CCTV Pilot Project Evaluation Report

Prepared for: Staff Superintendent Jeff McGuire Prepared by: Detective Sergeant Mark Barkley

CONTENTS

Introduction . 3 EXTERNAL EVALUATION 9 - 32 Canadian Police Research Centres Final Report . 9 INTERNAL EVALUATION. 33 - 111 31 Division Jane and Finch . 33

42 Division Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate 49 42 Division Tapscott and Neilson 65 52 Division Real-Time Monitoring in The Entertainment District ... 80 52 Division The Entertainment District 95

Introduction
In January 2006, the Toronto Police Service commenced research into the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in public spaces to reduce crime and increase community safety. The research culminated in a contract with the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCCS), which provided $2 million to conduct a pilot project. In researching CCTV, the project team reviewed articles from domestic and international sources including, but not restricted to: the United Kingdom Home Office, United Kingdom Information Commissioner, United States Department of Justice, Australia, New Zealand, Privacy International, Surveillance and Society, City of Toronto, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and applicable case law. The CCTV funding proposal to the MCCS was predicated upon implementing a pilot project based on the best practices and information drawn from this wide array of reference material. International and domestic research provided a broad perspective of the challenges, opportunities, risks and results; however, the project team needed to hear from the most important source, that being the citizens of Toronto. To this end, nine public consultation meetings were held across the City during February 2007. The results of the consultations and opinion surveys were reported to the Toronto Police Services Board on March 22, 2007 (Min. No. P102/07 refers). Further deployments into 51 and 14 Divisions followed the process of predeployment public consultation. Upon the completion of the deployments, Auxiliary Police Officers conducted door to door public opinion surveys in the immediate deployment areas. The project team engaged the respective communities as directly as possible in the pilot. As previously reported, the surveys reflect high levels of support for the CCTV pilot. It is the intention of the project team to conduct the next series of public meetings in the deployment areas to release the evaluations and receive feedback. This next stage is tentatively set for April 2009. Recognizing the significance of privacy concerns, the CCTV project team initiated liaison with the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC) in August 2006, and has maintained an ongoing relationship since. Representatives of the IPC have escorted the project team on walking tours of the CCTV deployment areas as well as the Video Services Unit to assess the technology and practices employed in the pilot. To date, no report of complaint in relation to the CCTV pilot has been submitted to the TPS. Drawing upon internal experience and best practices from around the world, the CCTV project team issued Request for Proposal (RFP) #1081984-07 CCTV System for Evidence in February 2007. After bid evaluation, Precision Camera Incorporated (PCI) was chosen as the successful vendor. In brief, PCI provided the TPS with camera units capable of pan/tilt/zoom functionality along with heated custom housings to incorporate digital video recorder (DVR) and requisite

management software. Entertainment District.

In April 2007, the first series of cameras were deployed in the

In May 2007, RFP # 1086309-07 was issued for the purchase of a fibre optic integrated connectivity solution that would allow for the transmission of video from the Entertainment District to the Video Services Unit. The RFP specified that the Toronto Police Service, sought an integrated solutions provider to design, install and manage modern dark fibre and point to point optical transmission (not networked) technologies to distribute real time, full period (24/7), uncompressed NTSC video and audio, and Ethernet (Triple Play) services. The designed system was to be capable of rapid deployment and integration into existing camera enclosures allowing for re-deployment of equipment as deemed necessary. This stipulation resulted in efficiencies realized later in the project through re-deployment of assets. An assessment of video retrieval from pole mounted DVRs identified a significant cost in resource time and lost productivity. This manual process encumbered both a video technician and a TPS vehicle for several hours per download request in addition to video processing and disclosure preparation time. The use of dedicated fibre optic transport of video direct to the Video Services Unit has provided security, efficiency and optimal image quality, the latter being critically important for evidentiary video. In determining the specifications for video transport mechanism, the project team reviewed the operational and legal challenges associated with use of video compression or decompression technologies and IP based transport for evidentiary video. Such compression processes would give rise to court challenge as to what effect, if any, such technology had on the video image. Failure to address any such concern could result in the dismissal of evidence. Therefore, the project team decided upon transmission of uncompressed video as a means of risk mitigation. Further, the use of point to point fibre optic cable has provided enhanced security and protection of privacy in keeping with the IPC guidelines. The acquisition of a TPS owned re-deployable fibre infrastructure permitted the project team to deploy CCTV in two additional areas at a fraction of the cost of the initial set-up in the Entertainment District. Leveraging these assets, the CCTV project team ensured that the path of the fibre infrastructure allowed for connection of CCTV cameras on Yonge Street to support operational deployments as necessary and approved by Command. The result was significant cost avoidance for the 2008 Caribana Festival. This cost avoidance is ongoing hereafter. The project team worked with counterparts in the City of Toronto and the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) to identify areas of efficiency resulting in cost avoidance and broader connectivity. This resulted in the ability to route CCTV feeds directly to the Communications Centre and the Police Command Centre at 703 Don Mills Road, and to the back-up TPS Communications Centre at 4330 Dufferin Street to support live monitoring of CCTV feeds where operationally justified and approved by Command. The TPS is far better positioned to respond to natural and human initiated disasters as a result of this forward thinking and asset leveraging. The video surveillance guidelines issued by the IPC, and adopted for operational governance of the CCTV pilot, speak to the need for verifiable statistical data to support deployment of CCTV cameras into public spaces. The Crime Information and Analysis Unit (CIAU) provided support

to the CCTV pilot project. Cognizant of the significance of statistical data and spatial analysis to the success of the pilot, the project team engaged the CIAU as the sole entity for information analysis. The deployment areas were carefully selected through comprehensive analysis of violent calls for service over a period of several years. Ms. Kristi Tayles, M.S.A., is the lead analyst for the CCTV pilot. Ms. Tayles holds a Masters degree in spatial analysis, and this skill set proved invaluable. During the term of the CCTV pilot, the Toronto Police crime database was not geo-coded and therefore unavailable for use in area selection. Alternatively, the geo-coded Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) database was utilized to identify areas of consistent high rates of calls for service involving violence. As noted in the internal evaluations, the calls for service examined include incidents such as shootings, homicides, sexual assaults, and weapons offences. CIAU utilized scientific methodologies in providing the project team with areas for consideration. Consultation with Divisional Unit Commanders along with their respective Crime Analysts and Community Response Units, resulted in deployment locations being identified that met the statistical requirements and offered a geographical diversity for evaluation. Public meetings were held in the identified area to discuss the crime issue and potential use of CCTV. Representatives of the applicable division and the CCTV project team conducted site inspections to assess privacy impacts, camera installation and video transport options. As a result of implementing this business model, CCTV cameras were deployed in 14, 31, 42, 51 and 52 (Entertainment District) Divisions. Further, utilizing temporal analysis of CAD data, the TPS conducted a study of live monitoring of CCTV. The live monitoring study employed all safeguards necessary to ensure the integrity of operations and prevent inappropriate use. As detailed in the internal evaluation on live monitoring in the Entertainment District, temporal analysis determined that the majority of calls for service categorized as violent occurred during the late evening to early morning hours of Friday and Saturday nights. The CCTV deployments, other than in the Entertainment District, were for a period of six months. At this time, CCTV cameras remain installed for operational purposes in the Entertainment District, and on Yonge Street, between Dundas Street and Gerrard Street, providing ongoing operational support to the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy. At the conclusion of the pilot, the CIAU prepared comprehensive evaluations for each of the deployment areas. Further, the Canadian Police Research Centre (CPRC), through Executive Director Steve Palmer, was commissioned to provide an independent evaluation of the effect of CCTV. The CPRC is a program with Defence Research and Development Canada, Centre for Security Science (CSS). The report from Doctor Simona Verga and Doctor Allan Douglas of the CSS is included in this report. The evaluations focused on reduction, displacement and evidentiary value. It should be noted that CPRC evaluations do not include 14 Division, and CIAU evaluations do not include 14 and 51 Divisions. These evaluations will be completed by the end of June 2009. In brief, the external evaluation found that the level of crime decreased in three of the five deployment areas; however, as noted in the table below, there are some differences in reported results between the internal and external evaluations.

Deployment Area 31 Division

42 Division A Victoria Park and Morecambe Gate 42 Division B Neilson Road and Sewells Road 51 Division

Internal Evaluation Result Overall reduction, but most serious offences not effected Overall reduction Overall reduction Internal evaluation yet to be completed Possible reduction in most serious offences Unable to determine effect.

CPRC Result Overall reduction

No effect Overall reduction No effect

52 Division

Overall reduction Not included in report

52 Division Live Monitoring

The summary table is absent the detailed context found in the evaluations. Each deployment evaluation must be read in its entirety for an understanding of the complexity of analyzing a CCTV project. This complexity and general findings are consistent with international research in this area. The internal and external evaluations share common conclusions that further analysis is necessary and isolating the statistical significance of CCTV in any environment may not be possible. Operational guidelines, legislation and resource availability preclude randomized testing of effectiveness, and other such approaches required to meet significance standards on a scientific methods scale. Accounting for other policing activities, changes in commercial industry operations, road closures, lighting and other such factors is extremely difficult without allocation of dedicated resources. Aside from the challenges of statistical significance, the operational evidentiary value was upheld. Investigators utilized CCTV video to support a myriad of criminal investigations ranging from assaults to homicide. In another incident, CCTV footage allowed for the exoneration of TPS personnel in a matter under review by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). In his letter to the TPS, Mr. James Cornish, SIU Director, stated that the allegation was in many ways refuted by security video camera footage. The CPRC report recommends that the future deployments be of a minimum one-year duration and broader in scope to allow for greater statistical analysis. Further, the CPRC identified the need for dedicated analytical support from project design through to concluding evaluations. While the CIAU provided outstanding support, such was infrequent and constantly under competing priority assessment. The project would have benefitted from the assignment of a dedicated analyst with expertise in spatial analysis. Should the use of public space CCTV

continue, this dedicated analyst would be responsible for identification of potential deployment areas, evaluation of operational plans, ongoing statistical monitoring, and production of analytical reports. The analyst would address some of the statistical challenges and improve target identification by: Developing a vulnerability index using all facets of socio-economic and demographic data, violent Calls for Service, and geo-coded crime data to assist in deployment area identification and baseline development Tracking all other policing initiatives engaged in the areas, comparative to immediate surroundings and other control areas Utilizing Automated Vehicle Locating System data to perform patrol pattern analysis in the deployment areas before, during and after to control for statistical effect Providing comprehensive analysis of other data sets in relation to the deployments, including community surveys, and integrating all data into a broader and more scientifically significant analysis of CCTV

As noted in the internal evaluations, CCTV video has played a role in a number of investigations. Video showing the commission of the offence is often the best evidence and can on its own, establish the guilt of an accused. The Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Nikolovski (1996) 111 C.C.C. (3d) 403 (S.C.C.) addressed this best evidence value. The Honourable Justice J. Cory, writing for the majority, with respect to the use that can be made of photographic and video evidence, commented that: Once it is established that a videotape has not been altered or changed, and that it depicts the scene of a crime, then it becomes admissible and relevant evidence. Not only is the tape (or photograph) real evidence in the sense that that term has been used in earlier cases, but it is to a certain extent, testimonial evidence as well. It can and should be used by a trier of fact in determining whether a crime has been committed and whether the accused before the court committed the crime. It may indeed be a silent, trustworthy, unemotional, unbiased and accurate witness who has complete and instant recall of events. It may provide such strong and convincing evidence that of itself it will demonstrate clearly either the innocence or guilt of the accused. The above comment is not a blanket endorsement of CCTV use, rather a statement on the value of video evidence. The governance framework for judicious use of CCTV in the public space combined with the best possible video technology lends to the initial admissibility of the footage and end-points comments such as that from the Supreme Court of Canada. Inappropriate use and/or questionable technology would certainly result in a far different perspective from the courts. Therefore, it is imperative that the technological approach and governance model utilized to date in the TPS CCTV pilot be formally adopted into policy and procedure. Such ensures the integrity of operations and video related thereto. An exhaustive analysis of the evidentiary value of CCTV is not required. Practical experience and comments such as that of the Supreme Court of Canada stand in support. The question

becomes one of how to extract the best possible value from the use of the CCTV. Cameras deployed for the pilot were on a programmable tour. This allowed for area coverage without saturating a neighbourhood with cameras. While this strategy leveraged minimal asset deployment for optimal coverage, it arguably lessened the effectiveness of the cameras in recording crimes. Cognizant of the need to maintain proportionality in the use of public space cameras, going forward an increase in the number of cameras deployed would allow for a combination of fixed focus and programmable tour cameras. Such may potentially increase the number of offences capture on video and thus increase the number of crimes solved. Employing the most current scientific methodologies in data analysis at all points in the CCTV operations process, combined with effective governance and the highest technological standards are critical to any further use of public space CCTV. Therefore, having consideration for these key points and the evaluation results, it is recommended that the TPS continue to operate CCTV public space cameras. As outlined in this document, CCTV has the potential to assist the TPS in reducing crime and apprehending offenders. The existing business model is effective in safeguarding against abuse, adhering to privacy guidelines and utilizes high-grade technology to produce the finest standard of evidentiary quality video. CCTV is an additional tool to support policing operations. The TPS has sufficient equipment at this time to continue deployments as established in the business model, and cognizant of the recommendation from the CPRC, extending those deployments to one-year periods for optimal analytical value. Whether CCTV be used in longer-term deployments or in short-term response to mass events, planned or otherwise, there is no question that video is an effective mechanism to record events and support operations.

INITIAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT SURVEILLANCE ON RATES OF CRIME

by Dr. S. L. Verga and Dr. A. J. Douglas

Working Paper TPS1

CLOSED CIRCULATION This report is based upon operational information from the Toronto Police Service. Neither its contents, in whole or in part, nor knowledge of its existence, shall be given to any person without the prior approval of the Chief of the Toronto Police Service or his delegate, with the sole exception of use within the Centre for Security Science where distribution will be controlled by the Manager of the Operational Research Team.

Operational Research Team Centre for Security Science Defence Research and Development Canada

OTTAWA, CANADA

2 DECEMBER 2008

INTRODUCTION Background The Toronto Police Force has commissioned Canadian Police Research Centre (CPRC) to perform an independent Program Impact Review (PIR) focusing on results from the Toronto Police Service (TPS) Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) pilot initiative. Over the period May 2007 to Oct. 2008 they installed CCTV cameras in a number of areas for periods of time between six months and one year; these installations are described in Annex A. Data are available from the TPS calls-for-service (CFS) database on the numbers of various crimes committed, along with their dates, times, locations and types of crime; a detailed description of the database can be found in the CCTV Evaluation Project charter (Ref. 1) and is summarized in Annex B. CPRC has requested the assistance of the Operational Research Team in the Centre for Security Science to perform the analysis of these data, with the emphasis on applicable statistical techniques, and to assess thereby the effectiveness of surveillance cameras in reducing crime. Purpose This working paper provides a preliminary report on the analysis conducted up to November 28, 2008. It provides the results of the application of standard, and fairly simple, statistical techniques to address some of the questions posed in the design of the pilot project, described in the Project charter (Ref. 1). Scope This working paper addresses only those questions in Ref 1 related to crime reduction in the targeted areas and diffusion of benefits beyond the targeted areas; some general considerations about displacement and dispersion are also discussed. Because of unresolved issues about the data available, lack of capacity and lack of time, addressing the other questions in Ref. 1 (e.g., community impact and perceptions of safety, and unexpected external changes that may have influenced the outcome) has been deferred. This is a preliminary report based on standard statistical techniques that could be brought to bear in the time available. The authors have confidence in these results; however, there remains a small possibility that more detailed analysis using more refined techniques might lead to their modification. This working paper is advisory only.

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DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AVAILABLE Data Provided The data were provided by the Toronto Police Service in two lots: An ACCESS database of incidents in the period 1 Jan 1995 to 26 Aug 2008, inclusive; and An EXCEL spreadsheet of locations of surveillance cameras.

Data Reconciliation The ACCESS database was received on a CD, from which back-up and working copies were made. The map location of each incident was given in an easting and a northing, i.e. in units of metres from the zero point for the grid zone for Toronto. See Ref. 2 for details of this system. For each descriptive location, such as 2739 VICTORIA PARK AVE, the grid locations were exactly the same throughout the database; this supports the inference that the grid references were consistently copied from some central standard for each descriptive location, instead of being measured for each incident. The imprecision introduced by this practice could not be assessed. The EXCEL spreadsheet was received by e-mail. The map location of each camera was given in coordinates from GPS measurements, in degrees and minutes of angle, with the minutes specified to three decimal places. The angular locations were converted to grid references using two different programs from the internet; these yielded consistent results for their conversions. The descriptive locations of camera locations and of incident locations were then compared. The eastings for the camera locations were, with two exceptions, less than 28 metres smaller than the eastings for the incident locations. The northings for the camera locations were, with one exception, between 205 and 261 metres smaller than the northings for the incident locations. Assessment of the Results of the Reconciliation While unknown, the imprecision arising from the use of standard locations for incidents, instead of measured locations for each incident, is unlikely to exceed the discrepancies found between the two systems of measurement the eastings and northings recorded for the incidents and the angular references of the GPS reading for the camera locations. Because of these inexactitudes, the determination, for each incident, of its location within or without a surveilled area often cannot be done with certainty. The areas used for the statistical analysis are therefore areas that can be specified readily in the database of incidents and that are approximations to the areas of surveillance. For the purposes of this trial, perpetrators are unlikely to know the surveilled areas more precisely than that.

