Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning

Roy A. Prete

The Journal of Military History, Volume 73, Number 2, April 2009, pp. 417-448 (Article) Published by Society for Military History DOI: 10.1353/jmh.0.0266

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Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning
I

Roy A. Prete
Abstract This paper examines the origins of the Battle of the Somme within the context of French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffres effort to coordinate Allied military operations in 1916 and to mount a combined AngloFrench offensive on the Western Front. The French chose a joint operation on the Somme, in which they would play the major role, as a means of leading the British into battle. But a major British attritional operation preceding the offensive was dropped, and ironically, the French Army bore the brunt of Allied wastage in the German attack at Verdun until the Somme offensive began on 1 July 1916.

he literature on World War I continues to flourish as scholars comb the archives and rethink the issues in quest of new and more satisfying interpretations.1 For the British, the Battle of the Somme, the first great battle of the war
1. Volumes of note include Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking, 2004); David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 2004); George H. Cassar, Kitcheners War: British Strategy from 1914 to 1916 (Washington: Brasseys Inc., 2004); Gary Sheffield and John Bourne, eds., Douglas Haig; War Diaries and Letters 19141918 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005); Robert T. Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Eric von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 18701916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2005); Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Roy A. Prete is a professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario. The author of several articles on Anglo-French military relations in World War I, he is completing a trilogy of books, Strategy and Command: The Anglo-French Coalition on the Western Front, 1914-16, of which the first volume on 1914 will be published by McGillQueens University Press in 2009.
The Journal of Military History 73 (April 2009): 417-448. Copyright 2009 by The Society for Military History, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing from the Editor, Journal of Military History, George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, P.O. Drawer 1600, Lexington, VA 24450. Authorization to photocopy items for internal and personal use is granted by the copyright holder for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), 121 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA (www.copyright.com), provided the appropriate fee is paid to the CCC.

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dominated by British forcesa bloodbath of unprecedented proportionsholds a particular fascination.2 The commemorative events of 2006 marking its ninetieth anniversary, including academic conferences and on-site remembrances, have long since come and gone.3 Several scholars have made recent contributions to the subject. Robert A. Doughty has helped us understand the developing concept of attrition in French staff thinking and the ongoing opposition of General Ferdinand Foch, the Northern Army Group Commander, to an operation he deemed unlikely to produce decisive results. Elizabeth Greenhalgh has underscored the tendency of the French staff to consider the French and British forces as one army in their strategic planning, and has noted the divergences between British and French perceptions and plans as the battle approached. And Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have underlined the important role of the British War Committee in the formulation and control of British strategy prior to authorization of the joint offensive, without, however, having delved into the French role in the planning of the offensive.4 Several questions on the origin of the Somme offensive, nonetheless, remain unresolved, particularly as to the role of the French staff and Anglo-French interaction in the planning process, despite a spirited controversy between two scholars on the reasons for British participation in the offensive.5 Such unanswered questions and controversy are enticing invitations to further research and appraisal. The purpose of this paper is to trace from archival sources the origins of the AngloFrench Battle of the Somme in relationship to French Commander-in-Chief Joseph J.-C. Joffres wider attempt to coordinate the Entente coalition, consisting of France, Britain, Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Belgium. This task, which he undertook in the latter part of 1915, must be considered in addition to the role of de facto
2. See, for example, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005); Peter Hart, The Somme (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005); Martin Gilbert, The Somme: Heroism and Horror in the First World War (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006); Christopher Duffy, Through German Eyes: The British and the Somme 1916 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2006). 3. Of particular note: The 90th Anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, International Conference, University of Kent, 1719 July 2006; Western Front Association, Great War Conference, 45 November 2006, National Army Museum, Chelsea, United Kingdom; and several Battle of the Somme Commemorations in 2006: Western Front Association, U.S. Branch, 90th Anniversaries of Verdun and the Somme Commemorative Events [including several on location]. 4. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations, 25090; Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, 4363; Prior and Wilson, The Somme, 1569. Prior and Wilson have not consulted any French sources (Ibid.). 5. Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Why the British Were on the Somme in 1916, War in History 6 (1999): 14773; William Philpott, Why the British Were Really on the Somme: A Reply to Elizabeth Greenhalgh, War in History 9 (2002): 44671; Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Flames Over the Somme: A Retort to William Philpott, War in History (2003): 33542; William Philpott, The Anglo-French Victory on the Somme, Diplomacy and Statecraft 17 (2006): 73151.

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coordinator of Anglo-French forces, which he assumed in August 1914 and continued to exercise. The essay will also consider the relative impact of French and British government policy and political oversight of joint military planning with regard to the 1916 offensive. For almost a generation, British historiography has shifted its focus from emphasis on the strategic debate between easterners and westerners to the broader issue of how to best manage the Allied coalition.6 The latter half of 1915 is particularly crucial in this discussion relative to the Entente powers since, for the first time, Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, with the assent of Frances Allied partners, undertook to coordinate the strategic planning of the Allied armies, to produce first a General Joseph Joffre, French Commander- coordinated effort for the fall of 1915, and in-Chief, August 1914December 1916 then a unified Allied offensive in 1916 to [Courtesy of the Service historique de deliver the knockout blow that would force la Dfense, Vincennes, France.] the Central PowersGermany, AustriaHungary, Turkey, and Bulgariato their knees. Joffre faced the additional task of coordinating the efforts of Allied forces on the Western Front. The concept of obtaining the maximum return from French allies inherent in these endeavors was not new in French planning, the entire prewar strategy for victory over the Central Powers having been based on the effective operation of French alliances. A closer look at the initial planning of the Battle of the Somme, with evidence gleaned from in-depth archival research in French and British archives, reveals that the Battle of the Somme was the culmination of a long series of measures, ploys, and discussions, by which the French had attempted to draw the British more fully into the war effort in France. Entering the war in August 1914 with a limited commitment to continental defense, the British government had reluctantly increased its commitment of troops and resources by degrees, as crisis succeeded crisis in the field. During the summer of 1915, the British government decided, largely in the face of French and Russian weakness, to send their New Armies of recently trained volunteers to France, and ultimately, for many of the same reasons,
6. See, for example, Keith Neilson, Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914 1917 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984); David French, British Strategy and War Aims 19141916 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Kathleen Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 19141918 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).
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to engage them fully in battle in the fall Loos-Champagne offensive. By 1916, with westerner Sir William Robertson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff exercising the dominant influence on British strategy, the British government was willing, though with some hesitation, to pursue a Western Front strategy and to engage British forces in the great battles of the war in 1916. The British Cabinet was thus prepared to follow Joffres lead in preparing a major Anglo-French offensive on the Somme, in concert with a combined Allied offensive against the Central Powers. Sir Douglas Haig, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), was thus obliged to defer and ultimately sacrifice his preferred coastal offensive in Flanders on the altar of Allied solidarity. The experience of trench warfare, with its heavy losses and little tangible territorial gain, had led the French and their allies to the conclusion that attrition and wastage of German forces were required as a precondition to breakthrough and ultimate victory. The British government, however, proved unwilling to have the manpower-rich British engage in major preliminary wearing operations without the French, as Joffre wished, in advance of the major joint offensive. This dispute formed the background to a revised strategy for the joint attack, focused on decisive action and breakthrough, to be preceded only by a series of short diversionary wearing operations. The belligerent powers during World War I were dealing with a new kind of war experience, the industrialized war of the twentieth century, which, after a period of movement ending in November 1914, resulted in trench warfare and stalemate on the Western Front. This was a different kind of war, for which the nineteenth-century experience and training of the generals had ill-equipped them,7 and for which the perception and practices of the politicians provided insufficient guidance. There was thus a tangible groping at the wall at every level of leadership, in a war largely experimental in nature. As the war dragged on, the Allied lack of success began to undermine the publics confidence in its leaders, both political and military. Both French and British governments by mid-1915 were coalitions with inherent elements of instability. In the French case, the Union Sacre government of Ren Viviani rested on shifting political groupings and interests whose strategic demands had to be considered. In the British case, the coalition government of H. H. Asquith, formed in May 1915, rested on the support of an unhappy amalgam of Liberals and Unionists, without strong central leadership. Moreover, the high commands and their staffs, who made the military plans, had varying degrees of latitude and enjoyed differing degrees of support from their governments.8 By the end of Political-Military Framework

7. See Timothy Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 19001918 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987). 8. On the British side, see Llewellyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War of 19141918 (London: Methuen and Co., 1967); on the French side, Jere Clemens King, Generals and Politi-

