Lazaro v.

Agustin (2010)1 Facts: Petitioners Lazaro filed a complaint for partition in the MTCC against respondents Agustin alleging that they are both descendants of the late Simeon Santos who died intestate and was the former owner of the land in dispute. Petitioners Lazaro alleged that they consented together with their other two deceased siblings that the said parcel be titled in the name of Basilisa, being the eldest, although it was agreed among them that it did not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa is the sole and exclusive owner. Petitioner Alejandra spent P68k for the construction of a residential house therein. Basilisa and her respondent children contributed around P3.5k. Petitioners alleged that without their knowledge and consent, the title of the lot was transferred into another titled in the names of the respondent children of Basilisa. Alejandra confronted Basilisa during the latters lifetime, but Basilisa replied that Alejandra should not worry because an affidavit was executed by her recognizing and specifying that her two brothers and her sister would each get share of the lot. Despite this assurance, respondents children and grandchildren of Basilisa refused and opposed when the petitioners initiated a partition in the barangay court. The MTCC dismissed the complaint ruling that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, whrein she purportedly acknowledged her coownership of the subject property with her siblings because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. Moreover, the MTCC gave credence to the testimonies of the doctor and nurse of Basilisa to the effect that at the time the affidavit was supposed to have been signed and sworn to before the notary public, Basilisa was already bedridden and an invalid. In addition, the notary public, before whom the document was supposedly signed and sworn to, testified that the affidavit was already complete and thumbmarked when the same was presented to him by a person who claimed to be Basilisa. The RTC affirmed, with the modification that petitioners, being builders in good faith, should be indemnified for the costs of the construction of the house therein. The CA also affirmed, modifying further that only petitioner Alejandra was entitled to the refund. Appealing before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contend that Basilisas sworn statement is a declaration against interest which is one of the recognized exception to the hearsay rule. They further argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court without further proof of its due execution and authenticity. They also claim that the notary public cannot impugn the same document he notarized for that would render notarized documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public. Issues: 1) WON the alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest? 2) WON the alleged sworn statement can be given full faith and credence in view of the issues raised regarding its genuineness and due execution? Held/Reason: 1) NO. Rather than a declaration against interest, the alleged sworn statement is an admission against interest.

Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor a privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. 2) NO. A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement reveals that it refers to Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676. On this basis, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the property being referred to in the sworn statement is the same property claimed by petitioners. Even granting that it refers to the property being disputed in the present case, it still could not be given credence. A question involving the regularity of notarization and the due execution of the sworn statement would require an inquiry into the appreciation of the evidence by the trial court. As a general rule, questions of fact cannot be raised in certiorari petitions before the Supreme Court. None of the recognized exemptions appear on this case. As a general rule, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. The fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption in favor of regularity cannot be applied here because the regularity in the execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the improbability of execution of the sworn statement at the time the questioned document was supposedly executed. The Court would not interfere with the trial courts reliance on the credibility of the witnesses. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the said sworn statement. Disposition: Petition Denied. AFFIRMED.

ron

Gutierrez v Mendoza-Plaza2 (2009, Chico-Nazario, J.) FACTS Ignacio Mendoza had to marriages in his life. The petitioners Herminio and Elisa are heirs from the first marriage while the respondents Flora and Ponciano were heirs from the second marriage (interesting twisted fact, the second wife was the younger sister of the first wife). After the death of his first wife, Ignacio bought a 446 sq. m. parcel of land which was embodied in a notarised document, an Escritura Publica. Ignacio then donated inter vivos the said parcel of land to his children from the second marriage. o The second wife accepted the donation in behalf of her children in the same instrument. o Children from the first marriage were witnesses to the donation. o The deed was notarized, but the same was not recorded in the Registry of Deeds. Flora and Poncianos mother, Felisa (Heirs of the Second Marriage), were in possession of the land for many years. However, one day in 2006, Herminio and Elisa (Heirs of the First Marriage) took possession of the southern portion of the subject property and constructed a house of strong materials therein. Flora and Ponciano filed a Complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, Publiciana and Quieting of Title. o Heirs of the Second Marriage: Relied on the Deed of Donation o Heirs of the First Marriage: Claimed that they have rights to the property, which was acquired during the first marriage and by virtue of intestate succession and acquisitive prescription, they owned the unregistered parcel of land. They also disputed the genuineness and authenticity of the deed of donation inter vivos considering that for more than 65 years the said document was NOT registered with the office of the Register of Deeds to cause its transfer to respondents. RTC Relying on the notarized deed of donation, Heirs of the Second Marriage are lawful owners. CA Reversed the RTC, but recalled and set aside the reversion upon motion for reconsideration. ISSUE Was the deed of donation validly presented amid lack of registration? YES. RULING The fact that the deed of donation inter vivos is a notarized document means it enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution (R132.30). Clear and convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. The Heirs of the First Marriage were unable to adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the abovementioned presumption. The only evidence offered to impugn the deed of donation inter vivos was a testimony of Elisa, claiming that they inherited the land from Ignacio, and this was utterly lacking. Furthermore, there was nothing wrong and/or unusual in the fact that the deed of donation inter vivos was produced and made known to the Heirs of the First Marriage 60+ years after its execution. Understandably, it was only when the action was brought forth was there a need to invoke the rights vested in the deed of donation. The non-registration of the aforesaid deed does not also affect the validity thereof. Registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons.
2

