The Senses of Democracy

As a certain democratic conviction comes to be affirmed more or less \ /e come to ask ourselvesmore and more aborrt the fragiliw evervrvhere, oF democracy. Vhen it is t:rken for granted in every discourse that "democracy" is the only kind of political regime deemed acceptable by a humanitv that has come of age, that has lreen emancipated, and that has no other end than itsell then the very idea of democracy losesits luster, becomes murky, and leaves us perplexed. \7e must flrst r-rnderstandthat it rva.s :rlreadl'from out of this mrrrkiness which spread across Europe that r.r,esaw the emergence of all the "totalitarian" possibilities experienced during this last century. Unlike those*4ro, in the rgros and r93os,could believein the need fbra radical reform of the public and the cofi)mon' we ourselvesare no longer ab[e to ignore the traps or the monsters hidden behind all these perplexities with regard to democracy. It is thus impossible to be simply "democratic" without asking what tl'rismeans, for the senseof this te rm never stops posing difficulties, almost at every turn, indeed, every tinle we have recourse to it. Failure to recognize these difficul1i65-qomelhing quite common in political discourse-is as drrngerousas tl.rerepudiation of dernocracy: it prevents

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Tl,t Scns,,: oJDrnorr,tcl,

o.fDerttottarl |'ln' Settset

J9

u s f r o n r t h i n k i n g i u r d t h L l s c o n c c a l st h e s a n r c r r a p s a n d m o n s t c r s , o r others still. I shall put firrwald here little more than a minimil argLlmenr or

scherlatic protocol in ordcr to quesriolr the possiblemerrninqof senseof "democracy." This word can thus desigr.rate fr-rst of :rll the exercise of political pou'er bv the people. In this case,"thc people" can irself be uncierstoodin one of two ways. It can refer to a part of the socialrvhole that is disrinct frorn irt lerrstone other part, to u,hich it is considered ro bc inferior and to rvhose domination it is subje'cted.Here democracf is nor a regime but (or at least against the governnrcnt). It is an uprising agair.rst the regin.re the rerolt of destitution, of *'l'r'.rt in minds and bodies, rhc is ir-rtolerable revolt of l.rungerand f-ear. The subjectedthus go from being passir.e subjects tt.rbecoming active ones. The legitimacv of the revolt is absolute. Ir is, hou,ever,the legitim:rcv onlv of rhe ro,olt and is r.roterrough ro found a regime. ln the revolt there are democrars but not democracrr The r c v . r l tc x i . t r t - r r r l i l r i t s , l u r r u c t . i r r i r s t ' r v n t i n r e : a i l J p l . l c e \ .l t i s n t , r r c cident that the idea of a "pelmanent revolution" i.rrs able to fbrnr u'har might be characrerized as rr vanishing poinr of infinire der.r'rand in modertr political experience. The strbjecrof revolr suggesrs nvo things rr once: in the immediacy of the momenr, an absolute, unprescribable,indivisible dignity, a value thrrt can be n.rcasurecl agair.rstr.rotl'ring otl'rer than itself, and, over tirne, the same absolutev,rluerrsan inflnite openinq that nr-r q u r l i r i . l a w , i n s r i r u t i o n .o r e \ ( l ) i t l c n t i t r r J l r e \ c l b r i n q r , t a c l o s e .D c r n o r r r t i c p o l i r i e si s r h r r sa 1 l , , l i r i . s o f p c r i , t d i cl e r r r r n l o r h c breach lbr?clte]of the revolt. It can determine rhe circurnsrances and the subject th:rt open this breach only on a casebv casebasis. Bv contrast, "tl.re pcople" can rrlso be understood as the ri'hole [1r toutl and the bodr as it were, of social realinr Instead of a cliffcrential -1'he tl-rinking,we have here an integral rhinking. polirical sovereignn'o1the people thus nreans befble all else the people's self-constitution as a people. This self-constitution obr.iouslv prececles x11' polirical consrirution, *,here rhe people irre cor-rsrirLrrinq. n()r c()nstinlred. Here tl're subject-people is affirmed not as an actor or as a force but first of all es a subst:urce: a realiq, that derivcs its existe nce an,.lits nrovcnrent or-rlr. frorn

