Padua vs. People G.R no. 168546 DECISION QUISUMBING, J.

This petition for review assails the Decision dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, [3] [4] 2004 and July 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation. The facts, culled from the records, are as follows: On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch [5] [6] 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive [7] Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for selling dangerous drugs. The Information reads: The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. Allan and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. Mike, with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows: On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseurbuyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. Contrary to law.
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[1]

[2]

When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.

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During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Paduas counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders [10] [11] under Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection. Thus, the RTC on the same date issued [12] an Order stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded [13] guilty. Hence, in a Decision dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged: In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. SO ORDERED.
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Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first[16] time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as The Probation Law of 1976 and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said laws. The RTC in an Order dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a PostSentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the order. On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report [18] to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation. However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition [19] for Probation on the ground that under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus: Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana. In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence. On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned. More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted: Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (underlining supplied) WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
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Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
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Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [021-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW. II. WHETHER OR NOT *THE+ ACCUSED*S+ RIGHT *TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE+ HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER [22] PURPOSES.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that I. THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW. II. SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH [24] THE LAW HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.

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as its

Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari assailing the trial [25] courts order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and [26] Welfare Act of 2006, violated? and (3) Does Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law have application in this case? As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari. For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, [27] speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at [28] all in contemplation of law.

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas petition for probation. Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit: SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must [29] be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of [30] intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be [31] no departure. Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections [32] [33] 11 and 15 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on [34] probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways. The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug [35] traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so. The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165. As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule [36] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law has application in this case. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation. Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the [38] law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years . Petitioner has already reached 21 years [39] of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee. Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant. Gregorio Baroque for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.: In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the co-operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, 1 make the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative." To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the following: "Then petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not appear. In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent 2 on preference of credits. Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P" respondent, in effect, 3 implemented the said provision of law. This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.

1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative 4 branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the 5 scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently born to that effect. . 2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from 6 instituting a a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa, this Court held. "Man-damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the 7 law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. The opinion continued in this wise:"According to former Chief Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated: "This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: "It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty 8 9 already imposed." So it has been since then. The latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations 10 Commission, this court speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful 11 cases. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners, vs. CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, Respondent. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision dated 2 September 14, 2004 and the Resolution dated November 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578. The assailed Decision set aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), and dismissed the deportation case filed against Christopher Koruga (respondent), an American national, for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; while the assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The factual background of the case is as follows: Sometime in August 2001, then BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous letter requesting the deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien for having been found guilty of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, United States of America (USA) for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in 1983.
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On the basis of a Summary of Information, the Commissioner issued Mission Order No. ADD-01-162 on September 13, 2001 directing Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Lino G. Caligasan, Chief of the Intelligence Mission and any available BI Special Operations Team Member to conduct verification/ validation of the admission status and activities of respondent and effect his immediate arrest if he is found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. On September 17, 2001, respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The case was docketed as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-126. The Charge Sheet reads: On September 17, 2001, at about 10:00 A.M., respondent was arrested by Intelligence operatives at his residence, located at 1001 MARBELLA CONDOMINIUM II, Roxas Boulevard, Malate, Manila, pursuant to Mission Order No. ADD-01-162; That respondent was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled Substance Act in connection with his being Drug Trafficker and/or Courier of prohibited drugs in the State of Washington, United States of America, thus, making him an undesirable alien and/or a public burden in violation of Sec. 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. CONTRARY TO LAW.
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On September 28, 2001, after filing a Petition for Bail and Supplemental Petition for Bail, respondent was granted bail and 9 provisionally released from the custody of the BI. Following the submission of respondent's Memorandum and the BI Special Prosecutor's Memorandum, the BOC rendered a 12 Judgment dated February 11, 2002 ordering the deportation of respondent under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. On February 26, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the BOC in a Resolution dated March 19, 2002. Unaware that the BOC already rendered its Resolution dated March 19, 2002, respondent filed on April 2, 2002, a 14 15 Manifestation and Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Cautelam with the Office of the President, which referred the appeal to the DOJ. On April 1, 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong rendered a Resolution dismissing the appeal. On April 15, 2003, 17 18 respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which he subsequently withdrew on April 23, 2003. On April 24, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
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with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76578, seeking to set aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC. On September 14, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision setting aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC and dismissing the deportation case filed against respondent. The CA held that there was no valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent since there was no violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed the case for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA filed against respondent; that petitioners further failed to present or attach to their pleadings any document which would support their allegations that respondent entered into a plea bargain with the U.S. Prosecutor for deferred sentence nor did they attach to the record the alleged order or judgment of the U.S. Court which would show the conviction of respondent for violation of the prohibited drugs law in the USA; that even if respondent was convicted and sentenced for the alleged offense, his deportation under Section 37(a)(4) is improper, since the prohibited drugs law referred to therein refers not to a foreign drugs law but to the Philippine drugs law, then Republic Act No. 6425 or the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972"; that although the BOC is clothed with exclusive authority to decide as to the right of a foreigner to enter the country, still, such executive officers must act within the scope of their authority or their decision is a nullity. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its presently assailed Resolution dated November 24, 2004.
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Hence, the present petition on the following grounds: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE SUBJECT CASE WHICH FALLS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT. II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT COULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OVER THE CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF HEREIN PETITIONERS. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST THE HEREIN RESPONDENT WERE DROPPED. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIOR CONVICTION IS REQUIRED BEFORE RESPONDENT COULD BE 23 DEPORTED. Petitioners contend that the BI has exclusive authority in deportation proceedings and no other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence presented therein; that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioners when they sought the deportation of respondent since he was convicted by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington for attempted Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and underwent probation in lieu of the imposition of sentence; that the dismissal of the charge against respondent was only with respect to penalties and liabilities, obtained after fulfilling the conditions for his probation, and was not an acquittal from the criminal case charged against him; that there is a valid basis to declare respondent's undesirability and effect his deportation since respondent has admitted guilt of his involvement in a drug-related case. On the other hand, respondent submits that the proceedings against him reek of persecution; that the CA did not commit any error of law; that all the arguments raised in the present petition are mere rehashes of arguments raised before and ruled upon by the CA; and that, even assuming that Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 does not apply, there is no reason, whether compelling or slight, to deport respondent. There are two issues for resolution: (1) whether the exclusive authority of the BOC over deportation proceedings bars judicial review, and (2) whether there is a valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent. The Court resolves the first issue in the negative. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that 24 25 the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress 26 or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or 27 jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. In Domingo v. Scheer, the Court set aside the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC over an alien for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in violation of the alien's constitutional and statutory rights to due process, since the BOC ordered the deportation of the alien without conducting summary deportation proceedings and without affording the alien the right to be heard on his motion for reconsideration and adduce evidence thereon. In House of Sara Lee v. Rey, the Court held that while, as a general rule, the factual findings of administrative agencies are not subject to review, it is equally established that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are contrary to evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the CA as 30 provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended. Clearly, the filing by respondent of a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to assail the order of deportation on the ground of grave abuse of discretion is permitted. This brings us to the second issue.
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The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and 31 administrative issuances pursuant thereto. Respondent was charged with violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which provides: Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. xxxx (4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Respondent contends that the use of the definite article "the" immediately preceding the phrase "law on prohibited drugs" emphasizes not just any prohibited drugs law but the law applicable in this jurisdiction, at that time, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 32 1972. The Court disagrees. The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, 33 they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a 34 whole. After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to 35 avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.
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Were the Court to follow the letter of Section 37(a)(4) and make it applicable only to convictions under the Philippine prohibited drugs law, the Court will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws may be allowed to enter the country to the detriment of the public health and safety of its citizens. It suggests a double standard of treatment where only aliens convicted of Philippine prohibited drugs law would be deported, while aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws would be allowed entry in the country. The Court must emphatically reject such interpretation of the law. Certainly, such a situation was not envisioned by the framers of the law, for to do so would be contrary to reason and therefore, absurd. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for which the law was passed. This Court has, in many cases involving the construction of statutes, always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity, and that therefore a literal interpretation is to be 37 rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes no distinction between a foreign prohibited drugs law and the Philippine prohibited 38 drugs law, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Thus, Section 37(a)(4) should apply to those convicted of all prohibited drugs laws, whether local or foreign.lavvphi1.zw+ There is no dispute that respondent was convicted of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA for attempted possession of cocaine, as shown by the Order Deferring Imposition of Sentence 39 (Probation). While he may have pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, and was not imprisoned but applied for and underwent a one-year probation, still, there is no escaping the fact that he was convicted under a prohibited drugs law, even though it may

