1. SEC vs. GMA NETWORK 575 SCA G.R. No.

16 40 26 : December 23, 2008 PETITIONERS: Securities and Exchange Commission RESPONDENTS: GMA Network,Inc. WHY: GMA averred that the basis for the filing fee is not valid. wHAT: Art. 2, New Civil Code; SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1 series of 1994 Ponente: Tinga, J. FACTS: 1. On August 1995, GMA: a. Applied for approval of various amendmens to its Articles of Incorporation an d By-Laws with SEC. b. Extension of corporate term for another 50 years. 2. SEC then assessd GMA a filing fee of: a. Exension: 1/10 of 1% of its capital stock b. Plus 20% amounting to 1,212,200. 3. On October 1995: a. GMA formally protested the assessment b. contends that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is INVALID. 4. April 1996, Associate Commissioner Gloria upheld the validity of the question ed assessment. 5. GMA contends that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee. ISSUE: Whether SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for co mputing the filing fee. RULING: 1. CA ruled that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1994 is ineffective si nce it was not published & not filed with ONAR. 2. RA 3531 - determines whether SEC's regulation is reasonable and within the b ounds of its rate-fixing authority. HELD: SEC's appeal is DISMISSED. 2. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB vs. ELIZAGAQUE 542 SCRA 65 G.R. No. 16 02 73 : January 18, 2008 PETITIONER: Cebu Country Club, Inc. RESPONDENT: Ricardo F. Elizagaque WHERE: RTC Pasig WHY: Elizagaque seeks comensation for damages to his rights. WHAT: Art. 19 & 21, CC. Abuse of Rights. Ponent: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. FACTS: 1. E filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership, endorsed by 2 me mbers of CCCI. 2. 5M required proprietary share. President of CCCI offered respondent a share of only 3.5M. E however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for 3M. 3. His application was deferred & disapproved. He wrote letters but no reply was returned. 4. E filed w/ RTC complain for damages. a. RTC ruled in favor of E. b. CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

5. Sec. 3c, Black Ball System - eligibility as member required a unanimous vote from the Board of Directors. a. Not included in aplication form. b. Only one voted for disapproval. c. Not made known to E. ISSUE: Is CCCI liable for damages despite the fact that it has the right to choose its members? RULING: 1. CCCI's right shoulb be exercised w care. Art. 19 & 21. 2. CCCI is ordered to pay exemplary & moral damages, etc. HELD: Instant petition is DENIED. 3. GREGORIO vs. CA 599 SCRA 594 GRespondent No. 17 97 99, September 11, 2009 PETITIONER: Zenaida Gregorio RESPONDENTS: Emma J. Datuin, Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc.; CA WHERE: RTC Albay WHY: Gregorio demanded for moral damages because of initial petitioner's careles ness in identifying whom to sue. WHAT: Article 26, CC. FACTS: 1. Respondent filed complaint for violation of Batasang Pambansa Bilang 22 (Boun cing Checks Law) against Petitioner on MTC. a. 3 counts of violation - 3 checks. 2. MTC - warrant of arrest. Petitioner ot able to refute charges against her. 3. It was found that Petitioner did not have an account w/ the bank. a. Signature wasn't also authentic. b. MTC dismissed the case. 4. August 2000, Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Rs. 5. RTC denied motion to dismiss. Motion for reconsideration also denied. 6. Respondent went to CA alleging grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Are Sansio and Datuin liable for damages to Gregorio? RULING: Yes. 1. SC ruled P's right to personal dignity. Rs should've acted w/ diligence in determining who tended insufficient checks. 2. Petitioner suffered embarassment & had to spend time, money, & effort to clea n her name. 3. SC ordered Rs to pay for damages. HELD: Instant petition is affirmed. 4. CONTINENTAL STEEL vs. MONTANO

