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j. Constitutional commissions COMMON PROVISION Section 6 1. GREGORIO M. ARUELO, JR., petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN, BRANCH 17, MALOLOS BULACAN, and DANILO F. GATCHALIAN, respondents. Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the office of the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a margin of four votes, such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected ViceMayor of Balagtas, Bulacan. On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition docketed as SPC No. 92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns. On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition docketed as Civil Case No. 343-M-92 protesting the same election. Aruelo, however, informed the trial court of the pendency of the pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC. On June 10, 1992, Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from the trial court, giving him five days within which to answer the petition. Instead of submitting his answer, Gatchalian filed on June 15, 1992 a Motion to Dismiss claiming that: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition. Meanwhile in SPC Case No. 92-130, the COMELEC on June 6, 1992 denied Aruelo's petition for noncompliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166, which requires the submission of the evidence and documents in support of the petition to annul Gatchalian's proclamation (Rollo, p. 42). The trial court, on the other hand, issued an order dated July 10, 1992, denying Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordering him to file his answer to the petition within five days from notice, otherwise, "a general denial shall be deemed to have been entered" (Rollo, p. 45). The trial court also directed Aruelo to

pay the deficiency in his filing fee, which the latter complied with. Gatchalian filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order but the trial court denied the same on August 3, 1992. On August 6, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28621, which alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying his Motion to Dismiss and his Motion for Reconsideration. Earlier, that is on July 23, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the trial court a Motion for Bill of Particulars, which was opposed by Aruelo. The trial court denied Gatchalian's motion in an order dated August 5, 1992, a copy of which was received by him on August 6, 1992. On August 11, 1992, Gatchalian submitted before the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, alleging inter alia, that Aruelo was the one who committed the election fraud and that were it not for the said fraud, Gatchalian's margin over Aruelo would have been greater. Gatchalian prayed for the dismissal of the petition, the confirmation of his election and the award of damages. On the day the answer was filed, the trial court issued an order admitting it, and without Gatchalian's specific prayer, directed the revision of ballots in the precincts enumerated in Gatchalian's Counter-Protest and Construction. For this purpose, the trial court ordered the delivery of the contested ballot boxes to the Branch Clerk of Court. On August 14, 1992, Aruelo filed with the trial court a Motion to Reconsider As Well As To Set Aside "Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim" Filed Out of Time by Protestee. The trial court, on September 2, 1992, denied Aruelo's motion and forthwith scheduled the constitution of the revision committee. On September 28, 1992, Aruelo prayed before the Court of Appeals for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court from implementing the Order of August 11, 1992, regarding the revision of ballots. The Court of Appeals belatedly issued a temporary restraining order on November 9, 1992, after actual revision of the contested ballots ended on October 28, 1992. Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the Court of Appeals on September 21, 1992 another petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Order dated August 5, 1992, which denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars. The Court of

Appeals, in its Resolution dated September 28, 1992, dismissed this petition for lack of merit. On November 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 28621, denying Gatchalian's petition, but declared, at the same time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter-Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below" (Rollo, p. 212). Hence, this petition. Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer. We do not agree. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343-M-92) with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides: Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction. It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts. Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules

concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]). Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely. The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation controversy which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2; Dipatuan v. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 86 [1990]). Pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators' desire that the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidate be done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. Questions as those involving the appreciation of the votes and the conduct of the balloting, which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest (Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 [1989]; Alonto v. Commission on Elections, 22 SCRA 878 [1968]). An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people. For this reason, it is a well-established principle that laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to the end that the popular will, expressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated (Unda v. Commission on Elections, 190 SCRA 827 [1990]; De Leon v. Guadiz, Jr., 104 SCRA 591 [1981]; Macasundig v. Macalangan, 13 SCRA 577 [1965]; Corocoro v. Bascara, 9 SCRA 519 [1963]). We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