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1915, significant changes had already taken place in both countries in politicalmilitary leadership, the institutional framework, and overall perceptions of the war. The Entente political-military context thus set the stage, defining the leadership role of the French staff and the corresponding British role in the decision-making process, as the third campaign season of the war approached. By the fall of 1915, the French government and command were having serious trouble justifying to the public their performance in the conduct of the war. The basic problem was the continuing failure to win the war, and the heavy costs involved in pursuing a war of attrition, with no visible end in sight. Despite his titanic reputation as Victor of the Marne, Joffre, the French Commander-inChief, was under severe criticism. His initial policy of nibbling on the enemy with partial offensives following the onset of trench warfare in November 1914 had been unduly costly without visible results, and his major offensives in the spring and fall of 1915, despite the mobilization of material resources to produce more guns and shells, produced no tangible results.9 By the end of 1915, France, which had carried the major burden of the war on the Western Front, had already suffered losses of nearly 2 million, of whom 1 million were dead.10 The Union Sacre of Ren Vivianis government thus gave way in late October. Those who felt France needed a change of military leadership, such as Georges Clemenceau, Paul Doumer, and Charles Humbert, members of the Army Commission of the Senate, focused their support on General Joseph Gallieni as a replacement for Joffre. Easterners in the Cabinet, Aristide Briand and several others, felt that France needed a new strategy to focus on external theaters. The Salonika expedition had been launched a few months earlier by the government to respond to these demands. This hastily contrived adventure superseded an earlier plan for an expanded Dardanelles deploymentwhich itself had been orchestrated to provide a suitable command for General Maurice Sarrail, the darling of the Left and a potential rival of Joffre. When the Ren Viviani government came down at the end of October, ostensibly because of the failure of its Balkan policy, Aristide Briand managed to plaster together a new Union Sacre. Criticism of Joffres command was blunted by installing General Gallieni as the Minister of War, to exercise a closer supervision of Joffre. In addition, major strategic initiatives would now have to be approved by a revitalized Conseil Suprieur de la Dfense Nationale, an inner Cabinet consisting of key ministersthe Prime Minister, the War Minister, the Navy Minister, and others as requiredpresided over by the President of the French Government and Command

cians: Conflict between Frances High Command, Parliament and Government, 19141918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951). 9. See Pierre Varillon, Joffre (Paris: Librairie Arthme Fayard, 1956), 357420. 10. Woodward, Great Britain and the War, 143.
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Republic, whose role in the wartime setting continued to expand.11 Joffres powers were thus severely curtailed. But Gallieni, Joffres former chief in Madagascar, soon found himself in conflict with Joffre, who resisted tighter control of his command, and at the same time requested, for the sake of unity of action, that he be placed in charge of all operationsnot only in France, but also in the Middle East where the Salonika expedition had assumed greater proportions.12 In Gallienis clash with Joffre, the government finally sided with Joffre. The government agreed on the need for unity of action, but rejected a plan to install Gallieni as Commander-in-Chief on all fronts, for fear of involving the parliament in strategy.13 Thus, on 2 December, to the consternation of some Socialists, who were still stinging under Joffres heavyhanded dismissal of Sarrail, Joffre was made Commander-in-Chief of all French Armies in France and in the Middle East. And eight days later, General Edouard de Curires de Castelnau, a recognized staff officer (then in command of the Second Army Group), was installed as Joffres Chief of Staff to anchor him with high-level professional advice.14 The extension of Joffres jurisdiction in effect was a clever ploy by Briand to bind Joffre to his eastern policy and oblige him to divert resources to Sarrail, while at the same time raising Joffres stature so that he could better deal with the Allies in interallied planning.15 But, all of Joffres plans for interallied planning had to be approved by the French government in the Conseil Suprieur de la Dfense Nationale. Ironically, while Joffres overall jurisdiction in the direction of the war had been considerably broadened, his liberty of action had been seriously undermined, and the governments role enhanced.16 The long process of the reassertion of civilian
11. See King, Generals and Politicians, 3688, for an account of the activities of the parliamentary commissions and the Sarrail affair; also Jan K. Tanenbaum, General Maurice Sarrail, 18561929 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), 5174. For illuminating insight on Joffres relationship with the politicians, see Varillon, Joffre, 357420. Varillon alone has had access to Joffres private papers. On the wide jurisdiction exercised by President Raymond Poincar in diplomatic and military affairs during the war, see J. F. V. Keiger, Raymond Poincar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 193239. See also Roy A. Prete, Joffre and the Question of Allied Supreme Command, 19141916, in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 16 (1989): 333. 12. Raymond Poincar, Au service de la France, vol. 7, Guerre de sige (Paris: Plon, 1931), 25 November 1915, 27780. 13. Raymond Poincar, Notes Journalires, XLI, 1, 2 dcembre 1915, 189, 193, Fonds Poincar, NAF 16038, Bibliothque Nationale, Paris [hereafter BN], 14. See Poincar, Guerre de sige, 9 and 10 October 1915, 16870. 15. Prete, Joffre and the Question of Allied Supreme Command, 333. 16. There is at least a grain of truth in A. J. P. Taylors pithy statement that the French, who had little faith in Joffre, kept him as Commander-in-Chief because they thought that this would please the Allies, and the Allies, who also had no faith in Joffre, conformed to his wishes, because they thought that this would please the French. (A. J. P. Taylor, Illustrated History of the First World War [New York: G. P. Putnams Sons, 1964], 8283.)

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authority over the high command was well under way. The French government thus began to play a more aggressive role in interallied coordination. Joffres consistent operational goal, determined by the political and physical realities of the situation, was to beat the German Army and drive it out of France.17 Failure of the costly offensives launched in 1915 was blamed on the lack of heavy artillery and munitions. The response was to order massive amounts of heavy artillery and shells, which French industry provided in remarkable quantities. Though not unresponsive to the tactical needs of the new conditions of trench warfare, the French staff s reevaluation of tactics proceeded more slowly.18 The experiences of 1915, in its view, demonstrated that French troops could always penetrate the German trenches. The problem was not how to breach the trenches but how to exploit victory. In its analysis, the Artois offensive in the spring of 1915 failed because of the narrowness of the attack, which, after an initial breakthrough, exposed their flanks to enemy counterfire, and because of the availability of German reserves. The 1915 fall offensives were thus launched on two fronts, with an initial attack by the British at Loos to draw in enemy reserves followed by the main French attack in Champagne to make a breakthrough.19 But, in the French view, the availability of German reserves proved decisive, leading to failure of both attacks. To win the war, the French concluded, the Allies would have to use up available enemy reserves on all fronts before engaging in the decisive battles. Joffres growing concept of the need for the attrition of the enemy prior to ultimate victory formed the backdrop to his plans for the coordination of Allied military operations in the fall of 1915.20 French grand strategy prior to 1914 relied not only on French military strength, but also on the support of French allies, of which Russia, deemed a faithful ally, was the chief cornerstone. From the time of his appointment as French Chief of Staff in 1911, Joffre had recognized fully that the next war would be a coalition war, which could be won only by the concerted action of allies. One of his first moves
17. [ Joseph J.-C.] Joffre, The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre, trans. Colonel T. Bentley Mott, 2 vols. (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1932), 1: 327. 18. See Michel Goya, La chair et lacier: lArme franaise et linvention de la guerre moderne, 19141918 (Paris: Tallandier, 2004); Captain James K. Hogue, Andr Laffargue and the Birth of Infiltration Tactics, paper presented at the Meeting of the Western Society for French History, 21 October 1989, at New Orleans, Louisiana. 19. Note au sujet des conditions gnrales de la guerre sur le front occidental, 25 mai 1915, France, Ministre de la Guerre, tat Major de lArme, Service Historique, Les Armes Franaises dans la Grande Guerre, 105 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 192339) (hereafter AFGG), II, A (II), no. 360. This official history, with massive tomes of accompanying documents, is excellent on operations, but omits important diplomatic and political documents. 20. 3e Bureau, Note sur lemploi des forces anglaises pendant la campagne dhiver 1915 1916, 7 October 1915, AFGG, III, A (III), no. 2792; Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations, 25052.
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therefore was to ascertain the nature of the diplomatic setting, and then to enter into closer collaboration with Russia, Frances principal ally.21 His decision in 1911 to take the offensive in any future war with Germany was based on the assurance that Russia would also launch a major offensive against Germany in East Prussia by the sixteenth day of mobilization in order to divert at least a fifth of available German forces to the East.22 On the other hand, repeated attempts by the French government to draw the British, linked only by the tenuous Entente cordiale, into a firmer commitment prior to 1914 had failed. While staff and naval conversations laid down a contingency plan, the arrangement contained no firmer assurance than the promise to consult in time of crisis, and, as a result of the 1912 naval accords, for the British to defend the French northern sea coast. The apocryphal story of a conversation between Major General Henry Wilson and General Ferdinand Foch in 1910 contains the germ of the relationship. What would you say was the smallest British military force that would be of any practical assistance to you . . . ? Wilson queried. One single private soldier, replied Foch, and we would take good care that he was killed.23 To draw the British deeper in their commitment to French defense was a major French goal from the outset of the war. In this the French government and high command worked hand in glove. Joffres consistent goal was thus to obtain maximum participation from his British allies, and to submit them to French strategic control.24 The goal of fully involving French allies had been pursued with at least a modicum of success in 1914, the initial Russian offensive in 1914 having contributed significantly to the Battle of the Marne by the diversion of German forces to the Eastern Front, and the British having played an ever-increasing and significant role in all the left-flank battles from the outset of the war.25 The Russian attack in Galicia in March 1915 had led the Germans to withdraw eight divisions from the Western Front, and ultimately to choose the Eastern Front for their 1915 offensive.26 By mid-1915, however, the seeming unity of Allied efforts had broken down, as the British pursued a competing policy of peripheral operations in the Dardanelles offensive, and the Russians retreated before the combined might of the German and Austro-Hungarian offensive. As a military man possessed of a strong
21. Joffre, Memoirs, 1: 3642, 5561. 22. Joffre, Memoirs, 1: 5557ff. 23. Major-General C. E. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. His Life And Diaries, 2 vols. (London: Cassell and Co., 1927), 1:2829. Though somewhat dated, the best account remains Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy : Britain and France Prepare for War, 19041914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969). 24. See Roy A. Prete, The War of Movement on the Western Front, AugustNovember 1914: A Study in Coalition Warfare (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, 1979), 5026. 25. See William James Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 191418 (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 1550. 26. See Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun, 12655.