Emilio v Rapal (Carpio-Morales, 2010)3 FACTS Flordeliza Emilio, by virtue of a grant from NHA, became the registered owner of a parcel of land in Caloocan City whereon she built a house, apportion of which was leased by Bilma Rapal. Later, she leased an adjoining room in the house. Emilio borrowed P10k then P60k from Rapal upon the condition that Rapal would not pay the monthly rentals from February to December amount loaned would serve as advance rentals. Later the two entered into a Sale and Transfer of Rights over a Portion of a Parcel of Land whereby Emilio sold to Rapal for P90k a portion of her lot and the house constructed thereon. This document was notarized by Atty. Balao-Ga. Emilio claiming that she signed the deed without its contents having been explained to her filed a complaint for reformation of document. She said there was no intention on her part to sell the property as she could not do so without the consent of the NHA. Rapal: Motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action and prescription, averring that while the complaint was denominated as one for reformation of document, it was actually one for annulment of contract which was executed on February 2, 1996, hence, the action had prescribed when it was filed on July 11, 2002. MTD denied. Answer filed out of time so was declared in default. TC: Deed of sale null and void as it did not reflect the true intention of the parties, the intention being one of loan. CA: Reversed the decision of the trial court. While petitioners cause of action is one for reformation of instrument and, as such, it had not yet prescribed, she failed to discharge the burden of proving that fraud attended the execution of the deed to warrant its reformation. Emilio filed MR to which she attached motion to admit Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by her daughter stating that, from what she knows, her mother was not able to finish her elementary school studies and could not fully understand English; and that, also from what she knows, her mother did not sell the property to respondent. MR denied. Respondent: In petitioners pleadings which are in English, petitioner stated under oath that she read and understood the same; and that petitioner testified in court in English as borne by the Transcript of Stenographic Notes, and her request/demand letters addressed to the Barangay Captain were also written in English. ISSUE/HELD WON the deed of sale should be reformed NO. RATIO For an action for reformation of instrument to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.

celeni

Grace Lazaro

Petitioner having admitted the existence and execution of the instrument, what remains to be resolved is whether the contract expressed the true intention of the parties; if not, whether it was due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident. The onus probandi is upon the party who insists that the contract should be reformed. Notarized documents, like the deed in question, enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence. This petitioner failed to discharge.4[11] The Sinumpaang Salaysay of petitioners daughter does not convince. In any event, it is clearly hearsay as the affiants what I know statements indicate. Petitioner could have presented Atty. Balao-Ga or the witnesses to the deed, but she failed to do so. Titan Construction Corp. v. Manuel David Sr. and Martha David 5 (Del Castillo, 2010) Facts: - Manuel and Martha got married on 25 March 1957. - In 190, they acquired a lot which was registered in the name of Martha S. David, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A. David, and covered by TCT No. 156043 issued by the Register of Deeds. - In 1976, the spouses separated de facto. - In March 1995, Manuel found out that Martha sold the said property to Titan through a deed of sale dated 24 April 1995, and a new TCT was issued in the name of Titan - Manuel filed a complaint for annulment of contract and for reconveyance against Titan. He alleged that since the sale of their conjugal property was without his consent, the same is void. - He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that the property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names. - Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated January 4, 1995 signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. - Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property. - Complaint was amended, impleading Martha. She was declared in default for failing to fila an answer. - RTC: Deed of sale is void ab initio; TCT in the name of Titan is null and void o The property was conjugal in character since it was purchased by Manuel and Martha with conjugal funds during their marriage o The SPA professing to authorize Martha to sell the property on behalf of the spouses was spurious, and did not bear Manuels genuine signature. This was the subject of expert testimony, which Titan failed to rebut. o Despite the fact that the SPA was notarized, the genuineness and due execution of the SPA was placed in doubt since it did not contain Manuels residence certificate, and was not presented for registration with the Quezon City Register of Deeds, in violation of Sec 64 of PD No. 15296

o The circumstances surrounding the transaction with Martha should have put Titan on notice of the SPAs dubious veracity. The RTC noted that aside from Marthas failure to register the SPA with the Register of Deeds, it was doubtful that an SPA would have even been necessary, since the SPA itself indicated that Martha and Manuel lived on the same street in Navotas. - CA affirmed RTC Issues/ Held: 1. WON the lot is part of the spouses conjugal partnership. YES 2. WON SPA purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void. YES 3. WON Titan was a buyer in good faith. NO Ratio:

1.