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METHOD OF ANALYSIS Selection of Data The first step in the analysis was to define "target areas" and select all the incidents in those areas before, during and after the implementation of the CCTV camera systems. The cameras were on a 360 degree programmed tour, and they were designed to zoom in and out as they sweep areas of particular importance. The cameras were positioned to cover areas within 100 - 200 metres from their location. Target areas were given by the overlapping coverage of a cluster of cameras installed at the same general location. Buffer areas are areas directly adjacent to target areas, obtained by extending a further 200 metres beyond the boundaries of each target area. Boundaries for both target and buffer areas were chosen with factors such as major roads, natural boundaries and other topographical features in mind. More details about boundary selection and calculations involved are presented in Appendix C. For the entertainment district (Divisions 52) and Division 51 the authors tried their best to select control areas that were similar to the targeted areas. Control areas were selected in the same general zone and with as similar features to the targeted areas as possible. In a truly randomized experiment, a number of areas with similar attributes (e.g., general location, physical features, and crime levels) are identified beforehand, and the systems whose impact one wants to evaluate are assigned randomly to some of the identified areas. This was not the case with the current project, and because of significant limitations in control area selection, the authors decided to compare any effects on crime that the implementation of CCTV systems might have had in the target areas with the crime records for the whole city, as the level of crime in the city seems to have been fairly constant over the period of time for which records exist (1995-2008). In order to assess the impact of CCTV system implementation, the authors have looked at levels of crime in the selected areas during the implementation period and during the same time period in each of years with records prior to the implementation. For example, if the pilot project ran from May to November 2007, the analysts calculated summary statistics for the implementation period and for the period May to November 2006, and looked at time series for the months from May to November each year since the records started until implementation (1995 to 2007). This data selection attempts to eliminate any seasonal effects that might alter the conclusions (e.g., the number of crime during the winter months might be different than the number of crimes during the summer months). Ideally, one would prefer to have data for a full year after implementation and at least a full year before. However, in only one of the areas evaluated was the CCTV system kept for a full year, while in an additional area the system was operational for seven months and for the remaining areas the cameras were installed for a period of six months.

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ANALYSIS OF DATA Summary Statistics For each target area considered, the authors calculated summary statistics the total and the average monthly number of recorded incidents and associated standard deviation for the selected areas during the implementation period and during the selected period before implementation (as discussed in the previous section). Simple percentage changes in the average monthly number of incidents before/after implementation were calculated, with positive values indicating a decrease in crime after implementation (desired effect) and negative values indicating the opposite effect (a value of zero indicating unchanged level of crime). To determine whether any observed changes are statistically significant, the authors have calculated the relative effect size (RES) between the number of recorded offences in the target areas and buffer areas, control areas (where identified) and citywide. This calculation measures the effect of the intervention in the target area and is based upon the odds ratio (sometimes also called a contingency table Ref. 3). Values of the RES over one indicate a relative decrease in crime levels in the target area compared with the buffer, control area or citywide, respectively. To test the significance of the RES values and construct confidence intervals, the authors have also calculated the associated standard error. The authors have used 95% confidence intervals to assess statistical significance. While one might be tempted to accept a weaker confidence level, the authors have decided that weaker levels might lead to conclusions based on findings that could plausible have arisen by chance, especially given the lack of true randomization in the experimental setup. In calculating RES values and the associated standard errors, the authors have followed the techniques described in Ref. 4, including adjusting the calculations to account for temporal fluctuations in the variance of monthly records of crimes. Time Series A second technique used in the analysis was based on time series. For this part, the number of incidents in each target area during the implementation months (see discussion in previous section) for all years with records was plotted over time. For each target area, it was possible to identify temporal trends in the data before implementation and use regression techniques to predict values for the implementation period if no CCTV system had been implemented. Predicted values for the number of incidents and calculated 95% confidence intervals were compared with data after CCTV system implementation. The results of the comparison enabled the authors to assess the effects of implementation without worrying about possible effects of other confounding factors that might have had an effect during the implementation period.

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RESULTS OF ANALYSIS Entertainment District Division 52 Target area: Pearl Street, east of Duncan Street Duncan Street/Adelaide Street West Duncan Street/Richmond Street West Richmond Street West, east of Duncan Street Richmond Street West /Widmer Street Richmond Street West / Peter Street Adelaide Street West/Peter Street Richmond Street West /John Street Implementation period: 01/05/2007-31/04/2008 Summary Statistics
No. incidents before Target area 853 Buffer area Control area Citywide 475 363 51037 Area No. incidents after 765 411 329 51494 % change Relative Efect Size (RES) 0.96 1.01 1.13 RES Lower RES Upper Statistical limit (95%) limit (95%) significance 0.74 0.75 0.95 1.19 1.27 1.30 NS NS NS

10% 13% 9% -1%

Table 1: Summary statistics for Entertainment District Div. 52

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Time
1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
M a M y1 a 99 M y 1 5a 99 A M y 1 6- pri a 99 A l M y 1 7- pri 199 a 99 A l 6 M y 1 8- pri 199 a 99 A l 1 7 M y 2 9- pri 99 a 00 A l 8 M y 2 0- pri 199 a 00 A l 2 9 M y 2 1- pri 00 a 00 A l 0 M y 2 2- pri 200 a 00 A l 1 M y 2 3- pri 200 a 00 A l 2 M y 2 4- pri 200 a 00 A l 3 M y 2 5- pri 200 ay 00 A l 2 4 20 6- pril 00 07 A p 20 5 - A ril 06 pr 200 il 2 7 00 8
After CCTV Implementation Before CCTV implementation Predicted, if no CCTV implementation Linear (Before CCTV implementation)

Series Figure 1: Time series for Entertainment District Div. 52

No. incidents Predicted value, if Lower limit after no implementation (95%) implementation 765 879 801 Upper limit (95%) 957 Observed effect Reduction

Table 2: Regression results based on time series for Entertainment District Div. 52 Division 51 Target area: Dundas Street/George Street Gerrard Street/George Street Pembroke Street/Dundas Street Dundas Street/Sherbourne Street East Dundas Street/Sherbourne Street West Sherbourne Street/Shutter Street Queen Street/Sherbourne Street Implementation period: 01/11/2007-31/04/2008

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Summary Statistics
No. incidents before Target area 475 Buffer area 384 Control area 178 Citywide 23137 Area No. incidents after 471 385 151 23834 % change Relative Efect Size (RES) 1.01 0.86 1.04 RES Lower RES Upper Statistical limit (95%) limit (95%) significance 0.71 0.56 0.79 1.31 1.15 1.29 NS NS NS

1% 0% 15% -3%

Table 3: Summary statistics for Target Area Div. 51 Time Series

600 500 400 300 200 100 0
N o N v1 o 9 N v 1 9 5ov 99 A N 19 6- pri l o 9 A 1 N v 1 7- pri l 99 o 9 A 1 6 N v 1 9 8- pri l 99 o 9 A 1 7 N v 2 9 9- pri 99 o 0 A l 8 N v 2 0 0- pri 199 o 0 A l 9 N v 2 0 1- pri 200 o 0 A l 0 N v 2 0 2- pri 200 ov 00 A l 2 1 N 20 3- pri l 00 o 0 A 2 2 N v 2 4- pri l 00 o 0 A 2 3 N v 2 0 5- pri l 00 ov 00 A 2 4 20 6-Apri l 00 0 7 p 20 5 -A ri l 06 pr 20 i l 07 20 08
After CCTV implementation Before CCTV implementation Predicted, if no CCTV implementation Linear (Before CCTV implementation)

Figure 2: Time series for Target Area Div. 51

No. incidents Predicted value, if Lower limit after no implementation (95%) implementation 471 441 396 Upper limit (95%) 486 Observed effect No effect

Table 4: Regression results based on time series for Target Area Div. 51

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North York Division 31 Target area: Jane Street/Finch Avenue West Jane Street/Yorkwood Gate Jane Street/Firgrove Crescent Implementation period: 01/05/2007-31/10/2007 Summary Statistics
No. incidents before Target area 123 Buffer area 104 Citywide 27900 Area No. incidents after 96 94 27660 % change Relative Efect Size (RES) 1.16 1.27 RES Lower RES Upper Statistical limit (95%) limit (95%) significance 0.67 0.92 1.64 1.62 NS NS

22% 10% 1%

Table 5: Summary statistics for North York Div. 31 Time Series

160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
M ay M -N ay o M -N v1 ay o 9 M - N v 1 95 ay o 9 M - N v 1 96 ay o 9 M - N v 1 97 ay o 9 M - N v 1 98 ay o 9 M - N v 2 99 ay o 0 M - N v 2 00 ay o 0 M - N v 2 01 ay o 0 M - N v 2 02 ay o 0 M - N v 2 03 ay o 0 M - N v 2 04 ay o 00 -N v2 5 ov 00 20 6 07
After CCTV Implementation Before CCTV implementation Predicted, if no CCTV implementation Linear (Before CCTV implementation)

Figure 3: Time series for North York Div. 31

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No. incidents Predicted value, if Lower limit after no implementation (95%) implementation 96 135 118

Upper limit (95%) 152

Observed effect Reduction

Table 6: Regression results based on time series for North York Div. 31 Scarborough Division 42 Target area A1: Morcambe Gate/Victoria Park Avenue Morcambe Gate/Chester Le Boulevard Implementation period: 01/05/2007-31/10/2007 Summary Statistics
Area No. incidents before 44 55 27900 No. incidents after 39 61 27660 % change Relative Efect Size (RES) 1.25 1.12 RES Lower RES Upper Statistical limit (95%) limit (95%) significance 0.26 0.37 2.24 1.87 NS NS

Target area Buffer area Citywide

11% -11% 1%

Table 7: Summary statistics for Scarborough Div. 42 (Target Area A1)

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Time Series
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
M ay M -N ay o M -N v1 ay o 9 M - N v 1 95 ay o 9 M - N v 1 96 ay o 9 M - N v 1 97 ay o 9 M - N v 1 98 ay o 9 M - N v 2 99 ay o 0 M - N v 2 00 ay o 0 M - N v 2 01 ay o 0 M - N v 2 02 ay o 0 M - N v 2 03 ay o 0 M - N v 2 04 ay o 00 -N v2 5 ov 00 20 6 07
After CCTV Implementation Before CCTV implementation Predicted, if no CCTV implementation Linear (Before CCTV implementation)

Figure 4: Time series for Scarborough Div. 42 (Target Area A1)

No. incidents Predicted value, if Lower limit after no implementation (95%) implementation 39 34 24 Upper limit (95%) 44 Observed effect No effect

Table 8: Regression results based on time series for Scarborough Div. 42 (Target Area A1) Target area A2: Neilson Avenue/Sewells Road Brenyon Way, west of Sewells Road Implementation period: 01/05/2007-31/10/2007

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Summary Statistics
No. incidents before Target area 20 Buffer area 20 Citywide 27900 Area No. incidents after 11 15 27660 % change Relative Efect Size (RES) 1.36 1.80 RES Lower RES Upper Statistical limit (95%) limit (95%) significance 0.00 0.23 3.01 3.38 NS NS

45% 25% 1%

Table 9: Summary statistics for Scarborough Div. 42 (Target Area A2) Time Series
40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
M ay M -N ay o M -N v1 ay o 9 M - N v 1 95 ay o 9 M - N v 1 96 ay o 9 M - N v 1 97 ay o 9 M - N v 1 98 ay o 9 M - N v 2 99 ay o 0 M - N v 2 00 ay o 0 M - N v 2 01 ay o 0 M - N v 2 02 ay o 0 M - N v 2 03 ay o 0 M - N v 2 04 ay o 00 -N v2 5 ov 00 20 6 07
After CCTV Implementation Before CCTV implementation Predicted, if no CCTV implementation Linear (Before CCTV implementation)

Figure 5: Time series for Scarborough Div. 42 (Target Area A2)

No. incidents Predicted value, if Lower limit after no implementation (95%) implementation 11 26 18 Upper limit (95%) 34 Observed effect Reduction

Table 10: Regression results based on time series for Scarborough Div. 42 (Target Area A2)

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DISCUSSION Entertainment District Division 52 A superficial evaluation of the tabulated percentage change results shown in Table 1 shows a decrease in the total number of violent crime incidents reported in the implementation period compared to the same period the year before implementation in the target area. Similar effects are also seen in the buffer area and the control area, while the level of crime citywide remained virtually unchanged. The calculated RES values seem to indicate a stronger impact on crime in the buffer area than in the target area, virtually as strong an effect in the control area as in the target area and a reduction in crime in the target area compared to citywide data. This would indicate a diffusion of benefits not only in the immediate buffer area, but also in a larger zone around the target. However, in all these cases the RES value of one falls within the calculated 95% confidence intervals (which was calculated taking into account temporal fluctuations in the data over the observed periods of time). Thus, none of the above results withstand scrutiny when subjected to statistical significance tests. In other words, these results cannot be used to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the implementation of CCTV cameras in reducing crime. The time series results shown in Figure 1 and Table 2, however, show that the implementation of the CCTV system significantly reduced the number of incidents in the implementation period, leading to a value in the implementation period bellow the calculated value (and 95% confidence interval) based on the trend in crime evolution over the years. Overall, the time series in Figure 1 shows a steep increase in crime levels over time in the target area, and the implementation of the CCTV system leads to a break in this trend. Division 51 Again, a superficial look at the tabulated percentage change results shown in Table 3 seem to show in this case a virtually unchanged level of crime in the target area reported in the implementation period compared to the same period the year before implementation, a unchanged level of crime in the buffer area, while a decrease is observed in the control area. The level of crime citywide seems to have increased slightly for the periods of time considered. The calculated RES values indicate virtually the same effect on crime in the buffer compared with the target area, a decrease in crime in the control area compared with the target area, and similar trends in the target area compared to citywide data. However, once again in all these cases the RES value of one falls within the calculated 95% confidence intervals, so none of the above results withstand scrutiny when subjected to statistical significance tests and cannot be used to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the implementation of CCTV cameras in reducing crime. The time series results shown in Figure 2 and Table 4 show that the implementation of the CCTV system had no significant effect on the number of incidents in the implementation period, leading to a value in the implementation period within the calculated 95% confidence interval based on the trend in crime evolution over the years. Overall, the time series in Figure 2 shows a slight decrease in crime levels over time in the target area, and the value after the implementation of the CCTV system follows the observed trend.