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The Western Front [adapted from the West Point Atlas]

sense of Allied solidarity, Horatio H. Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, was motivated by concerns for the overall effectiveness of the coalition earlier than many others.27 As early as March 1915, he had suggested to the French that Joffre ought to play a larger role in the overall coordination of the coalition with a view to simultaneous attacks on both Eastern and Western fronts.28 The Italians
27. See Prete, War of Movement, 100101, 13538, 25055, 26570; Neilson, Strategy and Supply, 711.
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also seemed agreeable to a French initiative. At the same time, the French staff came to the conclusion in June 1915, following successive Russian reversals on the Eastern Front, that the la guerre nest pas conduite (The war is without direction) and that lack of coordination was a major weakness of the coalition. The French staff concluded that France, as the lynchpin of the coalition, ought to take the initiative in Allied strategic planning.29 Unfortunately, a plan to create a central organ for the coordination of Allied operations was dropped in the haste to convene the July conference to deal with the immediate situation.30 Joffres first attempt at Allied military coordination thus began in the summer of 1915. The coordination of Allied military efforts depended on the realization by the respective governments and commands that the war could not be won by a series of isolated actions, and that the Allies would have to cooperate to produce the desired effect. Because of his prestige as Victor of the Marne and the central role of France in the coalition, the French commander, though lacking any official mandate, had the tacit support of the Allies for taking the initiative in calling the first interallied military conference, which met at French Headquarters at Chantilly on 7 July 1915.31 The day previous, as de facto coordinator on the Western Front, Joffre scored a major coup in his attempt to draw the British further into the war. The failed Battle of Artois in the spring of 1915 had convinced him that the French could not win the war without massive British assistance. The French staff had concluded that British forces must serve as the reserve of the French Army. Joffre thus requested repeatedly the deployment of twenty divisions of Kitcheners New Armies to France. After a full review of British strategy involving the field commander and staff, the British Cabinet decided to send the New Armies to France rather than deploy them elsewhere, fearing that the French would wobble without maximum British support.32 Thus, when the highest-ranking French and British political and military leaders met at Calais on 6 July for the first time in a political-military conference to resolve basic issues of strategy and resource allocation, the British promised to deploy their New Armies in Francesix divisions immediately, with the rest to follow according to a fixed schedulebut encouraged a defensive-offensive strategy on the shared front. Having retained the right to determine the scope of operations, Joffre promptly ignored this counsel the next day in planning his fall offensive.33

28. Prete, Joffre and the Question of Allied Supreme Command, 332. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. For later attempts at forming such a coordinating body, see William Philpott, Squaring the Circle: The Higher Co-ordination of the Entente in the Winter of 191516, English Historical Review 114, no. 458 (September 1999): 87598. 31. Prete, Joffre and the Question of Allied Supreme Command, 332. 32. Roy A. Prete, Le conflit stratgique franco-britannique sur le front occidental et la confrence de Calais du 6 juillet 1915, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 186 (April 1997): 2637. 33. Ibid., 3846.

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With British support assured, Joffre was able to take the initiative at Chantilly in arranging coordinated offensives for the fall of 1915, on both the Western and Italian fronts, in order to take the pressure off the hard-pressed Russians. These offensives succeeded in their goal, vindicating Joffres initiative in Allied military planning. The process of interallied coordination, moreover, had provided Joffre with a further lever for extracting a stronger participation from the British at Loos against the will of Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force. Always fearful that the British would either not engage fully or divert forces to other theaters, the French staff was thus doubly encouraged to take on a greater role in Allied coordination, by calling a major interallied military conference at Chantilly on 68 December 1915, to prepare for coordinated Allied offensives in 1916.34 In this endeavor, Joffre had the full endorsement of Briand, who, in addition to being an easterner, was a firm believer in the need for Allied coordination at all levels.35 One week before the conference, Joffre presented his plan for Allied coordination to key ministers for consideration by the Conseil Suprieur de la Dfense Nationale.36 The French staff plan for Allied coordination was thus the French governments plan, as well. While the need for closer coordination of Allied efforts, particularly among the Allies on the Western Front, had long been apparent, the imbroglio attending the mounting of the Salonika expedition in SeptemberOctober 1915 made it abundantly clear that such a need was paramount.37 By the end of October, various plans were being discussed between political and military leaders of the two countries for a coordinating body (much like the Supreme War Council set up in November 1917), including a council of six composed of the foreign and defense ministers and commanders-in-chief of both Allies. But even its partial realization was much in the future.38 The concept of Allied coordination was entirely sound, but Joffre was correct in assuming that under existing conditions, he was the only one with enough stature to make it effective.39 As the 1916 campaign season approached, the future looked promising to the French staff. While Great Britain was lagging in the production of needed war material, with nearly seventy divisions under arms with the Kitchener New Armies, she had not yet put into the balance the maximum of her power. If the Russians could be properly supplied, they, too, would be able to attack, as would the
34. Prete, Joffre and the Question of Allied Supreme Command, 23233. 35. See Georges Suarez, Briand, Sa vieson oeuvre avec son journal et de nombreux documents indits, vol. 3, Le Pilote dans la tourmente, 19141916 (Paris: Plon, 1952), 21737. 36. See #16650, Commander-in-Chief to Minister of War, 30 November 1914, 16N3014, 1/40, Archives de Guerre (hereafter AG), Service Historique de lArme de Terre, Vincennes, France. 37. Roy A. Prete, Imbroglio par excellence: Mounting the Salonika Expedition, September October, 1915, War and Society 19, no. 1 (May 2001): 4770. 38. Philpott, Squaring the Circle, 87597. 39. Cf. Joffre, Memoirs, 2: 4078.
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Italians. If all of the Allies could attack simultaneously in a coordinated way, the enemy would not be able to use his interior lines to meet one attack after another, and once his reserves were used up, the Allies would drive on to victory. Joffre, ever optimistic, believed, as he had at the beginning of campaign season in 1914 and 1915, that in 1916 he was going to win the war.40 But back of his optimism lay a deep anxiety with regard to the state of French arms. On 7 October 1915, as the fall offensive was grinding to its conclusion, the French staff began to assess the situation and future possibilities. The failure of the current operation to obtain more than tactical success it blamed largely on lack of artillery munitions. The French Armys offensive capacity had been blunted, as had that of their British allies, and as a result it was anticipated that the French Army would have to go on the defensive for several months, while its artillery stocks were replenished and its effectives reconstituted. But, noted the French staff, we are coming to the end of our resources in men, and . . . the 1916 and 1917 classes (about 270,000 total), constitute the only reserve with which we can undertake the 1916 campaign.41 From the beginning of the campaign, wrote Joffre the same day, France has carried the greater weight of the war, but she cannot continue to do so without compromising her future. French allies, particularly the Russians and British, with their large manpower reserves, must now carry the main effort, which will result in the definitive attrition of the adversary. France, he concluded, must keep its last troops intact for the final exploitation of victory; it must not waste [user] them prematurely.42 Here indeed was Joffres hidden agenda for Allied coordination. The second interallied military conference met under French auspices at French Headquarters at Chantilly, 68 December 1915. The decisions taken at the three-day military conference, to which all the Entente allies sent military representatives, were far-reaching and of vital importance. Having already brushed aside, prior to the conference, a Russian proposal for a massive offensive in the Balkans,43 Joffre rallied the military representatives of all the AlliesRussia, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and Serbiato his plan, which had the prior approval of his government. Decidedly Clausewitzian in conception, the French plan was to launch major coordinated offensives against the principal forces of the enemy and destroy the main enemy armies in the field. The military delegates of the several Allied armies thus agreed with the French that the Dardanelles should be evacuated. But the French, for political reasons, and in order to placate the easterners
40. Ibid., 41112. 41. 3e Bureau, Note au sujet des conditions gnrales de la guerre (dbut octobre 1915), 7 October 1915, AFGG, III, A (III), no. 2793. 42. 3e Bureau, Notes sur lemploi des forces anglaises pendant la campagne dhiver 1915 1916, 7 October 1915, AFGG, III, A (III), no. 2792. 43. Joffre, Memoirs, 2: 41314; Poincar, Guerre de sige, 296, 298.