- Ruling finds support in the pertinent provisions7 of the CC (1949) the law in force at the time of the celebration of the marriage between Martha and Manuel in 1957. These provisions were carried over to the FC8. - Manuel was not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership. - In the absence of Manuels consent, the Deed of Sale is void. Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses. - Article 124 of the FC requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void. 2.- The Special Power of Attorney purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void.The RTC found that the signature of Manuel appearing on the SPA was not his genuine signature. - The Special Power of Attorney is invalid. Plaintiffs evidence particularly the testimony of expert witness Atty. Desiderio Pagui, which the defense failed to rebut and impeach, showed that the SPA does not bear the genuine signature of plaintiff Manuel David thus rendering the same as without legal effect. - The genuineness and the due execution of the Special Power of Attorney was placed in more serious doubt as the same does not contain the Residence Certificate of the plaintiff and most importantly, was not presented for registration with the Quezon City Register of Deeds which is a clear violation of Sec. 64 of P.D. No. 1529. - The RTCs ruling was based not only on the testimony of Manuels expert witness finding that there were significant differences between the standard handwriting of Manuel and the signature found on the SPA, but also on Manuels categorical denial that he ever signed any document authorizing or ratifying the Deed of Sale to Titan. - It is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of the facts expressed therein. A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption.

Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses

pauline

Amending and Codifying The Laws Relative To Registration Of Property And For Other Purposes (1978). Section 64 provides: Section 64. Power of attorney. Any person may, by power of attorney, convey or otherwise deal with registered land and the same shall be registered with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. Any instrument revoking such power of attorney shall be registered in like manner.

Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; Article 116. "[a]ll property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved."

- However, such clear and convincing evidence is present here. While it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were defects in the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either genuine or duly executed. Curiously, the details of Manuels Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously absent, yet Marthas are complete. The absence of Manuels data supports his claim that he did not execute the same and that his signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, we have Manuels positive testimony that he never signed the SPA, in addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on the SPA was not Manuels true signature. 3.- TCT No. 156043 was registered in the name of "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A. David" but the Deed of Sale failed to include Marthas civil status, and only described the vendor as "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino citizen, with postal address at 247 Governor Pascual, Navotas, Rizal." And it is quite peculiar that an SPA would have even been necessary, considering that the SPA itself indicated that Martha and Manuel lived on the same street (379 and 247 Governor Pascual Street, respectively. - Titans witness Valeriano Hernandez, testified that Yao, Titans Vice President for Operations (and Titans signatory to the Deed of Sale), specifically inquired why the name of Manuel did not appear on the Deed of Sale. This indicates that Titan was aware that Manuels consent may be necessary. In addition, Titan purportedly sent their representative to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to verify TCT No. 156043, so Titan would have been aware that the SPA was never registered before the Register of Deeds. - Valeriano Hernandez also testified that during the first meeting between Martha and Yao, Martha informed Yao that the property was mortgaged to a casino for P500,000.00. Without even seeing the property, the original title, or the SPA, and without securing an acknowledgment receipt from Martha, Titan (through Yao) gave Martha P500,000.00 so she could redeem the property from the casino.These are certainly not actions typical of a prudent buyer. Disp: Petition is denied. CA affirmed, without prejudice to the recovery by Titan of the amounts it paid to Martha in the appropriate action before the proper court. Sps. Alcantra v. Nido9(Carpio, J.; April 19, 2010) RATIO DECIDENDI Since the GPA was executed and acknowledged before a notary public in the USA, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless, it is certified as such in accordance with Sec.25 Rule 132 ROC (1) by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or (1) by any officer in the foreign service of the Phils. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (3) authenticated by the seal of his office. FACTS Revelen executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) constituting her mother, respondent Brigida Nido, as her attorney-in fact and authorizing her to enter into any and all contracts and agreement on Revelens behalf. The GPA was notarized by Larry Reid, Notary Public in California, USA. Brigida sold a portion of the lot owned by Revelen located at Cardona, Rizal to the Sps. Alcantara on an installment basis. After the Sps. Alcantara have paid P17,500, they defaulted in their installment payments.

Brigida, acting as administrator and attorney-in-fact of Revelen, filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with preliminary injunction against the Sps. Alcantara with the RTC. Sps. Alcantara filed a Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. RTC (1). MTD denied. (2). Brigidas authority to sell was not in writing, hence the sale was void. Rescission is the proper remedy. CA reversed. (1). MTC has jurisdiction in unlawful detainers cases and where the property in question has an assessed value not exceeding 20,000 (province) BP 129. (2). Authority to sell not in writing, hence void. A void contract creates no rights or obligations or any juridical relations. Therefore, the void contract cannot be the subject of rescission. ISSUE/HELD 1. W/N the sale is void? YES. 2. W/N the general power of attorney of Brigida Nido is admissible in evidence? NO. RATIO 1. Sps. Alcantara: The sale of land by an agent who has no written authority is merely voidable and may be ratified expressly or impliedly. In fact, Brigida admitted the execution of the contract to sell during the pre-trial conference. SC: Art. 1874 CC explicitly requires a written authority before an agent can sell an immovable property; otherwise the sale shall be void. Art. 1878 also states that an SPA is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. The express mandate required by law to enable an appointee of an agency (couched) in general terms to sell must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of the act mentioned. 2. Since the GPA was executed and acknowledged before a notary public in the USA, it cannot be admitted in evidence here in the Phils. unless it is certified as such in accordance with Sec. 25 Rule 132 ROC (1) by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or (1) by any officer in the foreign service of the Phils. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (3) authenticated by the seal of his office. The agency must be established in clear, certain and specific proof. In this case, there is a clear absence of proof that Revelen authorized Brigida to sell her lot. DISPOSITIVE CA affirmed. Sale Void. ICUTANIM V HERNANDEZ 10 | Padilla, J. (1948) FACTS Icutanim was charged with parricide for having killed his child of tender age. At the trial, the prosecution called to the witness stand his wife who is the mother of the deceased child. Petitioner objected to his wife testifying against him. TC: overruled the objection, on the ground that the crime committed is against her; and for that reason the rule invoked does not apply (section 26 [d], Rule 123).

