Rwanda Settlements Nov 01

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
MINISTRY FOR LANDS, HUMAN RESETTLEMENT & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
BROOKINGS INITIATIVE IN RWANDA: LAND AND HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
NOVEMBER 2001
KIGALI, RWANDA
Table of Contents
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4 4.1 4.2 4.3
4.4
Introduction Background The Rwanda Initiative - Findings of First Mission Brookings Task Force Human Settlement 1995-1998 Response to Shelter Needs Response to Human Settlement Since 1998 Unmet Needs Conclusion Land Land Related Initiatives Challenges Conclusion Implementation Partnerships Aid Relationship to Date Government-Donor Relations Partnerships Regarding Human Settlement and Land
Conclusion 41
57 57 57 59 61 61 64 67 72 73 74 77 79 80 80 82 83
5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
The Proposed Way Forward Immediate Shelter Assistance Sustainable Community Approach Land Issues Conclusion
87 42 44 49 51
Annex 1: Terms of Reference Annex 2: List of Persons Met Annex 3: List of Documents Reviewed Annex 4: Results from the Rapid Assessment of Shelter Needs Annex 5: Budget Estimate for Immediate Shelter Assistance for the Most Vulnerable Families Annex 6: Proposal for a Rwandan National Solidarity Fund
Annex 7: Briefing Note on Decentralisation Annex 8: Types of Shelters in Different Settlement Sites
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ADB Asian Development Bank ALIR Alliance pour la Libration du Rwanda CCA Common Country Assessment CBO Community-based organization CCOAIB Conseil de concertation des organisations dappui aux initiatives de base CDCs Community Development Committees CEPEX Central Projects and External Financing Bureau CIDA Canadian International Development Agency DANIDA Danish Agency for Development Assistance DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EC European Commission ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FAR Forces Armes Rwandaises GoR Government of Rwanda IMF International Monetary Fund I-PRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency JRPU Joint Reintegration Programming Unit MINALOC Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs MINECOFIN Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning MINITERE Ministry for Lands, Human Resettlement & Environmental Protection NGO Non-governmental organization NUR National University of Rwanda NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission OAU Organization of African Unity OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper RDRC Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission RISD Rwandan Initiative for Sustainable Development ROC Republic of Congo RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army RTC Round Table Conference SIDA Section for Development Cooperation, Sweden UCAR Coordination Unit of Resettlement Activities, MINITERE UN United Nations UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Programme
Introduction
Background
In January 1999, the then UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and the World Bank President James Wolfensohn took the initiative to bring together multilateral agencies, a few NGOs, donor and recipient governments to discuss the need to address the gap between humanitarian assistance and long-term development. The ensuing process has become known as the Brookings process, after the Brooking Institution in Washington that hosted and chaired the two high-level meetings to date. In the beginning, the process focused on analysing the two main gaps identified - institutional coordination and funding gaps. At the second roundtable, it was agreed to "breathe life" into existing institutional arrangements by creating "partnership initiatives" on a case-by-case basis, as opposed to establishing new bureaucratic layers. Concretely, this translated into a high-level mission to West Africa in early 2000, which included the deputies of UNHCR, UNDP and the World Bank's Vice President for External and UN Affairs. Recognising that the Brookings spirit has not yet translated itself into tangible results on the ground, bilateral donors and multilateral agencies involved in the Brookings process met again in Geneva in November 2000. Ways were discussed to promote synergies and practical co-operation between humanitarian and development actors in countries experiencing transition or emerging from crisis. The group agreed that the overall objective of assistance is to move from violence and instability to development and stability and thereby ensure durable human security in fragile peace situations. To do so successfully requires translating "rhetoric to reality" by building effective strategic partnerships among the programmes of donors, agencies and local partners. Therefore the group decided to launch missions to the Republic of Congo (ROC) and Rwanda: to ascertain the nature of the gaps; to devise ways to address any such gaps; and to propose supplementary programmes where necessary.
This approach was endorsed at a videoconference on 14 December 2000, involving the top management of UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, World Bank, OCHA, EC, US State Department and Norway as well as the ambassadors of ROC and Rwanda. The participants renewed their political commitment towards joint post-conflict engagement. They called for clarification of roles and responsibilities; donor flexibility in funding support; and co-ordination at country level and empowerment of country teams.
The Rwanda Initiative - Findings of First Mission

The Rwanda initiative was set in motion by undertaking a pre-mission ("first mission") in February 2001 to discuss all aspects of the scope of the Rwanda initiative of the Brookings process with the GoR and partners in Kigali, and to collect relevant information and views. Assisted by the Kigali offices of UNHCR and UNDP, the pre-mission team included: Dr. Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Centre for Development Research, Denmark, Team leader Ms. Cecilia Magnusson Ljungman, COWI, Denmark Ms. Angela Martin, USAID, Washington Mr. Masamichi Ito, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
Mr. Toru Yoshikawa, Embassy of Japan, Nairobi Ms. DeeDee Angagaw, UNDP, Addis Ababa Mr. Niels Harild, UNHCR, Geneva In discussions with stakeholders and in document reviews, the team encountered a range of conflict-related needs - where conflict-related needs refer to needs derived from past, current or potential violent conflicts. The recent violent conflicts affecting Rwanda include the genocide and its immediate aftermath (1994-1997); insurgency from DRC (1997-98); and war in DRC (1998-2001). While the GoR sees this as one continued conflict, some donors view Rwanda's presence in DRC as a different conflict, or at least as a fundamentally different phase of the same regional conflict. Among the identified needs were the following: 1. Human capital was depleted during the genocide and is in acute short supply. A majority of Rwanda's trained and educated population was murdered and some have fled the country. Half of the country's 19,000 teachers were killed and of 800 magistrates, only 40 remained after the war. Virtually no defence attorneys were left. The public sector is suffering from a lack of human resources with a significant proportion of employees having had no secondary education. 2. A chronically poor country before the war, the genocide has led to 65% of households living below the poverty line. Since the genocide, the inequity among the poor has increased, with the emergence of the category "very poor," encompassing as many as 38% of the population. The pressure on land is even more acute than before due to continued land degradation and the population increase since 1993 - partly as a result of the return of old caseload refugees. By 2005, the population is expected to increase to 10 million. The Government sees diversifying the rural economy by expanding opportunities for off-farm employment as crucial. 3. A large number of Rwandans still live under makeshift shelter, without durable solutions regarding access to land. This need is related to general poverty reduction efforts, since it amplifies the long-term problems of land access, distribution and tenure. 4. Governance deficiencies are considered a primary factor contributing to the war and genocide. The introduction of rule of law, democratisation and decentralisation are seen as essential both for reconciliation and for the prevention of renewed conflict. Reconciliation to ensure peaceful coexistence is recognised as a priority by the Government and donors alike. The number of traumatised people as a result of the war and genocide is estimated to be considerable. 5. About 115,000 people are in prison awaiting trial for genocide-related crimes. This imposes a large economic burden on both the state and households. Conditions in prisons are in many cases appalling and the justice system lacks the capacity to speed up the trials of the suspects. The reintroduction of Gacaca, a traditional Rwandan justice system that involves community participation, will require support to ensure fairness and effectiveness. 6. The social fabric of Rwanda has been torn apart and infused with distrust, which has damaged its social capital, an essential building block for long-term development. Civil society needs to be supported in this context because: i) in its ability to strengthening social and economic collaboration, it is vital for the generation of social capital, and ii) by promoting reconciliation and enhancing democratic institutions and justice systems, it is a crucial component of peace-building.
