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THE RUSI JOURNAL

AIR pOWER IN THE mAU mAU cONFLIcT


THE gOvERNmENTS cHIEF WEApON
Stephen chappell

Air power has not featured prominently in most histories of the British counterinsurgency during the 195260 Kenyan Emergency. But as a fresh reading of the evidence shows, air assets were invaluable in the fight against the Mau Mau. By carefully avoiding civilian casualties, the RAF was able to target the Mau Mau insurgents in their remote strongholds without alienating the local population. The use of air power in the Kenyan campaign may well provide lessons for today.
hen Sir Evelyn Baring, the governor of Kenya, declared a state of emergency in October 1952 and requested the deployment of a battalion of British soldiers to the colony to help stop the rising attacks on loyalist Kenyans and European settlers, he believed the situation would be resolved by Christmas.1 However, it was soon clear that more security forces were required as the situation deteriorated into civil war and, ultimately, it took further deployments of British troops and a considerable RAF presence before the insurgency was militarily defeated in October 1956. However, although many accounts exist of the British Armys contribution to this counter-insurgency, little is known of the RAFs involvement. Of the few accounts available, many are inaccurate: one claims Lancasters bombed the Mau Mau2 and another that four RAF Harvard single-engine trainer aircraft, fourteen light aircraft of the Kenya Police Reserve Air Wing (KPRAW), and a squadron of Lincoln heavy bombers were already in Kenya when the emergency began.3 Evidence recently released from the National Archives reveals, however, that Lancaster bombers were never used in Kenya, and the Harvards did not arrive until March 1953. Equally, the KPRAW had only five

aircraft in late 1952 and the Lincolns did not deploy to Kenya until one year after the emergency began, flying their first mission on 18 November 1953.4 Further inaccuracies exist regarding air powers impact in Kenya, with Alan R Waters claiming the RAFs presence not only alienated the local population, but did little to influence the Mau Mau.5 Instead, between June 1953 and October 1955, the RAF provided a significant contribution to the conflict and because the army was preoccupied with providing security in the reserves until January 1955, it was the only service capable of both psychologically influencing and inflicting considerable casualties on the Mau Mau in Kenyas vast, inaccessible forests around Mount Kenya and in the Aberdare Mountains.6 This proved crucial at this time, as the government noted that whilst ground forces are being primarily directed against targets in the Reserves, heavy bombers and Harvards represent the chief weapon in our hands for attacking terrorists in the forest.7 Their success was fully recognised by General George Erskine,8 who expressed his appreciation when he addressed a parade at RAF Eastleigh in April 1955, stating that the alternative would have been the employment of three regiments of artillery and another infantry brigade,

neither of which would have been a good answer and both considerably more expensive.9 With strategists currently debating the efficacy of air power in counterinsurgency operations, this article examines how air power was really used in the Mau Mau conflict. This is done through the lens of Colonel John Wardens theory of systemic paralysis, and lessons are proffered for the use of air power in contemporary counterinsurgencies.

Wardens Model
Famous for being used as a basis for air powers employment in the First Gulf War, Wardens model for systemic paralysis is shown in Figure 1. He argued that leadership was the most important target for air power to attack, as it was the political decision-making group which the rest of the system was dependent on for its ability to command, control and communicate strategic direction. Next were the key production capabilities of electricity, oil and gas, followed by infrastructure, which comprised the transportation networks such as roads, railways, bridges and logistical nodes. The fourth ring was the enemys population, which Warden argued should only be targeted by psychological means. Finally,
DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2011.559986

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Suspected Mau Mau prisoners are guarded by members of the 5th Battalion King's African Rifles in the Nyeri district of Kenya, November 1952. Courtesy of AP Photo.

