People vs.

Mateo (2004) Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by his step-daughter Imelda Mateo. During the trial, Imeldas testimonies regarding the rape incident were inconsistent. She said in one occasion that incident of rape happened inside her bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it happened in their sala. She also told the court that the appellant would cover her mouth but when asked again, she said that he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the victim, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial and recommends an acquittal of the appellant. Issue: Whether or not this case is directly appeallable to the Supreme Court. Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no case in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court.

People vs. Salome (2006) The Court held that in light of the passage of RA 9346, the penalty to be imposed onthe accused Salome for rape aggravated by dwelling shall be reclusion perpetua. However, pursuant to sec. 3 of RA 9346, Salome shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Court also sustained the grant of Php75,000 as civil indemnity to the victim, explaining that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. It also added that since the death penaltys imposition is now prohibited, there is a need to perfect an appeal, if appeal is desired, from a judgment of conviction for an offense where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty

Villegas vs. CA (1997) Facts: On July 25, 1969, an information for libel was filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then Court of First Instance of Manila against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the United States where he stayed until his death on November 16, 1984. Nevertheless, trial proceeded in absentia; by the time of his death in 1984, the prosecution had already rested its case. Two months after notice of his death, the court issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect. No memorandum was ever filed in his behalf. RTC dismissed the criminal case against Antonio J. Villegas, on account of his death on November 16, 1984. And it ordered the payment of damages from estate of Antonio J. Villegas CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The heirs of Villegas appealed the decision of the court. Issue: - Whether, in the absence of formal substitution of parties, the trial court could validly render judgment against the heirs and estate of a deceased accused? - Whether, under the facts of the instant case, deceased Villegas was liable for libel, and assuming he was, whether the damages awarded by the trial court were just and reasonable?"

Held:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed. 2. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, Ratio: The source of Villegas' civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code. Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." In the case at bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal. There was no waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. Rule 87 Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator . No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him." The decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE without prejudice to the right of the private offended party, Antonio V. Raquiza, to file the appropriate civil action for damages against the executor or administrator of the estate, or the heirs, (substitution of parties) of the late Antonio J. Villegas.

People vs. Ayochok (2010) Facts: Ayochok was found guilty by the RTC for the offense of murder and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased SPO1 Claudio Caligtan the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death; P200,000.00 as moral damages; P378,956.50 as actual damages in connection with his death; P2,573,096.40 as unearned income. Ayochok was committed at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on October 31, 2003. The case was directly elevated to the SC for automatic review but was transferred to the CA pursuant to the decision in People v. Mateo. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC but reduced the damages. Ayochok, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals conveying his intention to appeal to the SC However, the Assistant Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed us that Ayochok had died. Issue: WON Ayochos civil liability was extinguished pending his appeal Held: Yes. Ratio: Ayochoks death on January 15, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of murder committed against Senior Police Officer 1 Claudio N. Caligtan, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime. Clearly, in view of a supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Ayochoks appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Ayochok had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Ayochoks appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered

against him when he died, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, was likewise extinguished by his death. People vs. Barro Sr. (2000) Facts: The group of Virgilio Saba, while waiting for the drizzle to stop, opted to down a few bottles of gin before going home. Outside the store was a shed where Juan Barro and his group were playing cards known as pusoy. Since the drizzle has stopped, Virgilios group decided to wrap-up their drinking spree and went home instead. Their noise infuriated the group of Joel Barro who was then still playing pusoy at the store. Virgilios group continued headway to their respective houses. But to their great consternation and surprise, an enraged Arnulfo Barro, Sr. brandished a bolo and confronted Virgilios group fiercely. Issue: WON the penalty imposed by a court could be modified in the absence of an appeal Ratio: Yes. Held: As heretofore stated, the circumstances recited indicate the attendance of conspiracy among the appellants. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. However, mitigating circumstances are personal to an accused in whose favor they are determined to exist and cannot be enjoyed by his co-conspirators or co-accused Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68 The trial court erred in imposing the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months because it is outside the range of said penalty. The records show that Joel Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty imposed on the co-accused who did not appeal was a nullity because it was never authorized by law, that penalty imposed on the accused who did not appeal can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become final and executory and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court to have it conformable with law.