7. Over the years, it has been repeatedly asserted that durable peace in Rwanda requires a sustainable solution to the related conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Stronger economic, social and political cooperation among the nations of the region should make important contributions towards preventing future violent conflicts. 8. The actual aid response to conflict-related issues has in turn created its own set of needs. The huge inflow of funds for humanitarian assistance combined with the destruction of the economic base led to an extreme case of the Dutch disease - an artificial economy with a strong currency and rapid recovery growth rates, but few productive investments and no revenue base for sustainable debt repayment. Discussions with stakeholders also revealed that on top of the conflict-related needs mentioned above, information exchanges, dialogue and strategic co-ordination among the aid actors are rare but badly needed. There appears to be considerable scope in improving aid management systems and establishing implementation partnerships. In its Issues Paper prepared in April 2001, the first mission concluded that the needs related to human settlement and land are unmet as a result of a combination of institutional barriers, inflexible funding mechanisms, uncertainties and disagreements about land reform and settlement patterns, as well as inadequate aid management. Meanwhile, it is viewed that the opportunities potentially being missed with regard to civil society are primarily a function of weak aid management: the numerous relatively fruitful high-level conferences over the years do not appear to have translated into transparent, effective and efficient partnerships on the ground.
As a result, the first mission recommended that the Brookings process should explore ways to operationalise implementation partnerships in the framework of the PRSP to address conflict-related needs within human settlement and land access. As part of this effort, a task force should be established with the specific aim of:
1. Extending the analyses of the Issues Paper and tailor them to a national workshop to take place in Rwanda, tentatively scheduled for June 2001. 2. To undertake preparations for the workshop and to support its implementation. The findings of the task force would constitute the basis for the second step in the process, namely a workshop in Rwanda. The workshop would aim to explore ways to operationalise implementation partnerships that address human settlement, land and civil society needs within the framework of the PRSP. Thirdly, general lessons would be drawn from the Rwandan experiences and compiled into a practical tool for aid management in the international response to conflict-affected countries.
Brookings Task Force

After discussions in Kigali among the UN, donors and the GoR, it was decided that the task force should only focus on human settlement and land since it was felt that these issues required greater attention. The task force, consisted of representatives from the Government, the donor community and the UN: James Kimonyo Ministry of Lands, Human Resettlement and Environmental Protection (MINITERE), Director of Habitat, Team Leader Cecilia Ljungman Consultant for Danida, Facilitator Aisha Buruku Deputy Representative, UNHCR
Glen Slocum Yousser Chaabane Sverin Mungangu Franois Sekamondo Onesphore Karuho Sbastien LaPierre Kiyoshi Harada Laurent Rudasingwa Priya Gajraj
Consultant for USAID/OTI Consultant for UNDP Professor, National University of Rwanda, Centre for Conflict Management National Poverty Reduction Unit Sida, Kigali UNHCR UNDP UNDP Consultant for UNDP
The task force started its work on September 10. The activities of the task force included the following: 1. Met with government officials (including the Minister of Land, Human Settlement and Environmental Protection, Social Affairs and Local Government and the Presidents office), NGOs, donors and UN agencies (see annex 2 for list of persons met); 2. Undertook a systematic analysis of relevant documents and policy papers (see annex 3 for documents reviewed); 3. Liased regularly with the National Poverty Reduction Unit; and 4. Visited Byumba (Zoko), Kigali Ngali (Mayange and Ntarama), Gisenyi (Mubuga) and Ruhengeri (Kinigi) where villagers and local authorities were interviewed. Task Force Approach In line with the terms of reference (see annex 1), the approach of the task force has been based on the principle of not only taking stock of the critical unmet needs created by the past and present conflicts, but also the potential risks they pose to peace building. The point of departure of the task force has therefore been the importance of the promotion of positive or sustainable peace in a conflict-affected country like Rwanda. This entails more than the absence of violence; it is the presence of social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial enforcement of law1. It involves establishing social equality and justice, economic equity, ecological balance; protecting citizens from attack, meeting basic human needs and the creation of sustainable livelihoods. It also includes establishing a civil peace that provides the constitutional and legal means necessary to settle differences non-violently and eliminating indirect violence which shortens the life span of people, sustains unequal life chances, or reduces quality of life for any citizen. To understand the linkages between human settlement and land, and sustainable peace, the task force developed a matrix that consisted of analysing the policies, progress and unmet needs of human settlement and land in relation to: 1. security, cohabitation and reconciliation (including demobilisation and refugee flows); 2. poverty reduction (including basic services, human development aspects and economic growth); and 3. decentralisation, participation and empowerment.
See, for instance, Johan Galtung's editorial "to the Journal of Peace Research 1(1): pp. 1-4.; and Mendlovitz's On the Creation of a Just World Order.
This has allowed the team to explore the issues of human settlement and land in the broader Rwandan social, political and economic context. Structure of the Report The purpose of the following report is to provide a background for the Brookings Workshop on Human Settlement and Land. Chapter two discusses human settlement, focusing on the response to human settlement and the unmet needs. Chapter three covers land issues including initiatives taken and remaining challenges. Chapter four analyses aid management to date and government-donor relations. Chapter five provides the recommendations on the way forward.
Human Settlement
The most visible conflict-related after-effects of the genocide and war are the issues of human resettlement and reintegration. The immense challenges faced by Rwanda in this area stem from: An estimated 800,000 "old caseload" refugees who left in the years 1959 to 1973 and returned in 1994 but had no claims to land of their own (Arusha Peace Accords); One million Rwandans who were internally displaced during 1994; 1.4 million refugees that returned, most in a matter of weeks from Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi in 1996-97; Over 600,000 Rwandans who were displaced between mid-1997 and mid-1998 as a result of the increased insurgency activity in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in 1997. Half of them were returnees from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
This chapter analyses how human settlement has been addressed in the "emergency" and "postemergency" phases. It discusses how the government policies and actions with regard to resettlement have evolved and provides an overview of the outstanding needs and pending challenges.
1995-1998 Response to Shelter Needs

Up until 1998, the international response to the shelter needs in Rwanda was impressive. With UNHCR at the forefront followed by WFP, the resettlement and reintegration efforts in Rwanda have been enormous UNHCR project expenditure in Rwanda from 1994 to 1999 amounted to nearly $184 million, while from 1995 to 1998, the World Food Programme disbursed over $122 million. UNHCR's re-integration efforts were more wide-ranging than ever before and grounded in the concept of sustainable repatriation meaning avoidance of conflict that could result in population re-displacements by creating conditions conducive to a durable homecoming. Thus, reintegration included reconstruction of schools, health centres, water systems along with training and capacity-building required to make these institutions function. The largest bilateral donors who supported housing construction either directly or through UNHCR or the UNDP Trust Fund were the Dutch, Japanese, German, British, Belgian, French and Swedish governments. A co-ordination unit (Co-ordination Unit of Resettlement Activities UCAR2) manned by 18 staff was established within MINITERE and funded by the UNDP Trust Fund. National and
When Rwanda moved into the development phase, funds were no longer available for this office. As a result, functions such as gathering and analysing statistics related human settlement and reintegration were no longer undertaken by MINITERE.
international NGOs provided technical support in housing construction. By 1999, a total of 177,000 houses had been built. Imidugudu - Rwanda's Villagisation Policy As the resettlement programme gained speed, the GoR launched its new human settlement policy in December 1996. This new policy, called "imidugudu", called for houses to be constructed in settlement sites as opposed to being dispersed on hillsides in the way Rwandans have traditionally lived. The point of departure for this policy was the Arusha Accords of 1993, which stipulated that returnees to Rwanda who had been in exile for more than 10 years would be settled in grouped villages. However, the Arusha Accord did not, of course, foresee the genocide, the war, the massive exodus in 1994 and the destruction of an estimated 40% of houses in rural Rwanda3. Not only did the Government extend the concept to include all returnees lacking shelter, its vision encompassed the entire Rwandan population:
The ultimate objective of the government is to enable the entire rural population to live in grouped settlements (MINITERE, 1999).
