What does 'Social capital' mean?

Denise Thompson

Abstract The paper begjns wJth an JnvestJgatJon of two metaphors central to the 'social capital' framework - 'glue' and 'capital'. Both are found to be JnapproprJate descriptions of the kinds of human relationships supposedly being alluded to by the term 'social capital'. While the inapproprJateness of the term 'glue' is not a major threat to the discourse, the case of 'capital' is more serious. The rest of the paper is devoted to unravelling the connotations of 'capital' and the implications of applying it to relationships where the kinds of calculations necessary for sound economic performance .have no place. The competitiveness inherent in the functioning of capital belies the cooperation assumed to exist in 'social capital', while the requirement for 'productiveness' has disquieting implications for those who, for whatever reason, cannot be productive in the economic sense. The final section of the paper argues that those who are supposedly the main, if not the only, beneficiaries of 'social capital' - t h e 'disadvantaged' or the 'socially excluded' - do not in fact benefit from whatever is being alluded to by the term 'social capital'. The paper concludes by asking, but not answering, the question: Why, if 'social capital' cannot diminish poverty, is it being posited as a substitute for the welfare state, the only institution that does address poverty (if minimally)?
Keywords: social capital, capitalism, welfare state

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This paper investigates some important connotations of the notion of 'social capital', in particular the use of the word 'capital' to describe social networks which, on the face of it, are the antithesis of what is required if the capitalist economy is to function with maximum efficiency. The paper is an investigation of the meaning of 'social capital', although it does not supply a definition. Rather, it discusses some of the social and political implications of the meanings embedded within its usage. Meanings are not well captured by explicit definition, largely because definition is the end result of a lengthy process, the vagaries of which cannot be summed up neatly in a phrase or two. The real meaning of terms lies in their history, and although native speakers for the most part know that history, this is not the case for neologisms like 'social capital'. As new arrivals, neologisms are unfamiliar, although they must have some reference point in the familiar if they are to be comprehensible at all. What follows begins with an explicit definition although it does not stay there, ranging instead across a number of related concepts with the aim of elucidating those reference points. 'Glue' To begin then, not at the beginning, not with yet another iteration of the work of Robert Putnam, James S. Coleman or Pierre Bourdieu, or yet another adumbration of precursors acknowledged or merely surmised, but with a source whose prestige and worldwide influence is undeniable - the World Bank: Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society - it is the glue that holds them together (World Bank, nd). This notion of 'glue' is a 'favoured World Bank metaphor'' (Fine, 2001: 158), and it has enjoyed wide currency, not least among the World Bank's own researchers: 'everybody recognizes that it is essential to have that glue that holds societies together that we have called social capital' (Serageldin, 1996: 196; Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000: 44). 'The term [social capital] refers in general to the glue that holds groups and societies together - bonds of shared values, norms and institutions' (Narayan, 1999: 1).

There is a suggestion that it originated with Putnam. Bryson and Mowbray refer to 'Putnam's ... catchy metaphor of social capital as "the glue that holds society together" (Bryson and Mowbray, 2005: 94).

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However, the usage is not confined to the World Bank. The Australian social policy environment uses it extensively: The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS): 'If social capital is seen as "the glue that binds" ...' (ABS, 2000: 8) The Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS): 'The relationships of trust and reciprocity said to characterise social capital, are the "glue" of civil society' (Winter, 1998: 7); '"Social capital" has been described as an empirically elusive concept, yet has also been heralded as the glue that holds communities together' (Stone and Hughes, 2002: 1); 'In the first ... political interpretation of social capital ... it is simply seen as the social "glue" produced by voluntary association' (Cox and Caldwell, 2000: 43) The Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing: 'Social capital is a new term used to describe the age-old concept of social glue' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2001: 32) The Department for Victorian Communities (DVC): 'The social capital of a society ... is ... the glue that holds society together' (DVC, 2003: 8) A former Leader of the Australian Labor Party: 'social capital [is] the trust reciprocated between people. Mutual trust is the glue that holds a good society together, generating self-esteem and a sense of social belonging' (Latham, 2000: 192) This is a hugely popular metaphor - it appears over and over again in tbe literature.- And yet 'glue' is not a pleasant image with which to convey tbe virtues of amicable togetherness and collective efficacy, connoting as it does a cloying messy stickiness, and an inextricability characterised by certain degree of lack of choice. It conjures up notions of a type of bonding that is not under anyone's control because it is enforced by a substance, not by anything that anyone may have done. Besides, it doesn't work for the so-called 'bridging' or 'linking' social capital, both of which imply some distance between tbe two sides of the bridge or the two (or more) links in the chain.
'Capital' Competitiveness

But then, perhaps social capital's popularity comes from a need to deny, without actually naming it in tbis context, tbe chief quality of real capital, i.e. its competitiveness. There is unlikely to be any disagreement that capital is indeed competitive - the words 'competitive' and 'competitors' recur throughout tbe business literature, tbe mass media, and anywhere else where scarcity has to be managed and justified. The following single example should serve to illustrate it. It is taken from a website called 'Business Link':
A variant is 'cement': 'A conception of one's role and obligations as a citizen, coupled with a commitment to political equality, is the cultural cement of the civic community' (Putnam, quoted in Cox, 1995); 'Social capital includes such social virtues as cooperation, trust, solidarity, responsiveness and cohesiveness, which are a most powerful cement for a community' (Hunout, David and Dewitt, 2006).

