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G.R. No. L-22272

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967

ANTONIA MARANAN, plainti-appellant, vs. PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants. PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant. Pedro Panganiban for plainti-appellant. Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant. BENGZON, J.P., J.: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found guilty, he was sentenced to suer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals.1wph1.t On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, led an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he rst assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

The court a quo, after trial, found for the plainti and awarded her P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plainti and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals armed the judgment of conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, nal judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33). Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very dierent however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. As this Court there found: x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied) Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when

the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting eect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein signicantly lies the statutory dierence between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a dierent result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
1 The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are 2 new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport

the passenger safely.

Under the rst, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sucient that the act be within the course of employment only.
4

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the

course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the
5 carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults

committed by its own employees.

As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection aorded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers conding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them. Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral bers, and social attitude. Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plainti's action
7 was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by nal judgment.

In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plainti-appellant. This is the minimum

compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the lower court's nding that plainti's evidence thereon was not convincing, should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it
8

9 becomes the court's duty to award moral damages. Plainti demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sucient. Interest upon

such damages are also due to plainti-appellant.

10

Wherefore, with the modication increasing the award of actual damages in plainti's favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the ling of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is armed in all other respects. No costs. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1 2 3

Section 4, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Republic Act 386. Report of the Code Commission, p. 64.

For an extensive discussion, see 53 ALR 2d 721-728; 732-734. Williams vs. Shreveport Yellow Cab Co., 183 So. 120; Southeastern Greyhound Lines vs. Smith, 23 Tenn. App. 627, 136 SW. 2d 272.
5 6 4

10 Am. Jur. 105-107, 263-265. Dixie Motor Coach Corp. vs. Toler, 1997 Ark. 1097, 126 SW

2d 618; Van Hoeen vs. Columbia Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 591, 162 S.W. 694; Brockway vs. Mordenti, 199 Misc. 898, 103 NYS 2d 621; Korner vs. Cosgrove, 141 NE 265, 31 ALR 1193.
7 8 9

Plainti-Appellant's brief, p. 7. Record on Appeal, p. 35. Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328-29 & L-13358, Sept. 29, 1961. Art. 2210, Civil Code.

10

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G.R. No. 8275

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 98275 November 13, 1992 BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANGELES CITY, BRANCH LVI, CARLOS OCAMPO, INOCENCIO TURLA, SPOUSES MOISES AGAPITO and SOCORRO M. AGAPITO and NICOLAS CRUZ, respondents. MELO, J.: The question of petitioner's responsibility for damages when on March 6, 1983, an accident occurred involving petitioner's Isuzu ten-wheeler truck then driven by an employee of Lino Castro is the thrust of the petition for review on certiorari now before Us considering that neither the driver nor Lino Castro appears to be connected with petitioner. On October 13, 1988, the disputed decision in the suit below was rendered by the court of origin in this manner: 1. Ordering Rock B.A. and Rogelio Villar y Amare jointly and severally to pay the plaintis as follows: a) To the plainti Carlos Ocampo P121,650.00; b) To the plainti Moises Ocampo P298,500.00

c) To the plainti Nicolas Cruz P154,740.00 d) To the plainti Inocencio Turla, Sr. 48,000.00 2. Dismissing the case against Lino Castro 3. Dismissing the third-party complaint against STRONGHOLD 4. Dismissing all the counterclaim of the defendants and third-party defendants. 5. Ordering ROCK to reimburse B.A. the total amount of P622,890.00 which the latter is adjudged to pay to the plaintis. (p. 46, Rollo) Respondent Court of Appeals armed the appealed disposition in toto through Justice Rasul, with Justices De Pano, Jr. and Imperial concurring, on practically the same grounds arrived at by the court a quo (p. 28, Rollo). Eorts exerted towards re-evaluation of the adverse were futile (p. 37, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition. The lower court ascertained after due trial that Rogelio Villar y Amare, the driver of the Isuzu truck, was at fault when the mishap occurred in as much as he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide with multiple physical injuries with damage to property in a decision rendered on February 16, 1984 by the Presiding Judge of Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court stationed at Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner was adjudged liable for damages in as much as the truck was registered in its name during the incident in question, following the doctrine laid down by this Court in Perez vs. Gutierrez (53 SCRA 149 [1973]) and Erezo, et al. vs. Jepte (102 Phil. 103 [1957]). In the same breadth, Rock Component Philippines, Inc. was ordered to reimburse petitioner for any amount that the latter may be adjudged liable to pay herein private respondents as expressly stipulated in the contract of lease between petitioner and Rock Component Philippines, Inc. Moreover, the trial court applied Article 2194 of the new Civil Code on solidary accountability of join tortfeasors insofar as the liability of the driver, herein

