UNESCO, LNCV & USPID - Nuclearization of South Asia 20-22 May 1999, City Hall, Como

Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China

Joseph Cirincione
Director, Non-Proliferation Project
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC
joseph@ceip.org

Indian officials believe there are many reasons for developing and deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles,
apart from domestic political considerations. The missiles would provide a deterrent to the use of nuclear
weapons by either Pakistan or China; the weapons would symbolize India’s status as a great nation; and,
possibly, missiles could become an export commodity that will both generate income and break what India
regards as an unfair missile technology monopoly. If India’s deployments proceed as envisioned the fleet may
also become the stimulus for a dangerous arms race in the region with global consequences.

Origins of the Indian Missile Programs

India has slowly developed its missile program over the past four decades largely by its own efforts. The
program began, however, with the extensive cooperation of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) in the 1960s. India also benefited from imports and assistance provided by Britain,
France, West Germany and the former Soviet Union.

India’s ballistic missile program grew directly from its civilian satellite program. In 1969, the Indian
government founded the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). The use of U.S.-supplied Scout sounding
rockets gave Indian scientists familiarity with solid-rocket propulsion systems. Intended for launching payloads
into sub-orbit or low-orbit configurations, the Scout is easily adaptable as a short-range missile with a limited
payload. The Scout was the basis for India’s first space-launch vehicle, the SLV-3, which successfully orbited
its first satellite on July 18, 1980.

The Indian space program continued to develop through the decades with the introduction of the
Augmented SLV in the late eighties and early nineties. Most recently the ISRO has developed the Polar SLV.
This launcher demonstrated the basic technologies needed for an intercontinental ballistic missile and was built
from technology and experience gained from the SLV and the ASLV.

Links to the Ballistic Missile Program

As one expert assessment concludes, “the link between space launch activities and ballistic missile
developments is clearer in the case of India [than in any other nation].”1 The Department of Defense notes that
“the space program supports New Delhi’s missile efforts through shared research, development and production
facilities.”2 The first direct cross over of technology occurred in the design and development of the Agni.
Begun in 1979, as India was launching it first SLV-3, the Agni eventually became a two-stage rocket utilizing
the SLV-3 as its first stage.

Recent speculation has centered on India’s potential to develop a long range IRBM and possibly an
ICBM. Defense Minister George Fernandes on May 11, 1999, denied any government plans to develop the
Agni-III, which he termed an ICBM. If a project to develop an IRBM were to exist it would likely rely on the
propulsion technology derived from the civilian space program’s Polar SLV. With a range of 3500 km and the

1
Strategic Defense Initiative Advisory Committee, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation – An Emerging Threat,” System
Planning Corporation, Arlington, 1992, p.27
2
Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” November 1997, p.20

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J. Cirincione Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China

capability to carry nuclear warheads it would play a major role in achieving India’s goal of minimum
deterrence.

The Indian ICBM (Surya/Agni-IV) program has reportedly been underway since 1994. Using a
combination of cryogenic technology developed indigenously at the Trivandrum Center’s laboratories
andtechnology from the, as yet, untested Geostationary SLV, the ICBM’s range would be 8,000 to 12,000 km.
The recent delivery of cryogenic boosters from Russia has helped India’s scientists in their efforts to master the
technology that helped lift the first American, Russia and Chinese ICBMs.

The development of the shorter-range Prithvi actually began after the Agni. A liquid-fuel, road-mobile
missile, the Prithvi program began in 1983 and was first test-fired in 1988. Although it relies on foreign
technologies for its propulsion and guidance systems, the Prithvi is purely Indian in design and development.
As Aaron Karp notes, “In essence, India has re-invented the Scud.”3 The Prithvi is the only ballistic missile
currently deployed by India. The 333rd Regiment with between 20 and 50 Prithvi missiles was originally
deployed near the Pakistan border at Jalandhar but has recently been moved back to a base in Secundrabad.
The Army version, the Prithvi I has a range of about 150 km while the Air Force version, or Prithvi II, extends
out to 250 km. Most recently, a new ship-launched, 350 km range version of the missile, called the Dhanush,
was to begin flight tests in December 1998, but it has yet to appear.

3
Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, The Politics and Technics, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p.121.

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J. Cirincione Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China

India’s Prithvi Class Ballistic Missile

Type First Tested/ Nuclear Range (km)/

Status Warhead Payload (kg) Technological
Capability Characteristics Comments

Prithvi Feb 1988/ Yes 150/1000 Single stage, liquid 1994 Army ordered 75 of which 20-50 have been delivered
(Army) Deployed 1995 fuel, road mobile, to the 333rd Regiment now in Secundrabad after having been
inertial guidance moved from Jalandhar, 80 miles from Lahore.