section 7 Cua v. Commission on Elections (& Priv.Respondent Puzon) (1987) Facts: 1. The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1 decision favoring the petitioner but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No. 1669. 2. Section 5 of the said resolution states that, A case being heard by it shall be decided with the unanimous concurrence of all three Comissioners and its decision shall be considered a decision of the Comission. If this required number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be appealed to the Commission En Banc, in which case the vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision of the Commission. 3. Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of the first division was a valid decision despite the resolution stated above because of Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. He argues that this applies to the votings of the Comelec both in division and En Banc. 4. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that no decision was reached by the first division because the required unanimous vote was not obtained. It was also argued that no valid decision was reached by the Comelec En Banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute the majority of the body. Issue: W/N the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid. Held: The 2-1 decision by the first division was a valid decision under Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Ratio: The three members who voted to affirm the first division constituted a majority of the five members who voted and deliberated thereon (Note: This is the part of the decision which Fr. B criticized in the Reviewer. See second column.) En Banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him to assume his seat in the House of Representatives. ACENA VS CSC FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. Acena was

assigned as Admin. Officer by then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor on temporary status pending his compliance to obtain a Masters Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the same, the new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer. Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to keep his appointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor. Thus the latters appointment was withdrawn. He also filed a complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the validity of his dismissal from his position as violation of security of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed petition for review to the Office of the President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC finds the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional issue. 5. FILIPINAS ENGINEERING VS. FERRER review of decisions of con-coms

Comelec issued an invitation to bid in preparation for the national elections of 1969. The invitation called for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of voting booths. 17 bidders submitted their bids. Filipinas Engineering and Acme Steel were 2 of those bidders. Comelec Bidding Committee recommended that the Filipinas bid be awarded. (It rejected Acmes bid.) Later however, after an ocular inspection by the Comelec, the Bidding Cmte issued a resolution awarding the contract to Acme, after finding that Acme submitted the lowest bid. Comelec issued a purchase order in favor of Acme. Of course, Filipinas objected and filed an injunction against Comelec before the CFI Manila (civil case) Acme however complied with its contract fully. The case was dismissed by the lower court, which Filipinas appealed. The Comelec filed a MTD on the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case involving an order of Comelec dealing with the award of contract?

While adjudicatory / quasi-judicial decisions = SC certiorari. 6. MATEO, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al G. R. No. 113219, August 4, 1995 FACTS: Petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. When placed under preventive suspension, Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as acting General Manager. He was later dismissed from service. Private respondent then filed a Special Civil Action

SC: NO. It is the SC, not the lower court (CFI) which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari, final decisions, order or rulings of Comelec, relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.

BUT, in this case, an order of Comelec awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals in response to invitation to bid, DOES NOT come within the purview of final order which is exclusively and directly appealable to the SC via certiorari.

before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on two grounds: 1. The court had no jurisdiction over the case; and 2. Quo warranto was not the proper remedy. Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss and

What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of Comelec reviewable by SC are those rendered in actions or PROCEEDINGS BEFORE COMELEC, and taken cognizance of by said body in the exercise of its ADJUDICATORY OR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.

the motion for reconsideration as well. ISSUE: Whether or not the regional trial court has jurisdiction over the special civil case involving dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporation. RULING: The Supreme Court held that it has no jurisdiction. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation

Comelecs powers are classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, and those which are inherently administrative in character.

created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are covered by the of Civil Service Law. Indeed the established rule is that the hiring and firing of

The order of the Comelec granting the award to Acme as winning bidder, is NOT AN ORDER RENDERED IN A LEGAL CONTROVERSY. Comelecs resolution was not issued in pursuance of its quasi-judicial function but merely as an incident of ITS INHERENT ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION over the conduct of the election. Hence, said resolution cannot be deemed as a final order reviewable by the SC. Being non-judicial in character, no direct and exclusive appeal to the SC may lie. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in ordinary civil action before TRIAL COURTS.





corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Laws and Rules and Regulations. Petition is hereby granted.