there were fielded forces, which had the purpose of protecting all other elements of the system10 and were the lowest priority for air as destruction of the enemy military is not the essence of war; [it] is convincing the enemy to accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at best a means to an end and at worst a total waste of time and energy.11 Unlike an industrialised state, an insurgency is an element of resistance that Clausewitz noted exists everywhere and nowhere.12 It is nebulous and elusive, never materialising as a concrete body, avoiding major actions and preferring to adopt a policy of scattered resistance, where [l]ike smouldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces ... [trying not] to pulverise the core, but nibble at the shell and around the edges.13 Table 1 analyses the use of air power against the Mau Mau through the lens of Wardens model. Unlike Operation Instant Thunder in the First Gulf War, where the focus was on striking the leadership, the weight of

effort against the Mau Mau was on the population and fielded forces. Less focus was placed on the inner three rings. Consequently, of the four fundamental roles of air and space power, only attack (particularly counter-land and influence operations) and intelligence and situational awareness (ISTAR) were used. Control of the air14 was not used at all, as the insurgents were unable to effectively challenge the RAFs air superiority.15

Leadership
The Mau Mau leadership ring comprised its political figures, the command and control (C2) elements in Nairobi, and the gang leaders in the forests. The political leadership was imprisoned before the RAF deployed to Kenya, and so the air force took no part in targeting this group. It is interesting to note, however, that thereafter the movement became more radical because the younger and more militant Mau Mau, whose extremist ideas had been previously suppressed

by the leadership, were now free to adopt a more revolutionary course.19 This questions Wardens theory that targeting the leadership will defeat the entire system: this may not be the case in a counter-insurgency. Likewise, air played no role in targeting those leaders based in Nairobi that provided the movements C2 and political direction this was eliminated during Operation Anvil in April 1954, when over 30,000 suspected Mau Mau operatives were evicted to detention camps outside the city.20 This was considered a resounding success as every Mau Mau cell in Nairobi was disrupted, including 700 people identified as oath administrators and gunmen.21 Anvil also reduced violent crime and provided reassurance for the law-abiding African population.22 However, it was undertaken entirely by the army and although the RAF could have assisted with ISTAR duties, it was not involved.23 Gang leaders in the forests were the only element of this ring targeted by air, and these included key figures like

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Stanley Mathenge and Dedan Kimathi.24 The thick forest canopy made it very difficult to track gang leaders from the air. As the 1950s RAF only had a limited ISTAR capability with which to find, fix and strike,25 no specific leadership strikes were mounted. Instead, pre-planned bombing missions were conducted on areas where it was believed leaders were located and, if key leaders were thought to be present, the mission was given a higher priority.26 This policy was undoubtedly successful and was arguably behind the disappearance of Stanley Mathenge in 1955.27

Air operations for strategic eect: the ability to strike at the heart of the enemy beyond elded forces.

1. Leadership

2. Key production

3. Infrastructure

4. Population

Key Production and Infrastructure


The Mau Maus key production target was its political network in Nairobi, which provided a rich source of recruits, arms, ammunition and money. However, as it was eliminated by the army during Operation Anvil, the RAF had no involvement in targeting this. The subsequent infrastructure targets were the fixed supply dumps of food and ammunition located deep in the forests. Insurgents venturing outside the forests to collect food were also targeted, mostly when they grouped together and waited on the forest fringes for dusk to arrive before venturing out.28

5. Fielded forces

1: Most important target to attack 5: Least important target to attack

Figure 1: Wardens Five-Ring Model.

Population
Air power helped to achieve the most important objective in a counterinsurgency: winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous people29 by targeting the loyalist Kikuyu, the European settlers and those Kikuyu defined as the undecided.30 Both the loyalist and the undecided Kikuyu were targeted by direct psychological operations (PSYOPS). Leaflets depicting the governments victories over the Mau Mau were dropped across the reserves and this reassured the loyalists that the government was winning, thereby emboldening their spirit. The undecided were also influenced by leaflets showing graphic pictures of Kikuyu women and children hacked to death in incidents like the Lari massacre in March 1953, where ninety-seven loyalists were murdered by Mau Mau. This had a profound effect on the undecided group, with many openly
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ceasing their support for the rebels, and some deciding to fight them by joining the governments loyalist Home Guard.31 Equally, the presence of Lincoln, Harvard and Vampire aircraft had the psychological effect of convincing all three groups they would be protected and that the government was committed to defeating the insurgency. As the chief inspector of police in Kangema stated, the presence of aircraft proved the power of the Government more than anything else.32 Although maintaining a continuous and effective presence on the ground in counter-insurgencies is important,33 such a dominating aerial presence was equally effective in Kenya given the Kikuyu were unaccustomed to seeing aircraft. Indeed, considering that the undecided group will usually wait to see which side is likely to prevail before declaring its support,34 the presence of air power arguably persuaded many in this group that the Mau Mau, armed with home-made weapons, could not win against the governments military power. However, the fundamental lesson of the use of air power in the Mau Mau conflict was that it is crucial to apply and then enforce a strict policy of avoiding civilian casualties from air action. Huw

