Cicero and Philosophic Inventio Author(s): Donovan J. Ochs Source: Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.

3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 217-227 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3885290 Accessed: 22/11/2008 18:30
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Tantalizing and provocative questions about classical systems of topical invention continue to receive well-deserved scholarly attention.Recently, Corbett, analyzedthe exploredhow the topics can informthe teachingof writingand Trimpi2 possible connections between the topics and literary theory. Whether or not the and "formal"received differing answers topics divide themselves into "material" Moreover,investigationsto discover how the tradition from Conley3and Grimaldi.4 of topics shifted and changed across time has been addressedby Stump,5Cogan,6 and Leff.7 The intellectual richness of such studies stems from many sources. Aristotle,for example, authorsa topical system for dialectic and another,somewhat similar somewhat dissimilar, for the art of rhetoric. Cicero, in his early work offered a topical system based on "persons and actions" for rhetorical practice. Later, in his Topica something resembling Aristotle's dialectical method appears and then, even more problematic, in his later treatises a topical system uniting rhetoricand philosophy emerges, but in a truncated,fragmentedform. As Buckley noted:
This identificationof rhetoricand philosophy in a single universal method is a of the interdependence of res and verbmn,an consequenceof the Ciceronianunderstanding mediatedandjustified througha historyof humanculture.8 understanding

Precisely what the natureof this "singleuniversalmethod"was becomes the focal point of this essay. I contend thatCicero developed and used a topical system for philosophic discourse, a system thatwas integrallyjoined to his topical system

EdwardP. J. Corbett,"TheTopoi Revisited,"in Rhetoricand Praxis: The Contributionof Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning, ed., Jean Dietz Moss, (Washington,D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 43-58. 2 Wesley Trimpi,Muses of One Mind: TheLiteraryAnalysis of Experience and Its Continuity(Princeton,New Jersey: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1983), 245-321.

Thomas M. Conley, "Logical Hylomorphismand Aristotle'sKoinoi Topoi," Central States Speech Journal 29 (1978): 92-98. William Grimaldi,"TheAristotelianTopics," Traditio 14 (1958): 1-16. Eleonore Stump, Boethius'sDe topiciis differentiis:TranslatedwithNotes and Essays on the Text, (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1978). Marc Cogan, "RudolphusAgricola and the Semantic Revolutions of the Ilistory of Invention,"Rhetorica 2 (1984): 163194. Michael C. Leff, "TheTopics of ArgumentativeInvention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to Boethius," Rhetorica 1 (1983): 23-44. Michael J. Buckley, S.J., "PhilosophicMethod in Cicero,"Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970): 143-154.

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invention. Mostimportant, thisintegrated forrhetorical to however, systemappears be the necessaryand sufficientconditionfor stylisticeloquence.To developthe I propose,first, to reconstruct his integrated premisesfor my argument method from two passages,de Orat. 3.28.109-119.and de Part. 18.61-67.Then, I will fromhis essay,de Amicitia. of theprocedure offeranillustration his lifetimeCicerohadnumerous interconnections withphilosophers During and philosophies.Ciceroknew the Epicurean system from his friendshipwith he learned Stoicphilosophy, from Phaedrus, Zeno,andAtticus.FromPosidonius' him in the doctrines rubric.2 PhiloandAntiochus tutored Staseasthe Peripatetic of Cicerodid notproposeanynew or the Academy.In his own philosophic treatises, of logic, physics,or ethics.Instead Ciceroofferedhis readers startling conceptions from the several schools. a widerangeof philosophic opinions the New Accepting was a contestbetweenopinionsandrejecting Academy's teachingthatphilosophy of rhetoric,3 disavowal Ciceromovedto joinrhetoric theEpicurean andphilosophy. To best servethe state,a Stoic tenet,he believedone mustacquirewisdomfrom the masteryof the rhetorical study,speciallythe studyof philosophy. Eloquence, the of Academic and came from art, study Peripatetic teachings.4 claimedthatpoliticalquestionswere the In the thirdcenturyHermagoras He instituted propergroundand subjectmatterfor rhetoric. the stasis systemfor locating proofsin a judicialconfrontation. thereafter in the several students Shortly weretaught a systemof inventional or schoolsof rhetoric more less arranged topics underthe stasis headingsof conjecture (an sit), definition(quidsid) andquality (quale sit). Designed to enable an oratorto develop materialsfor forensic, deliberative,or epideicticdiscoursethese rhetoricaltopics formedthe core of rhetorical invention forcenturies. Thequestion ariseswhether ananalogous naturally systemwas available for If one neededto address an abstract discourse. constructing philosophic topic,e.g., the natureof death,the originof law, the moralresponsibilities of parents,etc., some inventional system would be needed. Cicero's inventional system for philosophic discourse shows a definite influence of the Hermagorean stasis classification but seems also to derive,in part,fromthe Skeptic's teachings.That is, probability not certainty is theobjectiveof the set of questions. Mostimportant, the Stoicteachings of dutyandobligation areapparently paired withtheEpicurean dogmaon consolation.