21

North York Division 31 The tabulated percentage change results shown in Table 5 seem to show a decrease in the total number of violent crime incidents reported in the implementation period compared to the same period the year before implementation in the target area. Similar effects are also seen in the buffer area. The authors could not identify a suitable control area in this case. The level of crime citywide remained virtually unchanged. The calculated RES values seem to indicate a larger impact on crime in the target area than in the buffer area, and a reduction in crime in the target area compared to citywide data. This would indicate some diffusion of benefits in the immediate buffer area. But again, in all these cases the RES value of one falls within the calculated 95% confidence intervals, so the results do not pass statistical significant tests and cannot provide the base for any effectiveness conclusions. The time series results shown in Figure 3 and Table 6, however, show that the implementation of the CCTV system significantly reduced the number of incidents in the implementation period, leading to a value in the implementation period bellow the calculated value (and 95% confidence interval) based on the trend in crime evolution over the years. Overall, the time series in Figure 3 shows a slight increase in crime levels over time in the target area, and the implementation of the CCTV system leads to a large decrease below the trend. Scarborough Division 42 Target area A1: The tabulated percentage change results shown in Table 7, again, on a superficial examination, show a decrease in the total number of violent crime incidents reported in the implementation period compared to the same period the year before implementation in the target area. Opposite effects are seen in the buffer area, indicating a potential displacement of crime. The authors could not identify a suitable control area in this case. The level of crime citywide remained virtually unchanged. The calculated RES values seem to indicate a larger impact on crime in the target area than in the buffer area, and a reduction in crime in the target area compared to citywide data. Again, in all these cases the RES value of one falls within the calculated 95% confidence intervals. It must be noted that because of low numbers of records over the observed time periods and large variations from month to month, as well as a reduced implementation period (only six months) the authors have less confidence in the statistical calculations (this is also reflected in the very broad confidence interval). As was the case with all previous areas, the results do not pass statistical significance tests and cannot be used. The time series results in Figure 4 and Table 8 show that the implementation of the CCTV system had no significant effect on the number of incidents in the implementation period, leading to a value in the implementation period within the calculated 95% confidence interval based on the trend in crime evolution over the years. Overall, the time series in Figure 4 shows unchanged crime levels over time in the target area, and the value after the implementation of the CCTV system fallows the observed trend. Target area A2: The tabulated percentage change results shown in Table 9 seem to show a large decrease in the total number of violent crime incidents reported in the implementation period compared to the same period the year before implementation in the target area. A decrease in crime numbers

22

could also be seen in the buffer area, indicating a potential diffusion of benefits. The authors could not identify a suitable control area in this case. The level of crime citywide remained virtually unchanged. The calculated RES values seem to indicate a larger impact on crime in the target area than in the buffer area, and a large reduction in crime in the target area compared to citywide data. Again, in all these cases the RES value of one falls within the calculated 95% confidence intervals. As in Target Area A1, low numbers of records over the observed time periods and large variations from month to month, as well as a reduced implementation period (only six months) lead the authors to have less confidence in the statistical calculations (this is again reflected in the very broad confidence interval). As was the case with all other areas, the results do not pass statistical significance tests and cannot be used. The time series results shown in Figure 5 and Table 10 show that the implementation of the CCTV system significantly reduced the number of incidents in the implementation period, leading to a value in the implementation period bellow the calculated value (and 95% confidence interval) based on the trend in crime evolution over the years. Overall, the time series in Figure 5 shows an increase in crime levels over time in the target area, and the implementation of the CCTV system leads a decrease below the trend, visible even with the scatter due to low numbers of records. CONCLUSIONS The results presented and discussed in the previous two sections indicate that the level of crime decreased in three out of five areas after the implementation of the CCTV camera systems, and remained largely unchanged in the remaining two. These findings are supported by time series data done over the entire period of time for which records exist (1995 to 2008). While the authors tried to support these finding with calculated summary statistics, where crime levels over the implementation period were compared with crime levels during the same period in the previous year, the latter calculations did not stand scrutiny when they were subjected to statistical significance tests. Based on the above findings, one might conclude the implementation of CCTV camera systems can be effective, but further analysis is necessary. Based on existing data, additional time series analysis could be done for identified buffer areas around the target areas (this was not done because of lack of time). In the next section we make recommendations that might improve the effectiveness of any further CCTV camera implementation project. RECOMMENDATIONS Analyzing the effectiveness of any future implementation of CCTV systems would benefit greatly if such implementation is preceded by careful design. Thus, earlier involvement of statistical advice on experimental design is recommended, especially concerning controls. Ideally, a large number of areas could be identified beforehand, and they would be randomly allocated to have cameras or not. Crime analysis in the selected areas prior to implementation might help identify trends, crime evolution, existing mitigating measure and other characteristics and separate them from the effects of CCTV surveillance. In addition, coverage of at least one year is recommended, in order to avoid seasonal effects. Also, longer implementation period, as well of extended target areas, might lead to larger numbers of records, and thus improved statistical results.

23

A fully randomized controlled trial is only rarely achieved in an operational setting. However, there are experimental designs that can yield quite a few of the benefits of a gold standard design at a moderate increase in the burden of the trial. The possibility of using such designs should be examined before the trial. The benefits are so great that this is one of the strongest reasons for early involvement of statisticians in the trial design. Additionally, all maps and other geo-coded information should be brought in to registration before the trial starts; there should be exactly ONE map used for camera locations and crime locations. The accuracy of location information should also be determined before starting to gather data. In this trial there was an almost consistent bias of less than 28 metres in eastings and another almost consistent bias of between 205 and 261 metres in northings. A small amout of pre-trial work could confirm these biases and accurately estimate them; they could then be eliminated in later analyses. REFERENCES 1. CCTV Evaluation: Project Charter and Scope Statement Version 2, prepared by Mark Barkley, Toronto Police Services. 2. The Universal Transverse Mercator Grid, by Natural Resources Canada; available on the internet on 1 Dec 2008 at: http://maps.nrcan.gc.ca/topo101/utm_ref_e.php 3. Statistics Manual, by Edwin L. Crow, Frances A. Davis and Margaret W. Maxfield; Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1960 4. Technical Annex: methods used in assessing the impact of CCTV, by Martin Gill, Angela Spriggs, Javier Argomaniz, Jane Bryan, Sam Waples, Jenna Allen, Deena Kara Jonathan Kilworth, Ross Little, Polly Smith, Daniel Swain and Patricia Jessiman, Home Office Online Report 17/05, available on the internet at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr1705.pdf

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ANNEX A This annex describes the installation of CCTV cameras in a number of areas in Toronto by the Toronto Police Services (TPS) over the period May 2007 to Oct. 2008. The description is based upon details found in the CCTV Evaluation Project Charter (Ref. 1) and supplemented by additional information provided by TPS in e-mail exchanges. As a component of their comprehensive crime management strategy, based on existing research into the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) technology and under strict privacy guidelines set by City of Toronto Corporate Access and Privacy office, the Toronto Police Services (TPS) identified specific areas for deployment of CCTV camera systems as part of a pilot project. The areas targeted were identified as having elevated levels of crime comparative to the surrounding neighbourhoods and not responding well to other ongoing strategies. On April 30th, 2007, the following cameras were deployed in North York (31 Division), Scarborough (42 Division), and the Entertainment District (52 Division) as part of the pilot project: North York (31 Division): Jane Street/Finch Avenue West Jane Street/Yorkwood Gate Jane Street/Firgrove Crescent Scarborough (42 Division): Morcambe Gate/Victoria Park Avenue Morcambe Gate/Chester Le Boulevard Scarborough (42 Division): Neilson Avenue/Sewells Road Brenyon Way, west of Sewells Road Entertainment District (52 Division): Pearl Street, east of Duncan Street Duncan Street/Adelaide Street West Duncan Street/Richmond Street West Richmond Street West, east of Duncan Street Richmond Street West /Widmer Street Richmond Street West / Peter Street Adelaide Street West/Peter Street Richmond Street West /John Street On October 31st, 2007, the six-month pilot cameras in 31 and 42 Divisions were removed and re-deployed to 51 Division:

25

51 Division: Dundas Street/George Street Gerrard Street/George Street Pembroke Street/Dundas Street Dundas Street/Sherbourne Street East Dundas Street/Sherbourne Street West Sherbourne Street/Shutter Street Queen Street/Sherbourne Street The 51 Division and Entertainment District (52 Division) cameras remained in place until April 30, 2008. After that they were removed and re-deployed to the 14 Division until Oct. 31, 2008. 14 Division: Queen Street/Bathurst Street, South East corner Queen Street/Bathurst Street, North West corner Bathurst Street/Queen Laneway East Bathurst Street/Queen Laneway West Queen Street/Ryerson Ave Queen Street/Markham Street The cameras were programmed to perform a 360 degree tour. There were no degree by degree distance markers to establish what was within view of the camera throughout its tour. As the camera made its tour, it zoomed in and out as designed for areas of particular importance. It was also focused down to the sidewalk at any point where a larger view could create privacy concerns for residences. Each camera was individually programmed with these factors in mind. The cameras were positioned to cover areas within 100 - 200 metres from their location, with overlapping coverage points in order to ensure the best coverage possible of the target area.

26

ANNEX B This annex describes the data provided for analysis by the Toronto Police Service. 1. The call-for-service (CFS) ACCESS database includes all records of demands for policing services involving events of a violent nature, and each crime location is geo-coded. Violent CFS includes the following event types: Assault Assault Just Occurred Assist P.C. Assault In Progress Indecent Exposure Just Occurred Fight Holdup Holdup Alarm Homicide Indecent Exposure Person with a Gun Person with a Knife Robbery Sexual Assault Shooting Sound of Gunshot Stabbing Unknown Trouble Wounding

The TPS CFS data is the most consistent, geo-coded data available to TPS for an extended period of time, 1 Jan 1995 to 26 Aug 2008. The ACCESS database was received on a CD, from which back-up and working copies were made. The map location of each incident was given in an easting and a northing, i.e. in units of metres from the zero point for the grid zone for Toronto. See Ref. 2 for details of this system. For each descriptive location, such as 2739 VICTORIA PARK AVE, the grid locations were exactly the same throughout the database; this supports the inference that the grid references were consistently copied from some central 27

descriptive location, instead of being measured for each incident. A sample of the database table is provided in Table B1 below.

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PRIORITY 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 20:38:04 Homicide 314 20:26:32 Robbery 312 15:51:09 Robbery 314 19:40:40 Wounding 313 16:50:37 Robbery 315 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted 21:51:12 Sexual Assault 314 Redacted 14:47:39 Person W A Knife 313 Redacted 02:24:56 Robbery 314 Redacted 02:11:29 Person W A Gun 314 Redacted 01:19:49 Sexual Assault 316 Redacted 19:03:06 Shooting 314 Redacted 19:39:27 Person W A Knife 313 Redacted 12:23:59 Robbery 316 Redacted 627004.39 625967.98 628831.63 632016.54 635627.15 618621.09 627561.68 632875.60 636125.27 638728.51 646863.40 641617.20 629836.04 01:56:47 Person W A Gun 313 Redacted 623708.92 14:16:08 Robbery 312 Redacted 621929.88 21:45:30 Person W A Knife 312 Redacted 614091.46 23:59:48 Person W A Gun 313 2739 Victoria Park Ave 634841.17 4848376.71 4844125.36 4838866.35 4835554.55 4834022.23 4839298.61 4840255.67 4834297.53 4836253.14 4845710.52 4847510.96 4845319.64 4841308.57 4843124.37 4847814.32 4849730.00 4834534.80

DATE

YEAR

MONTH

TIME

EVENT TYPE

ZONE

ADDRESS

EASTING

NORTHING

2008.05.02 2008

2008.05.04 2008

2008.05.01 2008

2008.05.03 2008

2008.05.02 2008

2008.05.02 2008

2008.05.04 2008

2008.05.01 2008

2008.05.01 2008

2008.05.01 2008

2008.05.09 2008

2008.05.10 2008

2008.05.07 2008

2008.05.08 2008

2008.05.10 2008

2008.05.06 2008

2008.05.06 2008

Table B1: Sample page from the TPS CFS database

29

1. The EXCEL spreadsheet with locations of surveillance cameras includes the map location of each camera, given in coordinates from GPS measurements, in degrees and minutes of angle, with the minutes specified to three decimal places. The angular locations were converted to grid references using two different programs from the internet; these yielded consistent results for their conversions. The descriptive locations of camera locations and of incident locations were then compared. The EXCEL spreadsheet in Table B2 below shows the the GPS coordinates received from TPS, the grid reference conversions of those GPS coordinates, the grid references for those same locations found in the incident database and the discrepancy between the converted and CFS database eastings and northings.

30

PS CCTV Camera Location From the database

DUNCAN ST && PEARL ST ADELAID && DUNCAN JOHN ST && RICHMOND ST W RICHMOND ST W && WIDMER ST PETER ST && RICHMOND ST W ADELAIDE ST W && PETER ST DUNCAN ST && RICHMOND ST W JOHN ST && NELSON ST JOHN N && O ADELAIDE 629763 629659 629564 629601 629893 629786 630625 4833940 4833907 4833854 4833735 4833978 4833869 4834504 629959 4833770 629939 4833839

Date Active Date De-active Easting Northing

GPS Location

Converted Converted Easting Northing

105 22 25 20 26 8 23 7 811

Discrepancy Discrepancy Easting Northing

261 219 216 218 221 209 214 212 496

52 Division - Entertainment District 01.Duncan & Pearl 02.Adelaide & Duncan 03.Richmond (West of Duncan) 04.Richmond (East of Duncan) 05.Richmond & John 06.Richmond & Widmer 07.Richmond & Peter 08.Adelaide & Peter 09.Richmond and Duncan 10.John & Nelson 11.John and Adelaide 12.Peter North of Richmond - Cooper Lane 01/05/2007 01/05/2007 01/05/2007 01/05/2007 06/02/2007 01/05/2007 01/05/2007 01/05/2007 01/05/2007 06/02/2007 06/02/2007 01/05/2008 43.64790763911025, -79.38723921775818 43.648163828519095, -79.38851594924927 43.64944087760613, -79.38963174819946 43.649712586674774, -79.38833355903625 43.64908377238948, -79.39063489437103 43.64881594208366, -79.39199209213257 43.64838896376419, -79.39310252666473 43.64720505345751, -79.3928986787796 43.649380713289, -79.38904166221618 43.648402549484764, -79.3905919790268 43.64774460891751, -79.3903398513794 43.64879265243541, -79.39362287521362 630064 629961 629868 629972 629788 629679 629590 629609 629916 629793 629814 629547 4834031 4834058 4834198 4834230 4834156 4834125 4834075 4833944 4834192 4834081 4834008 4834119

BATHURST ST && QUEEN ST W BATHURST ST && QUEEN ST W

628701 4833703 628701 4833703

28 3

220 235

14 Division 23.Queen & Bathurst South East Corner 24.Queen & Bathurst North West Corner 25.Queen & Willis 26.Bathurst & Queen Laneway - West 27.Bathurst & Queen Laneway - East 28.Queen & Ryerson 29.Queen & Markham 01/05/2008 01/05/2008 01/05/2008 01/05/2008 01/05/2008 01/05/2008 14/05/2008 31/10/2008 31/10/2008 31/10/2008 31/10/2008 31/10/2008 31/10/2008 31/10/2008 43.64716526590258, -79.40381795167923 43.64730500744266, -79.4041197001934 43.64773878640247, -79.40410226583481 43.64676738890375, -79.40397083759308 43.64676835933866, -79.40396547317505 43.64746900925213, -79.40232396125793 43.6469081018021, -79.4050906598568 628729 628704 628705 628717 628718 628849 628627 4833923 4833938 4833986 4833878 4833878 4833959 4833892

QUEEN ST W && RYERSON AVE

628863 4833754

14

205

31 Division 31 Div - Jane and Finch 01/05/2007 31 Div - Jane and Yewtree/Firgrove Cresent 01/05/2007 31 Div - Jane and Firgrove/Yorkwoods Gate 01/05/2007 31/10/2007 31/10/2007 31/10/2007 43.75717013288185, -79.51733708381653 43.75490732486154, -79.51725125312805 43.75132307884019, -79.51631247997284 619355 619366 619449 4845971 4845719 4845323

FINCH && JANE JANE ST && YEWTREE BLVD JANE ST && YORKWOODS GT

619314 4845759 619369 4845492 619458 4845036

41 3 9

212 227 287

42 Division 42 Div - Victoria Park and Morecambe Gate 01/05/2007 42 Div - Chester Le Blvd and Morecambe Gate 01/05/2007 42 Div - Neilson Rd and Sewells Rd 01/05/2007 42 Div - Brenyon Way and Sewells Rd 01/05/2007 31/10/2007 31/10/2007 31/10/2007 31/10/2007 43.79806221884824, -79.3333911895752 43.798424244997285, -79.33181405067444 43.80662054944689, -79.21843975782394 43.807630974871216, -79.21626448631286 634072 634198 643299 643471

4850794 4850836 4851937 4852053

MORECAMBE GT && VICTORIA PARK634041 AVE CHESTER LE BLVD && MORECAMBE 634192 GT 643270 NEILSON RD && SEWELL'S RD 643511 BRENYON WAY && SEWELL'S RD

4850570 4850625 4851705 4851852

31 6 29 40

224 211 232 201

51 Division 23.Dundas & George 24.Gerrard & George 25.Pembroke & Dundas 26.Dundas & Sherbourne EAST 27.Dundas & Sherbourne WEST 28.Sherbourne and Shuter 29.Queen and Sherbourne 01/11/2007 01/11/2007 01/11/2007 01/11/2007 01/11/2007 01/11/2007 01/11/2007 31/05/2008 31/05/2008 31/05/2008 31/05/2008 31/05/2008 31/05/2008 31/05/2008

43.6573859195024, -79.37356665730476 43.66071868162696, -79.37483131885528 43.658242655931644, -79.37248840928077 43.65840953861541, -79.37095552682876 43.65842409231586, -79.37114596366882 43.65629727415106, -79.37007710337639 43.65442460272831, -79.36933413147926

631146 631037 631231 631355 631339 631430 631494

4835105 4835473 4835202 4835223 4835224 4834990 4834783

DUNDAS ST E && GEORGE ST GEORGE ST && GERRARD ST E DUNDAS ST E && PEMBROKE ST DUNDAS ST E && SHERBOURNE ST DUNDAS ST E && SHERBOURNE ST SHERBOURNE ST && SHUTER ST QUEEN ST E && SHERBOURNE

631143 631024 631228 631337 631337 631415 631472

4834875 4835244 4834973 4834988 4834988 4834753 4834572

3 13 3 18 2 15 22

230 229 229 235 236 237 211

Table B2: TPS CCTV camera locations

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ANNEX C This annex discusses the process of boundary selection for target and buffer areas, and the selection of control areas. The first step in the analysis was to define "target areas" and select all the incidents within the target area boundaries before, during and after the implementation of the CCTV camera systems. Target areas were given by the overlapping coverage of a cluster of cameras installed at the same general location. Initially, the authors had looked at each camera individually and selected 100-200 metres (depending on the physical features) around it, because the cameras were on 360 degree tour and "reached" as far as 100-200 metres from where they were mounted. A closer look at all camera locations on the map, and e-mail exchanges with TPS, led to the realization that a number of cameras were designed to survey an extended area (e.g., Peter St - Adelaide St Simcoe St - Richmond St in Div. 52). Thus, the target area was defined as an area that extended 50-100 metres beyond the polygon that contained all the cameras at the same general location, again, depending on such factors as major roads, natural boundaries, tall or low buildings and other similar features. There was a slight complication introduced by the fact that streets do not run perfectly north-south or east-west, which was fixed by some vector calculations (rotating the reference system) to define appropriate boundaries. For boundary definition, the camera location coordinates used were those found in the database for incidents reported at the camera locations (see Table B2), because the northing coordinates obtained from the GPS conversions were systematically about 200 metres smaller (between 205 and 261 metres) compared to the database northing coordinates for the same locations. Some of the camera intersections were not found in the database, but because the cluster of cameras was considered, rather than individual locations, it did not matter, as long as those cameras were boundary cameras. Buffer areas were areas directly adjacent to target areas, obtained by extending a further 200 metres beyond the boundaries of each target area. Boundaries for both target and buffer areas were chosen with such factors as major roads, natural boundaries, tall or low buildings, zoning and other physical features in mind. For two target area (Division 52 and 51), the analysts attempted to select control areas. They were selected in the same general location as the target areas, between 500-1000 metres away, and they were mainly selected based on similar physical characteristics. This is far from ideal, since the selection does not include crime analysis; moreover, in regards to the entertainment district (Division 52), it has been pointed out by TPS that: There is no comparative area anywhere else in the city. It is an anomaly that the Toronto Police Service struggles with every weekend. The mass influx of people creates a population greater than that of many cities in Canada. A control area for the Entertainment District is simply impossible in the City of Toronto. For these reasons, while comparisons with the control areas selected by analysts were included, the comparison with citywide data as a control measure (also included) is considered more useful.

