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March 21, 2003
(520) 670-6334

TELEPHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED

(202) 224-7132
The Honorable Thomas Keane, Chairman (602) 952-°170
The Honorable Lee Hamilton, Vice-Chairman
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Dear Tom and Lee:

I am writing to outline the priorities I envision for the independent commission to

investigate the attacks of September 1 1 , 200 1 .

The September 1 1th attacks represented a massive failure in the most fundamental duty of
government: the protection of its people from foreign attack. When Joe Lieberman and I called
for an independent commission, we stated clearly that it should not be a "witch hunt" directed at
one particular administration, one particular agency, or one particular set of individuals. It
should be an honest, probing, and thorough review and critique of U.S. policies, programs, and
practices spanning almost two decades and four administrations prior to the September 11, 2001,
al Qaeda attacks on the United States, with the goal of understanding what we did wrong and
how we can learn from identified failures, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities in order to make
necessary, systemic corrections. A full and frank accounting of such policies, programs, and
practices should be far-ranging and candid in assessing the failures of vision, threat assessment,
and policy response that preceded the attacks.

The joint congressional investigation into the intelligence failures associated with
September 1 1 th did critical work in uncovering how elements of our government failed to share
and use existing information to divine the terrorists' planning and intentions. The commission
should expand on the joint congressional committee's investigation of the myriad failures that
prevented significant information in our possession about the September 1 1th plot from being
pursued by the relevant agencies. The commission should also recommend additional reforms,
above and beyond those implemented to date, to rationalize the way intelligence information is
collected, analyzed, disseminated, and acted upon to improve the effectiveness of our efforts to
deter, prevent, preempt, and counter extremist terrorism.

The joint congressional investigation holds a valuable lesson for the commission on
securing information from the executive branch. Senators Shelby and Graham in particular have
strongly criticized the administration for resisting the committee's requests for information
related to the attacks. The committee's subpoena power was absolutely critical, they believe, to
the success it did enjoy in ferreting out information relating to the government's preparedness
and knowledge of planning for the terrorist assault. Notably, the exercise of that critical power
did not divide its members along partisan lines, but was accomplished through cooperation
between the committee's co-chairmen.

Accordingly, power of subpoena will be central to the ability of the your commission to
accomplish its mission. It is my hope that as Chairman and Vice Chairman, you will be able to
agree to issue most subpoenas by consensus, as the legislation allows, and that your joint
leadership will help prevent party-line votes on subpoenas. The families of the September 11th
victims and I are deeply concerned that members of the commission appointed by one political
party may work together to block the issuance of subpoenas because of a perceived detrimental
impact on a particular administration or set of individuals. I know you agree that a commission
in which the five members of a single political party unite to block the issuance of subpoenas to
uncover information that may be relevant to the committee's mandate would do a grave
disservice to the families of all who died on September 11th and to our nation. I cannot overstate
the importance of the example your leadership will provide on this issue.

It is also important that the commission's staff be truly bipartisan, of high professional
caliber, and be selected in consultation with the commission's vice-chairman, as the legislation
requires.

I support the fullest possible public disclosure of all committee hearings and findings,
consistent with existing law and the national security protections written into the legislation. I
encourage you to hold public hearings as frequently as possible, and to publicly issue
substantive, interim reports on the commission's progress as envisioned and allowed in the
enacted legislation. This is particularly important to the families of the September 11th victims.
It will help to dispel any doubts about the secrecy surrounding the commission's work, and will
provide information Congress and the administration can use to bolster our homeland defenses as
expeditiously as possible.

My vision for areas of inquiry the commission should pursue, but should not be limited
to, includes rigorous investigation into failings and shortcomings of policy, programs, and
practice in the use offeree to respond to terrorist attacks on Americans, intelligence, law
enforcement, diplomacy, immigration and border control, the financing of terrorist organizations,
aviation security, and the role of congressional oversight. No area of inquiry should be off-limits
if the commission determines it relates to the commission's mandate to pursue a comprehensive
investigation into the September 11th attacks.