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009 WHY: Montano argued that the unborn child already has a juridical capacity and t hus can benefit fom the Company's CBA. WHAT: Art. 40, 41, & 42, CC. FACTS: 1. Hortillano, an employee of P, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 2. Claim was bcoz of the death of Hortillano s unborn child. His wife had prematur e delivery. 3. Petitioner granted Hortillano's leave but denied his claims for bereavement l eave and other death benefits. 4. CBA didn't state whether child should first have juridical personality to be covered. Petitioner contended that only w legal personality could die, acc. to Art. 40, 4 1, & 42, CC. ISSUE: 1. Whether only people w/ juridical personality could die. 2. Can CBA provisions be applied to the employee? RULING: 1. No. Ps reliance on said articles is misplaced. a. Art. 40 - conceived child acquires personality only when it is born. b. Art. 41 - defines when a child is considered born. c. Art. 42 - civil personality is extinguished by death. - it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical perso nality could die. 2. Labaor Code should be interpreted in favor of the labor in case of doubt. 3. Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to the employee, HELD: Petition DENIED. 5. LIMBONA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 181907, 25 June 2008 WHERE: WHY: WHAT: LAWS: Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as amended) - more than one cert. Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) - COMELEC's power to diqualify Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. FACTS: 1. Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy, despite approval COMELEC, does not re nder the certificate void ab initio. Limbona didn't have to file certificate of candidacy again as a substitute to he r husband. This put her candidacy in question. 2. Alngan filed petition to disqualify Mohammad for non-compliance with the resi dency requirement. - being non-registered voter of Pantar. Likewise, he subsequently filed petition against Norlainie. 3. Thus, latter withdrawn her candidacy. Later, she then filed another cert. of candidacy & won.

4. COMELEC then disqualified her: a. lack of residency; b. not registered voter; c. nullity of her cert. 5. Now, Petitioner argues that COMELeC had granted the withdrawal of her first c ert. & provided due course. 6. Petitioner claimed resdence on Panatar for 20 moc. but no evidence. ISSUES: 1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying her. 2. Whether Norlainie satisfied the one-year residency requirement. 3.Whether Alingan will succeed Norlainie as mayor. RULING: 1. Withdrawal of cert. of candidcay renders cert. void ab initio. 2. SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case - votes will not be counted. 3. Term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile, w/c impor ts not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in t hat place. 6. SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS G.R. No. 133743 : February 6, 2007 WHERE: RTC Makati WHY: San Luis' children contested 3rd marriage as bigamous. WHAT: Article 256, FC; Art. 144, CC & Art. 148 FC FACTS: 1. Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. 2. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marria ge contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that marriage was bigamous s ince the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RPetitioner law. 3. Felicidad f iled petition for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIPetitioner ASSETS AND SETTLE MENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE. 3.Children contested Felicidad: a. Petition should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (d eceased's residence) b. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid. 4. Felicidad: a. Proved Felicisimo's residence. b. Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii. ISSUE: Whether 3rd marriage is bigamous. RULING: 1. Cases Ps relied upon were petition cases. Distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" fo r purposes of fixing the venue of actions. 2. Felicidad has capacity to sues. 3. Case was on remand. 7. BAYOT VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008

WHERE: RTC Muntinlupa wHY: WHAT: 1. April 1979 - Vicente and Rebecca were married. Rebecca gave birth to Alix in California. 2. Marriage soured as later initiated divorce in Dominican Republic. 3. February 1996 - Rebecca insisted on her American citizenship before the Domin ican court. 4. Latter filed another petition before RTC Muntinlupa: a.on grounds of Vicente's psycho incapacity b. insisted on her Filipino citizenship. 5. Vicente filed motion to dismiss but was denied. 6. Latter prayed for: Permanent monthly upport - P220k. ISSUE: 1. Whether divorce decre in Guam sufficient to dissolve marriage. RULING: CA ruled in favor of CA & declared marriage as dissolved: Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied. 8. Morigo vs. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 WHERE: RTC Bohol WHY: WHAT: FACTS: 1. Morigo & Barrete were boardmates at Tagbilaran City for four years. They lost contact after school year. 2. Lucio received a card from Lucia from Singapore. Thy became sweethearts. 3. Both agreed to be married. Lucia then went to Canada to work, leaving Lucio. 4. August 1991 - Lucia filed petition for divorce in Ontario w/c was granted. 5. Morigo then married Lumbago at Tagbilaran. He filed petition for declaration of nullity of he & Lucia's marriage. 6. Morigo was charged w/ bigamy by City Prosecutor. 7. Morigo moved for suspension. ISSUE: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith . RULING: 1. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judici al declaration of nulllity is guilty of bigamy. This applies even earier union i s "void". 2. However, Lucio and Lucia merely signed a marriage contract on their own. Private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriag e and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. 3. SC held Petitioner as not guilty of bigamy. 9. Figueroa vs. Barranco