32

CCTV Pilot Project: 31 Division (Jane and Finch)

Final Review

For the Period

May through October 2007

Analysis Requested by: Analysis by: Report Prepared by: Date Prepared: Date Effective:

S/Sgt. Mark Barkley (1470) Communications Services Crime Information Analysis Unit (CIAU) Kristi Tayles, M.S.A. (86570) Friday, November 29, 2008 Friday, November 29, 2008

33

Executive Summary The Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) is a Toronto Police Service initiativefunded by the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Servicesto create and sustain safe neighborhoods. TAVIS aims to reduce violent crime, increase community safety and improve the quality of life in Toronto neighborhoods. It is comprised of a number Servicewide strategies and ongoing initiatives, including the Bail Compliance Program and Rapid Response Teams, as well as focused initiatives in each of Torontos 17 divisions. This report is an assessment of another TAVIS initiative involving Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras in 31 Division. It aims to evaluate the impact of the cameras on the demands for policing services in the area during the six-month pilot project from May through October 2007.

34

Background As an intervention aimed at reducing crime, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) initiated a pilot project to evaluate the effectiveness of closed circuit television (CCTV). CCTV is viewed as a technique of formal surveillance and has been known to reduce crime to a certain extent. CCTV cameras were installed at identified areas in the Jane and Finch area on April 30th, 2007 (see Appendix A). The objective was to prevent or reduce violent crime that has been found to concentrate in the area. In accordance with the guidelines issued by the office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, recorded images have been viewed by police only in the event of a reported incident. Images recorded by the camera were retained for a period of 72 hours, and then recorded over unless viewed in relation to an incident. On October 31st, 2007, the cameras were removed at the completion of the six-month pilot project.

Objective This report assesses the impact of CCTV on the demands for policing services relating to violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) in the Jane and Finch area during the CCTV pilot projectfrom May through October 2007. Data for this analysis includes all CFS of a violent nature such as assaults, fights, hold-ups, shootings, stabbings, robberies, etc. (see Appendix B). The main objective of this report is to measure the impact of the cameras on the following outcomes: Dispersion: The dispersion (or diffusion) of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime and disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing crime to spread out. Displacement: The geographical displacement of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime or disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing offenders to move to other facilities or areas. Reduction: An overall reduction in crime, which occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention areas. Evidence Gained: The number of recordings/downloads where evidence was gained to assist in a criminal investigation.

To address these outcomes, several questions were developed to direct the study: Did CCTV deter crime? Did CCTV reduce crime? Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations?

35

Did CCTV deter crime? A number of methods and techniques were used to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the Jane and Finch area during the six-month pilot project. These involved measures of dispersion and displacement. Dispersion The first steps to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the intervention area were statistical tests for clustering and dispersion. These tests were used to reveal whether there were significant hotspots of violent CFS in the intervention area, and whether the concentration of crime in this area spread out during the CCTV pilot project. The average nearest neighbour was first used to test for clustering. This statistic calculates a nearest neighbour index (NNI) based on the average distance from each crime location to its nearest neighbouring incident and compares this distribution of crime data against a random data set of the same sample size. This statistic indicated that there existed significant clustering or hotspots in the intervention area in the periods before, during and after the pilot project. The average nearest neighbour was then used to compare the level of dispersion in the crime data over time. Threshold analysis was used to assess whether the intervention affected crime and disorder opportunities in the area, causing crime to spread out. These findings indicated that violent CFS became considerably more spread out during the CCTV pilot project as compared to the distribution of calls for the same period in recent years. In the six months after the cameras were removed, there was no evidence of diffusion or spreading of crime in the intervention area as compared with the distribution of calls for the same period in previous years. Displacement The next step to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV involved measures of displacement focused on the movement of crime or disorder from the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras. While dispersion tests for the diffusion of crime in the intervention area, displacement refers to an overall shift in the concentration or hotspot from the immediate area to other facilities or areas. One measure of geographical displacement is the mean centre point. It identifies the geographic centre or the centre of concentration for a set of data. These mean centres can be used to generally indicate that crime has a greater tendency to occur in certain parts of a study area. Here, the mean centre point for each year was used as a relative measure to compare spatial distributions of violent CFS for different periods of time. A significant shift in the mean centre during the pilot project would indicate that the initiative may have successfully deterred CFS from the area. In comparing mean centres during the same period for the years 1998-2008, the positioning of these points indicated that violent CFS during the pilot period experienced a subtle shift

36

westward within the intervention area. In the following six months, there was no evidence of a significant shift in the distribution of calls as compared with the same six-month period in previous years. Hotspot Analysis While these measures of dispersion and displacement help explain the general patterns in the CFS data, they do not indicate where the clustering of calls occurred geographically. Therefore, a series of maps were generated to highlight the camera locations in relation to areas of high violent CFS concentration to illustrate any changes in the distribution of calls during the pilot project. Hotspot analysis revealed that CFS activity for the period May through October was relatively consistent from 1999-2006. For that reason, hotspot maps presented here only illustrate changes in the concentration of calls in recent years (2005-2007). Map 1. Violent Call-for-Service Hotspots (May-October 2005)

37

Map 2. Violent Call-for-Service Hotspots (May-October 2006)

Map 3. Violent Call-for-Service during CCTV pilot project (May-October 2007)

38

While there has been some movement in the concentration of calls, significant localization of hotspots has persisted in the same general areas over time. As shown, the concentration of violent calls coincided with CCTV locations before and during the pilot project. This map series also supports a possible spreading/displacement of crime in the intervention area. The hotspots or red areas appear to have shifted from the immediate area surrounding the camera location just south of Jane Street and Finch Avenue. Further analysis is required to identify changes in the local environment that may have contributed to this changeparticularly since the shift in the concentration of calls during this time period is consistent with the trend in the six months after the cameras were removed (Map 4). Map 4. Violent Call-for-Service after CCTV pilot project (November 2007-April 2008)

The apparent shift in the concentration of violent calls after the project is not consistent with the distribution of calls for the same period in previous years (November-April). Possible changes in the local environment include increased security in shopping centers, closure/relocation of businesses, and Guns and Gangs Task Force projects in the area. Summary of Findings Based on the distribution of violent CFS during the pilot project, CCTV may have had a deterrent effect on violent crime in the area. There was some evidence of dispersion and displacement of crime from the immediate areas surrounding the cameras, particularly from the camera located just south of Jane Street and Finch Avenue. Overall, there appears to have been a

39

general shift in the concentration of crime calls in the area as revealed in the map series. Further analysis is required to assess whether the apparent shift is related to the volume of calls during the pilot project and/or local initiatives in the area.

Did CCTV reduce crime? An overall reduction in crime occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention area. To measure the net effect of the cameras on the demands for policing service in the Jane and Finch area, the level of CFS for the six-month period from May through October were compared with previous years (1998-2008). Violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) For the period May through October, beginning in 1999, violent CFS showed a variable trend in both the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras and in the eight square kilometre area around Jane Street and Finch Avenue (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Violent Calls-for-Service in the Jane and Finch area, for May through October (19992007)
750

Number of Violent CFS

600

450

300

150

0
19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07

Within 250m of CCTV cameras Within 8 sq.km. of Jane and Finch

Changes in the environmental landscape have contributed to this inconsistent trend over time. These may include development, demographics and changes in local business and land-use. Due to the difficulties in capturing these changes, the following statistics have not been standardized to reflect a crime ratewhich is often a better gauge of crime and the risk of victimization. Despite this limitation, threshold analysis was used to assess whether the number of calls was considered to be within an expected level or normal range given the natural crime trend.

40

Statistical software was used to determine the predicted value and a margin of error of calls for each year in order to identify an upper and lower limit or normal range of CFS. Within 250 metres of the cameras, the overall number of violent CFS was below the normal threshold during the CCTV pilot project. In the surrounding eight square kilometres, the number of calls was in the normal range. This suggests that CCTV may have had an effect on reducing the overall number of VCFS. Further analysis may be warranted to explore the apparent variability in the data over time. While the overall number of calls was below the normal range during the pilot project, certain call types did not adhere to this pattern. For further analysis, the calls were divided into the following categories based on the level of risk to the community: Group 1: Homicide, Shooting, Stabbing, Wounding, Sexual Assault Group 2: Assault in Progress, Person with a Gun, Person with a Knife, Robbery, Sound of Gunshot Group 3: Assault, Assault just Occurred, Assist Police Constable, Fight Group 4: Indecent Exposure Group 5: Unknown Trouble

The following table summarizes the demands for policing within 250 metres of the cameras by call type during the pilot project. Based on threshold analysis, red values indicate categories that were above the normal range and blue values highlight groups that were below the normal threshold. Note that when dealing with small numbers, small changes can appear to be significant.

41

Table 1. Violent Calls-for-Service within 250m of CCTV cameras in the Jane and Finch area (May through October)
Group Call Type 1 Homicide Sexual Assault Shooting Stabbing Wounding 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 3 2 3 2 3 2 1 1 3 3 0 3 2 1 3 2 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 5 7 6 3 8 5 6 6 4 7 4 7 6 8 7 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 7 6 8 6 8 17 12 17 12 7 17 8 3 9 10 7 5 14 24 19 11 14 18 11 14 21 4 5 7 6 5 7 12 7 2 38 51 57 41 36 51 57 44 46 27 30 27 23 21 26 22 17 13 15 8 17 17 25 20 26 22 23 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 25 19 13 22 19 19 15 26 15 67 60 57 62 65 65 64 65 51 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 39 40 49 44 37 47 51 48 40 39 40 49 44 37 47 51 48 40 156 158 171 156 144 171 177 163 143

Total 2 Assault I/Prog Holdup Holdup Alarm Person W A Gun Person W A Kni Robbery Snd Of Gunshot Total 3 Assault Assault J/Occ Assist P.C. Fight Total 4 Ind Exp Oj/Occ Indecent Expo Total 5 Unknown Trble Total Grand Total

As shown, the overall number of calls and calls in groups 3 and 5 were below the normal range within 250 metres of the cameras during the pilot project. Despite an overall reduction in violent CFS in the intervention area, the most serious calls in the immediate 50 meter area surrounding the cameras were not affected. Table 2 indicates whether the number of violent calls-for-service during the CCTV pilot project were above, below or within the normal or expected range with increasing distance from the camera locations.

42

Table 2. Violent Calls-for-Service with increasing distance from CCTV cameras in the Jane and Finch area during the pilot project (May through October)
Distance from Cameras (m)
50 100 150 200 250

All Violent Calls Above Below Below Below Below

Expected Number of Calls Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Above Above Above Normal Below Below Normal Normal Below Above Normal Below Normal Normal Below

Group 4 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Group 5 Normal Below Below Below Below

Table 2 suggests that CCTV did not have a significant effect on the number of violent CFS or the most serious calls in the immediate area surrounding the cameras. In general, the number of violent calls within 50 metres of the cameras was above the normal range during the pilot project. Given the natural variability in the data and the small number of calls in several of these groups, conclusions drawn from this threshold analysis are limited. Further analysis may be warranted to explore the footprint of the camera and the extent to which the cameras are visible. For example, within 100 metres of the camera locations, the overall number of calls and calls in groups 2, 3 and 5 are below the normal range. Table 3 summarizes call activity in the six-month period after the cameras were removed. Table 3. Violent Calls-for-Service with increasing distance from CCTV cameras in the Jane and Finch area after the pilot project (November through April)
Distance from Cameras (m)
50 100 150 200 250 All Violent Calls Normal Below Above Above Above

Expected Number of Calls Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Above Below Above Normal Normal Below Normal Above Normal Above Above Normal Normal Normal Above

Group 4 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Group 5 Normal Below Above Above Above

In this period, group 1 and group 2 in the immediate 50 metres of the cameras remains above the normal threshold. The variability between the two periods during and after requires further evaluation. Summary of Findings Despite an overall reduction in violent CFS in the intervention area, the most serious calls in the immediate area surrounding the cameras were not affected. In general, the number of violent calls within 50 metres of the cameras was above the normal range during the pilot project. On the other hand, the overall number of calls and calls in groups 3 and 5 were below the normal

43

threshold within 100 metres of the camera locations. Further analysis is warranted to explore the variability between the periods during and after the pilot project.

Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations? During the six-month pilot project, a total of eleven downloads were requested to assist in seven criminal investigationsthree of which to support homicide, two robbery, one assault and one unknown investigation. At this stage, it is difficult to quantify the value of these requests without further evaluation into which of the recordings/downloads were actually useful.

44

Final Summary Did CCTV deter crime? Based on the distribution of violent CFS during the pilot project, CCTV may have had a deterrent effect on violent crime in the area. There was some evidence of dispersion and displacement of crime from the immediate areas surrounding the cameras, particularly from the camera located just south of Jane Street and Finch Avenue. Overall, there appears to have been a general shift in the concentration of crime calls in the area as revealed in the map series. Further analysis is required to assess whether the apparent shift is related to the volume of calls during the pilot project and/or local initiatives in the area. Did CCTV reduce crime? Despite an overall reduction in violent CFS in the intervention area, the most serious calls in the immediate area surrounding the cameras were not affected. In general, the number of violent calls within 50 metres of the cameras was above the normal range during the pilot project. On the other hand, the overall number of calls and calls in groups 3 and 5 were below the normal threshold within 100 metres of the camera locations. Further analysis is warranted to explore the variability between the periods during and after the pilot project. Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations? While a number of downloads were requested to assist in criminal investigations, further analysis would be required to assess how useful these recordings were to investigators.

45

Note on this Assessment Dealing with perceptions of crime, particularly fear of crime, is as important as reducing crime. Fear of crime affects quality of life and may have negative economic outcomes. It can also affect community cohesiveness and neighbourhood incivility. In addition to accounting for the change in crime in the area, future initiatives of this nature should involve properly structured surveys and strategies for surveying residents before and after the initiative to gauge the potential for improved perceptions of crime in the intervention area. Arguably, the most significant challenge in assessing the impact of this initiative is accounting for changes in population. Without standardizing the crime data as rates, the true crime picture remains unknown. For example, it is possible that the crime trend is increasing at a slower rate than the growing demands for services and population in the area. In this case, the risk of victimization may actually be decreasing despite an increase in the overall number of CFS. Further analysis is also warranted to explore other local initiatives or Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategies that may have also focused in this area during the study period. Although CFS data provides a good indication of where crime tends to concentrate, not all calls result in a crime. CFS data is, however, readily available over a long period of time and is spatially-referenced for mapping. Actual reported incidents of violent crimes such as shootings and street robberies were not included in this analysis due to a lack of geo-coded data (spatially referenced information). Future analyses of this nature would benefit from making use of violent crimes in addition to violent CFS data. In addition to preventing or deterring violent crime, CCTV cameras may affect nonviolent crimes such as theft of vehicle or theft from vehicle. Due to a lack of geo-coded or spatially referenced data, these crimes were not evaluated as possible residual outcomes of the CCTV initiative. Further analysis is required to assess other local initiatives that may have contributed to the change in crime in the area over time. For example, increased police patrols in the intervention area may result in a higher number of reported crimes that would otherwise be unnoticed. Although it is not possible to separate out the effects of crime reduction strategies, it is important to account for additional factors that may have contributed to any changes in the crime picture during the pilot project.