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Understand your competitors Knowing who your competitors are ... will enable you to set your prices competitively and help you to respond to rival marketing campaigns ... [and] create marketing strategies that take advantage of your competitors' weaknesses ... You can also assess any threats posed by both new entrants to your market and current competitors ... (http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/ layer.>topicld=1073900131) This is capital in action and, given that it involves rivalries, taking advantage of weaknesses, and being threatened by one's fellows in the business, it is the antithesis of social cohesion. In the face of such centrifugal forces, perhaps only something as inexorable as 'glue' (or 'cement') will suffice to hold people together. Perhaps the 'glue' metaphor is an overstatement of the case for togetherness and cooperation because, under the actual social conditions of capital, people are driven apart, they can't trust each other because each is in competition with everyone else, and there will never be enough for everyone because the process of accumulating wealth in the hands of the few knows no bounds. Applying the notion of 'capital' to human relationships of 'mutual support, reciprocity, trust and obligation' (ABS, 2000: 3), or to 'the effective nurture of children' (ABS, 2001: 21),-' is to make a pernicious category-mistake (Ryle, 1976). It is a category-mistake because it transfers the logic and values of capitalism - competitive individualism, profit as the highest value, and the limitless creation of wealth - onto relationships based on altogether different values; and it is pernicious because those other values are not only different, they cannot survive in the face of the cold calculation necessary for wealth-creation and -ownership. Coleman spells out what is involved in treating interpersonal relations as 'capital': If A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this establishes an expectation in A and an obligation on the part of B. The obligation can be conceived as a credit slip held by A for performance by B. If A holds a large number of these credit slips, for a number of persons with whom A has relations, then the analogy to financial capital is direct. These credit slips constitute a large body of credit that A can call

'The nurture of children' was at the time 'not yet fully integrated into the ABS system of social statistics', although it was heing considered as part of the Social Capital Framework (ABS, 2001: 21). In fact, it was not to he included in the Framework. Tliere are a number of mentions of 'family', although usually in conjunction with 'friends' without any further discussion, e.g. 'Social attachment ... includes the more intimate relationships with family and friends as well as ... the wider community' (ABS, 2004: 6). References to children are more varied - 'poor educational outcomes for children', 'the immunisation of children', 'Children, parenting and school related groups' - hut there is no extended development of the notion of nurturing children and how that might ft into a social capital framework.

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in if necessary - unless, of course, the placement of trust has been unwise, and these are bad debts tbat will not be repaid (Coleman, 1988: S102). Coleman treats tbis scenario approvingly, but it is an undoubtedly exploitative view of buman relationships. Anyone who bebaved like tbis would be friendless, accompanied only by sycopbants and hangers-on (if be"* is powerful), or by temporary acquaintances (if be is not). Coleman rigbtly says tbat 'the analogy to financial capital is direct'. But 'financial capital' can have no place in interpersonal relationships if tbose relationships are to remain true to tbeir own emotional logic of mutual respect and recognition. There is no place in friendship (not to mention love) for assessments of who owes what to whom, and whether I have been repaid or not. And because tbis kind of logic is exploitative, because it views people as material resources for use and profit ratber than as valuable ends in tbemselves,^ it is also inappropriate for more distant relationships witb acquaintances and strangers. Altbough tbose relationships lack intimacy (by definition), tbe principle of a common bumanity forbids exploitation here, too. It is true that the kind of 'reciprocity' that occupies such a central place in the social capital framework is not on tbe wbole tbe one-on-one quid pro quo described by Coleman. As the ABS put it: The giving may be an investment in a process where tbe return to the giver is a generalised improvement in wbicb others as well as the giver participate ... [or] tbe sense of satisfaction -in enabling things to be done ... [It] encompass[es] tbe full spectrum of giving and receiving bebaviour ranging from ... favours and other direct excbanges, to [altruistic] behaviours ... [wbicb] consider ... tbe welfare and best interests of others, such as making charitable donations (ABS, 2004: 30-1). But why is this called 'capital'? None of these forms of reciprocity is characteristic of capital in the ordinary sense of tbe word, i.e. accumulated resources used for the production of other resources (profit). Improvements in wbicb others participate as well as the self cannot be used for tbe purposes of capital accumulation. Wbat the ABS is describing are 'public goods' from wbicb no one can profit (altbougb all may benefit) because no one can be excluded (by tbe lack of money to pay). In contrast, witbin the process of capital accumulation everything is a commodity and must be paid for, and tbose who benefit without baving done the work are anatbematised as 'free riders'. Witbin tbat framework, altruism is irrational, wbile doing a good job for its own sake
The masculine pronoun is deliberate. Although women can also be dominating and exploitative, this kind of calculating behaviour is typically male. The typical female equivalent is the diametric opposite - a tendency to eschew calculation altogether, even when calculation of one's own best interests is exactly what is required, e.g. in an intimate relationship with a domineering or violent man. Although Kant is currently out of favour in some quarters (and rightly so for many reasons), I have always found this principle an indispensable prerequisite for the good life (in the ethical, not the hedonistic, sense).

