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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 (2008) 393399 www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Emergency response plan of chlorine gas for process plants in Taiwan

J.M. Tsenga, M.Y. Liub, R.H. Changc, J.L. Sud, C.M. Shua,
Doctoral Program, Graduate School of Engineering Science and Technology, National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, 123, University Rd., Sec. 3, Douliou, Yunlin 64002, Taiwan, ROC b Chienkuo Technology University, 1, Chieh Shou N. Rd., Changhua 50094, Taiwan, ROC c Department of Chemical Engineering, National Chung Hsing University, 250, Kuo-Kwang Rd., Taichung 40227, Taiwan, ROC d National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction, 9F, No. 200, Sec. 3, Beisin Rd., Sindian City, Taipei 23143, Taiwan, ROC Received 9 August 2007; received in revised form 19 January 2008; accepted 25 January 2008
a

Abstract Potentially hazardous releases due to chlorine gas leaks have been a crucial social issue in Taiwan, especially leaks that have occurred in the process plants in general, such as water treatment plants (WTPs), petrifaction, and so on. Classied as a highly toxic gas, chlorine presents severe hazards when contacting the human body in various ways. It can very easily enter the human body through the skin, the eyes, inhalation, or by being ingested. Environmental contact typically affects the eyes, trachea, and respiratory system. In process plants, the units for transferring the chlorine gas are relatively effective and complex, including steel chlorine cylinders, piping, valves, and chlorine addition equipment. This study shows the benets of developing an adequate emergency response plan (ERP) with safety and industrial hygiene resources to deal with the effects resulting from a chlorine gas leak, in order to lessen or avoid injury to plant personnel and citizens in the neighboring community. Results from systematic planning indicate that properly trained personnel could immediately and effectively handle each level of incidents occurring in the process plants in Taiwan. r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Incident; Chlorine gas leaks; Process plants; Hazards; Emergency response plan (ERP)

1. Introduction Practically speaking, preventing incidents from occurring in the enormous number of human activities in everyday life is difcult, despite precautionary measures. In Taiwan, industrial and residential areas traditionally have not been clearly separated with buffer zones. Over the years, several serious chlorine incidents that threatened human lives have occurred in Taiwan as well as elsewhere, such as in Spain (Marco, Pena, & Santamaria, 1998). Hazardous chemicals, such as chlorine gas, are transported and stored in large quantities; therefore, all containers for chlorine transport are pressure vessels made of steel and equipped with safety devices (Lees, 1996). Chlorine is a highly toxic element (immediately dangerous to life or health concentration valueIDLHCl2 10 ppm) that is produced in large quantities all over the world (Dimbour,
Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 534 2601x4416/4499.

E-mail address: shucm@yuntech.edu.tw (C.M. Shu). 0950-4230/$ - see front matter r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2008.01.006

Dandrieux, & Dusserre, 2002). Chlorine dioxide is nding increasing use as an oxidizing bleaching agent in replacing chlorine, and so on. Hydrochloric acid is oxidized to chlorine gas and chlorate is reduced to chlorine dioxide, as follows: 2NaClO3+4HCl-2ClO2+Cl2+2NaCl+2H2O (Kaczur & Cawleld, 1993). An exposure to a hazardous chemical such as chlorine can result in injury or death, because it can be taken into the body by eating, drinking, or breathing; and small amounts can be absorbed through the skin (Argonne National Laboratory, 2005). The extent of the injury depends on the concentration or strength of the agent (Totenhofer & Kierce, 1999). Therefore, an effective and sound emergency response plan (ERP) or a disaster management plan (Boppana & Swaminathan, 2000; Gangopadhyay, Das, & Mukherjee, 2005) to quickly control the hazard and to lessen the risk of casualties and loss should be developed and implemented to deal with chlorine leaks. Many hazardous materials, in both liquid and gaseous states, have been used industrially and militarily (Laurent,

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394 J.M. Tseng et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 (2008) 393399 Table 2 Concentration of chlorine in air versus effect on the human body Concentration of chlorine (ppm) 0.10.2 1 36 1421 4060 100 900 IOSH (2008). Effect