See Benson Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley:UniversityPress, 1953). Also Edwyn Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1913), 129. And also Hans FriedrichAugust von Arnim,ed., Stoicorwn VeterwnFragmenta, 3 vols. (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner,1903-1924). Standard accountsare accessible in EdwardVernonArnold,RomanStoicism (London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1958) and EduardZeller, TheStoics, Epicureans,and Sceptics,trans.Oswald J. Reichel (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962). 2 The best collection of materialabout the Peripateticsin FritzRobertWehrle, ed., Die Schule des Aristotles (Basel: B. Schwabe and Co., 1944-1959). HermannKarl Usener, ed., Epicurea (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner,1887). See also, Cyril Bailey, The GreekAtomistsand Epicurus(Oxford:The ClarendonPress, 1928) and NormanWentworthDeWitt,Epicurusand His Philosophy (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1954). Cicero'sspeculationwritingsform somethingof a unified whole. The Academicaand Topica addressproblemsof logic; de NaturaDeorwn, de Divinatione,and de Fato presentthe current views of physics and cosmology espoused in the schools of philosophy. Political theory serves as the focus for the de Re Publica andde Legibus.Threetreatises,de Finibus Bonorum et Malorus, TusculanaeDisputationes,and de Officiis containCicero'sposition on practicalethics. See also, George Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World:300 B.C. - AD. 300 (Princeton,New Jersey: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1973), 264-268.
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At first glance the placement of Cicero's description of the system seems vexing. Within his discussion of style in Book III, Crassus explains the components of the ornate style and extolls the use of declamations on theses as a useful exercise.' Since amplification is the signal distinction of the orator (amplificatiopotest plurimum,eaque una laus oratoris est propria maxime, 17.105) mastering the challenge of declaiming theses,2unlimited questions, becomes absolutely essential to eloquence. Indeed, referring to the relegation of theses to philosophy and hypotheses to rhetoric Crassus introduces his (Cicero's) philosophicinventionalsystem in these words:
areboundto possessthe intelligence, andskill to capacity ...thefactbeingthatwe orators duty,equityandgood,moralworthand speakbothpro andcontraon thetopicsof virtue, andlike matters. andpunishment, reward Butnow we have utility,honoranddisgrace, of a trifling littleproperty, and beenoustedfromourownestateandleft in occupation of other to holdand peoplehavebeenunable thatcontested, andwe whoarethedefenders so let us putourpridein ourpocketandborrow whatwe ourownpossessions; safeguard on ourheritage. (3.17.107-108) needfromthosewhohavetrespassed

