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Progress in Human Geography 23,4 (1999) pp.

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On fatal flaws and fatal distractions


David Harvey
Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, Johns Hopkins University, 3400 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA

Each generation cultivates its particular set of intellectual heroines and heroes. It would be churlish of me to begrudge the younger generation their choice of such figures. Did I not construct Marx in such a role? And while there is a certain lemming-like fashionability these days in the rush to embrace the likes of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Butler, Lacan et al., it would be equally churlish of me to suggest that there is nothing to be gained from the study of such eminent thinkers. Jones complains in his commentary on Justice, nature and the geography of difference (JNGD) that I have acquired only a superficial understanding of his preferred heroes (Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari). In this he is quite correct. He then goes on to suggest that if I had taken as much trouble as he has to understand them I would not have written the book I did. Which in a way is also quite correct (though it does invite the riposte that if he had read this Marx more thoroughly he would not have written the piece he did either). But Jones takes it further. He purports to show that my framework for historical geographical materialism is fatally flawed and that I am unable to develop the flexible and creative concepts needed to interpret the world. And this because I have read the wrong rather than the right stuff. The only way to save me from the fatal flaws and the inflexible and uncreative concepts that litter JNGD is, I am told, to banish my Marx to the shadows and consult Joness icons instead (some of whom want to keep the spirit of Marxism alive while letting the material body go). Now there is something odd about this rush to bury JNGD as fatally flawed and there is something even odder about the manner of the interrment. The oddity lies in this. To my undoubtedly superficial knowledge, the authors he cites would never presume to dismiss the works of others in such judgemental terms. I cannot recall Derrida ever using terms like fatally flawed. It would be quite uncharacteristic of him to exercise such startling judgements. Derridas technique, as I understand it, is to study a text carefully, exhume its innumerable traces and expose its presences and absences, and thereby provide a quite different reading of the text (even turning it against itself) from that which seems on the surface to be the authors intent. Jones insists that
Arnold 1999 03091325(99)PH262RA

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Derrida, among others, has the answers. But he produces an essay that violates Derridas method to advance a conclusion that Derrida could never come to. Joness way of exposing my fatal flaws is interesting to behold. Not once does he actually substantiate his arguments. He merely asserts them in different contexts. He builds a case that begins with words like problematic and insufficient and then shifts gear into inadequate before delivering the final judgement of fatally flawed. This is the genteel academic version of what is more vulgarly known as the big lie. Assert a calumny a sufficient number of times in enough places and someone somewhere will start to believe it. And pretty soon it gets cited over and over as definitive proof (as Jones (1999) shows . . .). And so it goes, as Vonnegut would say. But consider how he deals with my fatally flawed version of the dialectic. After a somewhat lengthy summary of my argument (Derrida would never write this sort of thing) he asserts its fatal flaws by invoking Derridas deconstruction of Hegel. But Derridas way of turning Hegel against himself (which is quite different from saying Hegel is fatally flawed) can only apply to me if (a) Marx parroted Hegel and (b) I either parroted Marx or provided a strict Hegelian reading of Marx. Most serious scholars of Marx would now agree with Althusser that Marx revolutionized the Hegelian dialectic in which case Derridas deconstruction of Hegel would apply only if the trace of Hegel remained so strong in both Marx and myself to warrant carrying Derridas deconstruction over. This requires that the trace of Hegel be exhumed from JNGD for study. Jones nowhere attempts this. Instead he merely asserts that Derridas thought undermines Harveys position because it calls into question the validity of dialectical thinking and that Derridas deconstruction of Hegel has comparable force when applied to Harveys Marxist-based approach. But the oddity gets even odder because my own reading of Marxs dialectic is, at least on the surface, very un-Hegelian. As Jones acknowledges, in addition to Marx, figures such as Ollman, Bohm, and Levins and Lewontin have a prominent place in my version. For some reason Jones ignores the significance of Leibniz (from whom the theory of internal relations largely derives) and Whitehead, probably because they dont quite fit with his desire to put everything into the post mode (or maybe it has to do with Deleuzes admiration for Leibniz). In any case, Hegel is scarcely to be found in my account. Whitehead, whom I frequently rely upon for clarification, confessed he could never read more than four pages of Hegel without laying him aside (I tend to sympathize). Most of the other authors pay little mind to Hegel. They link their thinking to a more process-based philosophy. My conception of the dialectic is rather far from that of Hegel. It has to be, because Hegel could not be dialectical about space in the ways that Leibniz and Whitehead could. Derridas deconstruction of Hegel (even presuming its cogency) bears little or no relation to the arguments I advanced. It most certainly cannot be used to prove my version of the dialectic is fatally flawed. The only way in which it could be so construed is if all forms of the dialectic (and these are many and multiple as Jones admits) are brought under Derridas specific deconstruction of Hegal (interpreted in terms of fatal flaws). Jones actually seems to make this extraordinary claim which would eradicate as fatally flawed the thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Husserl and the whole tradition of continental philosophy including that of Derrida himself. For Derrida is a dialectician of the highest order. So are (were) Deleuze and Guattari. While we may enjoy the paradox of Derrida deconstructing himself through Hegel, I doubt that this is what is intended (though if

