Versions of Workplan For 9/11 Commission's Team 6

\—- b
As of February 3, 2004
TEAM 6 WORKPLAN
Based on current deadline of the 9-11 Commission and late March one-day hearing
February
• Complete planned interviews (e.g., NYPD, Watson, Edmonds, Townsend)

• Prepare first draft of issue papers - incorporating statement of issue, preliminary
analysis of the evidence, and potential recommendations for commissioners
• Begin preparations for counterterrorism policy hearings
• Review of MFRs, documents - including JI, GAO, DoJ/IG documents
• Identify needed interviews, document requests (e.g, Gorelick, Lamberth)
• Prepare second draft of issue papers
• Coordinate with other teams
March
Draft staff statement for hearing

Prepare briefing materials for commissioners
Prepare hearing materials for commissioners
Complete remaining interviews, MFRs
Continue review of MFR's, documents
April - End of Commission
• Draft monograph
• Duties as assigned
Additional work areas should Commission be extended
• Preparations for additional days of hearings

• Review of homeland security efforts to prevent or respond to WMD catastrophic
terrorism
• Greater scrutiny ofCTC, CTD, IA/IP and TTIC interaction and co-location
• Interviews concerning FBI/NR interaction
• Interviews with representatives of foreign services concerning their interaction
with FBI, CIA, andDHS
• Visits to smaller FBI field offices to check the progress of FBI reforms
• Interviews with other federal law enforcement agencies and A USAs
As of February 3, 2004
Questions for Team 6 Issue Papers

1. What strategic direction was given to the FBI's counterterrorism program prior to
9/11? (Mike)
2. How were the problems of the FBI's counterterrorism program understood prior
to 9/11 and what steps were taken to correct those problems? (Mike)
3. What does the Moussaoui story reveal about the FBI prior to 9/11? (Chris)
/ 4. What does the Hamzi-Midhar story reveal about CT prior to 9/11 ? (h-3, U aft /
L-- *~i • °*—
5. What has been the role of the analyst at the FBI (including analysts both in the
field and at headquarters, as well as analysts in the criminal and national security
programs)? (Caroline)
6. What were the problems in the FBI's analytic program prior to 9/11? Will those
obstacles be overcome by the FBI's current efforts? (Caroline)
7. What were the problems in the FBI's information technology systems prior to
9/11? Will those problems be remedied by the FBI's current efforts? (Caroline)
/ 8. What were the legal regimes under which the FBI operated prior to 9/11? What is
/ . the legal regime today? What impact have these legal regimes had on the FBI's
N counterterrorism effort? (Lance)
'oes the Patriot Act go too far in impinging on the civil liberties of U.S. persons?
(Lance)
10. What options do or could exist for providing due process to detainees and enemy
combatants within US and international organizations?-{TBD)- —-,
11. How does the FBI cooperate (or not) with state and local law enforcement
agencies? With other federal agencies? With foreign law enforcement and
intelligence agencies? (Peter)
12. Have the non-legal obstacles within the FBI to effective collection efforts been
identified and appropriate remedies put in place? (Peter)
13. What are the appropriate "lanes in the road" for TTIC, FBI's CTD, CIA's CTC,
and DHS's IA/IP? (Peter, Chris, Team 2)
14. What models for domestic intelligence and terrorism prevention (including
Director Mueller's reform proposals) have been recommended to the Commission
and what are the strengths and weaknesses of each model? (Chris)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

UPON THE UNITED STATES
TEAM #6 WORKPLAN
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS

INSIDE THE UNITED STATES
Team Members: Barbara Grewe

Michael Jacobson
Peter Rundlet
Lance Cole
Premise Statement
Item 1 Key Questions of the Investigation
Item 2 Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan
Item 3 Document Requests
Item 4 Interview Candidates

Team #6
Premise Statement
The September 11 terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived
openly and freely in the United States for varying periods of time prior to the attacks.
The six leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the
attacks, traveling throughout the country during this time. The U.S. Intelligence
Community generally, and the FBI more specifically, were aware prior to attacks that
three of these individuals had ties to al-Qa'ida. Although the plot was primarily financed
and orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received
assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers'
associates were known to the FBI prior to September 11 through its counterintelligence
and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible
attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC,
and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert.
Based on previous reviews, it is now clear that the FBI did not respond
aggressively and appropriately to all of the available intelligence, and failed in many
respects to "connect the dots" prior to the attacks. Less closely studied is the extent to
which the FBI's inability to detect the hijackers' activities and associations while in the
United States represented a systemic intelligence failure. Was the hijackers' ability to
avoid detection by the FBI while in the United States an indication of excellent
operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the
FBI? If the former, can changes be made to detect this type of tradecraft in the future? If
the latter, what accounts for these failures?
To answer these questions, our team will have to develop a comprehensive

understanding of the U.S. Government's efforts pre-September 11 to collect, process,
analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist activity in the United States. Our
review will focus not only on the FBI itself, which had primary responsibility for these
matters, but also on the FBI's relationship with other entities with important roles in this
process, such as state and local authorities, other federal agencies, and foreign
intelligence and law enforcement partners. By understanding the problems with the
system pre-September 11, it will be clearer what the specific failures were, why they
occurred, and will help us better explain why the FBI was unable to learn about or stop
the attacks.
Finally, we will review the current state of the U.S. Government's domestic
intelligence efforts, to assess whether they are adequate to remedy the pre-September 11
systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation. If not, we will
make recommendations to address these problems.