In short, administrative decisions = RTC civil action







intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner. Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. 6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91. 7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. The failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal thereof. 8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. 9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies. 1. SCOPE. These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission. 2. CASES NOT COVERED. These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. 3. WHERE TO APPEAL. An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency aquo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days. 5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition

10. DUE COURSE. If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. 11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record. 12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. 13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself. 14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose. In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further documents or records as it may deem

necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the mode of appellate review. 15. REPEALING CLAUSE. Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and superseded by this Circular. 16. EFFECTIVITY. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2 8. Tupas v. NHC Facts:N a t i o n a l H o u s i n g C o r p o r a t i o n is a corporation organized in u n d e r Executive Order No. 399 of the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations.Its shares of stock are and have been 100% owned by the government fromits incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The governmente n t i t i e s that own its shares of stock are the GSIS, SSS, DBP, the N a t i o n a l I n v e s t m e nt and D e ve l o p m e n t Corporation and the People's Homesite a n d Housing Corporation. On the other hand, Trade Unions of the Philippines andAllied Services is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election withD O L E Regional Office in order to determine the exclusive bargainingrepresentative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed t h a t i t s m e m b e r s comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition wasd i s m i s s e d b y t h e m e d - a r b i t e r h o l d i n g t h a t NHC being a g o ve r n m e n t - o w n e d and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, j o i n o r a s s i s t a n y l a b o r organization fo r purposes of collective b a r g a i ni n g p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 1 , R u l e I I , B o o k V o f t h e R u l e s a n d R e g u l a t i o n s Implementing the Labor Code. T U P A S a p p e a l e d t o B L R w h i c h , i n t u r n , reversed the med -arbiter ando r d e r e d a certification election to be conducted. However, the same w a s reversed in the MR. Hence, this petition.Issue:W O N a certification

election may be conducted among the N H C employeesHeld: Y e s . Under the present (1987) Constitution, the civil service n o w covers only g o v e r n m e nt owned or controlled corporations with o r i g i na l o r legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by speciallaw, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.Since the NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by theCivil Service Law but by the Labor Code.Anyway, whether the NHC is covered by Labor Code or the Civil ServiceLaw is beside the point. The right to unionize or to form organizations is nowe x p l i c i t l y r e c o g ni z e d a n d granted to employees in both the g o ve r n m e n t a l a n d t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r s . The Bill of Rights provides that the right of t h e people, including t ho s e e m p l o y e d i n t h e p ub l i c a n d p r i v a t e s e c t o r s , t o f o r m unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not beabridged. T h i s guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3,Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that t h e State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including theright to strike in accordance with law.S p e c i f i c a l l y with respect to government employees, the right t o unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX-B

General that her services as confidentialagent have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, theAuditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued anappointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of CivilService. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position.On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstatedto her former position as confidential agent. However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed apetition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to theCourt of First Instance. Issue: (1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not. (2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly terminated on thealleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to saidposition after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office. Held: (1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a positionmay be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of theCommissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to beprimarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functionsof the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power whichinsures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals ofpersonal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case before us, the provision of ExecutiveOrder No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents in the several department and offices of theGovernment, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential brings withinthe fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office ofthe Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positionsare excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein isallowed by the Constitution. T his should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of aprimarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should benoted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires, in much the the same way as officer, whoseright thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected,is not and

which providest h a t t h e r i g h t t o s e l f organization shall not be denied t o g o v e r n m e n t employees. The rationale for this is that the government for all its sovereignf u n c t i o n s a l s o p e r f o r m s m u n d a n e t a s k s s u c h t h a t i t i s a l s o a n e m p l o y e r i n the true sense of the term. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the nation. 9. Salazar vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976 The Civil Service Commission: Appointments Facts: On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor Generalconfidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the same office.On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor

cannot be deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon the expiration of saidterm. T he main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the latter isthat the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointingpower expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. W hen this even takesplace, the latter is not removed or dismissed from office his term has merely expired.But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidentialand that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandonedformer position of confidential agent in the same office. 10. corpus vs cuarderno CORPUS VS. CUADERNOFACTS: Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administrativelycharged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office.He was suspended by the Mnetary Board desoie the recommendation of the investigating committee that hebe reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was awardedP5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner was appealingthe amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent for attorneys fees. Whilethe respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lackof confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno.ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a publicofficer?HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical employees, and tothe latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No public officer or employee inthe Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law.Pertaining to the petitioners claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as toattorneys fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Codeallows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in thediscretion of the trial court.Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court

11. FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G. R. No. L-69137, August 6, 1986 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as permanent but the Civil Service Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioners position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commissions order and the private respondents title. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commissions resolution is set aside. 12 pagcoor vs rilloraza 13 SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ

of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.



