Irurozqui Political Leadership and Popular Consent Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899

Political Leadership and Popular Consent: Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899 Author(s): Marta Irurozqui Reviewed work(s): Source:
The Americas, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jan., 1997), pp. 395-423 Published by: Academy of American Franciscan History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1008031 . Accessed: 04/07/2012 19:43
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The Americas 53:3 January1997, 395-423 Copyrightby the Academy of American FranciscanHistory
POLITICALLEADERSHIPAND POPULAR CONSENT: PARTY STRATEGIESIN BOLIVIA, 1880-1899*
Constitutional,Democrat, and Conservative-encompasses the historical period from Bolivia's withdrawal from the Pacific War (1880), which saw a Peruvian-Bolivianalliance against Chile, to the outbreakof the FederalWarof 1899 betweenconservativesand liberals. Within this period of infighting lies the genesis of the Bolivian political party system. With the establishmentof a truce in 1880 between Chile and Bolivia, without which Bolivia would have had to definitively withdrawfrom the conflict and break its Peruvianalliance, two positions arose concerning a resolutionof the conflict: the continuation of the war or peace. These polar solutions adheredto the first ideological substratum of the Bolivian political it to define the various factions of the elite' in light parties, making possible of the new political restructuring and the role of the State. The initial partydifferenceswere due less to interestin Bolivia's national
ProjectPB94-0060 (DGICYT). The term "elite" designates a social group defined by its access to power and resulting from consensuses arrived at through its internalrivalries after each has resortedto employing, against the of the subordinated classes. It is partof a global concept dealing other, the supportand public aspirations with those social sectors that position themselves at the helms of the various hierarchiesof prestige, and reserves. When one speaks power, and property,and others that constitutea marginfor recruitment of the elite, one is making reference to a social group that, despite its heterogeneity, possesses a corporativeheritage that lends to its members a strong social and psychological cohesion. It does not constitutea monolithicentity that acts with internalconsensus and is, therefore,coordinatedin its mutual relations. Rather, among its factions there is mutual supportwhen common objectives arise relating to power. Its greatest weaknesses are personaland class competition. The constantnecessity to defend its activities, property,and social position against rival interestsin the local and regional spheres, obliges an elite to employ forced, political interventionat the nationallevel. In short, the term concerns various groupings of power that extend to all facets of the developmentprocess and that manage very diverse economic interests. * This study was carriedout under Research
The
governmentalera of the Bolivian conservative parties-
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PARTY STRATEGIESIN BOLIVIA
intra-eliterelationsvia clashes between those destiny than in reformulating those removed from and aspiringto power-all of which and holding power was taken up in the conservative-liberalrivalry. In brief, those who defended the war's renewal were not only the militaryand groups with commercial interestsin southernPeru, but also family clans with heterogeneous regional origins seeking to share the privileges of the southernoligarchy. Meanwhile those defending the peace were those groups of miners, landowners, and import-exportmerchantswith links to the Chilean economy. The former, the anti-Chile and anti-pacifistbloc, were later known as liberals, aligning themselves with Colonel Eliodoro Camacho, leader of the revolt againstGeneralDaza. The anti-pacifistasarranged themselves, under the title of conservatives, aroundAniceto Arce and GregorioPacheco, the principalowners of the silver mines, and MarianoBaptista, lawyer for and shareholderof various mining firms. One cannot make a strictly regional division in describing the contention between conservatives and liberals. The two consisted of contradictions: sectors with links to the postwar modernization process combined with those who profited from the caudillista domination that had prevailed since the country's independence. It was a battle between those who controlledthe means of production,who saw in the partysystem a mechanismfor seizing political power and a guaranteeof their legitimacy as the dominantgroup, and those to whom the instabilityof the caudillistaregime had given hopes of social ascent and restructuring. A conflict had begun between those possessing the power and those aspiringto it within the elite-a conflict channeledthroughthe political parties. Given that the conquest of centralpower-expressed by the demandfor the traditionalrepresentativesystem of democracy and embodied in the republicanelectoral system adoptedby the Constitutionof October 18392was one of the objectives of the Bolivian elite, this work tackles the party problems, taking into accountthe motives behind the alliances between the various political parties. The result is a reconfigurationof the manner in which the differences, contents, andpracticesof the partywere inventedand discursivelyconstructed.This propositionassumesthatthe issues alludedto will be discussed with the absence of social and professional differences, includingplatformdifferences,between the Bolivian parties.Their apparent ideological distinctionsrespondedto the elite's need to groupthemselves in distinct bands so as to define the internalredistribution of its privileges and competitions, while simultaneously regulating popular participation, as much in theirfuturedesigns for the nationas in theirown class restructuring.
2
Ramiro CondarcoMorales, Aniceto Arce (La Paz: Ed. Amerindia, 1985), p. 429.
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To avoid the same pace of social mobility of the caudillista period, it became necessary to reduce opportunitiesfor social ascent throughthe poof the litical partysystem. This was done in two ways. First, representatives conservative parties developed a strategy designed to limit the liberals' electoral successes. The most prominentmembersof the silver-miningfaction divided themselves in two, and both factions sought to reach separate agreementswith the oppositionLiberalParty.They hoped thus to neutralize its capacity to obtain a large margin of votes. Whateverthe results of the balloting, however, the partyin power always was influencedby a sector of the mining elite. Moreover, the opposition as well as the winning party maintainedsimilarpolitical directionsand objectives, somethingthat would have not occurredif the Democrats and Constitutionalshad come together against the Liberals. Second, the conservatives' clash with the Liberal Party generateda discourse in opposition to "el absolutismo de las masas populares" and the "revoluci6n desde abajo," necessitatingthe presence of the popularsector for defining which faction of the elite garneredhegemony. This sector was a valuable instrumentfor the partycontendersin negotiatingand acquiring political power, as well as legitimizing their candidatesas national representatives of the "people's" opinion. The elite group that monopolized popularconsensus won a means for pressuringthe others, althoughthis did not translateinto recognition of the subordinategroup's right to political interventionor citizenship. The subordinated groupwas consideredessential when it favoredthe internalfunctioningsof the elite, but it was pushed aside as soon as it presenteddemands questioning its lack of real public representation and participation.The less-privileged classes contributedto the elite restructuringand, consequently, to their own marginalizationin the course of theirrole as involuntary arbitrators of the conflict. Such arbitration transformedthe rural and urban masses into a source of support that the variousfactions of the elite used to threatenand compel theiropponents-if not through an outright defeat then throughnegotiation-into sharing the privileges of power. This attitudewas summedup in publicationsand parliamentaryand news column debates that made the expansion of suffrage and the education of the popularclasses the impetus for a universal, "civilized" movement directed towards abolishing authoritarianism and economic backwardness.As those objectives were being limited to educational and militaryreforms, theiractualmanifestation always remainedin question due as much to the political exclusion of the subordinatedclasses, whose
majority was represented by the Indians, as to the contempt raised against these classes when their votes were needed.
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Of the two forms of regulatingthe political scenario, this study concentrates on the latter, articulatedin anti-militarist,anti-oligarchic,antiperuanos, and anticaudillistasdiscourses with origins in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). These allow one to distinguish the various factions of the divided and contentiouselite, as well as to establish the ideological sustenance thateach partydeveloped to confirmitself and face up to the electoral competition. Political discourse receives great attentionbecause it can provide an avenue for understanding the prioritiesand necessities of the elite, and, specifically, the pacetia elite, who prevailedregionally after the Federal Warof 1899. At the same time, I contendthatthe principalcontribution of the conservatives to the internalrestructuring of the Bolivian elite between 1880 and 1899 was theirrole in regulatingsocial mobility, which the instability of the caudillistaregime had made inordinate. Andeanhistoriography of Ecuador,Peruand Bolivia) has (in its treatment in the past marginalizedthe role of political parties.The excessive zeal with which Marxistdependencymodels are employed has resultedin the linking of political and cultural themes of the elite with intellectually reactionary positions.3With some exceptions, the majorityof these positions tackles the question from an institutionaland narrativeperspectivethat, though essential, says very little about the internallogic of the political phenomenon.4 Despite this, there have recently appearednew focuses that make the study of political sociability a centraltheme. Although investigationof late nineteenth century poltical party dynamics in Latin America in general is also recent, there do exist importantstudies that tie its developmentas much to the daily practicesof clientelismoand patronage5 as to generationalconflicts in and, periodsof political agitation,with violence andelectoralcorruption.6