Team #6
Item 1: Key Questions
1. What relevant information did the FBI have prior to the September 11 attacks?
• What information was available to U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement entities
prior to September 11 regarding the 19 hijackers and their associates? When was
this information known and by whom, and how was this information shared and
utilized prior to the attacks?
• Did the FBI have all of the information about the 19 hijackers available to other
U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and their foreign intelligence and
law enforcement partners?
2. What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the
United States prior to September 11?
• How did the FBI collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence
information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States prior to September
11, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and
weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information collection?
• How effectively did the FBI collaborate, coordinate, and share information with
foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law
enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks?
• How effective was the FBI's leadership and management in directing its
counterterrorism program prior to September 11?
• What role did the White House, Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the various Justice Department components play in the FBI's
counterterrorism program, from a policy, budgetary, and investigative standpoint,
prior to the September 11 attacks?
• To what extent did legal authorities and the resultant sensitivities regarding civil
liberties impact on the FBI's counterterrorism mission?
3. To what extent was the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks an
intelligence failure, and was the FBI's approach to combating terrorism a critical
factor in the overall failure to prevent the attacks?
• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect, process, analyze and
disseminate information relevant to the September 11 attacks, and what accounts
for any failures in this regard?

• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collaborate, coordinate, and share
information relevant to the September 11 attacks with foreign law enforcement
and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other
federal agencies prior to the attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this
regard?
• What particularly glaring or significant failures stand out in terms of the FBI's
inability to prevent the September 11 attacks, and what accounts for these
failures?
• Are the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission and resulting organizational
structures and cultures incompatible with a successful counterterrorism program?
4. How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United

States collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated today? What has changed
since September 11, and how effectively is the system currently working?
• What are the ingredients of a successful domestic intelligence/counterterrorism

system? What degree of collaboration, coordination, and information sharing is
required between the FBI, state and local authorities, foreign intelligence and
law enforcement partners, and other federal agencies to have a successful
system? What role should private sector entities (e.g., data aggregating and
information technology companies) play in this system?
• Does the current system provide for the adequate collection, processing,
analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism-related intelligence, and if not,
what are the primary barriers to success?
• What are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, of
establishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreign
intelligence collection within the United States?
• What can we learn from other countries' approaches to and experiences with
domestic intelligence issues?
• What additional legal and policy changes, if any, are necessary and appropriate
for the U.S. Government to establish a successful domestic intelligence
capability?

. COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Team #6
Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan
A. Reading List
1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final Report, including Senator
Shelby's Additional Views [Why it is relevant: The Joint Inquiry has already
performed considerable investigation on the performance of the FBI relating to
the September 11 attacks. In determining the scope and focus of our
investigation, the Commission should be aware of what the Joint Inquiry found
and concluded. Senator Shelby's additional views contain important and relevant
conclusions about the systemic problems with the FBI prior to the attacks.]
2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (as
supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. [Why it is relevant:
these statements cover a number of topics relevant to our investigation including:
the Phoenix Electronic Communication, the Moussaoui investigation, the
information regarding aircraft as weapons, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's
handling of the information regarding the hijackers prior to the attacks.]
3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report on
National Security in the Information Age. [Why it is relevant: contains important
policy recommendations for the U.S. Government relating to the impact of
information and information technology on national security.]
4. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 one page fact sheet on the proposed
creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. [Why it is relevant: the fact sheet
contains some of the arguments in favor of the creation of a new domestic
intelligence agency.]
5. Jeff Smith's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled "Haste and the
Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. [Why it is
relevant: the op-ed briefly describes the problems with the current system, and his
proposals to remedy these problems.]
6. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE Spectrum on-

line Journal, dated April 7, 2003 on the FBI's information sharing and
technological problems. [Why it is relevant: the article discusses the well-known
problems with the FBI's technology and information systems, and assesses
whether the current proposals are likely to remedy these problems.]
7. The Cell, by John Miller [Why it is relevant: the author provides a detailed
explanation of why he believes the FBI and CIA failed to prevent the September
11 attacks. He traces the origins of al-Qa'ida in the United States, beginning in
the early 1990s, and how the U.S. Government failed to adequately respond to
this growing threat.]

B. Recommended Briefers
1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff
2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice
3. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
4. Mike Leavitt, Governor of Utah during 2002 Salt Lake Olympics
5. Jeff Jonas, CEO of Systems Research and Development
6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NS A
7. Oilman Louie, In-Q-Tel
8. Professor Philip Heymann, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Team #6
Item 3: Document Requests
1. In consultation with team #1, requests on hijackers' associates, al-Qa'ida

detainees, and updated timelines and lists of pending investigations from the
FBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM.")
2. Training curricula from new agent training, counterterrorism in-services, and

from FBI College of Analytical Studies.
3. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agent assignments to

counterterrorism investigations (referred to as "burn rates," which indicate agent
man-hours actually spent on particular matters) from 1993-Present.
4. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Investigative and

Operational Guidelines.
5. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Administrative

and Operational Procedures.
6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterterrorism reforms, including

documents relating to the creation of the Office of Intelligence and the Reports
Officer program.
7. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcement

agencies in cities where the hijackers resided or operated.
8. In consultation with team #3, written communications from the National

Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing
counterterrorism strategy, policy and guidance, 1998-September 20, 2001
9. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on

international terrorism matters, 1998-September 20, 2001
10. Any DOJ or NSC briefing materials relating to counterterrorism or domestic

intelligence issues created for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team.
11. Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney General,
Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division
to the FBI or to U.S. Attorneys' Offices on Counterterrorism matters from 1998-
Present, not relating to individual investigations.
12. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annual

counterterrorism priorities and strategies from select from FBI Field Offices,
1998-Present.

13. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Attorney General

Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations.
14. Copy of policy directives regarding the creation of the Department of

Homeland Security, and its role in counterterrorism policy, operations, analysis,
and collection.
15. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget, produced by the Director of Central Intelligence's Community
Management Staff, FY1995-FY2004.
16. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY2004
17. Department of Homeland Security's budget request for FY2003-FY2004

Team #6:
Item 4: Interview Candidates
*List of possible interviews at FBI field office in the areas where the hijackers
lived and operated relating to: (1) the hijackers' activities and associations in the
United States; (2) the way that these field offices collected, processed, analyzed,
and disseminated information about potential terrorist activity prior to 9/11,
(3) the offices' focus on counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks:
• FBI agents involved in the investigation of hijackers' activities and

associations (in conjunction with team #1), analytic personnel, language
specialists, counterterrorism managers.
*List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information

sharing between the FBI and state/local law enforcement in the cities where the
hijackers resided, and between FBI Legal Attaches and their foreign law
enforcement and intelligence partners in countries where the hijackers lived and
operated:
• State/local law enforcement personnel, including those who have served

on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Los Angeles, Phoenix, San
Diego, Newark, Miami, Washington, D.C., Tampa, and Jacksonville.
Current FBI Legal Attaches inj |

I tma Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/11.
*L;'st of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting

FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, and budget, and in directing FBI
investigative activity prior to September 11:
• DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General

Larry Thompson, former Attorney General Reno, former Deputy Attorney
General Holder, Jim Reynolds, former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick,
Barry Sabin, Chris Wray, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General Viet
Dinh, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edelman, former Assistant Attorney
General Jim Robinson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer,
Counsel David Nahmias, Fran Townsend, Ron Lee, Bruce Schwartz, Mark
Richard, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, USAs and AUSAs
in relevant jurisdictions.
• FBI personnel: Louis Freeh, Maryanne Woodson, Rose Rudden, Assistant

Director Finance Division, Tom Pickard, former Section Chief Michael
Rolince, former Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson.
'9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Sensitive

v*'
19/11 Closed by Statute
;'
9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy ;
. %:. ' ..... FOR OFFICIAL U$E ONLY
'%,. """•--......._ COMMISSION SENSITIVE
, : : .. *List of possible interviews related to White House leadership in setting FBI

.. ; .. counterterrorism priorities, policy, aad.jh directing FBI investigative activity prior
'.-. .to September 11 (in conjunction with team #3): ...
• FBI personnel:] I ""•--•... |

I I Dale Watson, Louis Freeh, Tom PickardJ
T \ /
• NSC personnel: Daniel Benjahrin, Steve Simon, Mara Rudman, Mary
McCarthy; Jamie Baker, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clarke.
*List of possible interviews related to the Director of Central Intelligence's

leadership in setting FBI CQunterteirorism priorities, policy, budget, and in
directing FBI investigative activity/prior to September 11 (in conjunction with
team #2): .. /
FBI personnel: Dan Colefnan,| |Maggie Gillespie,

Dale Watson, Michael Roiince
• CIA personnel:} [George Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S.,

"Gang of Eight" (FBI and CIA executives' group)
*List of possible interviews to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of the

current approach to domestic intelligence/counterrorism.
\I
• FBI Executives:
Director Bob Mueller, Executive Assistant Director Pat D' Amuro, Larry
. Medford, Chuck Frahm.
• . Office of Intelligence:
IMaureen Bagmski.
Information dissemination/reports officer cadre:
intelligence unit personnel: customers tor FBI intelligence proauctsi

i
• FBI technology Jssues:
SCOPE user management group, TRILOGY user management group, FBI
Headquarters arid field analysts, former CIO Bob Dies, CIO Darwin John,
Mitretek personnel..
9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive


COMMISSIONiSENSITIVE
• Training for agents and analytic personnel:

Training Division officials, Office of Intelligence personnel, field and
headquarters analysts. ;
• Centralization of intelligence operations:

Selected Special Agents in Charge; Pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck
Frahm, Mike Fedarchyk, Andy Arena, National Joint Terrorism Task
Force personnel. \ Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts/Coordination
State/local: \d pilot projects: Dallas FBI Early Response Network, Housto
Police Department, CATIC, Criminalilntelligence Division, Los Angeles

County Sheriff Department's Terrorise! Early Warning Group, St. Louis
Gateway Information Sharing Initially^, John Miller, Assistant to L.A.P.D.
Commissioner, Ray Kelly, NYPD Commissioner, David Cohen, NYPD
• Use of private sector data gathering and mining capabilities:

Officials from Choicepoint and Axiom. .
Other U.S. Government Agencies
• Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction with team #2):

John Brennan, Steve McGraw, relevant NSC officials
• Central Intelligence Agency:

George Tenet, Assistant Director of Central; Intelligence for Homeland
Security Winston Wileyl I
• Department of Homeland Security:

Karen Morr, Frank Libutti, Paul Redmond
• Justice Department, including legal and policy reform:

DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, Assistant
Attorney General Viet Dinh, Barry Sabin, David Nahmias
• FBI personnel: Director Bob Mueller, Michael Woods, Spike Bowman,

