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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-50464 January 29, 1990 SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Filoteo T. Banzon for petitioners. SARMIENTO, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods Corporation (hereafter simply SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach Development Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH) bring to our attention the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in "Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, et al.," disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the respondent judge dated October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case No. 4062 is set aside, and respondent judge is ordered to require private respondents to file their answer to the complaint in said Civil Case No. 4062 and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits and to render judgment thereon.' The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision and restated by the petitioners in their petition are accurate: (a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly described and bounded as follows: Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m ) Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m (b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land above-described; (c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant Coral Beach Development Corporation I (d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as Civil Case No. 4062. 2 SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: 1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all administrative remedies before filing the case in court; 2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become indefeasible and imprescriptible; 3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by the Solicitor General and not by the Director of Lands. 3 The then Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the complaint in the Order of October 7, 1977,4adopting mainly the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land. The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October 11, 1977 and filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 25, 1977 . 5 The Solicitor General then moved for an extension of thirty days within which to file the Record on Appeal and to pay the docket fee in order to perfect the appeal. This was to be followed by another motion for extension filed by the Solicitor General, resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner another extension of fifteen days from December 10, 1977. Finally before this period of extension lapsed, instead of an appeal, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals was filed. According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and in

a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to Dismiss, the correctness of its decision must be decided in the assumed truth and accuracy of the allegations of the complaint. The complaint alleges that the lands in question are forest lands; hence, inalienable. b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands despite clear and positive evidence to the contrary. c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it was not initiated by the Director of Lands. d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of action for alleged failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies. 6 The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari, set aside the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 4062, and ordered the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the answers of the private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action for reversion. Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review. A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted only when there are special and important reasons therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the premises for granting a review: (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for supervision . 7 We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court of First Instance with grave abuse of discretion. The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the Republic. An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied specifically 9 by the defendants (petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH. If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 10 Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. 11 Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 12 The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest. 13 The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land is by remanding the case to the lower court for a full- dress trial on the issues involved. Generally, the rules of procedure must be observed so that the efficient administration of justice is ensured. However, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14They must lead to the proper and just determination of litigation, without tying the hands of the law or making it indifferent to realities. Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 15 The long line of decisions denying the petition for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially in instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the instances when certiorari was given due course. The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, 16 or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 17 We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to give due course to the petition considering that the issue affected a matter of public concern which is the disposition of the lands of our matrimony No less than the Constitution protects its policy.

We therefore find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court, in the absence of a clear showing that the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in a manner inconsistent with jurisprudence, or that the respondent Court has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. In sum, no reversible error has been committed by the respondent court. 18 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. SOURCE: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/jan1990/gr_l_50464_1990.html Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989 THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents. CRUZ, J.: The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria. The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed. It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual. For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4 Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.

In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglareswere defined by the Court as: ... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains. xxx Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership. Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus: Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character. It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7 ...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land. xxx xxx xxx The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land. More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared: 'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment. These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.

The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court: The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress. No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that: ... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain. Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view. In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands. Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez: The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification. The petition is without merit. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.' The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case. Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.

The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources. In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus: Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into: (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Lumber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides: For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows: (a) Agricultural; (b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows: Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest. The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made. Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands. With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion: Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department.

