HON. WALDO Q. FLORES vs. ATTY. ANTONIO F.

MONTEMAYOR June 8, 2011 The motion is anchored on the following grounds:

G.R. No. 170146

1. Respondent was subjected to two (2) administrative/criminal Investigations equivalently resulting in violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. 2. Who to follow between conflicting decisions of two (2) government agencies involving the same facts and issues affecting the rights of the Respondent. 3. Respondents constitutional right to due process was violated.

4. Penalties prescribed by the Honorable Court is too harsh and severe on the alleged offense committed/omitted.[1] On the first ground, the Court finds it bereft of merit. Respondent asserts that since the PAGC charge involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was already the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-04-0568-LSC, along with the criminal complaint for unexplained wealth, the former can no longer be pursued without violating the rule on double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[2] We have held that none of these requisites applies where the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the same criminal offense against the respondent public officer.[3] The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial.[4] With respect to the second ground, respondent underscores the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the criminal and administrative complaints against him, including the charge subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP. It is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No. 6770, has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, as against the PAGC which is not a constitutional body but a mere creation of the OP. Under said law, it is the Ombudsman who has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government, such as herein respondent. The argument is untenable.

The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him to civil, administrative and criminal liabilities. We held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan[5]: [I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. (Italics in the original.) Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability.[6] Res judicata did not set in because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.[7] In the analogous case of Montemayor v. Bundalian,[8] this Court ruled: Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent argues that it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the administrative complaint filed against him. Notwithstanding the consolidation of the administrative offense (non-declaration in the SSAL) with the criminal complaints for unexplained wealth (Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019) and also for perjury (Article 183,

Revised Penal Code, as amended) before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondents objection on jurisdictional grounds cannot be sustained. Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution mandated the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations on his own or upon complaint by any person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also given broad powers to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public officials and employees. The investigative authority of the Ombudsman is defined in Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770: SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; x x x x (Emphasis supplied.) Such jurisdiction over public officers and employees, however, is not exclusive. This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.[9] (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent who is a presidential appointee is under the disciplinary authority of the OP. Executive Order No. 12 dated April 16, 2001 created the PAGC which was granted

the authority to investigate presidential and also non-presidential employees who may have acted in conspiracy or may have been involved with a presidential appointee or ranking officer mentioned x x x.[10] On this score, we do not agree with respondent that the PAGC should have deferred to the Ombudsman instead of proceeding with the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of his petition for certiorari with the CA challenging the PAGCs jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.[11] It may be recalled that at the time respondent was directed to submit his counteraffidavit under the Ombudsmans Order dated March 19, 2004, the PAGC investigation had long commenced and in fact, the PAGC issued an order directing respondent to file his counter-affidavit/verified answer as early as May 19, 2003. The rule is that initial acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction.[12] Having already taken cognizance of the complaint against the respondent involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL, the PAGC thus retained jurisdiction over respondents administrative case notwithstanding the subsequent filing of a supplemental complaint before the Ombudsman charging him with the same violation. As to the third ground raised by respondent, we find no merit in his reiteration of the alleged gross violation of his right to due process. Records bear out that he was given several opportunities to answer the charge against him and present evidence on his defense, which he stubbornly ignored despite repeated warnings that his failure to submit the required answer/counter-affidavit and position paper with supporting evidence shall be construed as waiver on his part of the right to do so. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[13] What is offensive to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.[14] This Court has repeatedly stressed that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process.[15] Having persisted in his refusal to file his pleadings and evidence before the PAGC, respondent cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated. In his dissenting opinion, my esteemed colleague, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, concurred with the CAs finding that respondents right to due process was violated by the unilateral investigation conducted by the PAGC which did not furnish the respondent