Jack Livingston, Ken Wainstein.
• Legislative branch personnel: Senators: Graham, Shelby, Specter,

Grassley, Edwards, Gregg; Congressmen: Sensenbrenner, Goss, Conyers.
Current and former staff: Vicki Divoll, Steve Cash, Chris Ford, Bruce
Cohen, John Gannon, Suzanne Spalding, Beryl Howard, John Gannon.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 10


*List of possible interviews related to current and future domestic intelligence

policy issues and considerations: ;
• Current and former FBI and CM officials:

Howard Shapiro, Bear Brvant| John McGaffin, Jeff Smith, Judge Webster,
Dale Watson, James Woolscyr ~\ Current and former White House officials:
John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker, Mary DeRosa, Dan Benjamin,
Dick Clarke
• Civi7 liberties organizations:

Jerry Berman, Jim Dempsey, Tim Edgar, Kate Martin, David Cole, Joe
Onek, Ann Beeson
• Other current and former government officials:

Brent Scowcroft, James Gilmore, Zoe Baird, John Hamre, Gary
Hart, Senator Edwards' staff, Ambassador Bremer, Warren
Rudman, former Chief Judge of the FISA Court, Royce Lamberth
• Officials from other agencies with a role in domestic intelligence

collection and analysis:
Foreign intelligence and law enforcement personnel:

9/11 Classified
Information
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 11

TEAM 6 DRAFT WORK PLAN, April 23, 2003
Barbara Grewe
Michael Jacobson
Peter Rundlet
Lance Cole
Premise Statement
The September 11th terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived
The leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the
Communityjaad the FBI more specifically, was aware that three of these individuals had
ties ta-ar^Qa'ida.^rior the attacks. Though the plot was primarily financed and
orchestfaTMTrorn overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received assistance
from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of these individuals were
known to the FBI prior to September 11th through its counterintelligence and
counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other warnings of a possible attack in
the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC, and the
U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert.
It is now clear that therejwere -intelligence failures by the FBI, which has the
primary authority over domestic intelligence, as well as by other U.S. Intelligence
Community agencies. IrHigTiruFtrlisT our team seeks to answer the following broad
questions:
• What accounts for the intelligence failures related to the attacks, and in particular
those of the FBI?
• What reforms has the U.S. Government undertaken to address these failures, and
how effective have these reforms been?
• What additional changes need to be made for the U.S. Government to have an
effective domestic intelligence/counterterrorism capability? ^c i/Vr'*
In evaluating why the intelligence failures occurred, our team will focus its efforts on the
following three possible broad explanations:
The existence of barriers internal to the FBI that prevented it from having an effective
counterterrorism program and effectively fulfilling its domestic intelligence function.
The existence of external barriers to the FBI that prevented it from having an effective
counterterrorism program and effectively fulfilling its domestic intelligence function.
The lack of adequate coordination within the FBI, between the FBI and other U.S.
Government agencies, state and local law enforcement, and foreign intelligence and law
enforcement counterparts.
/
I. Key Questions for the Commission

What barriers internal to the FBI contributed to the September 11th intelligence
failures and prevented it from having an effective counterterrorism program prior
to September 11th?
• What internal barriers acaount-for the FBI's failure to detect the hijackers and the
ultimate plot?
• Was the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission incompatible with successful
intelligence collection and analysis?
• Was there a failure in the FBI's leadership and management on counterterrorism
issues?
• Was the FBI's institutional culture a barrier to having a successful national
counterterrorism program? .-
• Why did the FBI fail to adequately address the widely reported technology
problems prior to the attacks?
• Why did the FBI fail to adequately address the widely reported analytic problems
prior to the attacks?
• Why was significant counterterrorism information not always adequately shared
within the FBI?
What barriers external to the FBI contributed to the September 11th intelligence
failures prior to September 11th and prevented it from having an effective
counterterrorism program?
• To what extent did the legal authorities hamper the FBI's ability to have an
effective counterterrorism/domestic intelligence capability?
• To what extent did Congressional and public sensitivities regarding civil liberties
hamper zealous counterterrorism investigation? ^
• Was there a failure in leadership by Congress, the White House, the Director of
Central Intelligence, and the Justice Department in guiding the FBI on
counterterrorism issues?
Was there adequate coordination and information sharing between the FBI and
other U.S. Government agencies, state and local law enforcement, and its foreign
intelligence and law enforcement counterparts?
• Did the FBI and other U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement
agencies adequately coordinate, collaborate and share information on
counterterrorism matters, and what accounts for any failures in this regard?
• Did the FBI and its foreign intelligence and law enforcement counterparts
adequately coordinate, collaborate and share information on counterterrorism
matters, and what accounts for any failures in this regard?
• Did the FBI and state and local law enforcement entities adequately coordinate,
collaborate and share information on counterterrorism matters, and what accounts
What reforms has the U.S. Government undertaken to address these failures? How
effective have these reforms and what additional changes need to be made for the
U.S. Government to have an effective domestic intelligence/counterterrorism
capability?
• What internal reforms has the FBI made to address the intelligence failures
identified as a result of the September 11th attacks, and how effective have these
reforms bgen? What obstacles remain to the successful implementation ot these *
reforms?
• If the Administration's various planned reforms are implemented, will the U.S.
Government have an adequate and effective domestic intelligence
counterterrorism capability, and if not, what additional changes are needed?
• Should the U.S. Government make wholesale structural changes to the way that~^s
counterintelligence and foreign intelligence information collection within the
United States is managed, disseminated, analyzed and exploited?
intelligence collection within the United States? What can we learn from other
countries' approaches to domestic intelligence issues?
• What legal reforms, including changes in the law and Executive Branch policy
guidance, have been adopted since the September 11th attacks, and how successful 3,
have these changes^been? What additional legal and policy changes are necessary
capability? ^^^^^
What are the tradeoffs urclyirfibertie^jf any^ of these legislative ^ad-structural
reforms? Are these trade&ffs acceptable?
II. Briefing Plan for the Commissioners