14.Lopez vs civil service com

: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DETORRES VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONPANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB whowent on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as thePhilippine Government official representative to the Centre onIntegrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific(CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was about toexpire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave,but was denied. He was advised to report for duty and that if hefailed to report within 30 days he would be dropped from the rollsof personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work.After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torreswrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to duty.However De Torres was informed that in the absence of anyapproved application for leave of absence, he was considered to beon AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr. DeTorres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision.Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified DeTorres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had beenofficially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty. Membersof Academic Personnel Committee, ACCIUPLB, requested the CivilService Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. DeTorres.The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating thatDe Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989since his request for extension of leave of absence for one yearwas denied. De Torres' absence from work was not duly authorizedby UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him thathe should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, DeTorres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as orderedcaused his automatic separation from the service.The CA upheld the decision of the CSC. ISSUE : WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torresfrom the civil service due to his prolonged absence without officialleave is valid. HELD : The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was in effect at the time.The provision states: "Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted formore than one year. If an employee who is on leave without payfor any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one yearfrom the effective date of such leave, he shall be consideredautomatically separated from the service; Provided, that he shall,within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one yearleave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of theexpiration thereof with a warning that

if he fails to report for dutyon said date, he will be dropped from the service." UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of beingdropped from the service, if he failed to return and report for duty.This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein,however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from theservice by the University. In the case at bar, however, PetitionerDe Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. Heremained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after hehad been warned of the possibility of being dropped from theservice if he failed to return to work within a stated period. UPLBrecords show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torresfrom the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On thecontrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not onlyretained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increasedthree times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicitapproval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing body of UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that theUniversity has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissingpetitioner from its employ.Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and evenpromoting him despite his absence without leave, the Universitywas exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, moreprecisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in thelight of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, theRespondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outrightdismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done sowithout trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined 16. Navarro vs CSC 17 Civil Service vs Dacoycoy Facts: In 1995, George P. Suan, Citizens Crime Watch VicePresident, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Quezon City, a complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism against respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. After a formal investigation, the CSC promulgated its resolution on January 28, 1997 finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the CSC found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

of nepotism. The Court further held that it is the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act. Issues: 1. Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism. 2. Who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case Held: Yes. The law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. The word relative and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. It is true that Dacoycoy did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended to DECS Region VIII the appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CSCs resolution was reversed ruling that the respondent did not appoint his two sons; hence, respondent was not guilty


and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was the respondent who recommended Mr. Daclags authority to appoint first level positions. It was also the respondent who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito and even rated his performance as very satisfactory. Further, Ped, listed him in his job description as his next higher supervisor. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions. Clearly he is guilty of nepotism. Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law. 2. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.

The Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service. (Civil Service Commission vs. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999)

18. santos vs yatco 19. csc v alfonso COMELEC SECTION 1 1. Cayetano vs. Monsod

FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. ISSUE: It is whether the respondent has the ten year practice of law requirement for him to assume such office HELD: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years..


2. Case Digest: Brillantes, Jr. vs. Yorac

G.R. 1990 FACTS:


93867 Ponente: Cruz, J.



The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of Chariman Davide. The petitioner argues that the choice of the Acting Chairman is an internal matter to the COMELEC. It is also averred that the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates the independence of the COMELEC. ISSUE: Whether the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution. RULING: Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7. The choice of temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President. The designation by the President of respondent Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is declared unconstitutional.

Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC which found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The petitioner, on 12 July 1994, filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the trial court granted On 3 August 1994. The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of execution which was denied on 5 August 1994. The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as Municipal Mayor, pending resolution of the appeal before the Commission. Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed this special civil action. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction? Held: The Court in concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. 697 has not been repealed by the Omnibus Election Code, held that the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioners motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

3. LINDO VS COMELEC Section 2 4.gallardo vs judge tambo 5 RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA Case Digest RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA 243 SCRA 502 Facts: In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner Relampagos and private respondent Cumba were candidates for Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of twenty-two votes over the former.

