ART. 6 GUY VS. CA (SEPT.

15, 2006) FACTS: This is a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Sima Wei. Respondents, represented by their mother (Remedios), alleged that they are the illegitimate children of Sima Wei. They pray for the orderly settlement of the estate and the appointment of the deceased's son as the administrator. The other heirs of Sima Wei opposed the petition on the ground that the filiation has not yet been proved. Further, that the respondent's claim had been paid, waived,abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of the Release and Waiver of Claim signed by respodent's mother, stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received, the respondents discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. Held: Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latters claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides: ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied) Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the courts scrutiny in order

to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioners invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail. Art. 15 1. Elmar Perez vs. Court of Appeals (01.27.06) Facts: Tristan married Lili twice on May 1968. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from each other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. The divorce was later on granted. On 1984, Tristan married Elmar Perez. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. When she confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her that he would legalize their union after he obtains an annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he would adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that of each of his children with Lily On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention10 claiming that she has a legal interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain information which might aid the trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which the trial court granted on September 30, 2002. Issue: W/N the order granting the motion to intervene was correct. Held: No.

The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor?s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant. Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules of Court. Petitioner's claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her claim of legal interest has no basis. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code21 which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano we held: (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based. 2. San Luis vs. San Luis
Facts: Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages: a. with Virginia Sulit in 1942 -- Virgini predeceased Felicisimo b. with Mary Lee Corwin -- an American citizen who filed for divorce in Hawaii which was granted in 1973 c. with Felicidad (respondent) in LA, California in 1974. Felicisimo died in 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo. The petitioners (children from the 1st

marriage) opposed the petition on the ground that the respondent was only a mistress of Felicisimo, since at the time of his death, Felicisimo was still legally married to Mary Lee. Respondent thereafter presetned the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. Held: In this case, the SC applied the ruling in Van Dorm vs. Romillo case. Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad?s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad?s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

3. Catindig vs. Court of Appeals