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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

UPON THE UNITED STATES

TEAM #1 WORKPLAN

AL QAEDA & RELATED TRANSNATIONAL

TERRORIST GROUPS

Team Members: Doug MacEachin

Tom Dowling
Dana Lesemann
Yoel Tobin
John Tamm
Rajesh De
Ernest May
Matt Levitt

Item 1 Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2 Suggested Readings

Item 3 Document Requests

Item 4 Interview Candidates

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TEAM#1
Item 1: Key Questions

I. Lines of Inquiry and Key Questons

A. We propose to organize our initial research around three over-arching

questions, which will be used as principal lines of inquiry:

1. What is the history of al Qaeda and its linkages to other terrorist entities
prior to the 9/11 attacks?

2. What can we determine through a comprehensive examination of all

evidence now available—synthesizing the information available earlier
with that obtained post-9/11—regarding the planning, preparation,
financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks?

3. What is now known of the present composition of al Qaeda and its

affiliated entities and what threat do they now pose?

Each of these lines of inquiry is a building block that encompasses many specific
component questions. We can identify some of these component questions at the
outset of the research, and they are listed below as a means of focusing the
initiation of our research. However, new component questions will emerge from
our discoveries as our research progresses. Thus, one of the aims of the initial
research is to identify additional key component questions for our research. One
of the crosscutting issues to which we will pay close attention is al Qaeda's
collaborative relationships and connections with various other entities because
these factors will be critical in assessing al Qaeda's means and capabilities for
future attacks.

B. The following is a list of some of the key component questions that will be the
focus of our initial research:

1. What is the history of al Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attack?

a) What are al Qaeda's origins, ideological roots, doctrines, and

worldview, and how have they evolved over time? Who have
been its key functionaries? How has it recruited personnel?

b) What attacks before 9/11 can we now connect with al Qaeda,

either operating alone or in collaboration with other terrorist
groups? How were they carried out?

c) With what other terrorist groups has al Qaeda been affiliated,

either in collaborative operations or through funding and
logistical support?

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d) How has al Qaeda functioned organizationally and financially?

e) What have been its relationships with governments or

government components acting outside the purview of their
own political leadership, including, but not limited to those
governments or factions that provided al Qaeda with support
and sanctuary?

2. What can we determine through a comprehensive examination of

all evidence now available—synthesizing the information available
earlier with that obtained post-9/11—regarding the planning,
preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks?

a) What can we now understand regarding the strategic objectives

of the attack?

b) How were the targets and means of attack chosen? By whom?

How was intelligence collected and employed for this purpose?

c) What do we know of the origins and details of the operational

planning for the attack, e.g., the designation of operational
command, the selection of the hijacking teams, the
establishment of logistic and financial support? When was the
plan finalized? Was it fixed or flexible?

d) What were the key planning and decision variables? For

example, is there any evidence of any variables that would
have resulted in a decision to abort the plan? Who had the
final authority to carry out the plan or abort it?

e) What training, exercises, and/or rehearsals were carried out?

f) What staging areas and support networks were employed in

carrying out the plan? Did affiliated entities play any role in
staging or supporting the attacks?

3. What is now known of the present composition of al Qaeda and its

affiliated entities and what threat do they now pose?

a) How has al Qaeda sought to adapt and compensate for its

losses? What changes have taken place since 9/11 in such
areas as tactics, doctrine, personnel, and financial practices?

b) What is the current status of al Qaeda's active membership and

its access to weapons and training?

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c) What has happened to the many thousands who passed through

the training and vetting camps in Afghanistan?

d) What role has al Qaeda played in terrorist attacks mounted

since 9/11, whether thwarted or actually carried out?

e) What has been the role, if any, of affiliated and collaborative

entities in these attacks, and what is the status of the
connections between al Qaeda and other terrorist groups?

f) Is there any evidence that al Qaeda is currently receiving any

support from any state actor?

g) What is the status of al Qaeda's efforts to acquire WMD?