Richter, & Michel, 1999). These hazardous materials need to be carefully handled by highly competent and experienced personnel to ensure safe storage and handling (Ramabrahmam, Sreenivasulu, & Mallikarjunan, 1996). Recently, a number of incidents have occurred as a result of chlorine gas releases from process plants in general in Taiwan. From lessons drawn from root-cause analyses, we cannot merely consider the preventative measures; a timely, well-dened emergency response must be implemented when an upset situation actually occurs. Immediate and appropriate response to mine disasters has been shown to be essential to minimize the loss of life and severity of incidents (Kowalski, 1995). Therefore, prudently establishing an adequate ERP to deal with hazardous chemical incidents has been a common concern throughout the world. Many laws and regulations have been announced that require careful management of toxic chemicals. According to the toxic chemicals management law enacted by the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA, 2008) in Taiwan, chlorine gas has been classied as the thirdcategory toxic material. Table 1 shows the physical properties of chlorine, indicating that it is a dense gas. This heavy gas can accumulate at ground level, so that an unexpected release exceeding its threshold value might ultimately cause human injury. Water is employed to reduce the concentration of leaking chlorine gas; therefore, two kinds of water sprays have been tested for dealing with the upset situations (Dimbour, Dandrieux, Gilbert, & Dusserre, 2003). Furthermore, although the color of chlorine gas is yellow-green, a minor leak might not be easily detected. The effect of chlorine gas concentration on humans is displayed in Table 2. In Table 3, the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) classied the toxic materials to three types by permitting exposure degree, as so-called Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs). If the degree is higher than one, emergency response should be started immediately (EPA, 2008). This study outlined a suitable ERP for dealing with a chlorine gas leak and demonstrated that the response to various levels of leaks during an unexpected incident could be readily planned,

Foul smell Strong irritating odor Causes a headache by irritating eyes, nose, and throat Continuous exposure of 0.51 h could be life threatening Short-term exposure could be life threatening Exposure for more than 1 min could be fatal Immediately causes death

Table 3 Exposure index of ERPG Exposure index ERPG-1 ERPG-2 ERPG-3 Exposure duration 1 h. EPA (2008). Permitted concentration (ppm) 1 3 20

controlled, and implemented. Most of the process plants in Taiwan have employed this systematic plan to practice emergency response drills for reducing the damaging effects from chlorine leaks. 2. Missions and response plan of the emergency response squad Development of a comprehensive ERP requires a systematic review of the hazards on-site, and the assumption of worse case scenarios (Fitzgerald, 1996). According to a previous incident analysis, when a leak occurred, staff in the process plant could not promptly deal with the upset situation, because a suitable plan which detailed responses had not been established. Therefore, a complete ERP must be effectively developed and distributed to the appropriate workers to prevent delaying corrective actions. Table 4 indicates the assignments of each staff member when an incident occurs. Figs. 1 and 2 show the role of each member when responding to an emergency. The response steps must be followed at each different level. 3. Triggering time and opportunity of emergency response The ERP established in this study for dealing with various incidents must be applicable year-round 24 h a day. The announcing level (AL), which was also an important part of ERP, has three stages; AL can be treated as a standard for determining the incident level. The appropriate responders will apply AL differently, depending on

Table 1 Physical characteristics of chlorine Atomic weight Molecular weight Boiling point (at 1 atm) Melting point Viscosity Color Critical temperature Critical pressure Degree of dissolve for water Specic gravity 35.5 70.905 34.6 1C 100.98 1C 133 up Yellowgreen 144.0 1C 76.1 atm 0.7 g/100 g H2O (20 1C) 2.5

Chronic Toxicity Summary Chlorine (2008) and Poling, Prausnitz, and OConnell (2001).

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J.M. Tseng et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 (2008) 393399 Table 4 Job duty of each related-staff during an incident in a process plant No. Response organization 1 Incident commander Work assignment 395

Incident Commander

Agent

 Executing and planning the emergency response

actions

 Realizing the hazard potential of the upset

situation and coordinating the teams

Coordinator

 Initiating the evacuation order to the staff  Assigning manpower resources  Providing a budget for the rescue process
2 Coordinator

Agent

 Coordinating the rescue team and offering the  

response measures Bridging between the incident commander and rescue team for assisting to dispatch each task Coordinating the task on the scene of the chemical disaster

Government Liaison

Leader of Medical Team

Spokesperson Agent

Agent Agent

Government liaison

 Contacting and reporting information to

related governmental agencies

 Contacting the department of toxic response

center to request safety and health equipment for other departments to use to control the upset situation 4 Rescue team

 Protecting the staff, dealing with the toxic 

materials, stopping the leaks, repairing damage, and controlling res Requesting and getting the necessary resources for executing emergency rescues

Leader of Rescue Team Agent

Leader of Safety and Security Team Agent

Leader of Rescue Information Team Agent

Fig. 1. Structure and responsibilities of emergency response. 5 Information team

 Providing and checking out the safety and    

health equipment Recording rescue information Assisting the incident analysis Reinforcing the role of technical members Environmental monitoring

Safety and security team

 Guiding and evacuating the staff and vehicles  Safely guiding the support-personnel into the
plant

 Crowd control and keeping order inside the

plant

 Maintaining security inside the plant  Evacuating visitors and onlookers to a safe
location 7 Medical team

