1

San Luis vs San Luis (G.R. No. 133743. 02-07-07) FACTS: F, contracted three marriages in his lifetime. His first marriage with V was terminated when the latter died in 1963. After 5 years, he validly married M, which the latter divorced in Hawaii in 1973 He then married S in California USA in 1974 F died in 1973.He then married S in California USA in 1974.F died in 1992, leaving real properties with an estimated amount of P30 M. The deceased left no unpaid debts. S sought for the dissolution of the conjugal assets and Fs estate and she filed letters of administration in Makati RTC. Children of F by the first marriage challenged the claim of S that she be the administrator of the estate of the deceased. They claim that her marriage to F was void since F was still legally married with M. They also prayed that Par.2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code not be given a retroactive effect. ISSUE: Whether the divorce decree issued by another foreign country to an alien spouse allows the Filipino spouse to remarry again under Philippine law. LESSONS: There is no need to apply Article 26 retroactively because during the time of the marriage between F and S, there was already sufficient jurisprudential basis Romillo. The Van Dorn case revolved around the marriage of a Filipino woman to a foreigner and whether or not a divorce filed by the foreigner freed the Filipino woman from responsibilities to the marriage, particularly as to properties. The Court ruled in that case that asto the effect of the divorce the Filipino woman, that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse and that she be no longer required to perform her marital duties and obligations. Article 26 is in fact only a codification of Van Dorns precedent. Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated to validate the marriage particularly Van Dorn vs. by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse. Navarro v. Domagtoy FACTS: Dapa, Surigao del Norte Municipal Mayor Navarro filed charges against Judge Domagtoy for gross misconduct and inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. He solemnized the wedding of a couple despite knowing that the groom was merely separated from his wife. He presumed that mans first wife was already dead because the would-be groom has not seen her for seven years. Presumption was made without the requisite summary proceeding. Second instance was when he performed another marriage ceremony in Dapa, which is outside his jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether judge acted with gross misconduct. RULING: Yes. The first marriage was bigamous. Presumption of death for purposes of marriage requires a summary proceeding (Art. 41 FC). Affidavits claiming that a person has not been heard of for more than seven years are not sufficient proof of the persons death. The second marriage, on the other hand, is beyond judges jurisdiction. Marriage can only be held outside a judges chamber or courtroom if: (a) at the point of death (b) in remote places (c) request of both parties in writing & sworn statement (Art. 8 FC). The second couple was not under any of these conditions. Only appellate and SC justices have jurisdiction over entire country. Judges with specific jurisdictions can only officiate within those areas. Araes Vs. Occiano FACTS: Araes filed charges against Judge Occiano of for Gross Ignorance of Law. Occiano solemnized Araes marriage without the requisite marriage license in latters house which is outside judges jurisdiction. Araes was not able to claim her right to inherit his deceased husbands property and she was deprived of receiving her husbands pension. Occiano avers that the ceremony took place in Araes house because the groom had a difficulty walking & he couldnt stand traveling. Judge was aware that there was no marriage license but due to the pleas of the couple and everything was prepared already and the visitors were there, he agreed to solemnize the marriage. He reminded them that marriage wont be valid without the license. They promised to give it within the day but they never did. Araes desisted and said that she had filed the case in a fit of rage but Court still decided the case. ISSUE: Whether the marriage was valid with regards to the lack of a marriage license and the lack of the judges jurisdiction. RULING: No. Judges can only solemnize marriage within their territorial jurisdiction. Marriage license is a requisite for marriage and without it, marriage is void. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. And since there was no license, Occiano didnt have the authority to officiate the ceremony. Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez FACTS: Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David, had, prior to the solemnization, issued an affidavit stating that they were both married; however due to incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They lived together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. ISSUE: Whether Payao and Davids marriage is valid. RULING: No. Although the couple had lived together for seven years (as the affidavit shows and which the Judge relied on in crafting his decision), Article 34 of the FC also requires that there must be no legal impediment to marry each other. Also in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. The judge ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage (regardless of the couple being separated) is a diriment impediment which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. And besides, free and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Republic vs. Nolasco (220 SCRA 20) FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

2
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a wellfounded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife. Armas vs. Calisterio (GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000) FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604, 750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds presumptive death. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled. ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death. RULING: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate. Mercado vs. Tan (337 SCRA 122) FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void. ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage. RULING: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void. In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. Nial vs. Bayadog (328 SCRA 122) FACTS: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. ISSUE: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. RULING: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. Republic vs. Orbecido (472 SCRA 114) FACTS: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case. ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). RULING: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the

