Cause Number: 2011-70365 TOM G. TULLOS AND DELMA C. TULLOS vs.

TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 12th MAN FOUNDATION a/k/a THE 12th MAN FOUNDATION IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

334TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

F OUR TH A MEND ED O RIGI NAL PET ITI ON OF P LAI NTI FFS

Now come Tom G. Tullos and Delma C. Tullos, plaintiffs, complaining of Texas A&M University 12th Man Foundation, a/k/a The 12th Man Foundation (defendant), and would show: I. D I SCO VE RY L EVEL Pursuant to Rules 190.1 and 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery is intended in this lawsuit to be conducted under Level 3. II. P ART I ES Plaintiffs are and have been citizens of the State of Texas at all times material hereto. Defendant is a corporation doing business in the State of Texas. Defendant was served with citation herein by serving W. Miles Marks, its registered agent for service of process, at Joe Routt Blvd. at Clark Street,

Texas A&M University Campus, College Station, Texas, 77843. Defendant has previously appeared and answered herein; accordingly, no service of citation is requested at this time. III. V EN U E Venue is proper in Harris County, Texas under 15.002(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim made the basis of this lawsuit occurred in Harris County, Texas (Harris County). In particular, at the time plaintiffs were solicited by defendant to enter the agreement involved in this suit, they were residents of Harris County. When defendant telephonically made representations to plaintiff Tom Tullos regarding the details of the benefits which are made the basis of this claim, plaintiffs were located in and resided in Harris County. Thereafter, defendant mailed written materials summarizing the agreement to plaintiffs at their residence in Harris County, where plaintiffs received them. In reliance upon the representations made and the written materials sent, plaintiffs, while located in and residing in Harris County, mailed to defendant their initial payments under the agreement. Following that, defendant mailed to plaintiffs at their residence in Harris County receipts for those payments plus a writing to be signed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs received, signed, and returned the writing to defendant while they were residing in Harris County. Over the next few years, all of the

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remaining payments due from plaintiffs were mailed to defendant from, and while plaintiffs resided in, Harris County. Thus, plaintiffs entire

performance of their financial obligations under the agreement occurred in Harris County and while plaintiffs were residents of Harris County. Before, during, and after this performance by plaintiffs, defendant made

representations to and communicated with plaintiffs while plaintiffs were located and residing in Harris County. Further, defendants wrongful actions that constituted a breach of its obligations occurred partly in Harris County. In 2008, plaintiffs appealed the location where defendant assigned their parking. The committee defendant had established to adjudicate such appeals was composed of five persons, three of whom (including the Chair) reside or work in Harris County. Such committee failed to discharge its obligation to fairly investigate and adjudicate plaintiffs appeal. Instead, its members conducted no investigation and merely rubber-stamped the Chairs summary conclusion that the appeal should be denied. The committees actions in this instance occurred by email. Accordingly, some of the actions constituting defendants misconduct herein, and of which plaintiffs complain, apparently occurred in Harris County. There is no county of mandatory venue. Finally, transfer of venue under 15.002(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code would be improper. It would substantially risk that

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plaintiffs would not receive a fair trial in a county dominated by defendants affiliates (which are by far the largest employers in Brazos County). IV. F ACT U AL BACK G RO U N D In or before December 1994, plaintiffs Tom G. Tullos and Delma C. Tullos were solicited to participate in the Texas A&M University 12th Man Foundation Permanently Endowed Scholarship Program. Under the terms proposed to Mr. and Mrs. Tullos, in exchange for making a $20,000 scholarship endowment to defendant, they were promised various endowed benefits for a 30-year term, without the necessity to pay further for those benefits. These benefits included the opportunity to purchase two endowed football season tickets for home and road games for a period of 30 years in the endowed seating area; in addition, certain parking benefits were promised to them. Specifically, they were promised football season parking privileges in the endowed parked [sic] area on game day for the 30 year term of the agreement. Defendant represented this to consist of the best available parking at Kyle Field. In response to and in reliance upon the representations made to them, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos began making payments toward the endowment. Thereafter, defendant sent them a writing entitled Texas A&M University 12th Man Foundation Permanently Endowed Scholarship Agreement, which they signed and which was later signed by defendant.