the inritsell The frisrorV of r.nodenrrhought shorvs$vo things: either r i n q a P o l i t i c st h a t r v o u l d b e t h e s e l f - e n g e n d e r i n g possibiliwof engende prestrppositiorrof a colrltl.rcir.rf-inite of the people ("direct" clcmocracv, organicitr': ri'hat Rousseaudechres to be good onlr'for the rnon rvill ar.rcl problern through the diseocls),or elsethe resolurion of the dernocratic a so n e d i s t i n c rs p h c r cl m o r r g o t h e r s ' s o l u t i o u o f t h e e n t i r e p o l i t i c a ls p h e r e (Marx). rvhich disappearsin a total and 5slf-prodlrcinq social existence as our Once this first h1'pothesisl'rasbcen taken fully iuto account' whlt for follow l.ristorr-seenrsro frave c1one,trvo possible nrod,rlities :rnd dispersed mighr be called a politics in negativiry: either the periodic "breach," something thelt configurations oithe poli,i., of those sir.rgular instittttions also i,nplies abstention fiorn participation in democratic thet (parlianrentafl. ar.rdrepublican)-or else a thinking .rt democracy ol arrr'l of den.rocracv fblloivs the impossibilitv oi incamating the esscrlce "denrocratically" keeping of alongsidethe r.recessity irs figr,rre, rcpreseltring politics is affirmed in an essential ui.,., thi. impossibilinr In borh cases, a rvithclra*,al lrttnitl. it the sense,preciseh', tl.rat the polit,.:"1,t1.,ru,.,g1.' and destinv' or proiect :rnd idenunio'of r-rarure ical, as the sr.rbsunrptive iIr withdrarval fronr titr,, fbr somethinq like a "people" ntust be held thrrt is alrvavsat a remove' fhis is of a Presence itsell the neqative ir.rdex is a matter hcre only of the model of negative theolop', and, indeed' it "theologico-political"), the sigr.r politics as onto-theo-poiitical (or as the (The question rnisht thus be formuhas sirnplr. been ir.r.'erted. ot.o.hicl., than invert the lated irr this rval': Har"e revolutions done irnl'thing othcr sign of theologico-Politicirltrar.rscer.rdence?) ..democracl..' ponot only something expresslv also desigr-rate c,tt-t But "sociirl the point from bond," considered lirical but "civil societt"'or the idea rcpuncler the regr.tlative feeling clemocratic of r.ier..of :rn ethos or a is to be thit howcver iraternin"" b)'tlre,-trotto "libern" eclr'rirliry resentecl .rnd/ol' an cr',tluis a dcscliptior-r ln this respect,clemocrrrcy ir-rterpreted. of in cOnrmon founded r,rponthe mutual recognition rrrion of a Lrcir-rg of each sroul.r rvhercin and upon the ir.rdependence fellou,s lsentblablesl qr()ulr is given irr rhe tl.risrecognition is sharctl.'fhe nroclel {tor such;'l "contrllttne" (asin Tocqueville)or a "comn.runity" fbrm oi$.hat is calleda possible. (as in N4arx).'lwo $.et.sof thinking rhe cornnlun(it1') are thus

