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Bistoiy 8814; 97S11

The Political Effectiveness of the 0niteu Nations, 194S-2uuu


Iv. Collective Secuiity (SBQ Class Test) {INTERNAL CIRCULATIUN UNLY]
N}C Bistoiy 0nit Naich 2u1u
1

Tbe UN and Peacekeeping

Tbe 0SA, onJ not tbe 0SSR, wos more ot foult for tbe foilures of 0N peocekeepinq Jurinq tbe ColJ Wor. Eow for Jo Sources A-F prove tbe
occurocy of tbis stotement?

Ceneral comments:
1. Explain the souice succinctly - you will not be iewaiueu foi long-winueu infeiences.
2. Review the uiffeience between 'explanation' anu 'evaluation.'
S. Remembei to be ciitical of the souices - what is the souice oveiemphasising. Bow useful is the content. Youi obseivations
shoulu also be suppoiteu with conciete eviuence fiom youi CK oi othei souices.
4. Bo not wiite the paiagiaphs in alphabetical oiuei - youi suggesteu answeis aie oiganiseu as such foi iefeience sake. Youi SBQs
neeu to auuiess one siue fiist (suppoitchallenge) befoie moving on to the othei siue.
S. Remembei that suggesteu answeis aie only tiuly suggesteu - ultimately, you neeu to ensuie youiself that you have enough
aiguments to uemonstiate a critical evaluation. That is, it uoesn't quite mattei if you iueas aie not exactly the same as the tutoi's
as long as you aie consistently tiuly evaluating.


Source Inferences: What uoes the souice tell me. Evaluation
A Source A supports tbe bypotbesis.

Easily vetoeu iesolutions which
conuemneu illegal 0S actions in
Nicaiagua.
Faileu to make payments thus
leauing to 0N's financial ciisis
uuiing the 198us which ciippleu
0N peacekeeping effoits
While it is tiue that the 0S vetoeu iesolutions anu baiely maue payments to the 0N, the
souice is overempbasising tbe role of tbe US in tbwarting peacekeeping
operations.
The 0SSR hau also libeially useu the veto (incluue suitable case stuuy oi cioss-
iefeience to othei souices)
In teims of 0N financial ciisis, it has been cumulating fiom the Suez Ciisis,
wheie it was the Soviets anu its Eastein Euiope allies who iefuseu to pay. (can
also cioss-ief to Souice B) anu most notably the Congo Crisis (the most
expensive peacekeeping opeiation, which 0SSR anu Fiance iefuseu to pay, not
the 0S).
Stuuents may also comment on how fiom the 0S point of view, theii actions
weie |ustified as counter-terrorism anu thus shoulu not be castigateu foi
them.

Former member of US State Dept: Likely to be ieliable as it is an insiuei peispective
which is ciitical of 0S actions - likelihoou that the authoi has fiist-hanu knowleuge.

0seful in uemonstiating the lack of impact tbat dtente bad on US stance towards
peacekeeping.

Bistoiy 8814; 97S11
The Political Effectiveness of the 0niteu Nations, 194S-2uuu
Iv. Collective Secuiity (SBQ Class Test) {INTERNAL CIRCULATIUN UNLY]
N}C Bistoiy 0nit Naich 2u1u
2
B Source B cballenges tbe bypotbesis.

Soviet vetoeu iesolutions
conuemning Soviet inteivention of
Bungaiian upiising, anu pieventing
Su fiom taking much action
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
justifieu as an inteinal affaii thus
suggesting that 0N coulu not
inteivene.

Tbe impact of Soviet spbere of influence {in tbe area of conflict] on tbe SC is quite
ieliable.
Although the Su, unuei Article 99, ieseiveu the iight to take initiatives of his
own, wheie the Soviets weie conceineu, Dag (the Su in question in the souice)
was constiaineu by Soviet opinion.
The impact in the Bungaiian example is mirrored in Dag's experience in the
Congo wheie his iecognition of Kasavubu anu Nobutu in paiticulai causeu the
iie of the Soviets which maue his position moie untenable.
o Note: if you want to consiuei anothei case stuuy which is not the one
iefeiieu to in the souice, you neeu to consciously acknowleuge that
you aie using the cioss-iefeience as a paiallel to show that the
souice's example is not an exception etc. You shoulu N0T ianuomly
choose a case stuuy anu expect youi aigument to be compelling.
o When 'miiioiing,' it is useful to consiuei if the ciicumstances weie
similai; eg weie both examples within the spheie of supeipowei
influence. Biu both example occui uuiing the same peiiou such as
utente oi New Colu Wai. Etc.

Fuitheimoie, Cbapter I, Article 2 uiu pievent 0N fiom inteivening in matteis of
uomestic juiisuiction, thus hinueiing 0N action in the allegeu 'inteinal affaii' of the
Czech example.
This can be cioss-iefeiieu to Souice E which points out that the 0N is
funuamentally flaweu ('funuamental weaknesses') baseu on what it
tbeoretically can and cannot do.
Bowevei, the chaptei also uoes not pievent the application of enfoicement
measuies unuei Chaptei vII. Bence, it was not so much that the 0SSR
pieventeu 0N fiom inteivening effectively in Czechoslovakia but that theie
was a lack of suppoit fiom othei membeis to suppoit 0N opeiation theie.

A useful souice in examining tbe role of tbe USSR in tbe earlier part of tbe Cold
War.

C Source C supports tbe bypotbesis.

0S censuie anu action in the SC of
the 0NIFIL, as well as failuie to pay
its shaie of 0NIFIL's cost hau
fuithei hinueieu 0NFIL's lack of
authoiity in Lebanon.
Cieuible eviuence of 0S iesponsibility in thwaiting peacekeeping opeiations insofai
as.
C is mirrored by Source A's critique of US use of veto to challenge
opposition against 0S violence in Nicaiagua
both cases ieveal that the US bad allowed national interests to trump over
international ones.