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deconstruction is understood as learning from rather than demolition then this would indeed be a way for Derrida to learn from his indebtedness to Hegel). What is actually being attacked here is a particular kind of dialectic based in a particular way of handling binaries. Now it is fashionable these days to decry the power of binary thinking (even though it still remains fundamental to most forms of scientific inquiry). And, plainly, it has its limitations even though I would make the strong argument that it is both impossible and unwise to try to abandon it (Joness article is littered with binaries if anyone cares to look very hard, including the binary implied in the phrase fatally flawed and in the title against). The intent of my process-based account of the dialectic is to avoid too many oversimplifying binaries (with the exception of the processthing distinction which is quite crucial and which I would avidly defend). The savvy reader will note, however, the crude transition Jones makes from my argument (cited by him) that the way to think differently is to rub together conceptual blocks in such a way that they catch fire to his representation of my argument that it is the interaction between two categories or concepts in some form of binarily opposed relationship that constitutes the core of dialectical approaches to new concept formation. Very odd, is it not, that someone so dedicated on the surface to antireductionism can reduce my dialectics (indeed, all dialectics as it turns out) to a matter of simply binary oppositions? Even odder, when we get to the end, where the whole Marxist tradition gets reduced to a binary opposition between two Marxisms that of the radical spirit which Jones (pace Derrida) wishes to preserve and that of dialectical materialism which Jones (pace Derrida) wishes to abandon. In American academic circles we call this kind of thing sophomoric argument and I am quite amazed that the geographical luminaries who apparently read this piece with approval (Thrift, McDowell, Kearns, Corbridge, four referees who sensibly guard their anonymity and the whole editorial board of PIHG) did not care to save Jones from it. But there are more sophistries to come. Jones, having argued along with Derrida that there is nothing outside the text and that it is only possible to criticize existing institutions from within an inherited language (his emphasis) suggests my dialectical materialism fails because it remains firmly within the western tradition of thought (my emphasis). Of course he adds that it is only that western tradition which Derrida criticizes which counts (Derrida necessarily being within the tradition too). And again, it is that tradition in which concepts have been produced through a historical process of binary synthesis that is singled out for criticism. That is the tradition within which I am supposedly exclusively situated. Reduced to mere binaries, of course, the whole western tradition (like Joness conclusion) can easily be found wanting. But the western tradition is much more than that (read Leibniz and Whitehead). Furthermore, there are different ways to understand binaries in dialectics. Kierkegaards rejection of Hegel focused on the latters insistence upon a bothand transcendence (it is the transcendence that is largely the object of Derridas critique) rather than the existential binary of eitheror choice which is just as dialectical (if rather more uncomfortably so). Of course, Derrida is well known for being so fearful of eitheror that he produces reams of convoluted argument over matters that in practice have all the simplicity of deciding whether or not to jump out of the way of an on-coming bus. Derrida is quite right, however, to argue for some kind of internal distancing and I am glad that some are now learning how to do that from him. I learned my version of