46

Appendix A

47

Appendix B

Definition for Violent Calls-for-Service Violent Calls-for-Service include the following ICAD Event Types:

- Assault - Assault just Occurred - Assist P.C. - Assault in Progress - Indecent Exposure just Occurred - Fight - Hold-up - Hold-up Alarm - Homicide - Indecent Exposure - Person with a Gun - Person with a Knife - Robbery - Sexual Assault - Shooting - Sound of Gunshot - Stabbing - Unknown Trouble - Wounding

48

CCTV Pilot Project: 42 Division (Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate)

Final Review

For the Period

May through October 2007

Analysis Requested by: Analysis by: Report Prepared by: Date Prepared: Date Effective:

S/Sgt. Mark Barkley (1470) Communications Services Crime Information Analysis Unit (CIAU) Kristi Tayles, M.S.A. (86570) Friday, November 29, 2008 Friday, November 29, 2008

49

Executive Summary The Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) is a Toronto Police Service initiativefunded by the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Servicesto create and sustain safe neighborhoods. TAVIS aims to reduce violent crime, increase community safety and improve the quality of life in Toronto neighborhoods. It is comprised of a number Servicewide strategies and ongoing initiatives, including the Bail Compliance Program and Rapid Response Teams, as well as focused initiatives in each of Torontos 17 divisions. This report is an assessment of another TAVIS initiative involving Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras in 42 Division. It aims to evaluate the impact of the cameras on the demands for policing services in the Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate area during the six-month pilot project from May through October 2007.

50

Background As an intervention aimed at reducing crime, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) initiated a pilot project to evaluate the effectiveness of closed circuit television (CCTV). CCTV is viewed as a technique of formal surveillance and has been known to reduce crime to a certain extent. CCTV cameras were installed at identified areas in the Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate area on April 30th, 2007 (see Appendix A). The objective was to prevent or reduce violent crime that has been found to concentrate in the area. In accordance with the guidelines issued by the office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, recorded images have been viewed by police only in the event of a reported incident. Images recorded by the camera were retained for a period of 72 hours, and then recorded over unless viewed in relation to an incident. On October 31st, 2007, the cameras were removed at the completion of the six-month pilot project.

Objective This report assesses the impact of CCTV on the demands for policing services relating to violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) in the Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate area during the CCTV pilot projectfrom May through October 2007. Data for this analysis includes all CFS of a violent nature such as assaults, fights, hold-ups, shootings, stabbings, robberies, etc. (see Appendix B). The main objective of this report is to measure the impact of the cameras on the following outcomes: Dispersion: The dispersion (or diffusion) of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime and disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing crime to spread out. Displacement: The geographical displacement of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime or disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing offenders to move to other facilities or areas. Reduction: An overall reduction in crime, which occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention areas. Evidence Gained: The number of recordings/downloads where evidence was gained to assist in a criminal investigation.

To address these outcomes, several questions were developed to direct the study: Did CCTV deter crime? Did CCTV reduce crime? Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations?

51

Did CCTV deter crime? A number of methods and techniques were used to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the Victoria Park and Morcambe area during the six-month pilot project. These involved measures of dispersion and displacement. Dispersion The first steps to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the intervention area were statistical tests for clustering and dispersion. These tests were used to reveal whether there were significant hotspots of violent CFS in the intervention area, and whether the concentration of crime in this area spread out during the CCTV pilot project. The average nearest neighbour was first used to test for clustering. This statistic calculates a nearest neighbour index (NNI) based on the average distance from each crime location to its nearest neighbouring incident and compares this distribution of crime data against a random data set of the same sample size. This statistic indicated that there existed significant clustering or hotspots in the intervention area in the periods before, during and after the pilot project. The average nearest neighbour was then used to compare the level of dispersion in the crime data over time. Threshold analysis was used to assess whether the intervention affected crime and disorder opportunities in the area, causing crime to spread out. These findings indicated that violent CFS became slightly more clustered or less spread out during the CCTV pilot project as compared to the distribution of calls for the same period in recent years. In the six months after the cameras were removed, there was little evidence of diffusion or spreading of crime in the intervention area as compared with the distribution of calls for the same period in previous years. Displacement The next step to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV involved measures of displacement focused on the movement of crime or disorder from the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras. While dispersion tests for the diffusion of crime in the intervention area, displacement refers to an overall shift in the concentration or hotspot from the immediate area to other facilities or areas. One measure of geographical displacement is the mean centre point. It identifies the geographic centre or the centre of concentration for a set of data. These mean centres can be used to generally indicate that crime has a greater tendency to occur in certain parts of a study area. Here, the mean centre point for each year was used as a relative measure to compare spatial distributions of violent CFS for different periods of time. A significant shift in the mean centre during the pilot project would indicate that the initiative may have successfully deterred CFS from the area. In comparing mean centres during the same period for the years 1998-2008, the positioning of these points indicated that violent CFS during the pilot period experienced a subtle shift westward within the intervention area. In the six-month period after the cameras were removed,

52

there was a subtle shift eastward in the distribution of calls as compared with the same six-month period in previous years. Hotspot Analysis While these measures of dispersion and displacement help explain the general patterns in the CFS data, they do not indicate where the clustering of calls occurred geographically. Therefore, a series of maps were generated to highlight the camera locations in relation to areas of high violent CFS concentration to illustrate any changes in the distribution of calls during the pilot project. With the exception of coinciding with CCTV camera locations, hotspot analysis revealed that CFS activity for the period May through October was somewhat variable in the Victoria Park and Morcambe area from 1999-2007. The following hotspot maps presented here only illustrate changes in the concentration of calls in recent years (2005-2007). Map 1. Violent Call-for-Service Hotspots (May-October 2005)

53

Map 2. Violent Call-for-Service Hotspots (May-October 2006)

54

Map 3. Violent Call-for-Service during CCTV pilot project (May-October 2007)

While there has been movement in the concentration of calls, some localization of hotspots has persisted in the same general areas over time. As shown, the concentration of violent calls coincided with CCTV locations before the pilot project. During the project, the hotspots or red areas appear to have shifted from the immediate area surrounding the camera locations. Further analysis is warranted to identify changes in the local environment that may have contributed to this changeparticularly since the hotspot of calls shifted back to the immediate area surrounding the cameras in the six-month period after the cameras were removed (Map 4).

55

Map 4. Violent Call-for-Service after CCTV pilot project (November-April 2008)

The distribution of violent calls after the project is relatively consistent with the distribution of calls for the same period in recent years (November-April). This suggests that the cameras may have successfully deterred crime from the immediate area surrounding the cameras. Summary of Findings Based on the distribution of violent CFS during the pilot project, CCTV may have had a deterrent effect on violent crime in the area. Although there was little evidence of crime spreading out in the intervention area, there was an overall shift in the concentration of violent CFS. The geographical displacement from the immediate area surrounding the cameras suggests that the intervention affected crime and disorder opportunities in the area, causing offenders to move to other facilities or areas. Further analysis is required to assess whether the apparent shift is related to the volume of calls during the pilot project and/or local initiatives in the area.

Did CCTV reduce crime? An overall reduction in crime occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention area. To measure the net effect of the cameras on the

56

demands for policing service in the Victoria Park and Morcambe area, the level of CFS for the six-month period from May through October were compared with previous years (1998-2008). Violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) For the period May through October, beginning in 1999, violent CFS showed a variable trend in both the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras and in the 9.25 square kilometre area around the cameras at Victoria Park Avenue and Morcambe Gate (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Violent Calls-for-Service in the Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate area, for May through October (1999-2007)

225 200 Number of Violent CFS 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0

19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07

Within 250m of CCTV cameras Within 9.25 sq.km. of Victoria Park and Morcambe

Changes in the environmental landscape have contributed to this inconsistent trend over time. These may include development, demographics and changes in land-use. Due to the difficulties in capturing these changes, the following statistics have not been standardized to reflect a crime ratewhich is often a better gauge of crime and the risk of victimization. Despite this limitation, threshold analysis was used to assess whether the number of calls was considered to be within an expected level or normal range given the natural crime trend. Statistical software was used to determine the predicted value and a margin of error of calls for each year in order to identify an upper and lower limit or normal range of CFS. Within 250 metres of the cameras, the overall number of violent CFS was below the normal threshold during the CCTV pilot project. In the surrounding 8.8 square kilometres, the number of calls was in the normal range. This suggests that CCTV may have had an effect on reducing the overall number of VCFS. Further analysis may be warranted to explore the apparent variability in the data over time.

57

While the overall number of calls was below the normal range during the pilot project, certain call types did not adhere to this pattern. For further analysis, the calls were divided into the following categories based on the level of risk to the community: Group 1: Homicide, Shooting, Stabbing, Wounding, Sexual Assault Group 2: Assault in Progress, Person with a Gun, Person with a Knife, Robbery, Sound of Gunshot Group 3: Assault, Assault just Occurred, Assist Police Constable, Fight Group 4: Indecent Exposure Group 5: Unknown Trouble

The following table summarizes the demands for policing within 250 metres of the cameras by call type during the pilot project. Based on threshold analysis, red values indicate categories that were above the normal range and blue values highlight groups that were below the normal threshold. Note that when dealing with small numbers, small changes can appear to be significant. Table 1. Violent Calls-for-Service within 250m of CCTV cameras in the Victoria Park and Morcambe area (May through October)
Group Call Type 1 Homicide Sexual Assault Shooting Stabbing Wounding 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 4 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 4 0 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 1 7 1 0 4 1 1 4 2 6 2 2 7 7 2 6 13 9 11 12 4 2 5 5 8 5 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 4 5 3 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 2 0 4 1 7 7 8 11 11 11 4 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 8 6 9 5 8 11 4 4 9 8 6 9 5 8 11 4 4 24 24 17 28 31 29 30 25 17

Total 2 Assault I/Prog Holdup Holdup Alarm Person W A Gun Person W A Kni Robbery Snd Of Gunshot Total 3 Assault Assault J/Occ Assist P.C. Fight Total 4 Ind Exp Oj/Occ Indecent Expo Total 5 Unknown Trble Total Grand Total

58

As shown, the overall number of calls and calls in group 4 were below the normal range within 250 metres of the cameras during the pilot project. Despite an overall reduction in violent CFS in the intervention area, the most serious calls in the immediate 50 meter area surrounding the cameras were not affected. Table 2 indicates whether the number of violent calls-for-service during the CCTV pilot project were above, below or within the normal or expected range with increasing distance from the camera locations. Table 2. Violent Calls-for-Service with increasing distance from CCTV cameras in the Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate area during the pilot project (May through October)
Distance from Cameras (m) 50 100 150 200 250 Expected Number of Calls Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Below Normal Normal Below Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Below

All Violent Calls Below Below Below Below Below

Group 4 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Group 5 Normal Below Below Below Below

Table 2 suggests that CCTV did not have a significant effect on the most serious calls in the immediate area surrounding the cameras. In general, the number of violent calls within 50 metres of the cameras was within the normal range during the pilot project. Given the natural variability in the data and the small number of calls in several of these groups, conclusions drawn from this threshold analysis are limited. In the six-month period after the cameras were removed, the number of calls within 250 metres of the cameras were within normal range. Table 3 summarizes call activity in the same period after the completion of the project. Table 3. Violent Calls-for-Service with increasing distance from CCTV cameras in the Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate area after the pilot project (November through April)
Distance from Cameras (m) 50 100 150 200 250 Expected Number of Calls Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Normal Normal Below Normal Below Below Normal Below Below Normal Normal Below Normal Below Below

All Violent Calls Normal Normal Below Normal Below

Group 4 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Group 5 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

59

In this period, group 2 was below the normal threshold in the immediate 50 metres of the camera locations. The variability between the two periods during and after requires further evaluation. Summary of Findings These findings indicate that the overall number of violent CFS and the calls in group 2 were below the normal range in the immediate area surrounding the cameras during the CCTV pilot project. At this stage in the analysis however, it is difficult to quantify the apparent reduction by call type given the natural variability in the data and the small number of CFS in several of these groups. However, this analysis provides some indication that the more serious violent CFS may have been impacted by this intervention strategy within 100 metres of the camera locations.

Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations? During the six-month pilot project, a total of eleven downloads were used to assist in seven criminal investigations from both CCTV systems in 42 Division (Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate; and Sewells and Neilson)five of which were Robberies, one shooting, and one Aggravated Assault.

60

Final Summary Did CCTV deter crime? Based on the distribution of violent CFS during the pilot project, CCTV may have had a deterrent effect on violent crime in the area. Although there was little evidence of crime spreading out in the intervention area, there was an overall shift in the concentration of violent CFS. The geographical displacement from the immediate area surrounding the cameras suggests that the intervention affected crime and disorder opportunities in the area, causing offenders to move to other facilities or areas. Further analysis is required to assess whether the apparent shift is related to the volume of calls during the pilot project and/or local initiatives in the area. Did CCTV reduce crime? This analysis indicates that the overall number of violent CFS and the calls in group 2 were below the normal range in the immediate area surrounding the cameras during the CCTV pilot project. At this stage in the analysis however, it is difficult to quantify the apparent reduction by call type given the natural variability in the data and the small number of CFS in several of these groups. However, this analysis provides some indication that the more serious violent CFS may have been impacted by this intervention strategy within 100 metres of the camera locations. Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations? While a number of downloads were requested to assist in criminal investigations, further analysis would be required to assess how useful these recordings were to investigators.

61

Note on this Assessment Dealing with perceptions of crime, particularly fear of crime, is as important as reducing crime. Fear of crime affects quality of life and may have negative economic outcomes. It can also affect community cohesiveness and neighbourhood incivility. In addition to accounting for the change in crime in the area, future initiatives of this nature should involve properly structured surveys and strategies for surveying residents before and after the initiative to gauge the potential for improved perceptions of crime in the intervention area. Arguably, the most significant challenge in assessing the impact of this initiative is accounting for changes in population. Without standardizing the crime data as rates, the true crime picture remains unknown. For example, it is possible that the crime trend is increasing at a slower rate than the growing demands for services and population in the area. In this case, the risk of victimization may actually be decreasing despite an increase in the overall number of CFS. Further analysis is also warranted to explore other local initiatives or Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategies that may have also focused in this area during the study period. Although CFS data provides a good indication of where crime tends to concentrate, not all calls result in a crime. CFS data is, however, readily available over a long period of time and is spatially-referenced for mapping. Actual reported incidents of violent crimes such as shootings and street robberies were not included in this analysis due to a lack of geo-coded data (spatially referenced information). Future analyses of this nature would benefit from making use of violent crimes in addition to violent CFS data. In addition to preventing or deterring violent crime, CCTV cameras may affect nonviolent crimes such as theft of vehicle or theft from vehicle. Due to a lack of geo-coded or spatially referenced data, these crimes were not evaluated as possible residual outcomes of the CCTV initiative. Further analysis is required to assess other local initiatives that may have contributed to the change in crime in the area over time. For example, increased police patrols in the intervention area may result in a higher number of reported crimes that would otherwise be unnoticed. Although it is not possible to separate out the effects of crime reduction strategies, it is important to account for additional factors that may have contributed to any changes in the crime picture during the pilot project.

62

Appendix A

63

Appendix B

Definition for Violent Calls-for-Service Violent Calls-for-Service include the following ICAD Event Types:

- Assault - Assault just Occurred - Assist P.C. - Assault in Progress - Indecent Exposure just Occurred - Fight - Hold-up - Hold-up Alarm - Homicide - Indecent Exposure - Person with a Gun - Person with a Knife - Robbery - Sexual Assault - Shooting - Sound of Gunshot - Stabbing - Unknown Trouble - Wounding

64

CCTV Pilot Project: 42 Division (Tapscott and Neilson)

Final Review

For the Period

May through October 2007

Analysis Requested by: Analysis by: Report Prepared by: Date Prepared: Date Effective:

S/Sgt. Mark Barkley (1470) Communications Services Crime Information Analysis Unit (CIAU) Kristi Tayles, M.S.A. (86570) Friday, November 29, 2008 Friday, November 29, 2008

65

Executive Summary The Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) is a Toronto Police Service initiativefunded by the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Servicesto create and sustain safe neighborhoods. TAVIS aims to reduce violent crime, increase community safety and improve the quality of life in Toronto neighborhoods. It is comprised of a number Servicewide strategies and ongoing initiatives, including the Bail Compliance Program and Rapid Response Teams, as well as focused initiatives in each of Torontos 17 divisions. This report is an assessment of another TAVIS initiative involving Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras in 42 Division. It aims to evaluate the impact of the cameras on the demands for policing services in the Tapscott and Neilson area during the six-month pilot project from May through October 2007.