In the de Part. Cicero places his discussion of the philosophic inventional system immediately after his discussion of the technical parts of the oration and offers the system as the logical beginning of his treatmentof inventio. Noteworthy is the fact that in eight years (from de Orat. in 55 B.C. to de Part. in 46 B.C.) Cicero no longer considered theses the property of philosophy, felt no need to "borrow," and simply encompassed theses and hypothesis into his unified conceptionof oratoricalinvention. To display both the emphases and the extent of Cicero's philosophic inventional system, at the risk of inelegance, I offer the schema in an outline format.While doing so makes the system appearmechanicalthe outline permitsone to compress the two discussions, overlaying the parts both treat in common, inserting the parts contained in only one of the discussions, and adding probable headings from his other philosophic treatiseswhen only allusions or references are made in the texts. The Inventional Schema I. All speculative inquiry (consultatio) can be divided into two classifications which have as their object either the study and understanding (cognitio rei scientiaque) of an arguable question or a principle of behavior (agendi consilium). An arguablequestion is an abstractproposition (propositio, thesis) characterized by no referenceto specific persons or times (notatumnullis neque personis neque temporibus).

of HarrisRackhamin his Cicero: De OratoreandDe Partitione Oratoria I have relied on the text and translations University Press, 1960). In later segments I acknowledge indebtednessto Walter (Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard Miller's, Cicero: De Officiis (London:William HeinemannLtd., 1938 and John EdwardKing's, Cicero: Tusculan Disputations (Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress, 1950). Two standardworks are of importancehere. In Stanley F. Bonner,RomanDeclamation in the Late Republicand Early Empire (Liverpool: Eaton Press Ltd., 1949) one can read an excellent discussion of the relationshipstheses and hypotheses had to Roman law. Also, Alain Michel, Rhetoriqueet Philosophie chez Ciceron:Essai sur lesfondements philosophiques de l'artde persuader (Paris:Presses UniversitairesDe France, 1960). Michel, too, arguesthat Cicero'slisting is new and Stoic in origin (p. 215). Michel's explication of the natureof the thesis, however does not extend to the second category of manipulatingemotions in consolatory discourse. 2

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A. Propositions deliberated upon to secure understanding (cognitio) or knowledge are of three types and function in terms of inference (conjectura),definition(definitio),anddeduction(consecutio). 1. If one is discussing whetheror not somethingexists, has existed or will exist (sit necne) one proceeds by asking the following questions, the answers to which can be used as a basis for drawinginferences: a. what actuallyexits (quidsit)? b. what is the origin of the concept (quae sit origo)? c. what is the cause andpurposeof a concept (causa et ratio)? d. can a conceptchange (immutatio)? e. are certainresultspossible (possitnealiqmidelfici)? f. how is a particular resultproduced(quemadmodum quidque fiat)? 2. If one is discussing what something is (quaeque res habeat) one proceeds by asking the following questions, the answers to which can be used to determinethe probableessence of a concept: a. what is the generally held view or definition of the concept (quid in communimente)? b. what are the special features of the concept (quid cuisuque sit proprium)? c. how mightthe conceptbe divided (cumres distribuitur in partes)? d. how is the concept the same or differentfrom otherrelatedconcepts (aliud an idemsit)? e. how might the concept be describedand distinguishedin relation to othersof its class (descriptiogeneris alicuius et quasi imago exprimenda est)? 3. If one is discussing or investigating the consequences or effects (consecutio) of something, one proceeds deductively by asking the following questionsthe answersto which enable one to reach a probable conclusion: a. In instances where the inquiry hinges on the effects of a single concept (simplexdisceptatio)one need consider: 1) Whether the effects are something to be desired or avoided (de expetendisfugiendisve)? 2) Whether the effects are equitable or inequitable (de aeqno aut iniquo)? 3) Whether the effects are honorableor dishonorable(de honesto aut turpi)? b. However, in instances where the inquiry hinges on a comparison (ex comparatione) or choice between two concepts one should consider: 1) Whetherthe concepts are the same or different (cum idemne sit an aliquid)? 2) Which of the two concepts is preferable(cumquidpraestat aliud auIF)? B . Propositionsdeliberatedupon to secure guidelines or principlesfor conduct (ad efficiendumn guild)can be consideredin termsof the following questions:

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1. Does the proposed action contain elements that should be followed aut declinandun)? To reach persistentlyor avoided (ad persequendum one shouldconsidermoralobligations (de officiis).i this determination a. Is the contemplatedaction morally right or wrong (aut honestumne in termsof prudence, justice, fortitide,and temperance? an turpe) b. If one must choose between two morally right actions, which is more in accordwith wisdom (sapientia)? c. Is or is not the contemplated action expedient, i.e. conducive to comfort and happiness in life (ad vitae commoditatem

jucunditatemqne)?
d. If one must choose between two expedient actions, one must ask whether the advantages are external or internal and, if internal, which is more likely to enhance one's social esteem (homines hominitribuunt)? e. In cases where the morally right conflicts with the expedient one must ask whetherthe conflict is apparentor real, and, if real, which is in the best interestsof the stateand humansociety (qui mrultan reipublicaeatquesocietati)? utilitatem 2. Does the proposedor completed action involve the producing,calming, aliquq permotione aut or extinguishingof an emotion (aut in animorurn gigendaaut sedandatollendavetractantur)?2 a. Is death an evil, a blessing, or a release from humanmisery? b. Is pain somethingto endureor escape? c. Is sorrowcapableof being controlledby the imagination? d. Are delight, desire, distress,and fear either naturalor necessary? e. To what extent can a virtuouslife producehappiness? II. Propositions developed for producing pleasure (delectationem sectatur), anticipatingthe futureor, arguinga past act (in provisions posteri temporisaut in praeteriti disceptationeversatur)deal with specific persons,times, and places (causa, hypothesis): (Here, one can readily supply the usual apparatus of rhetoricalinventionused in the epideictic,deliberative,andjudicial genres). Discussion The expanded schema of Cicero's philosophic inventional system raises numerous questions. From what source or sources might the procedureoriginate? To what uses might such a classification system be put? What relationships exist between Cicero's concept of philosophic "discussions"and rhetoricaldiscourse in legislative and legal settings? Moreover, what sort of discourse might the schema produce? The fact that Cicero was an eclectic, choosing whatever philosophical position seemed to fit his needs or the exigencies of a situation,requires no proof.

Here I am supplying the main headings Cicero uses in his de Off. to extend the cursorymention of moral obligations in in its Cicero's two presentationsof the schema. Michel alludes to the extension by claiming, "The study of officiwum relation to the virtues is indeed the subject of De officiis. It is the study of values, not in and of themselves, but in so far as they relate to usage, to life's circumstances"(p. 216). Here I am expandingCicero's brief account by extrapolatingthe key questions he raises in his Tusc. Disp. The extension seems justified since consolation is the controllingfeature of the division.

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His eclecticismis sufficientlydocumented. Nonetheless,the inventionalschema reflects the teachings of various schools of philosophy.That he was able to andcompeting of a testament andblenddisparate synthesize systemsis something not only to his eclectic bent but more so to his quest to make knowledge-in a broad theneedsof theorator-statesman. philosophy sense--serve Ratherthan a haphazard stitchingtogetherof partsof systems, Cicero's choicesof whatpiecesof whatsystemsto use suggestshe was makinga coherent, of rhetoric.For functional,practical,and teachableschema for practitioners of the OldAcademyin A. example,in the aboveoutlineone canreadthe tracings 1,2,3. The collection of questionsis reminiscentof Socrates'admonitionsto in his Rhetorica.Here,by andof Aristotle's Phaedrus displayof the "preferable" and also consciouschoice Cicerorejectsthe atomisticdogmaof the Epicureans tenetsof the Stoics.Whilean oratormightconceivably rejectsthe epistomologic is the shapeof the earth?" or "what is the wantto exploresuchquestions as, "what Cicerodid so on occasion,de Inv. 1.6.8,de Orat2.15.66--a size of the sun?"--and more pressingneed arises for a reasonedposition on such questionsas "Does or custom?", do experts or "Can virtue justicederivefromnature "Why disagree?" For one whose life and livelihooddependedon changeinto vice in a person?" anddissuading anddefending, actual praising andblaming, prosecuting exhorting personsandpolicies, such philosophicinquires as these could only broadenan orator's outlookandperspective. As Bonnersays,
in actual or in schoolexercises, of oratorical Experience pleading itself,whether practice thespecificcasewithits limited behind thatfrequently relation to musthaverevealed person, time,andplace,lay a widerissueof equitythedecisionuponwhichcalledfor the valuesinculcated thesenseof justice,themoral balance, by a philosophical training.,

