter to the Egyptian peasant couched in the rhetoric of populism.60 A direct appeal to the peasant to cast off the mantle of oppression and assert his inherent polit ical freedom was something still quite novel, if not radical, for Egypt. The political parties then active served established power groups, and even the most radical of them, the National Party of Mustafa Kmil, catered to an urban and literate middle-class constituency. It was not until the founding of the Wafd Party under Sa'ad Zaghlul during and after the war years that the Egyptian peasant was to enter into the main stream of Egyptian political life. Gasprinskii's appeal then can be seen not so much as a response to a populist ferment then evident in Egypt as it was a reflection of the influence which the very real populist agitation in Russia had upon him. Gasprinskii emphasized two factors: the eternal right of the peasant to the land, and the usurpation and exploitation of that right by an endless succession of rulers. The fellah alone has won the right to consider the land his own by his toil and ceaseless labour. But he has done more than cultivate the land for all the great monuments and artifacts of Egypt from the time of the pharaons to the present, pyramids, mosques, and the canal, are his achievement and rightly his heritage and legacy.



Neither Roman caesar nor Byzantine emperor, Syrian sultan nor Ottoman emir can claim the right to Egypt which the peasant can. For bearing, patient and hard-working, he has toiled for ages; yet the fruits of his labors have gone to a succession of oppressors rapacious and unjust. In a satirical cartoon Gasprinskii illustrated this oppression as evidenced in modern Egypt.61 A peasant in the character of a rabbit beseeches his master, a bear, to lease him a plot of land. The master agrees, but because of the fall in land prices charges an exorbitant rent plus a subsidy of seven-tenths of the crops grown. With the rest the peasant must make do. Gasprinskii exhorts, "You have drowned the govern ment with your gold. . . fed peoples of other regions with your wheat and clothed them with your cotton. . . you live in wretched huts. . . but deserve to live in palaces. . ." In place of a life of exploitation endured in villages of indescribable primitiveness, Gasprinskii proclaims the inalienable right to one free of poverty, where they could reap the fruits of their labor, enjoy improved living conditions and stand upright as free men. Anyone who has seen the squalor of Egyptian village life to some extent still evident today windowless mud-brick hovels densely constructed amidst disease infect ed canals can readily appreciate the appeal of his vision of scores "of well laid out villages and beautiful homes with windows, doors and gateways, set amidst lovely gardens [. . .] The time has come to pay heed to yourself, beloved fellah\ " No doubt Gasprinskii was appalled at the poverty of the Egyptian peasant, but was this call one to revolution? Gasprinskii did seem to envisage the possibility of violence to achieve political ends under certain circumstances. He was understandably reticent in this regard; however, one brief but telling reference indicates his train of thought. In speaking of the duty of the Egyptian mother to properly educate her children, he states that she must prepare a generation of children "capable of defending the independence of Egypt once granted, or of seizing it resolutely if not granted."62 The implication is clear: occupation by a foreign power could be opposed by the occupied if not unilaterally ended by the occupier. But what of the domestic government of the Khedive? Gasprinskii's attitude towards the militant and vociferous Egyptian nationalist, Mustafa Kamil, is telling in this regard.63 Karml had died suddenly on February ro, 1908 at the height of his career, only months after the formation of his party, and Gasprinskii wrote a glowing eulogy of the man.64 In it he referred to his immense funeral procession of some 60,000 people which accompanied the bier one of the earliest spontaneous demonstrations of nationalist fervor in Egypt. It showed the immense impact which this true patriot of Egypt and thinker of the Islamic world had on his fellow countrymen. Gasprinskii urged them all to emulate his example of tireless work for the benefit of the entire nation. There is more concrete reason than a common concern for social welfare for Gasprinskii's eloquent testimony to the man's achievement. Kamil in his capacity as editor of the nationalistic daily al-Liwd* (The Standard), had organized the collecting of funds from the Muslims of Egypt to be sent for the relief of famine victims in the Caucasus. The



funds were sent for distribution to the editors of the Orenburg journal Vaqt (The Times), the Ramiev brothers.65 In fact, the Muslims of Nukha in the Caucasus acknowledged their debt to the people of Egypt to whom they sent salutations through Mustafa Kamil (unaware of his death) in a letter to al-Nahdah.*6 But regardless of the popularity Kmil enjoyed whether at home or abroad, Gasprinskii felt called upon to deny allegations that he had been a revolutionary. Replying to an article which first appeared in an unident ified Egyptian newspaper in French and then subsequently in alAkhbr (The News), Gasprinskii denied its assertion that Kmil was agitating for the immediate establishment of a republican form of govern ment in Egypt.67 Egypt, despite its level of progress still lagged in the areas of science, technology and industry, as Kmil was well aware. Gasprinskii added that, as governments of and by the people can exist only when the level of achievement in these areas is high, it was inconceiv able that Kmil would have sought the immediate establishment of a republic. Rather he was alleged to have espoused the vague concept of "gradual progress" in the political sphere as elsewhere. Now it is evident that Gasprinskii's timidity here is due to the delicate position he felt himself to be in as a non-resident in Egypt. His article on the contemporary khdive of Egypt, 'Abbas II, which had first appeared in Terjiimdn upon his return from his first visit to Egypt in the Autumn of 1907, was reprinted here and strengthens this contention.68 This article was little else but a panegyric celebrating the Egyptian ruling family. 'Abbas was said to surpass in knowledge and education all reigning Muslim monarchs, and to belong to a line wellversed in modern culture. Egypt's future was said to be bound to loyalty to this noble and wise scion of the Muhammad 'AH dynasty. Most probably this stance was motivated by several factors, one of them being a sense of politeness towards his host. More importantly, Gasprinskii was probably reluctant to ally himself with anti-khedival forces at a time when he believed that solidarity against the common enemy, rather than inter-necine strife, was essential for Egypt. That he was not an uncritical supporter of Islamic regimes solely because they were such is made clear by his article on Iran.69 Under a portrait of the ruling Shah, Muhammad 'Al Qjr, in full uniform and prominently displayed on the first page of the paper, Gas prinskii briefly outlined the political situation in Iran. Hailing the constitutional revolution of 1906 as proof of the vitality of the Muslim people, Gasprinskii sought to determine factors underlying its success. These lay in the coalition effected between the merchant class and the shi'it clergy (the 'ulama). The first were particularly active in both domestic and foreign commerce unlike their brethren elsewhere in the Muslim world and were well acquainted with political developments in the West. Comparing the high standards of living enjoyed in Western countries the governments of which were based on the consent of the governed to the poverty and stagnation prevalent in their own, still suffering under the yoke of despotic autocracy, these resolved to oppose that despotism and erect a regime of freedom and justice in its stead.