3 Jorge Basadre, Elecciones y centralismoen el Perti. (apuntespara un esquema hist6rico), (Lima: Centro de Investigaci6n de la Universidad del Paciffico 1980); Herbert Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952, (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1969). 4 With respect to this: the argumentof Marta Irurozqui,La armonia de las desigualdades. Elites y conflictos de poder en Bolivia, 1880-1920. Cusco, CBC-CSIC, 1994; or the minutes of the Congreso Internacional"De reino a repiiblica:la independenciaen el Perni,1750-1850," (Universidaddel Pacffico, Lima, Agosto, 1994). 5 Helen Delpar, Red AgainstBlue. TheLiberalParty in ColombianPolitics, 1863-1899. (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1981); Richard Graham, Patronage and Politics in NineteeenthCenturyBrazil. (Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press, 1990). 6 Paul Lewis, Political Parties and Generationsin Paraguay's LiberalEra: 1869-1940. (Chapel-Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1993); P. Alonso. "Politics and Elections in Buenos Aires, 18901898: The Performanceof the Radical Party," Journal of LatinAmericanStudies, 25:2 (1993); Richard J. Walter "Politics, Parties, and Electionsin Argentina'sProvinceof Buenos Aires, 1912-42," Hispanic AmericanHistorical Review, 64:4 (1984).
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The majorityof such analyses are local studies of Colombia, Mexico, and Argentinaconcerning elections and parties.7
NATURE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN BOLIVIA
Entre nosotros se ha considerado comounidealde pazy concordia la siempre ausencia de antagonismo politicos.8 The majority of the historiographicanalyses dealing with the study of Latin Americanpolitical partiesat the end of the nineteenthcenturydo not consider the social repercussionsentailed in elite infighting. They are limited to dividing their members into conservativesand liberals according to theireconomic and social backgrounds,ignoringthe rangeof bipartisan play or the importanceof political party alternatives.Generally speaking, they identify the conservativepartieswith groups of bankers, aristocrats,industrial giants, and influentialclergymen, and the liberalor radicalpartieswith small businesses and industries, civil servants, professors, lawyers, journalists, and writers, among others.9This categorizationcan also be applied to the clash between an industrialor export-businessoligarchy and a traditional landowningoligarchy.10Such a polarizationis not viable in dividing up Bolivian supportersin which one encounterscompetitionbetween individuals with equivalenteconomic, political, and culturalbackgrounds.The economic diversity that characterized the Altiplanoelite forces one to consider whether the political differences were born more of similarities of origin and interests than of inequalities, as this diversity was the point of friction in the regional competitionsand in the attainment of traditionaland authoritative that to define a elite. The economic privileges help hegemonic situationwas important insofaras it supporteda preponderant political presence. Economic circumstances, in turn, controlled conditions so that the process of reconstitutingthe elite would not suffer disruptionsthroughthe democratizationof social participation. Far from representingdifferenteconomic interests, the Bolivian political parties were, like their opponents, the expression of elite control over the
7 An example of the multitudes of perspectives concerning the issue is the workshop "Partidos politicos y elecciones en America Latinay la peninsulaiberica, 1830-1930" organizedin February1995 by the Instituto UniversitarioOrtegay Gasset (Madrid)and the Congreso "The Expansion of Political Citizenshipin Latin America," presentedin August 1995 by la UniversidadNacional de Bogotaiand the SSRC's Joint Committee on Latin American Studies (JCLAS). 8 Bautista Saavedra,La democracia en nuestra historia (La Paz, 1921), p. 109. Maurice Duverger, Los partidos politicos (Mexico: FCE, 1987), p. 50. 9 10Efrain Kristal, Una visidn urbana de los andes (Lima: IAA, 1991) p. 26.
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PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA
political system. The party lines did not correspondwith social or professional divisions, nor, in the strict sense," with ideological ones. If ideological divisions arose, they were not as much ideologies of differentsocial groups as successive ideologies, different and interchangeablewithin the same social category.12The fact that some respected the denominationof conservativesand othersthatof liberalsdid not imply a complete acceptance of their respective platformsbut rather,and more appropriately, the search for an approveddividing nominationthathad universalcharacterand legitimacy.'3 Beneath the variationsand substantivedifferences between conservatives and liberals lay a similar culture, a set of practices and conceptions that shapedthe collective imaginationof the privilegedgroupand that, after the electoral contest, forced a politics of conciliation, ensuring the cohesion of the elite.14The differences that separatedthe members of this group would have to be found, then, within the contexts of theirorigins and family traditionsand, above all, relationsto political power:those who were excluded or those who were membersof the clientele in power.'5 Access to national power was based on the legitimacy that one was able to obtain within the society; thus the party leaders did nothing but express the rules and guidelines for political conduct existing within society. This fact is exemplified in the attemptby Aniceto Arce who, beginning with the elections of 1883, tried to create a bipartisanpolitical regime permitting the strongestmine owners to fight amongstthemselves, or at least to attemptto unite under one party power sufficient to make the opposition party into a merely symbolic presence. In both cases, Arce was attemptingto reduce
" The issues of religion and the origins of power were not debated. Alberto Cornejo, Programas politicos de Bolivia, (Cochabamba: Imp. Universitaria,1949), pp. 19-27; Programa de gobiernoformuladopor FernandoE. Guachalla,jefe del partidoLiberaly candidatoa la presidencia de Bolivia, (La Paz, 1908), p. 6; Reflexiones sobre politica nacional. Articulospublicados en "El Tiempo," (La Paz, 1915), p. 12. 12 "En nuestraAmerica los partidosse formanpor motivos o pretextos;raravez deben su origen a principios o intereses generales. Todos descansamosen una constituci6n republicanay en este orden, cuanto mais, ha habido una cuesti6n de forma: federal o unitaria.Como el programade ellos ha sido identico, para distinguirsealguna vez, se han mostradoseparadospor asuntos de administraci6no de politica: ferrocarrilistas,pacifistas; anticaministasy guerreros" (Letterfrom MarianoBaptista to Luis Paz, Cochabamba,April 19, 1904). 13 "Era constituirseverdaderas entidadespoliticas que los ciudadanos 16gicoe inexcusable, sifquerifan se agrupasenen torno a las banderastradicionalese hist6ricas, afiliaindose a los principiosliberales o a los principios conservadores" in Alberto Cornejo, Reflexiones sobre politica nacional. Articulos publicados en "El Tiempo", (1915), p. 10. '4 Saavedra, "El partidoconstitucionalno ha sido un partidoconservador,como el llamado partido liberal no ha sido una agrupaci6nnetamenteliberal. En Bolivia, maisque los principios han sido las a las personas, las adherenciasa los caudillos, las que han determinadola formaci6n de los simpatifas partidospoliticos," La democracia, p. 133. 15 La politica y los partidos. Articulos de actualidadpublicados en "La Tarde", (La Paz: Tip. Jose Manuel Gamarra, 1910) pp. 3, 17, 28, 33; Saavedra,La democracia, pp. 135, 173, 195.
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initial party differences by sealing off any uncontrolledavenue of governfor the rising social sectors.16By conjoining within the mental participation same group two apparently conflicting political positions, he was appealing for the continuityof social status and for the conformationof Bolivia under the interests of a fraction of the dominantclass. Suffice to say that direct elections did not give the majorityrequired by law to eitherof the candidates el dineroal dinero,guerredindose opuesto paraquelos circulosquese habian comenzasen a aproximarse el unoal otro,trabajando con encarnizadeamente, del que llamaban el presitigioso empefiio paraexcluirla candidatura y meri. . . es asi que los partidos torio GeneralCamacho rojo-arcista y pachecocorralista hanllegadohoy al mismot6rmino.17 Robert Michels' work suggests that the fight for power was a fight between minorities, i.e., factions, of the same group, in this case conflicting factions of the elite,18 reinforcingwhat has been said up until now.19In his view the organized battle would be sought between the political parties established around 1880 that, independentof the ideology and precepts outlined in their programs, leaned necessarily toward conservatismor the conservationof the political system. In otherwords, they tendedtowardthe perpetuationof a hierarchicalsystem with a means of social climbing controlled from above and based on the imitationof the modes of living of the privileged sectors. This tendency is consolidated through control of the State. Consequently,the availabilityof economic resourcesis subordinated and dedicated to the conquest of political power that, in turn, will provide the elite with a large degree of flexibility to define itself as a social group capable of giving collective oppositional responses to subordinatesectors aspiringto the same privileges. Thus, the politicalpartyacts as an institution whose purpose is the conquest and exercise of political power.20This definition invalidates Giovanni Sartori's conception of the Bolivian political party at the turnof the twentiethcentury. His assertionconcerns whetheror
16 With respect to this Aniceto Arce says: "Amenaza a nuestropais un grave peligro. La cuesti6n eleccionaria esti dando margen a una propagandadesorganizadora de nuestraconstituci6n social. Indispensable parece combatirlasin dividirnos." La coalici6n. Articulos publicados en "El Progreso" Tip. "14 de septiembre," 1884, p. 2. 6rgano del Partido Liberal. (Cochabamba: 17 Arce, La coalici6n, pp. 3, 12. 18 Robert Michels, Los partidos politicos (Buenos Aires: Ed. Amorrortu, 1983). 19 "Ni 61 (el conservador),ni su contendiente,el liberal, pueden ser discutidosen raz6n de principios e institucionesque ambos invocan. Ambos reconoceny proclaman las mismaslibertadesptblicas; ambos se declaransus tinicos sostenedores, acusaindose mutuamente de haberlasconculcado. La cuesti6n entre ambos no viene a ser te6rica ni de programaspoliticos; versa sobre hechos; es una cuesti6n de conducta." "Deslindando [1904]," in MarianoBaptista,Obras completas.Documentosde polftica externa e interna (La Paz: Ed. Renacimiento, 1933, T. V, p. 306. 20 Duverger, Partidos politicos, p. 15.