II. Outlining a Research Plan

We will start our research on the first line of inquiry—in effect, the
construction of the "base building block"—in the 1989-1990 time frame, when
Usama bin Laden's "base" or "al Qaeda" was set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, and
bin Laden himself returned to Saudi Arabia. After the deployment of U.S. forces
to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in 1990, bin Laden began his tirades against
the "apostate" regimes in the Muslim world and called for the expulsion of the
American "infidels" from the land of the "sacred sites" of Islam. In 1991 bin
Laden moved his base to Sudan. Some context:

During this time frame several major terrorist operations took place in
which bin Laden is known to have been involved, as well as additional
attacks for which there is evidence of, at least, bin Laden's support. These
attacks include the 1992 bombing of a hotel in Yemen where American
troops on their way to Somalia were staying; the February 1993 bombing
of the World Trade Center (WTC I); the "Day of Terror" plot, targeted at
New York City landmarks, a plot that was broken up by law enforcement
in June 1993; the 1995 "Bojinka Plot" in Manila, which included plans to
blow up 12 airliners over the Pacific Ocean, assassinate the Pope and the
U.S. president, and fly an airplane laden with explosives into the CIA's
headquarters; and the 1995 bombing of the Saudi National Guard
building in Riyadh that killed five U.S. soldiers. In addition, although the
attacks on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did not take
place until August 1998, the planning was already well underway while
bin Laden was residing in Sudan and he reportedly reviewed the plans for
the attacks and the reconnaissance photos used for those plans.

The multiple connections between these operations offer insights into the
evolving structure ofal Qaeda. For example, Wadih el-Hage served as

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bin Laden's personal secretary while the al Qaeda leader was based in
Sudan. Prior to that, from 1991 to 1992 El-Hage headed a so-called
charitable organization in New York City that ostensibly raised funds for
veterans of the Afghan jihad; the organization had previously raised funds
to support those fighters during the jihad. While in New York City El-
Hage also had contact with at least one of the participants in WTCI and
he was later convicted for his role in the 1998 Embassy bombings.
Similarly, Ramzi Yousef, who managed WTC I, escaped after the attack
and ended up in Manila, where he worked with future 9/11 commander
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on the 1995 Bojinka Plot.

Our research will then follow bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in the spring of
1996 and the establishment of his infrastructure there. We will focus on one of the key
developmental lines during this period, the further expansion of al Qaeda's global reach
through recruitment, indoctrination, training and the dispersal of its cells, at least some of
which played critical roles in the later 9/11 attacks. Some context:

Al Qaeda's base and operational infrastructure expanded by a significant

order of magnitude after bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in 1996,
entrenching its "army" infrastructure of bases for training in weapons,
tactics, and production of explosive devices. This infrastructure also
provided centers for ideological indoctrination and for screening the
ranks to spot and vet individuals for the inner cadre of terrorist cells. This
was the source of a large portion of the individuals dispatched to form
cells in cities around the globea process vividly demonstrated in what we
now know about many of the 9/11 hijackers.

The home base in Afghanistan also facilitated sequestered gatherings for

strategic and operational planning, and for collaboration sessions with
leaders of other terrorist groups. We now understand that a significant
expansion of consortium arrangements with other terrorists took place
from the Afghan bases. For example, there is evidence that al Qaeda
collaborated with two Asian terrorist groups in attacks carried out in
Manila and Jakarta in December 2000. This same connection was used to
set up the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur,
including individuals who would later be involved in the attack on the USS
Cole in October 2000, the 9/11 attacks, and in the October 2002 Bali
bombing.

Similarly, a report released by the Singapore police reveals that the

Southeast Asian terrorist organization Jema 'ah Islamiyya planned to
provide the foot soldiers for the aborted suicide strikes planned for Manila
and Jakarta in early 2002; al Qaeda leaders made the strategic planning
decisions at meetings in Afghanistan and provided the financing and much
of the target reconnaissance.