A. Reading List
Shelby's Additional Views.
supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002.
National Security in the Information Age.
4. Selected portions of the January 2001 report by the United States Commission on
National Security/21st Century, entitled "Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change." (Hart-Rudman Commission).
5. Selected portions of the December 2002 report by the Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Gilmore Commission).
6. Senator John Edwards' February 2003 fact sheet on the proposed creation of a
Homeland Intelligence Agency.
Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence.

technological problems.
710
III. Description of the Central Categories of Documents

1. Numerous specific requests on hijackers' associates (specific request items are
classified, and listed in a separate document).
2. Lists of pending investigations opened based on debriefings of Mohammed

Haydar Zammar, Ramzi Binalshib, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohammed Al-
Hasawi, Abu Zubaida, and other relevant GITMO detainees (the list is classified).
3. Updated timeline from FBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM.").
4. List of pending PENTTBOM investigations and responsible case agents.


counterterrorism investigations (referred to as "bum rates," which indicate agent
7. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up4o~date Manual of Investigative

and Operational Guidelines.
8. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up-to-date Manual of Administrative

9. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterrorism reforms, including

Officer program.
10. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law

enforcement agencies in cities where the hijackers resided or operated.
11. Written communications from the National Security Council to the FBI or the
Department of Justice containing counterterrorism strategy, policy and guidance, s /„ , , , - , .
' / . ) 1998-Present V^'
12. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on V ^ \ jti*
international terrorism matters, 1998-Present ^ n^'
13. Any documents relating to domestic intelligence issues created by the Clinton
fl"i
Administration for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE -7
14. Any final recommendations^OfsStudies createtTby the President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board regardinjp*h|j)roposals to create a new domestic
intelligence agency.
to the FBI on Counterterrorism matters from 1998-Present, not relating to r^n^/ i <-,-•-
individual investigations. \~ 0^^

1998-Present.
17. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up to date Attorney General
18. Copy of Decision Memos regarding^ttiecre tion of the Department of

Homeland Security, and its role in counterte rism policy, operations, analysis,
and collection.
IV. Interview List (by general topic matter)
*List of possible interviews at selected FBI field offices in the areas where the
hijackers lived and operated related to their knowledge and focus on
counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks:
FBI case agents for pre-9/11 al-Qa'ida investigations.
* List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information

sharing between the of FBI and state/local law enforcement in the cities where the
hijackers resided; state/local law enforcements' knowledge of hijackers,
associations, and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks:
Police officials and state/local law enforcement personnel who have

served on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Los Angeles, Phoenix,
San Diego, Newark, Miami, Washington, D.C., Tampa, and Jacksonville.
* List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information

sharing between the FBI Legal Attaches and their foreign law enforcement and
intelligence partners in countries where the hijackers lived and operated; foreign
partners' knowledge of hijackers, associates, and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks:
Current FBI Legal Attaches in|

and Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/11.
*List of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting

.investigative activity prior to September 11 th :

Larry Thompson, Former Attorney General Reno, former Deputy Attorney
Barry Sabin, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edelman, former Assistant
Attorney General Jim RobinsenJDeputy Assistant Attorney General Alice
Fischer, Counsel David Mahmias) Assistant Attorney General Michael
Chenoff, USAs and AUSATirTrelevant jurisdictions.
FBI personnel: Louis Freeh, Maryanne Woodson, Rose Rudden, Assistant

*List of possible interviews related to White House leadership in setting FBI

counterterrorism priorities, policy, and in directing FBI investigative activity prior
to September 11 th (in conjunction with team #3):
9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Sensitive
9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy ,/9/H Closed by S t a t u t e
\N SENSITIVE
FRJ ncrxnnnel'X
Dale Watson, Louis Freeh, Tom Pickard.
WSCpersonnel: Daniel Benjamin, Steve Simon, MaraRudman, Mary

McCarthy, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clark, Ray Mislock.

leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, budget, and in
directing FBI investigative activity prior to September 111 (in conjunction with
team #2): x /
FBI personnel. Dan Colerhari| [Maggie Gillespie,

Dale Watson, Michael Rolince
CIA personnel.] \e Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S.,

"Gang of Eight"
, *List of possible interviews related to post September 1 l lh reforms in the

Domestic Intelligence arena:
FBI specific Reforms
, Office of Intelligence:
FBI technology Issues:

Headquarters and field analysts.
Training for agents and analytic personnel:

headquarters analysts.
Centralization of intelligence operations:

Selected Special Agents in Charge, Pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck
Force personnel.
9/11 Closed by S t a t u t e
Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts:

Selected pilot projects: Dallas FBI Early Response Network, Houston
Police Department, CATIC, Criminal Intelligence Division, Los Angeles
County Sheriff Department's Terrorism Early Warning Group, St. Louis
Gateway Information Sharing Initiative
Other U.S. Government Domestic Intelligence-related Post 9/1 1 Reforms
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction with team #2):

