CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PASTOR VS. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. NO. 146873, 05/09/2002 * On re-assignment Facts: Petitioner Remedios Pastor is Budget Officer of the Municipality (now City) of Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of reports against her concerning the issuance of Advice of Allotments by her. In 1995, after three years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former position but she was instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government. Upon her complaint, the Civil Service Commission ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. However, on appeal of the city government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may be reinstated to her original position as Budget Officer. HELD: YES. We agree with the CSC that petitioner should now be returned to her original position for her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her removal without cause from the position to which she has been permanently appointed. The CSC held that, while petitioner's reassignment was originally made in the exigency of the service without reduction in her rank, status, or salary, respondent City Mayor failed to advance "sufficient reason" to warrant petitioner's continuous reassignment for more than three years which "appears too long for one to conduct the study assigned to her."There is no question that we recognize th e validity and indispensable necessity of the well established rule that for the good of public service and whenever public interest demands, a public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties even over his objection without necessarily violating his fundamental and legal rights to security of tenure in the civil service. But as we have already stated, "such cannot be undertaken when the transfer of the employee is with a view to his removal" and "if the transfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the employee away from his permanent position" because "such attitude is improper as it would in effect result in a circumvention of the prohibition which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the civil service. * Under the direct disciplining authority of the President LARIN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 280 SCRA 713 Facts: Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). He was in charge of the office of the Excise Tax Service. In 1992, the Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave misconduct. His conviction was reported to the Office of the President, at the same time, an administrative complaint was filed with the same office. The President then,

based on the Sandiganbayan conviction, created a committee to investigate Larin. Eventually, Larins removal was recommended. The President dismissed Larin. ISSUE: Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly. HELD: No. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career service of the Civil Service. Although it is a general rule that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, such power to remove I with limitations. In the case at bar, the limitation can be found in the fact that Larin is a career service officer and under the Administrative Code of 1987, such officers who fall under career service are characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, Larin enjoys the right to security of tenure. He can only be removed from his office on grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his removal was his conviction in the Sandiganbayan this is not one of those grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code. Further, the Supreme Court notes that when Larins conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court actually absolved Larin.

4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

Partisan Political Activity

PEOPLE VS. DE VENECIA, 14 SCRA 864 Facts: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4thdistrict of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioners proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondents proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.

Issues: 1. Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid. 2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case. 3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD: 1. The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorates choice. 2. Since the validity of respondents proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondents eligibility was not the issue. 3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelecs) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.

QUINTO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION, 613 SCRA 385 Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners, who held appointive positions in government and who intended to run in the 2010 elections, assailed Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678,* which deemed appointed officials automatically (ipso facto) resigned from office upon the filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC). Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369.** The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.*** Petitioners averred that they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. (Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 provides that any person filing his certificate of candidacy within the period set by COMELEC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.)

Petitioners further averred that the assailed provision is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Representing the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition was premature and petitioners had no legal standing since they were not yet affected by the assailed provision, not having as yet filed their CoCs. The OSG also argued that petitioners could not avail the remedy of certiorari since what they were questioning was an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of its rule-making power. The OSG further averred that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of its Resolution No. 8678 since it merely copied what was in the law. The OSG, however, agreed that there is no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned upon filing their CoCs because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Issues: Main Issue: 1. Whether or not Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678 and the laws upon which it was based (second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) are unconstitutional. Other Issues: 2. Whether or not certiorari is petitioners proper remedy. 3. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to file the case, and whether or not there is an actual controversy. Held: 1. On the Constitutionality of the Assailed Provisions. The second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 were declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.There are 4 requisites for a valid classification that will justify differential treatment between classes: (a) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (b) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.(W)hether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. An appointive official could wield the same dangerous and coercive influence on the electorate as the elective official. Both may be motivated by political considerations rather than the publics welfare, use their governmental positions to promote their candidacies, or neglect their duties to attend to their campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The challenged provision is also overbroad because: (a) It pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in

government or not (It would be absurd to consider a utility worker in the government as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC; it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.); and (b) It is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. 2. On the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be availed of because what petitioners assailed in their petition was a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Prohibition is also an improper remedy, because what petitioners actually sought was the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights there under. What they filed was a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court does not exercise original jurisdiction.