FACTS: 1. Sweethearts since they're teens.Intimacy resulted in a son born out of wedlck . 2. Barranco promised Petitioner that they'll marry after he passed the bar exams . 3. He passed after 4 takes & did not hold to his promise. Their relationship end ed. 4. Years later, he married another woman. 5. When Barranco was about to take his oath to enter the legal profession, Petit ioner filed a complaint relaying to the court what happened between her and Barr anco. 6. Barranco has filed three motions to dismiss because Figueroa still would not persecute. Her petition delayed his oath-taking. ISSUE: Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take his oath despite the accusatio ns of Figueroa. RULING: 1. What hapenned was not a grossly immoral conduct even if a child was of the relationship. 2. Ps allegation that she was forced to have sexual relations with him e as evidenced by her continued cohabitation with him even after their born in 1964. 3. Barranco has been sufficiently punished by the 26 years that he has ented from entering the profession he has worked so hard for. 10. SY vs. CA WHERE: RTC Pampanga WHAT: Article 80, CC. Art. 72-79, CC. FACTS: 1. Nov. 1973 - Filipina & Fernando contracted marriage. Sept. 1983 - Latter leaved the conjugal dwelling. 2. February 11, 1987 - Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of Pampanga. 3. May 1988 - Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against h er husband. RTC Manila convicted him of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sen tenced him to 20 days imprisonment. 4. August 1992 - Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nul lity of marriage to Fernando on ground of psychological incapacity. RTC & CA den ied. 5. Filipina presented incongruency w/ their marriage contract. Marriage shows place of Cavite though neither resides there. ISSUE: Whether marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. RULING: The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginnin g. 11. Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. CA WHAT: Article 76, CC. born out cannot li child was been prev

FACTS: 1. Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfre do E. Jacob. 2. Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alf redo, claiming his share of the deceased s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sol e surviving heir. 3. Petitioner could not present the original copy of Marriage Contract stating t hat the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jo se Centenera for registration. 4. Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issu ed in 1978. However, there were inconsistencies. 5. CA ruled for Pedro & declared Tomasa's reconstructed marriage contract as spu rious. ISSUE: Whether reconstructed marriage contract is valid. RULING: Yes. 1. An affidavit executed by the appellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they lived together as husband and wife for at least five years exempted them from the mar riage license requirement (Article 76, CC). 2. Absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO ) does not invalidate the marriage. 3. It is of solemnizing officer's duty to send a copy of marriage certificate to these offices in order to be duly recorded. 12. REPUBLIC VS. CA FACTS: 1. Castro's & Cardenas civil marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Ca stro's parents. 2. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the ma rriage was unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castr o discovered she was pregnant. 3. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted w ays. 4. Castro discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pas ig, Metro Manila. 5. Petitioner filed petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them. 6. Court ruled that inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. ISSUE: Is the marriage valid? RULING: The law provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential r equisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage vo id ab initio. 13. Alcantara vs Alcantara

FACTS: 1. Dec. 1982 - They were married w/out marriage license. 2. Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita. 3. 1988 - they parted ways and lived separate lives. 4. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that ther e was a marriage license issued. 5. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. 6. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restitut o. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid. HELD: The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intend ment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. 14. TY vs. CA FACTS: 1. Edgardo Reyes & Anna Villanueva's marriage was declared void ab initio for la ck of marriage license. 2. Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses, p rivate respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, who had 2 daughters. 3. Petitioner petition that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital o bligations of the respondent. HELD: 1. Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. Sh e submitted the marriage license in court and private respondent did not questio n the evidence. However, RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent. 2. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting . She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. 3. she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for ann ulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish. 4. Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband p ays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the app lication of the law absurd.