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('enabling things to be done'), and 'the welfare and best interests of others', are irrelevant unless they can be used to justify higher prices. Coleman's account is closer to the real meaning of 'capital' than the ABS' more nuanced version of social relationships. In fact, Coleman's account is unique in its honest (if inadvertent) exposure of what might be required of social relationships made in the image and likeness of capital. Normally in the social capital literature, the connotations of 'capital' must remain hidden if the term is to be used to designate equitable relationships between people. For example, Putnam says: 'By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital - tools and training that enhance individual productivity - "social capital" refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam, 1995: 67). Here, 'capital' becomes 'physical capital' exemplified by 'tools', and of the same order as individual competence ('human capital', 'training'). But 'tools' are not capital. They are not even 'physical capital', which is more accurately identified as industrial plant and equipment. They are certainly not finance capital. It is difficult to believe that Putnam does not know this and yet, if he does, he is being deliberately misleading. Although tools bear a certain superficial resemblance to (real) capital in the sense that they are a kind of private property (someone owns them) and they can be used to make a living, the resemblance is very superficial indeed. It pales into insignificance given that an individual armed only with 'tools' and 'training' is unlikely ever to become a capitalist. The point Putnam presumably wants to convey by using the term 'tools' to represent 'capital' is that they are mundane objects that anyone might have access to (although men more often than women). They have no connotations of elitism, privilege or power (in Putnam's view, and setting aside the connotations of masculinity). Tools are democratic in the sense that they are (relatively) easily acquired for (comparatively) small amounts of money. Putnam wants to democratise capital in the interests of his 'social capital' analogy. There would be no point in using the term 'social capital' to refer to 'cooperation for mutual benefit' if (real) capital was antithetical to cooperation. So the fact that it is competitive and, like all competitions, creates losers as well as winners, cannot be acknowledged. In such a way is capital bowdlerised and denatured in order to function as a term to describe the social life of ordinary citizens. Productivity One of the reasons given for the popularity of the notion of 'social capital' is that it modifies (and mollifies) the dominance of economics and provides a wider view of social life than the purely economic. But using the term 'capital', far from diverting attention towards other aspects of social life, in fact keeps the focus firmly fixed on the economic. To return to the World Bank definition quoted above: social capital (in the form of 'social cohesion') enables 'societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable' (World Bank, nd). In other words, the whole point of social capital is economic. Of course, the World Bank is a bank after all, and it is only to be expected that its focus
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would be on economic matters. But there is general agreement, among both the advocates and tbe critics of 'social capital', that the term 'capital' has connotations of 'productivity' in tbe economic sense of something that can be used to produce commodities, i.e. goods and services that can be excbanged for money. For tbe proponents of social capital, it is a good tbing tbat 'social capital' presents a mirror image of economic productivity and takes on mucb tbe same cbaracteristics. One advocate, writing in tbe context of tbe Canadian Policy Researcb Institute (PRI) project, 'Social capital as a public policy tool', said tbat tbe fact that 'social ties and their dynamic' could be 'accessed and used productively' meant tbat they were 'an additional means or resource for individuals and communities'. Tbe use of tbe word 'additional' bere indicates tbat there are otber 'means or resources', and these are identified in Figure 1 as 'Complementary resources sucb as other forms of capital (e.g., buman, financial, etc.)' (Franke, 2005: 9). Anotber advocate said that '[t]be meaning being captured bere is tbat social relations bave an on-going productive capacity; they can be used to belp produce sometbing else of value'. He, too, drew a parallel with 'financial capital',^ which be described as 'an asset' and something tbat 'people accumulate to make provision for the future' (Norton, 1998: 41). Social capital's critics agree witb its proponents tbat tbe term implies economic productivity, but tbey do not view this positively. One economist objected on tbe grounds tbat it was an illegitimate use of the notion of 'productivity'. He felt it was 'an attempt to gain conviction from a bad analogy'. 'Capital', be said, 'stands for a stock of produced or natural factors of production that can be expected to yield productive services for some time ... a stock of tangible, solid, often durable tbings sucb as buildings, machinery, and inventories'. He went on to ask: 'just wbat is social capital a stock of?' He conceded that sometbing like 'a reputation for trustwortbiness' migbt be valuable in business enterprises, and that norms for appropriate behaviour migbt enable both economy and society to function more smootbly. But be could not see, be said, 'bow dressing this set of issues in tbe language and apparatus of capital tbeory belps mucb one way or another' (Solow, 2000). Otber critics were worried that tbe connotations of productivity contained in tbe notion of 'capital' would 'be used as a nasty weapon of exclusion against' tbose who were unable to produce anything of economic value, for example, tbe old, tbe disabled, or tbe mentally ill. These critics saw similarities with
Like the first author quoted, he also drew a parallel with 'human capital': 'You can see the analogy with human or financial capital'. In the (usually economic) discourses that use the term, 'human capital' refers to those non-material resources acquired by individuals which can be used to earn money, education being the prime example. It is vulnerable to the same kind of critique as 'social capital' in that it, too, is a category-mistake - it involves the transfer of the meanings and values belonging to one framework onto another, unrelated framework. It differs from 'social capital' in that it is individualistic, i.e. it finds in the individual all that is necessary to explain success (and failure), and ignores the structural conditions outside the control of individuals. Access to high quality education, for example, requires money, and only some skills, training and abilities are saleable.