The rationale for imidugudu is multiple: With the population in villages, as opposed to scattered around the country-side, access to basic services, such as health care, education, water and sanitation, could be improved and provided in a more cost-effective way. Furthermore, roads and communication networks could be more easily provided which would support market access and possibly off-farm income generating activity. Imidugudu could allow for a more rational distribution of land and thereby enhance productivity levels. Furthermore, by settling people in clusters, markets could develop, as well as agro-industries and off-farm incomes. With this line of reasoning, the imidugudu policy could boost economic growth in rural Rwanda and thereby play a significant role in alleviating poverty. Imidugudu could assist in reconciliation and reintegration efforts by ensuring mixed settlements. Grouped settlements could enhance security - not only was the concept of living close together for mutual support attractive to genocide survivors and old caseload refugees, with the rise in insurgency during 1997-98 in the Northwest, grouped settlements were seen as both a way of protecting the population from insurgents and at the same time, depriving the infiltrators of hideouts and covert support. With the urgent need for shelter, grouped settlements offered a practical solution, particularly for the old caseload returnees. Mobilising rural populations for meetings would be easier and thereby civil society participation would be enhanced. Some members of the aid community saw the potential of imidugudu to radically alter Rwandan society as an advantage given that the organisation and economic conditions in Rwanda prior to the war had resulted in genocide. In the continuation of pre-war problems, they saw "a foreboding of renewed violence and therefore considered radical change imperative".4
Jones, Lisa (2000), "The Evolution of Property Rights in Rwanda". Refugee Survey Quarterly 19(3): p.131. Dorethea Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen (2000), "Emergency and Development: the Case of Imidugudu, Villagisation in Rwanda." Journal of Refugee Studies 33(3).
4
According to the Thematic Consultation on Resettlement for Vulnerable Families, the underlying rationale for imidugudu seeks to address
some of the structural challenges of Rwandan rural economic and social organisation that had likewise been fundamentally altered by the war and massive displacement of so many people. (MINITERE, 2001).
Imidugudu differs from villagisation attempts in other African countries in three important ways. Firstly, imidugudu policy is being implemented in the aftermath of a devastating genocide, war and related population displacements. These events have created circumstances that, to some extent, constitute an opportunity for grouped settlements. Secondly, being old caseload returnees, a significant number of those who have been settled include people who have had no land. Thirdly, Rwandans are in most cases not being settled in uninhabited areas, as was usually the case when villagisation was undertaken in, for instance, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Rather, the resettlement is taking place in the already (heavily) populated rural areas. Implementing Imidugudu Implementing the imidugudu policy has been beset with problems. The urgency of meeting the housing needs of so many people in such a short amount of time created difficulties. The large number of national and international actors involved in housing construction combined with the weak institutional capacity of the new government to co-ordinate the shelter operations exacerbated the problems. Secondly, many of the imidugudu have been inadequately planned and some houses are regarded as substandard. Site selection was sometimes not done correctly from a social, economic and/or environmental perspective5 and some of the consequences have been disastrous. By 1999, the Government developed guidelines for planning new settlement sites. Criteria included close proximity to basic facilities and farmland and a conducive landscape for easy construction. Nevertheless, according to research conducted by the Rwandan Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD), the instructions with regard to site selection were, in the great majority of cases, not followed. Instead, the availability of land became the most important factor determining how sites were selected, which is hardly surprising given the high population density and the acute shortage of land. Thirdly, lack of local participation in the planning process resulted in a poor sense of ownership among communities. Some people considered the house they lived in to belong to the organisation that built it. Fourthly, community structures were sometimes not taken into account when populating the new villages some contained only widows, one social group or very vulnerable people. Fifthly, a survey conducted by the Government and the UN agencies pointed to the fact that distance from the fields is contributing to an alarming fall in food production in some areas. A sixth issue associated with the new settlement was the aid agencies' questioning of the extent to which people were given a choice to move into settlements. This is particularly true in the Northwest where the civil war-like situation gave a security edge to the implementation of the resettlement policy: on the one hand, settling people in imidugudu made it easier for the security forces to protect the population, and at the same time, it deprived the infiltrators of hideouts and covert support.6 Some were thus made to destroy their old homes but have in many cases not been provided with assistance to construct new ones. This is not to say that people of the Northwest are opposed to living in settlements. In fact, studies, surveys and
In some cases, flat and therefore often the most fertile land was chosen, forcing communities to use less fertile and environmentally more precarious hillsides for farming. 6 Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development, (1999), Survey on Land Use and Villagisation in Rwanda, p. 38.
interviews confirm that the vast majority of the Northwestern population today are in great favour of grouped settlement because of the security it offers. Although the GoR stands by its position that imidugudu has always been a voluntary process, it also acknowledges that in some parts of the country local authorities have been overly zealous in implementing the imidugudu in the period 1995 to 1999. Local authorities were, on the one hand, pressured by directives from Kigali, and on the other hand, faced with great reintegration demands within their locality. A study conducted by Wageningen University in the Netherlands in 1999 concluded that the top-down approach and compulsory nature of imidugudu could contribute to "long-term social tension". Last but far from least, the imidugudu have in many cases not been able to live up to the promise of improved basic services and income-generating opportunities. There are villages that are over 20 km away from health centres, schools and, most seriously, clean water. The Secretary General's Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Michel Moussalli, wrote in his report to the General Assembly that
...while some coercion probably had occurred, the larger problem was lack of services. Many settlers would happily take up the offer of a new house if proper services were assured in advance.7
Response to Human Settlement Since 1998

Despite the massive resettlement and reintegration efforts in Rwanda during 1995-1998, an estimated 281,000 families lived under plastic sheeting in 1999 - 73% of whom lived in the Northwestern prefectures. Secondly, some 66,000 families inhabited seriously damaged houses - 64% being in the prefectures of Byumba (34%), Cyangugu and Kibungo. Thirdly, 63,000 families, mainly old caseload returnees, were illegally occupying houses - more than half in Rwanda's urban areas. In addition, a few thousand were squatting in schools, health centres or living in makeshift huts in the Gishwati national forest after being forced to vacate other people's houses. In total, 370,000 households lived in what was considered "inadequate shelter". Nevertheless, Rwanda has enjoyed modest improvement of the shelter situation since 1998 as a result of government efforts, the recovering economy and the initiative of Rwandans themselves. The following sections discuss the situation of human settlement since 1998, including funding difficulties, progress made and remaining unmet needs. Weak International Response Since 1998, there has been little funding available for shelter issues. After years of emergency assistance, the GoR and donors shifted to deal with long-term development issues. When the emergency was phased out, many of the traditional humanitarian agencies withdrew from reintegration or of Rwanda altogether. Thus, as aid agencies and donors switched from humanitarian to development budget lines, no resources were available for shelter, which in Rwanda has been associated with the funding structures of humanitarian assistance. In theory, many of the residual "reintegration" needs, such as resettlement, capacity building, construction of schools, water, sanitation and clinics, fall well within the development sphere of activities. Yet development agencies in Rwanda have tended to avoid addressing human settlement issues.
United Nations (2000), "Situation of the Human Rights In Rwanda". General Assembly, Agenda Item 116 c. July, p. 6.