petitioner and Rock Component Philippines was concerned (pp. 6-7, Decision; pp. 44-45, Rollo). To the question of whether petitioner can be held responsible to the victim albeit the truck was leased to Rock Component Philippines when the incident occurred, the appellate court answered in the armative on the basis of the jurisprudential dogmas which, as aforesaid, were relied upon by the trial court although respondent court was quick to add the caveat embodied in the lease covenant between petitioner and Rock Component Philippines relative to the latter's duty to reimburse any amount which may be adjudged against petitioner (pp. 32-33, Rollo). Petitioner asseverates that it should not have been haled to court and ordered to respond for the damage in the manner arrived at by both the trial and appellate courts since paragraph 5 of the complaint lodged by the plaintis below would indicate that petitioner was not the employer of the negligent driver who was under the control an supervision of Lino Castro at the time of the accident, apart from the fact that the Isuzu truck was in the physical possession of Rock Component Philippines by virtue of the lease agreement. Aside from casting clouds of doubt on the propriety of invoking the Perez and Erezo doctrines, petitioner continue to persist with the idea that the pronouncements of this Court in Duavit vs. Court of Appeals (173 SCRA 490 [1989]) and Duquillo vs. Bayot (67 Phil 131 [1939]) dovetail with the factual and legal scenario of the case at hand. Furthermore, petitioner assumes, given the so-called hiatus on the basis for the award of damages as decreed by the lower and appellate courts, that Article 2180 of the new Civil Code on vicarious liability will divest petitioner of any responsibility absent as there is any employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the driver. Contrary to petitioner's expectations, the recourse instituted from the rebus it encountered may not constitute a sucient foundation for reversal of the impugned judgment of respondent court. Petitioner is of the impression that the Perez and Erezo cases are inapplicable due to the variance of the generative facts in said cases as against those obtaining in the controversy at bar. A contrario, the lesson imparted by Justice

Labrador in Erezo is still good law, thus: . . . In previous decisions, We already have held that the registered owner of a certicate of public convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or damages suered by passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to a third person. (Montoya vs. Ignacio, 94 Phil., 182 50 O. Gaz., 108; Roque vs. Malibay Transit, Inc., G.R. No. L-8561, November 18, 1955; Vda. de Medina vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506, 52 O. Gaz., [10], 4606.) The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presumed that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be dicult with the public to enforce the actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required to prove who actual the owner is. How would the public or third persons know against whom to enforce their rights in case of subsequent transfer of the vehicles? We do not imply by this doctrine, however, that the registered owner may not recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the vehicle. Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should primarily responsible to the public or to the third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets. The members of the Court are in agreement that the defendantappellant should be held liable to plainti-appellee for the injuries occasioned to the latter because of the negligence of the driver, even if the defendant-appellant was no longer an owner of the vehicle at the time of the damage because he had previously sold it to another. What is the legal basis for his (defendantsappellant's) liability?