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not a party is capable of governing at the level of national interest in a mannerany differentfrom that of a faction:21 not only in revealing characteristics appropriate to a patrimonialsociety with a restrictedelectoral regime,22but also bearingin mind the risks and distortionsresultingfrom the applicationof evolutionarymodels to realities that did not possess the empirical foundationsfor a theoreticalconstructionof party models. Following the corporativeconceptionof the "nation" held by the Bolivian elite upon assuming their obligation (in theory) to convert the country into a modem nation, and given that for them the prioritywas the reconversion and restorationof the elite as a dominantsocial group, the parties could not have been instrumentsfor the attainment of collective benefits or for preventingtheir transformation into a privilegedgroup of combatants.23 The political parties never intendedto create ties between the government and the Bolivian population.Establishment of the partiescreatedas much a need to legitimize those possessing the country's economic power through the recognition of their political presence as it did to producea medium for This act of negotiation between themselves and their class competitors.24 would also entail the of all the other social legitimization delegitimization sectors aspiring to the same privileges. This was to become a judgement against militarismand caudillismowhen the latterwas identified as responsible for political instability, and thereforeas favoringsocial disorderwhich would dismantle the privileged positions of the elite. Moreover, the government's attemptsto discredit the opposition-as well as similar attempts against the governmentby the opposition-consisted of accusing each other of militaristicbehavior, an accusationwhich in turngave recognitionto the idea that such behavior contradictedthe appropriate role of the military.25 The change in the political structurecreated the necessary stability to assure the various elite groups that their opportunitiesfor renovation and social definition were not closed. Thus, the alternativeBolivian parties did
21 Giovanni Sartori,Partidos sistemas de y partidos (Madrid:Alianza Universidad, 1987) vol. 1. RigobertoParedes,Politica parlamentariade Bolivia. estudio de psicologia colectiva (La Paz: Ed. CERID, 1992) p. 77. 23 C. Wright Mills, La Elite del poder, (M6xico: FCE, 1957). 24 Gaetano Mosca, La clase politica (Mexico: FCE, 1984), p. 131. 25 "Ese pasado adn persiste, con la s61a diferencia de que a la guerracivil ha sustituido el fraude electoral, realizado algunas veces dejandocharcosde sangre. Los impetus guerreroshan sido remplazados con la venalidad y el envilecimiento del elector. No es coraje del soldado sino la conciencia En este se halla siempre latenteel cesarismo, pervertidadel ciudadanolo que hace ahoraal mandatario. o con maispropiedadel espifritu del cholo mand6n, que rasga las leyes y vulgar, testarudoy arbitrario ahoga las manifestacionesaisladas de resurgimiento,porqueasi conviene al papel omniciente y voluntarioso que representa." Paredes, Politica parlamentaria, p. 133.
22
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not jointly look out for the nationalintereston the basis of some particular principal on which all could agree, but rather they were interested in a suitable climate for the consolidationof their privateintereststhat, in turn, This did not were understoodand believed to be the interestsof the nation.26 contradict the political intention of achieving consensus. The means for reaching a consensus were to obtain electoral votes or create widespread modes of conduct so as not to threatenthe elite's ideas of self-reproduction. Elections were held with the purposeof attainingthe subordinated sectors' recognition and consent that their demands were being channeled through the political parties, now that the parties were the only ones with the capacity to give the sectors' petitions some sort of political dimension.27The sector of the elite with the greaterelectoral supporthad more opportunities to pressurethe elite in power and negotiate privileges for itself. One notes, then, a strong interest in popularizinggovernmentmeasures with regardto the elections and an initiativein channelingpossible discontent through the networks of clienteles of each party. Consequently, the was verbally abanconception of the traditionalelite installedby birthright doned and replaced with the concept of an institutionalelite resting on the confidence of the organizedmasses, the majorityof which duringthis period were made up of mestizo artisans.28 In time, this system came to formally the one based on of clients aroundan influentialboss arrangements replace or cliques broughttogether under a militaryhead. The two modes persist, constitutionalframeworkthat, however, undera bipartisanor multipartisan above all, intends to break with political instability. With this, the various factions of the elite sought guaranteesfor a suitable medium for their infighting and reconstitutionwithoutthe threatof emerging sectors increasing the competition for power.
This affirmationquestions the assumptionthat liberals, as much as conservatives, supportedthe idea of a representative governmentas promoterof the nation's economy. More than the recognitionby the two parties of the need for a government sensitive to civil direction that could promote national economic development, the party system guaranteedthe continuing growth of the economy's private sector. See HerbertKlein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1969). 27 "Vosotros (los artesanos)sofs la porci6nde la clase social que maisama mi coraz6n porque, como vosotros, tambi6nhe vivido escaso de fortunay soy artesano,con la diferenciade que mi taller esti en el seno de la tierra.Si Dios me destinagobernaros,procurar6 mejorarvuestrasituaci6n, proporcionando las mayores facilidades a vuestras industriasy planteando,con profesoreseuropeos, colejios para que vuestros hijos se dignifiquen por medio del trabajo... Parami valen tanto el humilde artesanocomo el rico propietario,cuandoestos se han dignificadopor la honradezy el trabajoporqueel trabajoes virtud y porquetodos tenemos un s6lo padreque es Dios." La banderanacional. Organo del "ClubIndustrial Fusionista." candidaturapresidencial del ciudadanoGregorio Pacheco en el Departamentode La Paz para las elecciones de 1884. (La Paz: Tip. Religiosa, 1883) pp. 7-8. 28 Rossana Barragin, Espacio urbano y dindmica itnica. La Paz en el siglo XIX (La Paz: Hisbol, 1990).
26
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PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND PARTY STRATEGIES
Una de las tareaspermanentes de los congresosque es la y caracteristicas de la administraci6n ha sido,en inter6s, con supervijilancia pdblica, ejercitada es imparcialidad, respetoy eficacia.Se ha comprendido que la moderaci6n unafuerza,quelos odiosy la c61era nunca establecen solo suscitan autoridad; el despecho.29 The formalized rules comprising the internalfunctionings of a political party system served to protectthe hegemonic group not so much from the subordinate sectors as from the otherclass factionsor the "parvenu"of their own faction. In this competitive context, the principalpreoccupationof the said sectors was the acquisitionof legitimacy throughdelegitimizationand defamation of the opposition. However, the hostility between these competitors was a result of the weighty issue of whetherto continue or end the war with Chile.30With the solution of this conflict31the principal accusations turningone party against the other and characterizingthe arguments between the parliamentmembersconcernedthe persistenceof caudillismo within the governmentand the existence of electoral bribery. Once the legitimacyof the liberalandconservativepartieswas established by virtue of abandoningmilitarismand continuing to accuse the opposing party of representingthe preservationof caudillismo, this debate became central. The anti-militarist argumentwas employed principallyby the conservatives, with Aniceto Arce as theirforemostarchitectand designer. This position was not meant to be monolithic, but was structuredin two ways which were used successively in the electoral campaigns of 1884, 1888, 1892, and 1896. First of all, anti-militarism signified antiperuanismo.The Bolivian conservative\pacifistswanted a quick peace accord with Chile while the guerristas (war-hawks)proposed the continuationof the war in alliance with Peru. As a means of delegitimizingthe opposition, the former accused the latter of maintainingthe principles of the caudillista regimes. Since the guerristas defended the maintenanceof ties with Peru, the antimilitaristposition ended up, then, identifying themselves with antiperuanismo. Beneath such apparent symbiosis lay a criticismof the desiredorientation
29Discurso pronunciado por el presidentedel Congreso, doctordon MarianoBaptista, en la clausura de las Cdmaras Legislativas de 1882, (La Paz: Imp. de la Uni6n Americana, 1882) p. 1. 30 Saavedra, La democracia, p. 240. Y3 Y aquf se presenta la ocasi6n de hacer notar que, si bien han sido divergentes nuestras . . opiniones polifticas,en el hecho hemos marchado,aunquepor caminos distintos, hacia el mismo objetivo-la salvaci6n de la patria" Contestaci6n del Presidente Constitucionalde la General Reptiblica, don Narciso Campero, (La Paz: Imp. de la Uni6n Americana, 1882) p. 5.