People vs. Hon. Enrique C. Asis (2010) Facts: Jaime Abordo (Abordo)was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by private complainants Kennard Majait (Majait), Joeniel Calvez(Calvez) and Jose Montes (Montes).nad An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt. Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder. RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted. The OSG filed a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. Issues: WON a verdict of acquittal by the RTC or the CA could be questioned by a notice of appeal Held: No. The remedy to question is a petition for certiorari. CA erred in dismissing the petition outright Ratio: A Rule 65 petition for certiorari, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. Our jurisdiction adheres to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordos acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper. Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. The OSG's petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the disposition of the case.

(Petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the same for lack of merit.) Uy vs. Sandiganbayan (2001) Facts: Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts. Held: We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The The 1973 Constitution mandated the legislature to create an office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. Its powers shall not be limited to receiving complaints and making recommendations, but shall also include the filing and prosecution of criminal, civil or administrative case It should be noted, however, that the prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was to be done by the Tanodbayan through the Special Prosecutor who, according to PD 1486, had the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file information for and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of said court. The Special Prosecutor was then under the control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice. PD 1630 reorganized the Office of the Tanodbayan and transferred the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan himself. Thus, the Tanodbayan was empowered to directly conduct preliminary investigation, file information and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and other courts. The power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined (therein). The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts. Organo vs. Sandiganbayan (1999) Facts: In an Information filed before the Sandiganbayan that Lilia Organo was guilty in Acquiring funds belonging to the National Government by opening an unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines, Petition for Habeas Corpus to produce the body of petitioners mother, Lilia B. Organo, and to set her at liberty without delay.

Lilia B. Organo filed a Motion to Quash Information for lack of jurisdiction and to defer the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused in a criminal case. Organo filed with the respondent court a MR. MR was denied.

Accused movant is still a fugitive from justice and continues to evade arrest so that jurisdiction over her person has not yet been acquired by this Court. Hence, movant Organo has no right to file with this Court her said Motion to Quash, which was denied, and subsequently her subject Motion for Reconsideration. Organo filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that respondent court has no jurisdiction over a case of plunder if the officials or employees fall below salary grade 27 and that respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in failing to act on her motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a case of plunder when none of the accused occupy Salary Grade 27 or higher? Held: No. Ratio: When the crime charged was allegedly committed, however, already in effect were RA 7975 (An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan) and RA 8249 (An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan) which confined the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to public officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher. OSG argues that since a special law will prevail over a statute or law of general application, it maintains that RA 8249 provides for the general jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, while RA 7080 is a special law which deals with the crime of plunder. In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper RTC or MTC. The apparent intendment of these amendments is to ease the dockets of the Sandiganbayan and to allow the AntiGraft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of those occupying higher positions in government, the proverbial big fish. Inasmuch as a Petition for Certiorari (GR No. 133535) raising the same issue had already been submitted by her mother before the Court at the time, the present Petition for Habeas Corpus should not have been filed at all. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (1999) Facts: Eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco 6 Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused was dropped from the case. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. They were transferred to the QC RTC. The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution Senate Bill No. 844 was introduced in Congress expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
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MR of special prosecutor was denied. But addendum was filed, stating that jurisdiction remains with them. Since the trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases. Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof."