More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall. Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland. It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code. The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership. Thus we held in the Yngson case: It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes. The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus: It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.' We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18 We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted. It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., took no part. SOURCE: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/feb1989/gr_l32266_1989.html Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-49903 February 21, 1983 MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO, ISABELA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAUIAN, LIBRADA, VIRGINIA, FIDENCIO, ARTEMIO, PORFIRIO and REGINA, all surnamed BAYAUA, respondents. Josefino Draculan for petitioner. Sofronio Ganaden for respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: The issue in the present controversy centers on the ownership of two contiguous lots, Lot No. 4976-A with an area of 4,719 sq. ms., and Lot No, 8000-A, with an area of 42,621 sq. ms. (Exhibit "2"), respectively, of the Santiago cadastre, Province of Isabela. Private respondent, Maria Cauian, is the surviving spouse of Eulalio Bayaua, son of Liberato Bayaua, the alleged original occupant of the disputed lots. The other private respondents are the children of the spouses. Maria Cauian passed away during the pendency of this case and was ordered substituted by her heirs. Litigated lots Nos. 4976-A and 8000-A were formerly portions of Cadastral Lots Nos. 4976 and 1, respectively, Cad. Case No. 30, G.L.R.O., Rec. No. 1496. Both lots were originally reserved for the Santiago farm school site by Proclamation No. 427 of then Governor General Dwight F. Davis, dated November 7, 1931. 1 On May 24, 1949, Proclamation No. 131 was issued by President Elpidio Quirino 2 releasing and excluding Lots Nos. 4976-A and 8000-A (a portion of Lot No. 1) from the operation of Proclamation No. 427, and reserving the same as market site for the Municipality of Santiago. Both said Proclamations were "subject to private rights if any there be. " After the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 131 in 1949, the Municipality filled the area of the lots in question, which were then low and swampy and constructed the present market buildings thereon allegedly worth P595,621.13 (Exhibit "4"). Those same two lots are being claimed by respondents, who allegedly possessed said property in the concept of owners since time immemorial through their predecessors-in-interest. They base their claim of ownership on (1) a Spanish document entitled, Estadistica de los Terrenos de

propiedad particular existantes en este pueblo de Carig, Provincia de la Isabela de Luzon Num. 6 del ano 1896" on file with the Division of Archives, Bureau of Public Libraries 3, wherein the name of "Don Liberato Bayaua" was listed as "proprietario" over a 3 hectare, 61 centare lot; (2) on Tax Declarations for the years 1921, 1938-1939, 1945, 1957-1959 in the name of Eulalio Bayaua 4 ; and (3) on tax receipts. 5 The Cadastral Case The records show that during the cadastral survey of the Municipality of Santiago from October 30, 1927 to March 23, 1932, and the cadastral proceedings that followed in 1939, private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest did not file any claim to Lot 8000-A (portion of Lot 1), which included the bigger portion of the market site. Eulalio Bayaua filed a claim with respect to Lot 4976 during the cadastral survey, but did not file an Answer during the cadastral proceedings. The only ones who filed their cadastral Answers with regards to Lot 4976 were the Municipality of Santiago and one Antero Catabas. The hearing of Cad. Case No. 30, G.L.R.O., Rec. No. 1496 was suspended at the outbreak of World War II and was resumed on December 10, 1962. On that date, respondent heirs of Eulalio Bayaua filed a Petition to Admit their Answers to Lot No. 4976 and Lot No. 1-D (portion), alleging that previous answers had been filed by Eulalio within the statutory period, but due to accident, mistake or excusable negligence, the same could not be found in the Court records. Petitioner opposed admission. On December 11, 1962, the Court denied admission of the Answer stating: Petition to admit answer dated December 10, 1962 filed by counsel for claimants Bayaua, et al., is denied because, it was filed beyond the five years period fixed by Republic Act No. 931; and because absolutely no reason whatsoever is alleged as required by the Rules of Court to show that there was excusable negligence on the part of the deceased Eulalio Bayaua, who has filed other cadastral answer for other lots, and the record shows that there are other cadastral answers of other claimants who have not been notified of the present petition, which is not verified. 6 Private respondents did not move for the reconsideration of said Order of December 11, 1962, nor did they take other remedial steps to have the Answer admitted. On September 17, 1963, the lower Court issued another Order declaring Lot No. 4976 public land. WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the First Assistant Provincial Fiscal representing the Municipality of Santiago, the cadastral answer filed by Anteno Catabas over Lot 4976 is hereby definitely dismissed, for lack of due prosecution, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 30, Rules of Court. Cadastral Lot 4976, Santiago Cadastre included in Cad. Case No. 30 GLRO Rec. No. 1496, is declared public land subject, however, to whatever rights the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, may have by virtue and pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 131 dated May 24, 1949. 7 (Emphasis supplied). Private respondents did not move for the reconsideration of the foregoing Order, nor did they appeal therefrom. Apparently, private respondents had reiterated their petition to admit answer, for, on July 19, 1968, another Order was issued in the cadastral case denying admission on the ground that Lot 4976 had been declared public land in the Order of September 17, 1963, which Order had become final (Exhibit "6"). The Civil Cases It appears that, on December 21, 1951, private respondent Maria Cauian had filed a complaint for Forcible Entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 32, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Santiago, against petitioner and the then Municipal Mayor Juan dela Cruz, claiming that the Municipality, on September 2, 1951, had forcibly and unlawfully entered the northern comer of Lot 8000-A over her objection and opposition. 8 On September 13, 1952, private respondents filed a complaint for "Ownership and Injunction" with the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch II, Cauayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 506, against Andres Acosta (the then Municipal Mayor) and the Municipal Government of Santiago, seeking to eject them from Lots Nos. 4976-A and 8000-A, to recover possession thereof, get their produce, and to recover damages and attorney's fees.