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Wrongful denial of home game seating benefit. Before entering the endowment agreement, defendant represented that plaintiffs seats for home football games would not change location during the term of their endowment. Upon entering the contract, plaintiffs got seats 8 and 9, row 11, section 204 (second deck), on the south 16 yard line, where they have sat every year since, in accordance with their expectations. In 2013, defendant announced its intention to commence a capital campaign called Redevelopment of Kyle Field, in conjunction with which it launched, in June 2013, a reseating process for football games effective beginning in 2015. The reseating process involves a reallocation of seats for all members. Defendants application of this process to plaintiffs breaches their endowment agreement in two, independent ways. First, it would require plaintiffs to pay a net additional sum of about $30,000 over the remaining term of their endowment just to retain, possibly, the ability to purchase tickets in the same location to home games from 2015 to 2024. Second, the process would impose the Priority Point Program upon plaintiffs efforts to purchase seats in the same location, such that plaintiffs would have to pay defendant yet additional, and indeterminate, sums of money in an effort to earn sufficient points to compete effectively to retain their seats.

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Defendant created, apparently in 2006 (twelve years after the contract involved in this case was entered into), a point system to allocate, among other things, parking for home football games and tickets for away games. In 2013, Defendant announced an expansion of the application of the Priority Point Program to the Kyle Field reseating process. The program, which is designed to increase defendants revenue, operates by awarding points to members generally on the basis of dollars paid to defendant in the form of contributions. Defendants members, including endowed donors, then

compete for benefits on the basis of their point totals. Defendant announced that the reseating process will begin in July 2013, when endowed donors may first designate (and must begin paying for) unspecified seats within a named section of the planned, redeveloped Kyle Field. Other fans will designate sections beginning in August 2013. Each section has unique capital campaign contribution and annual seat fees and term. The first installment of the capital contribution is due at the time of the bid in 2013. As each section is filled by designations, it will be closed to further designations. Defendant has named the section that will encompass the location of plaintiffs current seats Prime West Club, and it is said to extend from the 5 yard line to the 20 yard line, all rows, on the second deck, on the west side. (Plaintiffs current seats are on the 16 yard line, row 11, second deck, west side.)

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The total additional sum that would be due from plaintiffs, net of the credit defendant would give them because of their endowed donor status, to have unspecified seats in the section that includes their current location, Prime West Club, over the remaining term of the endowment, using defendants figures, is about $30,000. Defendant has further announced that it will determine on January 15, 2015 each members priority point total. It will then allow those persons whose section designations were accepted to select, by section, in order of priority point total, their seats. As a result, assuming plaintiffs were to be among those who are able to designate Prime West Club before it is filled and closed (but which designation would also thereby incur the above-described capital contribution obligations that accompany such designation), if any person who has greater priority points than do plaintiffs as of January 15, 2015 selects plaintiffs current seat location, plaintiffs would be denied the opportunity to select those seats and would be left to select from whatever seats remain in the section when it would be their turn to select. Moreover, even were plaintiffs to pay the additional, approximately $30,000 in capital campaign and annual seat contributions, they could still end up on the 5 yard line on the back row of the section. Defendants proposed reseating process, as above described, violates the contract defendant entered with plaintiffs.

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Wrongful denial of parking benefit. After their payments, and consistent with defendants representations about the nature and location of their endowed best available parking benefit, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos for a number of years beginning in 1995 received parking passes in the Endowed Parking lot immediately behind the Kyle Field south end zone scoreboard. This was the best available parking, as defendant had represented, because of its proximity to game day activities and tailgating capability. After several years, however, Texas A&M University engaged in construction projects which eliminated the parking area behind the south end zone scoreboard. During this transition period, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos were moved several times from lot to lot, ultimately in 2007 to Lot C. At that time, Lot C, because of its proximity to game day activities and tailgating capability, was considered to be the best parking then available. In 2008, however, defendant changed plaintiffs parking assignment again, this time to Lot D, a much less desirable location because, as a multilevel parking garage, it does not provide tailgating (which is prohibited there) and socializing opportunities. After that, defendant informed them that Lot H would become the new Endowed Parking area. Lot H is even worse: it is many times the distance of the original parking location, the Corps of Cadets does not parade there, nor does the band lead the football team to Kyle Field