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of the La Paz region (largely liberal and guerrista) with the rest of the country. This region competed directly with the southern elites and had greater possibilities for success. Peruvian markets were not priorities for these elites, who preferredto maintaintheir Chilean and Argentinianties. To the extent that the silver marketwas losing strength,this did not prevent the chuquisaquefios fromorganizingthemselvesto actively participate in the market as demonstrated Aniceto Arce's role in the by founding of pacehia the first banks of La Paz. The control they desired to have over this market can also be understoodas a wish to subordinate it to southernhegemony so as to block its potential as a competitor, negating the pacefio advantage. Thus constituted, the regional elite with the greatestpotential for economically carrying the weight of the other Bolivian districts and with greater possibilities for snatching away the hegemony of the silver miners, was itself in danger as the world price of silver fell. was destinedto underminethe opportunitiesfor Secondly, anti-militarism social ascent of the subordinatesectors. Its condemnationdiscredited the earliermodes of social competition.The social andpolitical instabilityof the caudillist regimes not only had given betteropportunities for improvingthe status of populargroups, thereby calling into question the state's rights to power, but caudillismo also no longer guaranteedthe continuationof elite privileges. At any moment this instabilitycould have disruptedeverything. In both cases, efforts were made to draw up new guidelines concerning the obligations and roles of the armed forces. The rejection of militarism should not be understoodas a critiqueof the militaryclass, but ratheras a desire to safeguardits role of order-keeping within a constitutionallyestablished government. In no case did anti-militarism intend to negate the importanceof the military. Rather, its proponentssought to limit and restructure its responsibilities, so that it would be an institutionmore in line with the civilian interestsof the partyregime, just as the means of social ascent were also regulatedto conform with the elite's restructuring of its power. Therefore, the attack on the caudillist positions came accompanied with praisefor the militaryclass, wantingto separatethem rhetoricallyfrom their earlier practices in order to make them more viable for the interests of the civilian elite. On the other hand, the denunciationsof the civilian-pacifist option had their counterparts in the speeches of the LiberalParty, which reignited the
issue of the guerrista legacy. To discredit the conservatives of the government, the opposition accused them of electoral bribery and abuse of their governmental powers, means by which the liberals searched for a way to
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justify the use of a coup d'etat. The aim of this attackwould be to offer a just solution to electoralfraud,and in time, would resultin a bloc againstthe Liberal Party as alliances formed among the conservativeparties. Despite their differences, the two bands aided in the creation of a permanent party system, which in turn gave institutionallegitimacy to their positions. The two participantgroups, in a purely competitive act, recognized the legitimacy of the ends pursuedby the other and, consequently, defended that "el derechopdblico natural,que arranca el poder de la fuente del pueblo, admiteen sus doctrinasla coexistencia necesariadel gobiernoy de la oposici6n.'"32 However, to this assertionthey were appendinga series of conditions that allowed the political parties to discredit one another, not only a lack of class coherencywithin the elite, but therebydemonstrating also the view that popularparticipation would act as an obstructionin this quarrel. A party would not be acting legitimately in turningthese sectors against the government, for it would threaten their own explanation of themselves as a dominantclass. The social battlebetween the elites was not, of the establishedorder. On the contherefore, a threatto the perpetuation trary, the permanenceof this order was assured by change and its power structurewas perpetuatedby political movement.33
ANTI-MILITARISM OR THE REJECTION OF THE CONFEDERATION
PERU-BOLIVIA
Of all the propositionsfor peace with Chile put forthby the conservatives, that which had the greatest resonance and was molded by party ideology, was expressed by Aniceto Arce, Vice-President of the Republic during Campero'spresidency. It consisted of an alliance with Chile that permitted the rectificationof the boundariesbetween Peruand Bolivia so thatthe latter would secure Tacna and Arica.34This position invalidateda treatyin 1873 between the two states and dissolved plans for a Confederation.35 Arce's was argument justified by the search for solutions to the possible "Polandization" of Bolivia:
32Mensaje del Presidente Constitucionalde de Bolivia al Congreso ordinario de 1887. la Repalblica (Sucre: El Progreso, 1887) p. 5. 33 Pierre Bourdieu, La distinci6n (Madrid:Taurus, 1988) p. 164. 34 "Bolivia sin litoral corre a su ruina. Morirnahogada, despu6s de habersedespedazadoen convulsiones polifticas,presa de la ambici6n de los infinitos caudillos que tiene . . . No ful nunca afecto a la alianza, porque nunca la cref provechosa, ni siquieraconveniente para Bolivia. El Pern siempre se ha esforzado por explotar, deprimiro anulara Bolivia .. ." Luis MarianoGuzmin, Cr6nica nacional de 1880 (Cochabamba:Imp. de Los Amigos, 1881). 35 El Comercio, La Paz, June 28, 1881.
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de nuestras Boliviano antetodo,he creido quedebiamos exigirla rectificaci6n naci6n sinla cualBoliviano puedeaspirar a llamarse fronteras, independiente. a Tacnay a Aricano puede La zonaque Bolivianecesitay que comprende a Perdi, decirseque se la arrebatemos queChilese pueses ya cosaaveriguada de ella no la a Peri.36 y apoder6 devolverai With this plan, presented in 1883, economic relations with Chile were intended to continue, in time blocking the hopes of pacefios, whose commercial interests were linked with those of southern Peru. This market comprisednot only the exchange of mineralssuch as gold, but also the trade in wool, cotton, and other agricultural and industrialproducts. Thus it was Paz La a natural outlet to the sea via the port of that, although possessed the area's activities were not Arica, exclusively dependenton it. However, with the south's devotion to the exportationof silver, this port, or the port of Antofagasta,was necessary. On the otherhand, Bolivian tradewith Peru was enjoying free transitthroughMollendo and the goods introducedfrom there paid duties at the Bolivian rate. With the truce agreementwith Chile in 1880, the latter imposed tariffs in its commercial transactions,and because these tariffs were quite high, Bolivian preferencefor Peruvianports followed, with the majorityof goods passing throughMollendo. The initiative of Campero'sgovernmentto create uniformtariffs meant, then, the loss not only of "la soberaniacomercialaduanera"but also of the Peruvian marketand thereforea decline in profits for the La Paz district.37 However, these economic prioritieswere concealed by demagogy aimed at stirringup the populationby calling attentionto violations of the public faith such as snatchingup money in compulsorydebentureloans and increasingtaxes not to defray costs of war but to create ostentatiousbatallionsandjobs for those with governmentconnections. From denunciationsof immoralityand political corruptionthere followed a delegitimizationof the government's measures.38On the other hand, denunciationof the suppressionof public liberties and individualguarantees,and the squandering of State funds for the augmentationof ministerialincomes underthe pretextof war,39 aided Arce
El Comercio, La Paz, September3, 1881. Nataniel Aguirre and Fidel Aranibar,Intereses nacionales (La Paz: Tip. "14 de septiembre," 1884), pp. 3-4. 38 Concerning Aniceto Arce's tendencies in international politics, Felix Avelino Aramayo writes in 1919: "Viene otra vez nuestroinfatigableenemigo, con su habilidadpolitica, a imprimira la diplomacia bolivianael rumboque le conviene a sus propiosinteresesa fin de mantener desunidosa Bolivia y el Peril " Letter from F61ixAvelino Aramayoto Jose Paravicini, February9, 1919, in A. Costa du Rels, Filix Aramayo y su epoca, 1846-1929 (Buenos Aires: Ed. Domingo Viau Cia., 1942), p. 153. 39 "En efecto: a pesar de la penuria de nuestro erario, se ha tenido en pie de guerra la naci6n, quedandoasifsatisfechoel programatrazadoal Ejecutivopor la Convenci6ndel 81; se ha salvado la nave del Estado a traves de mil escollos; las libertadesy las garantiasdel ciudadanohan venido a ser una
37
36
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in linking the guerrista position to the previousbad administrations, thatis, caudillismo.40This relationshipincreased the need to quickly conclude a definitive peace treaty with Chile, the only way to gain respect for the achievementsof the partysystem. With that, the Arce option appearedas the opportunityfor change, for progress, for a breakwith the shady caudillista who denigratedthe image of Bolivia at the international level.41Therefore, those who opposed these reforms,that is to say, "el gobierno [the Campero governmentwhich was consideredpolitical]y los escritoresque sostienen su in a politics of favoritism, a continuation politica," would be participating of the previousdisorderand un-governability. Consequently,they would not have "derechos para imponera la naci6n sus caprichosy opiniones; y que la llamadahonranacional, que se invoca por los que sostienen el estado de guerraa todo tranceno es maisque una paradoja,incompatiblecon el inter6s y las conveniencias del pais."42 Thus, the stated parallels between the caudillos of the period precedingthe Pacific War and Ministersof War and GovernmentNataniel Aguirreand Ndifiez del Pradorespectively (as a result of their pro-war stances), corroboratedthe same strategy, charged with delegitimizing those in power, the same people as before, in their attemptto revive the past.43In all, this was equivalentto denying Bolivia an outlet to the sea, and thereforewas an impedimentto nationalprogress: Enposesi6nBoliviade Tacna la lineaferrea de la costaal y Arica,construida el progreso ese pais,susriquezas se desarrolarin, interior, y entonces invadiri podraobrarcomo naci6nlibree independentiente y seri respetada por sus vecinos.Eso es lo que yo ambiciono mi no su desmembraci6n para pais y y ruina.44 In addition to associating the Peru-Bolivia alliance with the image of dismemberment,ruin, and impossibility for converting the country into a nation, Arce attemptedto prove thatPeruhad always forced Bolivia through exploitation, deprivation, and repeals, thereby counteractingthe call by
realidad;ha renacidola confianza ptiblica, y el nombrede Bolivia empieza a Ilamarla atenci6nhasta de los pueblos mis lejanos, que, antes de ahora,o no la conocian o apartaban de ella la vista" Contestacidn del Presidente Constitucionalde la Republica, Generaldon Narciso Campero(La Paz: Imp. de la Uni6n Americana, 1882), p. 3. 40 Candidaturadel Doctor Aniceto Arce. (Sucre: I. Col6n, 1880). 41 Ibid. p. 8. 42 "La tregua y la honranacional," El Comercio, La Paz, July 6, 1882. 43 "En los tiempos transcurridos, dos fuerzas se han disputadoalternativamente el mando supremo: la una, el caudillaje, que buscaba la base del poder en el pronunciamiento; y la otra, el civismo, que tiende a constituir la magistratura poliftica,desenvolvidndose, desde Sucre, por ensayos mis o menos eficaces." "Deslindando 1904" in Baptista, Obras completas. V, p. 301. 44 El Comercio, La Paz, September 13, 1881.