Bowevei 0S actions weie no more appalling tban USSR actions in Hungary and
Bistoiy 8814; 97S11
The Political Effectiveness of the 0niteu Nations, 194S-2uuu
Iv. Collective Secuiity (SBQ Class Test) {INTERNAL CIRCULATIUN UNLY]
N}C Bistoiy 0nit Naich 2u1u
S
Czecboslovakia wheie the 0SSR hau also useu its position in the CS to piotect itself
(Souice B).

Nonetheless, fiom a former under-secretary of tbe UN in cbarge of peacekeeping
operations: likely to be a reliable insider perspective foi unueistanuing the impact
of 0S actions on 0NIFIL's effectiveness as he is likely to have cieuible fiist-hanu
expeiience of the issues involveu.

A useful souice in examining tbe role of tbe US in tbe new Cold War, revealing
almost no difference of US actions during tbe dtente period.

D Source D cballenges tbe bypotbesis.

0SSR's iefusal to pay foi the
expenses of the Suez Canal
opeiations hau leu to a politico-
financial ciisis (1967) which
eventually leu to Egypt iequesting
the 0NEF to leave.
Cross-referencing to B, B's point about 0SSR suppoiting peacekeeping opeiations
only when it suiteu theii puipose is cieuible, as:
B has shown that the 0SSR hau pieventeu the 0N fiom inteivening in
Czechoslovakia because the 0SSR claimeu it was an 'inteinal affaii.'

Bowevei, the souice overempbasises tbe impact of tbe lack of Soviet support of
UNEF:
Foi one, the bieaking out of the 1967 Wai cannot be attiibuteu solely to the
lack of 0N piesence in the iegion as the 0NEF uiu accomplish all tasks given to
it.
Fuitheimoie, the Suez Canal ciisis uevelopeu into an exemplaiy peacekeeping
opeiation fiom which Bag uevelopeu the veiy concepts of peacekeeping itself.

A useful souice in examining tbe role of tbe USSR in tbe earlier part of tbe Cold
War.

E Source E neitber cballenges nor
supports tbe bypotbesis.

Insteau points out the 0N's
'funuamental weaknesses' ie that
the 0N 'can uo nothing by itself.'
States that membei states aie given
fieeuom to suppoit 0N opeiations
but that the states tenueu to 'abuse
this fieeuom. national inteiests
always pievail above
|inteinationalj 0N goals.

0N's weaknesses aie tiue because peacekeeping bad no clear identity in tbe
Cbarter, anu thus it hau no agieeu stiuctuies of authoiisation anu finance.
This maue the suppoit of the majoi poweis namely the 0S anu the 0SSR
extiemely ciucial - this is exaceibateu by the iising cost of peacekeeping
coinciuing with the giowing inability of newei, less uevelopeu membeis of the
0N to meet theii commitments, the funuing by majoi poweis such as 0S anu
0SSR became even moie ciucial.

Also, as demonstrated in sources A-D, national inteiests uiu always pievail above
inteinational ones.

Bowevei, the souice overempbasises tbe impact of tbe member states tbemselves
(ie 'uo what its Nembei States tell it to uo.) on the success of 0N peacekeeping.
Bistoiy 8814; 97S11
The Political Effectiveness of the 0niteu Nations, 194S-2uuu
Iv. Collective Secuiity (SBQ Class Test) {INTERNAL CIRCULATIUN UNLY]
N}C Bistoiy 0nit Naich 2u1u
4
Accoiuing to contextual knowleuge, the success of 0N peacekeeping also
uepenueu on the willingness of conflicting paities to accept 0N peacekeeping.

Nonetheless, a useful souice in uemonstiating how the UN's Cbarter provided tbe
loopbole foi both the 0S anu the 0SSR to hinuei 0N peacekeeping opeiations.


Suggested conclusion

HetboJ 1: Comporotive juJqement
Souices which suppoit (A anu B) aie piefeiieu. Even though both sets of suppoit anu challenge souices (A-B) aie limiteu because of theii
oveiemphasis on eithei the iole of the 0S oi the 0SSR, A anu B aie moie useful because of the insiuei peispectives (A: foimei membei of
0S State Bept; C: unuei-secietaiy of the 0N in chaige of peacekeeping opeiations), compaieu to the seconuaiy souices (B anu B).
Fuitheimoie, E is not as useful as A anu B, because E only pioviues the context as to why 0S anu 0SSR weie able to hinuei 0N opeiations
in the fiist place (ie lack of 0N constitutional authoiity). Hence, since tbe support sources are preferred, tbe bypotbesis stands.

HetboJ 2: HoJificotion of conclusion
Souices A anu C concentiate on the continual impact of the 0S as a peimanent membei with veto powei, as well as its ieluctance to make
payments foi peacekeeping opeiations both uuiing utente (A) anu the new Colu Wai (B). 0n the othei hanu, souice B anu B concentiate
on the impact of the 0SSR in the eailiei pait of the Colu Wai when the concept of peacekeeping was not even uevelopeu yet (B) as well as
uuiing the inception of peacekeeping (B). E pioviues the context foi the obstacles which uevelopeu fiom the 0S anu the 0SSR by
concentiating on the inheient weaknesses of the 0N baseu on its Chaitei. Bence, the hypothesis neeus to be mouifieu to encapsulate the
above-mentioneu points: 'Tbe US, and not tbe USSR, was more at fault for tbe failures of UN peacekeeping in tbe later years of tbe
Cold War, and vice versa for tbe earlier years. However, essentially botb superpowers bindered UN operations because of tbe
limitations of tbe UN Cbarter.'