Micha Arias

10

Krystel Bautista.

Icutanim says: overruling of the objection is not only against the law but also constitutes excess of jurisdiction and a grave abuse of discretion

ISSUE/HELD WoN the overruling of the TC constitutes grave abuse of discretion (WoN certiorari is the proper remedy)-- NO RATIO Appeal, and not certiorari, is the proper remedy for the correction of any error as to the competency of a witness committed by an inferior court in the course of trial Granting, arguendo, that the ruling of the respondent court is erroneous, the remedy to correct the mistake is by appeal. To allow parties litigant to come to this Court for the correction of errors committed in the course of the trial, which may be done on appeal, would unduly burden this Court with cases to be brought to it on appeal.

ground of bias alone, and must be judged on its own merits and if such testimony is clear and convincing and not destroyed by other evidence on record. Neither can said testimony be said to be self-serving. Court has said that selfserving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a partys testimony as a witness in court. Even assuming arguendo that the trial judge committed an error in basing his decision on the testimony of respondent, Carandang had a remedy by appeal and not a petition for certiorari.

DISPOSITIVE Petition denied Carandang vs Cabatuando11 Facts: Jose Carandang was the caretaker of respondent Consuelo Pandys 1.5 hectare of coconut land. Carandang had a house inside the said land and owned a land adjoining it. Pandy filed a petition for ejectment: alleged that Carandang, in gross violation of terms agreed upon, stubbornly refused and failed to clear the land of bushes and grass, take proper care of the coconut land. Moreover, petitioner had been feeding his hogs and chickens w/ coconuts from the land and gathered nuts and sold copra w/o notifying respondent. Petitioner failed to answer. Agrarian Court declared him in default. Petitioner then filed motion to set aside default order, alleging that it was due to mistake or excusable neglect and that he has a valid and meritorious defense. The court denied the motion. After respondent has presented ex parte her evidence, the Court decided ordering Carandang to vacate land and to pay plaintiff. Petitioner filed MR on the grounds that court erred in not lifting the order of default, not determining value of labor and expenses. Agrarian court issued an order of execution. Court later set it aside that it was first necessary to determine indemnification. Carandang submitted a bill of accounting for the value of his labor and plantings. Court then ordered an ocular inspection. The court, acting on the report of the ocular inspection, written and oral manifestations of respondent, petitioners affidavit, directed clerk of court to issue writ of execution ordering Carandang to vacate. Issue: WON TC committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered decision based on respondents evidence on the ground that it was self-serving Held:
11

Can the TC be accused of not having granted whole indemnity to w/c petitioner was entitled? RA 1199 SEC 22: Tenant shall have the right to be indemnified for his labor and expenses in the cultivation, planting or harvesting whether such dismissal is for a just cause or not, provided the crop still exists at the time of the disposition. The landholding under consideration is a coconut land. The crop raised is coconut. The tenant is entitled to indemnify for labor and expenses in the cultivation, planting and harvesting. The diverse fruit trees other than coconut w/c Carandang claimed to have planted were it not for the improvement of the crop raised. The law does not provide indemnity therefor. Any award made w/ regard to value of land of said permanent improvements or expenses of clearing the land is improper and unauthorized. ADDENBROOK V. PEOPLE12 June 29, 1967, J. Reyes, JBL Facts: About 3:15 PM, accused was driving a Stanvac Service Truck southward along Marquez de Comillas In front of House No. 1010, the trucks bumper came into contact with pedestrian Wenceslao Risaldo Upon impact, victim fell and rolled to a distance of fifteen (15) paces, as shown by two (2) sets of bloodstains observed by patrolman Emilio Guzman in his ocular investigation immediately after the occurrence of the incident. Risaldo was taken to PGH by the accused, but the victim was dead on arrival Victim suffered abrasions on the left forehead, and contusions with lacerations on the face, left arm, right thigh, knee joints, and right buttocks and waist and fracture of the skull (Exh. B) Accused was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence against accused Accuseds defense: The van was traveling at a slow and reasonable speed His view of the street was partly blocked by a parked car in front of house No. 1010 from behind which the deceased tried to cross the street Patrolman Guzman's competency because he was not presented as an expert witness, nor did he see the incident actually happen TC and CA: convicted Accused did not blow his horn despite the visual obstruction by the parked car He failed to observe that reasonable care required of a driver of a motor vehicle

Law itself provide that a party or any other person interested in the outcome of a case may testify. Testimony of an interested witness shouldnt be rejected on the
12

iani

jill

Issue/Ratio: (1) WON patrolman Guzman is a competent witness? YES. Credibility of witnesses is a question of fact and, therefore, not reviewable by the Supreme Court Accuseds objection is untenable because what Guzman testified to is what he saw in his ocular investigation, such as the two (2) sets of bloodstains and the 15 paces distance between them. These facts were derived from his own perception.