There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is the defendant-appellant as he is the registered owner in the Motor Vehicle Oce. Should he not be allowed to prove the truth, that he had sold it to another and thus shift the responsibility for the injury to the real and the actual owner? The defendants hold the armative of this proposition; the trial court hold the negative. The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that the vehicle may be used or operated upon any public highway unless the same is properly registered. It has been stated that the system of licensing and the requirement that each machine must carry a registration number, conspicuously displayed, is one of the precautions taken to reduce the danger of injury of pedestrians and other travelers from the careless management of automobiles, and to furnish a means of ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws and ordinances, regulating the speed and operation of machines upon the highways (2 R. C. L. 1176). Not only are vehicles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be used or operated without being properly registered from the current year, furnish the Motor Vehicle Oce a report showing the name and address of each purchaser of motor vehicle during the previous month and the manufacturer's serial number and motor number. (Section 5[c], Act No. 3992, as amended.) Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5[a], Act No. 3992, as amended). the main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle

on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be xed on a denite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identication of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identication. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily obtained, in the interest of the determinations of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. One of the principle purposes of motor vehicles legislation is identication of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and another is that the knowledge that means of detection are always available my act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules of conservative and safe operation. Whatever purpose there may be in these statutes, it is subordinate at the last to the primary purpose of rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the rules of safety shall not escape because of lack of means to discover him. The purpose of the statute is thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a "share and delusion," if courts would entertain such defenses as that put forward by appellee in this case. No responsible person or corporation could be held liable for the most outrageous acts of negligence, if they should be allowed to pace a "middleman" between them and the public, and escape liability by the manner in which they recompense their servants. (King vs. Breham Automobile Co., Inc. 145 S. W. 278, 279.) With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant-appellant poses is: should not the

registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and real owner is, and in accordance with such proof escape or evade responsibility and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle? We hold with the trial court that the law does not allow him to do so; the law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law xes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indenite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond nancially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or Identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other then by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Oce to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that is, to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured person. The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and would seem to conict with truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justication for relieving him of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to

comply with the registration that the law demands and requires. In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiappellee, but he (defendant-appellant) has a right to be indemnied by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plainti-appellant. If the foregoing words of wisdom were applied in solving the circumstance whereof the vehicle had been alienated or sold to another, there certainly can be no serious exception against utilizing the same rationale to the antecedents of this case where the subject vehicle was merely leased by petitioner to Rock Component Philippines, Inc., with petitioner retaining ownership over the vehicle. Petitioner's reliance on the ruling of this Court in Duavit vs. Court of Appeals and in Duquillo vs. Bayot (supra) is legally unpalatable for the purpose of the present discourse. The vehicles adverted to in the two cases shared a common thread, so to speak, in that the jeep and the truck were driven in reckless fashion without the consent or knowledge of the respective owners. Cognizant of the inculpatory testimony spewed by defendant Sabiniano when he admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of defendant Dauvit without the consent or authority of the latter, Justice Gutierrez, Jr. in Duavit remarked; . . . Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in the mishap but completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. In this regard, we cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly

taken from their owners at gunpoint or stolen from garages and parking areas and the instances of service station attendants or mechanics of auto repair shops using, without the owner's consent, vehicles entrusted to them for servicing or repair.(at p. 496.) In the Duquillo case, the defendant therein cannot, according to Justice Diaz, be held liable for anything because of circumstances which indicated that the truck was driven without the consent or knowledge of the owner thereof. Consequently, there is no need for Us to discuss the matter of imputed negligence because petitioner merely presumed, erroneously, however, that judgment was rendered against it on the basis of such doctrine embodied under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and decision under review AFFIRMED without special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ. concur.

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G.R. No. 82318

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989 GILBERTO M. DUAVIT, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Acting through the Third Division, as Public Respondent, and ANTONIO SARMIENTO, SR. & VIRGILIO CATUAR respondents. Rodolfo d. Dela Cruz for petitioner. Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This petition raises the sole issue of whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which gured in an accident can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter. The facts are summarized in the contested decision, as follows: From the evidence adduced by the plaintis, consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Virgilio Catuar, Antonio Sarmiento, Jr., Ruperto Catuar, Jr. and Norberto Bernarte it appears that on July 28, 1971 plaintis Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep with plate number 77-99-F-I Manila, 1971, owned by plainti, Ruperto