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through that area, unlike the previous parking location that had been represented to and, for a number of years, provided to Mr. and Mrs. Tullos. Mr. and Mrs. Tullos then learned that defendant had created the Aggie Access Priority Point Program. Designed to increase defendants revenue, this system, when applied to endowed donors, takes best available parking privileges previously sold to endowed donors and resells them to those who pay the most money to defendant. Essentially, defendant is doubleselling its parking privileges: endowed (best available) parking privileges were first sold to donors like Mr. and Mrs. Tullos; but now, because parking immediately adjacent to the stadium is scarcer, defendant has required, and persists in attempting to require, endowed donors like Mr. and Mrs. Tullos to contribute still more money simply to maintain what was previously sold to them. Based upon current trends, the value of this denied benefit could amount to one hundred thousand dollars or more. Plaintiffs promptly appealed their 2008 parking assignment; their appeal was initially ignored. When it did address the appeal, defendant failed to adjudicate plaintiffs appeal in a good faith, commercially reasonable manner. Defendant conducted no investigation. Instead, defendant

summarily denied the appeal, citing no basis in law or fact for its decision. In 2011, defendant, using the Aggie Access Priority Point Program, again assigned plaintiffs parking to Lot D, where tailgating is actually prohibited and socializing is impractical. This was another breach of its

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obligation. Again, plaintiffs appealed. Plaintiffs sought to resolve this breach amicably and privately. Their efforts included, but were not limited to,

submitting, after being solicited to do so, written evidence signed by defendants former employee (among other things) supportive of their position. Defendant wholly ignored such evidence and refused to assure

plaintiffs that it would continue to perform all its obligations under the endowment agreement. Such refusal was knowing, intentional, in bad faith, and in disregard of its contractual obligations and its obligation to treat its members in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. In 2012, defendant, despite plaintiffs repeated written request (again supported by written evidence corroborating plaintiffs statement, and again wholly ignored), again assigned plaintiffs parking to an inferior location, viz., Lot H. Defendant did so intentionally, knowingly, in bad faith, and in

disregard of its obligations under the endowment agreement and its obligations to treat its members in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. Defendant has known, at least since 2011, that its own former employees have either confirmed, not denied, or both, endowed donors statements that, at the time some endowment agreements were made, best available parking had been promised to prospective endowed donors. Despite such actual knowledge, defendant has knowingly, intentionally and in bad faith persisted in denying best available parking benefits to endowed

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donors such as plaintiffs, opting instead to continue applying the Priority Point Program to such persons, all as a means of increasing its revenue. Wrongful imposition of parking fee. From 1995 through 2006, plaintiffs received parking passes without defendants attempting to charge any additional sum. Beginning in 2007, however, without any contractual authority, defendant, acting unilaterally, has charged plaintiffs an additional Parking Fee in its annual ticket and parking application. Plaintiffs objected in writing in 2012 and 2013, reminding defendant of its contractual obligations. Defendant ignored plaintiffs written objections. It did not deny the basis for plaintiffs assertion of its contractual rights; it did not even acknowledge receipt of plaintiffs letter. Instead, although having plaintiffs unrebutted statements that defendant had represented that the endowment benefits would be received without necessity to pay anything additional, defendant required, and continues to require, plaintiffs to pay such fee (in 2013, $120) to obtain their parking benefits. Requiring payment of such charge is a further, knowing and bad faith violation of defendants contractual obligations and its obligation to deal in good faith with its members.