The fact that funding of resettlement needs has tapered off could be explained in two ways. On the one hand, the lack of response to the resettlement needs appears to be a traditional funding gap as a result of the institutional financing structures. Because human settlement has been associated with humanitarian budget lines, it cannot be funded since the humanitarian emergency has been declared over. For instance, at this stage in Rwanda's development, the European Commission's institutional set-up does not lend itself to bringing in ECHO, its humanitarian branch, back into the picture. Meanwhile, the aid agencies keenest to work with the government focus on the long-term perspective. Human settlement, ostensibly a shortterm problem, may not be encompassed in the long-term strategies of development co-operation agencies. Furthermore, shelter projects have many characteristics associated with humanitarian aid, which development agencies are inclined to steer clear of: the projects are of short duration, can be regarded as "non-sustainable" and directly address the need of individuals (or families) as opposed to communities. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the issue is not one of priority setting. A number of donors do have flexible funding systems - if priorities were different, donors could either reorient existing allocations or commit additional funds to address this problem. The reticence to prioritise human settlement may be a function of i) scepticism towards the imidugudu policy; ii) the anticipation of land reform; and/or iii) dissatisfaction with the military activities of the Rwandan army in Congo. The actual number of people in need of shelter has also been an issue of considerable debate between the donor community and the Government. This is discussed further in chapter 4. The insufficient response can also be traced to the institutional mandates within the UN system that clearly distinguishes mandates as relief or development-related. In Rwanda, the UN tried to pre-empt the problems related to the relief and development divide by establishing a consolidated institutional structure - the Joint Reintegration Programming Unit (JRPU) - that would ensure a smooth transition from emergency to development. However, apparently due to inadequate commitment from both sides, the JRPU did not have strong impact in terms of joint action and was closed down last year. With UNHCR having pulled out of reintegration, the JRPU having closed down and with UNDP not being able to take upon itself the task of resettling returnees, the institutional mandate to assist the authorities with resettlement has been somewhat unclear within the UN system. Progress in Human Settlement Despite the lack of aid flows for human settlement, the GoR has tried to address them. The GoR firmly believes that despite the initial shortcoming in implementing the imidugudu policy, it "represents the only feasible alternative to Rwanda's land-population equation for the foreseeable future"8. It also emphasises that:
Resettlement in the Rwandan context involves providing habitat for people who do not currently have suitable accommodation. It does not involve removing people from suitable homes, which they legally occupy. It is rather a voluntary process whereby people will move slowly into the newly established villages.9
Furthermore, as the situation has stabilised, Rwandans themselves have been able to improve their situation. Among the initiatives and improvements experienced in the area of human settlement are the following:
8 9
Thematic Consultation on Resettlement (2001), p. 1. Ibid.
1. The number of people illegally occupying other people's houses has dropped from 62,000 to a negligible number after a government decree was enforced in 1997 by setting a deadline for all squatters to relinquish the houses to their rightful owners. 2. The 800 families10 who were squatting in public building in the Northwestern provinces have been provided housing parcels and plots of land mainly by diminishing parts of the Gishwati forest reserve. This has been undertaken by the GoR with the support from UNDP, UNHCR, WFP and JICA. 3. Most of the 66,000 Rwandans living in seriously damaged houses have managed to find ways to repair the houses through their own means.
4. Local authorities and the Rwandan government have managed to allocate surveyed parcels of at least 20 by 30 meters using private surveyors, government staff, and the training people at the grassroots level. In all, 937 people were trained from all sectors (1 person/sector) in seven provinces. Faced with acute shelter needs in the Northwest, the GoR allocated the equivalent of one million US dollars of state resources in 1998-2000. For 2001-2002, another $900,000 have been allocated. The funds have been used for resettlement and reintegration of IDPs.
5.
6. As discussed further in chapter 4, a handful of donors have provided in recent years to the shelter situation and the sustainability of imidugudu. This has included support to resettlement of families evicted from the Gishwati nature reserve, housing for vulnerable groups, provision of social services and income-generating activities. 7. Authorities have also assisted people in other provinces by surveying and distributing housing plots. In some cases, Prefects (Kigali Ngali, Kibungo and Byumba) have distributed iron sheeting after villagers have prepared the foundation and built the walls of their houses. With some minimum support, most villagers support the self-help construction programme, be it their own houses or community infrastructure. This approach has been regarded as successful by MINITERE and provincial authorities alike. 8. The GoR and the local authorities have attempted to rectify some of the errors of the resettlement efforts during the emergency period. For instance, the authorities have encouraged mixing in villages that originally were inhabited by mainly one social group. With the assistance of the international community, the provision of services like schools, health centres and water are being undertaken by the GoR. The World Bank and ADB are financing the construction of schools. 9. The GoR has reviewed its approach to resettlement. Learning from past mistakes, the authorities aim to make the imidugudu process more participatory in terms of site selection and house construction. Past experiences in, for instance, Kibungo show that ownership and community sustainability are vastly improved when villagers themselves play an active role. 10. During the field visits, the task force was informed of some instances where local leaders were imprisoned or lost their post following the use of unjust means in the resettlement process.
10
OCHA, (2000), IDPS and other Affected Populations in Rwanda. September.
Unmet Needs
Despite the steady progress in recent years, a significant number of Rwandans do not have the means to improve their housing situation and continue to live under makeshift covers (see annex 8). A majority of villages have access to basic services. Furthermore, the effects of the past conflicts, such as demobilisation and repatriation flows, continue to have an impact on habitat and reintegration and will present a number of challenges in the months to come. The demand on the GoR to address the shelter issue is substantial, with frequent requests to the central and provincial level as well as to the President himself. Among the unmet needs are the acute need for adequate shelter for the vulnerable poor living under plastic sheeting or in makeshift huts; the sustainability of human settlements and the anticipated reintegration needs of ex-combatants, returnees and ex-prisoners. These issues are discussed in the following sections. Acute Shelter Needs
As many as 192,000 vulnerable families continue to live in sub-standard habitations, covered by old pieces of plastic sheeting or banana tree leaves. The table below illustrates the latest data compiled by MINITERE, with the assistance of Swiss funds as a way of supporting the Brookings process in Rwanda.
Table 1: Number of Extremely Poor Shelters by Province, October 2001.11

Province Butare Byumba Cyangugu Gitarama Gikongoro Kibungo Kigali Ngali Kigali Ruhengeri Gisenyi Umutara Kibuye Total Number of households living under plastic sheeting/blinds
1,624 10,075 4,202 3,532 2,729 30,541 1,025 8,90212 73,462 34,503 14,381 5,690 191,844
In the 1999 survey, the number of vulnerable families living under plastic sheeting, in damaged houses or were illegally occupied other peoples houses amounted to 370,000. This figure has decreased by almost 50% for the following reasons: 1. Some families have managed to construct their own homes. 2. Some NGOs, UNDP and the European Union have continued to support some shelter programmes.
11 12
For information on the methodology used, please see annex 4. These families do not live under plastic sheets/blinds. They share houses, assisted by friends.
3. During the assessment conducted in October 2001, the surveyors were instructed to identify those who are in extreme need of shelter. It should be noted that there are some families living in grass-thatched huts not because they are poor but because of illiteracy/ignorance in Umutara, some households live in blinds but have 200 heads of cattle. Therefore, not all families living in plastic sheeting and other makeshift structures were counted.
