INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR FAIR ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY (ISFED)

MONITORING OF OCTOBER 1 ST, 2012 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FINAL REPORT

2013 TBILISI
1

Report prepared By:

Nino Lomjaria Nino Rizhamadze Tamar Bartaia Elene Nizharadze Mikheil Benidze

ISFED election program for 2012 was carried out with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), National Democratic Institute (NDI), European Union (EU), East West Management Institutes project Policy, Advocacy and Civil Society Development in Georgia (EWMI G-PAC), National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF), and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The contents of this publication belong solely to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDI, NED, EWMI, OSGF, Sida, USAID, the United States Government or the European Union.

Contents
I.
II.

About the Monitoring Mission .......................................................................................................................... 4

Key Findings .......................................................................................................................................................... 5

III. Political Context .................................................................................................................................................... 8 IV. V. VI. Election Laws ..................................................................................................................................................... 9

The Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections ..................................................................... 13 The State Audit Office ...................................................................................................................................... 14

VII. Voter Lists ............................................................................................................................................................ 15 VIII. Election Administration ..................................................................................................................................... 16 The Central Election Commission .............................................................................................................. 16 District and Precinct Election Commissions ............................................................................................. 19 IX. Pre-Election Monitoring ..................................................................................................................................... 21 Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................... 21 Key violations in the pre-election period .................................................................................................. 22 Media environment in the pre-election period ........................................................................................ 29 Monitoring of public meetings held by political parties in the pre-election period ...................... 30 X. Election Day ......................................................................................................................................................... 32 Monitoring Mission ......................................................................................................................................... 32 Monitoring Methodology................................................................................................................................ 32 Results of PVT Monitoring .......................................................................................................................... 33 Election Day Violations and Complaints ................................................................................................... 37 XI. Post Election Period ........................................................................................................................................... 39 Complaints and lawsuits filed with district and precinct election commissions and court .............................................................................................................................................................. 39 Other important post-election developments ............................................................................................ 42 XII. Conclusions and Recommendations............................................................................................................... 43

I. About the Monitoring Mission

The present report outlines results of monitoring of the October 1, 2012 Parliamentary Elections carried out by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy.

ble to analyze the pre-election process in a comprehensive and objective manner. The pre-election monitoring focused on issues including use of government resources, activities of the election administrations and political parties, formation of voter lists, pressure, and threats on political grounds and vote buying. 2. The Election Day monitoring was carried out in 902 election precincts, including parallel vote tabulation (PVT) at 600 election precincts. In addition to randomly selected election precincts ISFED also observer 302 election precincts through short-term observers. Together with LTOs the Election Day monitoring mission was composed of 78 mobile teams, 73 district observers, 15 lawyers, 15 cameramen and 2 observers stationed at the Central Election Commission (CEC). The Election Day monitoring had three key components opening and setting up of election precinct, voting and vote counting. 3. Post-election monitoring was carried out by ISFED by means of 73 district observers, 15 lawyers and 2 monitors at the CEC. ISFED monitored activities of the election administration, consideration of complaints at district election commissions (DECs) and the process of vote tabulation.

During the 2012 parliamentary elections ISFED, as a monitoring organization with one of the largest observation networks, was actively involved in preelection monitoring as well as the monitoring on the Election Day and post-elections. The monitoring was carried out by ISFED by utilization of new methods innovative technologies. The complete monitoring entailed the following three key stages: 1. Pre-election monitoring was conducted throughout the period of six months prior to the elections1 by means of 73 long-term observers of ISFED in all election districts of Georgia. Length of the monitoring and use of effective methodology made it possi-

ISFED carried out pre-election monitoring from April 1, 2012 through September 30, 2012

II. Key Findings

The pre-election period was marked by high political competition between the ruling political force and the opposition coalition. Due to the tense political background, there was a lack of pre-election campaigning focused on discussion of election programs and thematic debate. Rather, the pre-election campaign involved plentiful use of compromising information, multiple violations of law, active use of hate speech, violent and aggressive clashes. It seemed that there was a competition between the state and the opposition, as opposed to political parties, which was caused by absence of a boundary line between the ruling party and the governments administrative function. The nature and dynamics of pre-election violations was changing as the election processes entered their active phase. At the beginning of the monitoring in April-May, dismissals from work on political grounds were most frequent. Later, as the elections approached, number of facts that involved use of government resources, violence on political grounds, physical clashes and use of administrative sanctions/imprisonment on political grounds increased. Pre-election violations were reported in almost all regions of Georgia. ISFED included hundreds of facts of pre-election violation in its reports. In the run up of the parliamentary elections, the new Election Code was adopted and fundamental changes were made in the organic law of Georgia on Political Union of Citizens. Further, a number of amendments were made to the Constitution of Georgia, the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences of Georgia. Although adoption of the new Election Code was a step forward for improving access to media, realization of passive election rights, promotion of gender participation, procedures for reviewing election disputes, it failed to remedy fundamental gaps in the existing election system, related to abuse of administrative resources, ensuring transparency of staffing of election administrations. New regulations introduced in the law on Political Union of Citizens have proved to be the most problematic. Although they increased transparency of party funding, set up an independent body to control party funding, introduced audit standards, established annual donations and spending threshold, the law contained certain problematic provisions that was expressly criticized by the civil society. Initial formulation of the law jeopardized freedom of expression and the right to property, limited civil and political activities and provided unequal playing field. Prohibitions placed by the law were frequently unreasonable and sanctions were disproportionate. As a result of active involvement of member organizations of the It Affects You Too campaign, significant improvements were made to the law; in particular, norms that jeopardized right to property, freedom of expression and civil activities were removed. Nevertheless, we believe that it still did not define competencies

and procedures applicable to the work of body that controls party funding. Rather, it granted broad discretion to the latter, posing a threat of selective application of law. In the run up of the parliamentary elections, a number of new institutes were created, including the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) whose work is commendable as unlike other agencies its efforts were more focused on responding to and preventing violations in pre-election period. As a result of the work of the task force, number of dismissals on political grounds was reduced in public sector. Further, we believe that the IATF played a positive role in pre-election period in diffusing violence.

On frequent occasions, the Audit Service selectively reacted to certain actions undertaken by the ruling and opposition parties, suggesting their loyalty to the United National Movement and excessive strictness towards opposition parties. Owing to the work of the Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC) information about voters abroad, deceased persons and persons not living at registration addresses was more accurate than in previous elections. Nevertheless, a decision to return voters removed from registration and voters whose registration had been annulled back to the voter list, which unprecedentedly increased number of voters on the list and left room for illegal manipulation with these voters on the Election Day. The work of the election administration and the CEC in particular, is commendable in terms of transparency and administration of elections. Interested parties had access to election information, facilitated by the CEC website. Improving the website design greatly simplified search of information. The fact that under the CEC initiative and with the involvement of civil society, guidelines were elaborated for members of election commissions, observers, media and political party proxies, which facilitated interpretation of election law and its uniform application.

Most of the claims have been raised about the work of the State Audit Service delegated with party funding regulatory function. While studying financial activities of political subjects and their supporters, the Service instituted unsubstantiated legal prosecution and imposed high, disproportionate sanctions.

Nevertheless, certain decisions of the CEC were perceived as politically motivated. In particular, assignation of a ballot paper number to the Georgian Dream as well as the decision prohibiting photo and video recording on the Election Day at the polling station. Further, ISFED believes that the

CEC failed to inform voters living abroad about registration procedures and therefore, it is possible than many of them refrained from registration at the election precinct. During the pre-election period media was rather diverse. Television, press, radio and Internet provided access to variety of information. The problem was that citizens of Georgia and particularly those living in the regions lacked equal access to all media outlets and in particular, to outlets criticizing the government. The problem was mostly caused by the fact that majority of cable companies refused to carry broadcasters known for their criticism of the government. After the Parliament of Georgia adopted the so-called must carry and must offer regulations for the Election Code, access to media known for its criticism was greatly improved throughout Georgia as the official preelection campaign commenced. During the pre-election period, interference with journalistic activities was often reported. ISFED identified dozens of cases that involved hindering of journalists, exerting pressure against them and subjecting them to violence. The violence mostly targeted representatives of media outlets that were known for their criticism of the government. Such acts of violence were ineffectively investigated or not investigated at all. Mostly the Election Day had no significant flaws; however, one important deficiency was that voters often found someone had already signed along their names beforehand. This frequently hindered voter participation. Further, at 6% of polling stations violations of inking procedures were reported. The principle of secret ballot was observed at 98% of polling stations, a significant improvement from the 2008 parliamentary elections. Notably, vote counting was duly administered at most of the election precincts, with the only exception of several precincts in Khashuri Election District, where drawing up of protocols was delayed with no reason until the appearance of Special Forces at these precincts, which eventually lead to the annulment of polling results at these precincts. Throughout the course of the elections and during the post-election period, ISFEDs observers acted on total of 223 violations at district and precinct election commissions. Most of the complaints were filed over alleged restriction of observers rights; agitation at polling stations; signatures made on the list beforehand, instead of actual voters; voting with wrong documents; violations in casting of lots, marking and vote counting. The process of examining election complaints was administered in a transparent manner. Interested parties were able to attend election commission/court sessions and participate in the process. Nevertheless, decisions delivered by election commissions rejecting claims mostly lacked proper substantiation. Further, election administration often refused to resort to its own power to investigate under its own initiative and eliminate polling day violations. As to courts, they often lacked objectivity and failed to examine evidence in a comprehensive and thorough manner before delivering decisions.