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GeneralCamperofor solidaritywith thatcountry,45 from which a greatdeal of militarysupporthad been obtainedto defeat PresidentDaza (1876-1879). To remove any lingering doubts about his image, Arce admittedto making war loans to the governmentfor the purchaseof arms during its Chilean campaign.46However, the loans were presented in a manner that would reinforce his patriotic discourse favoring progress, a progress which was increasingly linked to mining activity.47Miner GregorioPacheco similarly exalted progress but did not advocate breakingwith Peru because "a6n en la hip6tesis de que Bolivia hubierapodido rompersu pacto de alianza con el Peru'para aceptarde Chile los territoriosde Tacna i Arica, no es posible suponer que tanta generosidadde parte suya no hubierabuscado su compensativo en nuestras ricas provincias de Lipez i Porco.'"48 Against the conservative formulations, the argumentof the guerristaslliberalsinsisted that la f6rmula es la conservaci6n de la actitud que puederesolverel problema la lealtad a la la actividad del en la alianza, y circunspecci6n belica, gobierno ... [ya que]o venceel pensamiento diplomacia Campero, queestaapoyado de los politicosy del pueblo,es decirla actitud por la mayoria belicapara salvarel honornacional, o vencela oposici6n,quees la paz a todotrance.49 This line of thought in favor of continuing the war was endorsed on the whole by membersof the military, who saw in the fulfillment of the internationaltreatiesthe confirmationof theirsocial andpolitical legitimacy, and by the pacefios involved in diverse economic activities, whose interests in regional mercantileintegrationclashed with the mining sector. The pacerio discourse focused on patriotism as fundamentalto an ideology removed from all factions and from all partisanship. They wantedtheir conduct to be apolitical, since they legitimized their opinion throughtheir enmity toward complete disorder.50 They presentedthemselves as citizens disinterestedin
45 "Abandonaral Perni en los supremosmomentosde angustia,cuandoexhalabasus tiltimos alientos, bajo el peso de todas las calamidadesacumuladaspor la guerra,y entrarpor nosotros solos en acuerdos con el enemigo comdtn,y nada menos que para cooperaren la consumaci6ndel sacrificio a mutilarel territorioperuanoy tomar en nuestroprovecho un pedazo de 61, como gaje de infidelidad, habria sido un proceder sin nombre, un enorme crimen sin precedentesen la historia, que habria manchadopara siempre la purezade nuestrabandera,y precipitadoa Bolivia en el abismo del deshonorante propios y extrafiios."Narciso Campero,Mensaje especial dirigido al Congreso, (La Paz: s.p.d.i, 1884). 46 El Comercio, La Paz, September 14, 1881. 47 ((No nacifminero, sino agricultor;pero comprendiendo que la mineria es hoi la tinica fuente de nuestrariqueza nacional me consagr6 a ella," El Comercio, La Paz, March 5, 1885. 48 Mensaje especial del PresidenteConstitucionalde la Repdblica.Agosto 6 de 1884, August 6, 1884, (Sucre: El cruzado, 1884), p. 11. 49 El Comercio, La Paz, July 6, 1881. 50 Reflexiones sobre Politica Nacional. Articulospublicados en "El Tiempo", 1915, p. 9.
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governmentparticipationand, therefore, enlarged their halo of purity and political innocence, sacrificingfor the public good, free of worldly, material interests. Their objective was to supportthe alliance with Peru and to continue the war with Chile until victory was achieved.51Contraryto the conservative group headed by Aniceto Arce, the pacefios at first discardedall direct political links so as not to be identified with such clubs as La Uni6n Nacional, since they based the legitimacy of their propositions on the rejection of all political affiliations. They made theiroption appearmuch more impartialthan that of the pacifists: . . protestando no afiliarnos a banderfo la opini6nde los algunoy respetar de la a las resoluciones de la mayorfa.52 pueblos Repuiblica, someti6ndonos Their later identificationwith the Liberal Party magnified the character and image of this party as an honest, patriotic, and redeemingassociation, uniquelycapableof addressingthe excesses of the conservativesand returnThus, at every moment, the ing to the popularsectors theirusufructrights.53 liberals sought to link themselves to the "pueblo:" -os contestarn sin vacilar: -no, mil vecesno. Este iQuereisunapazsin honra? es el pueblo.54 hombre This behavior was taken on much later by the liberals on the eve of and during the Federal War of 1899 in a political, anti-oligarchical discourse55that should not be confused with a rejectionof the elite principles of power. These principleswere defendedat all times by liberals as well as conservatives of every region of Bolivia. The discourse consisted of an electoral strategy which tried to balance the economic power of Arce and Pacheco, employed not only in their campaigns, but also in the campaigns of MarianoBaptistaand Severo FernandezAlonso, throughan invocationof a popular, anti-oligarchicBolivian spirit. The political opposition of the
51 In 1880, when discussing which Bolivian city would host the Asamblea Convencional,the pacefios exploited their apoliticismby presentingthemselves as neutralpolitical coparticipants: "Sea donde fuere la Asamblea Convencional, concurranlos representantes del pueblo con todas las abnegacionesexigidas por la situaci6n, y sea la primerael imperio de si mismos, el dominio de las pasiones polifticas, la abdicaci6n del espiritu de partido. Esa abnegaci6n moral es la primera que impone la patria," El Comercio, La Paz, April 10, 1880. 52 El Comercio, La Paz, February27, 1880. 53 Alberto Cornejo, Programaspoliticas, p. 31. 54 "El gobierno y la oposici6n," El Comercio, La Paz, 6 de July 6, 1881. "Este partido ha sido bautizado de oligarquifa, concretindose particularmela designaci6n a los periodos de Pacheco, Arce y Alonso." "Deslindando 1904" in Baptista, Obras completas, p. 306; "En cambio, para no perderla costumbre, siguen peleando contra la actual oligarquifa entendi6ndosepor tal el conjunto de los hombres que han tenido la suerte de Ilegar al poder." La Politica y los partidos. Articulos de actualidadpublicados en "La Tarde", (La Paz: Tip. Jose Manuel Gamarra,1910), p. 19.
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liberals was conscious of this device and, therefore, attemptedto identify this populism with caudillistabehavior. In accordance with that strategy, the pacifists, representedby the Constitutional Conservative Party of Aniceto Arce and Mariano Baptista declared the existence of two adversefactorsthat the State needed to exorcize the if it wantedto link itself with a politicaltide of progressiveimprovement: chaos born from the anarchicrevolutionsstirredup by militarismon the one hand, and the danger of social subversionfed by demagogy on the other. The two declarationswere the result of the adoptionof principlesconsistent with the elite's need for stability as a political class.
ANTI-CAUDILLISMO OR THE REJECTIONOF POPULISTDEMAGOGY
Aniceto Arce tried to confront internal dangers, specifically, degraded militarismand degradingdemagogy. In his opinion, both factors had been fed by anarchyand chaos within the countryand resultedin the ingression of upper- and middle-class idleness into the ranksof the official class, and the ingressionof middle- and lower-classidleness into the soldiery. Military apprenticeshipeventually convertedthe soldiers into dangerousmob agitators in urban slums. In contrastwas the decent and dignified worker who enjoyed the fruits of his labor, making possible the growth of the nation, always keeping out of all political activity, for otherwise he would become a "cholo arribista," and an appallingparasiteon those who lived as hon56 The differences between these two types of individuals orable artisans. distinguished by Arce allows the establishmentof a relation between the critique of caudillismo and the exaltationof the artisan'swork. Moreover, the anti-militarist was shapedby the desire to regulatethe prospropaganda pects of social mobility for the rising classes. The greatestdangerto the elite's restructuring projecttook shape with the of the caudillista that it instability regime, given permittedthe absence of institutionalmechanismsto regulatesocial ascent. The society's permeability amplified the number of aspirantsto the positions of privilege of the hierarchical society. The dialectic of "de-classment" and "reenclassment," found at the base of all forms of social processes, implied and imposed that all of the affected groups advancedin the same sense and towards the same objectives, privileges, and properties. These priorities markedthe groupoccupying the first rungof the ladder,the elite, and were,
by definition, positions and merits inaccessible to other contenders. Once
56
CondarcoMorales, Aniceto Arce, p. 542.
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these privileges or privileged positions were increased and popularized, making them accessible to groups of inferiorrank, they would be modified and lose their distinctive rarity.57 In short, the increasedenjoyment of exclusive privileges by many people diminished the value of these prerogain power the same tives, and thereforedid not give to these new participants as was conferred and status fewer upon aspirants.The danger of authority of social from the political instability derived "democratization" privileges of the caudillistaregime, an instabilityagainstwhich the discursivecriticism of Aniceto Arce was directed as it threatenedthe viability of the elite's reconversionplans. The overall issue was a result not of the strengthof the popularsectors, but ratherof the power struggleamong the elite factions, a struggle which squandered,throughpopulist liberalization,all of the progress made in defining the elite as a socially-dominantclass. That is to say, the elite had the ability to create avenues for and hopes of social ascent for the popularsectors, when it was very possible that these groupsthemselves had not realizedeithertheirsubversivepotentialor theirrights.58Despite the inherentrisk of the move, the opposition in power did not seek to paralyze the social movement, but rathersought to regulateit so as not to contradict a logic of social inequalitythatguaranteed the existence of select privileges. In this way, the maintenanceof order, that is, the maintenanceof the entire system of differentials-the differences, the ranks, the points of origin, the priorities, the exclusivities, and the distinctionsthat gave their structurea social format-all of this was left assured in hopes of social ascent. Each social grouphad as a past the groupimmediatelybelow, and as a future, the group above, and maintainingthis relationshipwas necessary to the opposition because it foiled any type of horizontalor intra-classalliance between the excluded sectors. Thus, they permittedthe hierarchicalsocial order to remain unquestionedand, consequently, it was the dominatedgroups who supportedand fueled its exploitation-with the principalobjective of stealing a privileged position-not its elimination. For the pacifists, militarismhad annihilatedthe principleof healthy obedience and, with that, had also ended up turningupside-down "the rule of things." For them as well, there existed within the country a latent danger of the revolution "of a political nature" headed by some demagogic caudillo. The disorderand anarchyimposed by militarismwere the factors that sparked desires by the "masa ignorante," by "aquella inclinada a la ociosidad, and a la vagancia," to "pescar en rio revuelto." In answer to