Jeoffrey Abello as "Beroy", Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy" or "Langga" and Jimmy Paquingan as "Jimmy". Espanola et. al. gave their alibis, which involved watching beta at Simas house (jimmys alibi), being with Carmencita in a disco until 1am (Jeoffreys alibi) and being with Jeoffrey and Carmencita until 1am (Christophers alibi). Carmencita testified in favor of Joeffrey and Christopher. The trial court ruled against Espanola et. al. and found them guilty of murder with the aggravating circumstance of treachery. They were sentenced to reclesion perpetua, and thus appealed directly to the Supreme Court. On appeal, they assailed the testimony of Joel, who was a mental retard. They also contend that Joel should not have been discharged as state witness, for being mentally ill and for being the most guilty of the accused. ISSUE: WON Joels testimony may be admissible? YES WON Joel may be discharged as state witness? YES HELD: 1) . Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that "except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses." Section 21, inter alia, disqualifies as witnesses, "those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others." A mental retardate is not therefore, per se, disqualified from being a witness. As long as his senses can perceive facts and if he can convey his perceptions in court, he can be a witness. In the case at bar, we find that Gonzales had a tendency to be repetitious and at times had to be asked leading questions, but he was not unintelligible to be beyond understanding. He was clear and unyielding in identifying the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. On the whole, his account of the crime was coherent enough to shed light on the guilt or innocence of the accused. To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. The remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence. 2) Espanola et. al. contend that the trial court violated the rule in discharging Gonzales as a state witness. They claim that Gonzales was the only one who executed an affidavit of confession (Paquingan wants to repudiate his earlier confession for being done under duress), hence, he was the most guilty of the accused and cannot be used as a state witness.

(2) WON accused is guilty? YES. Accuseds claim that the deceased suddenly darted from behind the parked car cannot be believed considering the lack of corroboration. Further, the victim, being a grown-up man, would not have ignored the noise of the oncoming vehicle, there being no reason shown for his disregarding the obvious danger. While, the accident could not be avoided because the victim was so close to the truck, this does not exculpate the accused since the latter was driving at excessive speed. While the general rule is that a driver is not held accountable just because he failed to take the wisest choice in a sudden emergency, the rule does not apply where the emergency is of the driver's own creation or devising. Held: Affirmed judgment. People v Espanola (Puno J, 1997) 13 RATIO DECIDENDI: A mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness. As long as his senses can perceive facts and if he can convey his perceptions in court, he can be a witness. FACTS: On the evening of November 16, 1991, Jessette Tarroza was stabbed several times, dragged into the bushes, and raped. Investigation by the police led to a certain Wing-wing, whose full name was Joel Gonzales. He told the police that it was Langga, Jimmy and Beroy who killed and raped Jessette. These people were later identified to be Christopher Espanola, Jimmy Paquingan and Jeoffrey Abello. Espanola et. al. were later arrested by the police. Paquingan executed a confession before two lawyers that they indeed killed and took turns in raping Jessette, and further averred that Joel was in cahoots with them. According to Espanolas confession, Joel was the last to rape Jessette. Joel was arrested, but was discharged by the prosecution as a state witness, and was presented as witness by the prosecution. On the basis of the demeanor of Gonzales and the manner he answered the questions, the trial court gathered the impression that he was mentally retarded. Gonzales did not know how to read and write. In any event, he was able to testify that on the night of November 16, 1991, he went to Baybay, Camague, Iligan City, to witness a dance. His companions were "Beroy", "Jimmy" and "Cocoy". He identified
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Ixara Maroto