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Utilitarianism, whose principle of the greatest good for the greatest number had led throughout history to ignoring the needs and interests of minorities (Leeder, 1998: 13; Leeder and Dominello, 1999: 428). The exponents of social capital believe that the framework, far from excluding such categories of disadvantaged people, in fact is specifically designed with their needs in mind. The above-mentioned advocate for the Canadian PRI project, for example, listed '[s]eniors, youth at risk of dropping out, young children, persons with disabilities, newcomers, the long-term unemployed or individuals living in poverty, single parent families, and other segments of the Canadian population ... considered vulnerable or at risk of exclusion'. These were all people who could 'benefit, to varying degrees, from the contribution of social capital'. The subsequent discussion revolves around the notion of 'social networks' and how to characterise and measure them (Franke, 2005: 39-40). There are a number of problems with this account. For example, what does it mean to talk about the social networks of young children? And how helpful are the social networks of youth at risk when it quite likely to be their social networks that are egging them on to put themselves at risk? But the chief problem is the notion of 'social exclusion'. Although this is a concept that has been widely employed within social policy circles across the developed world in the last few decades, it is a strange notion to employ in relation to people who are explicitly acknowledged to occupy social networks. 'Social capital' just is social networks (if it is anything at all), not the absence of them. If people are already in social networks, if they already have 'social ties and support', how are they 'socially excluded'? What are they excluded from? Many of the people covered by the categories listed above would be poor'' - certainly the 'individuals in poverty'; but also 'seniors' on age pensions, especially if they do not own their own homes; youth who are unemployed with no foreseeable prospects of jobs in the near future; young children, whose levels of poverty are a cause for concern worldwide (UNICEF, 2006); people with disabilities whose way into the job market is blocked by insurmountable obstacles or who may not be capable of paid employment; the long-term unemployed, vilified and harassed because the only source of income is unavailable to them; single 'parents' (i.e. mothers) who are the segment of the population most likely to be 'at risk' of poverty, along with their children (Cass, 1988; Weinshenker and Heuveline, 2006). What these people are excluded from is access to sufficient income to live in comfort, dignity and security. What they need in order to be included is sufficient income to live in comfort, dignity and security, that is, some share in the benefits produced by real capital. What they are offered instead is 'social capital'. This is something they already possess and they are supposed to use it to get a job and hence make their way out of poverty (as long as the job is full-time and well paid, otherwise they are likely to remain poor) (Saunders, 2004).
Poverty is widely believed to be difficult to measure and hence to identify (Saunders, 2005). Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that people are poor if, for example, they are homeless, or have to rely on charitable organisations for food, or cannot afford to huy new clothes or pay for utilities or transport or school expenses.