I believe there are four specific areas that deserve particular attention from the
commission: the U.S. policy response to terrorism; the rise of al Qaeda; state support for
terrorism; and the role of Saudi Arabia.
U.S. Response to Terrorism

An evaluation of the effectiveness of the U.S. response to a series of terrorist attacks

against Americans and our interests by Islamic extremists over the last two decades is critical if
we are to prevail in the coming months and years. Osama bin Laden himself regularly cited
American inaction after devastating attacks on our Marine barracks and our embassy in Lebanon
as inspiration for his cause. Subsequent kidnappings and assassinations, the destruction of Pan
Am Flight 103, the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, subsequent planning of massive trans-
Pacific hijackings, the 1995 Riyadh and 1996 Khobar Towers bombings of U.S. targets in Saudi
Arabia, the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the planned attacks against
American interests on the eve of the millennium, and the 2000 bombing of the USS COLE all
provided a troublingly clear picture not only of terrorists' intentions, but of their ability to
significantly damage American interests. The role of U.S. policy in responding to these attacks,
and the ways in which American leaders failed to adequately counter the threat posed by
international terrorism, should be central areas of inquiry for the commission.

Illustrative questions would include:

• Did the tension between law enforcement and security responses to terrorism inhibit our
response by focusing on legal outcomes (indictments, prosecutions, and convictions)
rather than focusing on the destruction and defeat of terrorist infrastructure that targeted
Americans?

• Were more active responses to the threat posed by terrorism proposed but not
implemented because of legal, bureaucratic, diplomatic, or other concerns?

• How well was the counter-terrorist mission incorporated into the planning and operations
of our Armed Forces? Our diplomatic service? Our intelligence and law enforcement
agencies?

• How was it that a troubled youth from California was able to join the ranks of al Qaeda
(and meet Osama bin Laden) while our intelligence assets could not?

Rise of al Qaeda

It now seems clear that U.S. policy toward Afghanistan in the 1980s - and our decision to
abandon the region after 1989 - played a significant role in the conditions that allowed al Qaeda
to flourish. I believe the formative period of al Qaeda - not just its more recent operations -
should be thoroughly examined by the commission. Key questions would include what we knew
about bin Laden's efforts to build a network in close proximity to a major U.S. covert assistance
program in Pakistan and Afghanistan, al Qaeda's role in Somalia in 1993, the partnership formed
between Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, as well as al Qaeda's ideological development,
recruitment practices, networks, and eventual operations on at least five continents.
State Support for Terrorism

The questions surrounding the nature and extent of foreign government sponsorship and
support for al Qaeda and Islamic terrorists bear full examination. Afghanistan and Sudan, as
former bases for Qaeda training and operations, are obvious candidates for inquiry, but so too are
nations like Iraq, Syria and Iran, whose sponsorship of terrorist organizations known to have
collaborated with al Qaeda merits investigating and publicizing.

Saudi Arabia

The role of Saudi Arabia in the rise of a global terrorist network deeply hostile to
America must be a part of the commission's deliberations. The role of Saudi policy and Saudi
money, from both official and private sources - including members of the royal family - must be
fully investigated and made public. The Saudi leadership and public have clearly failed to
acknowledge and learn from the central Saudi role in the terrorist attacks. The United States and
Saudi Arabia cannot enjoy a normal relationship, much less a relationship of allies, as long as
denial and deception about Saudi culpability in the rise of extremist terrorism continues. The
U.S. government's reluctance to address this issue directly must not extend to your work.

In retrospect, it is simply remarkable that the United States stood by over two decades,
preoccupied by other dangers, challenges and opportunities, as a grave threat to our security
formed, grew in strength, expanded in reach, and conducted operations against American targets
around the world - and ultimately attacked our homeland. The challenge, and the privilege, of
the Keane-Hamilton commission is to explain to the American people how and why these
developments occurred, and what our government can do to provide the greatest degree of
security to our people in the face of these threats, consistent with the rights and laws of a free
people.

We will win the war al Qaeda and those who supported it started. The commission's
investigation and findings will be a significant part of our response, and will contribute to our
ultimate victory. I am grateful for your leadership, and know I speak for many Americans in
thanking you for serving once again the country you have already served so well.

Sincerely,

John McCain

cc: Philip Zelikovv