They found a ready group of allies in the religious clerical class. Shi't Muslim divines, unlike their Sunni Muslim counterparts elsewhere in the Islamic world, had refused to stamp the Divine Law (shar'ah) with a seal of immutability. Still enjoying the right to interpret the law and its provisions to meet the modern-day exigencies, they refused to grant legitimacy to tyrannical government on the basis of its manifest existence. Together with their compatriots of the merchant class they had led the assault aimed at smashing a government based on absolutism and tyranny, and replacing it with one based on constitutional guarantees. Despite his somewhat idealized presentation of the motivations of each class, Gasprinskii was basically correct in identifying them as the two bases in the constitutional movement. He also correctly pointed out perhaps for the benefit for his Turco-Tatar countrymen in Russia that Iranian Turks played a prominent role in the constitutional movement, being dominant in the areas of most extreme agitation Tehran, Tabriz and Khorasan. But despite his evident enthusiasm for this movement, Gasprinskii roundly condemned the later attempts to assassinate the Shah as unjust and outrageous. Apparently he believed that, since a constitution had been granted and basic freedoms guaranteed, to continue violent oppos ition to the government was anarchical. The constitution had conferred legitimacy upon the regime, and as such it had to be upheld and opposed by legal methods alone. Here then Gasprinskii has drawn a very clear distinction between legitimate constitutional government against which violent opposition is condemned, and an illegitimate tyrannical one against which such opposition is condoned. The brief allusion to an Egyptian independence struggle referred to above would indicate that among illegitimate governments he classified foreign occupiers. When we turn to his analysis of the domestic situation in Russia, such a classi fication assumes great significance.

2. Russia Gasprinskii did not himself write any article concerning political events in Russia, guided by a prudence gained from long experience in publishing there. He did however include in al-Nahdah materials written by others on Russia, and his selection of these revealed certain of his own predilections. The first such article is, surprisingly, the translation of several pieces which appeared in the influential and semio fficial Russian daily, Novoe Vremia, entitled "Rumours of war between the Sublime Porte and Russia" to which Gasprinskii added a brief note of comment.70 The writer alleged that a mobilization of Turkish troopsostensibly intended to be against Iran but actually directed against Russia was taking place on the borders of the Caucasus. He raised the spectre of a conquest of Russia by Turkey, a feat not impossible to accomplish given the weakness of Russia, due both to the recently fought RussoJapanese War and the internal strife then plaguing her. Turkey had


allies within Russia who would serve as a fifth column movement, and among these the writer included Caucasian insurgents, Polish railroad workers, the Tatars of Daghestan and the Georgian Social Democrats. Although the paper later published the denial of the Ottoman Ambass adorto St. Petersburg of these allegations, Gasprinskii thought it fi tting to publish them in al-Nahdah. He did so, he informed his readers in a postscript to the article, in order to expose the tenor of opinion then current in Russia as regarded the Sublime Porte. Without expressly stating so, he impUed that the Turco-phobia prevalent in Russia reflected the fanaticism of her foreign relations with the Islamic world in general. But this idea was not develope d, for further articles on Russia dealt with domestic politics only. The reader was left then with the image of a rather hysterical Christian power bent on using its Muslim neighbors as a scapegoat for its own political instability. In a series entitled "Letters from Petersburg" written by an anony mouscorrespondent, Gasprinskii allowed his readers a glimpse of political life in modern Russia in its most violent aspects.71 Only the first included information which could be classified as of especial Muslim interest, and that in a context critical of the Russian regime. The reader was informed that, due to the newly enacted electoral law, the Muslims of Turkestan would be largely disenfranchised in the next Duma election. Their representation of thirty-six members in the Second Duma had been slashed by two-thirds only twelve members were allotted them for the Third Duma.72 Despite this handicap, the "Islamic faction" was proceeding in its preparation of a bill advocating a universal educational reform of Muslim schools, by eliciting the views of all their constituency. The image conveyed in this short notice was of a Muslim community continuing to function internally along democratic lines, despite the curtailment of its aggregate rights under the Russian constitution. But by far the greatest amount of space in these letters was devoted to the reporting of various terrorist activities which had recently taken place throughout widely dispersed areas of the Russian Empire. As the correspondent related in the first letter, "a spirit of civil upheaval and of strikes is prevalent in the land," and daily reports reached the capital of the assassination of police and other officials, of robberies and the plundering of the homes of the wealthy, of conspiracy, arms smuggling and the illicit amassing of arms. A typical one day's news in the capital included the following reports: two police officials assassinated in Shidlovis, a town of the province of Radum (Poland); the chief of police in Dakharinlaf (Ekterinoslav (?), Ukraine) assassinated in retaliation for the ambush of a group of terror ists engaged in armed robbery; the discovery of a revolutionary hide-out in Libava (Leyepaye, Latvia) and seizure of a vast cache of arms, dyna mite and explosives; the smashing of a revolutionary cell in Lakutky, a village of Chernigov Province (Ukraine). Details of these incidents, most probably taken from the Russian press, were given in full. The object of this detailed reportage was obvious: to convey to the reader an image of the Russian Empire immersed in a sea of anarchy and lawlessness.



The second letter was entirely devoted to the seizure, arrest, trial and sentencing of a fairly large terrorist cell and is of interest to us for several reasons. Because of their chance discovery of the actual identity of one of their own gendarmes as a terrorist, the secret police were able to apprehend a group of eight terrorists among whom were two women. This initial seizure led to further police raids which netted a total of thirty-two suspected revolutionaries, male and female including one Italian, Calaino by name. These were arrested and imprisoned, their arms cache impounded. The report itself ends here, but in a postscript Gasprinskii informed the reader that he had learned via the wire services that seven of these were sentenced to death including two women and the rest sentenced to prison. This is the outline of the episode, but cer tain features of its reporting deserve closer scrutiny. One such feature is the prominence given to the role of the women within the terrorist cell. The younger of them, an eighteen year-old student of country origin, was subdued only with difficulty and even then, still managed, while being led to the police station, to break loose, retrieve her gun and critically injure one of her captors. Subdued a second time, she remained resolute and hostile, refusing to divulge any information whatsoever to her interrogators, not even her name. Her co-conspirators were equally silent. The bravery of the girl and of the other women eventually apprehended obviously impressed the corr espondent and Gasprinskii. But the impact which the reporting of female participation in such violent activity would have had on an Arab reader must have been tremendous. Still debating the propriety of permitting their women to walk in public unveiled, the Arabs were suddenly confront ed with women actively participating in the very liberation of their land. That the correspondent, and by inference Gasprinskii, viewed this activity as "patriotic" is revealed by another critical reference. Of the terrorists, only one is actually named, Bugdanov, the revolutionary gen darme. The man is described by one epithet only: fidai. The literal meaning of the word is "one who sacrifices his life", but its connotation in Arabic has come to be more explosive. It is used specifically to desig nate one who sacrifices himself for his nation and in the pursuit of nationa l goals. It is a term of unbounded admiration.73 Although used generally to refer to Muslim nationalists, its application to a non-Muslim individual in fact one not even resident in an Islamic country, as would be an Arab Christian is most telling. What is implied is that these terrorists are engaged in a national liberation struggle and not just in anarchical acts of violence. This struggle is directed against the Russian rgime which is here, by implication, considered to be not a legitimate government but an occupying power. It is crucial to this line of thinking that the terrorist acts reported take place in non-Russian areas, as indeed all of them included here did. Whether Gasprinskii consciously intended to convey such a radical analysis of events in the Russian Empire is hard to say. Certainly, he intended to present a negative picture of the Empire. His decision to publish such materials shows this, and his own continued interest in the situations described, witnessed by his postscripts, is undeniable. One must take into account as well the audience he was addressing.