66

Background As an intervention aimed at reducing crime, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) initiated a pilot project to evaluate the effectiveness of closed circuit television (CCTV). CCTV is viewed as a technique of formal surveillance and has been known to reduce crime to a certain extent. CCTV cameras were installed at identified areas in the Tapscott and Neilson area on April 30th, 2007 (see Appendix A). The objective was to prevent or reduce violent crime that has been found to concentrate in the area. In accordance with the guidelines issued by the office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, recorded images have been viewed by police only in the event of a reported incident. Images recorded by the camera were retained for a period of 72 hours, and then recorded over unless viewed in relation to an incident. On October 31st, 2007, the cameras were removed at the completion of the six-month pilot project.

Objective This report assesses the impact of CCTV on the demands for policing services relating to violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) in the Tapscott and Neilson area during the six-month pilot project from May through October 2007. Data for this analysis includes all CFS of a violent nature such as assaults, fights, hold-ups, shootings, stabbings, robberies, etc. (see Appendix B). The main objective of this report is to measure the impact of the cameras on the following outcomes: Dispersion: The dispersion (or diffusion) of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime and disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing crime to spread out. Displacement: The geographical displacement of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime or disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing offenders to move to other facilities or areas. Reduction: An overall reduction in crime, which occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention areas. Evidence Gained: The number of recordings/downloads where evidence was gained to assist in a criminal investigation.

To address these outcomes, several questions were developed to direct the study: Did CCTV deter crime? Did CCTV reduce crime? Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations?

67

Did CCTV deter crime? A number of methods and techniques were used to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the Tapscott and Neilson area during the six-month pilot project. These involved measures of dispersion and displacement. Dispersion The first steps to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the intervention area were statistical tests for clustering and dispersion. These tests were used to reveal whether there were significant hotspots of violent CFS in the intervention area, and whether the concentration of crime in this area spread out during the CCTV pilot project. The average nearest neighbour was first used to test for clustering. This statistic calculates a nearest neighbour index (NNI) based on the average distance from each crime location to its nearest neighbouring incident and compares this distribution of crime data against a random data set of the same sample size. This statistic indicated that there existed significant clustering or hotspots in the intervention area in the periods before, during and after the pilot project. The average nearest neighbour was then used to compare the level of dispersion in the crime data over time. Threshold analysis was used to assess whether the intervention affected crime and disorder opportunities in the area, causing crime to spread out. These findings indicated that violent CFS became considerably more spread out during the CCTV pilot project as compared to the distribution of calls for the same period in recent years. In the six months after the cameras were removed, the calls became slightly more clustered or less spread out as compared with the distribution of calls for the same period in previous years. Displacement The next step to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV involved measures of displacement focused on the movement of crime or disorder from the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras. While dispersion tests for the diffusion of crime in the intervention area, displacement refers to an overall shift in the concentration or hotspot from the immediate area to other facilities or areas. One measure of geographical displacement is the mean centre point. It identifies the geographic centre or the centre of concentration for a set of data. These mean centres can be used to generally indicate that crime has a greater tendency to occur in certain parts of a study area. Here, the mean centre point for each year was used as a relative measure to compare spatial distributions of violent CFS for different periods of time. A significant shift in the mean centre during the pilot project would indicate that the initiative may have successfully deterred CFS from the area. In comparing mean centres during the same period for the years 1998-2008, the positioning of these points indicated that violent CFS during the pilot period experienced a subtle shift eastward and southward within the intervention area. In the six-month period after the cameras

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were removed, there was a subtle shift northward in the distribution of calls as compared with the same six-month period in previous years. Hotspot Analysis While these measures of dispersion and displacement help explain the general patterns in the CFS data, they do not indicate where the clustering of calls occurred geographically. Therefore, a series of maps were generated to highlight the camera locations in relation to areas of high violent CFS concentration to illustrate any changes in the distribution of calls during the pilot project. Hotspot analysis revealed that CFS activity for the period May through October was relatively consistent from 1999-2006. For that reason, hotspot maps presented here only illustrate changes in the concentration of calls in recent years (2005-2007). Map 1. Violent Call-for-Service Hotspots (May-October 2005)

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Map 2. Violent Call-for-Service Hotspots (May-October 2006)

Map 3. Violent Call-for-Service during CCTV pilot project (May-October 2007)

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While there has been some movement in the concentration of calls, significant localization of hotspots has persisted in the same general areas over time. As shown, the concentration of violent calls coincided with CCTV locations before and during the pilot project. This map series also supports a possible spreading/displacement of crime in the intervention area. The hotspots or red areas appear to have spread eastward and southward from the immediate camera locations to cover a larger area. Further analysis is required to identify changes in the local environment that may have contributed to this change. Map 4 shows the concentration of calls in the sixmonth period after the cameras were removed. Map 4. Violent Call-for-Service after CCTV pilot project (November-April 2008)

The distribution of violent calls after the project is relatively consistent with the distribution of calls for the same period in recent years (November-April). The distribution of calls in this period is more clustered than during the CCTV pilot project. Summary of Findings Based on the distribution of violent CFS during the pilot project, CCTV may have had a deterrent effect on violent crime in the area. Violent CFS became considerably more spread out during the CCTV pilot project as compared to the distribution of calls for the same period in recent years. This is also evident in the map series which supports a possible spreading/displacement of crime in the intervention area. The hotspots or red areas appear to have spread eastward and southward from the immediate camera locations to cover a larger area.

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Further analysis is required to identify other factors that may have influenced the concentration of crime during this period. Did CCTV reduce crime? An overall reduction in crime occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention area. To measure the net effect of the cameras on the demands for policing service in the Tapscott and Neilson area, the level of CFS for the six-month period from May through October were compared with previous years (1998-2008). Violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) For the period May through October, beginning in 1999, violent CFS showed a variable trend in both the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras and in the 8.8 square kilometre area around the cameras at Tapscott and Neilson (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Violent Calls-for-Service in the Tapscott and Neilson area, for May through October (1999-2007)
400 350 Number of Violent CFS 300 250 200 150 100 50 0
19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07

Within 250m of CCTV cameras Within 8.8 sq.km. of Tapscott and Neilson

Changes in the environmental landscape have contributed to this inconsistent trend over time. These may include development, demographics and changes in land-use. Due to the difficulties in capturing these changes, the following statistics have not been standardized to reflect a crime ratewhich is often a better gauge of crime and the risk of victimization. Despite this limitation, threshold analysis was used to assess whether the number of calls was considered to be within an expected level or normal range given the natural crime trend. Statistical software was used to determine the predicted value and a margin of error of calls for each year in order to identify an upper and lower limit or normal range of CFS. Within 250 metres of the cameras, the overall number of violent CFS was within the normal threshold during

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the CCTV pilot project. In the surrounding 8.8 square kilometres, the number of calls was above the normal range. This may suggest that CCTV had an effect on the overall number of VCFS given that the number of calls in the intervention area did not increase proportional to its surroundings. Further analysis may be warranted to explore the apparent variability in the data over time. While the overall number of calls was in the normal range during the pilot project, certain call types did not adhere to this pattern. For further analysis, the calls were divided into the following categories based on the level of risk to the community: Group 1: Homicide, Shooting, Stabbing, Wounding, Sexual Assault Group 2: Assault in Progress, Person with a Gun, Person with a Knife, Robbery, Sound of Gunshot Group 3: Assault, Assault just Occurred, Assist Police Constable, Fight Group 4: Indecent Exposure Group 5: Unknown Trouble

The following table summarizes the demands for policing within 250 metres of the cameras by call type during the pilot project. Based on threshold analysis, red values indicate categories that were above the normal range and blue values highlight groups that were below the normal threshold. Note that when dealing with small numbers, small changes can appear to be significant.

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Table 1. Violent Calls-for-Service within 250m of CCTV cameras in the Tapscott and Neilson area (May through October)
Group Call Type 1 Homicide Sexual Assault Shooting Stabbing Wounding 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 6 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 6 4 3 2 2 3 0 2 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 6 8 5 10 9 8 9 11 8 4 2 6 4 8 2 6 3 3 3 0 0 4 4 0 4 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 10 6 7 7 3 11 2 12 7 16 14 19 9 13 21 11 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 2 4 5 8 5 10 13 5 7 2 4 5 8 5 10 13 25 22 27 31 39 27 29 44 33

Total 2 Assault I/Prog Holdup Holdup Alarm Person W A Gun Person W A Kni Robbery Snd Of Gunshot Total 3 Assault Assault J/Occ Assist P.C. Fight Total 4 Ind Exp Oj/Occ Indecent Expo Total 5 Unknown Trble Total Grand Total

As shown, the cameras did not appear to have had a significant effect on reducing the number of violent CFS within 250 metres of the camera locations. With the exception of calls in group 5 which were above normal, the numbers of calls were in the normal range. Given the small numbers in several of these groups, conclusions drawn from this threshold analysis are limited. In intervals of 50 metres from the cameras, however, the more serious calls in group 2 may have been affected by the CCTV initiative. Table 2 indicates whether the number of violent calls-forservice during the CCTV pilot project were above, below or within the normal or expected range with increasing distance from the camera locations.

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Table 2. Violent Calls-for-Service with increasing distance from CCTV cameras in the Tapscott and Neilson area during the pilot project (May through October)
Distance from Cameras (m) 50 100 150 200 250
All Violent Calls Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Expected Number of Calls Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Normal Normal Below Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Below

Group 4 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Group 5 Normal Above Above Above Above

Table 2 suggests that CCTV had a minimal effect on the most serious calls in the immediate area surrounding the cameras. In general, the number of violent calls within 50 metres of the cameras was within the normal range during the pilot project. Again, given the natural variability in the data and the small number of calls in several of these groups, conclusions drawn from this threshold analysis are limited. In the six-month period after the cameras were removed, the number of calls within 250 metres of the cameras were within normal range. Table 3 summarizes call activity in the same period after the completion of the project. Table 3. Violent Calls-for-Service with increasing distance from CCTV cameras in the Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate area after the pilot project (November through April)
Distance from Cameras (m) 50 100 150 200 250
All Violent Calls Below Below Below Normal Below

Expected Number of Calls Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Normal Normal Below Normal Normal Below Normal Below Above Normal Normal Below Normal Below Above

Group 4 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Group 5 Normal Below Below Normal Below

In this period, the overall number of calls and calls in group 2 were below the normal threshold in the immediate 50 metres of the camera locations. The variability between the two periods during and after requires further evaluation. Summary of Findings These findings indicate that the overall number of violent CFS and the calls in group 2 were below the normal range in the immediate area surrounding the cameras during the CCTV pilot project. At this stage in the analysis however, it is difficult to quantify the apparent reduction by call type given the natural variability in the data and the small number of CFS in several of these groups. However, this analysis provides some indication that the more serious violent CFS may have been impacted by this intervention strategy within 100 metres of the camera locations.

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Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations? During the six-month pilot project, a total of eleven downloads were used to assist in seven criminal investigations from both CCTV systems in 42 Division (Victoria Park and Morcambe Gate; and Sewells and Neilson)five of which were Robberies, one shooting, and one Aggravated Assault.

Final Summary Did CCTV deter crime? Based on the distribution of violent CFS during the pilot project, CCTV may have had a deterrent effect on violent crime in the area. Although there was little evidence of crime spreading out in the intervention area, there was an overall shift in the concentration of violent CFS. The geographical displacement from the immediate area surrounding the cameras suggests that the intervention affected crime and disorder opportunities in the area, causing offenders to move to other facilities or areas. Further analysis is required to assess whether the apparent shift is related to the volume of calls during the pilot project and/or local initiatives in the area. Did CCTV reduce crime? This analysis indicates that the overall number of violent CFS and the calls in group 2 were below the normal range in the immediate area surrounding the cameras during the CCTV pilot project. At this stage in the analysis however, it is difficult to quantify the apparent reduction by call type given the natural variability in the data and the small number of CFS in several of these groups. However, this analysis provides some indication that the more serious violent CFS may have been impacted by this intervention strategy within 100 metres of the camera locations. Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations? While a number of downloads were requested to assist in criminal investigations, further analysis would be required to assess how useful these recordings were to investigators.

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Note on this Assessment Dealing with perceptions of crime, particularly fear of crime, is as important as reducing crime. Fear of crime affects quality of life and may have negative economic outcomes. It can also affect community cohesiveness and neighbourhood incivility. In addition to accounting for the change in crime in the area, future initiatives of this nature should involve properly structured surveys and strategies for surveying residents before and after the initiative to gauge the potential for improved perceptions of crime in the intervention area. Arguably, the most significant challenge in assessing the impact of this initiative is accounting for changes in population. Without standardizing the crime data as rates, the true crime picture remains unknown. For example, it is possible that the crime trend is increasing at a slower rate than the growing demands for services and population in the area. In this case, the risk of victimization may actually be decreasing despite an increase in the overall number of CFS. Further analysis is also warranted to explore other local initiatives or Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategies that may have also focused in this area during the study period. Although CFS data provides a good indication of where crime tends to concentrate, not all calls result in a crime. CFS data is, however, readily available over a long period of time and is spatially-referenced for mapping. Actual reported incidents of violent crimes such as shootings and street robberies were not included in this analysis due to a lack of geo-coded data (spatially referenced information). Future analyses of this nature would benefit from making use of violent crimes in addition to violent CFS data. In addition to preventing or deterring violent crime, CCTV cameras may affect nonviolent crimes such as theft of vehicle or theft from vehicle. Due to a lack of geo-coded or spatially referenced data, these crimes were not evaluated as possible residual outcomes of the CCTV initiative. Further analysis is required to assess other local initiatives that may have contributed to the change in crime in the area over time. For example, increased police patrols in the intervention area may result in a higher number of reported crimes that would otherwise be unnoticed. Although it is not possible to separate out the effects of crime reduction strategies, it is important to account for additional factors that may have contributed to any changes in the crime picture during the pilot project.

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Appendix A

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Appendix B

Definition for Violent Calls-for-Service Violent Calls-for-Service include the following ICAD Event Types:

- Assault - Assault just Occurred - Assist P.C. - Assault in Progress - Indecent Exposure just Occurred - Fight - Hold-up - Hold-up Alarm - Homicide - Indecent Exposure - Person with a Gun - Person with a Knife - Robbery - Sexual Assault - Shooting - Sound of Gunshot - Stabbing - Unknown Trouble - Wounding

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CCTV Pilot Project: Real-Time Monitoring in District

Analysis Requested by: Analysis by: Report Prepared by: Date Prepared: Date Effective:

S/Sgt. Mark Barkley (1470) Communications Services Crime Information Analysis Unit (CIAU) Kristi Tayles, M.S.A. (86570) Friday, November 29, 2008 Friday, November 29, 2008

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Executive Summary The Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) is a Toronto Police Service initiativefunded by the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Servicesto create and sustain safe neighborhoods. TAVIS aims to reduce violent crime, increase community safety and improve the quality of life in Toronto neighborhoods. It is comprised of a number Servicewide strategies and ongoing initiatives, including the Bail Compliance Program and Rapid Response Teams, as well as focused initiatives in each of Torontos 17 divisions. This report is an assessment of another TAVIS initiative involving Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras in 52 Division. It aims to evaluate the impact of real-time monitoring on the demands for policing services in the area during peak hours from May through August 2008.

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Background As an intervention aimed at reducing crime, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) initiated a pilot project to evaluate the effectiveness of closed circuit television (CCTV). CCTV is viewed as a technique of formal surveillance and has been known to reduce crime to a certain extent. CCTV cameras were installed at identified areas in the Entertainment District on April 30th, 2007 (see Appendix A). The objective was to prevent or reduce violent crime that has been found to concentrate in the area. In accordance with the guidelines issued by the office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, recorded images have been viewed by police only in the event of a reported incident. Images recorded by the camera are retained for a period of 72 hours, and then recorded over unless viewed in relation to an incident. In the early stages of the project, evaluation of the demands for policing service in the area showed a seasonal trend with increased demands relating to violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) in the summer months. As a result, the Toronto Police Service explored the viability of implementing real-time monitoring of closed circuit installments in the area for the months May to October 2008. A time analysis was conducted to identify peak hours and days of the week that experienced the greatest volume of violent calls in the immediate area surrounding the cameras (see Time Analysis of CCTV Locations in The Entertainment District, TPS). On May 15th, 2008, the Service began real-time monitoring of the cameras on Friday and Saturday nights between 22:00 and 04:00.

Objective This report assesses the impact of CCTV during real-time monitoring on the demands for policing services relating to violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) during the months May through August. Data for this analysis includes all CFS of a violent nature such as assaults, fights, holdups, shootings, stabbings, robberies, etc. (see Appendix B). The main objective of this report is to measure the impact of this initiative on the following outcomes: Dispersion: The dispersion (or diffusion) of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime and disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing crime to spread out. Displacement: The geographical displacement of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime or disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing offenders to move to other facilities or areas. Volume of Violent CFS: Although an overall reduction in crime occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention area, an increase in crime occurs when real-time monitoring results in police-initiated calls that would otherwise be unreported.