In this light, it is safe to say that notwithstanding a rather problematic pre-election period, the elections were conducted, first of all owing to high voter turnout on the Election Day and maximum transparency of polling and vote count processes. Citizens of Georgia were able to express their will, which was duly reflected in election summary protocols.

III. Political Context

A heightened interest in the 2012 parliamentary elections was caused by several important factors; in particular, pursuant to the 2010 Constitutional amendments Georgia is switching to a new model of governance that will come into effect after the president-elect of Georgia takes an oath of office in 2013. Parliament will be further reinforced as presidential authorities will be reduced. Active preparations for the 2012 parliamentary elections started as early as on September 17, 2012, by promulgation of the draft Election Code. On October 7, 2011, Bidzina Ivansihvili made a public statement about the establishment of a political team and his political goals, followed by sharp intensification of political processes. It is safe to say that pre-election period in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections lasted for a year. Throughout this time, various actors including the parliament, political parties, media outlets and election monitoring organizations got actively engaged in the process of adoption of new election regulations, improvement of media environment and verification of voter lists as early as one year in advance. Unlike previous parliamentary elections, the 2012 elections featured two political subjects of relatively equal force the United National Movement on the one hand and the coalition Georgian Dream on the other. The latter brought together the following six political parties: Georgian Dream Democratic Georgia, Irakli Alasania Free Democrats, Industry Will Save Georgia, National Forum, Conservative Party, and Republican Party. Both political forces had a great number of supporters in public. Further, unlike other had an important financial advantage. In particular, the United National Movement, access to government resources and there were cases when it utilized the resources for On the other hand, the coalition Georgian Dream created around businessman Bidzina to huge financial resources. opposition forces they the ruling party, had political campaigning2. Ivanishvili, had access

The 2012 parliamentary elections were special due several additional institutes set up that took over important part of the CEC functions. In particular, for the first time the Election Code of Georgia mandated creation
2

ISFEDs pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012_Parliamentary_Elections_preelection_monitoring_findings_ENG.pdf; http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-06-15-report-en.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf http://isfed.ge/pdf/20120-08-20-report-eng.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20 Fifth%20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf

of the Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections. 3 This way, the function of financial monitoring of parties was now delegated to the State Audit Offices (formerly known as the Chamber of Control), Party Financial Monitoring Service. 4 The function of verifying voter lists was passed on to the Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC) 5. The VLVC was manned by equal number of representatives of the ruling party, opposition and NGOs.

IV. Election Laws

Applicable election laws for the 2012 parliamentary elections included the Constitution of Georgia, the Election Code of Georgia, the Law on Political Union of Citizens, the Criminal Code of Georgia, the Code of Administrative Offences, etc. Notably, adoption of new election regulations was a continuous process that started as early as one year prior to the elections. The Constitution of Georgia There were two key new regulations introduced in the Constitution of Georgia in May 2012 in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections; in particular, Number of majoritarian MPs was reduced from 75 to 73, whereas the number of proportional MPs was increased from 75 to 77; 6 In addition to citizens of Georgia, persons who have reached certain age and were born in Georgia, have been living permanently in Georgia for the last five years and have a citizenship of an EUmember state now have the right to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections up until January 1, 2014; 7 Minimum age for passive election right was reduced from 25 to 218.

3 4 5 6 7 8

ISFEDs pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012_Parliamentary_Elections_pre-election_monitoring_findings_ENG.pdf; http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-06-15-report-en.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf http://isfed.ge/pdf/20120-08-20-report-eng.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20Fifth% 20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf Information about the IATF is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php Please see the official website of the SAO: http://sao.ge/?action=page&p_id=6&lang=eng Please see the official website of the VLVC: http://sia.gov.ge/ Para.1, Article 49 of the Constitution of Georgia Article 1044 of the Constitution of Georgia Para.2, Article 49 of the Constitution of Georgia, para.1, Article 111 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia

The Election Code of Georgia Based on the agreement signed between the political parties, the parliament of Georgia presented draft Election Code in September 2011 for consideration, which, except for several positive new regulations, did not offer any other essential changes to improve the election environment. In particular, the new Election Code did not offer regulation of important and problematic issues related to observance of the principle of vote equality, raising barrier for majoritarian elections, introducing tight regulations for the use of government resources. On December 27, 2011, the parliament of Georgia adopted the new Election Code, although the process of amending the Code lasted through July 2012. The new Election Code stipulated the following important new regulations: The circle of officials who are not prohibited from pre-election campaigning (engaging in agitation) has been broadened; in particular, Gamgebelis have been granted the status of a political official9; The Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC) took over responsibility of verifying and publishing voter lists from the CEC; 10 Changes were made in the timeframe for considering election disputes; in particular, the deadline for appealing in higher election commission was extended but the time for consideration of a complaint by court was reduced; 11 Prisoners convicted for less grave crimes under the Criminal Code of Georgia have been granted with the right to vote in elections; 12 Independent candidates nominated by initiative groups have been allowed to run in elections; Video surveillance at polling stations has been prohibited; An inter-agency task force was set up with the Security Council of Georgia on July 1 of the election year, for the purpose of preventing and responding to violations of election laws of Georgia by public servants. 14
9 10 11 12

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Para.2z5 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia See Chapter VI for detailed information about the commission Para.2, Article 77 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia Less grave crime is a crime committed intentionally or a reckless crime subject to maximum punishment of five-year imprisonment under the Criminal Code Para.1c, Article 116 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia See Chapter V for information about the commission

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Higher standards of transparency were provided for international monitoring organizations; 15 Agitation in polling stations on the Polling Day was prohibited; 16 Must carry and must offer regulations were enacted in pre-election period, which ensured voters access to pluralistic information.17 Despite the fact that the new Election Code was an improvement for access to media, realization of passive election right, promotion of gender participation, procedures for consideration of election disputes, it failed to address problematic issues related to the existing election system, abuse of administrative resources, ensuring transparency of staffing election administrations and their activities. Further, from a technical point of view the Election Code became more systemic. The Law on Political Union of Citizens On December 12, 2011, a draft law on amendments and supplements to the law of Georgia on Political Union of Citizens was initiated in the parliament of Georgia. Although it improved transparency of party funding, the draft law contained regulations that were flawed and ambiguous and were sharply criticized by civil society. In consideration of some of the recommendations of international and domestic organizations, the law
15 16

envisaged setting up of an independent regulatory agency for party funding, established standards of financial audit of parties, maximum amount of donations, maximum amount of spending per year. ISFED together with its partner NGOs harshly criticized the new regulations, as it believed that the law jeopardized freedom of expression and the right to property and placed restrictions on civil and political activities, creating unequal playing field for political parties. We have highlighted that the restrictions were frequently unreasonable, sanctions disproportionate. 18 Further, With a demand to make changes to the law, civil sector that included most part of NGOs and media organizations, launched a large-scale protest campaign It Affects You Too19, where ISFED was actively involved.

Para.5, Article 39 of the Organic Law of Georgia Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia Para.9, Article 45 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia 17 Paras.17-21, Article 51 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia 18 Full statement is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/Joint_Party_Finance-January_27_2012.pdf 19 Information about the campaign is available at http://esshengexeba.ge/?page=9&menuid=9&lang=1

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As a result of active involvement of the It Affects You Too member organizations, the law was significantly improved; in particular, individual provisions that jeopardized the right to property, freedom of expression and civil activities were removed. Nevertheless, we believe that it failed to determine the purview of the regulatory agency in a comprehensive manner or the rule of its operations and delegated it with unlimited discretion for financial monitoring of parties, which posing the risk of its selective application. The Criminal Code New regulations were also introduced in prima Article 164 of the Criminal Code of Georgia regulating vote buying during official election campaigning. The amendment was first formulated in a way that a voter who received or requested a monetary or any other present from a political party or a person related to a political party in a direct or indirect manner, would be sentenced to three years of imprisonment or ordered to pay fine as punishment. Further, the voter concerned would be imposed with a liability notwithstanding the worth of property received or requested. The legislative amendment prohibited vote buying not only during the pre-election campaign but at any given time. Further, criminal liability would apply not only to the person who offered material goods or services to a voter for political purposes but also to a citizen who accepted or requested the offer. The law prescribed a three-year imprisonment as a sanction for committing the crime. The foregoing new regulations introduced in the Criminal Code were fundamentally unacceptable to us. We believed that it provided unreasonable restrictions that could have affected any citizen. Ambiguity of the provisions posed a great risk for their inconsistent and selective implementation. Further, it did not envisage any legal liability for funding activities with an effect of vote buying from state or municipal budgets. The campaign It Affects You Too offered alternative formulation of Article 1641 to the Parliament of Georgia20, which was taken into account in part. Eventually, due to the active involvement of the campaign members, the regulations were modified in a way that criminal liability would be imposed on voters for knowingly receiving material benefit. Further, it was specified that transfer of a gift would be considered vote buying if it was done for election purposes.