Prithvi II Feb 1996/ Yes 250/500 Single stage, liquid 1994 Airforce ordered 25
(Airforce) In Production fuel, road mobile,
inertial guidance

Prithvi III Development/D ? 350?/500? ? Untested, sea launched missile

(Dhanush) eployment by
(Navy) 2001

Sagarika /2010SLBM Yes 300?/500? Single stage, liquid India has denied the existence of any such project and Russia
fuel, underwater has denied helping India develop such a weapon
launch capability

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J. Cirincione Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China

India’s Agni Class Ballistic Missile

Type First Tested/ Nuclear Range (km)/

Status Warhead Payload (kg) Technological
Capability Characteristics Comments

Agni May 1989/ Yes 2500/1000 Two stage, first Described as a ‘technology demonstrator’. Tested to a range
Ready for stage solid fuel of 1400km. Two-stage missile – first stage booster motor
production second liquid from the SLV-3, second stage Prithvi

Agni II Apr 1999/- Yes 2500-3000 Two stage, solid Tested to a range of 2000km on 11th April 1999.
/1000 fuel, rail mobile,
inertial with
terminal guidance

Agni III ? Yes 3500 ? To be developed using PSLV technology

Sarya Under 8000?-12000? Combining recently delivered cryogenic technology and the
(Agni IV) development untested Geostationary SLV
since 1994

Sagarika /2010SLBM Yes 300?/500? Single stage, liquid India has denied the existence of any such project and Russia
fuel, underwater has denied helping India develop such a weapon
launch capability

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J. Cirincione Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China

Deployment Plans

The Prithvi was designed specifically for conventional use against Pakistani military formations. However, Dr. APJ
Abdul Kalam, the chief of the Indian Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), said after India’s
1998 nuclear tests that the missile could also be used with a nuclear payload.4 The Air Force has ordered 25 Prithvi
IIs, which would be the more likely version for potential nuclear deployments. To date, however, these deliveries
have not yet occurred and may be caught up in internal debates over nuclear deployment, command and control
issues.

Defence Minister Fernandes has made clear India’s intention to deploy nuclear ballistic missiles. Shortly
after the May nuclear tests, he said, “Without weaponization, this question of being a nuclear weapons state does not
make any sense. Nuclear weaponization is necessary, and in the ultimate analysis inevitable.”5 One of the Pokhran
tests is believed to have been a 45 kiloton explosion, testing a design for an Agni warhead.

On April 11, 1999, India resurrected the Agni test program after a 5-year hiatus with a dramatic 1400 km
test of an Agni II missile. Defence Minister Fernandes declared, “We have reached a point where no one, anywhere
can threaten us…We as a Government, first through the Pokhran tests and now, by operationalizing Agni, have
shown that no one can put pressures on us…”6 Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee emphasized in his statement
that India remain committed to a minimum deterrence posture and the no-first-use of nuclear weapons.7

Dr. Kalam said in April 15, 1999 interview with Brahma Chellaney, that the 2,000-3,000 km range Agni II
missile was “operationally ready” for deployment with a nuclear warhead. Kalam said that India had now emerged
as an independent missile power, capable of deterring threats from any regional adversary. He believes that Indian
technology had progressed so rapidly that it was no longer necessary to conduct multiple tests of the same missile
system.8

Consequences of Deployment

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, concludes,
“India’s nuclear policy since the early 1960s has been driven essentially by the China factor.”9 The government of
India details its position in a statement released by the official Press Information Bureau in April noting, “The
Pakistani threat is only a marginal factor in New Delhi’s security calculus. Agni is at the heart of deterrence in the
larger context of Sino-Indian equation.”

The statement elaborates:

“The acquisition of a missile system capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warhead bridges a key
gap in the nuclear deterrent profile of the country. The double distinction of being a nuclear-capable and
possessor of the means of delivery means that India can hold its head high without fear of being bullied in a
hostile security environment. China with its vast nuclear arsenal, Pakistan with its nuclear weapons and
delivery system capability, America perching in Diego Garcia and 11 other Asian countries possessing
missiles is quite a grim security scenario” 10

5
W.P.S. Sidhu, “India sees safety in nuclear triad and second strike potential,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1998, p. 24.
6
The Hindustan Times, “Fernandes supports N-weaponisation”, May 27, 1999 (from
http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/270598/detFro02.htm)
6
The Times of India, “Over 2,000 Km range Agni-II successfully test-fired”, April 12, 1999 (from
www.times.ofindia.com/120499/12home1.htm)
7
ibid
8
Hindustan Times, “Agni-II ready to carry N-warhead”, April 15, 1999 (from
www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/120499/detfro01.htm)
9
Jasjit Singh, Editor, Nuclear India, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 1998, p. 6.
10
Obtained from the Press Information Bureau, Government of India at www.nic.in:80/India-Image/PIB/f2304991.html

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J. Cirincione Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China

However, the Indian government’s statement, while boasting of the achievement (“it signifies the country’s
glorious entry into the select club of the nuclear nations possessing an indigenous capacity to develop a missile
system.”) also tries to allay fears of imminent deployment (“India has no desire towards Agni II’s production
schedule, let alone any deployment designs.”)11

The various statements will likely be read differently by the two major powers monitoring Indian nuclear
developments. The United States will look on the bright side, hoping that its yearlong diplomatic efforts, having
failed to convince India to suspend missile tests, may yet convince India not to deploy nuclear weapons. China is
not likely to operate under the same illusion. It is highly unlikely that China will stand by while India edges towards
deployment of a missile force capable of striking deep into Chinese territory.

