RE: pending final disposition of disciplinary

proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR

111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S.
Ct.
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org) This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Wed 10/10/12 9:44 AM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org)
Dear Mr. Coughlin,

When you met with me and David Clark to discuss the Complaint and the process. Mr. Clark explained
that since there was a conviction, the sole issue to be determined was the extent of the discipline. Not
if you committed the crime, since that was already determined beyond a reasonable doubt. It is that
context that we are reading the rule. Not that the state bar is precluded from bringing additional
allegations against you. Any additional allegations that have not already resulted in criminal convictions
will need to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. As such, at the hearing, on the issue of your
criminal convictions, the only issue for the panel to decide is the appropriate discipline. However, I will
be providing evidence as to the other allegations in the Complaint. The Panel will decide if the state bar
has met its burden of proof as to those allegations in the complaint, other than the criminal convictions,
and will decide the appropriate discipline on the totality of the case, including mitigating and aggravating
factors that may be presented at the hearing.

As such, I do not intend bifurcate these proceedings. I think to do so would cause unnecessary confusion,
undue time and expense and would be prejudicial to the administration of justice.

I am advised that you have not yet filed an Answer to the Complaint. I have sent you a notice of intent to
proceed on a default basis. The hearing date is expected to be Wednesday November 14, 2012. I will be
sending you a notice of hearing, along with a list of witness, and evidence that I intend to introduce at
the hearing.

Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.


From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 10, 2012 6:18 AM
To: tsusich@nvdetr.org; David Clark; Laura Peters; Patrick King
Subject: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus SCR 111(8) and the
June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct.

Dear Chairman Susich, Bar Counsel, and Clerk Peters,

I am writing formally request a bifurcation of sorts, consiering:
SCR 111(7).Suspension on certification.Upon the filing with the supreme court of a petition with a certified copy of
proof of the conviction, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, the court shall enter an
order suspending the attorney, regardless of the pendency of an appeal, pending final disposition of a disciplinary
proceeding, which shall be commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board upon referral by the supreme court. For
good cause, the court may set aside its order suspending the attorney from the practice of law.


I think Bar Counsel's argument that the "proceeding" call for in the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order (which quotes
SCR 111(7) may include some SCR 105 Complaint (ie, a SBN v. Zachary B. Coughlin Complaints bringin in all
sorts of matters, including pending criminal actions, and wearing pajamas, and Orders by Judges purporting to
take away this or that right of Coughlin's to practice this or that in some court (an Order which Patrick King
reference to me and Chief Bar Counsel Clark, and, apparently, to a client of mine in early May 2012 (the client is
the only other place I have ever heard of such an unpublished "Order" purporting to have said effect) despite the
dictate against Bar Counsel's doign so in SCR 121 (the SCR 11 Petition was not even filed at that point, and one
has to wonder if some deal between that client, Bar Counsel, and the new attorney that client can now magically
afford was worked out, with nothing said of any torts that client committed against Coughin, etc., etc., much less
criminal law violations, which Coughlin just put up with).


But my point is, Bar Counsel King points ot the "pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding" language of
SCR 111(7)...which is quoted in the Court's June 7th, 2012 ORder (though I feel Bar Counsel is taking the quote
out of context and ignoring the express language of SCR 111(7) in making this argument that the "pending final
disposition of the disciplinary proceedings" language in the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order entitles Bar Counsel to
file a SBN v. Coughlin Complaint deny Coughlin that afforded under SCR 111(8) (which the JUne 7th, 2012 Order
cites to as well), and, given Coughlin's Petition in 61426, filed and served on August 13th, 2012 (the service of
which was consented to or waived by Bar Counsel King and Clark where they directed Clerk Laura Peters to sign
"Proof of Receipt" thereof on August 13th, 2012...), Coughlin is now entitled to an "immediate hearing" pursuant
to SCR 102(4)(d), and SCR 111(10).

The Court's June 7th, 2012 Order reads, in relevant part: "Pursuant to SCR 111, temporary suspension and
referral to the appropriate disciplinary board are mandatory when an attorney has been convicted of a "serious"
crime, which includes theft. SCR 111 (6)-(8). Accordingly, pursuant to SCR 111 (8), we refer this matter to
the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the
sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore, pursuant to SCR
111(7), we hereby temporarily suspend Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law in Nevada, pending final
disposition of the disciplinary proceedings." Note that the Order says "pending final disposition of the
disciplinary proceedings" . It does not say "pending final disposition of an SCR 105 Complaint filed by SBN as the
complainant (see Ching). And, in fact, SCR 111(8) clear that up further,

I give Patrick King credit for making a crafty argument, but its just not colorable. I am so used to this with Pat by
now, he plays dumb in a way that screw one out of their due process, but it is clear he knows exactly what he is
doing, that crafty sum'itch.

SCR 111(8): "8.Referral to disciplinary board.Upon receipt of a petition filed under subsection 4 of this rule,
demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending
the attorney in accordance with the provisions of subsection 7 of this rule, refer the matter to the appropriate
disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined
shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed."

But the clearest expression of authority to defeat Bar Counsels stated goal of "combining" the Hearing required by
the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order and the Supreme Court Rules with some SCR 105 (or SCR 102, natch) style
SBN v. Coughlin Complaint that Bar Counsel wishes to file is found in SCR 111(7): "the court shall enter an order
suspending the attorney...pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by
the appropriate disciplinary board upon referral by the supreme court."

And, right there, Bar Counsel's attempt to combine these affairs must fail. That's the thing, though...the phrase
"commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board". It does not say "commenced by the State Bar of Nevada as
a complainant, under Ching, filing an SCR 105 Complaint...It just does not say that. SCR 111(7), rather, reads
"which shall e commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board".

So, to sum it up Bar Counsel's attempts combine these must fail in light of the following:
"SCR 111(8): "the supreme court shall...refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a
formal hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be
imposed."

SCR 111(7): "the court shall enter an order suspending the attorney...pending final disposition of a disciplinary
proceeding, which shall be commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board upon referral by the
supreme court."


However, Bar Counsel and the Disciplinary Board should recognize the import of SCR 111(7)-(8) and refuse to
allow Bar Counsel to "combine" or consolidate, or "fail to bifurcate. What Bar Counsel is thinking of is SCR
105(2):."Commencement of formal proceedings.Formal disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar counsel
filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar. The complaint shall be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the
attorney of the charges against him or her and the underlying conduct supporting the charges."

However, SCR 111(7) and SCR 105(2) are entirely different animals. In one, SCR 111(7) calls for: "the court shall enter
an order suspending the attorney...pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be
commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board..."

In the other, it is Bar Counsel doing the "commencing" of SCR 105(2):."Commencement of formal proceedings.
Formal disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar...."

The distiction and diferences are revealed in the Supreme Court Rules by whom is doing the "commencing" and just
what it is they are "commencing", ie, a "formal proceeding (in the case of SCR 105(2), or a "dsiciplinary proceeding",

There is a difference, and that difference entails bifurcating things or refusing to consolidate these affairs, and I am
formally making that request upon the Board here now.

Sincerely,


Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com