20

Alternative legal proposal submitted by It Affects You Too campaign to the Parliament of Georgia is available at http:/ /esshengekheba.ge/contentimage/ganc/20120228-14507-1ds47h9-0.pdf

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V. Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections

For the purpose of identifying and preventing abuse of administrative resources by public servants under the Election Code of Georgia, the Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections was set up under the National Security Council of Georgia on May 18, 2012.21 Members of the IATF included deputy ministers of Justice, Finance, Regional Development and Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs, and the Deputy Secretary National Security Council. Later deputy ministers of Education and Science, and Labor, Health and Social Affairs also joined the IATF members. Within the scope of its activities the IATF was holding meetings with local and international organizations, observers, political parties/election subjects and other stakeholders. The meetings were held in a constructive environment. Throughout the course of the pre-election monitoring, ISFED updated the IATF about violations of election laws on a systematic basis. The IATF in its turn was actively involved in the process of examination of preelection violations and provided subsequent recommendations in response to these violations. Based on the trends identified in pre-election period, the IATF issued recommendations for political parties, media outlets, ministries and various public agencies on a number of occasions. The recommendations were mostly timely and adequate; 22 however, violations could not always be effectively prevented in time. The IATF issued total of 12 recommendations, including IATF recommendation to public agencies for elimination of dismissals on political basis23 the ISFEDs monitoring illustrates that after issuance of the recommendation on May 31, 2012 by the IATF, number of dismissals on political grounds was reduced; however, such facts could not be fully prevented, possibly due to the fact that the IATFs purview covers only public sector. Regrettably, dismissals on alleged political grounds in private sector fell beyond the IATFs focus. IATF Recommendation to the Ministry of Labor, Healthcare, and Social Protection about suspension of reevaluations of persons registered in the database of the socially vulnerable24 after monitoring organizations reported termination of social aid benefits on political grounds, the IATF called on the Ministry to study the decisions of the Social Service Agency about terminating social aid deemed controversial by NGOs and political parties. Further, the IATF called on the Ministry to

21 22

23 24

Information about the IATF is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php The IATF issued total of 12 recommendations in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections. For a complete list of its recommendations please see http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1#start Recommendation about dismissals from work is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1&cp=2#start Recommendation about termination of social benefits is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1&cp=2#start

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suspendfor the duration of the electoral periodreevaluations of social aid benefits for citizens already receiving them; 25 IATF recommendation for the law enforcement authorities and political parties to ensure that public rallies are held peacefully26 the recommendation called on the law enforcement authorities to ensure that protest rallies were held with minimum risks of physical clash between participants. We believe that the IATFs work was positive, as unlike other agencies it was much more focused on responding to and preventing violations in pre-election period. As a result of the IATFs work, number of dismissals from public service on political grounds was reduced; further, we believe that the IATF played a positive role in diffusing acts of violence in pre-election period.

VI. State Audit Service

On December 27, 2011, pursuant to the amendments to the Law on Political Union of Citizens27, the authority of financial monitoring of parties was transferred to the Chamber of Control of Georgia (afterwards renamed as the State Audit Office). 28 Fundamental amendments to the law delegated the SAO with broad authority, without any legal mechanisms for curbing its power. Therefore, instead of improving the election environment, the work of SAOs financial monitoring service of parties resembled selective application of justice. The work of the financial monitoring service was harshly criticized from the beginning by monitoring organizations. Violations reported during obtaining of statements from citizens in March 2012 are particularly notable, as the process involved abuse of dignity of citizens, exerting moral and psychological pressure against them, disregarding their procedural rights and limiting journalistic activities. After the members of the It Affects You Too campaign harshly criticized the work of the SAO29 and called on the financial monitoring service to abide by law in its activities, the situation was relatively improved to a certain extent, the process of questioning citizens followed applicable legal standards.

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26

27 28

29

During the monitoring ISFED reported five cases of termination/suspension of social benefits on alleged political grounds. After examining grounds for the termination/suspension by the IATF, social benefits were restored to Mevlud Shushanashvili and Irma Petriashvili Recommendation about holding public rallies in a peaceful environment is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/ elections2012.php See Chapter IV for more information about the new regulations Under the June 22, 2012 amendments to the Law on Chamber of Control, the agency was renamed to the State Audit Office Statement of It Affects You Too is available at http://esshengekheba.ge/?lang=1&menuid=9&id=198

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While studying financial activities of political subjects and their supporters, the SAO instituted unsubstantiated legal prosecution30 against individuals and imposed high, disproportionate sanctions. 31 State agencies and the SAO in particular, selectively reacted to certain actions undertaken by the ruling and opposition parties, suggesting their loyalty to the United National Movement and excessive strictness towards opposition parties. 32

VII.

Voter Lists

Pursuant to the second paragraph of the June 27, 2011agreement reached between the ruling and several opposition parties on making of legal amendments, a special commission for verification of voter lists was to be set up. The commission would be manned by representatives of the authorities, opposition and NGOs. On October 13, 2011, Article 12918 was inserted in the Election Code of Georgia concerning verification of voter lists in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections. It was determined that a commission set up under the executive order would ensure verification of voter lists throughout Georgia until July 1, 2012. Thus, an independent agency, the Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC) was tasked with verifying voter lists for the 2012 parliamentary elections. The VLVC was manned in observance of the parity principle and its members included representatives of the authorities, opposition and NGOs (seven members from each). The VLVC Chairperson was elected according to the Election Code requirements, out of the opposition members of the VLVC. The legal framework of the work of the VLVC consisted of applicable norms of the Election Code and the VLVC regulations initiated by the VLVC and adopted by the president of Georgia.

30

31

32

The decision to impound satellite dish antennas of a tele-communications company Global Contact Consulting and Maestro TV can be qualified as unjustified legal prosecution and unfounded application of financial sanctions, similar to finding of Bidzina Ivanishvili on charges of making an illegal donation to Global Contact Consulting. Analysis of these cases shows that proceedings fell short of standards of transparency, objectivity and comprehensive examination of evidence Fining of employees of Cartu Bank Irakli Beria, Nato Khaindrava, Nodar Javakhishvili, Ia Gamtsemlidze, Davit Galuashvili on charges of making donations in favor of a public movement Georgian Dream; fining of Bidzina Ivanishvili and Kakha Kaladze for withdrawing cash from their personal accounts, when total amount of fine exceeded GEL 37 million; fining of Bidzina Giorgobiani for making a donation in favor of Komagi Foundation 27 persons who made donations in favor of the UNM the total amount of which was GEL 651 440, were also registered in the database of the socially vulnerable. The SAO deemed only five of them as violators of the law and applied to court seeking impounding of their property; for absence of evidence the SAO did not deem a celebratory dinner hosted by Majoritarian MP of Tetristskaro Davit Bejuashvili as violation of law; the SAO fined a member of Sakrebulo with GEL 7920 for distributing sheep and wine among the population of Rustavi in celebration of Easter

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Under Article 2 of the Regulations, it is the key function of the VLVC to ensure verification of voter lists throughout Georgia for the 2012 parliamentary elections. This triggered particular interest of public in the work of the VLVC. Work of the VLVC was transparent and focused on cooperation with political parties and monitoring organizations. ISFED monitored all stages of the work of the VLVC, including 10 000 visits of the VLVC members by means of direct monitoring.

VIII. Election Administration

ISFED has been monitoring all 73 election district and election precincts within them starting from August 1, 2012, when the commencement of official pre-election campaign was announced. The Central Election Commission Under the new Election Code for the 2012 parliamentary elections, the scope of the CECs regulatory activities was narrowed down and limited to administration of elections. In particular, it was no longer tasked with verification of voter lists and monitoring of party finances. After an inter-agency state commission undertook the functions of regulating the use of government resources, the CECs role became even more passive in this regard. Neither did the CEC carry out media monitoring for the elections about coverage of election subjects by media outlets; rather, the function was fully undertaken by government and media organizations. ISFED believes that the work of the CEC has been improved from technical point of view. Its website was improved, making search much easier for voters and other interested persons. Further, we commend the fact that under the CECs initiative and with the involvement of civil organizations, detailed and more flexible guidelines on election procedures were elaborated, not only for members of the election commissions but for monitors, media and political parties as well. Further, the guidelines were available to international community as well as ethnic minorities.

ISFED believes that the VLVC succeeded in verifying information about voters abroad, deceased voters and voters that do not reside at their places of registration, which was an improvement from previous elections. Nevertheless, the decision to return voters removed from registration and voters whose registration had been annulled back to the voter list, increased number of voters on the list33 and left room for illegal manipulation with these voters on the Election Day. 34

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Owing to the work of the VLVC, number of voters increased up to 3 669 887 ISFEDs corresponding statement is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012_09_29.pdf

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The CEC launched a large-scale voter awareness campaign. Under the initiative of the CEC, an educational film focusing on election-related procedures was produced and aired on various TV companies on a regular basis. The VLVC actively partnered with local and international organizations, political subjects, by organizing meetings and sessions with them, and providing access to public information. The process of examining various issues and making decisions during the CEC meetings was transparent. Nevertheless, certain decisions of the CEC were perceived as politically motivated. In particular, assignation of a ballot paper number to the Georgian Dream as well as the decision prohibiting photo and video recording on the Election Day at the polling station. 35 Further, ISFED believes that the CEC failed to inform voters living abroad about registration procedures and therefore, it is possible than many of them refrained from registration at the election precinct. 36 Memorandum on the use of administrative resources on August 16, 2012, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between seven local NGOs37 (one of which was ISFED), the IATF within the Security Council and the CEC. 38 The MOU contains interpretation of stipulations of the Election Code about use of government resources. The parties agreed during administrative and court proceedings they will be guided by interpretations outlined by the MOU. The Code of Ethics for officers of the election administration on March 9, 2012, the CEC approved a resolution on the adoption of the Code of Ethics for officers of the election administration #14/2012. 39 The Code determined key principles of the work of the election administration officers, violation of which would result in imposition of disciplinary liability as prescribed by the Georgian legislation. We believe that when commenting on the statement of ISFED and Georgian Young Lawyers Association (in the statement the organizations expressed their position on the replacement of representatives of the election subject UNMMore Benefit to the People in a number of DECs and the resolution of the CEC Secretary), the CEC ignored stipulations of the Code of Ethics to to express its opinions by relaying substantiated criticism in a tactful