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it by a careful reading of Marxs deconstruction (if I dare to use that term) of classical political economy which is precisely such an exercise in internal distancing (I recommend it to anyone who cares to take a careful look). What JNGD seeks to do is to rework and perhaps revolutionize concepts from within a long tradition of thought. Internal distancing rather than spurious external critique is its method. By emphasizing thinkers such as Whitehead and Leibniz and reconnecting a relational notion of dialectics to Marx, it permits, for example, a dialectical theorization of space-time (as opposed to the Hegelian pure temporality). Jones, of course, ignores this angle to JNGD altogether. He argues that there is a vague epistemological fetishization of space hovering over human geography in general and that my geographical theory in particular is restricted by its spatial ontology that imposes limitations by prioritizing the spatial in its conception of social life. When he returns to this issue, however, it is Soja and not me who gets criticized. Two whole chapters on the topic of the social construction of space-time in JNGD gets completely ignored. Had he bothered to read them in even superficial fashion he would know that I in no way prioritize the spatial (it is a contingent category along with time, as he correctly regurgitates, apparently without thinking about it, in his account of my version of dialectics). Furthermore, the arbitrariness of his own proposal to understand the world as incorporating at least three ontological fields: space, time and social practice is hardly a stirring example of any struggle to create flexible and creative categories. It is a reassertion of the very traditional fetishizations he criticizes. It has a positively Newtonian ring (Leibniz would object). I would put my flexible and creative reconceptualizations of the internal relations between space, time and process up against his wooden and old-fashioned ontology any day. The tragi-comedy of Joness piece is the way it falls into the pit of its own binarymaking. All modernism (including Marx) is depicted as rigid, stable and by implication stultified compared to the fluidity and creativity of postmodernism (I actually thought modernism was about everything solid always melting into air, but no matter). Everything in JNGD is represented in binary terms in order to facilitate easy deconstruction of binary thinking. Everything gets reduced in order to sustain an anti-reductionism. Everything gets essentialized (including something called post-Marxism) in order to proclaim the virtues of anti-essentialism. The piece is itself so fatally flawed (not being a Derrida acolyte I can cheerfully venture such a judgement) that it becomes impossible to discuss. The best I can do in relation to it is to give some grand-daddy advice to the younger generation as they pursue their aims (since that is my reluctant positionality these days: I hereby declare: I am not a post-Marxist but I am post-sixty). It is relatively easy in these times to introduce the thought of this or that great thinker into the loose amalgam of the discipline we call geography. This is so in part for the very laudable reason that the kind of repressive apparatus that tried in the 1960s to prevent Peter Haggett from presenting a regression coefficient at the RGS or Jim Blaut talking of imperialism before the AAG no longer exists (though Joness loose talk of fatal flaws reminds me how easy it might be to resurrect it). But it is also so for the less laudable reason that no one knows enough about the thought of this or that great thinker to tell the difference between serious and bowdlerized versions of the original. The fact that Joness evocation of Derrida passed muster with Thrift, McDowell, Kearns, Corbridge and four anonymous referees suggests that either lack even my superficial knowledge

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of Derridas work or that their understandings are of such extraordinary sophistication as to be totally beyond my ken. But once you have written your piece showing your paces and your abilities to write an exegesis of the thought in question, what do you do with it? This is the difficult part as you seek to apply the new thinking to the traditional subject-matter of geography and transform the latter in solid and meaningful ways. This is hard work. It took me many years to get Marx aligned with geography and I still have to work hard at it (and dont always succeed). I have seen many magisterial readings of Foucault, Derrida, Butler, Bakhtin or whomever, followed by quite banal and traditional geographical work that could just as easily be done without nary a mention of such thinkers. In his rewrite of the Hamlet North Carolina case Jones makes no use of Derrida, Foucault or Deleuze and Guattari though he did try to articulate a different positionality for explication and political action (on which more anon). The general point, however, is this: the acid test of importation of new thinking comes with the active transformation of geographical thought and practices. Since I do not underestimate the difficulty (I have lived it for far too long) I do not expect quick results. I do not therefore dismiss the current wave of importations because they have not yet produced the necessary results. But I do insist that judgement on their relevance must be withheld until such results materialize. Far more attention must be paid to this task than is currently the case (most seriously committed students I know who have gone through this complain at how hard it is to make the link: they know only too well what I am talking about). But then comes the most difficult step of all: to take the transformed geographical thought back into the world from whence the new ideas come and try to transform that intellectual world in the light of explorations on the terrain of geography. I have found it far easier (intellectually) to bring Marxism into geography than to transform geography into a kind of Marxism and far easier to do the latter than to take the transformed geography back into Marxism in general (a struggle that I sometimes despair of inspite of certain inroads). Feminist and postcolonial geographers will doubtless empathize with the general problem. JNGD records an important moment (at least for me) in that process. It is, as I have argued elsewhere (Harvey, 1998), a very traditional geographical book. It records how Marxism must be transformed to deal with questions of space, place and environment. This, rather than some answer to the postmodernists, is the core of its reasoning. It also attempts to project those transformations back into the world of Marxism in particular and social and literary theory more generally. It is a text that has its flaws (some of them quite charming but none of them particularly fatal) and open ends, a text of possibilities rather than of certainties. Its tentative qualities and lack of closure contrast with many of my earlier works (and several reviewers have complained about that, which makes it peculiar that Jones wants to represent it as so closed). This lack of closure occurs precisely because the geography is less restrained by the Marxism and the transformative possibilities of geographical thinking of Marxism (and social theory) are more clearly articulated. A lot can be learned, I submit, about the potentialities and possibilities for geographical thought in relation to social and literary theory as well as in relation to the life world around us by careful study of JNGD. It is, I insist, a very geographical book. It is, however, a sad commentary on the state of affairs within the field of geography itself that hardly anyone cares to situate it so. Reviewers in geographical journals have