Interallied Military Planning at Chantilly, 68 December 1915

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Interallied conference, 68 December 1915, Chantilly, France. From left to right: General Pell (French Major-General), General Porro (Italy), General Wiellemans (back rowBelgium), Marshal French (Great Britain), General Huguet (back rowFrench officer), General Joffre (French Commander-in-Chief ), General Gilinsky (Russia), and General Stefanovitch (Serbia). [LIllustration, 11 December 1915, p. 609. Courtesy of Roy Prete.]

in the Cabinet and buttress their Balkan policy, wished to maintain the expedition to Salonika. Already at loggerheads with the British, who wished to withdraw from Salonika, the French used the occasion to isolate the British and gain general support for their own policy. Thus, with the exception of the British delegation weakly led by Sir John French, approaching the end of his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF in France, and Sir Archibald Murray, stopgap appointment as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, all of the delegates agreed that the Allies should remain at Salonika.44 This put renewed pressure on the British government to stay at Salonika, despite their having extracted a promise from the French the day previous at Calais to evacuate.45 The major result of the conference was unanimous endorsement of the principle that the decision must be sought by concerted offensives on the main theatres where the enemy maintains the greater part of his forces, that is to say, on the Russian, Anglo-French and Italian fronts.46 The specifics of these attacks were left
44. #5441, Conference between the Representatives of the Allied Armies (held at Chantilly 68 Dec. 1915), Fonds Joffre, 14N10 11/42, AG, reproduced in AFGG, IV (I), A (I), nos. 4647, 69. On the background to the Anglo-French conflict over the Salonika expedition, see George H. Cassar, The French and the Dardanelles (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971); Suarez, Briand, 3: 11549, 179216; Tanenbaum, Sarrail, 8283; David Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans in the First World War (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998); Prete, Imbroglio par excellence, 4770. 45. George H. Cassar, Asquith as War Leader (London: Hambledon Press, 1994), 14142. 46. La Bataille de la Somme, I: Prparation des offensives de 1916, La confrence de Chantilly [a contemporary Staff study, n.d.], p. 1, 16N2062, AG.
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for later discussion, but the concept that they should take place as soon as possible, and not later than March 1916, was endorsed, so as not to leave the initiative to the enemy. The Russians, who had been sorely taxed by Central Powers offensives in 1915 and had felt largely deserted by their allies, had a mutual assistance clause inserted. In the event that one of the major armies was attacked before the plan came into effect, the others were to come to its aid.47 A crucial issue associated with the French plan, later to become a serious bone of contention, was the question of preliminary wearing operations. As indicated, the French, who had borne the brunt of the fighting on the Western Front to that point, were seriously beginning to feel the shortage of effectives by the close of the 1915 campaign season. As their low birthrate provided no surplus of available men, they now began to look to their allies (the British in particular), with their immense reserves of manpower, to carry a greater portion of the burden.48 Thus, argued Joffre, those powers with the greater reserves of manpower, that is to say, Russia, Great Britain, and Italy, should proceed with a series of wearing operations, pending the major offensives, in order to draw in and use up enemy reserves. The conference delegates agreed to this provision.49 The basis had thus been laid for a concerted military effort, with provisions for a variety of contingencies. So far as the coordination of the coalition was concerned, this was Joffres greatest achievement. For the first time, the several Allies had a plan by which they would all march together and prevent the enemy from using his interior lines to his advantage in engaging the Allies one at a time.50 The difficulty, of course, lay in execution of the plan. The question of planning a joint Anglo-French operation on the Western Front raised a number of issues, not the least of which was who in the British political-military structure had ultimate control of British strategy. Following the restructuring that took place in France in the fall of 1915, a similar process took place a few months later in Great Britain, for some of the same reasons. The leadership of H. H. Asquith and his political and military team had proven woefully deficient, particularly in the Dardanelles fiasco and in the mobilization of resources, notably in the production of heavy artillery shells. In May Asquith had formed a coalition government drawing the Unionists into the cabinet. Winston S. Churchill had been replaced as First Lord of the Admiralty, and the powers of Kitchener as Secretary of State for War were restricted with the creation of a new Ministry
47. #5441, Conference . . . (Chantilly, 68 Dec. 1915), AFGG, IV (I), A (I), nos. 4647, 69. 48. Ibid.; 3e Bureau, Notes sur lemploi des forces anglaises pendant la campagne dhiver 19151916, 7 October 1915, AFGG, III, A (III), no. 2792. 49. #5441, Conference . . . (Chantilly, 68 Dec. 1915), AFGG, IV (I), A (I), nos. 4647, 49; Neilson, Strategy and Supply, 123. 50. Gnral [Ren] Desmazes, Joffre: La victoire du caractre (Paris: Nouvelles ditions Latines, 1955), 18081.

The British Change of the Guard in December 1915

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of Munitions with David Lloyd George as Minister. In December, Kitchener found his powers further trimmed to those of Cabinet minister playing a uniquely political role. The role of strategic advisor to the government was taken over by the tough-minded Sir William Robertson, recalled from France, as Chief of a muchstrengthened Imperial General Staff.51 At the same time (on 19 December), Sir John French was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force and Sir Douglas Haig installed in his place. Robertson and Haig, who got along reasonably well, were both committed to a Western Front strategy. Thus 1916 was the generals war, as Robertson began to take over a key role in the determination of British military strategy.52 The Dardanelles expedition having discredited (at least temporarily) the idea of external theaters and having temporarily muted easterners such as Lloyd George, the War Committee on 28 December 1915 took a major decision to pursue a western strategy endorsing the French decision at Chantilly.53 That was a less difficult decision than the extent to which resources should be committed. The issue dividing Liberals and Conservatives was whether Great Britain had adequate financial resources to maintain the existing naval and business as usual strategy which had prevailed to the present, and at the same time launch a major campaign on land which would require conscription.54 New in office and seeking supporters, Haig was prepared to follow the lead of the French high command in strategic planning. But his government was unlikely to accept the role designated for it by the French of eating German reserves by independent British wearing actions.55 Nor was the British government, under Robertsons influence, prepared to endorse the French policy toward Salonika. Joffre, who had continually resisted diversion of French troops from the Western Front until his dramatic volte face in October 1915, the result of a futile effort to save the Viviani government (and himself ), now supported the expedition.56 Though the quarrel over Salonika is too large a subject to be dealt with more than summarily in the context of this paper, it nevertheless had a substantial impact on the Western Front.57
51. See French, British Strategy and War Aims, 15964; Roy A. Prete, The Artois Offensive and the British Changing of the Guard in December 1915, a paper presented at the Conference of the Western Society for French History, Los Angeles, California, 811 November 2000. 52. See Robert Blake, introduction to The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 19141919, by Sir Douglas Haig, ed. Robert Blake (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), 3839; Paul Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 19141918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 119ff. 53. Prior and Wilson, The Somme, 15; Neilson, Strategy and Supply, 14243. 54. French, British Strategy and War Aims, 17376. For the opening of the issue, see Letter, Asquith to the King, 1 January 1916, MSS Asquith, 8/12728, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom. 55. See below. 56. Tanenbaum, Sarrail, 7374. 57. See Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans.
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On the operational level, the key question for the French staff was not only how to best deploy available Anglo-French forces, but also how to obtain a maximum contribution from their British allies. Traditional stereotyping held sway. In French eyes, any decisive offensive would have to be conducted mainly by French troops with their superior lan. Based on their perception of the bulldog nature of the British character, the French view of British forces was that the British were better suited for defensive than offensive warfare. A major French concern, therefore, from the beginning of the war, had been to lead the British into battle. The dominant French perception of the British as slow, late and un-aggressive meant that to mount a really good offensive, one had to locate the French and British forces side by side. General Ferdinand Foch, who had been sent to coordinate the activities of the Allied armiesFrench, British, and Belgianin the North of France in October 1914, had used this as a method of holding the Allies in the line; hence, French forces encased Belgian forces and British and French forces alternated in the northern theater in the first Battle of Yprs.58 Perception of the British thus came to the fore as the French staff began to consider a new offensive for 1916. Experience has shown, said a French staff memo on 7 October 1915, in a general review of the Allied situation, that because of their limited offensive capacity, British forces are unable to engage in really powerful action except in close liaison with French troops.59 The French staff chose the British site for the battle north of the Somme contrary to the advice of Foch. In response to Joffres request to Army Group Commanders on 27 October for advice as to a potential location for a new offensive at least on the scale of that at Champagne, Foch argued on 10 November and subsequently, that breakthrough against fortified trenches and in-depth defenses was unlikely. Rather, he advocated a series of bite and holdoperations aimed at destabilizing the enemys defensive system by carefully planned, systematic, and successive artillery attacks, with reduced loss of troops in seizing and holding the terrain. In his view the wooded and hilly country north of the Somme as far north as Bapaume was unsuited to such actions, while the plains south of the Somme as far as Lassigny were deemed more satisfactory.60 Joffre having chosen the SommeLassigny front on 15 December, Foch presented a detailed plan on 2 February 1916 for a major French offensive on that front, but independent of any coordination

Why the Somme?

58. Prete, War of Movement, 6869, 391, 44045. 59. 3e Bureau, Note au sujet des conditions gnrales de la guerre (dbut doctobre 1915), 7 October 1915, AFGG, III, A (III), no. 2793. 60. See nos. 2915, 3583, Foch to General Commander-in-Chief, 10 November, 6 December 1915, AFGG, III, A (IV), no. 3064, 3122; Maxime Weygand, Mmoires, vol. 1, Idal Vcu (Paris: Flammarion, 1953), 29497, 3067; Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations, 25758 .