The families who do not have adequate shelter are among the poorest and most vulnerable in all Rwandan society. Many of them are female or child-headed households, which, according to the poverty study undertaken in Rwanda by the World Bank, have grown in size and depth of poverty. Some may be handicapped, sick and elderly. Others may be families that have lost traditional coping mechanisms as a result of the social upheaval caused by the war and genocide. They simply do not have the means and capacity to acquire the resources needed to improve their shelter situation. There is also some evidence that because of poor shelter and living conditions, some vulnerable families are moving from province to province in search of better livelihoods. This, of course, has implications for stability, and ultimately economic development. In absolute terms, the shelter conditions may not be worse than, for instance, in slums in other parts of the world. However, in comparison with the pre-war era, the habitat situation in areas such as the Northwest is, in overall terms, substantially worse. The feelings of indignity, bitterness and discontent that poor shelter is likely to provoke, can have important repercussions for stability and sustainable peace, taking into account Rwanda's past and recent history. This is particularly relevant in the Northwest considering (i) the relatively higher number of people living under plastic sheeting; (ii) the inequality between the Northwest and the other provinces that have received substantial housing assistance from the international community during the emergency period and (iii) the fact that the Northwest has traditionally had links with the old regime. It is plausible that communities may therefore perceive to be discriminated against. Adequate shelter is codified in international law as a basic human right (Habitat II). Not only is the failure to address the acute shelter issues in Rwanda an infringement on this right, it can constitute a risk in terms of sustainable peace in the long-term. Furthermore, poor habitat conditions are likely to have a negative impact on human and socio-economic development of the concerned vulnerable groups in the years to come. Thus, from a poverty reduction, human rights and sustainable peace perspective, it is imperative to provide a central part of the social safety net in the form of adequate shelter.
Box 1: Regional variations of shelter needs in Rwanda The habitat situation in Rwanda varies considerably from province to province. Northwest (Gisenyi and Ruhengeri): The situation differs from the rest of Rwanda in a number of ways: it is the most densely populated and most fertile area in Rwanda; it has been heavily affected by the insurgency activities and counter activities since 1997 and it was previously the stronghold of the former regime. The shelter needs are much greater in this part of the country. This is a result of the wide-scale destruction during the war and genocide in 1994 and the fact that the insecurity caused by the insurgency activities prevented shelter programmes (aside from distributing plastic sheeting) from being undertaken in 1995-1998. Furthermore, donors were reluctant to fund shelter activities in this region because of their perception of the security-driven regroupment as a result of the prevailing insecurity. Nearly 60% of households in acute need of shelter live in the Northwest. While Gisenyi has seen a drop in the number living under plastic sheeting, the assessment undertaken in 2001 sees a slight increase since 1999. Kibungo: The province received the largest number of old caseload returnees. In a measure to accommodate the arrivals and devise land redistribution systems, villagisation has been quite extensive in Kibungo. The province account for nearly 17% of those in acute need of shelter assistance. Umutara: This province was less populated than the areas of Rwanda before the genocide. This is partly because a large part of the province consisted of a national park. Furthermore, the RPA occupied the northern corner of this province before 1994. Many old caseload returnees have settled in Umutara there has been relatively more land available in this province and the flat and semi-arid landscape has been suitable for their livestock herds. Around 8% of the total caseload in need of acute shelter live in Umutara. Byumba: Destruction was considerable in this province. Not only was this the scene of many battles in 1994, fighting in 1990 and 1993 created over a million displaced people many of whom had not returned home before the genocide. About 5% of the vulnerable families in need of acute shelter assistance live in Byumba. Cyangugu, Kibuye, Gikongoro and Gitarama: These areas experienced the least amount of destruction. The four provinces combined hold 7% of the vulnerable Rwandan families in need of acute shelter assistance. Of the four, Kibuye has the largest number of families living under plastic sheeting or in blinds as a result of the particularly severe consequences of the genocide in the province and the relatively larger number of returning old caseload refugees. Meanwhile, Gitarama and Gikongoro have seen an increase by a few thousand of families living under plastic sheeting/in blinds since 1999. Butare and Kigali Ngali: While these provinces saw some destruction, perhaps the greatest challenge has been reintegration in view of the particularly extreme violence experienced in these provinces during the genocide.
Sustainability of Human Settlements Significant efforts are required to enhance the sustainability13 of human settlements in Rwanda: As mentioned in section 0, many imidugudu today lack adequate basic services. According to a UNDP survey from 1999, an estimated 50% of rural populations do not have reasonable access to water. The average distance from imidugudu to health facilities is 4-5 kilometres but it is not unusual that some
Sustainability here refers not only to socio-economic and environmental sustainability, it also includes the concept of sustainable or "positive" peace.
13
have to cover more than 30 kilometres for care. Likewise, although the average distance to primary school is 1 to 2 kilometres, some children walk up to 20 kilometres. However, even if there is a school building, there are sometimes no teachers or materials. Lack of income-generation opportunities and market access are of crucial importance if the imidugudu are to become economically viable and offer an alternative source of income to subsistence farming. This is particularly important for returnees who do not have land of their own. However, these aspects are extremely weak in most imidugudu. Social capital is an essential building block for long-term development but in Rwanda, it has suffered tremendously as a result of the fractures caused by the genocide and war. Imidugudu offer an important opportunity to enhance social capital by facilitating social and economic collaboration. Yet so far, few imidugudu dwellers have organised themselves into associations or co-operatives. Some imidugudu do not forge broader community cohesion due to their social structure. For instance, there are still villages mainly inhabited by the vulnerable poor widows, survivors of the genocide, the elderly and children. This segregation was noted in the recent NURC grassroots consultation as a negative factor affecting reconciliation. In fact, some NGOs fear that imidugudu risk becoming ghettos populated by vulnerable people. The commendable government efforts aimed at empowering local populations through decentralisation of administrative structure and funds, are being introduced in a country where decades of top-down governance systems have left behind a population unaccustomed to participating in political decisionmaking processes. Except for structures that benefited from assistance provided by aid agencies (World Bank, Dutch Co-operation, USAID and UNDP), capacities are very weak at the local level. Most villagers the Brookings mission met mentioned that local authorities were not active in their communities because they lacked the means. Some were not even aware of the existence of the Community Development Councils (CDCs)14. Considerable efforts are needed to strengthen the capacity of the CDCs and the communities' ability to participate in collective decision-making. Rwanda has seen dramatic environmental degradation since 1994. Resettlement itself has had a considerable environmental impact since little attention was generally given by agencies and the authorities during the construction of settlements in the emergency phase. Efforts are required to achieve balance in the ecosystems supporting the communities. Likewise, the sanitation in villages has not been given enough attention in the past. The vast majority of imidugudus do not have adequate latrines.
New Reintegration Challenges Although the reintegration requirements in the years to come will be of a smaller dimension than those seen in the years 1994-98, it will constitute a far more exigent challenge with regards to social peace. The reintegration of demobilised Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers and ex-FAR/Interahamwe, former prisoners and new returnees into Rwandan communities can potentially give rise to conflictual dynamics if considerable care is not taken.
CDCs have been established at the district, sector and cell levels and will play an important role in the conception, planning and management of human settlement programmes, according to the Thematic Consultations on Human Settlement for Vulnerable Families. A briefing paper on decentralisation is provided in Annex 7.