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37

38 39

ISFEDs opinion about restriction of photo and video shooting at polling stations is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ 2012-09-25.pdf There were reports during pre-election period that voters could register with precincts set up abroad only after registration with consular office, which was untrue. The CEC made a statement to clarify the issue only several days prior to expiration of the time for registration The MOU was signed by the following NGOs: the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Transparency International Georgia, New Generation New Initiative, Elections and Political Technologies Research Center, Center for the Development of Civil Society and Democracy, International Center for Civil Culture Full text of the memorandum on use of government resources is available at http://cesko.ge/files/2012/MoU.pdf The Code of Ethics for election administration officers is available at https://matsne.gov.ge/index.php?option= com_ldmssearch&view=docView&id=1608029&lang=ge

17

manner, by making incorrect comments and saying that opinions expressed by the NGOs was unprofessional. 40 Resolution of the CEC specifying procedures of photo and video shooting at polling stations on September 24, 2012, 7 days prior to the elections, the CEC adopted a resolution 42/2012 specifying procedures of photo and video shooting at polling stations from opening of the polling stations through drawing up of summary protocols by the election commissions. ISFED and other partner NGOs believe that the document placed unjustified prohibitions on the right of observers and media representatives to be present at a polling station at any time on the Polling Day, their right to a free movement a the premises of the election precinct and to observe all stages of polling freely, without any restrictions and from any place, as guaranteed by the Election Code of Georgia.41 Notably, the resolution was adopted 7 days prior to the election, without allowing adequate time for keeping PECs, observers and media representatives duly informed. ISFED, GYLA and Media Club of Georgia filed an administrative complaint with the Board of Administrative Cases of Tbilisi City Court on September 26, 2012, seeking annulment of the resolution. However, both the city court and the appellate court rejected the claim for being groundless. Registration of Political Subjects Total of 41 political unions applied to the CEC for their right to participate in the October 1, 2012
40

Parliamentary Elections. After documents submitted by the applicants were verified by the CEC and all gaps were remedied, total of 14 political parties and two election blocs were registered for the parliamentary elections. The CEC registered the following political subjects for the 2012 parliamentary elections:

41

Response of the CEC to the statement of the NGOs is available at http://www.cesko.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_ id=13&info_id=10943 Statement of the NGOs is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012-10-07.pdf

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The process of registration of parties at the CEC was quite open and transparent. Determination of the number of Bidzina Ivanishvili Georgian Dream on ballot papers was rather controversial. The election bloc had been using number 7 in its campaigning; nevertheless, the CEC assigned number 41 based on casting of lots. Number 7 that the bloc was going to use in the elections belonged to one of the members of the bloc, Conservative Party. The latter had been assigned the number for 2008 parliamentary elections. Although at the 2010 municipal elections the CEC allowed election blocs to use a number of one of its members, it interpreted the same stipulation of the law in a different way for the 2012 parliamentary elections and resorted to casting of lots for determining the number for the bloc Bidzina Ivanishvili Georgian Dream. The CEC explained that it had adopted a resolution on procedures regulating the use of election ballot number by election blocs; however, this time it did not consider the possibility of adopting a resolution due to the lack of political readiness to adopt a new resolution. Despite political protest, no further legal actions were taken with regards to the dispute. District and Precinct Election Commissions Observation of staffing and work of precinct and district election commissions was one of the important components of the election monitoring carried out by ISFED. In frames of the election administration monitoring, ISFEDs long-term observers (LTOs) attended meetings held at district and precinct election commissions, monitoring whether the election commissions observed election procedures and timeframes stipulated by election laws. The monitoring showed that the DECs acted in compliance to procedures and timeframes stipulated by the Election Code by publishing by August 12, 2012, election precinct numbers, PEC addresses, telephone (fax) numbers and other information by means of various media outlets, including press. DECs mostly published information on public notices boards and local media. The monitoring also showed that interested individuals could easily attend meetings of DECs and PECs. Initial meetings of precinct election commissions were held in compliance to stipulations of the law on August 26, 27 and 28.42 Starting from August 1 through October 31, 2012, observers of ISFED and GYLA carried out a joint monitoring of staffing of precinct election commissions in all election districts of Georgia. To study the process, the organizations carried out a statistical research of randomly and representatively selected 396 election precincts. Further, they also monitored enforcement of the Code of Ethics of election administration officers, as well as any violations of the election laws and subsequent legal proceedings. The study showed that initial meetings of precinct election commissions throughout the country were held in observance of stipulations of the law on August 16, 27 and 28, 2012. 43
42 43

Held no later than 34 days prior to the Election Day, under para.2, Article 21 of the Election Code Held no later than 34 days prior to the Election Day, under para.2, Article 21 of the Election Code

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Gender balance: research of information about PEC members showed that in 5075 members elected by DECs and appointed by political parties, women accounted for 64,3%, men 35,7%. Gender analysis of members elected to PEC offices showed that there were equal numbers of chairmen and chairwomen (50%). In deputy PEC chairpersons, women accounted for 60%, men 40%, whereas most of the PEC secretaries were women (80,3%) while men accounted for only 19,3%. The research showed the following trend in party affiliation of PEC secretaries: a) Political Union European Democrats - 35,9%; b) Political Union Christian Democratic Movement - 25,7%; c) Christian Democratic Peoples Party - 18,6%; d) Industry Will Save Georgia - 6,5%; e) Conservative Party - 5,5%; f) Labor Party - 1,3%. In 6,5% of cases PEC secretaries were elected out of the members elected by the DEC.
44

With regards to relevant experience and qualification in elections, the research showed that The research revealed that out of the members of the election administration elected by the District Election Commission only 17,4% had a certificate of an election administration officer, whereas the remaining 82,6% did not have the certificate; however, analysis of PECs showed that 47,5% had at least one member elected by the DEC who had a certificate of an election administration officer. 83,3% of members of target PECs (both PECelected and party appointed) about whom we could obtain information had some experience, whereas the remaining 16,7% has no experience. Conflict of Interests: Qualitative and quantitative analysis of target 396 precincts randomly selected throughout Georgia revealed 52 facts allegedly involving conflict of interests in 12,6% of precincts. The reasons of alleged conflict of interests revealed by the research were family ties between PEC members as well as subordination at permanent workplace - e.g. when a teacher and a school principal, both members of the same PEC, are working at the same school. Further, in similar cases it does not matter whether a teacher is subordinated to the principal in frames of the commission due to the latters status, i.e. whether the teacher is a member and the principal is the chairperson of the PEC. Subordination at permanent workplace is an important factor notwithstanding their positions at the PEC, which may have an adverse impact on impartial work of the commission.
44

Under para.19, Article 25 of the Election Code, If no candidate for secretary of the PEC is nominated as defined by this Article, secretary of the PEC shall be elected from the members of commission by a majority of the total number of the commission; any two members of the commission are authorized to nominate a candidate

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The monitoring revealed 75 persons who had been imposed with disciplinary liability during 2010 municipal elections and were re-elected as PEC members by DECs for the 2012 parliamentary elections. Majority of these person (33) were elected as PEC members in Khobi DEC; 16 were elected in Kutaisi DEC, nine in Kobuleti DEC, six in Batumi DEC, four in Shuakhevi DEC, three in Chughureti DEC and one in each of the DECs of Krtsanisi, Tskaltubo, Rustavi and Tsalenjikha. In majority of cases these persons were appointed as members of PECs that they served in 2010 elections. GYLA and ISFED provided the information about 75 members of PECs who had previously been imposed with administrative liability to the Central Elections Commission of Georgia.

LTOs were monitoring the pre-election period by means of specially designed electronic questionnaires. Prior to the launch of the monitoring, 73 LTOs of ISFED underwent two-day training in two stages in pre-election monitoring and reporting methodology.

IX. Pre-Election Monitoring

Methodology ISFED carried out pre-election monitoring through 73 LTOs for the period of 6 months, throughout all election districts of Georgia. There were two stages of monitoring that can be divided into unofficial and official pre-election periods. Although official pre-election period is launched after scheduling of the elections, in view of the fact that the characteristics of a pre-election campaign were evident earlier, ISFED launched monitoring of pre-election processes on April 1, 2012. From April 1through July 31, 2012, ISFED monitored election processes as part of unofficial election campaign, whereas official pre-election campaign was monitored from August 1 up until the Election Day. To obtain comprehensive and thorough information, ISFED identified concrete issues and designed mechanisms for obtaining information throughout the monitoring. The monitoring mostly focused on issues including Abuse of administrative resources; Vote buying, threats/pressure; Violence and physical assault; Interference with political activities; Dismissals from work on political grounds; Public meetings of political parties; Promises made by election subjects; The work of the election administration.