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This map appears in History of the Great War based on Official Documents: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916 (London: Macmillan, 1932)

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with the neighboring British armies, whose tasks are not decided.61 The French staff meanwhile began to think in terms of a simultaneous British battle in a nearby area north of the Somme, between Arras and the Somme, which they presented to the British on 25 December. And ultimately Joffre and his staff decided, on 14 February, despite the less-favorable terrain immediately north of the Somme, in favor of a joint offensive astride the Somme to bring British and French forces into yet closer liaison. The joint offensive, argued the French staff, in addition to drawing in the British, would also have the advantage of eliminating two flanks, improving the prospects of a decisive breakthrough.62 The French would thus be in position to lead the British into battle in the side-by-side offensive, despite the less-thanfavorable terrain north of the river. Shouldering the Burden. In a coalition, opined General N. P. Mikhnevich, a late nineteenth-century Russian theorist, allies will strive to shift the heaviest burden to other shoulders.63 In the French case, the desire to shift a greater burden onto the shoulders of the British and obtain a maximum contribution from their forces took several forms. Thus at Chantilly, the British were designated for major wearing operations prior to the main offensives. For them to do so they would need to draw on the full fighting capability of Kitcheners New Armies. Consequently, as enlistment waned in Great Britain at the end of 1915, the French command weighed in on the British conscription debate, urging through the diplomatic channel on 14 December that Kitcheners plan for seventy divisions not be shelved. An insufficient effort by England at the moment when certain allies arrive at the limit of their resources in men would gravely compromise the superior interests of the coalition, Joffre wrote. In particular, he expressed concern that the wearing actions agreed on at Chantilly would not be carried out.64 Likewise, in the field, in order to have the British carry more of the burden, the immediate French desire was to have the British occupy a larger portion of the trenches. The question of manning the trenches, which had become a major bone of contention in early 1915 and would again in 1917, depended on the allocation of British forces in Great Britain. What the French feared most was the diversion of British forces to other fronts. In the fall of 1915, to French consternation, eight
61. No. 8378, Instruction gnrale pour les commandants de groupe darmes, 15 December 1915; No. 5450, Foch Monsieur le gnral commandant en chef, 2 February 1916, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), nos. 60, 151. 62. Dos.: La Bataille de la Somme, I Prparation des offensives de 1916, p. 3, 16N2062, AG; Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, 4346; Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations, 25760. 63. John Erickson, Koalitsionaya Voina: Coalition Warfare in Soviet Military Theory, Planning and Performance, in Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord, ed. Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1983), 8. 64. #7553, General Commander-in-Chief to President of the Council, 14 December 1915, dos. 2, 5, 16N3014, AG, reproduced in AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 58.

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divisions of trained soldiers had been withdrawn from the French front and sent to Egypt to ward off the threat of Turkish attack as the British withdrew their troops from the Dardanelles. In this case, hardly had the British command received partially trained forces to compensate for those sent to Egypt than the French began to press on 2 December 1915, for the relief of portions of the French Tenth Army about Arrasan army sandwiched between the British First Army to the north and the British Third Army to the south. The French staff recognized that extension of the British front, disproportionate to their means of thirty-seven divisions, would risk destroying their offensive capacity.65 The ultimate goal nevertheless was to free the French Tenth Army for offensive action, and only secondarily to prepare the British for a later offensive by merging British forces north of the Somme. The British perspective was quite different. General Douglas Haig, who succeeded Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force on 19 December 1915, had not been involved in the Chantilly conference, and had visions of the British Army leading a decisive offensive in Flanders in conjunction with a British naval attack on the Belgian coast66an idea which he continued to harbor right until the costly Passchendaele offensive in the summer of 1917. But, for the immediate future, Haigs overriding concern was unity with the French command. His instructions, while maintaining the independence of his command, prescribed a closer cooperation with the French than had those of his predecessor in 1914, and his own lack of security as a new appointee made it wise to work closely with the French. Haigs first official act on learning of his appointment was to voluntarily subordinate himself to Joffre, indicating his desire to conform under all circumstances to the direction and instruction of the French Commander-in-Chief.67 Discussions began immediately as to future plans. At their first meeting on 23 December 1915, at Chantilly, Joffre indicated to Haig that he had not decided as to future plans, but with unlimited ammunition he expected to drive back the enemy by April. On the question of taking over more of the trenches of the Tenth Army, Haig pointed out that his Divisions were in great need of training, but that he would do his very best to carry out any order which he might be given
65. Nos. 502 and 7332, General Commander-in-Chief to Field Marshal French, 2, 13 December 1915, respectively, AFGG, III, A (IV), nos. 3112, 3154; also 3e Bureau, Note au sujet des relves faire effectuer par les units anglaises, 23 November 1915, AFGG, III, A (IV), no. 3096; #5441, Conference . . . (Chantilly, 68 Dec. 1915), AFGG, IV (I), A (I), nos. 47. At Chantilly, French protested that he had only thirty-four divisions on his front as he had received only five partially trained divisions to replace the eight divisions withdrawn. (Ibid.). 66. Joffre, Memoirs, 2:417; Haig, Private Papers, 26 December 1915, 120. 67. Prete, Joffre and the Question of Allied Supreme Command, 334. The quotation is from #129H, Huguet, Head of French Mission at British Headquarters, to General Commander-in-Chief, 17 December 1915, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 62.
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on the subject.68 Two days later, French thinking had evolved into a definite plan, which Joffre communicated to Haig in writing. The French would engage a major offensive south of the Somme, and the British would attack at the same time, in a largely inactive sector north of the Somme, between the Ancre and Arras, on favorable terrain, and though separated, not far distant from the French attack.69 Here in effect was the genesis of the Somme offensive, but as yet conceived as two distinct but simultaneous attacks. Haigs task of establishing a friendly rapport with the French command had succeeded well at his first visit.70 He was thus flattered to be invited to a more intimate second meeting of French political leadersFrench President Raymond Poincar, Briand, and Gallieniwith Joffre and the Army Group Commanders at Chantilly on 29 December. That meeting in effect was designed to head off with the politicians a growing chorus of parliamentary criticism on the state of preparation of the fronts. As directed by you, Haig reported to Lord Kitchener on this second meeting, I have done my best to start on friendly terms with the French. We parted great friends.71 He noted to Robertson, I like [ Joffre]. Not clever, but reliable I should think, and most ready to listen to any suggestions which I had to offer as to using up the Enemys Reserves before we launch our decisive strokes. But, he observed, They are funny fellows, these French generals, . . . They are so conceited!72 Allies of a kind73 and friends of a sort might best sum up the AngloFrench relationship, even when things were at their harmonious best. Haigs Northern Flank strategy. There were clouds on the horizon. Despite Haigs repeated protestations that there could be only one Commander-in-Chief within the Western Front and his willingness to follow Joffres lead in preparing for an attack north of the Somme, he nevertheless maintained a marked predilection,
68. Haig Diaries, 23 December 1915, 3155/103/7, National Library of Scotland (hereafter NLS), Edinburgh, United Kingdom. 69. #15479, Letter of General Commander-in-Chief to General Douglas Haig, 25 December 1915, AFGG, III, A (IV), no. 3202; also 3e Bureau, Note sur la coopration demander aux armes britanniques la reprise de loffensive, 18 December 1915, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 63. 70. Haig Diaries, 23 December 1915, 3155/96/4, NLS. 71. Handwritten letter, Haig to Kitchener, 1 January 1916, Kitchener Papers, 30/57/53, Public Record Office (PRO), The National Archives (TNA), Kew, United Kingdom; Haig Diaries, 23, 29 December 1915, 3155/96/4, NLS; on the meeting, see Ferdinand Foch Papers, Journes, events of 29 December 1915, p. 28, papers held by grandson, Henri Fournier Foch (hereafter AFF); Poincar, Au service de la France, 36970. 72. Letter, Haig to Robertson, 3 January 1916, Robertson Papers, I/22/6, Liddell Hart Military Archives (hereafter LHMA), Kings College, London; cf. Haig Diaries, 29 December 1915, 3155/96/4, NLS. 73. The term is from Christopher Thornes book Allies of a Kind: The U.S., Britain and the War Against Japan, 19411945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