this, the constitutionalist party is said to have "liadado con el militarismo y
57 Bourdieu, La distinci6n, p.163.
58
FranqoisXavier Guerra,Mexico: del antiguo regimena la revoluci6n(Mexico: FCE, 1991), p. 181.
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el populacho" opposing a "ciega disciplinade cuartely al rudo impetu del arrabal" since "el golpe del praetorianoy el frenesi del sans-culotte se habiandado cita parahacergironesel estandarte del progreso."59Thiseffort the elite to and select the characteristics of the political particiby design for all those comprisingthe populacho, pants entailed, therefore,contempt the unemployedmobs of the centralurbanslums that acted as clienteles and who were used by dictators as instrumentsfor matonaje.60 Thus, it was intended that, within the political definition of Bolivia, there be no participation by "la soldadesca y el populacho," that is, the elements of "estacionario despotismo y de la demagogia retr6grada.'"61 This concept of "populacho" was always contrastedwith thatof the "artisan," meaningthe individualworker, who had nothing to do with partydisputes or the fundamental elements of progress.62 The artisan'slove of order, respect for the law and job security were values praised by the political parties, which fought, without exception, to monopolize his sympathyand vote. For that reason, honor ceremonies were conducted in which the President of the Republic or the heads of the opposition held banquets for the artisan guilds.63 The objective of these ceremonies was to guaranteethe group's public favor and loyalty "a fin de consolidar maisy mis el gobierno del pueblo parael pueblo," and at the same time to assurethe continuityof job availability so as to dissuade them from participatingpolitically, because "solo el trabajoy la honradezennoblecenal hombre,y que estas cualidades son la base del progresode los pueblos."64This discursivedetermination to make them constitutionallylegitimate65 also entailed removing them from all caudillo and party politics, that is, keeping them in the margins of the national political sphere. At the beginning of the 1880s, this attitudeper59 "El ejercito," El Constitucional, Cochabamba,July 25, 1884. 60 CondarcoMorales, Aniceto Arca, p. 533. 61 "Los tres partidos," El Constitucional, Cochabamba, July 4, 1884. 62 El Comercio, La Paz, May 20, 1880 and June 12, 1883. 63 The artisancorporations usually reproducedofficial partypolarization,guaranteeingthe protection and electoral propagandaof the governmentand opposition candidates. In turn, there were spaces for recruitmentin the networksof loyalty competing for social ascent, just like the means of incorporating new social actors into the political dynamics, each time characterized more and more by the force of the State in putting under its guardianshipthe still-embryonicworkers' movement. These functions were growing as the political party system was solidified and therebymade more effective during the liberal period (1899-1920) than it had been during the conservative (1880-1899). Despite possessing a name with popularovertones, such associations were circles frequentedby lawyers, journalists, doctors and civil servants, until the names of its presidentand principalspokespersonswere connected with recognized personalities in public life. All of this suggests the fluidity of the urbanworld, where the lines between the professional elite and working groups are not clearly defined. 64 El Comercio, La Paz, April 10, 1880. 65 "Convencidos de que no puede haberprogresoen ramoalguno de la actividadhumana,sino cuando reina inalterableel orden ptiblico y las institucionesfuncionandentrode la 6rbitade la Constituci6n, los artesanos de La Paz toman su puesto de honor y de patriotismo, y se colocan al lado del gobierno constitucional," El Comercio, La Paz, January4, 1882.
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meatedthe government,althoughto a lesser extentthe opposition, due to the The conservatives,conscious of this popularsupportof the LiberalParty.66 substituted the support, progressively praise for artisanapoliticism with a desire to make them electoral participants,albeit controlled participants, subject to the watchful eye of partyleaders so as not to stray in supporting anothercaudillista regime. Henceforth, there began to appearin the press numerous articles combining praise for the worker with hints about the deceits behind the political promises: . . nuestro obrero es inteligente, es perola escuelaque le proporcionamos relativamente deficiente.67 Si los que tratan de encumbrarse a los primeros echanmanode 61,le puestos acarician el colmode sus deseo, sary halagan, y despu6s que hanlogrado los designan casticamente con el nombre de chusma.Es llegadoel momento la honrada clase debe en su porvenir artesana, que pensar y el de sus hijos con conciencia rectaen las urnas electorales su voto designando, depositando en favor,del que puedahacersu felicidad.68 The artisansrepresented a majorityof the Bolivian voting population,and thereforeconstituteda threatto the elite-a threatthathad to be neutralized in some way.69 Since the praise of their working conditions and of their honor as laborers did not guaranteethat they would voluntarily exclude themselves from the country's political life, the conservatives turned to disqualifyingthem, adducingtheir educationaldeficiencies and, moreover, their ethnic origins. These factors not only impeded the understandingof artisans' rights and the role they should have played in the national collective, but also made them vulnerableto any cruel opportunist,so that their ignorance favored the returnof the caudillos. An apparentlack of organization among the artisansmade it possible for the elite to press this apoliticism on them, to interferein theirelectoraldecisions, and to invalidatethese decisions if the desiredresultswere not obtained.Thus, as much importance was placed on capturingthe artisanvote as on declaringit illegitimate due to coercion: ". .. esos buhonerospoliticos que vendianla conciencia de los artesanos que Ilegaron a corromper." The threatof popularparticipation,
" In the liberalpress frequentlyemployed phrasessuch as "la clase laboriosa, aquellaque manejalos nobles instrumentosdel trabajomanuales la base principalde las democracias . . . alma y brazo de la de la ley y del derecho." Alcides Arguedas, democracia,paladinde las libertades,soldado incorruptible Historia general de Bolivia. El proceso de la nacionalidad, 1809-1921 (La Paz: Ed. Puerta del Sol, 1922), p. 488. 67 El Comercio, April 28, 1901. 68 La Voz del Pueblo, La Paz, February6, 1904. 69 "Grato nos fue encontrar entre la inmensa muchedumbre que vitoreabaa los candidatosliberales, a muchos artesanos, viejos ya, que habiamos conocido 1888, formando las masas populares que secundaron la revoluci6n del 8 de septiembre," La Politica y los partidos. Articulos de actualidad publicados en "La Tarde" (La Paz: Tip. Jose Manuel Gamarra,1910), p. 24.
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identified with caudillismo, was counteracted,then, with warnings of impending degradationand vice if one allowed oneself to be taken in by those who "reparten didivas a los holgazanes, hacen la vista gorda para los crimenes y halagan a los criminales.'"70 In this manner, three objectives were achieved that ensured the importanceof the party system: 1. The political interventionof the subordinated sectors was manipulatedso as to determine which sector of the elite ended up with political hegemony. 2. The winning partycountedon the supportof its electorateand clientele, and in case these sources became hostile, it could turnto accusing them of selling votes to the opposition, which providedlegal recourseagainst the opposition and thereby defended the former's political preeminence.71 3. The opposition could always toy with the threatof popularmobilization to achieve accords concerningthe division of power. In conclusion, the paternalisticdiscourse about the importance of the artisans to the life of the nation permitted the political parties, and the distinctfactions of the elite thatsupported them, to define theirpositions and determinetheirconflict's end result. Withinthe instrumental strengthof the a threat of artisan, embodying opposition and political subversion, also lay his weakness, since artisanswere never recognizedas directparticipants but ratheras allies. Therefore, their needs and petitions were subordinatedto those of the political partythat sought to win theirvote. The culminationof this politics of mediationwas the attainment of laborparticipation without72 demandingthe political involvementof the citizenry, or betterput, without requiring public representativeparticipation.In the conservative era, the capture of the artisanvote was not as much a controversyconcerning this group's political participation,as it was an elite wish to establish its legitimacy as a functionof the delegitimizationof the previous groupsin power, the caudillos.73However, it was the battle against the promises of social
"Honrado artesano," La Voz del Pueblo, La Paz, 1904. "Execremos, en fin, a los negociantespoliticos que especulancon la conciencia, con el voto y ain con la sangre de los ciudadanos,ora pararendira la patriaa los pies del tiranoo del enemigo exterior, ora paraentregarlaa los furoresdemag6gicos, ora parasacarpinguies utilidadesdel sudorde la Naci6n," Eliodoro Camacho, "Honrado artesano," La voz del pueblo, La Paz, February2, 1904. 72 El ataque al alcoholismo de los artesanos por parte de la prensa estai vinculado con el posible descontrol que puede ocasionaren el trabajoy su repercusi6nen las rentasde la el1ite,"si consideramos el inmenso desperdicio de inteligencia y actividadque es la consecuencia de ese vicio" El Diario, La Paz, May 31, 1904. 73 "Si era inmoral esta manera de conquistaradeptos, se tratabade uno de los vicios de la vida democraitica,quizaismenos grave que la suplantaci6nde la voluntad popularpor la violencia del ofi70 71
416