14
Returnees Rwanda no longer faces the dramatic population movements of "biblical" scale that it did during the mid1990s. However, effects of the past conflict continue to affect reintegration, settlement and land access. Firstly, the refugee flow from neighbouring countries continues. Last year, over 24,500 returnees arrived in Rwanda. This constituted the third largest repatriation figure in the world last year. UNHCR expects another 25,000 (of the estimated 130,000 refugees in neighbouring countries) in 2001. During the first seven months of 2001, around 2,000 Rwandans returned per month. Most of those who return are in a highly vulnerable state, having survived in the extremely isolated forests in war-torn Congo. Over 80% are women and children. Possibly because this caseload is comparatively small, though far from insignificant, assistance to reintegrate the returnees is considerably less forthcoming than in previous years. Furthermore, a greater number of the so-called old-caseload refugees are expected to return as a result of the recent "crackdowns" in Tanzania and Kenya, leading to the deportation of non-nationals. This includes Rwandans who were born in these countries in 1930s. UNHCR is concerned that the absence of assistance to new returnees might result in heightened tensions between returning populations and those previously reintegrated. Demobilisation
Adding to the reintegration context are the plans for demobilisation. The Rwandan war of 1990-1994 and the subsequent DRC wars of 1996-7 and 1998-to this day have caused both the swelling in the RPA and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. As the peace process progresses, a demobilisation programme is underway that is expected to address approximately 40,000 to 60,000 ex-combatants. All will need assistance to resume normal civilian life and sustenance. So far, more than 16,000 RPA soldiers have been demobilised in the first stage of the programme (1997-2001). However, the demobilisation has not been coupled with adequate reintegration programmes, which were either insufficiently implemented (RPA soldiers), or not even available (demobilised ex-FAR). The frustration of ex-soldiers is reflected in the NURCs latest round of
consultations, in which reference to ex-combatants inadequate shelter and reintegration assistance has surfaced. An underlying cause for the poor attention given to reintegration is the lack of funding available to the Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). This may be a result of donors scepticism with Rwandas involvement in the DRC.
Box 3: Rwanda's Demobilisation Plans: Currently, the RPAs demobilisation programme is managed by the Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and the negative forces demobilisation is handled by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). In the first stage of its programme (1997-2001), the RDRC demobilised 18,823 soldiers including 2,364 child-soldiers. In the second stage, scheduled to begin in the coming months, the RDRC plans to provide assistance to 40,000 ex-combatants who have returned to Rwanda. The total number of beneficiaries would thus amount to 60,000 ex-soldiers. In parallel to the RDRCs programme, the NURC has recently assisted with the demobilisation of 2,700 captured rebels through solidarity camps like Mudende and Nkumba, where re-education and re-orientation programmes are underway. For the second stage of the demobilisation programme, the Government is in the course of adopting the following guiding principles: 1. Balanced treatment of all ex-combatants, irrespective of previous affiliation. 2. Freedom of all ex-combatants to chose their community of settlement and path to economic reintegration. 3. All assistance to ex-combatants would be managed by the RDRC. The NURC would remain involved with the demobilisation of ex-ALIR but would follow agreedupon procedures. 4. Reintegration assistance would foster community participation. The donor community has been involved in the first stage of the RDRCs demobilisation programme and plans deeper involvement with the second stage pending progress with th L k P P
Ex-Prisoners A further factor that may potentially intensify the issue of human settlement is the release of some of the 115,000 prisoners as a result of the Gacaca process. The latter refers to the traditional court system that the GoR is reviving to speed up the justice process. The process is expected to try prisoners in the coming months. While some prisoners may be found innocent, others are expected to be released having already completed a prison term of seven years. It is believed that many ex-prisoners will have families with homes to return to. However, considering the dramatic events and the many years that have passed, this cannot be assumed to be the situation of most prisoners. In any case, whether they have access to some form of shelter or not, ensuring reintegration that promotes sustainable peace and coexistence will be a challenge.
Conclusion
Since human settlement is an important determinant of how society interacts, it constitutes a vital function of sustainable peace. It also has important ramifications on the establishment of lasting governance structures at the cell, district, provincial and national levels and consequently on the economic growth and long-term development of the country. Even though the extensive resettlement efforts in the 1990s have solved a significant part of the shelter problem resulting from the conflict, it has also given rise to others: with basic services to many new settlements being far from adequate, the aim of sustainable repatriation has not been achieved. Without addressing the reintegration problem, social tensions can only increase as time passes. Likewise, even in addressing the problem - tensions can grow if solutions are not perceived as equitable. Therefore, human settlement poses an important risk to peace building. To promote sustainable peace, human settlement issues - such as shelter, access to basic services and sufficient means to make a livelihood in imidugudu - and reintegration issues need to be addressed in an integrated way. This would call for a sustainable community approach that takes into consideration
social capital, reconciliation, empowerment, basic services and physical infrastructure. The decentralised structure offers an excellent opportunity for such an approach. With the local structures involved in identifying needs and prioritising them, shelter, basic services, income-generation activities, reintegration and other needs can potentially be addressed in an effective manner in line with community demand. This approach would however require sensitisation and social mobilisation at the community level as well as consistent monitoring to ensure inclusiveness and effectiveness. Likewise, linkages between the central and local structures need to be assured as well as improved interaction among the line ministries at the central level.
Land
Land is regarded as the most important asset for most Rwandans and it is generally viewed that all Rwandans have the right to own and use land. Considering that Rwanda has the highest population density in Africa (303 people per square kilometre) and one of the highest population growth rates, this is a tall order. With a population of 8 million, the average size of a family plot is 0.6 hectares15. Excessive partitioning of agricultural plots among family members is considered a serious problem for economic sustainability. By 2020, the population is projected to rise to 16 million, which in theory reduces the already tiny plot sizes by half. As villagisation progresses in Rwanda, a new rural landscape is emerging in which dwelling and farming areas are separated. Given the fact that over 90% of Rwanda's population are involved in subsistence agriculture, land and settlement are nevertheless intrinsically connected and need to be addressed in an integrated manner. The significance of the land tenure issues for durable peace cannot be over-emphasised. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission's grassroots consultations in 2000-2001 underscore this position the report claims that it was generally agreed that "most of the killings during 1994 were done with a promise of getting the victims' property - a promise for a better livelihood." At the same time, the latest round of NURC consultations reveal that communities consider land-related problems the most serious by far. A workshop organised by the Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD) observed that imidugudu-related land disputes - arising from previous landowners and the occupants of the new settlements, between leaders and communities and among communities - might be exacerbating social conflict in some areas.16 Customary law has governed land issues, but has been unable to deal adequately with the current situation in which the population movements following the genocide have led to a number of new cases of insecurity of land tenure. This includes conflicts over existing plots after population displacement, the temporary nature of new land allocations involving returnees and the halting of previous projects that aimed at allocating communal marshland to the population. Some land "grabbing" has allegedly taken place. This chapter covers initiatives undertaken and outstanding challenges related to land issues in Rwanda.
Draft National Land Policy, July 2001. FAO's recommended minimum size of an economically viable cultivation plot is 0.9 ha. 16 UN Common Country Assessment for Rwanda (1999-2000), "Resettlement and Reintegration", p. 11.
15
Land Related Initiatives

The Government of Rwanda and its partners have made considerable efforts to respond to the emergency needs affecting rural populations on the one hand, and to resolve the structural issues of land tenure on the other. Likewise, rural populations themselves and their leaders have found ad hoc solutions to land issues. At the same time, a number of important studies have been conducted by civil society organisations/institutions that provide the public and decision makers with information and analyses. These development are discussed in the following four sections. Local Land Solutions As discussed in the previous chapters, local authorities were, on the one hand. pressured by the needs of returnees in terms of ensuring shelter in imidugudu, dealing with illegal occupation, finding land for the landless and solving land disputes. On the other hand, the authorities were pressed by the GoR to hasten the process of settling people in villages. However, the Temporary Instruction on Housing issued in 1997 does not specify which lands should be used for the village sites17, the nature of the tenure, the procedures for implementation and what compensation would be provided. Nor have there been a land policy, land law or land use master plan in place to provide guidance. As a result, the local leaders and provincial authorities had to devise their own strategies to address the land needs.