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generally ignored the issue, which says a lot about their situatedness. Progressive thinkers are, it seems, so fatally distracted with cultivating their imported thoughts that they can pay no mind to their geographical heritage. I take Linda McDowells (1998) bizarre request that I write yet another book explaining what JNGD has to do with geography as an indicator of the pathetic lows to which geographical sensibilities have now drifted. Which is a pity, since, as I have argued elsewhere (Harvey, 1998), now is the moment when geography has an incredible amount to offer to a world in the full course of some pretty startling changes. We do need flexible and creative concepts as Jones most laudably argues. We also need a better way to produce them within as well as from without our own bailiwick. But we cannot do so out of nothing nor can we do so without engaging with political and intellectual commitments and passions that speak to the times. I wonder, then, about the kind of politics that lies behind the urge to bury JNGD as fatally flawed. Corbridge (1998), in his extended and seriously engaged review of JNGD, at least made no bones about the fact that it was political perspective rather than intellectual content that lay at the centre of his disagreements. Which in a way is fair enough. But there is always an odd dialogue between political and intellectual reasoning (they are not simple binaries either!) and Jones evidently thought he had found a convenient intellectual way to wave JNGD judgementally away as fatally flawed. This seems to have had sufficiently powerful political appeal to his geographical mentors and luminaries to cloud their judgement. That this is so does not surprise me. For I do have the impression from afar that there seems to be settling over progressive British geography a sort of mildly guilt-ridden cloud of have your cake and eat it Giddensian Blairism. It says, yes we must show compassion for all the poor (though Jones apparently needed Corbridge to remind him of the point) and yes we must pursue institutional reforms but please no revolutionary or upsetting rhetoric here that goes after the fundamental structural forces that are blasting societies apart from Russia to Indonesia and from Baltimore to Bangkok. Give us contextual theories that touch lightly on a world that is in the full flood of extraordinary change (sounds like a cover to go back to casual empiricism to me). The traces of such distanced engagements are easy enough to exhume. The inordinate amount of ink spilled in response to the ten pages in JNGD dealing with Hamlet, North Carolina (to which Jones strives to add his supposedly alternative and redemptive thoughts) makes me think I hit a raw nerve of guilty feelings (methinks they all protest a bit too much as I put in my Annals response). Jones provides wonderful examples of cake and eat it criticism too. He is against my dialectics (but then that is not really quite true). JNGD is fatally flawed (but there is much that is good and wonderful about it). My sensible and politically empowering recommendations with respect to Hamlet are arrived at in spite of my ill-scrutinized concepts. And so it goes. It is convenient and doubtless comforting, in the face of current economic turmoil (and in the light of the appalling information now emerging as to conditions of labour and environmental degradation around the world), to rule out old-time categories like capital and labour as far too simplistic for our outrageously complicated theorizations. It goes down even better to fantasize that capitalism does not exist (except in our minds). I only hope that as the postmodern band plays on, the Titanic does not do anything as inconsiderate as founder. Unsinkable and indestructible they called that

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fated ship. As late as the summer of 1997 that was what they were saying about capitalism. But now look at the mess. Even postmodernist academics have pensions. I sincerely hope (in part out of naked self-interest) that no binaries erupt to stand in the way of their collection. But then maybe we can take comfort in the idea that our radical spirit might live on long after our material bodies have been consumed by the sharks. References
Corbridge, S. 1998: Reading David Harvey: entries, voices, loyalties, Antipode 30, 4355. Harvey, D. 1998: The Humboldt connexion. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 88, 72330. Jones, A. 1999: Dialectics and difference: against Harveys dialectical post-Marxism. Progress in Human Geography 23, 52955. McDowell, L. 1998: Some academic and political implications of Justice, nature and the geography of difference. Antipode 30, 35.