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Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting and reconstructing the

planning, preparation, financing and execution of the 9/11 attacks in rigorous detail from
its origins to execution, will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging newly
developed intelligence (including findings emerging from the research on al Qaeda's
origins and development) with information from existing sources. Our specific
objectives include the identification of al Qaeda's links with other entities, including
possible links with state sponsors. These links could be a major part of the threat al
Qaeda poses in the future. Some context:

Evidence now available indicates that the concept of using aircraft as

weapons—crashing them into major sites—was raised with top al Qaeda
leaders as far back as the mid-1990 's, at the same time the Manila-based
Bojinka Plot was underway. Some have also theorized that the concept of
employing hijackers with pilot training evolved from the failed attempt of
Algerian hijackers to force pilots to steer a hijacked aircraft into the Eiffel
Tower in 1995. The process of selecting individuals for piloting the
aircraft, bringing together the operational teams, moving the financial
support for the training and maintenance of the teams, and, most notably,
coordinating the actions of the diverse components of the attack—entering
the United States from both sides of the continent, and coordinating the
implementation of the plot with flights from three major airports—are
prima facie indications of the linchpin role of the "central staff" ofal
Qaeda's inner circle.

The results of these research efforts will provide a base for honing specific areas
of focus and identifying sources for pursuing the third line of inquiry: What has
happened to al Qaeda in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the intensified worldwide
coalition in a war against terrorism, and, of even greater importance, what this reveals
about al Qaeda's present composition and its threat to the United States.

The research on al Qaeda's earlier developments will naturally feed into the
understanding of al Qaeda's current situation. However, we plan to step back at various
intervals to examine what specific component questions and branches of inquiry have
emerged from our research into al Qaeda's evolution and use these questions to sharpen
our focus on the current threat.

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TEAM#1
Item 2: Suggested Readings

On the origins and evolution of the al Qaeda global terrorist consortium,

we suggest either Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., (Touchstone, 2002) or Rohan
Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qa 'ida (Columbia University Press, 2002). Although both
were published within a few months after the 9/11 attacks, both authors had begun
their research into al Qaeda years earlier and both conducted extensive interviews
with key actors in foreign settings. The differences are mainly in presentation.
Bergen employs a more journalistic narrative style, while Gunaratna is somewhat
more scholarly and offers substantial depth on key points.

For insight into the Washington perspective and what was known of the
terrorist threat presented by bin Laden and al Qaeda prior to 9/11, we suggest
Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,
2002).

For a detailed, intimately informed layout of the complex interconnections

of individuals and cells involved in the terrorist plots in New York and several
individuals who later turned up in various al Qaeda operations, read John Miller
and Michael Stone, The Cell (Hyperion Books, 2002).

Bernard Lewis' book What Went Wrong? (HarperCollins 2002) provides a

conceptual background introduction to the Middle Eastern and Islamic
environment in which al Qaeda grew.

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TEAM #1
Item 3: Document Requests

We propose to initiate our research by digging into key known lodes of

information. This needs to be understood as a starting point, however, because one of the
desired products of an in-depth research effort is the identification of new branches and
potential sources for further research. We plan to look preliminarily to open sources,
many of which have already been used to begin shaping our detailed timeline of al
Qaeda's emergence and actions since its formation in the late 1980's. (Some of the most
useful books are listed in the attached list of suggested reading materials.) We then
propose to examine the following key sources:

1. The records compiled by the Joint Inquiry, both as substantive sources of

information and as a means of identifying what else to look for and where to
look. All of the documents that have been made available to the Joint Inquiry
are maintained in specific storage areas by the agencies from which they
originated.

2. The FBI's Penttbom file, which contains the details of what has been learned
from the investigations of the 9/11 conspiracy, including a detailed timeline of
what the FBI knows of the origins and movements of each of the plot's
participants.

3. Records of statements of individuals interrogated in connection with

several major terrorist prosecutions in the Southern District of New York
and elsewhere. This is a critical lode of information for examining the
evolving cell structure, transnational connections and key players in the
evolution. The documents include records of investigations and interrogations
from the first trial of participants in the WTC I attack, which concluded in
March 1994; the trial of the conspirators in the New York City landmarks
case, including the "Blind Sheikh," which concluded in October 1995; the two
trials of Ramzi Yousef, first for his role in the Bojinka Plot, concluded in
September 1996, and then for his role in WTC I, concluded in November
1997; the pre-empted "Millennium strike" on Los Angeles International
Airport; and the prosecution of the perpetrators of the African Embassy
bombings, which concluded in July 2001. In addition, the gunman in the 1990
assassination of Meir Kahane, the leader of the Jewish Defense League, was
later convicted for his involvement in the 1993 plot to bomb New York City
landmarks. We intend to review the records from the Kahane assassination
and other related investigations to determine the origins of the New York
terrorist cell.