To be discharged as state witness, Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court 14. All these requirements were satisfied by the prosecution and the trial court did not err in discharging Gonzales as state witness. From the evidence, it appears that Gonzales is mentally retarded. He could not have been a leader of the group for he was intellectually wanting. He did not inflict any of the fatal wounds that led to the death of the victim. The trial court's assessment that he is not the most guilty is well-grounded. It is also established that there was no eyewitness to the crime or other direct evidence. The testimony of Gonzales was absolutely necessary for the proper prosecution of the case against appellants. This was the decision of the prosecution itself when it moved for the discharge of Gonzales as a state witness. Part of prosecutorial discretion is the determination of who should be used as a state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless done in violation of the Rules, this determination should be given great weight by our courts. The records will also show that while Gonzales rambled in some parts of his testimony in view of his low intellect, nonetheless, his testimony was substantially corroborated in its material points. His declaration that the victim resisted and used her bare hands in scratching her attackers is confirmed by the findings of Dr. Villarin. His statement that Beroy slashed the neck of the victim, Langga slashed her breast and Jimmy stabbed her at the back finds support in the result of the autopsy of the victim's cadaver by Dr. Refe and Dr. Gomez showing incised wounds and numerous stab wounds on the front and back of the victim and incised wounds on her trachea and esophagus. His assertion that he and the appellants sexually abused the victim after her death is corroborated by the lacerations found in the private part of the victim as determined by doctors Lastly, there is no showing that Gonzales has been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. Gonzales also gave his consent to be utilized as state witness. People v Hayag15 (1980) | Aquino, J. FACTS a rape case involving a 32-year old deaf-mute (Esperanza Ranga), victim and 50-year old married guy (Daniel Hayag), accused. Hayag was convicted based on the uncorroborated testimony of Esperanza as interpreted and verbalized by Virginia, her sister and only available interpreter by means of a sign language which they devised since childhood. Hayag maintains that his sexual encounters with Esperanza had always been consensual as they were carrying an affair. Defense counsel also objected on the competency and partiality of the interpreter. ISSUE: WON Virginia is a reliable interpreter. HELD: NO. Accused acquitted.
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RATIO: The culpability of Hayag cannot be made to rest on the uncorroborated story of Esperanza, as conjectured by her sister and mother. That story in itself is not clear, convincing, positive and free from suspicion. It is not impeccable and does not ring true throughout. Esperanzas story was not recounted by her directly in her own words but was made known by means of sign language which was interpreted by her sister. The trustworthiness of that interpretation is doubtful. The probability of error or fabrication in such a case is very manifest. That is a dangerous procedure for ascertaining the truth especially in a case where the liberty of an accused is at stake. The court and the accused have no means of checking the accuracy of the verbalization made by the interpreter who is herself interested in sending the accused to prison. Other circumstances casting reasonable doubt on Hayags guilt: lack of tenacious resistance on the part of Esperanza; delay in reporting the alleged rape to her mother; absence of an immediate medical examination of her private organ; testimonies of prosecution impaired by inconsistencies. The Court noted that in two cases ( P v de Leon and P v Sasota) where accused was convicted of having raped deaf-mute an instructor in the school for deaf-mutes acted as an interpreter and the conviction was not based solely on the evidence given by the victim. Discussion on rules regarding communication with a deaf-mute [citing mostly American sources]. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they have sufficient knowledge to understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath and comprehend the facts as to which they wish to speak, and are capable of communicating their ideas with respect thereto. The method to be employed in eliciting the testimonies of a deaf-mute should be that which is best suited to attain the desired end, the particular method of examination including the qualifications of a particular person to act as an interpreter for a deaf-mute resting largely in the discretion of the trial court. That the best method was adopted is presumed and will not be reviewed by an appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted. Deaf-mutes who are competent to testify may give evidence by signs, or through an interpreter, or in writing. With respect to the conducting of the examination of a deafmute itself, asking leading questions is allowed in the discretion of the court as 'there is always more or less difficulty in eliciting testimony' where the witness is a deaf-mute. People V. Pedrosa16 | Sarmeinto, J. (1989) RATIO DECIDENDI Children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, so their testimony is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons, and where once established that they have fully understood the nature and character of an oath, as in this case, their testimony should be given full faith and credence. FACTS The Almaden spouses left their house to harvest palay in the neighboring barangay.

1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused concerned; 2. his testimony must be absolutely necessary; 3. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed; 4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; 5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and 6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
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They left behind their children, Maria, Roberto and Agnes together with Delia, a house guest. At around 11:30 pm Delia was awakened when someone tugged her head. As she sat up, she heard Maria cry out in pain. o She could not find Maria so she went out to get help from the neighbors. She ended up in the house of Francisco Mas. Roberto, in the mean time, had also been awakened when Maria cried out in pain. Roberto then went to the porch and sat down. A man emerged from the room and joined him. Francisco and Delia then arrived at the house and they found Pedrosa sitting at the porch. o Francisco then tried to go up the house be he had to beat a hasty retreat when Pedrosa shouted at him not to enter. After Francisco left, Delia, Roberto and Pedrosa went inside and found Maria lying in bed. o Pedrosa shook Maria but she did not move. She was already dead. The following morning, Pedrosa accompanied Roberto to inform Linda of her daughters death. o Pedrosa then told the Mrs. Almaden that Maria suffered from stomach ache and pains and that she was already dead. The spouses Almaden went home. Mr. Almaden saw Maria lying in a bloodied blanket. When he examined her and found that blood came from her vagina, he suspected foul play. o He then looked for a doctor. He did not find any so he reported the matter to the police. o