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Wrongful denial of road game ticket benefit. Defendant also determined to use the Aggie Access Priority Point Program to allocate its members ability to purchase tickets available for away football games, without excepting from the application of such program those persons, such as endowed donors, who have pre-existing contractual rights to purchase away game tickets. Defendants applying such program to plaintiffs effectively has deprived plaintiffs of another contractual right that they purchased in 1994, since to qualify under the priority point system for eligibility to purchase some away game tickets would require plaintiffs to pay defendant additional money. In doing so, defendant is double-selling (to

persons who have purchased more priority points from defendant) benefits previously sold to plaintiffs, knowingly and intentionally breaching its contract with plaintiffs. Indeed, in 2013 defendant is using the priority point system in an attempt to deny plaintiffs their right to purchase tickets to the Texas A&M LSU football game scheduled to occur Nov. 23, 2013 in Baton Rouge, LA. More specifically, plaintiffs, adhering to all procedures established by defendant for ordering away game tickets for the game in question, in March 2013 timely submitted their application and tendered payment. Defendant received and accepted such application and payment. In June 2013,

defendant notified plaintiffs that their application had been denied, claiming plaintiffs to have been not eligible to purchase tickets due to their

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insufficient priority point total.

This denial occurred despite defendants

actual knowledge that plaintiffs, as endowed donors in good standing with defendant, had purchased from defendant in 1994 (twelve years before defendant established the Aggie Access Priority Point Program) the express right to purchase 2 endowed football season tickets for home and road games for a period of 30 years. Additionally, defendant, when accepting away game ticket requests from endowed donors, has refused, and continues to refuse, to designate an endowed seating area at away games from among those tickets allocated by host schools so that endowed donors would receive preferred seating commensurate with their endowed donor status. This, again, violates the endowment agreement. Misrepresentation. Since 2008, defendant has, in its mailings, literature and application forms, consistently misrepresented to plaintiffs (and to other similarly situated endowed donors) that competing in the Aggie Access Priority Point Program (paying defendant more money to purchase additional priority points in an opaque effort to outbid other members) is the only means by which they can qualify for eligibility to purchase tickets for away football games (either at all or in an endowed seating area). Defendant has engaged in such deception for the purpose of increasing its revenue and knowing, inter alia, that some endowment agreements (like that of plaintiffs) expressly

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provide that endowed donors benefits include the right (not conditioned on priority point totals) to purchase season tickets in an endowed seating area for home and road games. Further, defendant has, in its mailings, literature and application forms, consistently misrepresented to plaintiffs (and to other endowed donors who were promised best available parking) that competing in the Aggie Access Priority Point Program (again, paying defendant more money to purchase additional priority points in an opaque effort to outbid other members) is the only means by which they can qualify for eligibility to obtain the best available parking at home games. Defendant has engaged in such deception for the purpose of increasing its revenue. It has done so despite knowing that some endowed donors claim to have been told by defendants former employees at the time of endowment that their endowed parking benefit would consist of the best available parking, which claims have been either confirmed or not denied, or both, by defendants former employees. Denial of member access to information/false claims of transparency. Still fu rther, in September 2011, and well before commencing this litigation, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos, exercising their rights as Foundation members in good standing pursuant to a specific provision of defendants bylaws, made a written request to the Foundation to allow them to inspect and copy certain Foundation records. Defendant ignored plaintiffs request, failing even to reply. Such conduct violated defendants bylaws and

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defendants duty to treat its members in a commercially reasonable manner and in accordance with its bylaws. Ironically, defendants various mailings to endowed donors regarding the Priority Point Program and Redevelopment of Kyle Field, among others, have made the self-serving claim that defendant operates with transparency. Such claims are false, misleading and deceptive. Defendants foregoing actions and omissions violate the terms of plaintiffs agreement with defendant, and of defendants duty to its members. Defendants breach of its agreement, its misrepresentations, and its bad faith, have been a producing cause of continuing damages suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Tullos. V. C AU SE S O F ACT IO N : BREAC H O F CO N T RACT , MI S RE P RES EN T AT I O N , BAD F AIT H Defendant made representations to Mr. and Mrs. Tullos concerning the rights and benefits they would enjoy as a result of entering the Texas A&M University 12th Man Foundation Permanently Endowed Scholarship Program. In reliance upon those representations, Mr. and Mrs. Tullos entered an agreement, paid the amounts due, and signed a writing. Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to honor the terms of that agreement. Defendant has further made repeated, knowing misrepresentations, and acted in bad faith, all as enumerated above. Mr. and