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ISFEDs LTOs received information from administrative agencies by means of requesting access to public information, as well as from political parties, media outlets and citizens. Further, they consistently attended and monitored meetings of political parties and local self-government agencies, course of these meetings and promises made to voters by election subjects. Key violations in the pre-election period In frames of the pre-election monitoring, ISFED published five interim reports on a monthly basis45 and a number of statements46. Throughout the six-month pre-election monitoring, ISFED reported multiple violations of election laws, criminal offences and other types of violations. In addition to studying the violations, ISFED also called on the authorities to take efficient steps for eliminating and preventing violations. Scale of incidents reported by ISFED in preelection period according to their geographic scope:

Nature and dynamics of pre-election violations was changing as the election processes entered their active phase. At the beginning of the monitoring in April-May, dismissals from work on political grounds were most frequent. Later, as the elections approached, number of facts that involved use of government resources, violence on political grounds, physical clashes and use of administrative sanctions/imprisonment on political grounds increased. Pre-election violations were reported in almost all regions of Georgia. Various types of violations mostly prevailed in Gori, Kaspi, Dedoplistskaro, Gurjaani, Akhmeta, Kutaisi and Batumi districts.47 The chart below illustrates the number of violations reported by ISFEDs LTOs from April 1 to September 30, 2012:

Abuse of Government Resources When identifying abuse of government resources, ISFEDs LTOs mostly focused on the following aspects: use of buildings/edifices funded from the
45 46 47

Pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://www.isfed.ge/eng/elections/reports/ http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf Information about violations reported by ISFED in pre-election period is available at the elections portal http:// electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=all

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state or municipal budgets, material goods, budget programs and projects for the benefit of a political party; involvement of public servants in pre-election campaign/agitation. Throughout the pre-election monitoring, ISFEDs observers reported 73 cases that involved abuse of government resources. The map below illustrates geographic scope of abuse of administrative resources reported by ISFED in pre-election period:

In parallel to electoral processes entering their active phase, the trend of individuals with different political beliefs and opinions attending public meetings held by the coalition Georgian Dream was revealed, including Gamgebelis, public servants and trustees of different communities or territorial agencies. Local self-government officials were particularly active in terms of interference with the political activities. They also pressured local population which in addition to interference with political activities also amounts to abuse of government resources. 49 Cases of abuse of government resources particularly increased as elections approached. Majority of the violations were reported in Gurjaani, Sighnaghi, Dedoplistskaro, Gori, Kaspi, Ozurgeti and Tkibuli districts. The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of abuse of government resources reported by ISFED:

Involvement of public servants and mostly, representatives of local self-governments and law enforcement authorities in pre-election campaigning and agitation meetings was the most common form of abuse of government resources. Frequently, public servants themselves acted as oppressors and/or were engaged in physical assaults.48

48

49

Although use of government resources is prohibited during official pre-election campaign only, ISFED reported all cases that involved abuse of the resources both during official and unofficial pre-election campaigning See the map illustrating abuse of government resources reported by ISFED: http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/preelection/?source=1.1&category=3.0

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Politically Motivated Threats/Pressure In alleged cases of politically motivated pressure, LTOs reported facts including: Threats made/pressure exerted against voters, party supporters, activists, commission members, private property owners on political grounds; Use of mechanisms of violence against political opponents, their supporters and voters. In frames of the monitoring, total of 53 cases of making threats/exerting pressure were reported. The chart below illustrates geographic scope and scale of facts of exerting pressure on political grounds, as reported by ISFED in pre-election period:

enforcement authorities frequently threatened politically active citizens and mostly supporters of the coalition Georgian Dream. Threats were made about dismissal, termination of social benefits, etc., motivated by various political activities of citizens, including collection of voter signatures for various purposes, attending opposition party meetings, refusing to attend events held by the authorities, participating in rallies. Politically motivated pressure and threats frequently also amounted to abuse of government resources. Public servants exerted pressure by abusing their official power. Such violations were reported in almost all regions of Georgia and particularly in Gurjaani, Dedoplistskaro, Gori, Kaspi, Kutaisi, Chokhatauri and Lanchkhuti district. 50 The chart below illustrates dynamics of politically motivated cases of pressure/threats:

The monitoring showed that frequently mechanisms of threats/pressures were used against citizens, political activists or individual entrepreneurs. Public servants from municipal self-governments and law

Dismissal from Work on Alleged Political Grounds Dismissal from work on political grounds was one of the most problematic issues during the pre-

50

http://electionsportal.ge/ge/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.0

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election environment. During monitoring ISFED reported total of 37 dismissals from work on political grounds. The map below illustrates geographic scope of dismissals from work on political grounds reported by ISFED during pre-election period:

work.52 In remaining other cases, reinstatement was impossible. The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of dismissals from work on political grounds:

Sympathy towards the Georgian Dream was most frequently cited as the motive for dismissals from work. Apparently, employees found political sentiments of their employees and their activities in favor of opposition party unacceptable. Employees were most often dismissed from work on political grounds in educational institutes and local selfgovernments. Violations were particularly evident in the regions of Kakheti and Imereti.51 ISFED was updating on a periodic basis the IATF with reports of these violations, for the purpose of taking further actions. After examining and verifying ISFEDs reports, six persons were reinstated to

The chart below illustrates dismissals from work reported by ISFED according to individual professions:

51

52

See the map illustrating dismissals from work in pre-election period reported by ISFED at http://electionsportal.ge/en/ incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.1 However, one of them refused to accept the job as he was not reinstated to his previous position but rather, was offered an alternative job

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Violence/Physical Confrontation In addition to other important matters, one of the most pressing issues of the pre-election period was frequent physical confrontations on political grounds. There were instances when a political dispute between persons with different political affiliation turned into a clash and harsh violence. Opposing sides frequently involved representatives of the Georgian Dream and the UNM. Acts of physical violence mostly occurred against supporters of the Georgian Dream. However, there were individual acts of violence against UNM representatives. 53 Total of 48 cases of physical confrontation on political grounds was reported throughout monitoring in Sighnaghi, Gurjaani, Sagarejo, Kaspi, Gori, Tbilisi, Rustavi, Borjomi, Ninotsminda, Mestia, Samtredia, Ozrugeti, Lanchkhuti, Kutaisi, Tskaltubo and Khobi.54 The map below illustrates geographic scope of the acts of physical confrontation on political grounds reported by ISFED during pre-election period:

act. As frequency of acts of violence increased, the IATF elaborated a recommendation, calling on the law enforcement authorities to ensure that public rallies are held under peaceful circumstances, in a way that that allows keeping a distance between persons with different opinions, so that risks of physical confrontation are reduced. Regrettably, the recommendation proved to be unsuccessful in preventing physical confrontation on political grounds. More importantly, frequency of such facts was increased in August-September, with passive role of the law enforcement authorities remaining to be a problem. Frequently they failed to act on violations in a timely manner and mostly arrested activists of the Georgian Dream. Notably, court ordered disproportionate sanctions against arrested individuals. The monitoring revealed a trend in which court resorted to maximum measure of administrative liability administrative imprisonment - against arrested activists of the coalition Georgian Dream, whereas it resorted to minimum period of administrative imprisonment against UNM supporters. The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of acts physical confrontation:

Growing of pre-election campaign into violence was mostly caused by the law enforcements failure to

53 54

ISFEDs statement on acts of physical confrontation is available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf Map illustrating incidents that involved physical confrontation is available at http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/preelection/?source=1.1&category=1.5

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Interference in Political Activities One of the most important trends revealed in preelection period was interference in political activities. For instance, meetings held by the coalition Georgian Dream were attended by people holding different political views and opinion, including Gamgebelis, public servants, representatives of different communities and territorial agencies. Representatives of municipal authorities were particularly active in interference of political activities and exerted pressure on local population. Further, there were instances of interference in political activities by hindering spreading of agitation proclamations, damaging/destroying agitation materials, etc. Total of 32 violations were reported by ISFED throughout monitoring mostly in Kakheti, Imereti and Shida Kartli regions55. The map below illustrates geographic scope of the acts of interference in political activities reported by ISFED during pre-election period:

Acts of interference in political activities showed signs of crime envisaged by Article 166 of the Criminal Code of Georgia. In particular, frequently interference in political activities was perpetrated by violence, threats of violence or abuse of official power. The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of interference in political activities:

Measures of administrative liability used against political activists Administrative arrests on political grounds particularly prevailed in August-September. Out of the total of 21 cases, majority was reported in Gori, Kaspi, Gurjaani, Dedoplistskaro, Sagarejo and Rustavi districts.
56

The map below illustrates geographic scope of using measures of administrative liability reported by ISFED during pre-election period:

55 56

Interference in political activities: http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.7 ISFEDs statement about arrests on political grounds is available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf

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Vote Buying Administrative detainees mostly included activists or supporters of opposition parties, even if they had not initiated physical confrontation. In late September frequency of using administrative imprisonment as sanction against political party supporters was unprecedentedly increased. Around 34 activists were imprisoned on administrative charges, whereas more than 15 persons were sentenced to administrative sanction. Political activists were arrested by law enforcement authorities on charges of hooliganism and/or disobedience to lawful orders of the police. Charges frequently lacked due substantiation. Further, almost all of the cases involved violation of mandatory human rights standards by failure of the authorities to explain grounds of the arrest or to provide access to a lawyer. The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of use of administrative measures against political activists: ISFED reported 12 cases that showed signs of vote buying throughout the monitoring. The map below illustrates geographic scope of alleged vote buying reported by ISFED during pre-election period:

These trends mostly entailed transferring of or promising to transfer various types of gifts to voters by political subjects or their representatives. Vote buying was perpetrated both by the Georgian Dream57

57

Statement of NGOs about Komagi Foundation is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf NGO_Statement_on_the_Creation_of_the_Charity_Foundation_Komagi_May15_2012_geo.pdf Further, five young men were arrested in Kutaisi on charges of vote buying by the coalition Georgian Dream. Information obtained by ISFED is available in the third interim report of pre-election monitoring, p.19; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf

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as well as the UNM representatives. 58 ISFEDs report also contained alleged facts of vote buying59 by Christian-Democratic Movement as well. 60 The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of vote buying:

ened with dismissal due to the fact that her employer deemed her work as political activity. Media Environment in Pre-Election Period Interference in Journalistic Reporting During the pre-election period, ISFED identified 23 cases that involved interference with journalistic reporting and subjecting journalists to pressure/threats63, including 10 cases that showed signs of physical assault. In most of the cases, violence was exerted against representatives of Maestro TV and TV9 companies, Info 9 media outlet and other regional media. The map below illustrates geographic scope of interference in journalistic reporting reported by ISFED during pre-election period:

Interference in the work of NGOs During pre-election monitoring, ISFED reported 7 cases where the organizations observers were subjected to pressure. These incidents occurred in Lanchkhuti, Khobi, Oni, Kaspi and Kharagauli districts.61 Particularly severe forms of interference in the work of NGOs were reported in Lanchkhuti and Kharagauli municipalities. Lanchkhuti Municipality Gamgebeli grossly interfered in the work of observers. While communicating with ISFEDs coordinator, he tried to interfere in and criticized her work. Head of the department, where ISFEDs observer is employed, tried to dismiss her.62 Similar case was reported in Kharagauli district, where ISFEDs LTO was threat-

58 59 60 61

62 63

See third interim report of ISFED, p.20. http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf Photo material available at https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.370145629715437.87957.174947139235288&type=1 See ISFEDs fifth interim report, pp.14-15 http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20Fifth%20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf Detailed information about interference in activities of ISFEDs LTO is available at http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/ map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=4.0 Special statement on pressure exerted against LTO in Lanchkhuti available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012-07-23.pdf http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=4.0

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The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of interference in journalistic reporting:

You Too campaign submitted legal proposals to the parliament of Georgia enacting must carry and must offer regulations. In particular, all cable provider systems were obligated to carry all general broadcasters that have corresponding license up until the Election Day. Cable operators were also obligated to carry the TV channels available to at least 20% of the Georgian population. Broadcasters in return were prohibited from refusing cable provider systems to carry their channel.

Must carry & Must offer During the pre-election period media was rather diverse. Television, press, radio and Internet provided access to variety of information. The problem was that citizens of Georgia and particularly those living in the regions lacked equal access to all media outlets and in particular, to outlets criticizing the government. The problem was mostly caused by the fact that majority of cable companies refused to carry broadcasters known for their criticism of the government. Transferring of satellite dish antennas and related equipment to citizens of Georgia by Maestro TV and Global Compact Consulting under preferential terms for the purpose of broadening coverage zone resulted in impounding by court of the equipment imported and stored by both companies in Georgia, while equipment that had already been sold was deemed vote buying. In this light, it is safe to say that media environment did not provide equal opportunities for election subjects. To address the issue, on May 7, 2012, members of the It Affects After the Parliament of Georgia adopted the socalled must carry and must offer regulations for the Election Code, access to media known for its criticism was greatly improved throughout Georgia as the official pre-election campaign commenced. Enactment of the law was welcomed by the It Affects You Too campaign. However, it suggested that the regulations also apply beyond the Election Day. Monitoring of public meetings held by parties during pre-election period Throughout the pre-election period ISFED was closely monitoring public meetings held by political/election subjects and pre-election promises voiced at these meetings. The monitoring shows that most of the public meetings in pre-election period were held by the coalition Georgian Dream and the United National Movement. The New Rights and the Christian Democratic Movement were also active in this respect.

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The chart below illustrates statistics of public meetings monitored by ISFED from April 1 up until the Election Day:

Tackling the problem of gasification Tackling the problem of employment New insurance packages for citizens of Georgia New rural programs Tackling unemployment. Key promises voiced by the New Rights 300% increase of rural budget Setting up a Rural Bank for farmers and providing the population of rural areas with universal access to agriculture insurance

In addition to monitoring public meetings held by political parties, ISFED was also registering election promises made to voters during these meetings. Key promises voiced by the coalition Georgian Dream: Development of agriculture Opening of agricultural extension centers in all municipalities Setting up a billion dollar fund for agriculture and improving infrastructure Increasing salaries for teachers Universal insurance that will cover all types of surgeries Creation of jobs. Key promises voiced by the UNM Tackling social problems

Providing access to agricultural equipment Reducing prices of fuel and pesticides; Improving access to drinking water Universal access to healthcare and education. Key promises voiced by the Christian Democratic Movement Providing employment opportunities for the youth Tackling the gasification problem Improving infrastructure in highland regions Improving access to irrigation and drinking water

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X. The Election Day

Monitoring Mission ISFEDs monitoring mission for the October 1, 2012 Parliamentary Elections was composed of 1271 accredited and trained observers distributed among precinct, district and central election commissions. ISFED observed total of 902 election precincts throughout 73 election districts of Georgia. Out of 902 short-term observers, 600 were dislocated at randomly selected election precincts. In addition to randomly selected precincts, ISFED also monitored 302 election precincts, including special precincts set up at penitentiary facilities and military units. In implementing its monitoring mission, in addition to short-term observers ISFED also utilized 73 district observers, 78 mobile teams, two observers at the CEC, 15 lawyers and 15 operators. During the first stage of preparations for the Election Day, with the help of foreign experts ISFED designed a methodology, the system of reporting and communication, database, forms of monitoring, instructions, guidelines and other election materials. During the second stage of preparations, ISFED selected 22 trainers and conducted the following trainings:

57 trainings for short-term observers 4 trainings for 73 district observers 4 trainings for 73 mobile teams Training for 15 lawyers Training for 15 hot-line operators ISFED selected members of the Election Day monitoring mission based on results of testing that training participants had undergone. Monitoring Methodology ISFED monitored the Election Day at 600 election precincts by utilizing Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), a leading methodology of election observation. Observers had been distributed among 73 statistically sound, representative and randomly selected election districts. Utilization of the PVT Methodology on the Election Day allowed ISFED to Collect and analyze the quantitative and qualitative information from randomly selected precincts; Evaluate the whole process of elections in a systemic and impartial manner, including opening, voting, closing, vote count and tabulation; Receive fact-based reports to act on for improving the process; Uncover flaws/violations during opening of precincts, polling and vote count; Generalize the information received from randomly selected precincts throughout the country;

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Verify official results for proportional elections;64 On September 26, ISFED conducted a complete simulation of the PVT for testing observers, operators, the database, communication and SMS reporting system. Throughout the one-hour long simulation, 97% of observers carried out reporting successfully. There were two centers operating at the central office on the Election Day PVT SMS center and the incidents center. Notably, for the first time in Georgian for 2012 parliamentary elections ISFED carried out reporting by means of the system of SMS reporting. Throughout the day information received from observers by text messages was gathered in a software program and verified by operators when needed. Verified reports were processed and analyzed by a group of experts. Any violation monitored at election precincts or districts on the Election Day was reported to the incidents center comprised by 15 lawyers. Observers took further actions after consulting with the lawyers. Verified and processed information was recorded by lawyers in the incidents database, entailing not only violation reports but also information about complaints filed with election precincts and districts. After reports received from incidents and SMS centers were processed, five complaints were filed on the Election Day over the course of elections, trends identified, violations observed and results, of which public was updated by means of the website and press-conferences. On the Election Day ISFED held the following 5 press-conferences: I 01.10.12, at 10:00 opening/setting up a precinct II 01.10.12, at 13:30 polling process/activities during the period of 12 hours III 01.10.12, at 18:30 polling process/ activities during the period of 17 hours IV 01.10.12, at 22:30 polling process/closing of precincts V 02.10.12, at 11:00 vote count/results Results of PVT Monitoring Opening of Precincts Most of the election precincts were opened on time on the Election Day. There were no large-scale violations in this respect.
64

Randomly selected election precincts are representative for the whole country and therefore, results reflected only the national elections

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In 77.2% cases, slight flaws were reported with respect to opening and setting up of 20.3% election precincts. Opening of 2.5% election precincts was carried out in violation of applicable legal procedures. 91% of election precincts were ready to receive first voter at 08:00am, same as in 2008 parliamentary elections. The Voting Procedures Based on the analysis of PVT results, it is safe to conclude that the polling was conducted mostly in a peaceful environment with only isolated incidents reported. At most of the precincts polling was carried out in abidance with applicable legal procedures. Polling started on time throughout the country and voters were able to freely express their will. By first half of the day, a high voter turnout was reported at most of the precincts throughout Tbilisi, resulting in lines outside election precincts; however, no chaos or disturbances were reported. Although there were many people at entrances of polling stations, overcrowding inside stations was reported only at 3% of election precincts. Based on the analysis of reports received from PVT election precincts showed that At 6% of polling stations marking procedure was violated, which amounted to an important Polling Day flaw. Ballot secrecy was observed at 98% of stations, a significant improvement from the 2008 parliamentary elections (91%). At 97% of polling stations, voter registration officers requested that voters present all necessary ID papers for voting, as prescribed by law. At 3% of polling stations individual voters were not requested to present the ID papers. In 2008 parliamentary elections, voter registration officers requested that voters present all necessary ID papers for voting in 98% of polling stations. At 97% of polling stations, traces of election ink were verified as prescribed by law, whereas at 3% of polling stations individual voters did not undergo the verification. In 2008 Parliamentary Elections ink was verified in 94% of polling stations. In 97% of polling stations ballots were always validated with a signature and a stamp; in remaining 3% of polling stations individual ballot papers were not validated this way. In 2008 ballot papers were validated in 98% of polling stations. In 96% of election precincts throughout Georgia, no acts of pressure or making of threats were reported, unlike the remaining 4% of the election precincts.