Indeed, the illustrations and examples Cicero provides in his two descriptionsof philosophical inquiryseem ideally designed to help an oratorattain Bonner's concept of "balance."For instance, in the section on definition Cicero offers illustrativequestions, suited for philosophicalinquiry,such as "Isright in the interestof the majority?" "How many classificationsof desirablethings are there?" "Whatare the defining characteristics of an avaricious person?" These are not speculativequestions on cosmological or metaphysicalissues. Nor do these sample questions suggest anything approaching contemporary concerns for such epistomological topics as objective criteriafor truthstatementsand the like. On the contrary,the first section of the scheme is best understoodas a procedure,deriving most probably from an admixture of Academic and Peripatetic teaching, for focusing the mind away from a specific question of law or fact and toward fundamental,arguableissues in moral philosophy. Reaching a certain conclusion on any of these issues was neither possible nor intended. At best, a probable, reasoned position could result but the discussion remains always open, never closed as when a vote is taken or a verdict reached. Cicero himself attests to the open, on-going dimensionof these inquiriesinvolving moralphilosophy:

Bonner,p. 6.

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We, however, whose guide is probabilityand who are unable to advance furtherthanthe point at which the likelihood of truthhas presenteditself are preparedboth to refute withoutobstinacy and be refutedwithoutanger.1

Section B of the schema deserves special attention. Whereas the general patternin Section A can be seen as a descendantof Hermagoras' inventional triplet of conjecture, definition, and quality applied to a procedure for deliberating on general questions of moral philosophy, no such easy description for Section B presents itself. A few clues however, suggest what Cicero was including in this division. In both treatises, when introducing his compressed discussion of the material in Section B, Cicero, in one case (de Part. 19.67), uses the phrase est praecipiendi genus quod ad rationemofficii pertinet (this classification of advice is directed toward the basis of moral obligation), and in the other instance (de Orat. 3.30.118) the phraseaut in officii disceptationeversantur([these questions]revolve arounddeliberationsof moralobligation).The almost paralleluse of officium,duty, is sufficient evidence to conclude that Cicero is here alluding to the teachings or publicationsof the Stoics, Panaetiusand Posidonius.In the arenaof moral practical behavior the Skeptics and Epicureanshad little to offer. Moreover, while a gap of two years exists between publication of the de Part. in 46 B.C. and his de Off. in 44 B.C. one can surely assume that Cicero was familiarwith the Stoic doctrineson moralchoice in practicalaffairs. Yet anotherclue exists in the examples Cicero uses to clarify the scope of section B in the inventional schema. In the two examples that appear in de Part. 20.67. Cicero offers the questions, "whatis the appropriateway to show respect colindi sint parentes) and "howcan language calm for parents?" (ut quemadmodum states emotional arousal?" (ut in consolandis maeroribus, etc.). Here one encountersa differentsort of generalquestionthanthose in Section A. Cicero shifts dramaticallyaway from the intellectualand cognitive to the practicaland prudential type of inquiry.Whereasthe queriesin Section A were of the type, "Whatmight or should a wise person conclude, believe, think, or tentativelyhold?"these examples indicate a type of inquiry,"Whatshould a wise person do?"Developing a discourse on a practical question does not require a dialectic apparatusof definition, genusspecies, or the machinery of Cicero's Topica. Rather, once an inquiry about choosing between two courses of action arises, one of necessity needs recourse to some philosophical or religious dogma, set of standards,or system of practical ethical behavior against which one can test a proposed action. Not surprisingly Cicero embraces Stoic morality and its principles of conduct in the de Off. and in that treatise one encounters such rules as, "Promisesare not binding when life or health is at stake," "It is the duty of a youth to show deference to elders," and dozens of others. If, however, one raises an inquiry about proper conduct and locates the relevantethical rule, is not the inquiryconcluded?By no means. Since the rule itself was derived from a system of philosophic assumptionsand reached by a system of probable consequences, a discussion on a general question of behavior remains open-ended and always subject to furtherexploration, revision, interpretation,or challenge. Perhapsa shortillustrationwould clarify the claim. The Stoics believed thattakingan active role in public service enabledone to attain happiness and, therefore, was a moral obligation. If a person, for example,