 Providing rst aid and transporting the injured

to a hospital

 Alerting the nearby hospital of potential

patients 8 Spokesperson

which of the three incident stages apply. Each department of the process plant must follow the principles of AL, if an incident has reached the third-stage. The incident commander must be informed to set up the emergency response team (ERT) in a safe location. Various methods of communication, such as telephone, cellular phone, Internet, broadcast system, and other suitable methods must be established. During the rst or second-stage, the incident commander must arrive at the scene and collect the incident information; an incident in one of these two stages might be easily controlled if personnel have been properly trained and drilled. Training is needed for all of these activities, but emergency response tasks are unique because of uncertainties about what is happening and the need for urgency in responding (Ford & Schmidt, 2000). The following are the details of AL. 1. First-stage: The incident can be controlled within the affected department itself and associated nearby departments. 2. Second-stage: The ERT must be mobilized to handle the incident. 3. Third-stage: Any of the following types of incidents might have occurred, and the mobilization of out-ofplant help to reduce the degree of hazard is necessary. 3.1. A threat to the safety and health of workers.

 Issuing and explaining the incident information  Explaining the status of the emergency response
process

 Setting up and participating in a press

conference

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Leaking of Chlorine Gas

Board Man in Control Room Determining

Announced by Worker Who Found the Accident Dispatching three workers to deal with the leak (two indoors and one outdoors) Emergency Handling 1. Wearing the Required Safety Equipment 2. Stopping the Leak

Emergency Response

Announcing

Emergency Director (Emergency Broadcasting)

Moving the Victims to Nearby Safe Area

Emergency Response and Guard Against in Inner-Plant

Operating by Organization of Emergency Response

Inside the plant, it does not need any further assistance Emergency Response for Victims Local Environmental Protection Organization, Fire Department, etc. Need others assistance

Medical Team

Government Liaison

Information Team

Rescue Team

Safety and Security Team

Liaison An Ambulance and Hospital

Liaison

Local Environmental Protection Organization

Police Department

Toxic Calamity Response

Providing the Safe Equipment for Rescuing

Rescuing

Outdoors Controlling

Indoors Controlling

Fig. 2. Emergency response steps for a chlorine gas incident occurring in a typical process plant.

3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5. 3.6.

Fire or explosion. Leakage of toxic gas. Leakage of chemical materials. An incident during a power failure. Natural disaster, such as typhoon, earthquake, oods, and landslide, etc. 3.7. Other serious incidents, such as sabotage or arson.

follows: Although the ventilation system and isolation door had been employed, a large amount of chlorine gas had leaked out of the process plant chlorine warehouse, and there were visitors in the plant. The wind direction was from the southwest, the weather was sunny with a relative humidity (RH) and temperature of 85% and 20 1C, respectively. Step 1: Announcement of emergency conditions. (1) The alarm is heard by the operator, who immediately goes back to the control room to inform the supervisor, and then it is conrmed by the detector system that the leak came from the chlorine warehouse. (2) The supervisor must report the information about the leak to the information center and the incident commander.

4. Case study A well dened and suitable ERP must be effectively deployed during an incipient upset situation. This case is a worst credible scenario, which might actually occur in a process plant. We used ten steps to deal with this complex worst-case incident. The upset condition is described as

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J.M. Tseng et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 (2008) 393399 397

(3) The incident commander should assess the wind direction and weather conditions from the information team, and then alert all of the members of the ERT by broadcast to go to a safe location to deal with the upset situation. The incident commander, rescue team leader, and medical team leader are instructed to carry walkietalkies. Step 2: Gathering all of the members of the ERT and isolating the disaster area. The incident commander must understand the conditions in the control room after the announcement is received. Depending on the scale of the incident, the emergency response center (ERC) is established at the entrance of the plant. (1) The rescue team, comprised of the members of re control and emergency response, gather in the rescue preparation room, bringing with them the required equipment. (2) The medical team prepares the equipment, personal protective equipment (PPE), medicines, and a large amount of water at a safe location to care for the injured. (3) The safety and security team must keep unnecessary people from going into the plant and evacuate the staff and vehicles to take refuge in a safe area. They then cordon off the leak area to isolate it. (4) The information team must prepare the PPE and the risk assessment report book, set out the drawings of the inner plant, the area drawings, the drawings of the re control facility, and liaising form to the ERC for rescuing. (5) The spokesperson is requested to report for duty in the communications center and to keep in close contact with the ERC. (6) The government liaison must contact other agencies for assistance. Step 3: Leak prevention, emergency closure, protection of the rescue team. The rescue team leader designates two team members, wearing class A PPE and carrying ammonia water and tools, to enter the leak area from up-wind to stop the leak. Additionally, he or she conrms that all of the surrounding equipment could be easily monitored via observation at the control panel. The appropriate repair steps are indicated, as follows: (1) Test for the presence of chlorine by using ammonia water; the white-smoke identies the source of the leak. (2) Orient the leaking steel cylinder to ensure that the leak opening faces upward, in order to prevent chlorine liquid from leaking. (3) Use the correct tools and methods to stop the leaking. (4) Both of team members must take care of each other, and must be alert to avoid jeopardizing themselves. If a