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By 8pm, in 99% of polling stations there were no voter lines or voters standing in lines were able to cast a ballot. Vote Counting Generally, procedures for closing of election precincts throughout the country were duly implemented, whereas in 96% of precincts no significant incidents accompanied the vote count. Violations during closing of precincts and vote count were reported at 4% of polling stations; Presence of unauthorized persons was reported at 1% of polling stations At 98% of polling stations election materials were sealed in observance of applicable legal procedures for their transfer to DECs. The PVT also showed percentage rate of party proxies at polling stations. In particular, the coalition Georgian Dream and the UNM had dislocated party proxies (observers) at 94% and 90% of polling stations respectively; the Christian Democratic Movement at 80%, while the New Rights at 64%. All or some of the remaining parties carried out monitoring at 81% of election precincts.

The chart below illustrates the types of violations reported at PVT precincts:

Voter Turnout The PVT showed high voter turnout throughout the country, amounting 61%, whereas voter turnout in Tbilisi was 64%, which is an improvement from the 2008 parliamentary elections. In particular, in 2008 voter turnout throughout the country was 53%, in Tbilisi 48%. It shows that high public involvement, as number of voters who cast a ballot was record high. According to ISFED, voter turnout by 12:00 was 25%, an improvement from 2008 parliamentary elections when voter turnout by 12:00 was at 22%. In Tbilisi voter turnout by 12:00 was at 24% (while in 2008 parliamentary elections the rate was at 20%);

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in the regions 26% (23% in 2008). By 17:00 voter turnout was 52%, a 9% increase from 2008 parliamentary elections (43%). Voter turnout in Tbilisi by 17:00 is particularly noteworthy as it reached 52%, an 11% increase from 1008 parliamentary elections (41%). Voter turnout in the regions by 17:00 was at 52% (while in 2008 the rate was at 53%). The chart below illustrates voter turnout in Tbilisi The chart below illustrates voter turnout throughout Georgia

Analysis of the PVT information also allowed us to determine the rate at which ballots were cast at individual election precincts targeted by the monitoring. According to reports received from 8am to 12:00pm, ballots were cast at 40% of election precincts at the rate of less than one voter a minute, whereas at 60% of polling stations the rate of casting ballots was 1-2 voters a minute. According to reports received from 12pm to 5pm, at 56% of election precincts ballots were cast at the rate of less than one voter a minute, whereas at 44% of precincts the rate of casting ballots was 1-2 voters a minute. Final Election Results According to the PVT ISFED received thorough information from 99% its observers. Below are results of the PVT carried out by ISFED for proportional elections, with +/-1.3 margin of error and 95% confidence interval.

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The chart below illustrates results of the 2012 parliamentary elections according to ISFED and the CEC:

plaints were filed over voters finding that someone had already signed along their names on voter lists, restriction of rights of observers, procedural violations and in particular, failure to conduct inking and validate ballot papers in due manner. DEC chairpersons acted more or less adequately on most of complaints by taking due measures for eliminating violations. These are the following types of violations reported: Restriction of observers rights, which mostly entailed hindering observers to make entries in the book of records and hindering their free movement, reported at the following election precincts: N70 election precinct of Rustavi N20 election district; N107 election precincts of N59 Kutaisi election district; N26 election precincts of Didube N8 election district; N105 election precinct of Batumi N79 election district; N23 election precinct of Isani N5 election district; N8 election precinct of Marneuli N22 election district; N70 election precinct of Vake N2 election district; N33 election precinct of Gldani N10 election district; N22 and 32 election precincts of Kaspi N30 election district; N46 election precinct of Sagarejo N11 election district; N36 election precinct of Gori N32 election district; N105 election precinct of Batumi N79 election district; N33 election precinct of Gldani N10 election district; N61 election precinct of Saburtalo N3 election district; N4 election precinct of Adigeni N38 election district. Violations involving ballot papers, which mostly entailed failure to stamp and sign ballot papers and providing voters with only one type of ballot paper, reported at the following election precincts: N18 election precinct of Vake N2 election district; N30 election precinct of Gurjaani N12 election district;

Election Day Violations/Complaints In the course of the polling and following the elections, ISFEDs observers took further legal actions on 223 violations at precinct and district election commissions. In 103 cases that involved gross violation of polling procedures and were immediately eliminated, the observers were issued verbal warnings only and made corresponding entries in the PEC polling day book of records. In remaining 120 cases, complaints were filed with election commissions. In particular, 67 complaints were filed with PECs, 52 were filed with DECs and one with the CEC. Two complaints were filed in court. Complaints filed with PECs: ISFEDs observers filed total of 67 complaints with PECs over the polling day and the vote count procedures. Violations pointed out in 53 complaints were remedied, while remaining 14 complaints were referred to DECs for consideration. Complaints filed with DECs: ISFED filed total of 67 complaints with DECs. Majority of these com-

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N4 election precinct of Kaspi N30 election district; N103 election precinct of Kutaisi N59 election district; N56 election precinct of Gldani N10 election district. Failure to keep records in a due manner, which entailed failure to fill out demonstration protocols, books of records, logbooks in a due manner, reported at the following election precincts: N63 (Gori N63 election district), N21 (Batumi N79 election district); N30 (Gurjaani N12 election district); N127 (Kutaisi N59 election district); N33 (Poti N70 election district); N43 and 13 (Khelvachauri N83 election district); N13 (Khulo N84 election district); N1 (Didube election district). Signing along names of voters by someone else on the voter lists was reported at the following election precincts: N33 (Poti N70 election district); N43 and 13 (Khelvachauri N83 election district); N13 (Khulo N84 election district); N1 (Didube election district). Signing along names of voters by someone else on the voter lists was reported at the following election precincts: N61 (Saburtalo N3 election district); N86 (Rustavi N20 election district); N107) Kutaisi N59 election district; N8 (Senaki N64 election district); N33 (Poti N70 election district); N22 and 8 (Batumi N79 election district); N26 (Didube N8 election district). Failure to administration the process in a due manner, which entailed chaotic situations at polling stations, ignoring distribution of powers by commission members, was reported at the following election precincts: N22 and 50 (Batumi N79 election district); N22(2) and 1 (Kaspi N30 election district); N45 (Sagarejo N11 election district); N21 (Khelvachauri N83 election district); N91 (Nadzaladevi N9 election district); N46 and 50 (Marneuli N22 election district); N46 (Vake N2 election district); N58 and 53 (Kutaisi N59 election district). Flaws in voter lists, which mostly entailed omission of IDPs, absence of red table lists at precincts although needed, was reported at the following election precincts: N82 (Vake N2 election district); N6 (Gurjaani N12 election district); M36 (Kaspi N30 election district), N107 (Kutaisi N59 election district). Voting with inappropriate documents, which mostly entailed voting with an expired ID card, a copy of an ID card, IDP certificate only, was reported at the following election precincts: N20 (Chokhatauri N62 election district); N8 (Senaki N64 election district); N1 (Kobuleti N81 election district); N2 (Nadzaladevi N9 election district); N106 (Gldani N10 election district); N65 (Samgori N 6 election district) Political agitation was reported at the following election precincts: N47 (Batumi N79 election district); N45 (Sagarejo N11 election district). Violation of marking procedures was reported at the following election precincts: N4 (Akhalkalaki N40 election district); N4 (Tskaltubo N58 election district); N4, 50, 46, 48, 50 and 8 (Marneuli N22 election district); N53 (Gldani N10 election district); N89 (Saburtalo N3 election district); N105, 35 and 39 (Batumi N79 election district); N4 (Samgori N6 election district); Mestia N20 election precinct.