4. Documentary reports of information relating to the 9/11 attacks and the

history of al Qaeda that were obtained from individuals and material
taken into custody since 9/11. The Intelligence Community has obtained a
vast amount of information from the large number of operatives, documents,

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and equipment captured since 9/11. We will start with the Director of Central
Intelligence's Review Group, which has been tasked with accumulating all
information on bin Laden, al Qaeda, and terrorist plots against the United
States worldwide.

This information is critical to the task of examining al Qaeda's development,

structure, key players and collaborative ties with other regional and
transnational terrorist entities, which is particularly important in assessing the
threat al Qaeda currently poses.

Many key individuals and materials have been captured since the conclusion
of the Joint Inquiry, including, according to media accounts, individuals who
played key roles in the al Qaeda leadership circle, such as Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and Abu Zubaida, as well as key field operators such as Ramzi
Binalshib, Umar Faruq and Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. The latter two are
sources for information on al Qaeda's global reach because of their central
roles in the collaboration of al Qaeda and Southeast Asian terrorist groups in
the December 2000 attacks in Manila and Jakarta, the planned multiple attacks
in Singapore and Malaysia that were thwarted by local authorities in
December 2001, and the October 2002 Bali bombing.

Other individuals currently in custody, such as Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi,

served as regional points of contact with al Qaeda in coordinating terrorist
actions, and funneling money and materials to operatives,

5.

9/11 Classified Information

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9/11 Closed by Statute
TEAM#1
Item 4: Interview Candidates

The following is a preliminary list of individuals and categories of

individuals who are probable interviewees. We will prioritize initial interviews
based on their potential for providing guidance and clues to mining known and
potential sources of information. We will take up additional interviews as the
research process proceeds, with the guiding principle that the effectiveness and
productivity of factual interviews is directly related to the availability of relevant
documents, and the time and effort given to preparatory research. In other words,
the more informed the interviewer, the more effective the interview.

U.S. Intelligence Community

George Tenet (DCI)
' Gen. Michael Hayden (Director, NS A)
'I
Cofer Black (former head, Counterterrorist Center, CIA)
|(DCI Review Team)
PIA)
l(DIA)
)IA)
Other CIA officers currently under official cover

New York Criminal Cases and PENTTBOM Investigation

Robert S. Mueller, m (FBI Director)
Louis Freeh (former FBI Director)
Dale Watson (former Deputy Executive Assistant Director, FBI)
Patrick Fitzgerald (former Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.)
John Mullaly (New York Police Department)
l(New York Joint Terrorism Task Force)
](FBI New York)
j(FBI New York)
JFBI New York)
Ken Karas (Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.)
Andrew McCarthy (Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y.)
](FBI Headquarters, lead agent on Penttbom investigation)
1 ](FBI Headquarters)
Michael Rolince (FBI Headquarters)
Pasouale J. D'Amuro (Deputy Executive Assistant Director, FBI)
•I rFBI New York)

Scholars and Outside Experts

Bruce Hoffman (RAND Corporation)
Daniel Benjamin (CSIS)
Steven Simon (RAND)
Rohan Gunaratna (Saint Andrews)

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Magnus Ramstrop (St. Andrews)

Zachary Abouza
Bernard Lewis

U.S. Department of State/NSC

JINR/NESA)
KINR/TNC)

Richard Clarke (former Chair, CSG, NSC)

Barbara Bodine (former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen)
Prudence Bushnell (former U.S. Ambassador to Kenya)
| [(former Coordinator for Counterterrorism)

Foreign Services
Officials from various foreign services, potentially including officials
from the I
~

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