Bennett argues that in the early stages, repression and violence were encouraged against the Kikuyu from Cabinet level downwards, and the armys approach was to crush the insurgency with a heavy hand. Indiscriminate targeting was commonplace and top-level commanders exercised a loose grip on soldiers behaviour.35 Whilst this may have been true for the army, the archival evidence reveals that senior RAF officers and members of the Cabinet were fully attuned to the need to avoid civilian casualties from air action. This was first seen when the rules concerning the use of Harvard aircraft were issued: [aircraft] will not take armed offensive action against any target outside the prohibited areas. It is emphasised that it is of the greatest importance that our own forces and loyal Africans should not be subjected to offensive action from the air.36 Likewise, another report reveals that neither General Erskine nor the Kenyan government supported indiscriminate bombing of the Kikuyu, as offensive air operations were only authorised in those areas prohibited to civilians where the Mau Mau were known to operate.37 The chief of the air staff also directed the commander-in-chief Middle

stephen chappell

East Air Force (MEAF) to ensure that the senior RAF officer in Kenya was fully aware of the need to take precautions against air action that could cause civilian casualties.38 Such evidence clearly refutes claims that General Erskine and others in authority were indiscriminately bombing civilians.39 Proposals to change aerial bombing practices were also considerably scrutinised. In April 1954, a proposal to extend RAF operations outside of the prohibited areas and into the reserves was resourced because it was clear that the Mau Mau had realised the restrictions placed on aerial operations; many were taking advantage of this by openly walking around the reserves in large gangs. Some had even fired at passing aircraft, safe in the knowledge they could not be attacked.40 The vice chief of the air staff first scrutinised the request and stated such targets should only be prosecuted if gangs could be clearly identified, if there was absolutely no danger of killing innocent civilians and, in all cases, the principle of minimum force was to be used to achieve the effect desired. Therefore, only the Harvards 20 lb bombs were authorised and its machine gun was not.41 Following discussion by Churchill and the Cabinet on 26 May 1954 (with the chief of the air staff present), permission was granted for air strikes to occur outside of the prohibited areas.42

Such action would now be termed Operation Mushroom.43 In January 1955, Prime Minister Churchills approval was sought to continue Operation Mushroom activity. The matter would be kept under constant review and such operations would not be permitted to continue for longer than they are really necessary.44 This shows that the most senior members of the RAF and the government understood that the contest for the support of the population in counter-insurgencies is based on moulding the populations perceptions45 clearly something on which civilian casualties would have had a detrimental effect. These events also indicate that senior RAF commanders understood the type of conflict they were involved in, heeding Clausewitzs warning that:46
the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

Fielded Forces
The Mau Mau gangs in the forests of Mount Kenya and the Aberdares (a mountain range north of Nairobi) comprised the fielded forces ring in the model, and were predominantly targeted by kinetic action (pre-planned

bombings and close air support) and PSYOPS. The latter consisted of shows of force, leaflet drops and sky broadcasts aimed at persuading the fighters to surrender. PSYOPS were regarded by the Colonial Office as one of the main ways of solving the emergency and a significant investment was made to influence local minds. The RAF played a key role in this by undertaking sky-shouting duties and by dropping propaganda leaflets to persuade the Mau Mau to surrender.47 Lincoln bombers dropped over 100,000 leaflets during Operation Hammer in January 1955 and then 5 million more in June 1955 alone.48 Likewise, many pre-planned missions were co-ordinated with the Auster sky-shouting aircraft from the end of February 1954, and air operations orders show this was usually undertaken for three days after an attack occurred. As the conflict progressed, the importance of PSYOPS increased; the Percival Pembroke twin-engine aircraft was modified to undertake sky-shouting duties and to assist the two Austers and in June 1955, General Gerald Lathbury urgently requested two more aircraft for this role, judging them to be more useful at this time than the Lincolns.49 Shows of force were also undertaken from June 1953 onwards, with Churchill stressing the importance of making a display of air power over the heads of the Mau Mau, stating that The more they saw an