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The chart below illustrates statistics of complaints filed with PECs:

XI. Post-Elections Period

Complaints filed with DECs, the CEC and in court ISFED conducted post-election monitoring in 73 election districts throughout Georgia by means of 73 district observers, 15 lawyers and two observers dislocated at the CEC. This way ISFED could monitor activities of the election administration, consideration of complaints at DECs and vote tabulation. Throughout the post-election monitoring, total of 52 complaints were filed with DECs. 23 claims were upheld, 16 were rejected as being unfounded and unsubstantiated, 10 were upheld in part and 3 were left without consideration. Complaints with the DECs were filed over the following violations: Restriction of observers rights - #79 Batumi election district (election precincts #105; #49); Adigeni #38 election district (#4 election precinct); #2 Vake election district (#70 election precinct); Agitation at election precincts - #79 Batumi election district (#47 election precinct); #11 Sagarejo election district (#45 election precinct); #55 Khoni election district (#2 election precinct);

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Signing along names of voters by someone else on the voter lists - #79 Batumi election district (#8; #17; #22; #31 election precincts); #64 Senaki election district (#8 election precinct); #3 Saburtalo election district (# 61 election precinct); Voting with inappropriate documents - #62 Chokhatauri election district (#20 election precinct); #70 Poti election district (#33 election precinct); #67 Zugdidi election district (#75 election precinct); #64 Senaki election district (#8 election precinct); #47 Mestia election district (# 20 election precinct); #9 Nadzaladevi election district (# 2 election precinct); #10 Gldani election district (#106 election precinct). Violations related to drawing up of summary protocols - #81 Kobuleti election district (#14, #24 and #54 election precincts); #62 Chokhatauri election district (#4 election precinct); #84 Khulo election district (#33 election precinct); #83 Khelvachauri election district (#14 election precinct); #13 Sighnaghi election district (#5 election precinct); #65 Martvili election district (# 19 election precinct); #67 Zugdidi election district (#65 election precinct); #40 Akhalkalaki election district (#1 election precinct); Khashuri N35 election district (#9 election precinct); #47 Mestia election district (#3 election precinct); #27 Mtskheta election district (#26 election precinct); Flaws in voter lists - #12 Gurjaani election district (# 6 election precincts); #10 Gldani election district (#115 election precinct); #32 Gori election district (#111 election precinct); #59 Kutaisi (#95 election precinct); #35 Kiev election district. Violation of procedures for transferring materials to DEC - #84 Khulo election district ( #15 election precinct); #68 Tsalenjikha election district (#7; #11; #18 #19; #26 election precincts); #22 Marneuli election district (#22 election precinct); Violation of procedures that apply to casting of lots - #11 Sagarejo election district (#46 and #45 election precincts); #14 Dedoplistskharo election district (#18 election precinct); # 9 Nadzaladevi election district (#91 election precinct). Violations related to election inking - #40 Akhalkalaki election district (# 9 election precinct); #47 Mestia election district (#20 election precinct); Failure to keep records in a due manner - #55 Khoni election district (#15 election precinct). Violations related to validation of ballot papers - #83 Khelvachauri election district (#21, #13 and #43 election precincts); #22 Marneuli election district (#50 election precinct).

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The chart below illustrates complaints filed by ISFED with DECs:

Claims raised in complaints filed In most of the cases ISFED filed complaints seeking imposition of disciplinary and administrative liability on precinct and district election commission members. Total of 47 complaints were filed with the foregoing claim. 26 of these claims were upheld while 16 were rejected. Disciplinary liability was ordered against 122 members of precinct election commission, including 11 precinct election commission members. 6 complaints were filed seeking imposition of administrative liability. One claim was upheld while four were rejected and one was left without consideration. ISFED filed 16 complaints seeking annulment of summary protocols and recount of votes. 3 complaints were upheld, one was left without consideration. Khashuri DEC did not examine one complaint but referred it to the office of the prosecutor, stating that the alleged violation showed signs of a criminal offence. ISFED filed a complaint with the CEC seeking annulment of Kiev election precinct N35 and imposition of disciplinary liability on the PEC members. The complaint was filed over the fact that voters who had not been registered at the unified list of voters were allowed to cast a ballot on the polling day based on the supplementary list drawn up by the PEC. The complaint was upheld in part; in particular, the CEC deemed the PEC results null and void but rejected ISFEDs claim for imposition of the liability. Under the resolution of the CEC, an election precinct set up

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in a foreign state is an independent election district members of which may be subjected to a disciplinary liability measure only by a higher district commission. Since there was no higher district commission for Kiev election precinct, the CEC was not authorized to order a liability under para.2, Article 28 of the Election Code. We believe that the CEC interpreted the stipulation rather narrowly, as the CEC acts as a higher election administration for election precincts set up abroad both with respect to setting up an election commission as well as vote tabulation.65 It should undertake the function of higher election commission for imposing a disciplinary liability. These are the following trends evident in consideration of complaints in election commission: DECs often granted the claims for disciplinary liability unlike claims for drawing up protocols of administrative offence or deeming precincts/district results null and void. DECs mostly resorted to lighter measures for imposition as disciplinary liability, including warnings and reproofs. Notwithstanding gravity of violation, DECs basically never resorted to forms of disciplinary liability such as salary deduction possibly due to low amount of compensation that commission members received for their work (as stated at the CEC meeting). Often decisions made by DECs rejecting claims lacked proper substantiation. Election administration often failed to exercise its authority of investigating and eliminating polling day violations under its own initiative. As to court proceedings, ISFED was litigating about decisions made by Gori N3266 and Bolnisi N2267 DECs. Court acted in a subjective manner in both cases and failed to examine evidence in completely and comprehensively in the process of decision-making. Other Important Post-Election Developments Monitoring of post-election period revealed cases when political party activists assembled outside DECs, demanding recount of votes or annulment of precinct results. Such facts occurred in Senaki, Martvili, Terjola, Ambrolauri, Sighnaghi, Dedoplistskaro, Lagodekhi, Akhalkalaki, Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli, Tetristskaro and Khashuri election districts. Voters and party activists often expressed their demands in an aggressive form. ISFED together with its partner organization made a special statement on October 1, 2012, calling on political parties to refrain from aggressive activities at the DEC premises, and election administrations to count votes and tabulate results in full compliance with stipulations of law. 68 Party activists acted aggressively when they
65 66

67

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Para.7, Article 23 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia, as well as para.3, Article 24 of the Code Details of the litigation in Gori District Court are available at https://docs.google.com/open?id= 0BwOay8rYdyAZTXdaMDFHcVZSRzg Details of the litigation in Bolnisi District Court are available at https://docs.google.com/open?id= 0BwOay8rYdyAZSHdSaTZDamFFdUU Full text of the statement is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012.10.04_intimidation_statement.pdf

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pressured ISFEDs observers in Zugdidi election district due to the fact that ISFEDs logo was associated by a party activist with the logo of the UNM. Following the elections, the election subject United National Movement More Benefit to the People replaced representatives registered at certain DECs. The corresponding resolution of the CEC secretary was adopted on October 3, 2012 (N11). In view of the applicable legislation, GYLA and ISFED deemed replacement of proxies following the Election Day as an illegal decision. Further, they believed that MPs, the UNM More Benefit to the People could have appointed former ministers, deputy ministers and first deputy of general prosecutor as representatives in district election commission in an effort to influence DEC members, which was unacceptable.69 The CEC expressed rather unconstructive criticism in response to the opinion of ISFED and GYLA. A post-election physical confrontation was reported in Marneuli Municipality when activists of the coalition Georgian Dream were verbally abusing employees of Gamgeoba. Regrettably, Gamgebeli, his deputy and driver were assaulted physically.70

XII. Conclusions and Recommendations

It is important to start working on the reform in a timely manner and implement it stage by stage, during the period between the 2013 presidential and the 2014 municipal elections. The reform must conclude prior to the 2016 parliamentary elections and should be carried out in an open and transparent manner as much as possible. Previous elections have shown that the election systems in Georgia and election laws in general are in need of a fundamental reform; otherwise, fragmented or superficial changes in the Election Code will be insufficient for meaningful improvement of the election environment. New regulations must be adopted about the election system, staffing of election administration, voter registration, polling and vote count procedures, the use of government resources. The election system the existing mixed system of elections in Georgia fails to ensure both proportional representation and protection of equality of votes. Therefore, prior to the upcoming parliamentary elections the existing election system must be reconsidered in order to ensure that the principle of equality of vote is observed and will of citizens is proportionally reflected in the supreme legislative body. Election administration for the election administration to be eventually formed as a qualified and objective agency, much more efficient steps need to be made. Therefore, reforming the election administration is important to liberate it from political influence and increase professionalism. We believe that the procedures
69 70

See Chapter VIII about unconstructive criticism of the CEC ISFEDs statement about the incident in Marneuli is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012-10-05.pdf

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for staffing the election administration must be transparent as much as possible. The process itself should focus on selection of members based on professional skills; procedures for the appointment of members in higher election commissions on political grounds must be reconsidered; mandatory qualification exams of varying complexity must be introduced for members of other levels of election administration. Government resources to rule out as much as possible the use of government resources for the benefit of a political party, applicable normative base must be improved. In particular, the procedure that regulates engagement of public servants in agitation must be expressly defined and limited; the list of political officials for election purposes must be narrowed down; measures of liability for abuse of government resources must be tightened; norms and procedures prohibiting the use of government resources must be clearly formulated; prohibition of the use of administrative resources during non-election period as well. Voter List works for verification of voter list must be continued in the future. We believe that the role of civil registry should be increased in the process of improvement of voter list; procedure for registration of citizens of Georgia residing abroad (legally/illegally) must be simplified, for them to no longer face problems in realization of their right to vote, universal census is the most realistic way to get a more comprehensive and accurate picture about number and location of voters, which should be carried out in the nearest future. Party funding the Law on Political Union of Citizens must be reconsidered; in particular, attention must be paid to improving the norms regulating party funding. Both the normative legal base as well as the State Audit Office should ensure legal, reasonable and equal enforcement of law. Vote buying should not result in criminal liability of a citizen (recipient of material goods). Polling day individual procedures of polling must be revised for introducing more effective and high-tech safeguards against vote rigging; list of persons with the right to vote at a special election precinct must be limited. Ethnic minorities more attention must be paid to raising awareness of ethnic minorities on all components of elections. Outdoor advertising to ensure level playing field for all political parties in pre-election period, procedures regulating placement and use of outdoor advertising must be regulated.

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