ascent thatpermitteda politically unstableregime. To achieve the fruitionof the oligarchic reconstruction plan, it was necessaryto accept, collectively, a political system that made this plan possible. This was the party system and the assertionof its legitimacy was given priority.In admittingthis, the legitimacy of ballot-box winners was also guaranteed: La historia de Bolivianos demuestra que ha sido titinicala luchadel sable contrala idea, del parlamento contrael cuartel,del gobierno civil-simbolo el podermilitar-reflejode la autocracia perfectodel liberalismo--contra de Bolivia, salvo dos o tres administraciones que hastahoy ha gobernado civil.74 raquitica personeria Against these accusationsof continuingmilitarismand before the agreements and party alliances between constitutionalistsand democrats, the Liberal Party defended its legitimacy as a competing party in the elections througha reformulationof the coup d'etat based on the electoral coercion exercised by their adversaries: Mientras Arceatraea los venalescon su plata,Pachecoalejaa los liberales con los soldados,con los policiales,calabozos,sablazos,multasi torturas, con el reclutaje, con la persecuci6n de justicia, porlos jueces o denegaci6n todo a la naci6n con el sudordel ejecutado por ajentes quienespaga .etc., de estei de aquelconvergen contra los liberales pueblo.Asi es quela plata que no tienenmasque su entereza, su honradez i sus desnudos pechosqueoponerles. Colocados en esta situaci6n hondamente quecarcome posici6nse hace . sobremanera . . Solo Dios sefialarnos el rumbo penos podra que hemosde en lucha tan seguirparasalvarla.Pocas horasfaltanpira que ingresemos el resultado no puedesernosdudoso.Preveo preparada; desventajosamente o prescrita indicada el casoen quela violenta quela abstenci6n coacci6n para el se imposibilite sufrajio harai Entonces, indispensable. iqu6 seri del pais?75 The liberal's political coup was not always carriedout, as it was considered a pretext too close to the common interestswith which, in analogous cases, the dictators had justified the uprisings of the emerging interests. However, when it was used, the liberalsrespondedthat it was more than a wish to seize power, it was also an augmentation of the liberalforces against the other parties. It was known in advance that the coup was aimed at conflicting with the forces of two powerful civilian parties, the Democrat and the Constitutional,with the aim not of triumphingover, but ratherof redefining, the elite. Speeches aboutthe continuationor the cessation of the war, conflicts between pro-Peruviansand pro-Chileans,the persistence of
cialismo o por los pronunciamientos de cuartel" EugenioGomez, BautistaSaavedra, (La Paz: Biblioteca del Sesquicentenariode la Repdtblica,1975), p. 51. 74 El Constitucional, Cochabamba,June 18, 1884. 75 ANB (Archivo Nacional de Bolivia). "Carta de Eliodoro Camacho a Escalier," La Paz, May 4, 1888.
monirquica y del predominiopor la fuerza . ...
El partidomilitares el Uinico
MARTA IRUROZQUI
417
the caudillos, and the disasters of militarism were rounded out with the supposed misuse of liberties by the parties and illicit attemptsto spoil the right of free suffrage. These speeches consistedof argumentssupportingthe establishmentof closed blocs of competitorswithin the elite that, in turn, the rest of the populationso that it remainedsubordinate would restructure to the elite's intentions.76The coup d'etat also signified an imposition of legitimacy, valid in an unequalfight, where the acts of political proselytism had increased. The coup was attemptedwith the understandingthat the be theirspokesmen,the representatives of each political participants/victims to the of of determined necessities arbitrary imposition party, capable giving the appearanceof a liberationmission. This quasi-revolutionary orientation made the aims of the LiberalParty a collective necessity against a vigilant social order, because it recognized the right of the dispossessed to happiness, althoughonly in the long run. This did not deterthem from continuing their confidence in political promises since it was not an acceptance of a future but rather an acceptance of the present.77On the other hand, the ConstitutionalPartyof Aniceto Arce tried to delegitimize the liberal option connected with the revolution and the autocratic and despotic abuse of liberty. This conservative strategywas roundedout by making the Liberal Partyappearopposed to the interestsof the army and the popularsectors,78 an act that permittedArce to affirmhis partyas the moralpersonificationof constitutionality,equalitybefore the law, and democracy.The next step was to proclaimthemselves heir to all of the liberalprinciplesreferringto progress which did not contradictthe principlesof libertyand authority,thereby annullingthe LiberalParty'srhetoricalcontrolof them.79Arce practicedthe social philosophy of positivism and this doctrinecontributedgreatly to the thoughtof his political group. His programsummarizedthe path for Bolivia's transformationthrough jobs, industry, associations, foreign capital, improvementsin the means of communication,y por la iniciativa energica, fecunda e ilustrada: anheloconsistirdi, si Ilegoal poder,en organizarlo, ensancharlo ... mi s61lo cambiando la faz econ6mica del paispormediode y protegerlo, porcompleto la industria sin trabas de viasde comunicaci6n y el establecimiento queaproximando a los pueblos de la Repdiblica entresi, los unana las naciones quenos son limitrofes.80 Thus, one can say that the usurpationof ideologies and programseffec76 Exposici6n que dirige a sus conciudadanosel jefe del Partido Liberal General Eliodoro Camacho, (Puno: Ed. Juventud, 1889) p.43. 77 Bourdieu, La distincti6n, p. 163. 78 El Comercio, La Paz, April 26, 1897. 79 El Comercio, La Paz, January11, 1892. 80 CondarcoMorales, Aniceto Arce, p. 530.
418
tively made both parties redundantin that there were no significant differences between the Bolivian political parties, and therefore they neither served as instrumentsof expression for the distinct social classes nor did they permit the country's populationto make its presence felt within the State. On the contrary,they were a form of serving one sector-the dominant class-that needed them to establishthe termsby which its restoration and reconversiondesigns were to be carriedout. And within these designs, stability and order were to be central to the achievementof elite cohesion and subsequent modernizationof the structuresthat ensured its preeminence. This idea gains validity if one examines moments such as that in which colonel Pando assumedthe leadershipof the LiberalParty, replacing General Camacho. One substitutionwas enough to keep this party from becoming an instrumentof a traitorto peruanismo, that is, "un 6rgano disolvente en lo social, revolucionarioen lo politico, y ateo en lo religioso."'81 Immediatelyaccepted were the differencesbetween the previous head and the "honrada,sana y decente" leaderwhom the rest of the parties supported,recognizing "la legalidad actual del orden de cosas, bajo cuyo amparose proponePando una obra de aliento nacional." And from a "minoria revolucionariaque no es la expresi6n genuina de la opini6n ni el pensamientorealizadode ciudadanosbolivianos," the LiberalPartybecame "un verdaderopartido, digno de aprecio y respeto.'"82 This change of attitude may have been related to the drop in silver and the gradualadvancement of La Paz thatobliged Aniceto Arce and othermembersof the southern elite to search for alternativemeans to realize their economic objectives. Their principal solution proposed retentionof their control of the government in an attemptto avoid the nullificationof earlierprojectsundertaken by the emerging elite. Theireconomic foundationswere in a decadentstate and made presidential aid more necessary each time, as the southern mining zones were losing the capacityto supportthemselveseconomically. At first, the conservative elite required political stability to guaranteethe correct functioning of its economic mining establishment, stability achieved throughthe implantationof a political partysystem. In a second stage, this same elite made Presidential involvement essential to prevent the world silver market's collapse from dragging under its principal beneficiaries while also allowing them to diversify investmentsinto other areas. The neutralizingelement was, in both cases, the same-the LiberalParty. The Party's principalthreatlay as much in the development,by many of its
81 82
CondarcoMorales, Aniceto Arce, p. 530. El Comercio, La Paz, May 10, 1892.
MARTA IRUROZQUI
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members, of an increasinglyaggressive and dynamiceconomic behavior, as in its capacityto mobilize the popularsectors, thanksto its deep connections with the urbanand peasant communities. Their involvement with the subordinatedgroups was attributedto the desire to see these groups inherit a militaristic system with great social mobility. Consequently, means by which to nullify and subordinate the Constitutionaland DemocraticParty's ability to neutralizepotential subversives were sought, thereby provoking the discontented and marginalelite, and its network of clients, into questioning the existing order. But if on previous occasions the conservatives employed directcriticismand rhetorical manipulation,this time, with Pando as head of the LiberalParty, the governmentsought to politically defuse the threatby publicly recognizingits value. This was a means for presentingthe Liberal Party to its electorate with the characteristicsand support of the ConservativeParty, that is to say, contradicting its initial principles. However, the conservatives' change of attitude also could be viewed as the simplest way to maintainthe social order, recognizing the equal statureof the LiberalParty so as to attackit. And this came about, for so long as the Liberalsbelieved they had an equal chance to run competitivelythroughthe ballot, they would not think of resortingto a coup d'etat, a threat whose likelihood increased,moreover,due to the contemporaneous deterioration of the elite's foundationsof governmentalpower. The crumblingof its power forced the elite to go to illegal extremes with official measures in order to maintainits presence in the government,in turn, forcing the competitionto bypass constitutionalformulas. The change in attitudeby the conservativeshad its parallelin the liberal ranks that, in appearance,was manifestedas a more compromisingdisposition duringpolitical negotiationsand a decreasedalacrityin resortingto a military coup "desde abajo.'"83 The softening of the group's belligerent conduct did not signify the recognitionof its conservativepolitical practices nor of its social legitimacy, but ratherheraldedthe realizationof the progressive loss of economic livelihood and electoral supportfor the conservative parties against the liberals. They began to believe that they had constitutionaloptions as a legitimate opposition group. This did not mean, however, that they believed they could win in the ballot boxes due to the prevalence of electoral fraud-they would have greater success with an insurrection:
Este programapolitico puede ser o no de oposici6n en el terrenolegal o puede serlo de oposici6n armada, o, en fin de combinaci6n de fracciones de otro
83
El Comercio, La Paz, February11, 1897.
420
circulo. Llegadoel momentooportuno, yo daremi opini6n,la que ha de conformarse de segurocon las quehe profesado desdeque ingres6 en la vida piblica.84 This transpirednot only because of the continuing dissolution of the conservatives' materialbase, but also because of the progress and modernization this sector had been developing which endangeredthe reciprocitypacts of the State with the less privileged groups, i.e. the peasantcommunities.85 The LiberalParty, throughspeeches opposing the breachof those pacts and a long campaignto proselytize the ruralcommunity, would obtain the supportof the indigenouspopulationas an auxiliaryarmy. In addition,the Party would receive the support of the diverse, politically-marginalizedelites during the elections of 1884, 1888, 1892, and 1896, as well as the previously conservative elites, who saw in a change of party orientation the opportunityto conserve its privileges and augment its future options for power.86Despite its populist appearance,the liberals' promise of political revitalization was circumscribedby and directed towards elite cohesion, representing,for once, a momentin which the governmentdid not abandon its earlier political measures-measures which were reinforcedby the acquisition of legitimacy. This legitimacy was closely tied to the discourse concerning what to do with the Indian and the exploitationof the internalizedfears of the criollomestizo association.87Thus developed a cycle of panic in which each individual partof this associationcontributed to thatwhich was most feared, that is, each helped to increase the danger that the subordinatesectors would destroy its privileges. The immediate consequence was an atmosphereof social insecurity that favored the elites in its process of internalreorganization. This occurredbecause the opposition, whatevermeasurethe elite in the governmentwished to pass, was immobilizedby the fear this produced. These internalizedfears made possible a consensus within the elite that, over time, maintainedintact the means for though varied in representation excluding ethnic groups from public participation, thereby guaranteeing their survival.
Carta de Jose Manuel Pando a Lisimaco Gutierrez,Antofagasta, January8, 1889. TristanPlatt, Estado boliviano y ayllu andino: tierra y tributoen el norte de Potosi, (Lima: IEP, 1978). "La experiencia andina del liberalismo boliviano entre 1825 y 1900: raices de la rebeli6n de Chayanta(Potosif)duranteel siglo XIX" in Steve Stern(comp.) Resistenciay conciencia campesina en los Andes, siglos XVIII-XX.(Lima: Institutode Estudios Peruanos, [IEP] 1990). 86 MartaIrurozqui,"Guerrade razas en Bolivia: la (re)invenci6nde una tradici6n," Revista Andina, 21 (Cusco, 1990), pp. 163-200. 87 "La experiencia diaria nos muestraque un abuso trae consigo otro abuso, que tras una estralimitaci6n vienen otras extralimitaciones,"El Comercio, November 18, 1898.
84
85
MARTA IRUROZQUI THE MILITARY AND THE ANTI-MILITARIST DISCOURSE
421
Anotheraspect which should be consideredis the position of the military within the dynamics of anti-militarist discourses. The suppressionof milias caudillismo a dominant tary system of political control was initiatedwith the defeat in the War of the Pacific that revealed the backwardnessof the This event solidified the idea thatit was now no longer Bolivian military.88 to risk necessary governing throughthe supportof a military faction.89In this way, the post-warpolitical logic and the absence of a professionalarmy caused the party regime to reinstate the old militarism. But if it was the installationof a civil oligarchicalsystem, reducingthe political aspirations for social ascent within the various military groups, it nonetheless offered those in the military a place in guiding the party system: the job of supervising the elections. This act permittedthe army to acquire the capacity to act as arbiterin the political system, simply in termsof its relative strength. The reconstructionproject of the criollo elite found in this institution an instrumentfor purges and deliberationsthat it utilized in the "revolutions" of 1899 and 1920 to ensure its reconversion.In the process, the expansion of landownerpropertywas essential, and was achieved throughthe seizure of communal land. This measureformed an unavoidablepart of the liberal ideology that consideredthe destructionof the materialistfoundationsof all institutionalizedcollectives and judicial suppressionof its corporateprivileges fundamental to the installation of a modem regime.90 The disappearance of the indigenous communities was thereforenecessary as much for the economic modernization of Bolivia as for the regeneration of the elite which was to support this process. To suffocate the uprisings this would provoke, the aid of the militarywas necessary. Its actions on the side of the landowners, as well as its presence in the colonizationof the East,91would end up defining these as its characteristic activities. Above all, avenues were examined throughwhich the military could be made useful in the new political regime while at the same time eradicating its tendency to overtake the government-therefore, the military was as"El militarismo," EL Constitucional,Cochabamba,July 4, 1884. "El lado flaco en este partido(Liberal), y que fue admirablemente explotado por los adversarios, era que para aspiraral poder Ilevabacomo candidatoa un militar, siendo asi que la tendencia comdin,el anhelo vivamente sentido por todos era acabarya con las candidaturas militares." Arguedas, Historica general, 1922, p. 425. 90 Guerra,Mexico, pp. 229-30. 91 Erick Langer and Robert Jackson,"El Liberalismoy el Problemade la Tierra en Bolivia, 19251920" Siglo XIX. Revista de Historia, (Monterrey1990).
88 89
422
signed functions that would favor the elite's primacy. These new delegated ideas developed by Narresponsibilitieswere inspiredby threefundamental ciso Campero:the armedforces should not interferein partypolitics, nor be led blindly by those makingup the government,nor act as anythingelse but the nationalarmedforces in the defense of the countryand the law. Campero advised, in short, the absoluteremovalof the militaryclass's electoralrights and the conversion of the class into a nationalistBolivian force: a nuestros Convienepredicar de armas del ej6rcito la amigosy compafieros mis tranquila lealtad a la ley. Boliviase salvard de todos sumisi6n y acendrada sus malesy se presentard al extranjero cuando el respetable hagamos praictico ofrezcamos nuestra al les adhesi6n sufragio y designado por mayoria. iQu6 a los militares candidatura?92 ninguna importa Thus, with the consent of the conservativesand liberals, the armybecame de la ley y el defensorde la integridad "93 once more "el guardiain territorial, regenerating its caudillista antecedents. While the importance of a noncaudillista military was admitted, the army's supportfor the Liberal Party remaineddivided and was retractedin cases of a coup d'etat: No entraademris en nuestros el crimenen toda su verprop6sitos presentar usabavilmentede la gonzosadesnudez paraprobar que el militarismo tinica armaque posefahaciendo victimasdel honrado ciudadano que vive de sus rentascomo del proletario, del indio que vejetaen nuestras sierrasdiridas. Hemosvistopasar delante de nosotros comoaterradores fantasmas, gobiernos sin ley, blandiendo la espadasobreinocentes cabezase imponiendo su voluntad comoel amoal esclavo.Todoesto lo recordamos con espanto, perono los m6ritosdel actualmilitarismo, no somos sus detractores. amenguamos Hemosluchado contra no el de hoy sea el mismoque y lucharemos porque 61, su representante, el dignogeneral del 27 de diciembre sea ni ayer,ni porque en poco, semejante a los dominadores de otro tiempo.Pero si porqueanhelamos de la escenapolitica de Boliviamienqueel militarismo desaparezca trasse olvideunpasado de crimenes; al adelanto de la clase porque aspiramos militarque no ha negado a la categoria de instituci6n entrenostoros; atin la bandera de las verdades de la porquedeseamosver en Boliviatriunfante a la sombra no ya de las bayonetas, sino del pensamiento democracia, y la idea.94 The conservative denunciationof the popular vote's corruptionby the heirs to caudillismo-that is, the liberals--criticized above all the salvation of the armedforces. For them, the militarywas to be not only a guarantor of constitutionalorderbut also the principalforce againstthe militarismthat
92 Aguirre and Aranibar,Intereses nacionales, p. 4. 93 Aguirre and Aranibar,Intereses nacionales, p. 3. 94 El Comercio, La Paz, April 10, 1880.
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preceded the Pacific War. The liberals' measurewas favorableas much to the civilians as to the militaryclass, for it reducedthe risk of legitimizing uprisings while also presenting the military with an ideal opportunityto purge their caudillista past and thereby regain the prestige lost after the Pacific War debacle. The recognitionby the civil governmentof the necessity of maintainingcontrol of the army did nothing but confirm the elite's need to find a way to solve its partyrivalries. CSIC-IUOYG Centro de Estudios Hist6ricos Madrid, Spain
MARTA IRUROZQUI

Irurozqui Political Leadership and Popular Consent Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899

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Irurozqui Political Leadership and Popular Consent Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899

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Political Leadership and Popular Consent: Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899 Author(s): Marta Irurozqui Reviewed work(s): Source:

POLITICALLEADERSHIPAND POPULAR CONSENT: PARTY STRATEGIESIN BOLIVIA, 1880-1899*

governmentalera of the Bolivian conservative parties-

PARTY STRATEGIESIN BOLIVIA

PARTY STRATEGIESIN BOLIVIA

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND PARTY STRATEGIES

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA

CondarcoMorales, Aniceto Arce, p. 542.

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA

FranqoisXavier Guerra,Mexico: del antiguo regimena la revoluci6n(Mexico: FCE, 1991), p. 181.

PARTY STRATEGIESIN BOLIVIA

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA

monirquica y del predominiopor la fuerza . ...

PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIA

CondarcoMorales, Aniceto Arce, p. 530. El Comercio, La Paz, May 10, 1892.

El Comercio, La Paz, February11, 1897.

PARTY STRATEGIESIN BOLIVIA

MARTA IRUROZQUI THE MILITARY AND THE ANTI-MILITARIST DISCOURSE

PARTY STRATEGIESIN BOLIVIA

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