3
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Roehr v Rodriguez (404 SCRA 495) FACTS: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr was married to private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, in Hamburg, Germany. Private respondent filed a petition of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Manila. The petitioner, after a series of denied petitions, obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. The petitioner then filed a Second Motion to Dismiss private respondent's petition claiming that the court had no jurisdiction over the matter since a decree of divorce had already been issued; the court granted the petition. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which also asked for the case to proceed to resolve issues regarding custody of children and distribution of properties. An Opposition was filed by the petitioner since under the decree of divorce; he had been already awarded the custody of children. ISSUE: RULING: "As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts." Under the Rules of Court, the respondent must be given an opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. Therefore, foreign judgment cannot nullify Philippine laws. Garcia vs. Recio (366 SCRA 437) FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy alleging respondent was not legally capacitated to marry her on January 12, 1994 because of his prior subsisting marriage to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. Respondent claimed that petitioner knew of his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He had obtained a divorce decree as proof of his legal capacity to marry petitioner in 1994. While the suit for the declaration of nullity was still pending, respondent, who had become a naturalized Australian citizen in 1992, secured a divorce decree in Sydney, Australia for the dissolution of his marriage with petitioner on the ground that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. This was recognized by the trial court in rendering its assailed decision that deemed the marriage between respondent and petitioner ended not on the basis of respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry but on the basis of the divorce decree (Australian divorce) obtained by respondent. Petitioner argues that the divorce decree may only be given recognition in this jurisdiction upon proof of existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce, and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven; and (2) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. RULING: (1) Yes. The divorce decree has to be admitted in evidence with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code in order to prove the divorce as a fact and prove its conformity to the foreign law allowing it for our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, compliance with the registration requirements is no longer binding to respondent for he has acquired Australian Citizenship and therefore, he is no longer bound by Philippine personal laws. Respondent submitted the divorce decree and was rendered admissible by the trial court as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Autralia and accorded weight by the judge. (2) No. The court held that respondents presentation of a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree-a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce showed that the divorce obtained may have been restricted; it did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to national law. Respondent also failed to submit a Certificate of Legal Capacity together with the application for a marriage license required by Article 21 of the Family Code which would have been admitted as a prima facie evidence of his legal capacity to marry. The Court finds no absolute evidence that proves that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera (174 SCRA 653) FACTS: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. RULING: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to

4
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. (139 SCRA 139) FACTS: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property. ISSUE: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. RULING: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA v. EDWARD RUMBAUA (G.R No. 166738 August 14, 2009) FACTS: On February 23, 1993, Rowena Padilla and Edward Rumbaua were married in City of Manila. However, they never lived together in one habitat because their marriage was a secret to Edward's family. In 1995, Edward's mother died and he blamed Rowena being responsible for her death associating it to the discovering of their "secret marriage." Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage due to psychological incapacity in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Court nullified the marriage in its decision on April 19, 2002. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals due to prematurity, as it was rend despite the absence of required certifications from the Solicitor General. On June 25, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court due to prematurity thus denied the nullification of the parties' marriage. Rowena, not happy with the decision of the Court of Appeals, filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying for the Court of Appeal's decision be set aside and regional Trials Court's decision be reinstated. The Supreme Court on August 14, 2009, deny the petition for lack of merit, thus affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004. ISSUE: Whether or not, the psychologist was able to prove that the respondent is indeed psychologically incapacitated according to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. RULING: No, the psychologist did not have enough proof because in her psychiatric report, she did not mention the cause of the respondent's so-called "narcissistic personality disorder", she failed to explain to the court an insight into the respondent's development years. Furthermore, she did not explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondent's incapacity is "deep seated and incurable", when Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines states that evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed in marriage. Carlos v. Sandoval (574 SCRA 116) FACTS: Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, the parcels of land were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and corespondent, Teofilo II. In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City. In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the marriage between Felicidad and Teofilo should be rendered null and void. 2) Whether or not the filing of petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of herein petitioner was valid. RULING: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage. If the nonpresentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not