Providing land for the old caseload returnees was particularly challenging. Virtually all land owned by those that left 1959-73 was subsequently occupied and the Arusha Accords discouraged those who left the country more than 10 years ago to reclaim their properties in the interest of social harmony and reconciliation. In provinces such as Kigali Ngali, there are committees at the communal level that are in charge of identifying and distributing available land to the landless. In some cases communal or abandoned land were given to this group. In Umutara and Gisenyi, significant slices of the national reserves (Akagera Park18 and Gishwati forest reserve) have been reclaimed to accommodate land requirements of returnees. In many cases, people are informed that the land distribution is a provisional measure pending the land bill. Sharing arrangements have also been undertaken in several provinces, with reasonable success. In what has been regarded as a participatory process, the majority of the population in Kibungo (the province that has received the most old caseload returnees) opted to share their land to avoid the real danger of renewed violence. Likewise, the Prefect of Ruhengeri claims that after sensitisation, 95% of the population have volunteered to share their land to accommodate newly repatriated persons19.
Establishing the imidugudu brought about another set of land issues. While villages were sometimes established on communal or abandoned land, quite often settlements were built on land belonging to individual citizens20. This has required organising compensation in the form of land parcels from the other village inhabitants. This solution has been quite problematic and is discussed in greater detail under section 0.
The Arusha Accords state that unoccupied land should be used. The Ministry of Lands produced a resettlement guide for village site identification, planning and housing and infrastructure construction. 18 The Akagera National Park is currently one third of its original size. 19 However, the RISD report from 1999 cites villagers in Ruhengeri who claim that "many unending disputes over land sharing and exchange was a result of moving from their previous places to the villages" (p.22). 20 The selection of village sites is usually the responsibility of ad hoc commissions at the provincial or district level with the support of a technician from MINITERE.
17
Draft Land Policy and Land Bill

An important development is the government's progress in the preparation of a draft national land policy and a land bill, which will be presented to the Cabinet in November. During recent months, the Government has been holding consultations on land at the grassroots level and with NGOs. Wider consultations may be undertaken if deemed necessary by the Cabinet. Within the not-so distant future, the law and policy are expected to eliminate the current legal ambivalence surrounding land issues. The overall goal of the national land policy and law is to elaborate a land system that provides land tenure security for Rwandans and sound management of national land resources for a harmonious and sustainable development. The draft land law, if accepted in its current form, for the first time permits private ownership of land on a wide scale21. Through granting ownership titles, land is given a market value and would allow to the farmers to have access to credit through collateral guaranty. Furthermore, by bringing together customary and written systems of law, it provides protection to land rights acquired under either system. More specifically, the new land policy has the following objectives: To promote an equal distribution and access to land, implying no discrimination against women; To guarantee security of land tenure in order to encourage investments in land development; To orient land management towards the necessities of profitability and sustainable exploitation; To strictly monitor land management systems in order to avoid speculation and abusive exploitation; To encourage the participation of the population in the management of land.
Meanwhile, the content of the draft land bill can be summarised as follows: Land lease for minimum 3 years and maximum 99 years; People with customary holdings under 2 hectares, and those with customary holdings between 2 and 30 hectares where the owner has a project and a development plan, will be recognised as owners; The land market will be free (although fragmented plots under 1 hectare will not be tradable); Land management will be placed under the responsibility of a district land commission in which all the local partners will be represented. It will be responsible for registering lands and providing a certificate of title; Detailed provisions are made to expropriate land if its owners fail to exploit it properly or leave it idle for long periods; A tax will be imposed on holders of a land title.
The impact of the draft land bill on the imidugudu policy will be that, in the first place, article 17 of the draft bill provides for land to be earmarked for imidugudu sites. Secondly, since land will be given its real value and by ensuring secure tenure, this will in general improve land management and therefore enhance economic development. Thirdly, by legalizing the land ownership of the people, future land disputes will be avoided.
Provisions have been made to hinder families with small plots from selling their land to avoid a situation where poor families sell what constitutes their livelihood for short-term gains.
21
Master Plan of Land Use

In December 2000, a preliminary study on a master plan of land use was done by a consultant, funded by the European Union. The goal of this study was to provide a national strategic framework for agricultural development and food security based on profitable and sustainable use of land and land management. If present trends continue, only 67% of food needs will be covered by 2010 and 425,000 households will find themselves without revenue from land exploitation. This situation could be improved with diversification of agriculture, a valuation of the best land, and the development of livestock farming. The master plan of land use has been devised as a countrywide planning tool for this process. At the provincial level, the plan will provide guidance for decision-making to farmers and local leaders in view of helping in the planning of development and equipment to be put in place to facilitate the exploitation of resources. Meanwhile, at the local level, the plan will take into consideration the land allocation and management practices and experiences that have developed over the years. The Master Plan constitutes a strong methodological support for future development interventions in Rwanda. It also gives the meaning, pertinence, and consistency to the decentralisation policy currently implemented by the Government. The most important aspect to be highlighted in this development planning process is its highly participatory and decentralised nature. The master plan will be put in place over a period of thirty months by a national team led by MINITERE, which will be backed by committees at the national, regional and local levels. The cell level will collect and analyse data for information sharing and follow-up.
Studies and Consultations

Land issues in Rwanda have also seen progress through the number of studies and consultations that have/are being been undertaken. A common goal of these endeavours has been to make data and analyses available that can assist the authorities at all levels to make informed legal and policy decisions in the area of land. Some of the more important initiatives are discussed below. 1. From April to July 1999, the Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD) in partnership with OXFAM conducted a survey on land use and villagisation. Using data collected in Butare, Gikongoro, Ruhengeri and Kigali Ngali, the survey constitutes an important source of information regarding the problematic land issues communities face and recommendations from these communities on how these issues should be addressed by the GoR. The Rwanda NGO umbrella organisation, CCOAIB, conducted a study from November 2000 entitled: "Problmatique du rgime foncier au Rwanda: Contexte et perspectives, relations avec l'habitat regroup". In as far as this coalition of NGOs expresses the opinion of the civil society, the CCOAIB study reflects a great similarity of views between the civil society and the Government with regard to land policy choices. The research programme underway at the Centre for Conflict Management of the National University of Rwanda (NUR) focuses on the economic and social factors of the Rwandan conflict. A significant part of the research aims at analysing changes within the Rwandan land system over the years in order to anticipate the potential conflicts that may arise from the implementation of the new land policy. It hopes to make recommendations on the optimal exploitation of land from a conflict prevention perspective and to demystify the ethnic dimension of land tenure issues by demonstrating the commonality of issues that communities face. Over a period of several months, the centre aims to study a half a dozen communities and their relationship to the land they cultivate. Some of the questions the study will address include the following: What type of land rights do the members of the communities have and what are the contents of these rights? What is the process of acquiring land rights like? How has land been redistributed since 1994 and how has compensation been administered? How have changes in the communities' land tenure affected the balance of power and the status of community members and their relations? Where is the centre of decision-making within the community in relation to land issues? How have decisions been taken and what have been the norms used? What have been its strengths and weaknesses? How is production affected by co-ownership or renting of land? To what extent do gender roles affect production given that women tend to cultivate while men take decisions on production? 4. In August 2000, the Rwanda chapter of LandNet was established. This is a sub-Saharan initiative involving NGOs and governments with the aim to network on issues related to land. In Rwanda, LandNet members have taken the initiative to use their respective local networks in the provinces to hold consultations on land issues and potential areas of conflict. The aim is to contribute to a positive dialogue between the GoR and non-governmental actors on land policy issues. Its principal activity is to gather information and identify areas of conflict arising from land. This
2.