Department of Homeland Security:

Karen Morr, Pat D'Amuro, Frank Libutti, Paul Redmond
Justice Department, including legal and policy reform:

FBI personnel-. Director Bob Mueller, Michael Woods, Spike Bowman,

Legislative branch personnel: Judiciary and Intelligence Committee staff

and members
*List of possible interviews related to future domestic intelligence policy issues

and considerations:
Current and former FBI and CIA officials:

Howard Shapiro, Bear Brvaht John McGaffjn. Jeff Smith, Judge Webster,
Dale Watson, James Woolseyl I
*?
Current and former White House officials:
John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Mary DiRosa, Dan Benjamin, Dick Clarke
Civil liberties organizations:

Onek, Ann Beeson
Other current and former government officials:

Rudman
Officials from other agencies with a role in domestic intelligence

9/11 C l a s s i f i e d
Information
COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10
Premise Statement
Community, and the FBI more specifically, was aware that three of these individuals had
ties to al-Qa'ida prior the attacks. Though the plot was primarily financed and
orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received assistance
from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers' associates
were known to the FBI prior to September 11th through its counterintelligence and
counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible attack
in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC, and the
U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert.
stay below the FBI's radar while in the United States an indication of excellent
operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the FBI,
and if so, what accounts for these failures?

understanding of the U.S. Government's efforts pre-September 11th to collect, process,
system pre-September 11th, it will be clearer what the specific failures were, why they
the attacks.
intelligence efforts, to assess whether they do or will remedy the pre-September 11th
systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation.

What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the
United States prior to September 11th?
• How did the FBI collect intelligence information about foreign terrorist activity in
the United States prior to September 11th, and why did the FBI adopt this
approach? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to
information collection?
• How did the FBI process intelligence information it received about foreign
terrorist activity in the United States, and why did the FBI adopt this approach?
What were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information
processing?
• How did the FBI analyze intelligence information about foreign terrorist activity
in the United States, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the
strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information analysis?
• How did the FBI disseminate intelligence information about foreign terrorist
activity in the United States, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What
were the strengths and weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information
dissemination?
counterterrorism program prior to September 11th?
prior to the September 11th attacks?
Why was the FBI unable to detect and prevent the September 11th attacks?
• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect information relevant to the
September 11th attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this regard?
• hi what ways did the FBI fail to adequately process information relevant to the
September 11th attacks' and what accounts for any failures in this regard?
• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately disseminate information relevant to
the September 11th attacks and what accounts for any failures in this regard?
• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately analyze information relevant to the
September 11th attacks' and what accounts for any failures in this regard?
information relevant to the September 11th attacks with foreign law enforcement
regard?
What particularly glaring or significant failures stand out in terms of the FBI's
inability 1to prevent the September 11th attacks, and what accounts for these
failures?
How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United

since September 11th, and how effectively is the system currently working?

capability?

A. Reading List
Shelby's Additional Views.
supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002.
National Security in the Information Age.
4. Selected portions of the January 2001 report by the United States Commission on
National Security/21st Century, entitled "Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change" (Hart-Rudman Commission).
5. Selected portions of the December 2002 report by the Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Gilmore Commission).
6. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 fact sheet on the proposed creation of a
Homeland Intelligence Agency.
Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence.

technological problems.
6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NSA
III. Description of the Central Categories of Document to be Requested

to Supplement the Joint Inquiry's Record


4. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up to date Manual of Investigative

and Operational Guidelines.
5. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up to date Manual of Administrative

6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterrorism reforms, including

Officer program.




11. Any final recommendations or studies created by the President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board regarding the proposals to create a new domestic
intelligence agency.

1998-Present.
14. Copy of the pre-September 11th and most up to date Attorney General

and collection.
lived and operated relating to: (1) the hijackers activities and associations in the


operated:

• Current FBI Legal Attaches in| I

\ and Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/11.
*Ljst of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting

FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, and budget, and iirdirecting FBI
investigative activity prior to September 11 th :
• DOJ personnel: Attorney General AShcroft, Deputy Attorney General

Barry Sabin, Chris \Vray, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General Viet
Dinh, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edelman, former Assistant Attorney
General Jirn Robinson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer,
Counsel David Nahmias, Fran Townsend, Ron Lee, Bruce Schwartz, Mark
, in relevant jurisdictions.

,9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy
| \COlViMISSION SENSITIVE
*List of possible interviews related to Whit& .House leadership in setting FBI

counterterrorism prioritdes; policy, and in directing FBI investigative activity prior
to September 1 l t f ; (in conjunction with team #3): .. ...
FBI oersdnnel. \ Dale Watson. Louis Freeh. Tom Pickard

l j
• NSC personnel: Daniel Benjamin, Steve Simon, Mara Rudman, Mary

McCarthy, Jamie Baker, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clarke.

leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, budget, and in
directing FBI investigative activity.prior to September 11 (in conjunction with
team #2):
FBI personnel: Dan Coleman| | Maggie Gillespie,

• CIA personnel.^ \e Tenet, Joan Deiiipsey, Mike S.,

*List of possible interviews to understand and evaluate the .effectiveness of the

FBI /
• F&I Executives:
Director Bob Mueller, Executive Assistant Director Pat D'Amuro, Larry
.Medford, Chuck Frahm.
9 Office of Intelligence:
L I, Maureen Baginski.
FBI technology Issues:

Headquarters and field analysts, former CIO Bob Dies, CIO Darwin John,
Mitretek personnel.
• Training for agents and analytic personnel:

headquarters analysts. i
• Centralization of intelligence operations:

Selected Special Agents in Charge, pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck
Force personnel. i
• Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts/Coordination with

State/local: \d pilot projects: Dallas FBI E^rly Response Network, Housto

Gateway Information Sharing Initiative, John Miller, Assistant to L.A.P.D.
• Use of private sector data gathering and mining capabilities:

Officials from Choicepoint and Axiom]
Other U.S. Government Agencies \ Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction with
• Central Intelligence Agency: \e Tenet, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Homela
Security Winston ^
• Department of Homeland Security:

• Justice Department, including legal and policy reform:

• FBI personnel: Director Bob Mueller, Michael Woods, Spike Bowman,

• Legislative branch personnel: Senators: Graham, Shelby, Specter,

Grassley, Edwards, Gregg; Congressmen: Sensenbrenner, Goss, Conyers.
Cohen, John Gannon, Suzanne Spalding, Beryl Howard, John Gannon.
*List of possible interviews related to current arid future domestic intelligence

policy issues and considerations:
• Current and former FBI and CIA officials:

Howard Shapiro, Bear Bryant John McGaffin. Jeff Smith, Judge Webster,
Dale Watson, James WoolseyP 1
• Current and former White House officials:

John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker, Mary DiRosa, Dan Benjamin,
Dick Clarke
• Civil liberties organizations:

Onek, Ann Beeson


c.nllec.tinn and analvxix:
9/11 Classified
Information
Team 6: Law Enforcement and Intelligence
Collection Inside the United States
Proposed Investigative Work Plan
Barbara Grewe
Peter Rundlet
Michael Jacobson
Lance Cole
Premise Statement
Community generally, and the FBI more specifically, were aware prior to attacks that
three of these individuals had ties to al-Qa'ida. Although the plot was primarily financed
and orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received
assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers'
associates were known to the FBI prior to September 11 through its counterintelligence
and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible
attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC,
and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert.
avoid detection by the FBI while in the United States an indication of excellent
operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the
FBI? If the former, can changes be made to detect this type of tradecraft in the future? If
the latter, what accounts for these failures?

understanding of the U.S. Government's efforts pre-September 11 to collect, process,
system pre-September 11, it will be clearer what the specific failures were, why they
the attacks.
intelligence efforts, to assess whether they are adequate to remedy the pre-September 11
systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation. If not, we will
make recommendations to address these problems.
What relevant information did the FBI have prior to the September 11 attacks?
• What information was available to U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement entities
prior to September 11 regarding the 19 hijackers and their associates? When was
this information known and by whom, and how was this information shared and
utilized prior to the attacks?
• Did the FBI have all of the information about the 19 hijackers available to other
U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and their foreign intelligence and
law enforcement partners?
What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the
United States prior to September 11?
• How did the FBI collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence
information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States prior to September
11, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and
weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information collection?
counterterrorism program prior to September 11 ?
prior to the September 11 attacks?
• To what extent did legal authorities and the resultant sensitivities regarding civil
liberties impact on the FBI's counterterrorism mission?
To what extent was the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks an
intelligence failure, and was the FBI's approach to combating terrorism a critical
factor in the overall failure to prevent the attacks?
• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect, process, analyze and
disseminate information relevant to the September 11 attacks, and what accounts
information relevant to the September 11 attacks with foreign law enforcement
regard?
• What particularly glaring or significant failures stand out in terms of the FBI's
inability to prevent the September 11 attacks, and what accounts for these
failures?
• Are the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission and resulting organizational
structures and cultures incompatible with a successful counterterrorism program?
How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United

since September 11, and how effectively is the system currently working?

capability?
A. Reading List
Shelby's Additional Views [Why it is relevant: The Joint Inquiry has already
performed considerable investigation on the performance of the FBI relating to
the September 11 attacks. In determining the scope and focus of our
investigation, the Commission should be aware of what the Joint Inquiry found
and concluded. Senator Shelby's additional views contain important and relevant
conclusions about the systemic problems with the FBI prior to the attacks.]
supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. [Why it is relevant:
these statements cover a number of topics relevant to our investigation including:
the Phoenix Electronic Communication, the Moussaoui investigation, the
information regarding aircraft as weapons, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's
handling of the information regarding the hijackers prior to the attacks.]
National Security in the Information Age. [Why it is relevant: contains important
policy recommendations for the U.S. Government relating to the impact of
information and information technology on national security.]
4. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 one page fact sheet on the proposed
creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. [Why it is relevant: the fact sheet
contains some of the arguments in favor of the creation of a new domestic
intelligence agency.]
Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. [Why it is
relevant: the op-ed briefly describes the problems with the current system, and his
proposals to remedy these problems.]

technological problems. [Why it is relevant: the article discusses the well-known
problems with the FBI's technology and information systems, and assesses
whether the current proposals are likely to remedy these problems.]
7. The Cell, by John Miller [Why it is relevant: the author provides a detailed
explanation of why he believes the FBI and CIA failed to prevent the September
11 attacks. He traces the origins of al-Qa'ida in the United States, beginning in
the early 1990s, and how the U.S. Government failed to adequately respond to
this growing threat.]
6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NSA
III. Description of the Central Categories of Document to be Requested

to Supplement the Joint Inquiry's Record


4. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Investigative and

Operational Guidelines.
5. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Administrative

6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterterrorism reforms, including

Officer program.