with a copy of the prejudicial PAGC resolution. The dissent also agreed with the CAs observation that there was a rush on the part of the PAGC to find t he respondent guilty of the charge. This was supposedly manifested in the issuance by the PAGC of its resolution even without taking into consideration any explanation and refutation of the charges that he might make, and even before the CA could finally resolve his suit to challenge the PAGCs jurisdiction to investigate him. On the other hand, the dissent proposed that the non-submission by respondent of his counter-affidavit or verified answer as directed by the PAGC should not be taken against him. Respondents refusal was not motivated by bad faith, considering his firm belief that PAGC did not have jurisdiction to administratively or disciplinarily investigate him. We do not share this view adopted by the dissent. Records reveal that on August 26, 2003, the CA already rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 dismissing respondents petition challenging the jurisdiction of the PAGC. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Upon elevation to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 160443), the petition suffered the same fate. Under the First Divisions Resolution dated January 26, 2004, the petition was denied for failure of the petitioner (respondent) to show that the CA committed any reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution. Said resolution became final and executory on April 27, 2004. Thus, at the time respondent submitted his counter-affidavit before the Ombudsman on May 21, 2004, there was already a final resolution of his petition challenging the PAGCs investigative authority. On the other hand, the PAGC submitted to the OP its September 1, 2003 resolution finding respondent guilty as charged and recommending that he be dismissed from the service, after the expiration of the 60-day temporary restraining order issued on June 23, 2003 by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. The OP rendered its Decision adopting the PAGCs findings and recommendation on March 23, 2004. As thus shown, a period of ten (10) months had elapsed from the time respondent was directed to file his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the administrative complaint filed against him, up to the rendition of the OPs decision. It cannot therefore be said that the PAGC and O P proceeded with undue haste in determining respondents administrative guilt. Still on respondents repeated claim that he was denied due process, it must be noted that when respondent received a copy of the OP Decision dated March 23, 2004, his petition for review filed in this Court assailing the CAs dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 was already denied under Resolution dated January 26, 2004. However, despite the denial of his petition, respondent still refused to recognize PAGCs jurisdiction and continued to assail the same before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84254, a petition for

review under Rule 43 from the OPs March 23, 2004 Decision and May 13, 2004 Resolution.[16] In any event, respondent was served with a copy of the OP Decision, was able to seek reconsideration of the said decision, and appeal the same to the CA. We also find nothing irregular in considering the investigation terminated and submitting the case for resolution based on available evidence upon failure of the respondent to file his counter-affidavit or answer despite giving him ample opportunity to do so. This is allowed by the Rules of Procedure of the PAGC. The PAGC is also not required to furnish the respondent and complainant copy of its resolution. The dissent of Justice Bersamin assails the OPs complete reliance on the PAGCs findings and recommendation which constituted a gross violation of administrative due process as set forth in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[17]. Among others, it is required that [T]he tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. Justice Bersamin thus concludes that the OP should have itself reviewed and appreciated the evidence presented and independently considered the facts and the law of the controversy. It was also pointed out that the OPs statement that the respondents arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration With Motion For Leave To Admit Explanation/Refutation of Complaint were a mere reiteration of matters previously considered, was a patent untruth. We disagree. The OP decision, after quoting verbatim the findings and recommendation of the PAGC, adopted the same with a brief statement preceding the dispositive portion: After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the recommendation of PAGC and the legal premises as well as the factual findings that hold it together. Respondent failed to disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of the prescription of the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded ample opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let the opportunity pass by.[18] The relevant consideration is not the brevity of the above disquisition adopting fully the findings and recommendation of the PAGC as the investigating authority. It is rather the fact that the OP is not a court but an administrative body determining the liability of respondent who was administratively charged, in the exercise of its disciplinary authority over presidential appointees.

In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,[19] this Court ruled that the rights of parties in an administrative proceedings are not violated by the brevity of the decision rendered by the OP incorporating the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. Thus: It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a[t] bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled Judiciary, and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige[d] to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII. The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows: 1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof. 2) 3) 4) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented. The decision must have something to support itself. The evidence must be substantial.

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. 6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. 7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. As can be seen above, among these rights are the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; and that the decision be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for

the decisions rendered. Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied. At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient, and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65. xxxx Accordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court rules that the said Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative due process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Office of the President did not violate petitioners right to due process when it rendered its one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-informed as to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and make a presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and the issues involved in its case.[20] (Emphasis supplied.) Since respondent repeatedly refused to answer the administrative charge against him despite notice and warning by the PAGC, he submitted his evidence only after an adverse decision was rendered by the OP, attaching the same to his motion for reconsideration. That the OP denied the motion by sustaining the PAGCs findings without any separate discussion of respondents arguments and belatedly submitted evidence only meant that the OP found the same lacking in merit and insufficient to overturn its ruling on respondents administrative liability.

On the fourth ground cited by the respondent, we maintain that the penalty of dismissal from the service is justified as no acceptable explanation was given for the nondeclaration of the two expensive cars in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. Pursuant to Section 11, paragraph (b) of R.A. No. 6713, any violation of the law proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him. Respondents deliberate attempt to evade the mandatory disclosure of all assets acquired during the period covered was evident when he first claimed that the vehicles were lumped under the entry Machineries/Equipment or still mortgaged, and later averred that these were already sold by the end of the year covered and the proceeds already spent. Under this scheme, respondent would have acquired as many assets never to be declared at anytime. Such act erodes the function of requiring accuracy of entries in the SSAL which must be a true and detailed statement. It undermines the SSAL as the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public officers and employees in the government through which the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; [as] a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.[21] IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
JOSEPH C. CEREZO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JULIET YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and VICENTE AFULUGENCIA G.R. No. 185230 June 1, 2011

On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).[5] Finding probable cause to indict respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them on February 18, 2003 before the RTC. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-QC. In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003, respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a not guilty plea.

In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed in its Order dated March 17, 2004, viz.: Settled is the rule that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public Prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. Being vested with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution if he finds that there is reasonable ground to do so. x x x. More so, the Court cannot interfere with the Public Prosecutors discretion to determine probable cause or the propriety of pursuing or not a criminal case when the case is not yet filed in Court, as a general rule. However, if the same criminal case has been filed in Court already, the Public Prosecutor can still interfere with it subject to the approval of the Court. In the case of Republic vs. Sunga, et al., the Supreme Court held that while it has been settled in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed after the complaint or information has been filed in court, nonetheless any motion of the offended party for the dismissal of the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal and only after hearing should the court exercise its exclusive authority to dismiss or continue with the prosecution of the case. The Court, therefore, after hearing and conferring with the fiscal, can dismiss the case if convinced that there is [no] reason to continue with the prosecution [of] the same. As in this case, the Court finds merit [in] the motion of the Public Prosecutor. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).[12] The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ.[13] On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QCs November 20, 2003 resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for libel. On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioners motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, thus: Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. In the same manner as discussed in arriving at its assailed order dated 17 March 2004, the Court gives more leeway to the Public Prosecutor in determining whether it has to continue or stop prosecuting a case. While the City Prosecutor has previously decided not to pursue further the case, the Secretary of Justice, however, through its resolution on the Petition for Review did not agree with him. The Court disagrees with the argument raised by the accused that double jeopardy sets in to the picture. The order of dismissal as well as the withdrawal of the Information was not yet final because of the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court[,] therefore, can still set aside its order.

Moreover, there is no refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one. The case filed remains the same and the order of dismissal was merely vacated because the Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious. WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious, the Order dated 17 March 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Let the arraignment of accused Oscar Mapalo and pre-trial [of] the other accused be set on 06 December 2006 at 8:30 in the morning. SO ORDERED. Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the RTCs second assailed Order dated February 26, 2007. Relentless, respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the RTC Orders violated their constitutional right against double jeopardy. Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of double jeopardy. Ruling: NO In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents. The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. This is evident from the general tenor of the Order and highlighted in the following portion thereof: As discussed during the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court will resolve it depending on the outcome of the Petition for Review. Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainants right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.

This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew. It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[24] Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.

People vs. DANTE TAN G.R. No. 167526 July 26, 2010
The facts of the case are as follows: On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1,[4] in relation to Sections 32 (a)-1[5] and 56[6] of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by petitioner People of the Philippines against respondent Dante Tan in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 153. They were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832. The Information[7] in Criminal Case No. 119831 reads: That on December 10, 1998, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the beneficial owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered security sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be reported, and covered by Certificate Nos. DT-UK 55485704 and DT-UR 55485776, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and regulations prescribed and pursuant thereto. CONTRARY TO LAW.[8] The Information[9] in Criminal Case No. 119832 reads:

That on June 18, 1999, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the beneficial owner of 75,000,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered security which has been sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be reported, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and regulations prescribed pursuant thereto. CONTRARY TO LAW.[10] After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty[11] to both charges and the trial ensued. On November 24, 2003, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence,[12] consisting of Exhibits A to E with sub-exhibits, Exhibits K-1, K-10 and K-11, Q, R, S, T and W with sub-exhibits, and Exhibit X. On December 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order[13] admitting Exhibits A, B, W and X, but denied admission of all the other exhibits on the grounds stated therein. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in an Order[14] dated January 27, 2004. In the meantime, on December 18, 2003, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence[15] and to admit the attached Demurrer to Evidence. On January 29, 2004, the RTC issued another Order[16] granting respondents Motion for Leave to File the Demurrer and forthwith admitted respondents attached Demurrer. The RTC also ordered petitioner to file an opposition. On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition[17] to the Demurrer to Evidence. Respondent then filed a Reply.[18] On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order[19] granting respondents Demurrer to Evidence, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused Dante Tan to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.[20] Xxxx

The CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.[24] Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated February 24, 2005. Issue: RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE PEOPLE FROM PROSECUTING ITS CASES AGAINST DANTE TAN. The petition has no merit. Notwithstanding the RTCs grant of respondents Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner contends that the CA erred in applying the rules on double jeopardy. Specifically, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not apply in cases decided by the trial court without jurisdiction and in violations of petitioners right to due process.[26] In People v. Sandiganbayan,[27] this Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.[28] The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[29] These elements are present here: (1) the Informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 against respondent were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the RTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832; (3) respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr.,[30] this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus: x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was

denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[31] After an extensive review of previous Court decisions relevant to herein petition, this Court finds that the abovementioned exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondents demurrer to evidence. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[32] In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[33] this Court ruled that the prosecution was denied due process of law when the trial was but a mock trial, to wit: More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the respondentsaccused. In addition, in People v. Bocar,[35] this Court ruled that there is no double jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court, to wit: It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that the parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent Judge (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before respondent Court. Respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit. Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, the prosecution was denied due process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. x x x[36] Likewise, in People v. Judge Albano,[37] this Court held that there is no double jeopardy when the trial court preemptively dismissed the case, thus:

The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it preemptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process." With this violation, its Orders, dated 28 October 1976 and 20 December 1976, are therefore null and void. Likewise, for being null and void, said orders cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.[38] In Saldana v. Court of Appeals,[39] this Court ruled that the prosecutions right to due process is violated when the trial court aborted its right to complete its presentation of evidence, thus: The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. One of the elements of double jeopardy is a competent court. The trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. The remand of the case for further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. x x x[40] Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is did the RTC violate petitioners right to due process? On this note, this Court rules that petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents which led to the grant of respondents demurrer. On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and, on the day after, filed its formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002, respondent filed an opposition to petitio ners formal offer. Instead of filing a reply as directed by the RTC, petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of Evidence.[41] Said motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner thus continued its presentation of evidence. On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses and was then ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On February 26, 2003, petitioner filed a request for marking of certain documents and motion to admit attached formal offer of evidence.[42] The motion was initially denied by the RTC, but on motion for reconsideration the same was granted by the RTC. The RTC, thus, ordered petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally, on November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence.[43] After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated January 29, 2004, directed petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition[44] to the demurrer. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its case. Unlike in Bocar and Saldana where the prosecution was prevented from completing its presentation of evidence, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, formally offer its evidence and

oppose respondents demurrer. It even bears to point out that the RTC even allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal offer of evidence after having initially rested its case and then continue its presentation by introducing additional witnesses. Thus, no grave abuse can be attributed to the RTC as petitioners right to due process was not violated. Even Galman finds no application to the case at bar as clearly such trial cannot be considered a sham based on the abovementioned considerations. Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose to grant respondents demurrer to evidence notwithstanding that it had filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of Accused Dante Tans Demurrer to Evidence and The Prosecutions Opposition Thereto.[45] Petitioner contends that instead of acting on the motion, the RTC peremptorily granted respondents demurrer to evidence which prevented petitioner from its intention to file a petition for certiorari to question the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC. While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois acquit.[46] We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.[47] To reiterate, the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which cannot be attributed to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence. Consequently, petitioners attempt to put in issue the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC which denied admission of certain documentary exhibits in evidence must fail. As correctly manifested by the CA, the said Orders have already been overtaken by the March 16, 2004 Order, which already granted respondents demurrer to evidence. Hence, this Court would be violating the rules on double jeopardy if the twin orders were to be reviewed after a finding that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence. Xxx There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is manifestly mistaken. Assuming, however, that there is an error of judgment on the denial of admission of certain exhibits of the prosecution and the appreciation of the prosecutions case, there is to this Courts mind, no capricious exercise of judgment that would overcome the defense of double jeopardy. Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. While petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that none can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, OSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011 On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses.[1]

But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. x x x

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:[2]

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as

enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.[3]

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.[4]

Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the evidence.[5] But he has not specified the violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision[6] is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception.

Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan[7] as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was dictated, coerced and scripted.[8] It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process.

Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.

For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.