They claimed that the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. The amendment: one or more of the accused. Original: one of the principals Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975. Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. No specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

People vs. Moilina (2001) Facts: Roland J. Molina, accused-appellant, was charged with attempted rape and four (4) counts of incestuous rape penalized under RA 8353 amending Art. 266 of The Revised Penal Code committed against his very own 16-year 2 old daughter Brenda Molina. He was subjected to a regular preliminary investigation by the municipal trial judge whose findings were affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor. Accused-appellant did not file a counter-affidavit to refute the charges. Roland Molina was arraigned on the four (4) indictments for incestuous rape on 18 May 1999. He pleaded not guilty to each of the four (4) charges. The hearing was cut short when the prosecution "asked for a deferment to determine whether the proposal of the accused to withdraw his plea of not guilty and change same (sic) to guilty could have the effect of lowering the penalty 7 attached to the offense charged to reclusion perpetua."
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The defense counsel manifested the desire of accused-appellant to change his plea to guilty as regards all the five (5) 8 crimes since he "was being bothered by his conscience and by way of contrition would like to make amends." Thus he was immediately re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty "after," as the trial court noted, "the consequences of the change of plea had been duly explained to him by his counsel and by 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Eugenio Manaois, the public prosecutor handling the case for the prosecution." On 10 November 1999 the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of the five (5) crimes charged on the basis of "the change of plea by the accused from not guilty to guilty The Public Attorneys Office, in its Brief for the Appellant, asserts that accused-appellant's plea of guilty was improvidently made. (improvident = not having or showing foresight; spendthrift or thoughtless) Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the accused-appellant must be furnished a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses to be read to him in the language or dialect known to him, was not followed by the trial court. Record of the re-arraignment merely noted that "the accused was re-arraigned and [he] entered a plea of guilty separately in the five-entitled cases after the consequences of the change of plea have been duly explained to him When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf. Under established principles, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that actually took place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given, with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-economic status as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. There are therefore clearly no verifiable facts for us to assume that he completely comprehended the legal significance of a guilty plea and the nature of the crime or crimes he confessed to. Equally distressing is the correlated omission of the transcripts of stenographic notes of the supposed re-arraignment or plea colloquy of accused-appellant. In view of the foregoing we have no alternative but to set aside the plea of guilty. The improvident plea appears to have sent the wrong signal to the defense that proceedings thereafter would be abbreviated. Held: We find that the improvident plea of guilt of accused-appellant has affected the manner by which the prosecution and the defense conducted its presentation of the evidence, and the trial court in carefully evaluating the evidence on record. Verily, a judgment of conviction cannot stand upon an invalid arraignment. Since the vice of nullity affects not only the criminal cases for incestuous rape under automatic review but also the criminal case for attempted rape, notwithstanding the absence of a notice of appeal in the latter, we rule to set aside the Joint Decision dated 3 November 1999 in toto. We therefore remand the crim cases for rearraignment and reception of evidence for the prosecution and accused-appellant if both so desire. Ong vs. Genio (20090 Facts: Petitioner Elvira O. Ong (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against respondent Jose Casim Genio (respondent) for Robbery which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Makati City. respondent was charged with the 5 crime of Robbery in an Information Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of Probable Cause. RTC dismissed the case because elements of robbery such as intent to gain and violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not specifically alleged in the Information filed against respondent. Despite the dismissal of the case, respondent filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated January 2, 2007, reiterating that the Information should be dismissed in its entirety for lack of probable cause
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RTC granted respondents Partial Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause Petitioner filed an MR, claiming that the RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, since the said provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and it does not cover the determination of probable cause. RTC denied petitioners MR. Issues: a. WON the petitioner has no personality to elevate the case to CA without conformity of the OSG b. WON the RTC has the authority to dismiss the information on the ground of lack of probably cause contrary to the findings of the DOJ secretary c. WON RTC could dismiss information on the ground of lack of probable cause when it has concluded the information defective Held: No merit in the petition. Ratio: Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own 29 behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant case. petitioner failed to advance any justification or excuse why she failed to seek the assistance of the OSG when she sought relief from the CA, other than the personal belief that the OSG was burdened with so many cases. Thus, we find no reversible error to disturb the CA's ruling. It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant