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CONSTI 2 CHAPTER 9 Equal Protection Suggested Reading 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 349 U.S. Yick Wo v.

Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 People v. Vera 65 Phil 56 People v. Cayat 60 Phil 12 Villegas v. Hiu Chiong 86 SCRA 270

SUGGESTED READING Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 349 U.S. Brief Fact Summary. Black children were denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. The children sued. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Separate but equal educational facilities are inherently unequal. Facts. The Plaintiffs, various black children (Plaintiffs), were denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. Plaintiffs sued, seeking admission to public schools in their communities on a nonsegregated basis. Issue. Do separate but equal laws in the area of public education deprive black children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Held. Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren) stated that even if the tangible factors of segregated schools are equal, to separate black children from others of similar age and qualifications solely on the basis of race, generates a feeling of inferiority with respect to their status in the community and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone. Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is relying on the same rationale to invalidate the segregation laws here that it did in Sweatt v. Painter (ordering the admission of a black student to the University of Texas Law School, despite the fact that a parallel black facility was available). The rationale is that its

Footnotes: 1. Plessy v. Ferguson 163 US 537 2. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 349 U.S. 3. Smith Bell v. NAtividad 40 Phil 136 4. International Harvester co. v. Missouri 234 US 199 5. People v. Cayat 68 Phil 12 6. Dumlao v. Commission on Elections 95 SCRA 392 7. Ceniza v. Commission on Elections 96 SCRA 763 8. Nunez v. SAndiganbayan 111 SCRA 433 9. Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon GR No 81958 June 30,1998 10. Ormoc Sugar co. , Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City 22 SCRA 603 11. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong 86 SCRA 270

the intangible factors that make segregation laws in the area of public education inherently unequal. Whether stigma or the perception of stigma alone is sufficient injury to invalidate a law supported by a valid, neutral purpose is an open question. Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 FACT:\ 1. Order No. 1617, defining 'the fire limits of the city and county of San Francisco and making regulations concerning the erection and use of buildings in said city and county,' and of order No. 1670, 'prohibiting the kindling, maintenance, and use of open fires in houses;' that he had a certificate from the health officer that the same premises had been inspected by him, and that he found that they were properly and sufficiently drained, and that all proper arrangements for carrying on the business of a laundry, without injury to the sanitary condition of the neighborhood, had been complied with and on June 1st, 1885, applied to the board of supervisors, for consent of said board to maintain and carry on his laundry, but that said board, on July 1st, 1885, refused said consent." 2. The petition, and more than one hundred and fifty of his countrymen have been arrested upon the charge of carrying on business without having such special consent, while those who are not subjects of China, and who are conducting eighty odd laundries under similar conditions, are left unmolested and free to enjoy the enhanced trade and profits arising from this hurtful and unfair discrimination. The business of your petitioner, and of those of his countrymen similarly situated, is greatly impaired, and in many cases practically ruined, by this system of oppression to one kind of men and favoritism to all others.

ISSUE: whether the plaintiff in error has been denied a right in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. HELD: A municipal ordinance to regulate the carrying on of public laundries within the limits of the municipality violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States if it confers upon the municipal authorities arbitrary power, at their own will, and without regard to discretion in the legal sense of the term, to give or withhold consent as to persons or places, without regard to the competency of the persons applying, or the propriety of the place selected, for the carrying on of the business. An administration of a municipal ordinance for the carrying on of a lawful business within the corporate limits violates the provisions of the Constitution of the United States if it makes arbitrary and unjust discriminations, founded on differences of race between persons otherwise in similar circumstances. The guarantees of protection contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution extend to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, without regard to differences of race, of color, or of nationality . Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.

For the cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified. The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is, therefore, illegal, and they must be discharged. To this end,

Summary of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886). Facts Yick Wo was imprisoned for operating a laundry in a wooden building in violation of a San Francisco statute. That statute vested in the board of supervisors the discretion to grant or withhold licenses to operate laundries in wooden buildings. Yick Wo had operated the laundry in the same building for 22 years and fire wardens and safety inspectors had inspected the premises and found them safe. The board denied licenses to all Chinese-American applicants but denied only one of 80 non-Chinese Americans. Yick Wo was fined ten dollars and was imprisoned for failing to pay. Yick Wo sued the Supreme Court of California for a writ of habeas corpus and the Court found that the board of supervisors had acted within the scope of its authority and denied the petition. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Issues 1. May a city enforce an ordinance in a racially discriminatory manner? 2. Does a law or ordinance granting a person or entity absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry on a lawful business violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? Holding and Rule (Matthews) 1. No. A city may not enforce ordinances in a racially discriminatory manner.

2. Yes. A law or ordinance granting a person or entity absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry on a lawful business violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. If the statute were discriminatory on its face the court would have applied strict scrutiny. In this case however the statute was not discriminatory on its face and the court looked to rational basis. The statute was ostensibly intended to reduce the risk of fire; however the court also noted that only Chinese laundries were affected by the statute. The court concluded that the statute was intended to reduce Chinese laundries rather than the risk of fire and ruled that the statute was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Facts: Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take. Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law. Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the nonChristian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.Q

The judgment of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Yick Wo, and that of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California in the case of Wo Lee, are severally reversed, and the cases remanded, each to the proper court, with directions to discharge the petitioners from custody and imprisonment.

People Vs. Cayat Case Digest People Vs. Cayat 68 Phil 12 G.R. No. 45987 May 5,1939

Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong Case Digest Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong 86 SCRA 270 No.L-29646 November 10, 1978 Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance. Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation. While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure. Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While

it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.


Plessy v. Ferguson

Brief Fact Summary. A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal accommodations for its Black and White passengers. The Plaintiff, Plessy (Plaintiff), was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for whites. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A law, which authorizes or requires the separation of the two races on public conveyances, is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) unless the law is unreasonable. Facts. A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal accommodations for its Black and White passengers. An exception was made for nurses attending to the children of the other race. Plaintiff, who was seven-eighths white, was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for whites. The alleged purpose of the statute was to preserve public peace and good order and to promote the comfort of the people. Issue. Was the statute requiring separate, but equal accommodations on railroad transportation consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?

Held. Yes. The State Supreme Court is affirmed. Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it was not intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the races in a way unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of either. If the law stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority, it is because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the States police powers. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the exercise of a States police powers be reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public good and not for the annoyance or oppression of another race are reasonable. As such, the statute was reasonable. Dissent. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) said that everyone knows that the purpose of the statute was to exclude the colored people from coaches occupied by whites. The Constitution is color-blind. It neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. Discussion. This case marks the beginning of the separate but equal doctrine. It is later overturned by Brown v. Board of Education Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R. No. 23794 February 17, 1968] Post under case digests, Taxation at Thursday, March 29, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments

for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed? Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988] Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1. Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC Case Digest DUMLAO vs. COMELEC 95 SCRA 392 L-52245 January 22, 1980 Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that .Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits

to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation. Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid. Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class. WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.