simply be called a "misdemeanor drug offense." The BOC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the deportation of respondent. The Court quotes with approval the following acute pronouncements of the BOC: x x x We note that the respondent admitted in his Memorandum dated 8 October 2001 that he pleaded guilty to the amended information where he allegedly attempted to have in his possession a certain controlled substance, and a narcotic drug. Further, he filed a "Petition for Leave to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and Enter Plea of Not Guilty" to obtain a favorable release from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the filing of the said charge. Evidently, the U.S. Court issued the Order of Dismissal in exchange for the respondent's plea of guilty to the lesser offense. Though legally allowed in the U.S. Law, We perceive that this strategy afforded the respondent with a convenient vehicle to avoid conviction and sentencing. Moreover, the plea of guilty is by itself crystal clear acknowledgment of his involvement in a drug-related offense. Hence, respondent's discharge from conviction and sentencing cannot hide the fact that he has a prior history of drug-related charge. This country cannot countenance another alien with a history of a drug-related offense. The crime may have been committed two decades ago but it cannot erase the fact that the incident actually happened. This is the very core of his inadmissibility into the Philippines. Apparently, respondent would like Us to believe that his involvement in this drug case is a petty offense or a mere misdemeanor. However, the Philippine Government views all drug-related cases with grave concern; hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972" and the creation of various drug-enforcement agencies. While We empathize with the innocent portrayal of the respondent as a man of irreproachable conduct, not to mention the numerous written testimonies of good character submitted in his behalf, this incomplete and sanitized representation cannot, however, outweigh our commitment and sworn duty to safeguard public health and public safety. Moreover, while the U.S. Government may not have any law enforcement interest on respondent, Philippine immigration authorities certainly do in the able and competent exercise of its police powers. Thus, this case of the respondent is no different from a convicted felon abroad, who argues that he cannot be removed from the Philippines on the ground that the crime was committed abroad. Otherwise, it would open the floodgates to other similarly situated aliens demanding their admission into the country. Indeed, respondent may not be a menace to the U.S. as a result of his being discharged from criminal liability, but that does not ipso facto mean that the immigration authorities should unquestionably admit him into the country. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully 42 admissible at the time of his entry. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon 43 such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, 44 an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose 45 continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration ordering the deportation of respondent Christopher Koruga under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
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DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.: Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, [1] scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for [2] misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, [3] the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwis e known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election , petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree. The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. [Emphasis added.] It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of [4] the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an [5] effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, [6] nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the [7] Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x. Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the [8] intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same [9] having been scheduled on May 1997. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.