Catuar was driving the said jeep on Ortigas Avenue, San Juan, Rizal; that plainti's jeep, at the time, was running moderately at 20 to 35 kilometers per hour and while approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Virgilio Catuar slowed down; that suddenly, another jeep with plate number 99-97-F-J Manila 1971 driven by defendant Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped plainti's jeep on the portion near the left rear wheel, and as a result of the impact plainti's jeep fell on its right and skidded by about 30 yards; that as a result plaintis jeep was damaged, particularly the windshield, the dierential, the part near the left rear wheel and the top cover of the jeep; that plainti Virgilio Catuar was thrown to the middle of the road; his wrist was broken and he sustained contusions on the head; that likewise plainti Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. was trapped inside the fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured. Evidence also shows that the plainti Virgilio Catuar spent a total of P2,464.00 for repairs of the jeep, as shown by the receipts of payment of labor and spare parts (Exhs. H to H-7 Plaintis likewise tried to prove that plainti Virgilio Catuar, immediately after the accident was taken to Immaculate Concepcion Hospital, and then was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital; that while plainti Catuar was not conned in the hospital, his wrist was in a plaster cast for a period of one month, and the contusions on his head were under treatment for about two (2) weeks; that for hospitalization, medicine and allied expenses, plainti Catuar spent P5,000.00. Evidence also shows that as a result of the incident, plainti Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. sustained injuries on his leg; that at rst, he was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital (Exh. K but later he was conned at the Makati Medical Center from July 29, to August 29, 1971 and then from September 15 to 25, 1971; that his leg was in a plaster cast for a period of eight (8) months; and that for hospitalization and medical attendance, plainti

Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. spent no less than P13,785.25 as evidenced by receipts in his possession. (Exhs. N to N-1). Proofs were adduced also to show that plainti Antonio sarmiento Sr. is employed as Assistant Accountant of the Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary of P1,200.00 a month; that as sideline he also works as accountant of United Haulers Inc. with a salary of P500.00 a month; and that as a result of this incident, plainti Sarmiento was unable to perform his normal work for a period of at least 8 months. On the other hand, evidence shows that the other plainti Virgilio Catuar is a Chief Clerk in Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary of P500.00 a month, and as a result of the incident, he was incapacitated to work for a period of one (1) month. The plaintis have led this case both against Oscar Sabiniano as driver, and against Gualberto Duavit as owner of the jeep. Defendant Gualberto Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep (Plate No. 99-07-F-J Manila, 1971), denied that the other defendant (Oscar Sabiniano) was his employee. Duavit claimed that he has not been an employer of defendant Oscar Sabiniano at any time up to the present. On the other hand documentary and testimonial evidence show that defendant Oscar Sabiniano was an employee of the Board of Liquidators from November 14, 1966 up to January 4, 1973 (Annex A of Answer). Defendant Sabiniano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter (TSN, September 7, 1978, p. 8). He testied further, that Duavit even led charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did not push through as his (Sabiniano's) parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf.

Defendant Oscar Sabiniano, on the other hand in an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, makes it appear that he was taking all necessary precaution while driving and the accident occurred due to the negligence of Virgilio Catuar. Sabiniano claims that it was plaintis vehicle which hit and bumped their jeep. (Reno, pp. 21-23) The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but found no employer-employee relationship between him and the petitioner because the latter was then a government employee and he took the vehicle without the authority and consent of the owner. The petitioner was, thus, absolved from liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The private respondents appealed the case. On January 7, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano. The appellate court in part ruled: We cannot go along with appellee's argument. It will be seen that in Vargas v. Langcay, supra, it was held that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by the operator of record or registered owner, and it is even not necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and who the employer of the driver is. When the Supreme Court ruled, thus: 'We must hold and consider such owner-operator of record (registered owner) as the employer in contemplation of law, of the driver,' it cannot be construed other than that the registered owner is the employer of the driver in contemplation of law. It is a conclusive presumption of fact and law, and is not subject to rebuttal of proof to the contrary. Otherwise, as stated in the decision, we quote: The purpose of the principles evolved by the decisions in these matters will be defeated and thwarted if we entertain the argument of petitioner that she is not liable because the actual owner and employer was established by the evidence. . . .

