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b. Executive Branch
i. Executive Office of the President
1. National Security Council staff
2. Office of Homeland Security staff
3. Office of Management and Budget staff
ii. Federal Agencies and Departments
1. Intelligence (CIA, NSA, NIMA, DIA, INK, etc,)
2. Law Enforcement (FBI, SS, INS, Customs)
3. Defense (OSD, Special Operations Command, Central
Command, Northern Command)
4. Foreign Affairs (State, AID, etc.)
5. Public Safety (FAA, FIMA, etc)
c. State and Local Government Officials
i. NY, NYC
ii. Washington, DC
III. Analysis (May through June)
a. Congressional Oversight
i. Map Committee oversight of counterterrorism since 1985
ii. Track substantive Committee changes to US counterterrorism
policies
iii. Track guidance, direction, and legislation imposed on the
Executive Branch in regards to the conduct of counterterrorism
activities
iv. Track Executive Branch compliance with Congress' direction,
guidance and the law
v. Site key examples where, if at all, congress imposed its direction
on the Executive Branch activities
vi. Site key examples where, if at all, the Executive Branch failed to
comply with Congress' direction
b. Resource Allocation
i. CT funding in the context of other federal spending for
intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, and for first responders
ii. Track the funding trail
1. how much was requested by which entities and how was it
finally executed for intelligence, law enforcement,
diplomacy, first responders. etc.
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iii. CT funding priority w/in the Executive Branch and how, if at all, it
was altered by the Congress
iv. Impact of congressional increases to CT funding
IV. Findings and Conclusions
a. Key questions that need to be addressed concerning congressional
oversight:
i. Was congressional oversight of US counterterrorism activities
appropriate and effective?
ii. What was the overall impact of congressional oversight on the
government's counterterrorism efforts?
iii. Did congressional oversight have a chilling effect on "risk taking"
by federal intelligence and law enforcement entities, particularly in
overseas operations?
iv. Did Federal entities use congressional oversight as an excuse for
more aggressive attempts to thwart terrorist attacks?
v. Did congress "micro manage" Executive Branch agencies and if so
what was the impact?
vi. Was congressional direction followed?
vii. Were priorities in the government's efforts to thwart terrorism
altered by Congress and what were the implications?
b. Key questions that need to be addressed concerning resource allocation:
i. Were counterterrorism programs underfunded in relation to the
knowledge the Congress had of the threat at the time?
ii. Did the Intelligence Community and the Law Enforcement
Community provide a clear articulation of their efforts to counter
terrorism to the Congress?
iii. Did the Executive Office of the President provide a clear
articulation of its counterterrorism strategy and its resource
requirements?
iv. Did the White House significantly alter the agency's requests?
v. Did Congress significantly alter the President's Budget?
vi. Did the agencies executive the funds appropriated by Congress for
counterterrorist efforts?
vii. Were the funds allocated for counterterrorism adequate?
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