established that they have fully understood the nature and character of an oath, as in this case, their testimony should be given full faith and credence. People vs. Mendoza17 FACTS - Gina Mendoza was put to fire in her home. Because of this, she died of hypostatic pneumonia and infected 4th degree burns. Her husband was charged with parricide. The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established: - that the accused-appellant and his wife were in their house with the children - Later in the morning, relatives of accused-appellant went to the house of Jhun (brother of victim) and told him Gina got burned - Jhun and his father went to the couples house and saw the house in disarray: coke bottle which smelled of kerosene, hair strands, burned human flesh, burned clothes of Gina outside the house, branches and leaves of the atienza tree infront the house somewhat burned. - they went to the neighbors house where the children were and found Paul Michael tulala - Erlinda Porciuncula informed Jhuns family that Gina was brought to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital. - Later, Gina died - When Jhun told Paul Michael that his mother died, Paul Michael narrated to him what actually happened to his mother that evening. Because of this, Jhun reported to the police. - Jhun went to the couples place 5x but never saw accused-appellant. The latter also didnt show up during Ginas wake and bural. - accused-appellant was arrested in a womans house Paul Michaels testimony: - that evening, his father boxed his mother and tied her up (however, the witness didnt answer succeeding questions although he kept looking at his father) - that he saw matches and kerosene in their house - that it was his father who burned his mother since accused-appellant was drunk, tied her hands behind her back and poured kerosene on the front of her body and set her aflame. - his father tied up his mother because they fought Testimonies of witnesses for defense Erlinda Porciuncula (grew up with accused-appellant and was like his sister) - that accused-appellant went to her house and asked for help because his wife burned herself - she borrowed the owner type jeep of her neighbour so they could bring his wife to the hospital - that accused-appellant asked her to buy medicine and inform the relatives of the victim of what had happened accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza -when he got home, he saw his wife jumping up and down and removing her burning clothes - he saw a pail of water which he used to kill the flames - he removed her dress and cried for help - he entrusted the children to the neighbors - he brought her wife to the hospital and stayed with her until she died - he didnt attend her wake and burial because of the threats of his brother-in-law
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ISSUE/HELD WoN the trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of Pedrosa and his witnesses - NO RATIO Findings of fact of the trial judge must be accorded great weight by an appellate tribunal for the latter can only read in cold print the testimony of the witnesses. o The trial court stated in its decision that the witnesses for the prosecution testified in a frank and straightforward manner and showed no unwillingness nor hesitation in answering questions. o They testified with apparent sincerity and in a manner which indicated sufficient intelligence. The star witnesses for the prosecution in this case are children of tender years. o And from the mouths of the children we get the truth. o An intelligent boy is undoubtedly the best observer to be found. He lays hold of everything new, striking, strange; all his senses are on the stretch to assimilate it as far as possible. o As a rule, he is but little influenced by the suggestions of others, and he describes objects and occurrences as he has really seen them. o An intelligent boy is as a rule the best witness in the world. Children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, so their testimony is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons, and where once

ros

-TC gave credence to Paul Michaels testimony and convicted the accused-appellant of Parricide ISSUE: WoN the LC erred in giving full credence of Paul Michaels testimony considering the childs tender age? NO RATIO 1. Sec. 20, Rule 130 RoC provides that except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses With respect to the disqualification of children to be witnesses, Sec. 21(b) of the rule disqualifies children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. Thus, its clear that any child regardless of age can be a competent witness, if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. a. b. c. The requirements of a childs competency as a witness: capacity of observation capacity of recollection capacity of communication The SC agrees with the TC that Paul Michael is competent to testify. At the time he testified, he could be deemed a child of above average intelligence as hes capable of responding to the questions asked and recalling events and relating them to such recollections. The initial hesitancy of Paul Michael to name his father as the author of the crime could be explained by the fact that when he first testified, the father was directly in his sight and whenever their eyes met, the child could no longer speak. The second time the child testified, the private prosecutor covered the child form the accused and the accused sat out of his direct sight. With this, he was able to testify freely. 2. Accused-appellants claim that Paul Michaels testimony was influenced by Ginas relatives is just an unmitigated speculation as there wasnt any shred of evidence offered in support. 3. Neither is the cause of death of his wife hypostatic pneumonia and not due to the burns she sustained. Such a claim borders on misrepresentation because both the Autopsy Report and the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination indicated the cause of death to be hypostatic pneumonia; infected fourth degree burns. Moreover, as testified to by Dr. Nieto Salvador, the proximate cause of the hypostatic pneumonia was Ginas recumbent position due to the fourth degree burns she suffered. 4. Moreover, accused appellants flight was indicative of his guilt. There was no proof that the family of his wife threatened him with bodily harm. US v. Teresa Concepcion18 | July 29, 1915 | Johnson (Appeal to the SC) FACTS:
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Concepcion was charged with a violation of the Opium Law. It was alleged that she had in her possession and control a quantity of opium. She was arrested, arraigned, pleaded not guilty, tried, found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of P300. She appealed to the SC, wherein she alleges that the lower court erred in deciding that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause was sufficient to show that she was guilty. EVIDENCE: (What appears on) On the night of Dec. 2,, 1913, several policemen went to the Concepcion's house where she was living with her husband, Felix Ricablanca. Upon arriving there, they obtained permission to enter and immediately proceeded to make a search of the premises for opium. The SC believes that the proof showed that Concepcion, during the time the policemen were searching the house, went to a bed located in the house, after being so ordered by her husband, and took from beneath a pillow a small can of opium containing about 7 grams of opium, and attempted to throw it away. At that moment the policemen took possession of the can. What happened next is of conflict. That the policemen inquired to whom the opium belonged is not denied. The conflict arises in the answer which was given to that question. According to some of the witnesses, Concepcion declared that it belonged to her. Her husband, Felix Ricablanca, according to some witnesses, declared that he was the owner of the house and was responsible for everything that was found within it. The policemen, at that moment, evidently believed that the opium belonged to the husband, Felix Ricablanca, for the reason that they arrested him and took him to the pueblo, and later filed a complaint against him for a violation of the Opium Law. He was later brought to trial and was acquitted. Ten months later, Concepcion was charged as violating the Opium law. Note that: it is supported by evidence that Concepcion took the opium from under the pillow on the bed, at the request of her husband. Her husband was a confirmed user of opium. He admitted that he was in the habit of smoking opium. That Concepcion was temporarily in possession of the opium is not denied by her. That her possession was such a possession as is prohibited by the law, she strongly denies . ISSUES: 1. WON Concepcion is guilty of possession of opium contrary to law. NO 2. WON the testimony of her husband should have been allowed by the lower court? NO RATIO 1. The mere fact that she had in her possession the opium for but a moment and took possession of it under her husband's order, is not the kind of possession of opium as is intended to be condemned by the law. She certainly did not intend, even remotely, to have in her possession opium. She did exactly what any other faithful wife would have done under similar circumstances . (HA!) There is no proof that she was a user of opium in any form. There is no proof that she knew that the can contained opium and consequently there is no proof of the animus possidendi. Absent these, she cannot be convicted. 2. When her husband's testimony was presented, she interposed her objection. She alleges that this violated the rule that "a husband can not be examined for or against his wife without his consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without her consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other." T he court said that what is prohibited is for a husband to give a testimony against his wife without her