6.galido vs comelec Section 2



Facts: Mrs. Negros


Barba the


letter-complaint for allegedly

apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. PEOPLE VS. BASILIA PEOPLE vs. DELGADO 189 SCRA 715, 1990 Facts: On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually recommended the filing of an information against each of the private respondents for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as recommended. Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court. Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.

against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Oriental with COMELEC transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote law. After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition. Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists? Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by


COMELEC VS. SILVA ATTY. ROSAURO I. TORRES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 270 SCRA 315 Facts: On 9 May 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite, issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Municipal Offices. Two (2) days after or on 11 May 1995 the same Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for correction of the number of votes garnered by petitioner who was earlier proclaimed as the fifth winning candidate for councilor. Upon prior authorization, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a corrected Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates which included private respondent Vicente Rafael A. de Peralta as the eighth winning councilor and excluded petitioner from the new list of winning candidates. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to grant such authority. Held: In Duremdes v. COMELEC, this Court sustained the power of the COMELEC En Banc to order a correction of the Statement of Votes to make it conform to the election returns in accordance with a procedure similar to the procedure now embodied in Sec. 7, Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Since the Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the proclamation, any error in the statement ultimately affects the validity of the proclamation. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. What is involved in the instant case is simple arithmetic. In making the correction in the computation the Municipal Board of Canvassers acted in an administrative capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Pursuant to its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections, the COMELEC En Banc has authority to resolve any question pertaining to the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Sec. 3 Sarmiento Vs Comelec Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. G.R. No. No. No. No. No. 105628 105725 105727 105730 105771 SPC SPC SPC SPC SPC No. No. No. No. No. 92-266 92-323 92-288 92-315 92-271

6) G.R. 7) G.R. 8) G.R. 9) G.R. No.

No. 105778 SPC No. 105797 SPC No. 105919 SPC 105977 SPC No. 92-087

No. No. No.

92-039 92-153 92-293

Issue: Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it Divisions. Held: The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division. A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility. Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court. Notes: 1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return; 2) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of


Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein; 3) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts; 4) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioners opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers; 5) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioners objection to certain election returns; 6) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166; 7) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitioners objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass; 8) G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioners appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao; 9) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition. REYES VS. RTC Section 4 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992] Facts: Petitioners of in the these mass cases media consist which of are

petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the of constitutional expression. guarantees comprising freedom

Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.

Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of


prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by


communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible operations supervision so as to or regulation of media constitute unconstitutional

Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.

repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

Issue: Whether or Not the COMELECs prohibition Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the Held: The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental respect right of free may speech. be The preferred is the freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost when what curtailed dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. TELECOMMUNICATION vs. GMA ADIONG VS. COMELEC [207 SCRA 712; G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992] Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates. unconstitutional.









instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers in this should case be is a posted is so broad that it In encompasses even the citizen's private property, which privately-owned vehicle. consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis. SWS Facts: vs Comelec

The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship. SANIDAD vs. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529 Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods. Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that

Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional? Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. present danger to justify such restraint.


MITMUG VS. COMELEC COMMISSION ON AUDIT Section 2 Guevara vs. gimenez Orocio vs. COA Osmena vs. COA sambeli vs. province of isabela bustamante vs, coa Saligumba v COA (117 SCRA 669) FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the COA regarding the Administrative case filed by petitioner against Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III of the Auditors office of Misamis Occidental. The charge was that the respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several occasions. The COA dropped the administrative complaint due to insufficient evidence. Saligumba petition the court to review such action taken by the COA. ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take cognizant of the case. RULING: The court dismissed the petition as it held that the power of the Supreme Court to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel and even assuming that it does have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above, the court can not do so on factual issues since its power to review is limited to legal issues only. barbo vs. commission on audit

pal vs. coa\ bagatsing vs. committee on privatization