Table 1: Wardens Model Applied to the Use of Air Power in the Mau Mau Conflict, 195355. Leadership Kenyatta and key political officials (Operation Jock Scott) Key Production Political and financial networks in Nairobi Command and control elements in (Operation Anvil) Nairobi (Operation Anvil) Gang leaders in forests Infrastructure Stocks of food deep in forests Supply routes to and from forests Population Kikuyu loyalists European settlers Kikuyu undecided Fielded Forces Gangs in the forests Gangs in the reserves (after 1 June 1954: Operation Mushroom)

Elements

Action

Gang leaders targeted by kinetic and ISTAR assets Aircraft used: Harvard, Meteor, Lincoln, Vampire, Piper-Pacer16

Mau Mau supporters transporting food supplies Not targeted by air: Both only indirectly Targeted by leaflet no ISTAR used targeted information by drops, air presence, bombing gangs focus on avoiding civilian casualties Some ISTAR Aircraft used: Aircraft used: Lincoln, Valetta, Lincolns, Piper-Pacer, Harvards17 Vampire, Harvard

Kinetic targeting: pre-planned bombing, close air support PSYOPS targeting: shows of force, leaflet drops, sky-shouting ISTAR used in forests and the reserves to help Home Guard and land forces Aircraft used: Harvard, Lincoln, Vampire, Auster, Meteor, PiperPacer18

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aircraft overhead, the more they would feel that all their movements were under observation.50 It was clear that shows of force certainly influenced the insurgents; reports from two prisoners revealed that when two Vampires flew over them, their speed terrified them so much they decided to surrender immediately.51 By October it was clear an aircraft capable of delivering more firepower was required and consequently, the chief of the air staff offered the Lincolns to the commander-in-chief MEAF, based on the glowing reports that General Gerald Templer had provided on their use in the Malayan Emergency.52 Churchill gave permission for the deployment on 5 November, and eight Lincolns arrived six days later with twenty-four air and thirty-seven ground crew from 49 Squadron. Although Waters argues that Lincoln bombings were a futile and counterproductive exercise which actually gave the Mau Mau a psychological boost,53 the archival evidence reveals that almost 900 insurgents were killed or wounded as a direct result of air attacks by June 1954.54 Moreover, air powers objectives of breaking the insurgents morale, spreading disaffection, driving insurgents out of the forests and breaking up the gangs55 were all achieved by not only killing terrorists, but by imposing on them such intolerable conditions that they will elect to come out of the prohibited areas.56 Reports compiled from prisoner interrogations revealed considerable success was achieved in inducing psychological terror in the insurgents. For example, a Mau Mau gang leader called Gitonga Karame surrendered in September 1954, and revealed that twenty of his gang were killed in an air strike and as a result, the gang decided to disband and many surrendered.57 In a report he was asked to provide to Churchill, General Erskine argued that the bombers were vital to operations in Kenya. The threat of air attack they created had caused the gangs to disband, lowered their morale, and a pronounced relocation of gangs from the forests to the reserves was witnessed after the Lincolns arrived. Moreover, air action in general had also boosted the morale of friendly forces.58 Crucially, the ability for
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air to take the fight to the Mau Mau in the deepest areas of the forests, where General Erskines ground forces were unable to operate in strength, proved its worth. In some areas it was virtually impossible for ground troops to surround and destroy gangs in hideouts and the Lincolns proved ideal for attacking the Mau Mau in such circumstances.59 The Lincolns remained in Kenya until 28 July 1955 when General Lathbury decided there was no longer a justification in keeping them in the colony because of the reduction in Mau Mau targets.60 During their deployment, they dropped nearly 6 million bombs and conducted over 900 sorties.61 However, with other commitments such as Operation Alacrity62 looming, it is not surprising they were withdrawn.

Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit


As the conflict progressed, it became increasingly recognised that ISTAR was arguably the most important role for air power to undertake, supporting the view that [n]either close air support nor air interdiction is the most significant contribution to the counter-insurgency campaigns that our air forces are making. The most significant contributions are probably in the areas of mobility and intelligence and situational awareness.63 However, in the early stages of the conflict the ISTAR functions of find, fix, strike and exploit now viewed as so critical to the success of air operations64 were not all satisfactorily undertaken. Whilst the RAF was able to comprehensively strike targets, it struggled to undertake the find and fix functions because it lacked a timely and accurate source of intelligence. The planning for pre-planned air operations was based almost exclusively on information received from army patrols or prisoner interrogation reports highlighting where gangs were believed to be operating in the forests. This often took eight weeks to arrive and was usually inaccurate by then because the gang had moved from the area by the time a bombing mission occurred.65 Moreover, due to a lack of photographic reconnaissance capability, no highquality photographs of target areas, from which air operations could be planned, existed.66

To address this, the commanderin-chief MEAF ordered the Lincolns to be modified for photographic reconnaissance duties in March 1954 until a more permanent solution was found. They undertook forty-two successful sorties providing valuable information for planning air strikes67 before two Meteor PR 10s from 13 Squadron were permanently detached to Kenya in August 1954 (after demonstrating their superior reconnaissance capabilities on a threeweek detachment in April).68 Operating from Eastleigh, the Meteors undertook 234 sorties before leaving Kenya in July 1955; air staffs acknowledged that they proved invaluable for planning large scale bombing operations and for passing intelligence to ground forces without them we would have been groping in the dark.69

Conclusion
Despite almost sixty years passing, the RAFs contribution to the Mau Mau counter-insurgency still provides many lessons for the use of air power in contemporary counter-insurgencies. Through the careful use of kinetic air power, civilian casualties were avoided in Kenya and the RAF operated within the rule of law. However, as Mark Clodfelter notes: In the amorphous conflicts in the future, firepower, no matter how precise, is unlikely to yield the success necessary to secure the war aims sought and in some cases it may well produce the antithesis of the desired effects.70 Not forgetting that the fundamental goal in counter-insurgencies is to win the populations hearts and minds because it is in mens minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided71 it is through the softer air power tasks that ultimate success will be realised. Excellent results were also obtained in Kenya by using air power to influence the population through leaflet drops, sky-shouting and shows of force. These, along with a policy of destroying insurgent food supplies and adopting an approach where the threat of bombing increased the psychological pressure, paved the way for military victory and ultimately helped to drive the insurgents out of the forests.

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Finally, it must not be forgotten that air power is just one of the assets available to a government tackling an insurgency. All elements of the diplomatic, economic and military mix must be used to achieve success and in this regard it must be recognised that, although the RAFs contribution was significant in achieving military success against the Mau Mau, ultimately the rising wave of nationalism in Kenya never halted because the colonial government failed to address it through

enhanced social policies and a political solution was highly influential. As General Lathbury said, we should have no illusions about the future. Mau Mau has not been cured: it has been suppressed. The thousands who have spent a long time in detention must have been embittered by it. Nationalism is still a very potent force and the African will pursue his aim by other means. Kenya is in for a very tricky political future.72

Stephen Chappell is a logistics officer in the RAF, currently working at the Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood. He was previously a student on the Advanced Command and Staff Course at the Defence Academy, Shrivenham, and has also undertaken tours in Iraq and Afghanistan in logistics appointments. This article is based on the authors submission to the 2010 Trench Gascoigne Essay Prize, for which it was awarded second place.

