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Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the LakasNUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. (2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution. Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Supremacy of the Constitution enforced through judicial review Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 NATURE: Original action in the Supreme Court for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. FACTS: IN the elections of September 17, 1935, Jose Angara and respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Taybas.. On October 7, 1935 petitioner Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the National Assembly and he later took his oath of office on November 15, 1935. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 which declared with finality the victory of petitioner. On December 8, respondent Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara praying that said the former be declared elected member of the National Assembly or that the election of the said position be nullified. On December 20, Angara filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest" arguing that a) Resolution 8 was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its member should be presented; b) that aforesaid resolution has for its object and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and c) protest was filed out of the prescribed period. The Electoral Commission denied petitioner's motion. Thus, this action in the present case. ISSUE: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing facts; 2. WON the Electoral Commission committed a grave abuse of its discretion having entertained a protest after the National Assembly passed Resolution 8 which declared the deadline of filing of protests. HELD: 1. The nature of the present case shows the necessity of a final arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. NOt taking cognizance of said controversy would create a void in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutitonl organ which can be called

4 upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the ingral or constituent units thereof. 2. The Electoral Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction. It has been created by thew Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly". Thus, entertaining the protest of Ynsua must conform to their own prescribed rules and the National Assembly cannot divest them of any such powers. Wherefore, petition DENIED .

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections

Facts On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,

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asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, his son, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees.

Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of threefourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of twothirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country.

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When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.