Notes from the deck of the postmodern Titanic : a response to David Harvey
Andrew Jones

The problem with David Harveys Justice, nature and the geography of difference (JNGD), as a number of its reviewers have expressed, is that it is not so much one book as many (cf. Eagleton, 1997; Fainstein, 1998; Young, 1998). It deals in a vast array of philosophical, theoretical and politicized ideas to a degree that any critical engagement with it must confront the necessity of limiting its scope. This fact is I think central to the flaws in both my original article critiquing Harveys dialectical historical-materialism, and in his subsequent response. In his lengthy critical response to my article, Harvey raises a considerable number of points, some more important than others. There are, I think, four major criticisms which require an extended response, and I will turn to these shortly. However, there are also a range of points which I suggest are designed to dismiss my arguments out of hand, relying on turns of rhetoric to achieve their affect. For example, the response is littered with diminutive or trivializing comments arguing I am criticizing his approach because [he] has read the wrong rather than the right stuff, or that my implementation

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of some of the insights produced from Derridas work means that I am some kind of Derridean acolyte. These are clever textual devices which I cannot, as space is limited, address one by one. Indeed, much of Harveys response is concerned to point to the flaws which arise from misrepresentation, omissions and possible connotations within argument: some of which are valid and some of which are unjustified. In particular, Harvey suggests that in using Derrida I write something which he would never have written. This is misplaced as I had no intention of doggedly adopting a Derridean stance which itself has been criticized at length as leaving little scope for the construction of politically engaged theory (cf. Norris, 1993; Beardsworth, 1996). Nor do I suggest that Harvey alone is problematically situated in the western tradition, or that there is only one way to understand dialectics, or that I am in some way essentializing post-Marxism, or that I am fitting everything into the post- mode . And so it goes, as Harvey might say. Rather, I will concentrate here on the more developed and salient criticisms which Harvey elaborates in amongst his persuasive writing. First and foremost of these, there is Harveys vituperative response to my suggestion that his dialectical materialism relies on the interaction of problematic black-box binarily opposed categories. In considering this, I realized that my continuing discomfort with Harveys recurrent call for a reconstructed, postmodernized Marxism rests not so much on the philosophical discussion of Althusser or Whiteheads dialectical ontology, as with the practical implementation of dialectical thinking in the way he constructs politicized theory. Harvey accuses me of making an extraordinary claim which would irradicate as fatally flawed the thought of a range of continental philosophy. Such a point requires a response, primarily because I have no such intention. Now I am not in the business of beginning to argue that Harvey is somehow pervasively wrong, nor have I argued or will I argue that his work is fatally flawed in some universalizing fashion. My focus was much more specific than that. What I am seeking to criticize, and indeed what I am arguing is fatally flawed (or at least an unproductive starting point for the production of politically-engaged theory), is the implementation of Harveys specific brand of dialectical thought in JNGD. The article is centrally concerned with the way in which Harveys desire for politically engaged theory is produced through his interpretation of dialectical thinking. He complains that I make a crude transition from his argument concerning the rubbing together of conceptual blocks in such a way that they catch fire to a representation of his argument as relying on a crude interaction of conceptual categories in some form of binarily opposed relationship. This is fair comment to a degree, because the article fails to account for the differences between the way dialectics is discussed at the philosophical level, and the way it becomes implemented in the discussion of politically engaged theory. But I think that in this implementation, for all the preceding discussion of contingent relations, the latter chapters of the book deal in the same, wooden, often binarily opposed concepts. Thus we confront the issue of JNGD being a book of disjunctive elements. In fact, it represents an amalgamation of Harveys writing over some time, and as such I think contains much which is contradictory and this is particularly true of his use of dialectics. Whilst Harvey examines at length the fluidity of Whiteheads dialectical framework, at the end of the day, when it comes to consider whichever case studies