The Egyptians had already endured some twenty-five years of occupat ion by Great Britain. Agitation for the immediate end to this occupation was prevalent among nationalist circles, and as mentioned earlier, Gasprinskii hinted at the legitimacy of armed opposition to gain this end. It would take only the slightest suggestion for an Egyptian to draw an analogy between his own situation and that of the peoples of Russia. These articles, with their enumeration of terrorist acts perpetrated by cou rageous fid'n, certainly provided the basic material with which to make such an assumption. Never did Gasprinskii refer specifically to the Muslim peoples of Russia, yet the inference is clear: if these European Christians suffer under the yoke of Russian occupation, how much more so do the Muslims. Once again I must stress that there is an ambivalence prevalent in Gasprinskii's political ideas. That he was cautious is obvious and under standable; he could not be expected to openly advocate the violent over throw of the Russian government, and to do so would have been irr esponsible. Nevertheless, the tenor of this material on Russia points at least to an unmistakeable feeling of reservation on his part as to the legitimacy of future Russian suzerainty over her Muslim peoples. In conjunction with the rest of the material in al-Nahdah, it implies much more. The Russian Muslims too, as their brethren throughout the Islamic world, once transformed and modernized as a society, would have to assert their independence as a nation in a world of equals. D. Conclusion In the articulation of his ideas social, economic and political eclectic though it may have been, one characteristic of Gasprinskii's approach appears unmistakeably dominant. It is sociological. The abstract theological rationalizations so characteristic of the thought of many of his contemporaries when dealing with these same issues were not for him. Men such as Muhammad 'Abdu of Egypt visualized social change as an abstract concept which itself had first to be reconciled with the principles of Islamic theology, and only then applied to a given social situation. Gasprinskii rejected this approach as inherently traditionalist and conceptually invalid. Based on his observation of economic, social and political conditions as they were in fact manifested, he drew his conclusions. For him it was not a question of the adaptation of questionable social change to an Islamic society, but rather its very opposite the restructuring of Islamic society to cope with the challenge of social changes which were themselves accepted a priori as valid. Islamic society was now irrevoca bly tied to that of the West in all its facets, but the relationship had to change from one of subservience to a superior power to one of interdepen dence with an equal. This fundamental principle explains the ease with which Gasprinskii could propose radical innovations, undreamed of by his modernist contemporaries elsewhere in the Islamic world. What was for them a heritage of immutability and eternal validity was for him but an easily shed and obsolete relic of a past age.



As we emphasized earlier, Gasprinskii's attention was directed mainly towards social issues, and it is in that sphere that he most clearly articu latedhis viewsone in which he actively worked. But the economic and political repercussions of his thought was evident to him and to his readers, and in al-Nahdah he acknowledged this by the inclusion of mater ials specifically addressed to these issues. We must repeat that these ideas were presented in a fashion which was vague and disorganized, and they contrast starkly with his clearly formulated stance on social issues. This however does not negate the validity of the former as indi cators of his political thought. After all, al-Nahdah was a call to the awakening of the whole man who would forge not oniy a dynamic new society, but a national entity as well, in which the aims of that society could be most fully realized. IV The proposed Universal Islamic Congress As we have mentioned, the ostensible reason for the publication of al-Nahdah was to solicit support for the immediate convocation of a Universal Islamic Congress.74 Such a Congress was never held. Some observors, misled by the flurry of activity which followed Gasprinskii's proposal in favor of this idea, and more particularly by Gasprinskii's visits to Cairo of which there were two, and not one as often supposed drew the conclusion that this Congress did in fact materialize. As there is ample and incontrovertible evidence to the contrary, it would be well to review the exigencies of the proposal and its final outcome. Gasprinskii first broached the idea of such a Congress in his own journal Terjiimdn, on the eve of his fist visit to Cairo which took place in early November, 1907. 7 This initial appeal, coupled with the speech which he delivered at the Continental Hotel in Cairo on Novemb er 1, 1907, 76 gives essentially the form he envisaged that the Congress would take, and the subjects he wished it to consider. But the idea for the holding of a Universal Congress of this nature was not totally novel. According to Rashid Rida, the Muslim polemicist and activist Jaml al-Din al- Afghani and his Egyptian collaborator Muhammad 'Abduh, had proposed the convocation of a similar congress in 1893 in the organ al-Urwah al-Wuthq (The Indissoluble Link). The idea was taken up five years later by Rida, a follower of 'Abduh, in his periodical al-Mandr (The Beacon) and later by one Ibrahim Bey Najib in the nationalist paper of Mustafa Kmil, al-Liwa> (The Standard) ." Another Egyptian think er and radical Arab nationalist, 'Abd al-Rahmn al-Kawkibi, used the protocol of a fictitious Islamic congress held in Mecca in 1896 as the core of his popular and widely read novel, Umm al-Qurd (Mother of cities). So convincing was his description of this imaginary event, that many were misled into believing that it had actually occurred.78 All these proposals however were centered around one burning issue: the resurrec tion of the Caliphate as a viable politico-religious office, and its return to an Arab dynast.79