Tusc. Disp. 2.2.5.

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raised a generalquestion, "Shouldone join a political party?"and applied the Stoic rule, an affirmative answer would result, albeit with qualifications. If the same a negativewould result. questionwere appliedto the Epicurean"ethic," Quite apart from their ethical dogma, Cicero's inclusion and prominent featuringof the generalquestionsaboutconductevinces most clearly one of the key linkages Cicero saw between wisdom and eloquence. Section A of the schema yields a cognitive type of knowledge; Section B enables an orator not only to consider alternate philosophical positions but, most important, alternate moral actions. An orator much more so than a speculative philosopher contends with actualnot abstractcontroversiesand needs a methodfor deliberatingupon practical courses of actions, before arguing for or against a specific action in a specific instance. In simpler terms, Cicero's approachto practicalinquiry is the source of the values underlying an orator'sarguments.In de Off. 1.28.101, for example, one can read an exposition of the moral tenet that "Temperance dictates one to subject appetiteto reason."Most of Cicero'scourtroomattackon Verres, for instance,rests on Verres'failure to follow the moralprescription. Section B.2 in the schema suggests a third distinctive type of philosophic inquiry.Much less well developed than the other two, this category does not yield easily to analysis or description. More than likely, Cicero is here addressing something akin to a system for producingconsolatorydiscourse. Comfortat a time of personal loss or grief requiresany speakerto locate resourcesfar removed from to courts and assemblies. Inventionalapparatus for the epideictic those appropriate genre, dealing as they typically do with an individual'sbirth,family education, and reflect societal values and tend not to addressthe emotionalstates accomplishments, of those suffering a loss or experiencinggrief. Cicero addressedseveral treatisesto the topic of consolation--the Consolatio, the Hortensius, and the Tusculan Disputations. Of these only the latteris extant but it does offer a view of Cicero's ideas concerning the contributionphilosophy can offer in situations of personal, emotion-laden loss. The connection between consolation and moral virtue is also addressedin de Part 22.77 and Rackamtranslates the passage in this way:
Similarly temperanceis directedboth to one's own affairsand those of the communityand is manifested in two ways in respect of profitablethings--in not seeking those which one has not got and in refrainingfrom using those which are in one's power. In respect of unprofitablethings temperanceis similarly two fold: That which withstandscoming evils is named fortitude,and thatwhich steadfastlyendurespresentevil, patience.