China did not react strongly to the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, but internally debate continues on the
proper military response to a nuclearizing South Asia. (p.47) Analyst Ming Zhang details the contending points of
view in a recent monograph from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China’s Changing Nuclear
Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests.

Zhang believes experts in the various civilian institutes, such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, argue for a moderate response to India’s nuclear
and missile tests. Many of these analysts do not believe that India’s tests, in and of themselves, pose a serious threat
to China’s national security. By most military measures, China enjoys superiority over India, they say, and it will
take years for India to develop its nuclear devices into usable weapons.12

By contrast, says Zhang, representatives of the military institutes such as the China Institute for
International Strategic Studies and the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center argue for at least
a moderate buildup of its nuclear forces. China’s deployment along the border with India has traditionally been
insufficient and the nuclear tests signal that India intends to create a significant new nuclear threat to China. If India
deploys weapons aimed at China, they conclude, China must respond with new deployments aimed at India.

If India does not deployment its Agni missiles and if U.S. and Japanese interest in deploying national or
theater missile defenses along China’s eastern shores remains just talk, China will likely continue with its current,
relatively modest plans to modernize its nuclear forces.

China’s Modernization Plans

China is slowly modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. Chinese doctrine is centered around the maintenance of a
“limited nuclear deterrent” capable of launching a retaliatory strike after an adversary’s nuclear attack.

Missile Forces.

China currently has the capability to strike U.S. cities with its force of approximately 20 long-range Dong Feng-5
missiles, each armed with a 4- to 5-megaton thermonuclear warhead. However, the preparation time for these liquid
fueled ICBMs, the lack of hardened missile silos, and a lack of mobility have raised some concern in the Chinese
leadership of the ability of these forces to survive a first strike. Additionally, its sea-based force (currently only one
Xia submarine armed with 12 medium-range ballistic missiles) does not pose a credible threat to either Moscow or
Washington. The Xia has never sailed outside China’s territorial waters and is considered vulnerable to modern anti-
submarine warfare techniques. By comparison, the United States maintains 5,500 strategic warheads on its land-
and sea-based missiles.

11
ibid
12
Ming Zhang, China’s Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1999, pp 46-47.
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J. Cirincione Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China

China has a range of nuclear-capable missiles with sufficient range to reach most of India. These include:

Designation Range (km) Number Deployed Warhead

DF-3 and -3A 2,650-2,800 50 3.3 MT
DF-4 4,750 20 3.3 MT
DF-21 and 21A 1,700-1,800 36 300 KT

Missiles launched from the Xia submarine could also strike Indian targets. China’s fleet of H-6 bombers also carries
120 air-dropped nuclear bombs with yields ranging from 10 kilotons to 3 megatons. With a range of 3,100 km,
these planes are technically capable of reaching all targets in India.

Probable Results of Chinese Force Modernization

By 2010, China hopes to have completed an upgrade of its forces. The planned improvements seem to be designed
with the United States in mind, assuring the survivability of a second-strike force with sufficient range to reach
targets in the continental United States. Only the DF-25 and possibly the planned submarine fleet would impact
India directly.

These plans include:

ICBMs

The replacement of the aging force of DF-5's (and potentially the DF-4's) with two new missiles:

DF-31: a solid-fuel, road-mobile missile with an 8,000-km range. Though the missile has yet to be flight tested, the
engine has been tested several times since the 1980s and could be fielded as early as 2000 to 2002.

DF-41: a solid-fuel, road-mobile missile with a 12,000-km range. This missile is expected to be deployed near
2010, as the DF-5 leaves service. Some of the newer DF-5's may remain in service past this date. (Reports indicate
that 6 DF-5's were produced at Wanyuan in 1998 and that 2 more are expected before the closure of the production
facility.)

Exact deployment numbers are unknown, but some experts estimate that China could field between 50-70
MIRVed, solid-fueled ICBMs (DF-31s and DF-41s) by 2010, both mobile and in hardened silos, equipped with
various penetration aids to defeat missile defenses.

China may also be planning a DF-25 solid-fueled, road-mobile missile with an estimated 1700-km range
and a 2,000-kg payload. Reports on this program are sketchy and it may have been abandoned.

