Republic vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 97906) FACTS: Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr.

and Segundina Alcala. When he was two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala Jr. and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and order of the court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years if marriage. Upon reaching the age twenty-two, herein private respondent, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the name suggest a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname. ISSUE: Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting of said petition. HELD: Yes, the reasons given in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient, and proper to warrant the granting of said petition. The change of name is justifiable because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another justifiable cause is his desire to improve his social and business life. In granting and denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all best evidence available. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are; a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. b. When the change results as legal consequence, as in legitimation. c. When change will avoid confusion. d. Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of alien parentage. e. Sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody. f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that change of name would prejudice public interest. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose which is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and provide his best interest. Concordantly, the Court

held that a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship; what is altered is only the name.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE NAME OF ONG HUAN TIN TO TERESITA TAN, ONG HUAN TIN, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.G.R. No. L-20997. April 27, 1967SANCHEZ, J p: Facts: A case was filed by herein petitioner seeking that her name Ong Huan Tin be changed to Teresita Tan. Said petition was, however, denied by the c o u r t e x p r e s s i n g t h e o p i n i o n t h a t a n a l i e n c a n n o t a v a i l h i m s e l f o f t h e provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of name. Issue: Whether or not an alien in this country may petition for a ch ange of name. Ruling: The Court lay down the rule that aliens residing in the P h i l i p p i n e s m a y apply for change of name in the courts thereof. Accordingly, change of nameu n d e r o u r l a w, i s a s p e c i a l p r o c e e d i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e s t a t u s o f a p e r s o n involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regardto, the rest of the community. The petition therefor is directed against all. Itis in rem. So it is, that under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of the petitioni s r e q u i r e d . T h e b r o a d g e n e r a l d o c t r i n e i s t h a t t h e s t a t u s o f a n a l i e n individual is g o v e r n e d a n d c o n t r o l l e d b y t h e l e x d o m i c i l i . I m p l i c i t i n t h i s precept is that an alien may be allowed to change his name here only if he be domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means permanent home, theplace to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends tor e t u r n , a n d d e p e n d s o n f a c t s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e y disclose intent."

G.R. No. L-23595

February 20, 1968

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMES OF ANTONIO ANG GUI, ALBERTO BASAS ANG, ERNESTO BASAS ANG and EVELYN BASAS ANG, minors, VIRGINIA BASAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, In her petition, appellant alleges that said minors are her children, born out of wedlock, on August 23, 1953, July 4, 1956, December 17, 1958 and May 22, 1960, respectively; that, although the children

had been registered, in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, under the names aforementioned, they were baptized as Antonio Chua, Jr., Alberto Chua, Jose Ernesto Chua y Basas, and Evelyn Chua, respectively; and that these discrepancies, between their names as registered in the aforementioned office and as entered in the records of the parish churches in which they were, respectively, baptized, are "very confusing and may mislead the people and the authorities of their true identities." Appellant prayed, therefore, that the names of said minors be changed to Antonio Basas, Alberto Basas, Ernesto Basas and Evelyn Basas.

Held: This Court has previously ruled that aliens cannot avail themselves of Rule 103 (Sp. Proc. No. 03252, Sim Chi Tat, Petitioner), and that it will not entertain a petition for a change of name when petitioner's citizenship is either controverted or doubtful (Sp. Proc. No. 02915, Chua Mah Tuan, Petitioner). In a recent case (Lim v. De la Rosa, L-17790, March 31, 1964) a statement made by the trial court in a change of name proceedings to the effect that petitioner was a Filipino was deemed by the Supreme Court to be an indication that petitioner was indeed a Filipino. The ruling confirms the advisability of this court's denying a change of name where a petitioner's claim of Filipino citizenship is open to doubt. In the case at bar, the children involved would be Chinese citizens if they are natural children, or if their parents are legally married. The Court has grave doubts in respect of the allegation made in their behalf that they are illegitimate. Of late, there has been a trend for claims of illegitimacy being made by children of Chinese fathers and Filipino mothers with the obvious aim of obtaining judicial recognition, however, indirect, that they are entitled to be considered Filipino citizens. The Court has refunded to give due course to petitions based on such claim.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990 TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, FACTS; Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas her full blood brothers and sisters, filed, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana .Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body.

ISSUE; W/N THE COMMON LAW MARRIAGE OF EUGENIO AND VARGAS IS VALID. HELD: Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19 While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters .

G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents. ISSUE: the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law. FACTS; private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His

mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. HELD : Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except:(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. 3 The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt. 4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. 5 It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for

adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. 6 This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. 7 As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.