Along the same vein, the defendant-appellee Gualberto Duavit cannot be allowed to prove that the driver Sabiniano was not his employee at the time of the vehicular accident. The ruling laid down in Amar V. Soberano (1966), 63 O.G. 6850, by this Court to the eect that the burden of proving the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship is upon the defendant and this he must do by a satisfactory preponderance of evidence, has to defer to the doctrines evolved by the Supreme Court in cases of damages arising from vehicular mishaps involving registered motor vehicle. (See Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226, 230). (Rollo, pp. 26-27) The appellate court also denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. The petitioner contends that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding him jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano in spite of the absence of an employer-employee relationship between them and despite the fact that the petitioner's jeep was taken out of his garage and was driven by Sabiniano without his consent. As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. Thus, in Duquillo v. Bayot (67 Phil. 131-133-134) [1939] we said: Under the facts established, the defendant cannot be held liable for anything. At the time of the accident, James McGurk was driving the truck, and he was not an employee of the defendant, nor did he have anything to do with the latter's business; neither the defendant nor Father Ayson, who was in charge of her business, consented to have any of her trucks driven on the day of the accident, as it was a holy day, and much less by a chaueur who was not in charge of driving it; the use of the defendant's truck in the circumstances indicated was done without her consent or knowledge; it may,

therefore, be said, that there was not the remotest contractual relation between the deceased Pio Duquillo and the defendant. It necessarily follows from all this that articles 1101 and following of the Civil Code, cited by the appellant, have no application in this case, and, therefore, the errors attributed to the inferior court are without basis. The Court upholds the above ruling as still relevant and better applicable to present day circumstances. The respondent court's misplaced reliance on the cases of Erezo v. Jepte (102 Phil. 103 [1957] and Vargas v. Langcay (6 SCRA 174 [1962]) cannot be sustained. In the Erezo case, Jepte, the registered owner of the truck which collided with a taxicab, and which resulted in the killing of Erezo, claimed that at the time of the accident, the truck belonged to the Port Brokerage in an arrangement with the corporation but the same was not known to the Motor Vehicles Oce. This Court sustained the trial court's ruling that since Jepte represented himself to be the owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicles Oce, relying on his representation, registered the vehicle in his name, the Government and all persons aected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration. Thus, even if Jepte were not the owner of the truck at the time of the accident, he was still held liable for the death of Erezo signicantly, the driver of the truck was fully authorized to drive it. Likewise, in the Vargas case, just before the accident occurred Vargas had sold her jeepney to a third person, so that at the time of the accident she was no longer the owner of the jeepney. This court, nevertheless, armed Vargas' liability since she failed to surrender to the Motor Vehicles Oce the corresponding AC plates in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and Commonwealth Act No. 146. We further ruled that the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and third persons, and as such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operator. The vehicle involved was a public utility jeepney for hire. In such cases, the law does not only require the surrender of the AC plates but orders the vendor operator to stop the operation of the jeepney as a form of public

transportation until the matter is reported to the authorities. As can be seen, the circumstances of the above cases are entirely dierent from those in the present case. Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in tire mishap but completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. In this regard, we cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly taken from their owners at gunpoint or stolen from garages and parking areas and the instances of service station attendants or mechanics of auto repair shops using, without the owner's consent, vehicles entrusted to them for servicing or repair. We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with pending cases. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. Where, as in this case, the records of the petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia of an employeremployee relationship between the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner for the vehicle's use, we cannot hold the owner liable. We, therefore, nd that the respondent appellate court committed reversible error in holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano to the private respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision and resolution appealed from are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna, 8th Judicial District, Branch 6, dated July 30, 1981 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.

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