Paula

consent, except in a civil action between husband and wife, and in a criminal action when the crime was committed by one against the other. The present is not a civil action between husband and wife, neither it is a criminal action where the crime was committed by one against the other. It would seem to clear, therefore, that the testimony of the husband is not admissible if the wife objected. The testimony of the husband should not have been admitted. At the common law the rule was that husband and wife could not testify for or against each other in any criminal proceedings, except in the prosecution of one for criminal injury to the other. The common-law rule has been adopted in practically all of the States of the United States. The rule is based upon considerations of public policy growing out of the marital relation. To allow one to testify for or against the other would be to subject him or her to great temptation to commit perjury and to endanger the harmony and confidence of the marital relation. Decision reversed. Concepcion acquitted. Lezama vs. Rodriguez19 (1968, Castro) Facts: Jose S. Dineros et al, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance of Manila for collection of money. Defendants were Marciano C. Roque (creditor) and the spouses Jose Manuel (president of La Paz) and Paquita Lezama (secretary of La Paz). The complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership of Dineros. During the pendency of the receivership, Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it. Summons was served not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that, because the summons was served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that court was void. Defendant spouses alleged in their answer that Jose Lezama had authority to receive in behalf of the company the court summons in Civil Case 39827. They denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque's claim because they knew it to be a legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors. At the hearing Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court." The request was granted over the objection of the petitioners who invoked marital privilege. Spouses appealed to the CA, which affirmed the trial court. Issue: Whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her husband. (Restated later: Where the wife is a codefendant in a suit charging fraud against the spouses, can the wife be compelled to testify

as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without violating Section 20(b) of Rule 130?) NO. Reasoning: The provision of the Rules of Court on marital privilege deals with two different matters which rest on different grounds of policy: a) disqualification of husband and wife to testify in each other's behalf - relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the disqualification, and b) privilege not to testify against each other - the natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other's condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life partner Here the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita Lezama was to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the case and, indeed, in the light of the allegations both in the complaint and in the answer, the request was apparently one that could reasonably be expected to be made. While the petitioners denied the charge that the loan was fictitious, they did not deny the allegation that it was Paquita Lezama who, as secretary of the company, signed the minutes of the meeting at which Jose Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as secretary, made the entry in the books of the corporation. It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion that the loan transaction was above board that Dineros, the company receiver, wanted Paquita Lezama on the witness stand, not as a spouse witness "for or against her husband," but rather as an adverse party in the case. 1. It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but her testimony would be receivable only against her. It is even suggested that "each may testify in his or her own behalf, although the testimony may inure to the benefit of the other spouse, or against his or her own interest, although the testimony may also militate against the other spouse." However, The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy." The wife, Paquita Lezama, is called upon to testify as an adverse party witness on the basis of her following participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme: "that it was Paquita Lezama who as Secretary of the company signed the minutes of the meeting during which Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise as Secretary, made the entry in the books of the corporation." Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and will be asked questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband. 2. It is further argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and his or her testimony could operate only against himself or

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herself Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that charge. In those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness when both spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or nominal party.

3. The final point urged is that to prevent one spouse from testifying would encourage alliance of husband and wife as an instrument of fraud (what better way would there be to prevent discovery than to make a co-conspirator in fraud immune, to the most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite party?) The said rule of discovery should not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one's spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains. Decision reversed. PEOPLE VS. CASTANEDA20 (Santos, 1979) Original Action in the SC. Certiorari and Injunction FACTS: Private respondent Benjamin Manaloto was accused by his wife, Victoria with Falsification of Public Document. She alleges that he forged her signature in order to execute a Deed of Sale of a house belonging to the conjugal property to make it appear that she consented to the sale. When she was called to the witness stand, the opposing counsel objected invoking Sec. 20 of Art. 130. The prosecutor, however, alleges that the testimony falls under the exception under the same section. Sec 120 provides: The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated: (b) A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. ISSUE: WON the criminal case may be considered as a case for a crime committed by the a husband against his wife, and therefore, falls under the exception. (YES) RATIO: When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception. Since in this case, the party injured is the wife, and she also testified that the actuations of the husband caused their marital relationship to be so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved.

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