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Private respondents claim that Liberato Bayaua was the original occupant of the lands in controversy; that upon his death in 1916, his son Eulalio, to whom said properties were bequeathed, took possession of the same, cultivated the land, declared it for taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon; that in 1939, Eulalio and his wife Maria Cauian mortgaged the land to one Marcelo Alvarez and the same was cancelled in 1946; that after Eulalio's death in 1940, his wife, Maria, and their children Librada, Virginia, Fidencio, Artemio, Porfirio and Regina all surnamed Bayaua, continued in peaceful possession of the land until May 1951, when petitioner entered and occupied the northern portion of the land constructing some buildings thereon. The Municipality, on the other hand, alleges that neither respondents nor their predecessors-ininterest had ever been in actual possession of subject properties; that the Agricultural Farm School of Santiago had been in actual peaceful, public, open and continuous possession of said property since 1931, when the same formed part of the farm school site by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 427 dated November 7, 1931, until possession of the same was turned over to petitioner as its market site pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 131 dated May 24,1949. Defendant Andres Acosta, the then Municipal Mayor, was declared in default for failure to file an answer within the reglementary period. The Forcible Entry Case, Civil Case No. 23, was dismissed on February 20, 1954 upon motion of private respondents' counsel in view of the pendency of Civil Case No. 506 before the Court of First Instance of Isabela. 9 Beginning January 25, 1963, the Trial Court heard jointly Cad. Case No. 30 for Lot 4976 with regards to the claim of the Municipality and Antero Catabas, and Civil Case No. 506. On March 2, 1970, or about 6-7 years after Lot 4976 was declared public land, the Court rendered a Joint Decision in Cad. Case No. 30 and Civil Case No. 506, decreeing: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered: (a) Dismissing the complaint and supplemental complaint; (b) Declaring cadastral Lot No. 4976-A, Cad. Case No. 30 in Subdivision Plan Psd-18663 together with the technical description in said plan, the property of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela, as part of the market site in question; (c) Declaring the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela the owner of Lot No. 800-A (8000-A) shown in the plan Psd-18663 with the technical description in said plan which consists of the bigger portion of the market site of the municipality of Santiago in question; and (d) That the plaintiffs pay the costs. 10 Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 47575- R). On December 20, 1978, respondent Appellate Court ** reversed the judgment of the Trial Court and declared private respondents the lawful owners and possessors of the disputed land through acquisitive prescription, rationalizing thus: The adverse and uninterrupted possession of the disputed land by the plaintiffsappellants (referring to private respondents) for more than 30 years, from the time they acquired it by inheritance from Liberato (should read Eulalio) Bayaua in 1916, let alone the prior continuous and public possession thereof by their predecessor-in-interest Liberato Bayaua, the original owner, is pretty well established. In view of this fact, acquisitive prescription has operated to vest absolute title over the land in question on the plaintiffs-appellants, pursuant to Section 41 of Act 190, the law then in force and effect (Parcotilo vs. Parcotilo, 12 SCRA 435, 440). Under that law, 10 years of actual and adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that period of time of any land in whatever way his occupancy may have commenced or continued and under a claim of title exclusive of any other right adverse to all other claimants is enough to vest title thereto by prescription (Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516, 522; Parcotilo vs. Parcotilo, supra; Sanchez vs. Rosales, CA-G.R. No. 3663-R, August 30, 1974; Lim vs. Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental, CA-G.R. No. 35006-R, August 15, 1974)... 11