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Mrs. Tullos are entitled to recover their actual damages, specific performance and to receive the benefit of the bargain. In addition, plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees. The sum of plaintiffs damages is within the jurisdictional limits of the Court. VI. TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Defendants actions in June 2013 relating to their denial of plaintiffs right to purchase tickets to the 2013 Texas A&M - LSU game and the commencement of the Kyle Field reseating process will additionally cause probable, imminent and irreparable injury to plaintiffs. Accordingly,

injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the status quo and to prevent probable, imminent and irreparable injury. Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Temporary Injunction and incorporate same herein by reference as though fully set forth. Regarding the LSU game tickets, plaintiffs have demonstrated a cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiffs also have demonstrated a probable right to the relief sought, with defendant having not even asserted in this suit a valid defense to plaintiffs long-standing claims herein regarding plaintiffs right to purchase away game tickets. Finally, plaintiffs have

demonstrated that injury is probable (certain, actually), imminent (defendant says it will ship tickets in August), and irreparable (game experience, sitting among other Aggies, is unique, and it cannot be compensated adequately in

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damages, or damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard). See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). Unless ordered by the court to set aside two tickets in an endowed seating area from among the ticket allotment Texas A&M receives from LSU, and to sell those tickets at face value to plaintiffs, defendants planned sale of LSU game tickets to its other members, but not to plaintiffs, will occur before this matter can be tried, final judgment entered and any appeals exhausted. Regarding the Kyle Field reseating process, plaintiffs have

demonstrated a cause of action for breach of contract.

They also have

demonstrated a probable right to the relief sought, as defendant, acting without any contractual authority, is unilaterally attempting to extract additional, substantial money from plaintiffs simply for the ability to enforce their contractual rights to their seating. Finally, they have demonstrated that injury is probable (defendant has persisted in applying the process to plaintiffs), imminent (the designation process begins in July 2013), and irreparable because, by the time this litigation concludes, designations for Prime West Club seating allocations will have occurred, and, when that section is fully designated (and payments for same begun), all seat allocations therein will be taken, making plaintiffs current seat location unavailable. Were plaintiffs to timely designate in that section before it fills and closes (and have to pay additional sums, as explained above), still, because of the opaque and indeterminate nature of the Priority Point Program, it would be

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impossible for plaintiffs to know how many additional priority points they would have to also purchase in order to have the highest point total of all persons designating in that section. As a practical matter, plaintiffs would lose their seat location. Unless ordered by the court to set aside and preserve tickets from the upcoming reseating process for the redeveloped Kyle Field and that are equivalent to section 204, row 11, seats 8 and 9, for the 2015-2024 football seasons, defendants plan to commence the reseating process in July 2013 will make plaintiffs current seat location unavailable before this matter can be tried, final judgment entered and any appeals exhausted. VII. AT T O RN EY S F EES As a result of defendants breaches of its agreement and

misrepresentations, it became necessary for Mr. and Mrs. Tullos to retain attorneys to investigate, present and litigate their claims. Accordingly, in addition to their actual damages, plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees from defendant. VIII. RU L E 5 4 Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs aver that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred, and

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that every notice required by law to be given has been properly and timely given. IX. P RES ERVAT I O N O F EVI D EN C E Plaintiffs hereby request and demand that defendant preserve and maintain all evidence pertaining to any claim or defense related to the incident made the basis of this lawsuit, or the damages resulting therefrom, including contracts, lists of donors, email, minutes of meetings, memoranda, correspondence, financial records, diagrams, maps, photographs, videotapes, audiotapes, recordings, invoices, checks, files, facsimiles, voice mail, text messages, calendar entries, log books, or information related to the reference claim. Failure to maintain such items will constitute a spoliation of the evidence. X. R EQ U EST FO R DI SCL O SU RE Pursuant to Rule 194.1 et seq. of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs hereby request defendant to disclose (including, but not limited to, supplementation of prior disclosures) the information or material described in Rule 194.2(a) through Rule 194.2(l) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit: 1. Rule 194.2(a): The correct names of the parties to the lawsuit;

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2. 3.