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As the social capital researchers from Australian Institute of Family Studies put it: i n Australia, as in many other nations, there is an emphasis upon paid work as a primary means for achieving economic independence, alleviating poverty and avoiding welfare dependency'. These researchers believed that social capital could support people's 'labour market engagement' (i.e. help them get jobs) and hence alleviate their poverty. In their view this happened most obviously in 'the job search process', through the role played by 'one's family, [and one's] informal, civic and institutional ties' (Stone, Gray and Hughes, 2003: xii, 2). But governments do not rely on social capital to ensure that the poor engage in 'the job search process'. Instead they pass laws and promulgate regulations requiring 'activity tests'* which entail stiff penalties for failure to comply (Pearce, Disney and Ridout, 2002). For the purposes of 'job search', the poor are assumed to have little or no 'social capital' - and the proof of that is that they don't already have a job, especially if they haven't had one for a long time ('long-term unemployed') - and they must engage in mandatory 'job search activities'' if they want any income at all for the time during which they remain poor.'" The researchers cited above do not discuss this, and in fact their rational choice framework forbids it. There is no room in such a framework for notions of coercion or powerlessness, based as it is on one of the primal beliefs of economics, that is, that the economy operates through the freely-willed decisions of self-interested individuals. It is acknowledged that there are 'constraints' and 'imperfect information' impeding the exercise of free will, but these are seen simply as the occasion for decision-making and choice, not as insurmountable obstacles preventing people from exercising their 'preferences' altogether. The corollary of this belief in the freely-willing individual is the conviction that all unemployment is voluntary: In the neo-classical model, an individual makes labour supply decisions by maximising a utility function subject to a wealth or budget constraint. An individual's decision to participate in the labour market (and work a desired number of hours) can be explained in terms of a trade-off between time spent at home on market-substitution activities, leisure, and paid work. The decision to work or not work depends on a comparison between the wage that can be obtained in the market and their reservation wage (Stone, Gray and Hughes, 2003: 5).
8 This is called 'activation' in Europe (Barbier, 2001; Skevik, 2005), and 'workfare' in the US. 9 The 'seniors' mentioned above are exempt from activity test requirements because they are beyond workforce age. But they are also not likely to get jobs and hence to alleviate their poverty. The 'young children' are also not required to engage in activity tests because they are not yet of workforce age. But their parents must and that has an effect on the children, especially when their parents lose their income for infringing the rules. So even if it is the case that getting a job is the way out of poverty, it is true only for those of workforce age (and who are able-bodied). For the old and the very young (and the disabled), their way out of poverty is dependent on someone else. 10 Although these activities are coerced - the penalties for non-compliance involve the reduction or outright loss of an already meagre income - the requirement is termed 'assistance' in the social policy literature (OECD, 1988; ACOSS, 2002).

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This is so far from being an accurate depiction of the lives of the poor (or of anyone at all, for that matter) that it borders on absurdity. These authors admit to finding the 'neo-classical' account 'somewhat unsatisfying' (because it does not take account of 'family factors', by which they mean an adult couple since it makes even less sense to talk about children in the context of 'labour supply decisions'). But this proviso does not affect their focus on the 'labour market outcomes' of 'an individual' (Stone, Gray and Hughes, 2003: 5), and hence on this kind of unrealistic 'rational choice'. People do not 'make labour supply decisions'. Although everyone knows they must get paid work if they are to make a living (except those who are born into wealth or who marry it), the labour market is not structured according to the needs or desires of individuals. People have to make the best bargain they can in a world not of their own choosing. Education helps, although not as much as the social policy emphasis would have us believe - it is possible to spend many years becoming highly skilled in something that has no market value. Luck plays a part, and yes, so do family, friends, acquaintances and social networks of all kinds (and it is possible to say as much without mentioning the words 'social capital'). But rarely is there a choice between being involved in the labour market and not being involved. People either work (for money) at jobs the terms and conditions of which they have little or no control over, or they go without. And a decision between penury and a job that does not recognise one's best skills and abilities, that may require complicity in things one finds morally repugnant, and that doesn't pay very well either, cannot be called a decision on any rational meaning of the term. Nevertheless, although government treatment of the unemployed indicates a lack of trust in the efficacy of 'social capital' for 'job search', the framework remains an economic one. In this context, 'social capital' is of interest to governments and policy-makers only to the extent that it helps the economy. Although it doesn't equip people for the labour market, there is still a concern about whether or not people are 'productive' in the strict economic sense, and as such it does indeed have disquieting implications for those who, for whatever reason, cannot be productive in that sense. Despite the social capital framework's claims to be redirecting attention away from the economic and towards other areas of social life, economic interests remain paramount. 'Social capital' as an alibi for the withdrawal of state provision But whose interests are they? The economy is not a domain of cooperation, social cohesion and equality. On the contrary, it is essentially competitive (as noted above). Neither does it operate in the interests of all. Instead, it involves antagonistic and unequal interests, of which the best known are those identified by Marx during the nineteenth century - capital and labour. Of course, the reality is not so neatly divided. There have always been antagonistic inequalities within capital itself, not only between individual capitalists, but also between what used to be called (in the 1970s) different 'fractions' of capital." There
1] Nicos Poulantzas Political Power and Social Classes., first published in English in 1973.