LAZATIN v CAMPOS GR No. L-43955-56 TEEHANKEE; July 30, 1979 FACTS: Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita deA s i s , a n d h i s a d o p t e d t w i n d a u g h t e r s , N o r a a n d I r m a . Margarita also died, leaving a holographic will. Ramon,son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.Clara, filed a motion claiming that Margarita had executed a subsequent will and demanding itsproduction. R e n a t o f i l e d a m o t i o n t o intervene in the estate of Margarita as anadopted child, on the basis of an affidavitexecuted by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Mariano, which stated that Renato was a n " i l l e g i t i m a t e s o n " o f M a r i a n o a n d w a s l a t e r adopted by him. This affidavit was later modifiedt o s t a t e t h a t p e t i t i o n e r w a s a d o p t e d b y b o t h Mariano and his wife Margarita.- L o w e r c o u r t a l l o w e d R e n a t o t o i n t e r v e n e a s a d o p t e d s o n i n t h e e s t a t e o f M a r ga r i t a . B u t Renato presented no decree of adoption in hisfavor. Instead he attempted to prove that he hadrecognized the deceased spouses as his parents;he had been supported by them until their death;formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" butwas compelled to change his surname to "Sta.Clara" when the deceased spouses refused togive consent to his marriage to his present wife;t h a t a t f i r s t , h e a n d h i s w i f e s t a y e d a t t h e residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita,but a few months later, they transferred to theMercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned bythe deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were alsointended to be presented, e.g., photo of Irmawhere she addressed herself as his sister; photoo f h i m a n d M a r g a r i t a w h e n h e w a s a b o y ; document showing that his real name is "RenatoLazatin ISSUE: W O N R e n a t o h a s e s t a b l i s h e d h i s s t a t u s a s adopted child of the deceased spouses.

HELD:NO - Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationships i m i l a r t o t h a t w h i c h r e s u l t s f ro m l e g i t i m a t e paternity and filiation. Only an adoption madet h r o u g h t h e c o u r t , o r i n p u rs u a n c e w i t h

t h e procedure laid down under Rule 99 is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but iswholly and entirely artificial. To establish the r e l a t i o n , t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s m u s t b e strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is anabsolute nullity. The fact of adoption is neverpresumed , but must be affirmatively proved bythe person claiming its existence. The absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve apresumption of its non-existence. Where, undert h e p ro v i s i o n s o f t h e s t a t u t e , a n a d o p t i o n i s effected by a court order, the records of suchc o u r t c o n s t i t u t e t h e e v i d e n c e b y w h i c h s u c h adoption may be established.- Renato's proofs do not show or tend to showthat at one time or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an orderapproving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. Hem e r e l y c l a i m s t h a t h e w a s j u d i c i a l l y a d o p t e d between the years 1928 and 1932. He did notshow which court decreed such adoption, and hec i t e d n o w i t n e s s e s t o s u c h p ro ceed ing.

G.R. No. L-18008

October 30, 1962

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FACTS: Elisea Laperal married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final; That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now; That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL. ISSUE: W/N ELISEA MAY CHANGE HIS NAME HELD:The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code which reads: ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. (Emphasis supplied) Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.

It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

G.R. No. L-45152

April 10, 1939

HILARIA SIKAT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOHN CANSON, defendant-appellee. Hilaria Sikat and John Canson contracted marriage in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan. They lived together as husband and wife until 1911 when they separated. During the same year the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her spouses, but on January 16, 1912, upon petition of both parties, the case was dismissed without the court passing upon the merits thereof. At the time of their marriage in 1904, John Canson was an Italian citizen but on February 27, 1922, he became a naturalized Filipino citizen. In 1929, he went to Reno, Nevada, United States of America, and on October 8, of that year, he obtained an absolute decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. Hilaria Sikat, however, did not accompany her husband but remained in the Philippines. Subsequently, in 1933, the plaintiff filed another action, civil case No. 5398 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, wherein she sought to compel the defendant to pay her a monthly pension of P500 as alimony or support. ISSUE: W/N THE DIVORCE DECREE IS VALID. HELD: Counsel for plaintiff-appellant contends that twelve days prior to the issuance of the decree of divorce, defendant-appellee became a naturalized American citizen and argues that the Nevada court had thereby acquired jurisdiction over him to issue a divorce decree. It is not, however, the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the State . And assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers, this did not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant a divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person. This was not a proceeding in rem to justify a court in entering a decree as to the res or marriage relation entitled to be enforced outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. That our divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too liberal is not for this court to decide. The allotment of powers between the different governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within the confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has been upheld by this court