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Harvey turns to, we are still confronted with familiar, binarily opposed concepts and categories. And that is true as much as in the overanalysed Hamlet chicken-factory fire as in Harveys assertion that environmental theory requires a similar reinsertion of the dialectical relation between nature and society (Harvey, 1996: 184). In asserting that human beings, like all other organisms, are active subjects transforming nature according to its laws, Harvey remains firmly trapped in a naturesociety binary division which is increasingly being lamented by a growing (and already substantial) literature (e.g., Haraway, 1991; Gare, 1995; Latour, 1995; 1996). His second key criticism is that my article falls into the pit of its own binary-making, and this is a significant issue which needs addressing. The point that I sought to make, in hindsight perhaps not sufficiently well developed in the article, was not that all binaries are bad per se in some form of ontological knee-jerk reaction, but that the actual epistemology/post-Marxian theory developed by Harvey is. Indeed binary oppositions are pervasive in western thought, although there may be ways to address the growing number of limitations they present to creative thinking (Latour, 1995). Consequently, to criticize the article for making use of binary terminology at the rhetorical level has limited force. In retrospect, my primary concern should have been with the limitations of the way dialectical thinking is implemented (or perhaps not sufficiently implemented) by Harvey in his form of post-Marxism. If Althusserian (and Whiteheads) dialectical thought is based around flexibility and fluidity in a way that Hegelian dialectics does not incorporate, then I would argue that Harveys actually existing post-Marxist stance is not. Thirdly, Harvey suggests that I merely assert the flaws of his dialectical thought, rather than substantiating it. This seems a remarkable response given that the article works through the argument, substantiating it through a discussion of the Hamlet case. As I have intimated in this response, a similar approach might have equally been employed in considering his arguments about the dialectics of naturesociety. His fourth major point, however, indicates the limitations of my suggestion for a move towards what I termed contextual theories. Whilst the criticism of an epistemological fetishization of space would have been better directed at others rather than Harvey, what remains is the inconsistent nature of JNGD as a book. For as Demeritt (1998) suggests in his review, the philosophical aspects to the book remain distanced from the engaged theory. Whilst Harvey might be right to argue that an ontology of three fields (space, time and social practice) remains unstirring, in the end his own considerations of space-time as contingent relations seem not to feed into discussions of engaged theory where he continues to adhere to the same, familiar concepts. For example, in criticizing the contemporary emphasis on the local (Harvey, 1996: 353), he suggests that this emphasis totally erases others and thereby truncates rather than emancipates the field of political engagement and action (1996: 353). He goes on to assert that we can never ever be purely local beings and that while membership in one sort of premanence defined at a given scale may be more important to each of us than others such identifications . . . are rarely so singular. There is no consideration of what the local means, how it is constructed, how this concept might or might not be useful. There is no sense here of the fluidity of space-time as discussed earlier in the book. Clearly, both my critique and a contextual approach need to be developed to overcome the flaws of my earlier arguments. However, what Harveys response does not do is convince me that his dialectical materialism is all he purports it to be. It misses

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the point of my critique to jibe that postmodernist might fantasize that capitalism does not exist. The whole issue is that I think there is a pressing need to produce more practical theories of political action. Perhaps Althusserian dialectical fluidity does enable much greater scope for the development of flexible concepts to provide the basis for politically engaged theory, but my feeling is that this has more to do with the fluidity than the dialectical element. If geographers are to be listened to at all (and presumably this at least is an objective which David Harvey shares with me), then I would still argue strongly that it is problematic to continue to implement a dialectical postMarxism whose concepts seem increasingly old-fashioned and wooden when put through their paces in the real world. References
Beardsworth, R. 1996: Derrida and the political. London: Routledge. Demeritt, D. 1998: Review of Justice, nature and the geography of difference. Transactions, the Institute of British Geographers 23, 28486. Eagleton, T. 1997: Spaced out. London Review of Books 19, 2223. Fainstein, S. 1998: Review of Justice, nature and the geography of difference. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 22, 33941. Gare, A. 1995: Postmodernism and the environmental crisis. London: Routledge. Haraway, D. 1991: Simians, cyborgs and women: the reinvention of nature. London: Free Association Books. Harvey, D. 1996: Justice, nature and the geography of difference. Oxford: Blackwell. Latour, B. 1995: We have never been modern. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1996: Aramais, or the love of technology. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Norris, C. 1993: The truth about postmodernism. Oxford: Blackwell. Young, I.M. 1998: Harveys complaint with race and gender struggles. Antipode 30, 3642.