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have always been inequalities within labour, too, between skilled and unskilled workers, for example, or between the employed and the unemployed, or between women and men. There have also always been categories of people who belonged to both, or to neither capital nor labour, a conundrum summed up in terms like 'lumpen proletariat', 'reserve army of labour', 'middle class' or 'petty bourgeoisie'. Where should we locate, for example, the CEOs of multinational firms who are paid (or who pay themselves) tens of millions of dollars annually.' Where is the proletariat when the industrial workforce has dwindled to vanishing point, to be replaced by automation, highly skilled and privileged technicians who are paid accordingly, and highly exploited 'off-shore' labour? But it is not necessary to make any hard and fast distinctions in order to notice that the capitalist economy does not benefit everyone while at the same time benefiting others spectacularly.'- It is not the poor who benefit from the economy (by definition) and it is those who do not (or cannot) benefit from real capital, the poor or the 'socially excluded' (some categories of whom were listed above), for whom 'social capital' is deemed most relevant. As a leading authority in the area said, 'the social capital of the poor is the one asset that they can potentially draw upon to help negotiate their way through an unpredictable and unforgiving world' (World Bank researcher, Michael Moorcock, quoted in CONSCISE, 2003: 22). But social capital is not much of a resource if it cannot make the world any less 'unpredictable and unforgiving' and if people are still poor even if they have it in abundance. What purpose does it serve when it makes no difference to people's economic resources, when it cannot even be relied upon to get people jobs? It is difficult to see in what way the 'social capital' of the poor can be of benefit to them. It refers to resources they already have, and only to those they already have. There is no suggestion in the social capital framework that wealth might be redistributed. Everything that goes to make up social capital the poor already possess and still they're poor. In this sense, 'social capital' is a recommendation to the poor that they confine themselves to the resources they already have, i.e. those that are so seriously lacking they are called 'poverty'. But if 'social capital' does not benefit the poor, what is its purpose? Is it no accident that a discourse of 'social capital' gained enormous popularity in an era when attacks on and cut-backs to welfare states were occurring in liberal democracies worldwide? Is 'social capital' being posited as a substitute for the

12 The right-wing explains this state of affairs in terms of the attributes of individuals. Both those who succeed and those who fail purportedly do so because of the qualities and abilities each individual possesses (or lacks). This kind of explanation is deeply embedded in the discipline of economics under the name of 'rational choice theory' or 'the rational actor model'. This is not the place to go into the structure/agency debate in any detail. Suffice it to say for the moment that I find implausible this belief in the free-floating, self-engendered individual, and I remain unconvinced that failure to thrive under conditions of capitalism is some kind of personal deficiency or moral lapse.

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welfare state.-"^ Tbere is one aspect of tbe framework tbat tells against sucb a bypotbesis, and tbat is tbe inclusion witbin tbe ambit of 'social capital' of resources provided by tbe state. For example, tbe ABS says, in its brief note on 'Social capital' in its Measuring Wellbeing publication: 'the transfer of income from tbe more to tbe less well off via tbe tax and social security systems, is a good example of social capital at work' (ABS, 2001: 20). And Putnam bas strongly denied tbat social capital is a substitute for 'public policy': 'Social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy but ratber a prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it' (Putnam, 1993). But 'transfer of income from tbe more to tbe less well off does not appear in tbe ABS' later 'Social Capital Framework'. Tbere, tbe relationsbip between citizen and state is all one way - from tbe people to tbe government, and not vice versa. For example, 'individuals or groups wbo feel closed out of tbe government power structure, may feel marginalised and locked out of decision making'. Here, tbe focus is on tbe feelings of tbe 'individuals and groups'. Wbetber or not tbey bave actually been 'closed out' is not stated. Again, one of tbe Framework's indicators (of tbe presence or otberwise of social capital) is tbe proportion of people wbo know members of parliament; anotber is tbe proportion of people wbo find accessing public services and facilities very easy (or difficult) (ABS, 2004: 81-3). But tbe Framework contains no indicator or data item for measuring tbe extent to wbicb people bave benefited from income support. Indeed, witbin tbe terms of tbe discourse, a bigb proportion of people on income support would be a telling indication of a lack of social capital. Putnam's examples of tbe kind of good 'public policy' required for social capital, e.g. 'agricultural extension services' in tbe nineteentb century, 'tax exemptions for community organizations' in tbe twentietb (Putnam, 1993), do not include any of tbe functions of tbe welfare state. In fact, at least one of bis examples of government action tbat damaged social capital was a welfare state program, i.e. 'urban renewal and public bousing projects [tbat] bave beedlessly ravaged existing social networks' (Putnam, 1993). Putnam is rigbt to be critical of sucb projects, many of wbicb bave indeed been disastrous for tbe communities tbey were meant to 'renew', and not only in tbe US. But tbe problem lay, not in tbe projects tbemselves, still less in tbe ideals of urban renewal and public bousing, but in tbe way tbey were carried out and tbe contempt witb wbicb tbose responsible treated tbe people. Housing programs tbat treated people witb respect, tbat consulted tbem, tbat were generous in design and execution instead of meagre and mean-spirited, would bave vastly different and beneficial effects on social networks. Still, tbis example of Putnam's indicates tbat, in tbe terms of tbe social capital discourse, any attempt to include tbe welfare state is simply tokenistic. Not only is tbe welfare state not tbe kind of tbing tbat counts as 'social capital', it is regarded, at least in Putnam's example, as actively destructive of it.
13 Tbe welfare state involves tbe redistribution of wealtb witbin the liberal democracies. 'Social capital' is also used by tbe World Bank in the context of international 'development'. In that context it has implications for redistribution between nations, and many of the same issues discussed in this paper apply there, too.