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as reported Colonel Pierre des Vallires, the new French liaison officer at British Headquarters, for a combined operation with the British fleet consisting of a fleet attack on Ostend and a British offensive in Flandersan operation obviously advantageous considered from the British point of view.74 Already on 29 December he had discussed the possibility of such an offensive with Joffre.75 Parallel to his plans for an attack north of the Somme, Haig continued, on 7 January 1916, to make plans with the Royal Navy for the Channel operation, an operation which in his view would depend on the timing of Joffres plan for the Somme. Haigs plan for the combined operation as a result was discussed repeatedly with the French. Thus, at his third meeting with Joffre on 20 January, at British Headquarters at St. Omer, Haig again promoted his proposed attack in Flanders as the decisive British action of the year. And indeed the British chief was not discouraged, even after learning, to his great dismay, in a conversation with King Leopold on 7 February, that the Belgian King did not wish the British to launch a major offensive in Flanders because of the destruction it would bring on Belgian territory, but preferred to have the Allies drive the Germans out of France first. On 10 February Haig was still ardently promoting his Flanders offensive with the French as the preferred British attack.76 His northern flank strategy thus became a victim of the need for Allied unity of action on the Western Front with the agreement made with Joffre on 14 February to launch a joint Anglo-French attack on the Somme. Haig nonetheless persisted, giving instruction on 25 February for detailed planning of the Channel offensive, with its application being deferred to a later date, until the Enemys reserves had been drawn off.77 By 14 January Haig had begun to fall in line with the French point of view regarding the need for wearing operations by the British prior to the major offensive. The French manpower question provided the key. His information came from the British liaison officer at French Headquarters. The French, Haig wrote in his diary, owing to lack of men, can only make one more big offensive. As the Russians would not likely be ready until July, the French were anxious that the British and Italians carry out a wearing attack in April or May, before all the Allies engaged in a major combined offensive several weeks later, for which the French might put in 50 divisions. The French, he wrote, were not likely to stand another
74. Colonel des Vallires to General Commander-in-Chief, 1 January 1915 [1916], dos.: Arme Anglaise, #125, 16N1905, AG. 75. Haig Diaries, 29 December 1915, 3155/96/4, NLS. 76. Haig Diaries, 7 January 1916, 20 January, 7 February 1916, 3155/96/5, 3155/103/7, NLS; Joffre, Memoirs, 2: 417; Note to French Staff, Plans for future operations, 10 February 1916, signed D. Haig, reproduced in AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 175. 77. Sheffield and Bourne, eds., Haig War Diaries and Letters, 25 February 1916, 181. For a fuller account of planning for the operation, see Philpott, Anglo-French Relations on the Western Front, 11228.
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winters war for want of manpower. There is no doubt to my mind but that the war must be won by the Forces of the British Empire, Haig reasoned. Following the nineteenth-century model of skirmishes followed by preliminary attack and decisive engagement, Haig was thus prepared to engage British forces, first in smaller raids, the so-called winter sports, then wearing out fights at several points along the front for a period of about three weeks, to draw in the enemys reserves, and finally decisive attacks at several points in order to break through.78 The British government was not nearly so generous-minded. On 28 December 1915, the War Committee had adopted a western strategy ratifying the results of the Chantilly conference and had agreed to the preparation of offensive operations next spring in the main theatre of war in close cooperation with the Allies and in the greatest possible strength.79 But, by a week later, the Cabinet was having serious second thoughts on that strategy, as civilian ministers queried whether Britain could both fight a continental war and continue with business as usual.80 As Robertson reported to Haig on 13 January 1916, there is a fairly strong party in Cabinet opposed to offensive operations on your front in the Spring or indeed at any time.81 A. J. Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, member of the War Committee and a powerful Conservative, had written a memorandum following the earlier War Committee deliberation, criticizing the conduct of the war and, in particular, the costly Loos offensive of the previous September. The second source of discontent came from David Lloyd George, the Minister of Munitions, whose main intent was to defer operations until there was a more adequate stock of munitions. As a result, the War Committee on 13 January watered down the original decision to the effect that Haig should prepare for offensive action in the spring, but without committing ourselves definitely to them.82 Needless to say, with that shift of attitude in the government, Haigs proposal to engage British troops in winter sports and major wearing operations before the main offensives met with a mixed response in Cabinet.83 Kitchener, whose great plan had been to prepare massive British armies for decisive actions in the third year of the war, gave his support to Haigs plan for preliminary wearing attacks.
78. Haig Diaries, 14 January 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS, reproduced in Haig, Private Papers,

125.

79. Letter, Robertson to Major-General L. E. Kiggell, Chief of Staff of the British Expeditionary Force, 5 January 1916, War Office (hereafter WO) 158/21, PRO, TNA. 80. Letter, Robertson to Haig, 5 January 1916, Haig, Private Papers, 12223; French, British Strategy and War Aims, 17475. 81. Letter, Robertson to Haig, 13 January 1916, Haig, Private Papers, 124. 82. Ibid. See also Letter, Haig to Robertson, 5 January 1916, Haig, Private Papers, 122; Letter, Lord Reginald Esher to Kitchener, 23 January 1916, Kitchener Papers, 30 55/59, PRO, TNA; Prior and Wilson, The Somme, 1622; cf. David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 2 vols. (London: Oldhams Press Limited, [193436]), 2: 322. 83. See Letters, Haig to Robertson, Robertson to Haig, 16 January 1916, Haig Papers, 3155/104/7, NLS.

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Doubtful that the French could last another winter, Kitchener was anxious that an attack not be delayed. In his view, the war had to be won in 1916, or Britain would be obliged to make an unsatisfactory stalemate peace. The British offensive would thus have to begin early, not later than March, in order to beat the Germans by August. Contrary to Lloyd George, he believed the fighting should begin with available stocks of munitions and accelerate as more and more munitions became available.84 Others in London were not so supportive. As the French plan evolved, it soon became apparent, to the great dismay of the Imperial General Staff, that the French desired that the British attack should be a major preliminary wearing operation conducted north of the Somme with minimal French support, and that the operation should be conducted not later than April 1916, prior to the major offensives which now were being deferred until July to accommodate the Russians. Robertson, who was now beginning to exercise a more considerable influence on British strategic direction of the war than Kitchener, was particularly disturbed with the prospect of the French waiting for their main offensive until Russia would be ready in July, while in the meantime the British should prosecute a wearing down system on a rather large scale. The inequality of the situation alarmed him greatly. Joffre, he thought, quite correctly, was very much in the hands of the politicians. Robertson was also disturbed that the French had made no plans to respond to a German attack in the meantime, presumably on Russia. He thus proposed to meet with Haig and Joffre to help straighten things out.85 Haig was thus caught in the middle between divided British counsels expressing a variety of British views on the one hand and the exigencies of the French command on the other. What was entirely clear was that the Cabinet would not sanction major wearing operations by the British without the French. Haig thus trimmed his sail to the wind, realizing that at this early stage of his command, he must first and foremost give satisfaction to his political masters in London. Thus, after a review of future plans with his staff on 18 January, Haig concluded that any wearing operations must be begun by all the Allies simultaneously and also include the French.86 The question of wearing operations came to a head at Haigs meeting with Joffre at British Headquarters on 20 January 1916. Joffres position was clear. All of the Allies must attack simultaneously, but as Russia would not be ready until June, his plan was to have the British, in the meantime, attack North of the Somme with
84. Letter, Kitchener to Haig, 14 January 1916, Kitchener Papers, 30 57/53, PRO, TNA. 85. Haig Diaries, 18 January 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS; Letter, Haig to Kitchener, 19 January 1916, Haig Papers, 3155/104/7n, NLS. 86. Haig Diaries, 18 January 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS. But note Haigs diary entry of 11 January 1916 regarding his discussion of future plans with Foch: He agrees with me that no attack should be made until all the allies are ready and we have practically unlimited ammunition, so that once we start we can go through to a decision. This probably cannot be until May. (Ibid., 11 January 1916)
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the object of capturing the enemys first system of defense, and wearing down the enemy.87 I consider it indispensable, before the general offensive, that the British army seeks to wear down German forces by large and powerful offensives as the French Army did in 1915, Joffre wrote to Haig the next day. The British were thus asked to launch an attack of at least fifteen to eighteen divisions north of the Somme toward the end of April. The French would attack south of the Somme with twenty-five divisions only if the international situation required it.88 As indicated in his discussion with Robertson and Haig at Chantilly two days later, Joffre did not plan to launch a major French attack in the spring unless the Russians were attacked.89 The intent was entirely clear. The British would carry the burden of wearing down the enemy, and the French with their superior lan and offensive capability would move in for the clean-up operation. The issue thus became one of carrying the burden within the coalition. While Haig, and even Robertson, apparently swayed by Joffres logic, still appeared willing to countenance a major preliminary wearing operation by British forces, the British government decidedly was not. The War Committee, wrote Robertson from London a few days later, is not altogether wholehearted on the question of an offensive on the Western Front, and is quite definitely opposed to an attack on our part which is independent of a general Allied offensive. The question, moreover, was potentially divisive, as the British did not wish to give the appearance of slacking on their obligation. Robertson therefore proposed a new interallied conference to renegotiate the basic plan.90 Haig as a result dug in deeper in his discussions with the French. While preparing a major offensive north of the Somme, he argued in a six-and-one-halfpage letter to Joffre on 1 February that any preliminary attacks to draw in enemy reserves should immediately precede the major offensive by only ten to fourteen days, and thus prevent the enemy from reconstituting his forces. Early attacks would have no effect on enemy reserves and in fact do more harm to the attacking force. His intent, he said, was that there should be no misunderstanding as to what I am able to undertake and to what the British Government is likely to approve of my undertaking.91 In private conversation with Colonel des Vallires, the Head
87. Haig Diaries, 20 January 1916, 3155/103/7, NLS. 88. Procs-verbal de la confrence du 22 janvier 1916, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 116. 89. #13310, General Commander-in-Chief to Haig, 23 January 1916, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 120. The French also envisioned a second British wearing operation at the end of May if accelerated transportation of British troops from Egypt allowed. For the general joint offensive, the French were still thinking of a joint Anglo-French attack on the Somme with major French attacks on other parts of the front. (Ibid.) 90. Des Vallires to General Commander-in-Chief, 28 January 1916, dos.: Arme Anglaise, #134, 16N1905, AG; Letters, Robertson to Haig, 27 January 1916, Robertson Papers, I/22/19, LHMA; Letter, Robertson to Haig, 28 January 1916, Haig Papers, 3155/104/7, NLS. 91. OAD 344, Haig to Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, 1 February 1916, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 147; Haig Diaries, 1 February 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS.