But Gasprinskii castigated those who sought such a renewed Cali phate and branded them as motivated only by "ignorance and fanati cism".80 He looked rather to the several All Russia Muslim Congresses of 1905 and 1906 and the All India Muslim League Congresses as examples to follow. Like these, the Universal Islamic Congress, made up of dele gates from throughout the Islamic world, he promised twenty from Russia and Persia ,was to devote its proceedings to the discussion of socio-economic and cultural issues facing the Muslim people. Representing the entire Islamic world, the Congress would "be able to sanction [the] unavoidably necessary reforms and innovations in Islam."81 The use of the word "innovation" is most telling, for its Arabic and Turkish equivalent, bid' ah, carries the religious connotation of unsanctioned deviation from the revealed path, i.e. heresy. Gasprinskii was warning his readers to expect radical social change hitherto unthought of. He discounted any political motivations for convening the Congress and insisted that its deliberations would be strictly a-political. Events were to prove the futility of drawing such a distinction between the political and the socio-economic spheres.82 Response to Gasprinskii's proposal, as manifest in the Muslim press editorially and in letters to the editor for the next several months, was generally favorable. Al-Mu'ayyad, the editor of which 'Ali Yusuf had organized the Continental Hotel gathering, fully endorsed Gasp rinskii's analysis of the ills facing Islamic society, and warned of possible conflicts which might arise in such a congress due to the diversity of theological views of its participants.83 Al-Liwa" stressed the role of the Congress as a force for the mobilization of all the Muslim masses of the world and assured its Christian readers that they needed fear no manif estation of religious intolerance in the proceedings.84 Al-Ahrdm, in an interview with a member of the organizing committee, Sheikh al-Bakri, revealed the nascent religious character with which some of the Congress organizers seemed to invest the Congress.85 Al-Mandr gave guarded approval to the idea if viewed as the latest in a series of such proposals, but cautioned of the opposition it faced on political grounds.86 On his return to Cairo in February 1908, Gasprinskii noted the inter national response to the Congress in al-Nahdah. He rejected the proposal of the Cairo daily al-Muqattam to broaden the basis of the Congress to include non-Muslims.87 This suggestion however did evoke a later article in al-Nahdah calling for Muslim co-operation with the peoples of the East who were of different faith.88 The publication of Gasprinskii's Continental Hotel speech in Terjiimdn (75 1 X97) prompted several letters warmly commending him for the proposal and wishing success to the Congress deliberations. These came from a spokesman for the community of Zaysan in East Turkestan (alNahdah I.2.e.), the Mufti of Samarkand (al-Nahdah II.3.C), a represensentative of the people of Nukha in the Caucacus (al-Nahdah II.3.C), and a member of the Muslim community in Kandia on the island of Crete (al-Nahdah ...). One of the first problems which Gasprinskii faced was deciding on the locale for the Congress. Already in the editorial of Terjiimdn (bo) he indicated that Istanbul would be an unsuitable choice "owing to certain



reasons," and that Cairo, as the second capital of Islam, would be a logical alternative. There is evidence that the former city was still favored by him, and in Cairo in the November speech he once again opened the possi bility of holding the Congress there. Interestingly enough, he rejected a suggestion to hold it in a neutral, i.e. non-Islamic city such as Geneva. But there was opposition to the Congress in Istanbul. Al-Ahrdm reported that during his brief sojourn in Istanbul in December 1907 (on his return from Egypt), the Porte sought to dissuade Gasprinskii from the idea of holding such a congress, fearing that it would degenerate into a forum of opposition to Ottoman political policies and administrative procedures.89 Al-Mandr claimed that not only had the Porte expressed its displeasure to Gasprinskii, but indeed the Sultan had, in a letter to the Khedive, proscribed the stop-over in Cairo of pilgrims to Mecca the Congress being planned to coincide with the pilgrimage month. The press at Istanbul was said to be opposed to the idea as well. Moreover, claimed al-Mandr, the Egyptian government too for the same reasons of politics would oppose the convening of the Congress in its territory.90 In point of fact Cairo was chosen as the seat of the Congress. Gasp rinskii himself listed three reasons which dictated the choice of the city. In the first place, as Arabic was the lingua franca of all Muslims binding them into one community, it was fitting that the Congress be held in an Arabic-speaking environment. Secondly, Cairo was the ideal choice in preference to other Arab cities due to its ideal geographical location, its recognized position as a center of Islamic culture, and its role as the second capital of the Ottoman Empire. Finally, Istanbul had been eliminated due to the political turmoil in which it was then immersed, an involvement that Gasprinskii wished to avoid. Cairo, due to the special situation reigning in Egypt (the British occupation), was a locale which guaranteed freedom from involvement in this political im broglio.91 Immediately after Gasprinskii's first Cairo visit, an ad hoc committee of notables was formed to further discuss the proposal. Meeting in the home of a Cairo dignitary, Salm al-Bashri, this committee elected from its midst an administrative steering committee enjoined with the task of organizing the Congress.92 The committee was composed of men who represented a broad range of political opinion and religious sympathies, often belonging to mutually antagonistic groups.93 Some belonged to the circle of the pan-Arabist al-Ka\vkibi,94 others to that of the renowned modernist Muhammad 'Abduh.95 Salim al-Bashri had been rector of al-Azhdr, the venerable Islamic university, and was considered to be a traditionalist by many.96 Perhaps he was chosen as president of the committee to allay fears that this would be a politically oriented gathering, and to give to the Congress a stamp of religious orthodoxy. His vice-chairman Muhammad Tawfiq al-Bakri, who held the influ ential position of Sheikh of the Sufi Orders and Naqb al- A shrdf (Doyenne of the notables) , was of the progressive school. Both religiously and politi cally a liberal, he was committed to the strengthening of constitutional government in Egypt. Educated in Europe, he borrowed liberally from