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The right-wing''' makes this explicit. One author refers to the 'damaging effects of government on social capital', and says that this happens through the phenomenon of 'crowding out'. Government provision for the poor deters their families and friends from providing for them: As government has stepped in to provide welfare benefits, there has been that much less need for private provision of welfare, whether this be through the family, networks of friends, or formally organised charitable bodies (Norton, 1998). In this author's view, substituting government-provided benefits for 'private provision' is a problem because '[t]he incentive to invest in these [private] social relationships declines, and so social capital is lost'. But this is implausible. People do not stop 'investing' in family and friends because they (or their friends or families) receive welfare benefits. On the contrary, it is destitution unleavened even by welfare benefits that is more likely to be so demoralising that people become unable to care for or about others, or themselves, and the weak and helpless are preyed upon and brutalised instead of nurtured and protected. And charity is notoriously cold, meagre, begrudged and resented, whether formally organised or not. So, of course, is the giving of welfare benefits, but they are at least connected to a sense of citizens' entitlements, which persists despite the neo-liberal push to re-define receipt of benefits as 'dependence', and to force recipients into behaviour deemed to display 'obligation' and 'responsibility'.''' The argument also suffers from historical amnesia. The families and friends of the poor are likely to be poor too and hence unable to provide for each other, a state of affairs that was directly responsible for the establishment of liberal democratic welfare states in the first place. In the words of William Beveridge, the architect of the British welfare state, what was required when he was writing his report. Full Employment in a Free Society (1944), was '"an attack upon five giant evils: upon ... physical Want ... upon Disease which often causes that Want and brings many other troubles in its train, upon Ignorance which no democracy can afford among its citizens, upon Squalor ... and upon that Idleness which destroys wealth and corrupts men"' (quoted in Timmins, 1995: 24). In other words, the components of the welfare state were: income security in times of unemployment, illness and old age, and child allowances (as the solution to 'physical Want'); a health system available to all (as the solution

14 At this point the designation 'right-wing' requires some explanation. The author quoted here is a Research Fellow at the Sydney-based Centre for Independent Studies (CIS), and his article appears in CIS' journal. Policy. CIS say on their website that they are 'politically non-partisan; our research is not directed by our supporters'. But they are funded by large corporations and are known to be socially conservative and neo-liberal in policy orientation. And their stated research agenda is typically right-wing, with its emphasis on 'the role of the free market in an open society and other voluntary processes in providing many of the goods and services normally supplied by the compulsory methods of government'. 15 As, for example, in the Australian government's imposition of 'mutual obligation' on the unemployed, and the Clinton Administration's 1996 legislation aimed at single mothers, the Personal Responsihility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).

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to 'Disease'); universal education (as tbe solution to 'Ignorance'); affordable, i.e. public, bousing (as tbe solution to 'Squalor'); and full employment, wbicb Beveridge saw as a government responsibility (as tbe solution to 'Idleness'). Beveridge's report, and tbe eventual establisbment of tbe welfare state in Britain, were partly motivated by a sense of common national purpose, but tbey were also motivated by tbe privations suffered by tbe population during tbe depression of tbe 1930s. As Beveridge put it: '"tbe purpose of victory is to live in a better world tban tbe old world"' (Timmins, 1995: 24). Ironically, it was tbe introduction of rationing tbat improved tbe diet of tbat tbird of tbe population of Britain wbo were cbronically malnourisbed just before tbe war. Wbile food rationing meant tbat most people bad to restrict tbeir diets, it also meant tbat tbe undernourisbed bad tbeir first adequate diets in 1940 and 1941, and '"tbe incidence of deficiency diseases, and notably infant mortality, dropped dramatically"' (Ricbard Titmuss, quoted in Timmins, 1995: 34). 'Family and friends' and 'cbaritable bodies' were no substitute for tbe welfare state tben; only government action brougbt people's living standards above tbe level of destitution. And tbey are no substitute for tbe welfare state now. Tbere is evidence to suggest tbat it is tbe welfare state, so excoriated by tbe rigbt-wing for its failure to cure poverty, tbat in fact bas ensured tbat poverty in tbe western nations bas not been worse,"" and tbat was the reason it was establisbed in tbe first place. Nonetbeless, within tbe social capital framework as it is expounded above, not only is tbe welfare state not an aspect of 'social capital', it is inimical to it. Tbere are dissenting voices. Patulny (2005), for example, argues tbat social capital and tbe welfare state are entirely compatible, and tbat botb are undermined by wbat he refers to as 'the three threats of capitalism', i.e. commodification, stratification and familialisation. Using tbe World Values Survey and Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states, be finds evidence tbat tbose nations wbere tbe welfare state bas come most under attack, i.e. tbe 'liberal' and tbe 'corporatist' types, are also tbose nations wbere tbe values of social capital'^ are least (in comparison witb tbe 'social democratic' type of welfare state). But dissent is rare. Despite its implausibility, the notion that the welfare state is a threat to social networks is firmly embedded witbin the discourse. It is difficult to avoid tbe conclusion tbat tbe discourse of 'social capital' is a way of saying tbere is no need for a welfare state, and an ideological justification for dismantling it. Tbe constituencies of 'social capital' and tbe welfare state are similar. Compare tbe following 'social capital' tasks with Beveridge's solutions tp the 'five giant evils' listed above: 'tackle social exclusion and poverty, create employment, provide services, generate and retain wealtb and income in distressed localities and regions, provide training and skills.
16 For Australia, see: ACOSS, 2003; FaCS, 2003; for Scandinavia, see: Esping-Andersen, 1990: 57; for Europe including the UK, see: Gauthier, 2000; Martin and Vion, 2002; Kamerman, 2003.
17 As measured by responses to questions about trust.