partner is affected by chlorine, the victim must be removed upwind from the leak area. In the process of rescuing, these two members must constantly communicate with their leader by sight or signals. Step 4: Reporting to the incident commander. The leader of the rescue team must report to the incident commander to conrm that the two team members entered the leak area to begin stopping the leak. Step 5: Initiating water mist facility. If the leaked chlorine gas escapes from the windows or rolling iron doors to the outside, the rescue team leader must contact the incident commander to request activating the water mist. After information regarding the leak is provided, the incident commander directs the information team leader and the members of re control to begin setting up the water mist starting in the appropriate places. The steps are as follows: (1) Using two re control boxes and re hydrants, establish two water mist facilities and direct the spray at the windows and doors. (2) Request help from other re control teams and use another re hydrant placed upwind to increase the blocking effect. (3) Firemen must wear the class A or B of PPE. Step 6: Medical treatment, rst aid, and care of the injured. If the rescue team members are affected by chlorine gas, the injured must be removed from the leak area to a safe location upwind of the leak, and the emergency shower must be used before entering the safe location. At the same time, the rescue team leader must request two members to replace the injured to continue dealing with the leak. The medical team must assemble near the leak area and the name and number of the injured must be provided by the information team to hasten the treatment process. Ambulances must also be ready to transfer the injured during the emergency response. All of the information from the rescue team is reported to the incident commander for formulating the next order. Step 7: Evaluation of a disaster. The information team uses the risk assessment report book to predict the affected area and then informs the incident commander regarding the present situation. Step 8: Communicating outside the plant, looking for support, establishing contacts, making arrangements for the public in the disaster area, and maintaining order. After the incident commander receives the incident reports, the communications center must inform the following departments immediately: (1) EPA: provide the location of the disaster, the department, the time, the classication, accident degree, the disaster status, and a phone number.

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(2) Labor inspection department: inform of the disaster status and casualties. (3) Affected community: inform of the disaster category, evacuation instructions, gathering place, and the disaster information phone number. The rst step in estimating evacuation demand is to assess the size of the evacuating population (Urbanik, 2000). (4) Police department: ask for support, maintenance of order, and evacuation of the neighboring civilians. (5) Fire department: assist in enhancing the water mist and stopping the chlorine gas leak. (6) Local science park: ask for manpower and PPE support. (7) The joint defense team: inform the other plants in the neighborhood of the need for additional equipment and manpower. (8) Medical department: request ambulances, doctors, nurses, and medicines. (9) Other departments, such as the public, government agencies, etc. Step 9: Eliminating the disaster. Fire engines and the joint defense team gather at the entrance of the plant, and then enter the plant guided by a member of the safety and security team to report for duty to the incident commander. If the leak is properly controlled and repairs completed, the rescue team leader, wearing class A PPE, inspects the leak area. After the previous steps are nished, the members of the EPA or members of the labor inspection department must use a toxic-gas detector to conrm that the source of the chlorine gas leak is eliminated. In addition, a security check and the incident investigation to determine the cause must be initiated. Step 10: Dealing with problems or difculties arising from the incident and treatment of wastewater. The incident commander needs to thank all of the members who executed the ERP, and then requests the spokesperson to hold a press conference to explain the whole process of handling the incident. Finally, the incident commander, by various approaches, needs to placate the neighboring citizens and reassure the victims. All of the above-mentioned steps must be rehearsed biannually, in order to lessen the degree of hazard if an incident occurs. 5. Conclusions While chlorine gas is leaking, the staff must lessen the degree of hazard classied as AL in limit time by this ERP. All of the ERTs also need to comply with the designated responsibilities for accidents after the ERP has been initiated by the incident commander. Each team, such as government liaison, rescue team, information team, safety and security team, medical team, and spokesperson have the same duty for trying the best and fastest way to control or eliminate an accident that has occurred in a specic

plant, as above-mentioned. Training also is an important unit for teaching the staff what to do and how to function while an accident occurs. Without training, even the best method of ERP cannot be workable or deliverable. PPEs should be prepared and replenished on the go. In this study, we indicated an extensively used method of ERP for dealing with an upset situation in a process plant in Taiwan, in terms of a chlorine gas incident. This plan could be employed exclusively for process plants or similar processes regarding a chlorine gas leak. Currently, most of the plants, such as WTPs, petrifaction, and so on, have effectively adopted and implemented this ERP, as their means for reducing the impact of chlorine gas incidents in Taiwan. Acknowledgments We thank the Tading Water Treatment Plant, Tainan County, Taiwan, for nancial support and Mr. Anthony M. Janeshek of Dow Chemical, Freeport, Texas, USA, for his valuable suggestions on this study. References
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