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Evidence Gained: The number of recordings/downloads where evidence was gained to assist in a criminal investigation.

To address these outcomes, several questions were developed to direct the study: Does CCTV deter crime during peak hours? How does real-time monitoring affect the demands for policing services? Does CCTV assist in criminal investigations during peak hours?

Does CCTV deter crime during peak hours? A number of methods and techniques were used to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the Entertainment District during peak hours for the period May through August. These involved measures of dispersion and displacement. Dispersion The first steps to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the intervention area were statistical tests for clustering and dispersion. These tests were used to reveal whether there were significant hotspots of violent CFS in the intervention area, and whether the concentration of crime in this area spread out during real-time monitoring in 2008. The average nearest neighbour was first used to test for clustering. This statistic calculates a nearest neighbour index (NNI) based on the average distance from each crime location to its nearest neighbouring incident and compares this distribution of crime data against a random data set of the same sample size. This statistic indicated that there existed significant clustering or hotspots in the intervention area during peak hours. The average nearest neighbour was then used to compare the level of clustering or dispersion in the crime data over time. Threshold analysis was used to assess whether the intervention affected crime and disorder opportunities in the area, causing crime to spread out. These findings indicated that there was little diffusion or spreading of crime from the camera locations for this period in 2007. During the period of real-time monitoring, calls actually became slightly more concentrated in the intervention area. Displacement The next step to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV involved measures of displacement focused on the movement of crime or disorder from the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras. While dispersion tests for the diffusion of crime in the intervention area, displacement refers to an overall shift in the concentration or hotspot from the immediate area to other facilities or areas. One measure of geographical displacement is the mean centre point. It identifies the geographic centre or the centre of concentration for a set of data. These mean centres can be used to

83

generally indicate that crime has a greater tendency to occur in certain parts of a study area. Here, the mean centre point for each year was used as a relative measure to compare spatial distributions of violent CFS for different periods of time. A significant shift in the mean centre during the pilot project would indicate that the initiative may have successfully deterred crime from the area. In comparing mean centres during the same period for the years 1998-2008, the positioning of these points indicated that violent CFS during real-time monitoring experienced a subtle shift northward and westward within the intervention area. Due to the variable nature of crime in this area however, these changes may not be significant. Hotspot Analysis While these measures of dispersion and displacement help explain the general patterns in the CFS data, they do not indicate where the clustering of calls occurred geographically. Therefore, a series of maps were generated to highlight the camera locations in relation to areas of high violent CFS concentration to illustrate any changes in the distribution of calls during real-time monitoring. Hotspot analysis revealed that CFS activity was relatively consistent from 19992006. For that reason, hotspot maps presented here only illustrate changes in the concentration of calls before and during the real-time monitoring (2006-2008).

Map 1. Violent Calls-for-Service during peak hours (May-August 2006)

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Map 2. Violent Calls-for-Service during peak hours (May-August 2007)

Map 3. Violent Calls-for-Service during real-time monitoring (May-August 2008)

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While there has been some movement in the concentration of calls, significant localization of hotspots has persisted in the same general areas over time. As shown, the concentration of violent calls during peak hours for the months May through August coincided with CCTV locations before and during the real-time monitoring. Although the increase in the concentration of calls in the intervention area is not evident in this map series, Map 3 does show a subtle westward shift in the concentration of calls during real-time monitoring. Summary of Findings During real-time monitoring in 2008, there was no evidence of diffusion of crime in the intervention area, but some evidence that violent calls experienced a westward shift. Despite this change, the fact that the concentration of calls remained consistent with the camera locations suggests that real-time monitoring did not have a deterrent effect on violent crime. Further analysis is required to identify other factors that may have influenced the concentration of crime during this period.

How does real-time monitoring affect the demands for policing services? Although an overall reduction in crime occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention area, an increase in crime occurs when real-time monitoring results in police-initiated calls that would otherwise be unreported. In other words, while the net effect of the cameras is a possible reduction in violent CFS, the outcome of monitoring activity via the CCTV cameras and responding to events is a possible increase in reported crime. To measure the impact of live-monitoring on the demands for policing service in the Entertainment District, the level of violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) during peak times Friday and Saturday nights between 22:00 and 04:00 from May through Augustwere compared with previous years (1998-2008). Violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) During peak hours for this period, beginning in 1998, violent CFS showed an upward trend in both the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras and in the 5.5 square kilometre area around the Entertainment District (Figure 1).

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Figure 1. Violent Calls-for-Service in the Entertainment District on Friday and Saturday nights between 22:00 and 04:00, May to October (1998-2008)
400

350 Number of Violent CFS 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08

Within 250m of CCTV cameras Within 5.5 sq.km. of Entertainment District

Changes in the environmental landscape have contributed to the rising demands for policing services in the area over time. These may include development, population growth, increased tourism, and growth in the service industry. Due to the difficulties in capturing these changes, particularly the demands for entertainment services and tourism in this area during peak times, the following statistics have not been standardized to reflect a crime ratewhich is often a better gauge of crime and the risk of victimization. Despite this limitation, threshold analysis was used to assess whether the number of calls was considered to be within an expected level or normal range given the natural crime trend. Given the increasing trend, statistical software was used to determine the predicted value and a margin of error of calls for each year in order to identify an upper and lower limit or normal range of CFS. The overall number of violent CFS during peak times in 2008 was above the normal threshold. However, the increase in calls or reported crime may be in part attributable to the 86 police-initiated calls generated by monitoring the cameras and responding to events that may have otherwise been unreported. Although the type of call was not recorded in all cases, the majority of these calls were dispatched as Unknown Trouble which is among the violent call types included in this analysis.

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Although the overall number of violent CFS in the intervention area was above the normal threshold during real-time monitoring, certain call types did not adhere to this pattern. For further analysis, the calls were divided into the following categories based on the level of risk to the community: Group 1: Homicide, Shooting, Stabbing, Wounding, Sexual Assault Group 2: Assault in Progress, Person with a Gun, Person with a Knife, Robbery, Sound of Gunshot Group 3: Assault, Assault just Occurred, Assist Police Constable, Fight Group 4: Indecent Exposure Group 5: Unknown Trouble

On average, the majority of calls during peak hours in the Entertainment District included Fights, Assaults and Unknown Trouble calls. During real-time monitoring in 2008: Group 1 represented less than 0.01% of violent CFS; Group 2 represented 7% of violent CFS; Group 3 represented 84% of violent CFS; Group 4 represented less than 0.01% of violent CFS; and Group 5 represented 9% of violent CFS within 250m of the camera locations.

During peak hours, the following table summarizes the demands for policing within 250 metres of the cameras by call type. Based on threshold analysis, red values in Table 1 indicate categories that were above the normal range. Note that when dealing with small numbers, small changes can appear to be significant.

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Table 1. Violent Calls-for-Service within 250m of CCTV cameras in the Entertainment District during peak hours (May-August, 1998-2008)
Group Call Type 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2 0 1 0 3 3 3 1 1 0 8 11 8 3 54 76 1 1 7 7 0 0 2 0 2 4 3 2 2 0 11 15 13 1 32 61 0 0 6 6 2 0 0 0 2 5 3 1 3 1 13 20 17 0 47 84 1 1 8 8 1 1 0 0 2 3 3 3 1 2 12 14 12 3 38 67 0 0 10 10 0 0 1 1 2 5 2 1 4 0 12 6 7 1 54 68 0 0 9 9 1 0 1 0 2 4 2 2 3 0 11 15 11 3 70 99 0 0 6 6 0 2 0 0 2 5 2 1 1 0 9 14 17 1 82 114 0 0 16 16 0 1 2 1 4 6 5 1 1 1 14 30 12 3 70 115 0 0 11 11 3 0 1 0 4 7 5 2 2 0 16 14 19 1 83 117 0 0 8 8 2 1 1 0 4 6 3 2 1 1 13 8 21 4 104 1 0 0 0 1 3 2 1 3 4 13 25 23 1 107

1 Sexual Assault Shooting Stabbing Wounding

Total

2 Assault In Progress Person with a Gun Person with a Knife Robbery Sound of Gunshot
Total

3 Assault Assault just Occurred Assist P.C. Fight Total 4 Indecent Exposure
Total

137
0 0 15 15

156
0 0 17

5 Unknown Trouble Total

Grand Total

95

80

108

91

91

118

141

144

145

169

17 187

As shown, the number of violent CFS in groups 3 and 5 were above the normal range in the 250 meter area surrounding the camera locations. In intervals of 50 metres from the cameras, the overall number of calls and calls in group 3 were above normal in all but the immediate 50 metreswhich were in the normal range. Unknown Trouble calls were significantly above the normal threshold in each 50 meter interval up to 250 metres from the camera locations. Due to the small numbers in Groups 1, 2 and 4, little can be done to gauge the impact of real-time monitoring on these particular call types. That being said, the overall number of violent CFS in Group 1 was lower than in previous years. Summary of Findings During peak hours in 2008, the total number of violent CFS was above the expected level in the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras. Given the number of police-initiated calls while monitoring the cameras and responding to events, this increase is likely the result of realtime monitoring. Further evaluation is required to identify the number or percentage of policeinitiated calls that were violent in nature.

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Does CCTV assist in criminal investigations during peak hours? During peak hours, a total of nineteen recordings/downloads were requested for the purpose of assisting in criminal investigationsincluding Assault Bodily Harm (ABH), Assault, Assault Police, Cause Disturbance, Crowd Run (Caribana), Homicide, Obstruct Police, Sexual Assault, Shooting, Special Investigation Unit (SIU), and Threaten Death/Assault (Table 2).

Table 2. Downloads for Criminal Investigations

Event ABH Assault Assault Police Cause Disturbance Crowd Run Homicide Obstruct Police Sexual Assault Shooting SIU Investigation Threaten Death/Assault Evidence Requested

1 4 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 1

Video evidence from one such request was used by the Special Investigation Unit to clear two officers. The mental stress avoided by the officers and cost savings that was averted from a trial is difficult to quantify. Further analysis is required to identify which of the remaining downloads also assisted in investigations. In addition to requests for recordings/downloads to support investigative work, real-time monitoring resulted in: 86 police-initiated calls that may have otherwise been unreported. Intelligence gathered from these events may be critical to future investigations; and 38 CPIC hits on the 2,642 vehicle plates checked. These included a stolen vehicle, persons armed and dangerous, persons under surveillance, possible impaired, known gang members, suspended driver, no match to plate, etc.

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Table 3 provides a summary of events that were monitored in real-time via the CCTV cameras during peak times from May 15th through August 2008.

Table 2. Events monitored in real-time, May-August 2008

Event Arrests Assault Police Assaults Assist Police Constable Crowd Disroderly Drinking in Auto Drugs Drunks Fights Impaired Driving Medical Calls Mischief Person/Vehicle Investigation Resist Arrest Robbery Sexual Assault Shooting Stabbing Theft Theft from Auto Threatening Traffic Problem Unknown Calls resulting in Arrests TOTAL Number of Incidents 43 2 7 2 9 20 1 7 34 98 4 11 3 9 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 9 4 98 373

Concluding Remarks During real-time monitoring in 2008, there was no evidence of diffusion of crime in the intervention area, but some evidence that violent calls had experienced a westward shift. Despite this shift, the concentration of violent CFS remained consistent with the camera locations, suggesting that real-time monitoring did not have a deterrent effect on violent CFS. Although the total number of violent CFS was above the expected level in the immediate area of the cameras, given the number of police-initiated calls while monitoring the cameras, it is possible that this increase was the result of real-time monitoring. In other words, the volume of calls may have been below or within the normal range in the absence of live-monitoring. Finally, a number of downloads were requested to assist in criminal investigations, one of which was used to clear two officers in a SIU investigation. At this stage it is difficult to quantify the value of these requests without further evaluation. In addition to requests for 91

recordings/downloads for investigative work, real-time monitoring resulted in a substantial number of calls that may have otherwise been unreported, and a number of CPIC hits on vehicle plates.

Note on this Assessment Arguably, the most significant challenge in assessing the impact of this initiative is accounting for growth in the Entertainment District. Without standardizing the crime data as rates, the true crime picture remains unknown. For example, it is possible that the rising crime trend is increasing at a slower rate than the growing demands for entertainment services and night-time population. In this case, the risk of victimization may actually be decreasing despite the increase in the overall number of CFS. Further analysis is also warranted to explore other local initiatives or Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategies that may have also focused in this area during the study period. Although CFS data provides a good indication of where crime tends to concentrate, not all calls result in a crime. CFS data is, however, readily available over a long period of time and is spatially-referenced for mapping. Actual reported incidents of violent crimes such as shootings and street robberies were not included in this analysis due to a lack of geo-coded data (spatially referenced information). Future analyses of this nature would benefit from making use of violent crimes in addition to violent CFS data. In addition to preventing or deterring violent crime, CCTV cameras may affect nonviolent crimes such as theft of vehicle or theft from vehicle. Due to a lack of geo-coded or spatially referenced data, these crimes were not evaluated as possible residual outcomes of the CCTV initiative.

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Appendix A

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Appendix B

Definition for Violent Calls-for-Service Violent Calls-for-Service include the following ICAD Event Types:

- Assault - Assault just Occurred - Assist P.C. - Assault in Progress - Indecent Exposure just Occurred - Fight - Hold-up - Hold-up Alarm - Homicide - Indecent Exposure - Person with a Gun - Person with a Knife - Robbery - Sexual Assault - Shooting - Sound of Gunshot - Stabbing - Unknown Trouble - Wounding

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CCTV Pilot Project: 52 Division (The Entertainment District)

Final Review

For the Period

May 2007 through April 2008

Analysis Requested by: Analysis by: Report Prepared by: Date Prepared: Date Effective:

S/Sgt. Mark Barkley (1470) Communications Services Crime Information Analysis Unit (CIAU) Kristi Tayles, M.S.A. (86570) Friday, November 29, 2008 Friday, November 29, 2008 95

Executive Summary The Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) is a Toronto Police Service initiativefunded by the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Servicesto create and sustain safe neighborhoods. TAVIS aims to reduce violent crime, increase community safety and improve the quality of life in Toronto neighborhoods. It is comprised of a number Servicewide strategies and ongoing initiatives, including the Bail Compliance Program and Rapid Response Teams, as well as focused initiatives in each of Torontos 17 divisions. This report is an assessment of another TAVIS initiative involving Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras in 52 Division. It aims to evaluate the impact of the cameras on the demands for policing services in the area during the first year of the CCTV pilot project from May 2007 through April 2008.

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Background As an intervention aimed at reducing crime, the Toronto Police Service (TPS) initiated a pilot project to evaluate the effectiveness of closed circuit television (CCTV). CCTV is viewed as a technique of formal surveillance and has been known to reduce crime to a certain extent. CCTV cameras were installed at identified areas in the Entertainment District on April 30th, 2007 (see Appendix A). The objective was to prevent or reduce violent crime that has been found to concentrate in the area. In accordance with the guidelines issued by the office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, recorded images have been viewed by police only in the event of a reported incident. Images recorded by the camera are retained for a period of 72 hours, and then recorded over unless viewed in relation to an incident. In the early stages of the project, evaluation of the demands for policing service in the area showed a seasonal trend with increased demands relating to violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) in the summer months. As a result, the Toronto Police Service explored the viability of implementing real-time monitoring of closed circuit installments in the area for the months May to October 2008. A time analysis was conducted to identify peak hours and days of the week that experienced the greatest volume of violent calls in the immediate area surrounding the cameras (see Time Analysis of CCTV Locations in The Entertainment District, TPS). On May 15th, 2008, the Service began real-time monitoring of the cameras on Friday and Saturday nights between 22:00 and 04:00.

Objective This report assesses the impact of CCTV on the demands for policing services relating to violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) prior to real-time monitoringfrom May 2007 through April 2008. Data for this analysis includes all CFS of a violent nature such as assaults, fights, hold-ups, shootings, stabbings, robberies, etc. (see Appendix B). The main objective of this report is to measure the impact of the cameras on the following outcomes: Dispersion: The dispersion (or diffusion) of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime and disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing crime to spread out. Displacement: The geographical displacement of crime, which occurs when the intervention affects crime or disorder opportunities at a facility or in an area, causing offenders to move to other facilities or areas. Reduction: An overall reduction in crime, which occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention areas. Evidence Gained: The number of recordings/downloads where evidence was gained to assist in a criminal investigation.

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Due to the increase in violent crime and violent crime calls in the Entertainment District during summer months, these outcomes were measured for the following two six-month periods: Period 1: May 2007 October 2007 Period 2: November 2007 April 2008 To address these outcomes, several questions were developed to direct the study: Did CCTV deter crime? Did CCTV reduce crime? Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations?