Notes
1 The National Archives [hereafter TNA] CAB 129/55, Memorandum, Baring to Lyttelton, 13 October 1952. Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgencies, Civil War and Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 1. Andrew Mumford and Caroline KennedyPipe, Unnecessary or Unsung? The Strategic Role of Air Power in Britains Colonial Counterinsurgencies in Joel Hayward (ed.), Air Power, Insurgency and the War on Terror (Cranwell: RAF Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009), p. 73. TNA AIR 14/4496, Report on 49 Squadrons Mau Mau operations, 20 January 1954. Alan R Waters, The Cost of Air Support in Counter-Insurgency Operations: The Case of the Mau Mau in Kenya, Military Affairs (Vol. 37, No. 3, 1973), p. 99. Areas each approximately 800 square miles large were declared prohibited to all civilians in December 1952. TNA AIR 2/12668, Report on the Role of Air Power in Mau Mau Operations, 14 August 1954, p. 5. The General Officer Commander-inChief, East Africa Command, 7 June 19532 May 1955. In this post, General Erskine commanded all forces in Kenya including the RAF. TNA AIR 14/4073, Weekly Intelligence Report, 27 April 1955. 10 John A Warden, The Enemy as a System, Airpower Journal (Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995), pp. 4155. 11 John A Warden, Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century in Barry R Schneider and Lawrence E Grinter (eds.), Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues (Maxwell Air Force Base: Maxwell University Press, 1998), p. 109. 12 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (London: David Campbell Publishers, 1993), p. 580. 13 Ibid., pp. 57980. 14 John A Olsen, John Warden and the Renaissance of American Power (Dulles: Potomac, 2007), p. 265. 15 Whilst the Mau Mau lacked the capability to shoot down RAF aircraft, it did not stop them trying. At least two Lincolns were lost during the conflict crashing in poor visibility on night bombing sorties and killing all crew members. One crashed in the Aberdares on 29 March 1954 and another near Mount Kinangop on 7 April 1954. However, examination of the wreckages revealed enemy action was not responsible for their loss. See TNA AIR 20/9516. 16 Gloucester Meteors and de Havilland Vampires being single-seat jet aircraft; Piper-Pacers being light propeller aircraft. 17 Vickers Valetta being a twin-engine transport aircraft. 18 The Auster being a light propeller aircraft. 19 The Mau Maus supposed political leader, Jomo Kenyatta, and 180 other political figures were arrested in Operation Jock Scott on 21 October 1952. See Caroline Elkins, Britains Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), pp. 3536. 20 TNA CO:822/796, Report on Operation ANVIL, 5 March 1954, p. 11. 21 TNA CO:822/796, Telegram Crawford to Lyttelton, 11 May 1954. 22 Ibid. 23 Over 600 police and 1,400 army personnel were involved, including four companies each of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, Royal Inniskillings and the Black Watch. See TNA CO:822/796, op. cit. 24 TNA WO:276/459, Mau Mau organisation and personalities 195455. 25 The functions of find, fix, strike and exploit are given in Air Staff, AP3000: British Air and Space Power Doctrine, 4th Edition (London: Ministry of Defence, 2009), p. 46. 26 Examples include the pre-planned Lincoln bombings on an area where the gang leaders Kahau Karichu and Samuel Mwangi were thought to be present and the strike of 13 May 1955, when a gang of 300 Mau Mau under Generals Wariungi and Kiarii Manuthia was attacked. See TNA WO 276/458, AirOpsO 11/54, para 4 and AirOpsO 20/55, paras 23, respectively.

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27 TNA WO 216/892, Letter Lathbury to CIGS, 27 September 1956. 28 TNA WO 276/458, AirOpsO 11/54. 29 British Army, Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 10: Countering Insurgency (Warminster: Land Warfare Centre, 2009), pp. 12. 30 Referred to as such in this analysis because they were unsure as to where their allegiances lay. Ministry of Defence, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2009) defines this element of the population as neutrals and notes that their passive acquiescence plays a critical role in a governments success in counterinsurgencies. See pp. 53. 31 This militia of loyalist Kikuyu was led by European officers. Started in late 1952, it increased to over 25,000 by mid-1954 largely due to the publication of such leaflets. See Branch, op. cit., pp. 5571. 32 TNA AIR 20/9530, Report on the Use of Air Bombing as a Morale Weapon, p. 2. 33 British Army, op. cit., pp. 12. 34 Ibid., pp. 116. 35 Huw Bennett, The Other Side of the Coin: Minimum and Exemplary Force in British Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya, Small Wars and Insurgencies (Vol. 18, No. 4, 2007), pp. 64057. 36 TNA WO 276/233, Royal Air Force Bombing Raids: Emergency Directive No. 6, 3 May 1953, p. 4. 37 TNA AIR 20/9041, Note on RAF Support to Mau Mau Operations by Air Commodore Graham, 20 June 1953, p. 4. 38 TNA AIR 20/9041, Signal CAS to C-in-C MEAF, 30 June 1953. 39 Robert B Edgerton, Mau Mau: An African Crucible (London: I B Tauris, 1990), p. 86. 40 TNA AIR 20/9041, Signal Crawford to Lyttelton, 24 April 1954.

41 TNA AIR 20/9041, Signal VCAS to C-in-C HQ MEAF, 30 April 1954. 42 TNA CAB 128/27, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting of 26 May 1954. 43 TNA AIR 20/9041, Letter Lyttelton to Erskine, 28 May 1954. 44 TNA AIR 8/1886, Letter seeking Churchills permission to continue Op MUSHROOM activity, 24 January 1955. 45 British Army, op. cit., pp. 17. 46 Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 100. 47 Susan L Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Government, the Media and Colonial Counter-insurgency, 19441960 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1995), pp. 14258. 48 TNA AIR 14/4073, Intelligence Reports 195455. 49 TNA AIR 8/1886, Signal Lathbury to C-in-C MEAF, 3 June 1955. 50 TNA AIR 2/12268, Extract from minutes of the Defence Committee (53) 4th meeting, 7 March 1953. 51 TNA AIR 20/9041, Brief for the War Council on the Effects of Bombing the Mau Mau, 5 July 1954, p. 2. 52 The Lincolns were requested by Templer on 9 June 1953 and, under Operation Bold, eight were sent to Tengah and began operations with 83 Squadron at a planned rate of effort of thirty-five hours per month. They remained in Malaya until April 1954. See TNA AIR 20/9271, Bombers Malaya: Air Support for Operations by Lincoln Aircraft. 53 Waters, op. cit., p. 98. 54 TNA AIR 20/9041, op. cit. in note 51. 55 Ibid. 56 TNA WO 276/233, RAF Bombing Raids: Report on the Use and Value of Heavy Bombing, p. 1. 57 TNA AIR 14/4073, Extracts from interrogations of Mau Mau prisoners

about the effects of bombing, 15 November 1954. 58 TNA AIR 20/9041, Erskines report on the efficacy of aerial bombing, 29 December 1953. 59 Ibid. 60 TNA AIR 8/1886, Signal Lathbury to VCIGS, 19 May 1955. 61 TNA AIR 20/9517, Operations Summary Reports. 62 Alacrity involved the deployment of three Lincoln, two Canberra and two Sabre squadrons to the Middle East Air Force to support Operation Quickfire the codename for the contingency plan to defend Jordan in the event of an Israeli attack. See TNA AIR 20/9509, Operation QUICKFIRE: Plan for Rapid Reinforcement of MEAF in an Emergency. 63 Hayward, op. cit., p. 14. 64 Air Staff, op. cit. in note 25, p. 46. 65 TNA AIR 20/9530, Report on planning for Air operations. 66 TNA AIR 23/8617, Air Operations Policy: Report from Wg Cdr Newman to DirofOps(3), Air Force Operations in Support of Cold or Limited Wars, 17 May 1954. 67 TNA AIR 20/9517, Summaries of terrorist and Security Forces Action, 1955, Report on Photo Reconnaissance. 68 TNA AIR 20/9530, Report on RAF Operations 19531955, p. 6. 69 TNA AIR 20/9517, op. cit. in note 67, p. 2. 70 Mark Clodfelter, Back from the Future: The Impact of Change on Airpower in the Decades Ahead, Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall 2009), p. 111. 71 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 31. 72 TNA WO 216/892, Letter Lathbury to CIGS, 5 December 1955, p. 4.

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