SLBMs

While China plans to deploy 4-6 of its second-generation submarines (the 09-4) it is likely that no more than three
will actually be deployed by 2010. Each submarine could be armed with 12 JL-2 SLBMs, with a range of 8,000 km
and potential MIRV capability. The JL-2 is based on the DF-31 missile and has been under development since the
1980s. China has experienced severe engineering problems with both its ballistic missile submarines and the
submarine-based missiles. It is quite possible that no new submarines will be successfully deployed over the next
ten years.

Strategic Bombers

The H-6 is China's current medium-range bomber. Based on the Soviet Tu-16 Badger of 1950s vintage, it has a
range of 3,000 km. While the Chinese air force flight-tested a more modern bomber, the H-7, in 1988, most experts
believe that it will not have a nuclear role and that only 20 will be built. It is unlikely that China will invest
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J. Cirincione Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China

substantial resources in it’s airborne nuclear capability unless it is able to purchase the T-22M Backfire from Russia
(although China is reportedly developing an air launched cruise missile).

China also purchased 26 Soviet-built Su-27 Flanker fighters from Russia in 1992, basing them at the Wuhu
airfield west of Shanghai. Although the Su-27 does have an air-to-ground capability there are no confirmed reports
of Chinese modifications to give these planes a nuclear role.13

Accelerated Chinese Deployments

Should Chinese concerns about their security situation substantially increase, and if military modernization were
given preference over economic modernization, China would likely increase the number of deployed systems and
warheads rather than embark on a crash program to produce new, more advanced systems than those cited above.

While the exact size of China’s fissile material stock is unknown, analysts estimate that China currently has
between 1 and 2 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and between 9 and 13.5 tons of highly enriched uranium in its
nuclear weapons. There may be an additional 2 to 6 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and between 15 and 25 tons
of highly enriched uranium available to produce between 300 and 1,000 additional warheads.

China could take a number of steps, including increasing deployments at existing sites, establishing new
deployments, producing new tactical nuclear weapons and possibly developing missile defenses.

China also has the option of expanding its force by establishing new missile bases. Several Indian officials
and experts claim, as Minister of Defence George Fernandes did in May 1998, that, “China has its nuclear weapons
stockpiled in Tibet along India’s borders.”14 This has never been corroborated by independent analysis and China
denies it. Some experts now believe that after the Indian nuclear tests, “it seems more likely that China will deploy
nuclear weapons in Tibet to strengthen its defense against India. At 4,000 meters above sea level and facing down
on India, the Tibetan plateau is ideal for weapons deployment.”15 However, this would entail substantial new
expenditures and the creation of a new brigade in the Second Artillery to man the base. China has been decreasing
the size of its armed forces over the past two decades and its six missile bases and the brigades assigned to each
have been relatively stable for the past 15-20 years. Creating a new base would seem to be the least attractive option
for China, and the debatable geographic advantage seems small consolation for the expense involved.

Conclusions: A Slow Motion Arms Race

A year after the test, says analyst Brahma Chellaney, “India is still unable to frame a clear political and defense
strategy based on nuclear weapons.”16 He is right. This has served India’s short-term political strategy as the slow
pace of the weapons programs, especially in contrast to the hectic May test series, and the ambiguous statements
from Indian leaders have reduced the global opprobrium. Other world crises have distracted attention from South
Asian nuclear and missile developments. The United States and other nations have been forced to drop sanctions
and abandon efforts to punish India for breaking international non-proliferation norms. But the lack of clear strategy
and planning has left India’s nuclear strategy subject to the pulls and pressures of domestic politics, program
timelines, and decisions made in Islamabad and Beijing. India drifts towards nuclear deployment.

India’s deployments will not take place in a vacuum. Pakistan and China will react. Pakistan’s tests of the
Ghauri missile indicate that nation’s willingness to match India test-for-test. Of more global importance, China will
react with its own missile tests and deployments, increasing tensions not just in South Asia but throughout the
continent and across the Pacific to the shores of the United States. If the United States reacts to increased
deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles with the deployment of theater and/or national missile defense
systems, as is likely, other nations may well conclude that the non-proliferation regime no longer serves their

13
William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, Joshua Handler, “Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1988,” Natural
Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C. 1998, p.48.
14
Zhang, p. 44
15
Zhang, p. 45.
16
Brahma Chellaney, “For India, the Big Nuclear Breakthrough Has Fizzled,” International Herald Tribune, May 13, 1999.
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interests. Nuclear options will be re-examined with new interest. Even the possibility that Japan might exercise its
missile or nuclear options could be sufficient to escalate tensions, rhetoric and programs to new heights.

While merely pursuing what it considers its national security interests, India’s deployment of nuclear
ballistic missiles may well light a fuse too hot to extinguish.