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Hence, the present appeal by certiorari by the Municipality, raising the following issues: 1) Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in disregarding the findings of fact of the trial court; 2) Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had already acquired the property in question by acquisitive prescription before the issuance of Executive Proclamation No. 427 and Presidential Proclamation No. 131 on November 7, 1931 and May 24, 1949 respectively, reserving the same for public use; and 3) Whether or not public interest, as well as justice and equity justify the granting of this petition. In our Resolution of April 4, 1969, we had denied the Petition. However, upon the Municipality's instance, we reconsidered, after attention was called to the fact that private respondents had failed to file their Answer in the cadastral proceedings. We are constrained to reverse. 1) Respondent Court had overlooked and misapprehended the material fact that prior to the issuance of Proclamations Nos. 427 and 131 (supra) the disputed lots had been included in the cadastral proceedings of Santiago, Isabela, from 1927 to 1932. Private respondents did not register their claim to Lot 8000-A during the cadastral survey of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela in 1927. Nor did they file Answers in respect of both lots in the cadastral proceedings in 1939, which they should have done if they had been in actual possession, and as their predecessor-in-interest, Eulalio, did in respect of other lots not covering the subject market site. There being no private claimants to Lot 8000-A, it was deemed to be public land at the time it was reserved as a school site in 1931 and later as a part of the market site in 1949. And in respect of Lot 4976, the only recorded claims were those of one Antero Catabas and the Municipality. Private respondents sought to remedy the absence of a claim by filing a Petition to Admit their Answer during the continuation of the hearing of Cadastral Case no. 30 on December 10, 1962, and reiterating the same Petition again in 1968, as stated before, both of which Petitions were denied. Respondents did not move for reconsideration, nor did they take other remedial measures. Likewise, on September 17, 1963, the Trial Court issued an Order declaring Cadastral Lot No. 4976 public land subject to whatever rights the Municipality of Santiago may have by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 131 of May 24, 1949. Private respondents were parties in the proceedings but they did not question nor appeal from the aforestated Order. it had, therefore, become final and conclusive. One of the main purposes of cadastral proceedings is to settle titles to lands. Anyone claiming ownership of any land so affected should lay claim thereto. Failure to do so authorizes the Court to declare the same as public land.12 Settled is the rule that a cadastral proceeding is one in rem and any decision rendered therein by the Cadastral Court is binding against the whole world. 13 Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 14 2) Contrary to the statement of the Court of Appeals, the Spanish document Estadistica presented by respondents is not a "title". It is not one of the grants made during the Spanish regime. In fact, the lots "con titulo" were so indicated in the 'Estadistica". Respondents themselves admit that the Estadistica does not grant a valid title of the same efficacy and validity as a "composicion con el estado " or an "informacion posesoria ". Respondents' tax declarations for certain odd years (Exhibits "H", "J"), and tax receipts (Exhibits "I", "I-1", "K"), although constituting proof of claim of title to land, 15 are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are supported by other effective proof. 16 And although Proclamations Nos. 427 and 131 declared that they were "subject to private rights if any there be", private respondents have failed to prove their rights. ... For it is well-settled that, unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicant or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish

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Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. 17 3) The Trial Court was not convinced that the parcels of land being claimed by respondents are Identical to the properties in litigation. For, while it is not disputed that the land in question was originally swampy and devoted to rice planting, the parcel of land referred to in the "Estadistica" was classified as "tabaco " land while others were "palay". As the Trial Court noted, tobacco land connotes an elevated land. And even assuming that they are the same property, private respondents failed to submit convincing evidence of actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the entire area in question until the time they were allegedly dispossessed by the Municipality sometime in 1951. As pointed out by the Trial Court, private respondents merely showed a "sporadic feeble cultivation of portions thereof which does not amount to possession as owner". 18 A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. 19 It has been sufficiently established, on the other hand, that the lots in controversy have been under the continuous possession of the Agricultural Farm School of Santiago, cultivated by its students as part of their curriculum from 1931 to May 24, 1949 when the Municipality took over a portion thereof for its market site and built improvements thereon. It was the students who had built "pilapils " and a barbed wire fence around the property. As found by the Trial Court, "the witnesses for the Municipality are unbiased; the preponderance of evidence tilts heavily in its favor." Those witnesses were the cadastral surveyors themselves, the former principal of the Santiago Farm School, and the ex-Mayors who had been old residents of the town. Whereas private respondents' witnesses were "all close relatives of the plaintiffs either by consanguinity and/or affinity 4) It was reversible error for respondent Court to have ruled that acquisitive prescription had operated to vest absolute title over the lands in question in private respondents. Contrary to that Court's finding, the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed properties for more than 30 years and even "for close to half a century" has not been conclusively established as explained heretofore. Moreover, the institution of cadastral proceedings had the effect of suspending the running of the prescriptive period. 20 Additionally, having been declared public land, Lots 8000-A and 4976-A cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. 21Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State. 22 The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 23 The exception under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 by which public lands may be acquired by prescription can neither apply to private respondents as the latter had failed to establish conclusively that they were in continuous possession and occupancy of public land under claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. 24They merely showed "sporadic feeble cultivation", mere casual cultivation of portions of the land, which does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. 25 WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals of December 20, 1978 is hereby reversed and set aside, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 506, is hereby reinstated and affirmed. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. SOURCE: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1983/feb1983/gr_l_49903_1983.html

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 66130 September 8, 1994 DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ISABEL TESALONA and the HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. Rabendranath Y. Uy for private respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered on December 29, 1983 which modified the decision dated December 8, 1976 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The controversy arose from an application for registration of five (5) parcels of land on the basis of an alleged possessory information title. The application was opposed by the government on the ground that the parcels of land are part of the inalienable land of the public domain. The subject property is situated in Barrio Butanyog, Mulanay, Quezon, and consists of about 7.4343 hectares alleged to have been originally acquired by Maria Rosita Lorenzo under a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896 under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. Maria Rosita Lorenzo was married to Felipe Lizada. Maria Rosita begot two (2) sons, Laureano and Cipriano. Cipriano died a bachelor and without any issue. Upon the death of the spouses, Laureano inherited the land. Laureano Lizada married Baldomera Roces and the couple had two (2) children, Andres and Magdalena. Andres died a bachelor and without any issue, so upon the death of Laureano, Magdalena inherited the land. Magdalena married Nerio Tesalona and they had three (3) daughters, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia, applicants herein. On June 23, 1971, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia Tesalona filed an application for registration of five (5) parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of plan Psu 215382 with the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch. 1 Lot No. 1 has an area of 7,583 square meters; Lot No. 2 has 36,319 square meters; Lot No. 3 has 24,347 square meters; Lot No. 4 has 5,388 square meters; and Lot No. 5 has 706 square meters 2 or a total of 74,343 square meters. The possessory information title covers only an area of 10,481 square meters. 3 The Director of Lands through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed his opposition to the application alleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title of the land applied for nor had they been in possession thereof for a period of at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application and that the same is public land. 4 On December 8, 1971, the applicants filed a reply to the government's opposition claiming that the land in question is private property covered by a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896. 5 At the initial hearing on the same date, the applicants presented proof of compliance of jurisdictional requirements. On motion of applicants' counsel, the court issued an order of general default with the exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. 6 During the hearing on January 18, 1972, the Fiscal moved to withdraw the opposition of the Director of Forestry and the same was granted. 7 On May 3, 1972, Assistant Fiscal Antonio Robles likewise moved for the withdrawal of the opposition of the Director of Lands and the same was again granted. 8 Reception of evidence was thereafter delegated to a commissioner. 9 Constancio dela Pena Tan likewise filed an opposition even as he supported the government's contention that the lands applied for are part of the public domain. Tan averred that he had possessed the land as lessee for a period of more than thirty five (35) years. Records reveal that Demetria dela Pena, mother of herein private oppositor occupied Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Plan Psu 215382, applied for registration, by virtue of a fishpond lease granted by the Bureau of Fisheries sometime in 1953. 10 Said lands were converted into fishponds and had been subject of a sales application sometime in 1963. 11 The application to purchase filed by Constancio is still pending before the Bureau of Lands.