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encourage entrepreneurship, develop grass-roots involvement and increase social cohesion and democratic participation' (CONSCISE, 2004: 16).'* There are differences between the two lists - this one contains no references to housing or health (although health is very much a preoccupation of the 'social capital' framework), and there is a neo-liberal emphasis on self-help ('entrepreneurship', 'grass-roots involvement') that is absent from the original f^ormulation." But the concern with poverty is common to both. Combine this with the attack on 'big government' (or more circumspectly, worry about how expensive the welfare state is), and with the 'dependency' and 'idleness' the welfare state supposedly produces in its beneficiaries, and 'social capital' takes on the appearance of a brand new, improved solution to poverty, itself re-branded as 'social exclusion'. But if 'social capital' cannot reduce poverty, why is it being posited as a replacement for the one social institution that does (if only marginally)?^"
Conclusion

To answer the question of why 'social capital' is being posited as a replacement for the welfare state, when it offers no equivalent material resources for alleviating poverty, would take us too far from the limited purpose of this paper. That purpose was to examine certain terminological infelicities in the discourse of 'social capital' with a view to uncovering some of the deeper problems with the framework. Terminology is not neutral. Using 'glue' as a metaphor for human relationships indicates that something is wrong with the framework. People do not behave like glue, and yet the metaphor is frequently called upon to illustrate 'social capital'. The problems can be further elucidated by looking closely at another terminological usage, the central metaphor of 'social capital', i.e. capital itself. Connotations of competitiveness and productivity sit uneasily with social capital's professed concern for those who are failing to thrive, those subjected to 'social exclusion' and in need of 'social inclusion'. 'Social capital' remains tied too closely to the meanings and values of (real) capital to ameliorate the the
18 The source of this quote is the final report of a project financed within the EC Framework V Research Programme, under the Key Action, Improving the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base. The initials CONSCISE stand for 'The Contrihution of Social Capital in the Social Economy'. Strictly speaking, the tasks listed in the text helong to 'social enterprises'. The connection hetween 'social capital' and 'social enterprises' is as follows: 'places with good stocks of social capital nurture social enterprises within a growing social economy' (C;ONSCISE, 2003: 16). 19 This does not mean that the neo-liheral criticisms of the welfare state are new. From its inception the welfare state has had to balance 'competing and quite possibly irreconcilable goals'. As Timmins has pointed out, 'Chief among the competing goals were the desire to provide security as of right, set against incentives for work and saving; and the balance between individual freedom and compulsion - compulsion for the good of all and for the good of the individual' (Timmins, 1995: 51). The neo-liberal hegemony of the last few decades has merely tipped the balance further in favour of 'work and saving' and compulsion, and away from rights, entitlements and individual freedom. 20 Employment is said to be the way out of poverty, hut employment is less reliable than a system of social security - that is why systems of social security were devised in the first place.

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effects of the social conditions of the capitalist economy. As well, it provides no new resources to enable it to do so. It leaves people to their own devices, with only the resources they have provided for themselves. If those resources are so scant as to qualify as 'disadvantage' or 'social exclusion' (or poverty), how is the disadvantage to be overcome? The 'social capital' discourse does not say.
References

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family allowances: Social security for everyone', San Jos, Costa Rica, 27-29 January - http://www.issa.int/pdf/sanjose03/2kamerman.pdf Latham, M. (2000) '"If only men were angels": social capital and the Third Way', in I. Winter, ed., 192-222 Martin, Claude and Antoine Vion (2002J Lone Parent Families, Work and Social Care: A Qualitative Comparison of Care Arrangements in Finland, Italy, Portugal, the UK and France 'New kinds of families, new kinds of social care', SOCCARE PROJECT, work package 2 - http://www.uta.fiy laitokset/sospol/soccare/report2.PDE Narayan, D (1999) Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty Policy Research Working Paper 2167. The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Poverty Division - http://www. worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html Onyx, J. and P. Bullen (1997) Measuring Social Capital in Five Communities in NSW: An Analysis Working Paper Series No.41, Centre for Australian Community Organisations and Management (CACOM), University of Technology Sydney Patulny, R. (2005) Society Building: Welfare, Time and Social Capital PhD thesis - http://www.library.unsw.edu.au/~thesis/adt-NUN/public/ adt-NUN20070727.112148/index.html Putnam. R. D. (1995) 'Bowling alone: America's declining social capital' Journal
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