European thinkers in the articulation of his views on Islam and Islamic society in his widely heralded work al-Mustaqbal l-il-Islm (The future of Islam).91 'Ali Yusuf, editor of al-Mu'ayyad, was founder of the Constitutional Reform Party which though nationalist in tone fully supported the Khedive, of whom 'AH Yusuf was a close confident.98 The two al-'A?m brothers were Syrian exiles both active in the Arab nationalist movement. Haqqi was later secretary of the Decentralization Party which opposed the Young Turks of the Committee for Union and Progress," and Rafiq was one of the seven notables to whom the British Declaration of June 16, 1918 was addressed, regarding Arab national aspirations.100 'Umar Lutfi had been active in the first nationalist party founded in the immed iate pre-British period,101 and was still prominent in nationalist circles. Ibrahim al-Hilbw later became a founding member of the moderate Constitutional Liberal Party.102 Ahmad Hufiz was a writer and journali st, served as the private secretary to 'Abbas II, and was later active in the Wafd Party.103 Of the others members of the committee no biographical material was available to me. However, on the basis of those identified, one can agree with the analysis of Hartmann that the members of the committee belonged to radically opposing groups.104 Perhaps it is partially to this fact that we can trace the failure of the Congress to materialize. On January 21, 1908 the Statutes of the Congress were made public by the committee.105 The first section dealt with the rules governing the membership and duties of the steering committee itself. The second section, stating the aims of the Congress, was couched in the most tradi tional religious language, belying the innate conservatism of many memb ers of the committee. Articles XIV-XV stated that the Congress would examine the social ills afflicting the Islamic community, but also "here sies" within Islam which were sapping its strength. All reforms were to be based on the traditional Islamic principles of the Qur'n, the Sunnah (Tradition), Ijma* (Unanimity of the community), and Qys (Analogy). Clearly this version of the aims of the Congress was far different in formul ation than was Gasprinskii's. The third section of the Statutes laid down the regulations governing participation in the Congress, which was open to any Muslim of education. The last section dealt with the actual convening of the Congress, the date of which was not yet decided upon. The official languages of the Con gress would be Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Hindustani. Gasprinskii assured his readers that to foster the widest possible publicizing of the Congress, its Statutes would be published in French, Persian, Turkish and Russian.106 A principle issue facing the Congress committee was the selecting of a date for its convening. In an appeal again couched in the most religious of terms, Salim al-Bashri asked for full support for the Congress which he indicated would be held in September 1908, just before the Pi lgrimage.107 This was the date Gasprinskii himself favored, as indicated in the editorial of Terjiimn (60, 1907). However, the Young Turk revolution of July 1908 cast doubt not only as to this date for convening the Congress, but as to its locale as well.



In September 1908, Gasprinskii announced that it was too late to change the venue of the Congress, and that it would still be held in Cairo, but in November; a second Congress would take place in Istanbul and the third in Tehran.108 Gasprinskii's optimism that the Congress could be held so soon was misguided, for over a year passed during which nothing was heard of the venture. Then in Summer 1909, he sought to revive the idea by gaining the support of the Turkish nationalists for its convocation. Journeying to Istanbul ostensibly on an educational mission, Gasprinskii succeeded in getting the agreement of the leadership of the Committee for Union and Progress for the holding of the Congress. Terjiimdn and the Istanbul press jointly announced that it would be held in Cairo as planned and open on January 31, 1911.109 This was the last official communiqu on the Congress by Gasprinskii or the steering committee. The Congress did not convene. It remains for us to inquire why the project for a Universal Islamic Congress failed. In retrospect it seems clear that there were several forces working against the holding of the Congress though we cannot single out any particular one as the sole cause for its failure to materialize. Gasprinskii's belief that Cairo provided a setting free from the political turmoil of Istanbul was largely unfounded. As revealed in the Aqaba crisis of 1906, Egyptian nationalists were wont to express their nationali stic feeling by unconditional support of the Ottoman government in those policies which were at variance with British interests. They would be reluctant to support a Congress which the Ottoman government declared was hostile to its broader political interests, if those interests were seen to be anti-British. For their part it seems probable that the British too would have opposed such a Congress. There was fear in British governing circles of a Pan- Islamic political movement and the broad appeal of the Congress to which delegates from the entire Islamic world would come, lent to it a Pan-Islamic image. It matters not that in retrospect this fear can be seen to be what it was a bogey. Evidence that the British opposed the Congress is to be found in the suppression of al-Nahdah. Moreover, Gasprinskii in a letter written some years later to Le Chatelier, editor of the Revue du Monde musulman, stated that the Congress could have been held in French terri tory, had France's Eastern policy been amenable to it. One can infer that despite earlier hopes, he had discovered British policy to have been inimical to the project.110 Opposition to Gasprinskii's Congress was expressed also by Rashid Rida', the champion of neo-orthodoxy (the Saldfyah) . Despite his earlier espousal of the Congress in November 1907 (al-Mandr X), Rida' bitterly attacked it for religious reasons in a second article several months later. 1U First finding fault with the chairman of the steering committee as a tradi tionalist went Rida' whose on to espousal criticize ofthe "liberal" Congress religious as not ideas beingwas truly not concerned to be trusted, with Islamic, i.e. religious issues, but with social ones. Moreover, he attacked Gasprinskii for his championing of Turkish nationalism and the Turkish language at the expense of the Arabs and Arabic. Rida' was committed



to the idea of a Caliphal Congress, and once the nature of Gasprinskii's proposal became clear to him, he actively opposed it. This is clear in his response to a question directed to him concerning the Congress from a correspondent in Bahrein some time later.112 At the time Rida' faulted Gasprinskii for proposing a Congress which was political in nature, and claimed that his failure to elicit any response from the Rida' stated Islamic that community the Congress, (!) was if it proof were of to its be rejection held at all, of his would proposal. have to be truly Islamic, i.e. religious in nature, and held in one of the two Holy cities, Makkah or Madmah. Finally, we must return to the opposition to the Congress voiced in Istanbul. It is obvious from his several visits to the Ottoman capital that Gasprinskii considered an espousal of the Congress proposal by the Turkish government to be of utmost importance. That the government of Abdul-Aziz opposed the Congress is evident. Gasprinskii himself admitted it. However, it appears that the Committee for Union and Pro gress too, despite its earlier expressed approval of the idea eventually opposed it. This is Hartmann's contention,113 and Rida' too insists that the Turkish revolutionaries were antagonistic to the idea.114 This failure to gain the support of the Turks for the Congress must have greatly saddened Gasprinskii. Indeed, without Turkish partic ipation the effectiveness of the Congress as a forum of all the Islamic peoples would have been severely hampered. It would appear that in the face of such a diverse coalition of opposition the Egyptian Salfists led by Rid', both the pre-revoiutionary and post-revolutionary Turkish rgimes, certain Turcophile nationalists in Egypt, and the British rgime there as well Gasprinskii abandoned his project. The two General Islamic Congresses held in 1926 that of the Ca liphate in Cairo (13-19 May, 1926) and that of the Muslim world in Makkah (7 June-5 July, 1926) were of a totally different order than that proposed by Gasprinskii.115 The former dealt with the question of the revival of the by then defunct Caliphate, and the latter with the normalization of affairs in the Holy Cities, newly conquered by the Sa'udi dynasty. A Congress of the type and magnitude envisaged by Gasprinskii has yet to be held in the Islamic world. Chicago, 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY As the reader is aware, this paper is basically an exposition of the ideas of Ismail Bey Gasprinski as contained in the Cairo journal edited by him in FebruaryMarch 1908, al-Nahdah. It does not purport to be a comprehensive study of this great Tatar reformer. Materials for such a study are available, and would include of greatest importance his Crimean based journal, Terjihnun. The following bibliography is divided into two parts. The first is meant to serve as a guide for those who are interested in further exploring the history of the Tatar national revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is