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of the French Mission at British Headquarters, Haig further pointed out that a partial attack with no visible result would adversely affect public opinion in Great Britain and, in fact, do harm to British credit, a significant factor, as gold was now becoming rare. Even more telling was the fear expressed by General John Davidson, Head of the British Operations Bureau, that an unsuccessful early offensive could well lead the politicians to suspend further offensive action for the season. A new conference, concluded des Vallires, was thus necessary between the French high command and Haig and Robertson to clarify points of the arrangement worked out in December in Chantilly, which had obviously broken down.92 The dispute began to take on a much wider political dimension as mistrust grew between the two commands. After an interview with des Vallires on 2 February, Haig summed up the French strategic plan as follows:
Germans have 25 Divn in Reserve behind their front in the West and that no decisive attacks can hope to succeed until they are used up. The French have not enough troops to wear out the enemy, and afterwards have men left in sufficient numbers to deliver a strong decisive attack. For this reason Genl Joffre has decided not to attack with the French Army until the German Reserves have disappeared, either by their withdrawal to Russia or by English attacks! . . . and he [des Vallires] let slip the remark that at the Peace it would never do for France to have no army at all left. This is clearly the main reason for wishing us to do the Preliminary attacks.93

Des Vallires attributed similar motives to the British in resisting preliminary wearing operations: England wants to triumph with minimal sacrifices in men, and to maintain an army which will weigh in the settlement of accounts at the end of the war.94 There was, however, on the question of major offensives, a substantial area of agreement. Haig was agreed to be ready to attack with twenty-five divisions at the end of April in conjunction with the French in case the Germans should take the initiative against Russia. He was also agreed, in the event that the Allies maintained the initiative until the summer, to carry out simultaneous offensives with all his forces as soon as the Russians were ready.95 The question of ammunition no longer seemed an impediment. After a meeting with Lloyd George, Andrew Bonar Law, and Robertson on 30 January 1916 in which the schedule of future deliveries was
92. Colonel des Vallires to General-in-Chief, 2 February 1916, dos.: Arme Anglaise, #139, 16N1905, AG; #11159, Captain Gmeau, French Mission at British Headquarters to Head of Mission, 2 February 1916, dos.: Arme Anglaise, #138, 16N1905, AG. 93. Haig Diaries, 2 February 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS. 94. #9s, des Vallires to General-in-Chief of the French Army, 9 February 1916, dos.: 1916, 17N348, MMF/AB, AG. 95. OAD 344, Haig to General-in-Chief of the French Army, 1 February 1916, 3807, General Commander-in-Chief to Haig, 6 February 1916, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), nos. 147, 158.
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examined, Haig concluded that the amount of ammunition by the end of April seems to be ample and that the amount coming in from May onwards should easily meet our demands.96 Faced with the futility of trying to force the British into major wearing operations, the French staff at this point made a dramatic reversal, based largely on the idea of scoring a decisive victory in 1916 when all of the Allies were fully ready. In view of the slowness of Russian preparation, Joffre thus sought approval from the French government in early February for his plan of waiting until mid-summer to launch a major offensive. The staff document submitted on 2 February to the Conseil Suprieur de la Dfense Nationale, the inner French cabinet which dealt with strategic matters, shows that the French command, in fact, expected to win the war in 1916. All of the French staff planning was based on the idea of delivering a decisive blow by the several Allied armies. The seriousness of the French manpower situation was clearly borne out. After the class of 1917 (enlisted a year early) arrived at the front in mid-1916, French forces would begin to decline. The French staff therefore considered that it was vital that decisive action begin by this crucial date. Pas aprs, said a marginal note by Joffre.97 The question was how to attack with the greatest possible strength. As the Russian Army lacked rifles, field artillery, and munitions, the French staff proposed to wait until July so the Russians could participate powerfully in the decisive action of the coalition. The balance of forces on the Western Front would then be favorable. When the British Army received all available forces they would have 56 divisions on the Western Front, bringing the Allied total to 167 against 124 German divisions. The goal was then to break the German lines and obtain by strategic exploitation a complete victory capable of bringing about the dislocation of enemy forces. What if the Germans attacked on the Western Front? A German attack on the French front, in the meantime, argued the French staff, would be in the French interest, as French defensive organization would allow them to stop the enemy with a minimum of forces and then to take up the offensive with the major part of their reserves. While the question of preliminary wearing operations by the British remained a residual part of the plan, the staff warned that the British command must not lose sight of the necessity to prepare for the major offensives.98 The focus clearly had shifted from that of preliminary actions to the decisive attack. On 8 February 1916, the Conseil Suprieur de la Dfense Nationale approved the French staff s plan, but with the proviso that the Salonika expedition be kept Joffres Revised Strategy

96. Haig Diaries, 30 January 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS. 97. lments dun Plan daction de la coalition, 28 January 1916, Copy no. 2, to be taken to the Conseil Suprieur de Dfense Nationale, 2 February 1916, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 130. 98. Ibid.

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up to strength.99 Enthusiasm for the decisive coordinated Allied offensive thus appears to have been the major factor which led the French staff to adopt a new negotiating position with the British, in which the French reverted to their earlier tactic of asking the British to occupy more of the trenches, rather than engage in an independent offensive action. The matter was resolved at the crucial meeting of Joffre with Haig and Robertson on 14 February. According to Haigs account, General Joffre began the discussion by giving way on the question of the wearing out fight, admitting,
99. Questions poses et rsolues au Conseil Suprieur de la Dfense Nationale dans la sance du 8 fvrier 1916, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 163.
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presumably on the advice of General de Castelnau, his Chief of Staff, that attacks to prepare the way for the decisive attack, and to attract the enemys reserves were necessary, but only some 10 to 15 days before the main battle, not in April for a July attack! This seemed quite a victory for me! wrote Haig. Then he [ Joffre] proceeded to ask me to relieve the whole of the Xth Army! (a 7 division front).100 In this matter Haig had the upper hand, having been advised by Sidney Clive, the liaison officer at French Headquarters, what to expect.101 With the use of tables of troop strength Haig was able to argue convincingly that relieving the seven remaining divisions of the Tenth Army would seriously impair his offensive capacity, a prospect even less pleasing to the French, as they were now expecting the British to carry even more of the fighting. It was thus agreed in principle that Haig would relieve the forces of the French Tenth Army, but only as British forces became available from Egypt and elsewhere. I felt at the Conference that I had been given some power not always in me, wrote Haig, a devout Presbyterian, commenting on his success in withstanding French demands.102 Robertson, who was present but took no part in the discussion, was also pleased. I think you managed Joffre excellently, he wrote from London a few days later. They always ask for far more than they expect to get, and you gave them practically nothing.103 On the larger question of the major offensive, the French likewise reverted to their earlier model of leading the British into battle. The major offensive, it was agreed, would be a decisive offensive when Russia was ready on approximately 1 July, and would be a joint attack, side by side on the Somme. One or two weeks before the main attack, the British would engage a partial offensive in the Ypres-La Basse area in the North, aided by the French. The French would occupy both sides of the Somme to facilitate coordination.104 Here in its initial form was the plan for the Battle of the Somme. The initial plan as conceived at French Headquarters thus called for a French attack of forty-two divisions astride the Somme on a front of forty-three kilometers extending as far south as Lassigny. The French attack would be extended north of the river by a British offensive (of approximately twenty-five divisions) on a front of twenty-seven kilometers. The combined attack would thus take place on a wide front of seventy kilometers. A few days before the main attack, the French also planned to launch secondary attacks elsewhere in Champagne, Lorraine, and
100. Haig Diaries, 14 February 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS; cf. Procs-verbal de la confrence tenue entre le gnral Joffre et le gnral Douglas Haig (2e confrence14 fvrier 10h), AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 221. 101. Clive Diaries, 13 February 1916, II/2/129, LHMA. 102. Haig Diaries, 14 February 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS; Procs-verbal . . . 14 fvrier, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 221. 103. Letter, Haig to Robertson, 17 February 1916, Haig Papers, 3155/104/7, NLS. 104. Haig Diaries, 14 February 1916, 3155/96/5, NLS; Procs-verbal . . . 14 fvrier, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 221. See also Conclusion de la conversation tenue entre le gnral Joffre et le gnral Douglas Haig le 14 fvrier, 10 heures, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 222.