Rule 194.2(b): Rule 194.2(c):

The name, address, and telephone number of any potential parties; The legal theories and, in general, the factual bases of the responding partys claims or defenses; The amount and any method of calculating economic damages; The name, address, and telephone number of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, and a brief statement of each identified persons connection with the case; For any testifying expert: (1) (2) (3) The experts name, telephone number; address, and

4. 5.

Rule 194.2(d): Rule 194.2(e):

6.

Rule 194.2(f):

The subject matter on which the expert will testify; The general substance of the experts mental impressions and opinions and a brief summary of the basis for them, or if the expert is not retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to the control of the responding party, documents reflecting such information; If the expert is retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to the control of the responding party: A. All documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data compilations that have been provided to, reviewed by, or prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of the experts testimony; and

(4)

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B. 7. 8. 9. 10. Rule 194.2(g): Rule 194.2(h): Rule 194.2(i): Rule 194.2(j):

The experts current resume and bibliography;

Any discoverable indemnity and insuring agreements; Any discoverable settlement agreements; Any discoverable witness statements; and All medical records and bills that are reasonably related to the injuries or damages asserted; All medical records and bills obtained by you by virtue of an authorization furnished by any plaintiff to this lawsuit; The name, address, and telephone number of any person who may be designated as a responsible third party.

11.

Rule 194.2(k):

12.

Rule 194.2(l):

Pursuant to Rule 192.3(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the responses to this request for disclosure upon defendant shall be due 30 days after the service of this request upon defendant. Wherefore, premises considered, plaintiffs pray that defendant be cited to appear and answer herein, and that upon final trial plaintiffs have and recover from defendant their actual damages in a sum within the jurisdictional limits of the Court, injunctive relief, attorneys fees, prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, costs of Court, and such other and further relief, at law and in equity, to which plaintiffs may be justly entitled.

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Respectfully submitted, ABRAHAM, WATKINS, NICHOLS, SORRELS, AGOSTO & FRIEND Randall O. Sorrels Texas Bar Number: 18855350 Clyde J. Jay Jackson, III Texas Bar Number: 10502500 800 Commerce Street Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone: (713) 222-7211 Telecopier: (713) 225-0827 MCQUARRIE LAW OFFICE

By: ________________________________ Claude M. McQuarrie III Texas Bar Number: 13849550 20887 Sweetglen Drive Porter, Texas 77365 Telephone: (281) 354-2417 Telecopier: (281) 354-2417 AT T O RN EY S F O R P L AI N TI F F S

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V E RIF I CAT I O N STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF _________

BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public, appeared TOM G. TULLOS, whose identity is known to me and who upon being duly sworn deposed and said: My name is Tom G. Tullos. I am over the age of eighteen and of sound mind, and I am fully competent to make this affidavit. All facts stated herein are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct. I am a plaintiff in the above-styled lawsuit. I have read the forgoing Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Original Petition. The facts are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct. Further affiant sayeth not. Tom G. Tullos, Affiant SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN, BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public, on this day of July, 2013. SEAL: Notary Public, State of Texas

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C E R T I F I CA T E

OF

S ER V IC E

This will certify that a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Original Petition has been furnished to the following on this ____ day of July, 2013 via certified mail/return receipt requested, hand-delivery, email, or telephonic document transfer: Mr. Otway Denny Mr. Randall S. Richardson FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, L.L.P. 1301 McKinney, Suite 5100 Houston, Texas 77010 Telephone: (713) 651-5100 Telecopier: (713) 651-5246

Attorneys for Defendant

___________________________________ Claude M. McQuarrie III

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