this revival which served as the immediate background of the material found in al-Nahdah. This short list contains primarily works in Western languages and does not in any sense pretend to be exhaustive. Several of the studies included contain excellent bibliographical guides for those interested in further intensive investigation and in examination of the primary source material, both Turkic and Russian. The second part of the bibliography is a complete list of the material upon which my account of the abortive Universal Islamic Congress is based. To my knowledge, no further materials are forthcoming. REFERENCES Tatar national revival Bennigsen, Alexandre and Chantai Lemercier-Quelquejay i960 Les mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie (Paris: Mouton). 1964 La presse et le mouvement national chez les Musulmans de Russie avant I20 (Paris: Mouton). 1967 Islam in the Soviet Union (London: Praeger). (Tr. G. Wheeler and H. Evans.) Bobrovnikoff, Sophy 191 1 "Moslems in Russia," Muslim World I: 5-31. Caroe, Sire Olaf I()53 Soviet Empire (London: Macmillan; 2nd ed. 1967). Hostler, Charles 1957 Turkism and the Soviets (London: Allen and Unwin). Kirimal, Edige 1952 Der nationale ampf der Krimtrken (Lechte: Emsdetten, Westf.). Mende, Gerhard von 1936 Der nationale Kampf der Russland Tiirken (Berlin: Weidmannsche). Seydahmet, Cafer 1934 Gaspirali Ismail Bey (Istanbul: Turk Anonim Sirketi). Vambry, Arminius 1905 "The awakening of the Tatars," Nineteenth Century LVII: 217-229. 1906 Western culture in Eastern lands (New York: Dutton). 1907 "Die Kulturbestrebungen der Tartaren," Deutsche Rundschau CXXXII72-91. 1913 "Das Erwachen des Mohammedaner in Asien," Beitrge zur Kenntnis des Orients X: 51-83. Zenkovsky, Serge 1967 Pan-turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Universal Islamic Congress Hartmann, Martin 1908 " Der Islam 1907, " Mitteilung des Seminars fur Orientalische Sprachen XI. 1909 "Der Islam 1908," M SOS XII: 33-108. Hartmann, Richard 1941 "Zum Gedanken des 'Kongresses' in den Reformbestrebungen des Islamischen Orients," Die Welt des Islams XXIII: 122-132. Rida', Rashd 1907 "Bahath f al-Mu'tamar al-Islm" (Discussion regarding the Is lamic Congress), al-Manar X: 680 sq. 1908 "al-Mu'tamar al-Islnr" (The Islamic Congress), al-Manar XI: 181-184. 1911 "As'ila min al-Bahrayn: al-Mu'tamar al-Islm" (Questions from Bahrein: The Islamic Congress), al-Manar XIV: 731-738.



Revue du Monde musulman (RMM) III (1907) "Le Congrs musulman universel" (Gasprinskii's speech, Cairo, Nov.): 497-5O3IV (1908) "Le Congrs musulman universel "(Press comment): 100-107. IV (1908) "Egypte Congrs musulman universel" (al-Bakr): 134-137. IV (1908) "Sayyid Mohammed Taoufik al-Bakr": 276-283. IV (1908) "Statuts du Congrs musulman universel": 399-403. V (1908) "La presse musulmane Al-Nahda (La Renaissance)" (L'analyse): I73-I77V (1908) "La convocation au Congrs musulman": 372-373. V (1908) "Congrs musulman universel" (Committee members): 711. VI (1908) "Le Congrs musulman universel" (Locale): 284. IX (1909) "Le Congrs musulman universel" (Date): 194-195. XII (1910) "Politique musulmane Les musulmans russes" (Letter of Gasprinskii to Le Chatelier): 164-165. The Times Letter to the Editor, Oct. 22. 1907. A translation by A. Vambry of Gasprinskii's Terjiiman editorial on the Congress, Terjmnan, 60 (1907). Al-Nahdah Several articles cited in text by Gasprinskii on the Congress and its aims. al-Jund, Anwr 1970 Tarjim al-a'lam al-mu'sarn (Biography of modern personalities) (Cairo: Maktabah al-Akhbl al-Misriyah).

[NOTES] I wish to acknowledge here my gratitude to Professor Alexandre Bennigsen of the cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences Sociales and the University of Chicago who provided me with a microfilm copy of the only known extant collection of the paper located in the Dr al-Kutub of the Citadel in Cairo. (Cf. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1964: 176 sq.) At the same time I wish to express my indebtedness to Professor Fazlur Rahman of the University of Chicago who rendered his invaluable assistance in numerous difficulties of translation and who imparted to me many of his penetrating insights into Islamic modernism. 1 . Although the first two examplars of al-Nahdah include the French subheading La Renaissance, the latter does not adequately convey the dynamic connotation of the Arabic word to the English reader. This could best be rendered by the phrase "socio-cultural awakening and national resurgence." 2. al-Nahdah (hereafter ) I.i.a. Citations of aN will be given in this form throughout this study: capitalized Roman numeral refers to issue number; Arabic numeral refers to page number; small-case letter refers to column number; small Roman numeral refers to column number of the feuilleton. 3. The most complete treatment of Gasprinskii (Turkish: Gaspirali) is the Turki sh work Gaspirali Ismail Bey by the Crimean author Cafer Seydahmet (1934). Shorter biographical notes and analytical studies in European languages can be found in G. von Mende, 1936: 44-61; and the works of A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemerc ier-Quelquejay, i960, ch. ii-iii; 1964, ch. 11; 1967, ch. 111. A full treatment of Gasprinskii has still to be written in a Western language. 4. Cf. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1964: 40-48 for a summary of political activity in pre-revolutionary Muslim Russia. 5. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bitgiinkii Tiirkili (Turkistan) ve yakin tarihi (Modern Turkestan and its current history) (Istanbul: Arkadas Ibrahim Horoz ve Giiven Basimevleri, 1947): 556, as quoted in O. Caroe, 1953: 227, and C. Hostler, 1957: 127. 6. On Terjiiman, cf. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1964: 35-42. 7. aN, III.3.e. The excuse of physical indisposition was a favorite tactic of the Russian censor. 8. aN, I.i.b-c. 9. Desormeaux in Revue du Monde musulman (hereafter RMM) V (1908): 174.



. io E.P. is equivalent to F.F. 2.6o/2S.6d./$ 50 U.S.; x/i E.P. to 12V4 centimes/ i/*d./2Vi; E.P. to F.F. 2/IS.8P./840. Cf. K. Baedeker, Egypt and the Sudan, A handbook for travelers, 6th ed. (English) (Leipzig: K. Baedeker, 1908), xv; and currency table. 11. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1964: 124-128. 12. The Arabic name of the Tatar writer and historian, 'Abdullah BattalTaymas (i882-i9[?]). For a brief biographical note on this scholar and journalist, cf. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1964: 68, n. 2. He is given credit as the translator in two of the three issues of the paper. 13. aN, I, II, III, 4.a. 14. "Dear reader," aN, I.i.a. 15. aN, I.3. 16. G. von Mende, 1936: 46. 17. Cf. his clear repudiation of this charge in Terjumn, 60 (1907), translated by A. Vambry in a letter to The Times, Oct. 22, 1907. 18. Gasprinskii's active participation in the spread of the modernist jadd school system, which he developed in the Crimea, throughout Islamic Russia and beyond to Turkey, Persia and India is of course the most concrete evidence of his universalism. Cf. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967: 39. 19. He had done just this in a journey elsewhere. In 1893 Gasprinskii visited the Emirate of Bukhara and in the course of his stay there presented a delegation of notables (including the chief Qd, the Grand Wazr, and the Finance minister) with a copy of his school prospectus. aN, II.3.b-c. A syllabus specimen of the jadd schools can be found in S. Bobrovnikofi, 191 1: 17. 20. aN, II.i.a-c. 21. aN, ..-b. 22. aN, III.2.H. 23. aN, III. 4. a. 24. aN, II. 4. b. 25. aN, I.3. a. 26. aN, I-3-b. On the high incidence of alcoholism among Egyptians at this period cf. the remarks of M. Hartmann, 1909: 81. 27. aN, II.i.a-c. 28. aN, III.2.a-c. 29. aN, II. 2. i. 30. aN, II.2.b-c. 31. aN, II.4. 32. A. Vambry, The life and adventures of Arminius Vambry (New York, n.d.): 20 33. aN, III.4.b. 34. "The Muslims of Poland," aN, II.2.b-e. 35. "Enlightened Islamic societies," aN, III.2.a-e. 36. aN, 1. 3-. Egyptian pound equivalent to 25.90 F.F./20S. 6 p. /85.00 U.S. 37. RMM, III (1007): 500. This speech, delivered in Turkish on Nov. 1, 1907 at the Continental Hotel in Cairo and translated simultaneously for the benefit of the Arabic-speaking audience by Gaspmnskii's collaborator, 'Abdullah BattalTaymas (cf. n. 12) was published in French translation by L' tendard gyptien (3.1 1.07) from which excerpts appear in the Revue. An Arabic version of the speech was most probably published in al-Liwa' (the parent organ of L'tend ard,both under the editorship of the Egyptian nationalist Mustafa Kmil) but I was unable to verify this. However, excerpts of the Arabic version are to be found in Anwar al-Jundi, 1970: 60-66. Though al-Jund grossly exaggerates the number attending this lecture (6,000!), this over-estimation graphically depicts the importance attached to this gathering. 38. aN, IH.i.d-e; 2.a. 39. In the periodical Itihad cited by B. Lewis, The emergence of modern Turkey (Oxford, 1968): 236, 267. 40. aN, I. .. 41. Terfi'tman, 60 (1907). As in The Times, Oct. 22, 1907. 42. RMM, III (1907): 499. 43. aN, II.2.b-c. This article appeared simultaneously in the Egyptian daily al-Mu'ayyad (3.3.08) edited by a sponsor of Gasprinskii's visit, 'AU Yusf.



44. These seven provinces (with the percentage of Muslim inhabitants indicated for 1908) were most probably Kovno (o. 11), Vilna (0.28), Grodno (0.37), Suwalki (0.14), Lomja (0.08), Siedlce (0.08), and Warsaw (0.08). These statistics are taken from a table listing all of the provinces of Asiatic and European Russia with the percentage of their Muslim inhabitants indicated. It was included in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance for 1908 and fortuitously published by S. Bobrovnikoff in her article, 1911: 1-26. 45. aN, ..- and III.2.d-e; .-b. The account which was published orig inally in Turkish in Terjiiman stops in this version in mid-journey, before his encounter with the Emir. This was due to the discontinuation of the paper. 46. The Emir had visited Bahesaray three months earlier on his return from a visit to St. Petersburg. At that time he had bestowed on Gasprinskii many honors including a Gold Medal "Pour le mrite" and invited him to visit Bukhara. (aN, I.2.d.) 47. In a post-script to the second instalment of the account, Gasprinskii's translator, Abdullah Battal-Taymas, provided the Arab readers with an historical excursus on this figure and his role in the development of the science of astronomy. 48. aN, II. 3 and I.3. It is significant that of the seven photographs published in the paper, four are of Central Asian subjects. Besides the two mentioned, there is one of the Emir's summer palace at Shrbadun (III. 2.) and another of a display of Turkestani handicrafts (III.3.). He had moreover, intended to print a photo graph of the reigning Emir 'Abd al-Ahd Khn (I.2.d). 49. aN, I.2-3.-; II.2-3.i-ui; III.2-3.i-Hi. 50. According to the introduction to the first instalment, the Arabic Muslimu Dr al-Rahah : Rihlah Gharbiyah is the translation of the second chapter of a series entitled "European letters" which first appeared in Terjiiman. This is most prob ably an earlier recension of Gasprinskii's, novel Dar ul-Raha Miisiihtianlari publish ed at Bahesaray under the pseudonym Moll 'Abbs Fransw i.e., Moll 'Abbs the Frenchman. A Persian version of this latter work is also extant. 51 aN, 1.2. 52. RMM, III, 1907: 497-503. 53. "Our Eastern brethren," aN, ... 54. aN, II.i.d-e; 2.a-b. 55. One oka is equivalent to 1 282 kg. 56. For an example cf. Mustafa Kmil's work al-Shams al-mashraqah (The rising sun) (Cairo, 1906). 57. Given the relatively insignificant percentage of Japan's trade with the Islamic world as compared to her total trade at this time (cf. table below), Gasprins kii's warnings seem particularly perceptive. He understood the inevitability of Japan's rapid economic expansion once her industrial establishment had been modernized a process just then almost fully completed. The following statis tics,taken from official sources, gives relevant information regarding this trade. Value (millions of yen) of Japanese import-export trade, 1903-1907 (selected countries) 1902 AR Eg. T Im. Ex. Im. Ex. Im. Ex. 5.963,858 2,144,961 2,418,262 449.305 271,731,259 258,303,065 1903 8,267,652 2 239,987 2,401,599 322,664 3i7.i35,5i8 289,502,442 4.527.746 27,814 2,476,258 418,529 371,360,739 319,260,896 1905 2,726,564 1,709,787 2,999,133 283,801 488,538,017 32i,533,6io 1,407,230 10,494,077 1,669,589 378,734 418,784,108 423,751,892 1907 1,655.649 5,067,723 3.457,204 386,300 494,467,346 432,412,873

AR : Asiatic Russia, including Manchuria Im. : Import Eg. : Egypt Ex. : Export T : Total, all countries Sources: These tables were compiled from Nikon teikoku nenkan (Annual statistics of Imperial Japan) 27 (1908): 462-463, tables 261-262.



My thanks to Mrs. Etsuko Murata Kiley, Japanese bibliographer at the Uni versity of Chicago Library for providing me with this information. Tables for the period 1882-1903 are also given in Bulletin du Comit de l'Asie franaise (Sept. 1904): 442 ff. 58. There are certain striking parallels between Gasprinskii's schema tization presented in this article and the radical marxism of the Tatar national communist Sultan Galiev. He postulated a world revolution fought not on the basis of class but of national economic structure, i.e. the industrialized nations vs. the nonindustrialized. One should examine the relationship between the ideas of the two men. Cf. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-juelquejay, i960. 59. Cf. S. Zenkovsky, 1967: 41-51. 60. "To the dear Egyptian peasant," aN, I.i.b-c. 61. aN, I.4. a. 62. "Causes of progress and development," aN, II. i.e. 63. On Mustafa Kamil, cf. J. Landau, Parliaments and parties in Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1954): 107-126; and F. Steppat, " Nationalisms und Islam bei Mustafa Kmil," Welt des Islams, n.s. IV (1956-1957): 241-341. 64. aN, 1. 2. a. 65. Cf. A. Vambry, 1907: 88. On Vaqt cf. A. Bennigsen and Ch. LemercierQuelquejay, 194: 72 . 66. aN, . .. 67. "A republic in Egypt," aN, 1.3. 68. "The Khedival family," aN, II.3.d-e. 69. aN, III.i.b-d. 70. aN, I.2.b-c. 71. aN, 1.2.-. (dated 2.2.08) and ..-d. (n.d.). 72. According to Hostler (1957: 136) the figures axe respectively thirtyfive and ten representatives. 73. Cf. the use of the westernized fedayeen in referring to the present-day Pales tinian guerillas. 74. "Editorial," aN, I.i.a. 75. Terjiimn 60 (1907). Cf. n. 17. 76. French text RMM, III (1907): 197-502. The speech was reported in The Times, Nov. 4, 1907. Cf. n. 37. al-Islml" 77. So (Discussion Rida' contends concerning in al-Manar the Islamic X (1907): Congress). 680 ff.Partial "Bahath French al-Mu'tamar translation in RMM, IV (1908): 99.105-107. But al-'Urwah al-Wuthq appeared only from 3.13.84 to 10.17.84. Rida' has mistaken his source. 78. S. Kedourie-Haim, The ideas of a precursor: 'Abd al-Rahmn al-Kawkibi, I84-IO2, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Edinburg, 1953. 79. For a general survey of the congress ideas, cf. R. Hartmann, 1941: 121-133. 80. "Our Eastern brethren," art. cit. 81. Terjiitnun 60, as in The Times, Oct. 22, 1907. 82. The political nature of such congresses was not lost on supporters and oppo nents of the idea. Cf. M. Hartmann, 1908: 213-214. 83. al-Mu'ayyad, 29.10.07 and 2. 11.07 as reported in RMM, IV (1908): 100 sq. 84. al-LiticV, 3.11.07 as reported in RMM, IV (1908): 100 sq. 85. al-Ahram, n.d., RMM, IV (1908): 100 sq. 86. al-Manar X (1907), in RMM, IV (1908): 100 sq. 87. aN, I. i.e. 88. "Our Eastern brethren," art. cit. 89. al-Ahram as excerpted in RMM, IV (1908): 105, 136. 90. al-Manar X (1907) as excerpted in RMM, IV (1908): 106. Also cf. M. Hart mann, 1907: 214. 91. aN, I.i.c-d. 92. al-Mu'ayyad, 20.11.07. 93. The members of the committee were: Salm al-Bashr (president), Husayn Wsif (vice-chairman), Muhammad Tawfq al-Bakr (vice-chairman), Ahmad Hafiz Bey (treasurer), 'I'mar Lu^fi (secretary), 'All Yusuf, Hasan Rafq, Ms Ghlib, Ibrhm al-Hilbwi, Muhammad Husayn, Ysf Sdiq, Rafq al-'Azm, Haqq al-'Azm, Hasan Bakr, Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharf. (al-Mu'ayyad, 20.11.07; RMM, V (1908): 711.)



94. S. Kedourie-Haim, op. cit.: 97, n. 1. She has misinterpreted the purpose of the Congress as Caliphal. 95. The Times, Nov. 5, 1907. 96. "al-Mu'tamar al-Islm" (The Islamic Congress), al-Manar XI (1908): 181 sq. 97. RMM, IV (1908): 276-283. 98. Cf. J. Landau, op. cit.: 141 sq. 99. S. Kedourie-Haim, op. cit.: 25, n. 6. 100. Cf. G. Antonius, The Arab awakening (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939): 433. 101. J. Landau, op. cit. : 87, 90. 102. Ibid. : 169. 103. Cf. his biography of the Egyptian Wafdist, Sa'd Zaghlul Pasha (Cairo: Matba'ah al-Hadfthah, 1927). 104. M. Hartmann, 1908: 36, n. 2. 105. RMM, IV (1908): 399-403, taken from al-Mu'ayyad, 1.23.08. 106. aN, III. 1. a. 107. RMM, V (1908): 372 ff. taken from al-Mu'ayyad, 4.14.08. 108. Terjiiman, 14/27 Sept. (1908), as reported in RMM, VI (1908): 281. 109. RMM, IX (1909): 194-195. no. RMM, XII (1910): 165. in. "al-Mu'tamar. . .," art. cit. 112. al-Manr XIV (Oct. 1911): 731 sq. 113. M. Hartmann, 1908: 35. 114. al-Manar XIV (191 1): 737. 115. Cf. RMM, LXIV (1926), for the protocol of both Congresses edited by A. Skaly.