What one has in this thirdtype of inquiryseems to be a rudimentary and illdeveloped psychology. That is, when a religious belief in a god and an afterlife is not available--and such was the case for Cicero and most of his contemporaries-one must take refuge in that branch of moral philosophy which treats of the emotions and theircontrol.A speaker,for example, can offer consolationto another who is experiencing emotional pain by offering philosophic insights designed to enable one to reinterpret or re-perceivethe cause of the grief. The deathof a beloved spouse, as a case in point, creates grief. The grief can be ameliorated, Cicero suggests, by exploring whetherdeath might be a blessing or an escape from human misery. The procedure involves changing the perception of the disconcerting situation by counter-posing the unwanted emotional state against the virtue of temperance and its practicaldirectives. Here again, as was true with the other two types of inquiry, the resultant discussion remains open-ended and capable of being developed from multiple perspectives. Consider the possibilities in developing answers to a contemnporary culturalquestion, "shoulda young male be permittedto cry?"One easily can project mentally the turns such an inquiry might take as one varies the situations and

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contexts. Still, some aspect of temperancewould serve as the underlying virtue regardless of the direction of the discussion. To console, in the final analysis, requires a transference away from the emotionally arousing context to a level of meaning,a level providedby this thirdtype of generalinquiry. transcendent Cicero'sTusculanDisputations provides a readerwith Cicero'sown attemptto use philosophy as a defensive armoragainst the vicissitudes and misfortunes of life. Two centuries later Marcus Aurelius, following the Stoic doctrine of living according to nature,composed his Meditations. In this work of Aurelius one can read the uses to which philosophy was put in the living out of one's life and overcomingthe inevitabledistressthatcomes from living a humanlife. To see how these three types of inquiry contribute to the production of discourse we turnnow to an illustration. Cicero's de Amicita Given the general and generalizable nature of the questions used in the schema one ought not be overly surprised to discover that Cicero's essay "On Friendship"'reflects a good many of the probes. Cicero's "answers"are supplied under the abbreviatedheadings of the schema to indicate both how Cicero used the inventionalprocedureand, by implication,to suggest how others might. A. To secure understanding 1. Via conjecture a. what exists? [Cicero asserts that "friendshipcan exist only among good men." (18)] b. origin of concept? [Friendship originates in nature; (19), (27), (32) does not spring from weakness, poverty, want (29) nor from a need for defense or aid (46); "cultivatedby those least in need of another'shelp and by those most generous and most given to acts of kindness."(51)] c. cause and purpose? [Friendshippermitsintimatediscussion, allows one to sharejoy and bear adversity;friendshipstrengthensthe spirit;(20-23), friendship derives from virtue (28, 50, 83, 100)] d. change? [Since changes in social status, responsibilities, age, etc. happen, maintaininga friendshipthroughoutone's life is almost impossible (33)] e. certainresultspossible? ["Butif you should take the bond of good will out of the universe, no house or city could stand,nor would even the tillage of the fields abide"(23)] resultsproduced? f. particular ["Nothinggives more pleasure than the returnof good will and the interchangeof zealous service."(50)] ["Nature,loving nothing solitary, always strives for some sort of support,and man'sbest supportis a very clear friend"(88)]

I am indebtedto the text and translationof William ArmisteadFalconer,Cicero: De Amicitia (London:William HeinemannLtd., 1953).