Did CCTV deter crime? A number of methods and techniques were used to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the Entertainment District during the first year of the pilot project. These involved measures of dispersion and displacement. Dispersion The first steps to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV in the intervention area were statistical tests for clustering and dispersion. These tests were used to reveal whether there were significant hotspots of violent CFS in the intervention area, and whether the concentration of crime in this area spread out during the CCTV pilot project. The average nearest neighbour was first used to test for clustering. This statistic calculates a nearest neighbour index (NNI) based on the average distance from each crime location to its nearest neighbouring incident and compares this distribution of crime data against a random data set of the same sample size. This statistic indicated that there existed significant clustering or hotspots in the intervention area in both Period 1 and Period 2. The average nearest neighbour was then used to compare the level of dispersion in the crime data over time. Threshold analysis was used to assess whether the intervention affected crime and disorder opportunities in the area, causing crime to spread out. These findings indicated that violent CFS became more spread out in the intervention area in Period 1. During Period 2, there was no evidence of diffusion or spreading of crime from the camera locations. Displacement The next step to measure the deterrent effect of CCTV involved measures of displacement focused on the movement of crime or disorder from the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras. While dispersion tests for the diffusion of crime in the intervention area, displacement refers to an overall shift in the concentration or hotspot from the immediate area to other facilities or areas.

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One measure of geographical displacement is the mean centre point. It identifies the geographic centre or the centre of concentration for a set of data. These mean centres can be used to generally indicate that crime has a greater tendency to occur in certain parts of a study area. Here, the mean centre point for each year was used as a relative measure to compare spatial distributions of violent CFS for different periods of time. A significant shift in the mean centre during the pilot project would indicate that the initiative may have successfully deterred CFS from the area. In comparing mean centres during the same periods for the years 1998-2008, the positioning of these points indicated that violent CFS during Period 1 experienced a subtle shift southward and westward within the intervention area. In period 2, there was a shift southward in the distribution of calls as compared with the same six-month period in previous years. Due to the variable nature of crime in this area however, these changes may not be significant. Hotspot Analysis While these measures of dispersion and displacement help explain the general patterns in the CFS data, they do not indicate where the clustering of calls occurred geographically. Therefore, a series of hotspot maps were generated to highlight the camera locations in relation to areas of high violent CFS concentration to illustrate any changes in the distribution of calls during the pilot project. Hotspot analysis revealed that Period 1 and Period 2 shared relatively similar patterns of CFS activity over the years. For that reason, hotspot maps presented here are for whole years (May 2007-April 2008) as opposed to six-month periods. Map 1. Violent Call-for-Service Hotspots (May 2005-April 2006)

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Map 2. Violent Call-for-Service Hotspots (May 2006-April 2007)

Map 3. Violent Call-for-Service during CCTV pilot project (May 2007-April 2008)

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While there has been some movement in the concentration of calls, significant localization of hotspots has persisted in the same general areas over time. As shown, the concentration of violent calls coincided with CCTV locations before and during the pilot project. This map series also supports a possible spreading of crime in the intervention area as the red areas appear to have shifted in the immediate areas surrounding the cameras. There also appeared be a greater concentration of calls along the west side of the Entertainment District as compared with previous years. Summary of Findings Based on the distribution of violent CFS in Period 1, CCTV may have had a deterrent effect on violent crime in the area during summer months (May-October 2007). There was some evidence of dispersion and displacement of crime from the immediate areas surrounding the cameras and a subtle westward shift of crime calls in the Entertainment District. Despite this change, however, the fact that the concentration of calls remained consistent with the camera locations suggests that CCTV did not have a significant deterrent effect on violent crime. During Period 2 of the pilot project, there was little evidence of diffusion of crime in the intervention area, but some movement or displacement from the immediate areas surrounding the camera locations. Overall, there appears to have been a general shift in the concentration of crime calls in the area as revealed in the map series. Further analysis is required to assess whether the apparent shift is related to the volume of calls during the pilot project.

Did CCTV reduce crime? An overall reduction in crime occurs when the intervention successfully prevents crime and criminal behaviour in the intervention area. To measure the net effect of the cameras on the demands for policing service in the Entertainment District, the level of CFS for the one year period from May through April were compared with previous years (1999-2008). Violent Calls-for-Service (CFS) For the period May through April, beginning in May of 1999, violent CFS showed an upward trend in both the immediate area surrounding the CCTV cameras and in the 5.5 square kilometre area around the Entertainment District (Figure 1).

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Figure 1. Violent Calls-for-Service in the Entertainment District, for May through April (19992008)
4000 3500 Number of Violent CFS 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0
19 99 -20 00 20 00 -20 01 20 01 -20 02 20 02 -20 03 20 03 -20 04 20 04 -20 05 20 05 -20 06 20 06 -20 07 20 07 -20 08

Within 250m of CCTV cameras Within 5.5 sq.km. of Entertainment District

Changes in the environmental landscape have contributed to the rising demands for policing services in the area over time. These may include development, population growth, increased tourism, and growth in the service industry. Due to the difficulties in capturing these changes, the following statistics have not been standardized to reflect a crime ratewhich is often a better gauge of crime and the risk of victimization. Despite this limitation, threshold analysis was used to assess whether the number of calls was considered to be within an expected level or normal range given the natural crime trend. Given the increasing trend, statistical software was used to determine the predicted value and a margin of error of calls for each year in order to identify an upper and lower limit or normal range of CFS. Within 250 metres of the cameras, the number of calls was within the normal range during the CCTV pilot project. However, there was a significant increase in the number of calls in the surrounding 5.5 sq.km. of the Entertainment Districtwhich was above the normal threshold for the same period. This may suggest that the number of calls in the intervention area did not increase proportional to its surroundings. Further analysis may be warranted to explore the apparent variability in the data over time. For example, local initiatives or Guns & Gangs Task Force projects may have focused on this area in the past and did not occur during the analysis period. Due to the increase in violent crime and violent crime calls in the Entertainment District during summer months, threshold analysis was conducted for the two six-month periodsMay-October 2007 and November 2007April 2008. Figure 2 summarizes the demands for policing within 250 metres of the cameras, highlighting the periods affected by the CCTV pilot project.

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Figure 2. Violent Calls-for-Service within 250m of CCTV camera locations in the Entertainment District for the six-month periods May-October and November-April (1999-2008)
600 Number of Violent CFS 500 400 300 200 100 0
19 99 -20 00 20 00 -20 01 20 01 -20 02 20 02 -20 03 20 03 -20 04 20 04 -20 05 20 05 -20 06 20 06 -20 07 20 07 -20 08

Period 1

Period 2

The overall number of violent CFS during the CCTV initiative was within a normal range during Period 1 and above the normal threshold during Period 2. Certain call types did not adhere to this pattern. For further analysis, the calls were divided into the following categories based on the level of risk to the community: Group 1: Homicide, Shooting, Stabbing, Wounding, Sexual Assault Group 2: Assault in Progress, Person with a Gun, Person with a Knife, Robbery, Sound of Gunshot Group 3: Assault, Assault just Occurred, Assist Police Constable, Fight Group 4: Indecent Exposure Group 5: Unknown Trouble

The following tables summarize the demands for policing within 250 metres of the cameras by call type for Period 1 and for Period 2. Based on threshold analysis, red values indicate categories that were above the normal range and blue values highlight groups that were below the normal threshold. Note that when dealing with small numbers, small changes can appear to be significant.

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Table 1. Violent Calls-for-Service within 250m of CCTV cameras in the Entertainment District during Period 1 (May through October)
Group Call Type 1 Sexual Assault Shooting Stabbing Wounding 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 3 8 3 8 5 5 2 11 8 1 3 3 3 4 5 6 2 1 8 1 0 2 6 3 6 5 4 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 12 14 6 14 15 13 15 18 14 14 17 19 14 15 13 23 19 28 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 2 5 3 5 0 0 0 19 9 12 9 13 11 19 13 8 18 9 12 5 8 6 14 10 6 18 28 21 19 19 9 7 12 14 1 4 4 3 6 6 4 4 5 78 70 70 56 64 50 67 58 61 63 72 53 47 59 60 70 51 49 38 61 53 42 48 75 86 85 67 1 5 4 4 8 3 5 5 6 127 122 118 127 156 236 238 219 227 229 260 228 220 271 374 399 360 349 3 11 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 5 8 3 2 3 3 0 0 0 8 19 4 2 7 3 0 0 0 32 38 52 40 34 63 59 59 65 32 38 52 40 34 63 59 59 65 359 401 360 332 391 503 540 495 489

Total 2 Assault I/Prog Holdup Holdup Alarm Person W A Gun Person W A Kni Robbery Snd Of Gunshot Total 3 Assault Assault J/Occ Assist P.C. Fight Total 4 Ind Exp Oj/Occ Indecent Expo Total 5 Unknown Trble Total Grand Total

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Table 2. Violent Calls-for-Service within 250m of CCTV cameras in the Entertainment District during Period 2 (November through April)
Group Call Type 1 Sexual Assault Shooting Stabbing Wounding 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 5 5 4 5 5 2 3 5 12 2 0 3 0 2 3 1 4 0 2 5 2 3 2 3 4 3 6 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 11 9 9 9 8 8 12 18 12 16 15 18 18 19 18 20 15 2 6 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 5 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 8 10 9 9 11 10 16 8 13 3 11 7 10 9 7 3 6 6 19 17 18 20 16 11 12 14 7 2 3 3 1 2 3 6 3 1 48 68 55 62 58 50 55 51 42 56 71 47 43 63 45 61 55 77 47 43 56 48 62 78 69 77 123 2 2 7 4 3 3 5 9 1 117 121 125 133 197 202 202 220 271 222 237 235 228 325 328 337 361 472 1 5 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 5 4 1 4 0 0 0 0 4 10 8 3 6 0 0 0 0 36 46 40 42 46 61 71 75 74 36 46 40 42 46 61 71 75 74 320 372 347 344 444 447 471 499 606

Total 2 Assault I/Prog Holdup Holdup Alarm Person W A Gun Person W A Kni Robbery Snd Of Gunshot Total 3 Assault Assault J/Occ Assist P.C. Fight Total 4 Ind Exp Oj/Occ Indecent Expo Total 5 Unknown Trble Total Grand Total

As shown, the numbers of violent CFS in Period 1 were in the normal range for all groups. In Period 2, the overall number of calls and calls in groups 1 and 3 were above the normal range, while calls in group 2 were below what was expected. With this exception, the cameras did not appear to have had a significant effect on reducing the overall number of violent CFS within 250 metres of the camera locations. In intervals of 50 metres from the cameras, however, the more serious call types may have been affected by the CCTV initiative. The following tables indicate whether the number of violent CFS during the CCTV pilot project were above, below or within the normal or expected range with increasing distance from the camera locations.

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Table 3. Violent Calls-for-Service with increasing distance from CCTV cameras in the Entertainment District during Period 1 (May through October)
Distance from Cameras (m)
50 100 150 200 250 All Violent Calls Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Expected Number of Calls Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Normal Below Below Normal Below Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Group 4 Normal Normal Above Above Above

Group 5 Normal Above Above Above Normal

Table 4. Violent Calls-for-Service with increasing distance from CCTV cameras in the Entertainment District during Period 2 (November through April)
Distance from Cameras (m)
50 100 150 200 250 All Violent Calls Normal Above Above Above Above

Expected Number of Calls Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Normal Above Below Above Below Above Above Below Above Above Below Above Above Below Above

Group 4 Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal

Group 5 Normal Above Normal Normal Normal

In Period 1, calls in groups 1 and 2 were below the normal threshold within 50 metres of the camera locations. In Period 2, calls in group 2 were below the expected level in the immediate 50 metres of the cameras. The overall number of calls and calls in group 3 and 5 may also have been affected by the cameras in this period. Although these groups were within a normal range within 50 metres of the camera locations, they experienced a significant increase with increasing distance from the cameras. This suggests that calls in the immediate 50 metres of the cameras did not increase proportional to the surrounding area. On the other hand, calls in group 1 were above normal within 50 metres of the cameras in Period 2. Further analysis is required to assess the significance of this trend.

Summary of Findings
CCTV cameras in the Entertainment District did not appear to have had a significant effect on reducing the overall number of violent CFS. In Period 1, violent CFS were within the normal range, while Period 2 experienced a significant increase above the normal threshold. While overall violent calls were not reduced, the more serious call types may have been affected by the CCTV cameras within 50 metres of the camera locations. Calls in groups 1 and 2 were below the normal threshold during Period 1, and the overall number of calls and calls in groups 2, 3 and 5 may have been affected by the cameras.

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Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations?

A number of downloads were requested to assist in criminal investigations. At this stage, it is difficult to quantify the value of these requests without further examination of which of the recordings/downloads were actually useful. During Period 1, a total of thirty-seven recordings/downloads were requested to assist in a total of thirty-three criminal investigationsincluding several Assaults, Attempt Murder, Fail to Remain, Fight, Firearm, Gang Fight, Mischief, Obstruct Police, Robbery, Sex Assault, Shooting, Special Investigation Unit (SIU), and Theft (See Table 3). Data from Period 2 was not included in this assessment.

Table 3. Period 1 downloads for Criminal Investigations

Event Assault Assault & Resist Assault Police Assault - Broken Neck Attempt Murder Complaint Fail to Remain Fight Firearm Gang Fight Mischief Obstruct Police Robbery Sex Assault Shooting SIU Unknown Theft

Evidence Requested 9 2 3
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 3

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Final Summary
Did CCTV deter crime? Based on the distribution of violent CFS in Period 1, CCTV may have had a deterrent effect on violent crime in the area during summer months (May-October 2007). There was some evidence of dispersion and displacement of crime from the immediate areas surrounding the cameras and a subtle shift of crime calls in the Entertainment District. During Period 2, there was little evidence of diffusion of crime in the intervention area, but some movement or displacement from the immediate areas surrounding the camera locations. Overall, there appears to have been a general shift in the concentration of crime calls in the area as revealed in the map series. Further analysis is required to assess whether the apparent shift is related to the volume of calls during the pilot project.

Did CCTV reduce crime? CCTV cameras in the Entertainment District did not appear to have had a significant effect on reducing the overall number of violent CFS. In Period 1, violent CFS were within the normal range, while Period 2 experienced a significant increase above the normal threshold. While overall violent calls were not reduced, the more serious call types may have been affected by the CCTV cameras within 50 metres of the camera locations. Calls in groups 1 and 2 were below the normal threshold during Period 1, and the overall number of calls and calls in groups 2, 3 and 5 may have been affected by the CCTV cameras.

Did CCTV assist in criminal investigations? While a number of downloads were requested to assist in criminal investigations, further analysis would be required to assess how useful these recordings were to investigators.

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Note on this Assessment

Dealing with perceptions of crime, particularly fear of crime, is as important as reducing crime. Fear of crime affects quality of life and may have negative economic outcomes. It can also affect community cohesiveness and neighbourhood incivility. In addition to accounting for the change in crime in the area, future initiatives of this nature should involve properly structured surveys and strategies for surveying residents before and after the initiative to gauge the potential for improved perceptions of crime in the intervention area. Arguably, the most significant challenge in assessing the impact of this initiative is accounting for growth in the Entertainment District. Without standardizing the crime data as rates, the true crime picture remains unknown. For example, it is possible that the rising crime trend is increasing at a slower rate than the growing demands for entertainment services and night-time population. In this case, the risk of victimization may actually be decreasing despite the increase in the overall number of CFS. Further analysis is also warranted to explore other local initiatives or Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategies that may have also focused in this area during the study period. Although CFS data provides a good indication of where crime tends to concentrate, not all calls result in a crime. CFS data is, however, readily available over a long period of time and is spatially-referenced for mapping. Actual reported incidents of violent crimes such as shootings and street robberies were not included in this analysis due to a lack of geo-coded data (spatially referenced information). Future analyses of this nature would benefit from making use of violent crimes in addition to violent CFS data. In addition to preventing or deterring violent crime, CCTV cameras may affect nonviolent crimes such as theft of vehicle or theft from vehicle. Due to a lack of geo-coded or spatially referenced data, these crimes were not evaluated as possible residual outcomes of the CCTV initiative. Further analysis is required to assess other local initiatives that may have contributed to the change in crime in the area over time. For example, increased police patrols in the intervention area may result in a higher number of reported crimes that would otherwise be unnoticed. Although it is not possible to separate out the effects of crime reduction strategies, it is important to account for additional factors that may have contributed to any changes in the crime picture during the pilot project, such as increased lighting in the Entertainment District.

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Appendix A

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Appendix B

Definition for Violent Calls-for-Service Violent Calls-for-Service include the following ICAD Event Types:

- Assault - Assault just Occurred - Assist P.C. - Assault in Progress - Indecent Exposure just Occurred - Fight - Hold-up - Hold-up Alarm - Homicide - Indecent Exposure - Person with a Gun - Person with a Knife - Robbery - Sexual Assault - Shooting - Sound of Gunshot - Stabbing - Unknown Trouble - Wounding

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