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'I'he

Stttse:o/'[)emocrac.y

'llt

of Denotracy Senses

4I

In the first (rvhich is more American, according to Tocqueville), the commune is not y'etin the realnr of the politicirl: it is before tl.restareand can be representedas exisring without it or beneath it: its freedonr is more of an emancipation [Jtanchise)than a self-consriruring fieedom. It is local and restricted; it does nor involve power as such. It is a kind of interioriry and its exterior is as much the orher commune as rhe srareirsell, which thus appearslessas an agenc)'of subsumption and identific:rtion than as a quite separareagency in charge of another sphere (an imperial or federal power). In the second (rlore Europear.r and dilferentiated into a variety of socialist or fascistforms), the community t:rkesthe place of rhe negativirv formulated above. Its interioriry or subjectiviry takes on the identificatorv and subsumptive role of the state, which tends to efface or sublimate itselfw'ithin ir. A positive onro-rheologico-political is thus reconstituted. but in an immanent and no longer transcendent version. It thus seemsrhat the question of democracy can be summed up in the following way: Does this vu.ordultimately designate the reconfiguration of the rheologico-political rhlough a transcendenr-nesatir.,e or positive-immanenr meramorphosis, or does ir designate :r genuine break with the theologico-political? (lt is not hard ro see here the general outline of the debate over "secularism" that opposed Carl Schmitt ancl Har.rsBlumenberg. Generallv speaking, it is a debate ovcr the essence or the senseof rnode rniry.) If, as I believe,ir is indeed a marrer of a break, it is nonerheless appropriate to determir.re in what wal'it has nor ver been completed. Not onl1. does the "European" thinking of democracv often remain u'eighed down b1'a political theology (whetl'rer positive or negarive),but the "American" thinking at once unleashes the forces of inequaliq', which are no longer ten-rpered by an "inner" principle of the "people," and leirdsto various kir.rdsof communitarian rerrear,each at once sterile in itself and incornpatible with a[[ the others. There thus remains at leasr one sense of "democracy" (or whatever name you wanr ro give it) that has nor )'er been elaborated. (The designations "European" and "Anrerican" are, here, fbrmal inclication-s: the leal characteristics take shape,ro some extent, everyr,vherc. It is nonerl'reless nor incongruous ro rhink that Europe,

in spite of all its shortcomings, might indeed be a place for putting to the test a truly new senseof "dernocracy.") l-he task d'rat is clearly set forth is thus neither a destruction of democracv nor its indeflnite perfecting: it is above all to decide orl the "break" in question and thus on "modernity" (or what is called "post-moderniry"). This decision will require a decision about the nature, stakes,and place of politics. N{Lrstpolitics still be thought under the :regisof the theologico-political (or of what is simply called today "the political")? Or must it be thought in relation to an essentialwithdrawal or reneat [retrait] substantial,and subsumptive of all being in of this "political" (essential, would be not a retirement or a retiring but a recommon)? This retreac tracing of everything that being in common is (being together or being with). In a singular fashion, it rvould be a matter of knowing whether the political sphere must not remait.tdistinct from the sphere of the "common," which it u'ould neither exhaustnor command frorn above' Politics is not responsibleFor the identiry and destiny of the comnron, but only justice. (lt thus has to do for the regulation-even if it is infinite-of with power.) The common, hou'ever,puts existencein play' (It thus has to do with sense.)What is at stake here is a separation benveen sense:rnd porver. One certainly does not exclude the other, but one cannot replace the other, either. (This does not undermine the legitimacy of revoit, but it does displaceits ultimate horizon.) The theoloeico-politicirlsubsumes ar once power :urd sense,jr,rsticeand existence; it absorbs the common into the political (or vice versa). Ultimately, one no longer knows what "cornmon" or "political" means. That is what is so perplexing about "den'rocracy."It is thus a matter of thinkine the interval berween the conlmon and the political: rve do not belong to the one as we do to the other, and "everything" is not "political." And "everything" is not common either, since the "common" is neither a thing nor an everything, there is proximiry ano that is, a whole ftrn tout]. Berweenpower and sense ancl a relation of relation o[ power distancing, at once-altogether-a sense. . It is perhaps a completely new fbrm of man's relationship to hinrsell, rvhere man would no longer be "his own end" (if such is indeed he rvereable to distancehimself from himthe basisof democracv) ul.rless selfin order to go beyor.rd.