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2. Via definition a. generallyheld view? ["Most want a friend to be such as they cannot be themselves and requirefrom friendswhat they themselvesdo not bestow"(82)] [Unanimousagreementthatwithoutfriendshiplife is not life at all (86)] b. special features [Friendshipis "an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love ratherthanthe calculationof profit"(27)] c. conceptdivided? [No apt illustration] d. same or different? [Friendshipdiffers from neighborliness(20)] e. distinguishedvia class? [Friendshipis "an accord in all things, things, human and divine, conjoinedwith mutualgood will and affection"(20)] 3. Via consequences(single concept) a. effects to be desiredor avoided? [Knowing thatfriendshipsare rareamong those in public office and that materialgain is a threatto other'smisfortunes,one should look for loyalty in a friend(62-64)] [Friendshipenables people to subdue theirpassions, to take delight in what is fair to requestonly honorablethings from each other, and of mind (83)] contributesto honor,fame, and tranquility effects? b. equitableor inequitable ["A friendmust neithertakepleasurein bringingchargesagainstyou nor believe them when made by others"(65)] effects? c. honorableor dishonorable [No apt illustration] or choice) 4. Via consequences(comparison a. same or different? [No apt illustration] b. which is preferable? [Should one prefer new friends to old? Cicero answers that old friends tend to be more delightful but that one ought not scorn new friends (67-71)] B. Guidelines for behavior(to follow or avoid) a. right or wrong in termsof cardinalvirtues? [Friendsmust avoid hypocrisyand suspicion (66)] ["Askof friendsonly what is honorable;do for friendsonly what is honorableand withouteven waiting to be asked"(44)] b. more in accordwith wisdom? ["Renderto each friend as much aid as you can and as much as the otherhas the capacityto bear"(73)] ["Love a friend after you have appraisedhim ratherthan appraise after beginningto love" (85)] c. conducive to comfortand happiness? [When breaking a friendship do so slowly unless an unbearable wrong has been committed,then breakthe relationshipquickly (7678)]

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d. likely to enhanceone's social esteem? ["If a friend asks a dishonorable favor involving his life or reputation,comply so long as utterdisgracedoes not follow" (61)] e. best interestsof stateand humansociety? ["Let not a sort of ungoverned goodwill hinder your friend's matters" (75)] advantagein important [How truthful should one be? Cicero answers, "let advice be free from harshness,reprooffree from insult"(89)] Observations
From this distilled excursus through the de Amicitia one can clearly see that

the inventional schema is anythingbut mechanistic. Some problems are addressed directly, some obliquely, some quite fully, and some not at all. Also, while the conjecturalprobes precede the practicalin the schema, and to a great extent in the treatise, a good bit of interminglingand interfacingoccurs. Were this sequence of probes merely a recipe or formula,one would expect each to be dealt with in order. Happily, such is not the case. to the probes result in certain conclusions and ironNor do the "responses" clad behavioral directives. Instead, one can read the qualifications and tentative conclusions resultingfrom the separateinquiries.That is, a readeris not compelled, as in mathematics,for example, to accede to Cicero'sreasoned conclusions, strong and forceful though they be. We have here a schema designed to assist one in working throughan abstractcognitive and practicalinquiry,what is friendshipand valid or certain how ought one treata friend?We do not have a system guaranteeing or finalized conclusions. Thus, someone else could as easily use the same probes to reason through the question and reach different, new, contrary, or contradictory
positions.

Of what value is the schema?Considerable.Reflecting upon and responding to the probes in the schema can yield a coherent, reasoned position replete with epistomological, ethical, and psychological materials. Without such materials an orator might be eloquent in a rhetorical situation, but never wise. With such materials, wisdom may not be guaranteed, but is highly probable. With the resources of the integratedinventional system an orator,Cicero implies, can attain
the "highest distinction of eloquence" (summa laus eloquentiac, 3.26.104).

When the two systems of invention,one for philosophicaldiscourse and the other for rhetoricalreasoning are combined and used in the inventional phase of expression, a speaker is protected against undue narrowness. In a given specific case one ought consider the larger view, the moral dimension. At present, for example, many are arguing whetherjury awards in tort cases are excessive. Were one only to concentrateon a single accident, suit, and monetaryaward,one would assuredly fail to understandthe broader,general issues and moral obligations that contextualize the case. One can claim that dialectic must precede rhetoric, but without some inventional system or guideline for actually doing practicaldialectic one is left only with the admonitionand little else. Cicero's invention system for philosophic inquiry admittedly is not complete but it does offer worthwhileinsights for reasoning throughquestions of a general nature and locating moral values that, in turn, can inform and infuse rhetoricalargument. Donovan J. Ochs of Rhetoric Department University of Iowa