1998-Present.
13. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Attorney General


and collection.
lived and operated relating to: (1) the hijackers' activities and associations in the


operated:

• Current FBI Legal Attachesjflj /

I / and Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/1 L
*List of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting

investigative activity prior to September 11:
• DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General

Barry Sabin, Chris Wray, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General Viet
Dinh, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edeiman, former Assistant Attorney
General Jim Robinson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer,
Counsel David Nahmias, Fran Towrisend, Ron Lee, Bruce Schwartz, Mark
in relevant jurisdictions.

9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy
""'•-•-... 19/11 Closed by S t a t u t e
*List of possible interviews related to White House leadership in setting FBI
'qounterterrorism priorities, policy, and in. directing FBI investigative activity prior
to September 11 (in conjunction with team #3):..
17 D r «AM«A/*1 ' '"-- 1

f^fjf t}€rSUfiil€l.^^^—_ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^,__JL|
Dale Watson, Louis Freeh, Tom Pickard
• NSC personnel: Daniel Benjamin, Steve Simon, Mara Rudman, Mary

McCarthy, Jamie Baker, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clarke.
*List of possible interviews related to,the Director of Central Intelligence's

leadership in setting FBI cbunterterrojfism priorities, policy, budget, and in
directing FBI investigative activity p.fior to September 11 (in conjunction with
team #2): . /
• FBI personnel: Dan Colenianj I Maggie Gillespie,

• CIA personnel I George Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S.,

^.List of possible interviews to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of the

< \I
\ Executives:
, Director Bob Mueller, Executive Assistant Director Pat D'Amuro, Larry
Medford, Chuck Frahm.
cp nf Intelligence'
JMaureen Bagmski.
• FBI technology Issues:

Headquarters and field analysts, former CIO Bob Dies, CIO Darwin John,
Mitretek personnel.
Training for agents and analytic personnel:

headquarters analysts.
Centralization of intelligence operations:

Selected Special Agents in Charge, Pat D'Amuro, Larry Medford, Chuck
Force personnel.
Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts/Coordination with

State/local:
Selected pilot projects: Dallas FBIEarly Response Network, Houston
Gateway Information Sharing Initiative, John Miller, Assistant to L.A.P.D.
Use of private sector data gathering and mining capabilities:

Officials from Choicepoint and Axiom;
Other U.S. Government Agencies .
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction with team #2):

Central Intelligence Agency: \e Tenet, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence fo
Security Winston W i l e y ] I
Department of Homeland Security:

Justice Department, including legal and policy reform:

FBI personnel: Director Bob Mueller, Michael Woods, Spike Bowman,

Legislative branch personnel: Senators: Graham, Shelby, Specter,

Grassley. Edwards, Gregg; Congressmen: Sensenbrenner, Goss, Conyers.
Cohen. John Gannon, Suzanne Spalding, Beryl Howard, John Gannon.
*List of possible interviews related to current .and future domestic intelligence

policy issues and considerations:
• Current and former FBI and CIA officials:

Howard Shapiro, Bear Bryant, John McGaffin. Jeff Smith, Judge Webster,
Dale Watson, James Woolsey.l |
• Current and former White House officials:

John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker, Mary DiRosa, Dan Benjamin,
Dick Clarke
• Civil liberties organizations:

Onek, Ann Beeson


» Foreign intelligence and law enforcement personnel:

9/11 Classified
Information

Versions of Workplan For 9/11 Commission's Team 6

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\—- b

• Complete planned interviews (e.g., NYPD, Watson, Edmonds, Townsend)

Draft staff statement for hearing

April - End of Commission

Additional work areas should Commission be extended

• Preparations for additional days of hearings

Questions for Team 6 Issue Papers

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS

Team Members: Barbara Grewe

Item 1 Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2 Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan

Item 3 Document Requests

Item 4 Interview Candidates

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

To answer these questions, our team will have to develop a comprehensive

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4. How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United

• What are the ingredients of a successful domestic intelligence/counterterrorism

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE Spectrum on-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff

2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice

3. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency

4. Mike Leavitt, Governor of Utah during 2002 Salt Lake Olympics

5. Jeff Jonas, CEO of Systems Research and Development

6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NS A

7. Oilman Louie, In-Q-Tel

8. Professor Philip Heymann, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1. In consultation with team #1, requests on hijackers' associates, al-Qa'ida

2. Training curricula from new agent training, counterterrorism in-services, and

3. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agent assignments to

4. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Investigative and

5. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Administrative

6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterterrorism reforms, including

7. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcement

8. In consultation with team #3, written communications from the National

9. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on

10. Any DOJ or NSC briefing materials relating to counterterrorism or domestic

12. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annual

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Attorney General

14. Copy of policy directives regarding the creation of the Department of

16. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY2004

17. Department of Homeland Security's budget request for FY2003-FY2004

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• FBI agents involved in the investigation of hijackers' activities and

*List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information

• State/local law enforcement personnel, including those who have served

Current FBI Legal Attaches inj |

*L;'st of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting

• DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General

• FBI personnel: Louis Freeh, Maryanne Woodson, Rose Rudden, Assistant

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

, : : .. *List of possible interviews related to White House leadership in setting FBI

• FBI personnel:] I ""•--•... |

*List of possible interviews related to the Director of Central Intelligence's

FBI personnel: Dan Colefnan,| |Maggie Gillespie,

• CIA personnel:} [George Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S.,

*List of possible interviews to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of the