5
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. RTC declared the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license. CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Republic v. Iyoy (470 SCRA 508) FACTS: The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36. On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, in the same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an American and had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children in which she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation. On March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her new husbands last name as evidences. Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA. ISSUE: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Tenebro vs.Court of Appeals (423 SCRA 272) FACTS: V contracted marriage with L. After a year, V informed L that he had been previously married to H five years previously. Thereafter, V contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain L. When L learned of this third marriage, she filed a complaint for bigamy against V. V claims as a defense that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is an indicator that this marriage lacks the essential requisites for validity. This retroacts to the date of celebration of the second marriage, and there being no valid second marriage, there can be no bigamy. ISSUE: Whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity is a defense in a criminal case of bigamy. LESSONS: Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. The declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that Vs marriage to L lacks the essential requisites for validity. Although judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of marriage, there still exists legal effects. Marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences such as incurring criminal liability for bigamy. Morigo v. People (422 SCRA 376) FACTS: M and B got married by signing a marriage contract. B went back to Canada where she was working, and thereafter filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against M which was granted. M then married L. Less than a year after the marriage, M filed a petition for Judicial Declaration of Nullity with B on the ground that no actual marriage ceremony took place. M was then charged with the crime of bigamy and he was subsequently found guilty. While the criminal case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the Judicial Declaration of Nullity of marriage between M and B was handed down. LESSONS: The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case the first spouse is absent; said spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) the offender contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid were it not for the existence of the first. In this case, the second marriage is not bigamous because the first marriage was void ab initio due to the fact that no marriage ceremony was solemnized at all. Legally speaking, there is no first marriage to speak of. The mere signing of a marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus needs no judicial declaration of nullity. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for the said offense may not be sustained when there is no first marriage to speak of. Rep. v. Molina (268 SCRA 198) FACTS: On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is incapacity. It appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence merely adduce that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem,

6
neither its juridical antecendence nor its incurability. The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983.8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel of the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. Santos v. CA (240 SCRA 20) FACTS: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICALANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICALINCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED. Abunado vs. People (426 SCRA 562) FACTS: Salvador Abunado, and Narcisa Arceno got married, their marriage remains existing, Abunado contracted a second married with Zonaida Beas. On January 1995, an annulment case was filed against Arceno. On the other hand, Arceno filed a case of bigamy against Abunado on May 1995. on October 1998, Abunado obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. On May 2001 the RTC of Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of bigamy. ISSUE: Whether Abunado constitutes the crime of bigamy and if his first marriage was still subsisting at the time he marry Beas. RULING: Yes, the second marriage was bigamous because of the fact that the first marriage was still subsisting when he contracted second marriage. Under the family code, before one can contracted a second marriage, the first marriage must be declared annulled or void as the case may be liability and is not a prejudicial question. Because the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity the crime was already consummated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of Abunados marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of Abunados innocence or quiet in the case of bigamy. DE CASTRO v ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO (545 SCRA 162) FACTS: Reinelle Anthony de Castro impregnated Annabelle Assidao, a government dentist. Their marriage license expired so they (falsely) executed an affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for five years. By virtue of this affidavit, they contracted a marriage. The parties, however, lived separately after the marriage's celebration. Assidao filed a complaint for child support, asserting that she was validly married to De Castro and that her daughter was De Castro's legitimate child. HELD: The execution of the false affidavit stating that the parties had been living together as husband and wife cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. They were married without a valid marriage license and so their marriage was void ab initio. The child born to them was illegitimate; however, it does not free De Castro from the duty of providing financial support since he has been declaring her as a dependent in tax exemption and even signed in her birth certificate. Suazo v. Suazo (G.R. No. 164493 : March 10, 2010) FACTS: A and B were married when they were 16 years old. They lived with Bs parent. A took odd jobs while B refused to work and was most of the time drunk. A urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, A left B 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36. A testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that B was psychologically incapacited. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage but the CA reversed it.

7
ISSUE: Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Art. 36. RULING: As evidence is insufficient to establish Bs psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Bs psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Bs psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to As psychological condition, this is not true for Bs. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description of Bs purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. As testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations. Ang v. CA (GR # 182835) FACTS: The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent, Irish Sagud were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in Maria Aurora Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has a live-in-partner whom Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish decided to broke up with Rustan. The latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to which Irish refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia messages to Irish, bearing a picture of a naked woman, who spread her legs with a face of Irish superimposed on it. Rustan even added in the text message that it is easy for him to spread those pictures in the internet. Because of this scenario, Irish, asked help from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local police was made. Entrapment operation was conducted and arrested Rustan. Issue: Whether or not Rustans contention that the multimedia messages should not be made admissible for the basic reason that such was not properly authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic Documents? Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following: Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. Indeed the assertion of Rustan will not be given merit for the basic reason that such contention was only raised before this court to which the latter had a presumption that Rustan has waived his right to question the authenticity of the pictures. Moreover, the court avers that such assertion of Rustan cannot be made possible in criminal case; such can only be made before, civil and administrative actions. The high court denied the petition. Cario vs Cario FACTS: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes. HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything

8
they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.