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Alsace, to draw in enemy reserves.105 Thus, as originally conceived, the Battle of the Somme was to be a major French offensive accompanied by a lesser British offensive. A joint offensive would have the advantage of reducing the number of flanks and allowing for an attack on a wide front, which it was believed would prevent the enemy from reestablishing himself after the first thrust.106 A joint offensive would obviate the political problem of an isolated British action.107 Implicit within the French plan was the concept of leading the British into battle. Fochs renewed complaint on 6 February that a battle in the French sector between the Somme and Lassigny could not lead to important strategic results, because of the difficulty of debouching in free terrain beyond the water lines of the Somme, was simply swept aside in favour of a joint operation of the two armies.108 Also sacrificed on the altar of Allied solidarity was Haigs preferred plan for a major attack in Flanders.109 But, a unified joint plan of attack, with a reasonable chance of success, had now been agreed upon, which represented a significant achievement in Anglo-French military planning. The German attack at Verdun, which would greatly affect the French level of participation in the Somme offensive, would be launched just one week later, however, on 21 February. Reflections on the process. The elaboration of the plan for the Battle of the Somme shows the labored operation of the decision-making process as the two commands attempted to function within the parameters defined by their political masters. The limits of command decision-making varied significantly within each army, but so far as the undertaking of larger offensives was concerned, both French and British commands required the approval of their governments in this period. The role of the two governments in the planning process needs to be underlined. Ultimately, the two commands functioned only within the limits defined by their respective governments. Joffre was able to take the initiative in Allied coordination because his aims and objectives corresponded with those of his government. Not only was it imperative for the Allies to gain a better rendering from their resources by coordinated
105. Staff Study: La Bataille de la Somme, I, Prparation de loffensive de 1916, AG, 16N2062, p. 3; see also Plans for future operations, 10 February 1916, D. Haig, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 175. 106. #6356, GQG le 10 fvrier 1916, Note sur la conduite des oprations en 1916 sur le front occidental (remise au gnral Haig et au gnral Robertson), AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 172. 107. See #9s, des Vallires to General-in-Chief, 9 February 1916, dos.: 1916, 17N348, MMF/AB, AG. 108. 3e Bureau, Note du gnral Foch sur loffensive entre la Somme et Lassigny, 6 February 1916; Cipher telegram #2624-2625M, General Commander-in-Chief to Foch, 14 February 1916, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), nos. 159, 220. 109. See Plans for future operations, 10 February 1916, D. Haig, AFGG, IV (I), A (I), no. 175.
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efforts, but as declining French manpower became more and more of an issue, it became all the more imperative from the French point of view that the coalition operate as a whole. Shifting a part of the burden to other shoulders was a major part of this attempt. A significant part of early French planning was to have the other Allies carrying a major burden in wearing operations which would use up enemy reserves, while conserving French forces for the decisive blow. This, of course, the British government, although having earlier agreed to a Western Front strategy, was unprepared to do (as were also the Russians and Italians). Haig thus fell in line with the political direction from London, obliging Joffre to come up with a new strategy for the joint offensive that was mutually acceptable to both governments. When chided by the French at the end of May for not having done his part, Haig was able to report, nonetheless, that the British Army had suffered 83,000 casualties in small operations since the start of the year.110 By making a plan for all the Allies, Joffre was able to bring extra pressure on the British so far as concerted offensives were concerned. But on 14 February, when the military leaders had decided on the joint Somme offensive, the British government had not yet given its final adherence. Two issues challenged the newly established French plan for the Somme. The first revolved around the French governments demand in mid-February for an extra 100,000 troops (whether Allied or French) at Salonika in a bid to draw Rumania into the coalition. This was a demand which was certain to embroil the two governments in an acrimonious tug-of-war as the Imperial General Staff in London had now come to favour putting all available resources into the Western Front.111 The disagreement was all the more critical as the British government ultimately refused any reinforcements for Salonika. On 27 March, at a political-military meeting in Paris, the issue ended in deadlock, as discussion became highly acrimonious, jeopardizing the future of the Somme offensive.112 The future of the Salonika campaign was still under discussion when the Somme offensive was launched on 1 July 1916. The second major challenge to the French plan, of course, was the German offensive launched at Verdun on 21 February, just one week after the elaboration of the Anglo-French plan. As might be anticipated, the first French measure was to call not for a British diversionary attack, as Haig preferred, but for the immediate relief of the entire French Tenth Army, which Haig accepted under pressure from his government.113 This, however, used up available British resources, blunting their future offensive capabilities until new forces arrived.
110. Haig, Private Papers, 31 May 1916, 14546. 111. Letter, Robertson to Haig, 17 February 1916, Haig Papers, 3155/104/7, NLS. 112. Haig, Private Papers, 29 March 1916, 13637. Following the dispute, Haig reported to Kitchener, I had never had any intention of attacking with all available troops, except in an emergency to save the French from disaster . . . . 113. Ibid., 27, 28 February 1916, 13334.

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For the French, the question of when to unleash the great offensive rested largely on an assessment as to when it would have its maximum impact with regard to the material preparation of the several Allies. The German offensive at Verdun thus cast the French in the role of carrying the attrition cost of the war while their allies pursued their preparations. The impact of the Verdun offensive on Allied planning, various aspects of which have recently been studied so far as the British are concerned, has yet to be fully explored in terms of the Entente coalition.114 Suffice it to say that the French plan presented on 12 March at a new interallied military conference at Chantilly for Allied attacks to relieve the pressure at Verdun produced no immediate results, beyond the disastrous Russian attack at Lake Narotch six days later.115 But the Verdun attack was one of the decisive factors in causing a reluctant British government to give its approval on 7 April for the Somme offensive.116 Ultimately, the French, with much anguish of spirit, decided to wait for the British attack until the deadline of late Juneearly July, when the British would be at maximum strength, but no later. By this time French offensive power had been blunted so badly at Verdun that the French, after successive scale-downs in their plan, were able to engage only fourteen divisions in the Somme offensive.117 The battle thus became largely a British battle with French support, as the front was also scaled down from seventy kilometers in the original plan to forty kilometers. The Battle of the Somme still proved to be one of the greatest bloodbaths in human history. In the area of coordination of the Entente for the 1916 offensives, Joffre rendered considerable service to the Entente, first, in taking the initiative in Allied planning; second, in mounting a plan which would allow for coordinated attacks by all the Allies; and third, in responding to unforeseen circumstances in order to
114. For an in-depth treatment of the immediate Allied response, see Roy A. Prete, Verdun and the Somme: Allied Military Planning, 21 February1 July 1916; Part 1, Immediate Response to the German Offensive, a paper presented at the Conference of the Western Society for French History, 2730 October 2005, Colorado Springs, Colorado. For a brief account of the Anglo-French military response, an appraisal of the French political situation, and an appreciation of the developing strategic difference over the operational objectives of the proposed Somme attack, see Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, 46-55. 115. Procs-verbal de la confrence entre les tats-majors allis tenue le 12 mars 1916 Chantilly, AG, 16N3015, GQG, 3e Bureau, TOE dos #6, Sorties doc # 5 (also in AFGG, IV[I] A[II], no. 1212); Prete, Immediate Response. 116. French, British Strategy and War Aims, 18485. Cf. Prior and Wilson, The Somme, 27 28, who indicate that the War Committee approved Haigs request for approval of the offensive, without giving the reasons related to the Battle of Verdun that Haig cited in his request. 117. See Staff Study, Dos.: La Bataille de la Somme, chapter 2, La Bataille de Verdun, Relve de la Xe Arme and succeeding chapters, pp. 417, 16N2062, AG, which gives a fairly good preliminary account of this transformation.
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assure a concerted action, thus denying to the enemy the use of interior lines to his advantage. Not until the spring of 1918, with advent of Ferdinand Foch as Allied Commander-in-Chief, were the Entente powers able to mount such a concerted action. Victory, it was apparent, could be purchased only at the price of concerted action. But, ironically, it was the French, already short of manpower before the opening of the campaign season, who fell into German Chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayns trap of carrying the burden of attrition warfare, which Joffre had earmarked for the Allies. The mutinies of the French Army after the 1917 spring offensive are not an unrelated outcome of its punishment at Verdun. Thus, ultimately, in trying to win the war in 1916, Joffre obliged French forces to carry the burden for which they were least prepared, in the hope of scoring a decisive victory later by well-prepared Allied attacks. Joffres attempt to buttress the Entente at French expense would thus seem, apart from his failures in the field, to be at least a partial reason for his dismissal by the French government at the end of 1916. On the question raised in an earlier controversy118 of whether the British acted contrary to their interests in planning the Battle of the Somme in deference to the French, the evidence would indicate that Haig at least had to forgo the immediate application of his coastal roll-up operation. But it is also clear that his government was unwilling to engage in the wearing operations, as desired by the French, prior to the major joint offensive. Also, the governments final approval for the Somme offensive was given only after the German offensive on French forces at Verdun, suggesting that the British put maintaining the alliance ahead of any specific strategic plan. The same set of facts would suggest that the notion that Haig essentially did as he pleased, independent of the French, also needs adjustment, as the operation of the alliance required a continual give and take to maintain a unified action in the field. The Battle of Verdun had a significant impact. The German offensive was the event which impelled the British government to authorize the joint Somme offensive on 7 April 1916. The Verdun offensive obliged the French to dramatically reduce their participation in the Somme offensive, propelling the British into the role of major contributor. The German onslaught at Verdun was also the event which forestalled Haigs plan to postpone the British offensive until August when his forces would be in a greater state of readiness. The needs of the Allied coalition thus proved decisive, as Joffre undertook to coordinate Allied offensive operations. First and foremost, World War I was a war of coalitions, in which the several Allies eventually came to recognize that their nations success and even survival depended on the success of their allies.

118. See note 5, herein.

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