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Pending the resolution of whether or not the opposition of Constancio dela Pena Tan should be admitted, the lower court learned that the special counsel who had withdrawn the government's opposition was not authorized to do so. Acting accordingly, the court reinstated the opposition of the Director of Lands and directed that the opposition of the private oppositor be considered as evidence in support of the claim of the government that the land applied for is part of the public domain. 12 After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favor of the applicants and declaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as owned by the government subject to the rights of the lessee, Constancio dela Pena Tan, pending the approval of his sales application. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the application insofar as Lots 3, 4 and 5 of plan Psu-215382 are concerned and hereby adjudicates these properties in favor of the applicants Heirs of Isabel Tesalona namely: Lilia, Rebecca, Sonia, Emma, Imelda, Antonio, Minda, Luisa, Buenafe and Carmencita, all surnamed Pobeda; Consuelo L. Tesalona and Serapia L. Tesalona, together with all the improvements existing thereon and confirms their title thereto as their exclusive properties. The Court hereby declares Lots 1 and 2 as owned by the Government subject to the right of the lessee pending the approval of the sales application of private oppositor Constancio de la Pena. Upon this decision becoming final, let decree of confirmation and registration be entered and thereafter, upon payment of the fees required by law, let the corresponding certificate of title issue in the names of Heirs of Isabel Tesalona namely: LILIA POBEDA, married to Salvador Magtibay; REBECCA POBEDA, married to Jose Pineda; SONIA POBEDA, married to Ildefonso Avellano; EMMA POBEDA, married to Raul Capesano; IMELDA POBEDA, married to Ceferino Jimenez; MINDA POBEDA, married to Rolando Nagar; LUISA POBEDA, single; BUENAFE POBEDA, married to Tomasito Javate; and CARMENCITA POBEDA, single; CONSUELO L. TESALONA, married to Eleuterio Luna; and SERAPIA L. TESALONA, single, all Filipino citizens and residents of Mulanay, Quezon as their exclusive properties, free from all liens and encumbrances. SO ORDERED. 13 Not satisfied with the trial court's ruling, herein applicants interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals seeking confirmation of title over Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as well. On December 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court through its First Civil Cases Division 14 rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but modified declaring the confirmation of the title of applicants-appellants over Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan PSU-215382, and ordering the registration of said Lots in their names, along with Lots 3, 4 and 5 of the same PSU Plan already adjudicated to them in said appealed decision. SO ORDERED. 15 The instant petition seeks to set aside the aforequoted decision on the basis of the following grounds, to wit: (a) the respondent court acted contrary to law in confirming private respondents' alleged title to Lot Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of a mere blue print copy of plan Psu 215382; and (b) the respondent court acted contrary to law in confirming private respondents' alleged title to Lot Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896 which covers only an area of 1.0481 hectares. 16 The petition is impressed with merit. At the outset, we note that private respondents' application for registration of five (5) parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Plan Psu 215382 ought to have been struck down at its inception for the reasons which we will discuss hereinafter. However, since the trial court ruled for confirmation of title over Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of Plan Psu 215382 in favor of the applicants (herein private respondents) and no appeal thereon was brought by the government to the Court of Appeals, 17 we cannot pass upon the validity of the registration of the other three (3) lots, the same was not put in issue in this petition. Suffice it to state that we deny the application for registration of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 without prejudice to the right of the government to pursue whatever means appropriate with respect to Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5.

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To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence by private respondents. Such omission is fatal to their application as the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. 18 While a blue print of survey Plan Psu 215382 19 as surveyed for the Heirs of Magdalena Lizada was presented before the trial court, the same falls short of the mandatory requirement of law. Private respondents contend that they are in possession of the original tracing cloth plan but they did not submit it in evidence for fear that it may be lost or misplaced while in possession of the court. 20 This contention spurs disbelief. The original tracing cloth plan, together with the duplicate copy of their application for registration of land title were under the custody of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) at that time. But such does not relieve the private respondents of their duty to retrieve the said tracing cloth plan and submit it before the court. In the case ofDirector of Lands v. Reyes, 21 this Court clearly declared that if the original tracing plan was forwarded to the LRC, "the applicants may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence." 22 This was not done. Assuming that the same was in their possession during the trial, private respondents should have made it available to the trial court for verification. Private respondents further claim that petitioner failed to object to the submission of the blue print copy of the survey plan when the same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving objection to said evidence. We are not persuaded. Given the mandatory character of the requirement for the submission of the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, said requirement cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly. Besides, Rule 143 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the rules do not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not provided therein, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. In the case at bench, there appears no reason to apply the exception to the aforesaid rule. The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona, herein private respondents, is a Spanish title, 23 a possessory information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares. But private respondents did not submit the original of the possessory information title. What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a Spanish document purporting to be the title evidencing the land grant of 1896. Moreover, proof of loss or unavailability of the original document as required by Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not established thus, rendering admissibility of the said secondary evidence questionable and dubious. This Court has time and again reiterated that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of secondary evidence of alleged possessory information titles considering the number of fake titles that have been discovered following their supposed reconstitution after the last World War. 24 In fact, the rash of anomalies prompted the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 892 which outlawed all Spanish titles, including possessory information titles, unless they were authenticated in appropriate registration proceedings before August 16, 1976. 25 Another point to consider is the fact that there is a glaring and irreconcilable discrepancy between the area of 1.0481 hectares covered by the alleged possessory information title and the actual area of 7.4343 hectares applied for. Law and jurisprudence dictate that applicants have the burden of proving that the title justifies the considerable increase in land area, failure in which results in the resolution of the conflict in favor of the government and against them. Well-settled is the rule that land grants, being gratuitous in nature, are always construed favorably in favor of the government and strictly against the grantee, 26 and that possessory information titles, assuming them to be valid and legal, are grants from the State which cannot extend beyond the terms thereof. 27 Finally, Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy area and were as early as 1955, filled with mangrove trees. 28Lorenzo del Mundo, husband of Demetria del Mundo, lessee of the lots in question, in his testimony declared that: Q When you first came to know these parcels of lands and possessed the same, what was the condition or nature of these lands?

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A That is (sic) a swampy land with bakawan trees, mangroves and some other swampy trees. Q Please name what "lalao" trees or swampy trees were planted when you possessed the same? A Bacawan, sasa, pipisik, tabigui, talisay, tingayos, langaray and bongalon. I forget (sic) the names of those other big trees planted thereon. 29 This belies the contention of herein private respondents that said lots were planted to coconuts in 1909 and, thereafter, to palay and other seasonal crops. Being swampy area covered by mangrove trees and the like, these lots may very well be considered and classified as forest lands. In the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 30 we declared that: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way place. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 31 (Emphasis ours) Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 32 Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens System, nullifies the title. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Appellate Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration of the Heirs of Isabel Tesalona of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason JJ., concur. Cruz, J., is on leave. SOURCE: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/sep1994/gr_66130_1994.html