3.
information is then used to lobby both the Government and non-governmental agents to address and constructively resolve land issues, yielding both social legitimacy and more appropriate interventions. 5. In its efforts to finalise the land policy, the GoR appears to be genuinely committed to engaging stakeholders in the land policy discussion, including gathering views from communities. In November 2000, the Ministry of Lands, Human Resettlement and Environmental Protection held a workshop to discuss the Rwandan Draft Land Policy. Around 150 participants representing a range of relevant stakeholders attended and actively engaged in open discussions. Among the key issues covered were the right of access to land for all Rwandans; the need to secure tenure to stimulate maximum development of land and sustainable management and rational land use as a precondition for the right of land. It also discussed the need for maps, an appropriate cadastral system, a legal and institutional framework as well as the need to develop a market for land and property. Key recommendations formulated during the seminar included proceeding step by step by first issuing land use titles to every person currently exploiting a land. In a subsequent step, the land use title would be transformed into a land ownership title with regard to traditional rights and/or written rights currently held by the land user. Secondly, the workshop recommended grassroots consultations on the land policy. These are currently being undertaken across the country. The results of this process are expected to be ready by December 2001.
Challenges
Despite the initiatives taken, Rwanda faces enormous land challenges. Today and even more so in the future, demographics are an underlying problem. The population pressure on the land is tremendous, particularly as over 90% of the population rely on subsistence farming for a living. The projected doubling of the population in less than 20 years hardly permits a gradual change of Rwanda's socioeconomic structure. The Land Policy and Land Bill face not only the challenge of responding to the needs of agricultural development and land use planning, but also fair and transparent land ownership rights -the ultimate goal being reconciliation and the promotion of sustainable peace. Below are some of the key challenges that potentially have an indirect or direct affect on the progress of achieving sustainable peace. Land Distribution With no land law or interim policy guidance, local authorities have had few instruments at their disposal to deal with land issues. Therefore, different systems and norms have been used throughout the country. Authorities and farmers express concern over the security of the land distribution action since 1994, which in most cases lack a legal foundation. Meanwhile, organisations have questioned the extent to which the local decisions have respected human rights. As mentioned in section 0, the human settlement policy does not clearly define who is responsible for taking decisions on site selection or clarify the modalities for taking the decisions but the Resettlement Guide in Kinyarwanda takes care of this. As a result, implementation varies from district to district, "largely depending on the personality or experience of the local officials, the means at their disposal and the presence or activities of the international aid agencies in their area.22
According to the Arusha Accords, the GoR is obliged to distribute land for the old caseload returnees. Not only is this difficult given the scarcity of available land, there are also no local master plans to help authorities identify land distribution and management strategies in their areas.
In sites visited by the Brookings task force, land sharing between the current owners and the newly repatriated people was one way of solving land for some of the old caseload returnees. Others were also
22
Jones (2000), p. 140.
settled on the land belonging to the Government. However, both groups live in utmost legal insecurity. Furthermore, there still is a significant number of old caseload returnees without land of their own and who must rely on sharecropping arrangements. Villagisation has also created land distribution challenges. In the implementation of the imidugudu process, the Government decided that residents of the imidugudu, and not the state, would compensate owners whose land was used for site construction. There are allegedly a significant number of people who have yet to be compensated23. Those who have been compensated by the other villagers have often received what in sum amounts to less than what they originally had. RISD's survey report highlights the problems that stem from the land exchanges undertaken as part of the villagisation process:
First, in exchange one person with a sizeable piece of land has to exchange his/her land with at least four people. It becomes difficult to utilise the many far away pieces of land. Secondly, disputes arise in exchange of land, as a former landowner has to acquire land from people living in houses built on that land. In the exchange exercise, both parties can hardly agree on which land to exchange. At times, some beneficiaries have no land at all, which intensifies the land exchange dilemma. (pp. 18-19)
However, article 21 of the draft Land Bill provides for the process of putting together those small pieces of land. The system of land exchange system, which is generalised throughout the country, has in effect shifted attention away from what could be considered the GoR's responsibility to pay compensation. Land Disputes Land disputes are, according to the consultations on national unity and reconciliation, the greatest negative factor hindering sustainable peace. It is estimated that over 80% of cases coming before a prefect are concerned with land. Between the leaders and the population, conflicts arise over the distribution of village plots and , land redistribution operations. Within communities, conflicts stem from land exchange, inheritance and property violations. Another major conflict may arise, notwithstanding the articles of the Arusha Accords, between the 1959 refugees and the current occupants of the land but there are very few cases. All land operations carried out by local leaders should have been implemented subject to formal decisions and land arrangements secured through legal provisions. However, this has not been the case. Instead, leaders have had to make do with ad hoc solutions. In provinces such as Ruhengeri, the traditional council of elders, the Gacaca, has served as forum for land disputes. Meanwhile, in a fire fighting manner, the Minister of Lands and the senior officials at MINITERE are frequently called to the provinces to intervene in difficult disputes. The NURC grassroots consultations identify the speedy implementation of the land law as the most important way of addressing reconciliation. While the finalisation of the land policy and land bill will clarify land rights and thereby settle many outstanding land issues, it will not necessarily lessen the pressure on the authorities. Many Rwandans are today showing some understanding and accepting provisional land solutions for the time being. However, once the framework for land rights is defined, pressure on the authorities and the justice system may be substantial. Considerable capacity among the relevant national institutions will be required. The PRSP recognises this need by aiming to establish costeffective mechanisms for resolving land disputes at the local level.
23
See, for instance, RISD's 1999 "Survey Report on Land Use and Villagisation in Rwanda", p. 15.
Production and Sustainable Use

Agricultural production is a function of investment. Without security of land tenure, farming investments have not constituted a priority for many members of the rural population, which has resulted in under-productivity. In fact, the authorities have discouraged beneficiaries of provisional land distribution from investing in the land until land rights have been settled. In the meantime, many cultivators do not apply techniques, such as terracing and irrigation systems, that would make their farms more productive and sustainable. The fact that lack of secure tenure has affected economic or monetary value has also affected investments farmers are, for instance, not able to use their land as collateral for credit. At the same time, with the massive return of refugees since 1994, the pressure on land has increased. As a result, protected natural forestry resources, steep hills24 and other fragile soils have come under cultivation, most of the time without any anti-erosion management. By the end of the 1980s, the average losses of soil pursuant to erosion were 10.1 tonnes/ha/year for all the cultivated land of the region. Today, this is believed to have increased to up to 17 tonnes.25 Loss of wood resources has also been alarming - the reconstruction and resettlement process is taking a large toll. Land degradation in Rwanda as a result of unsustainable agricultural techniques has resulted in lower yields and poorer households in the last decade. It is important to consider that some 2,150 Rwandans have taken refuge in Tanzania in the last year, most of whom are allegedly fleeing from the drought and poverty in the Bugasera and Kigali Rural making them, to some extent, economic refugees. For the same reason, roughly 3,500 have become internally displaced in neighbouring prefectures. These population movements contribute to tensions in the region and could largely have been averted if more sustainable agriculture had been practised over the years. Therefore, sustainable land use is part and parcel of a durable solution to peace in Rwanda.
Low productivity is not only a function of poor investments and land degradation. A recurring problem in all the sites visited is the distance between the shelters and the farms. Several of those encountered by the Brookings task force walk up to two hours to reach their farms. Those whose farms have been taken for village sites and who have received compensation in the form of small, scattered plots have a particularly difficult time. The long distance to their fields was considered the main disadvantage of villagisation and deemed to have an impact on production. However, this is the case only for the first few pilot villages constructed in 1996, this situation has changed by identifying the village sites in the cellules and making the villages as small as 100-200 families instead of 400-500, therefore being closer to the fields.
Conclusion
The pending land law can potentially solve a number of problems related to land issues in Rwanda. Land distribution, security of tenure, sustainable land management and guidance regarding land disputes along with a host of other land issues less closely related to sustainable peace will be greatly assisted with the ratification of such a law. Ensuring a prompt ratification of the land law and policy is of course tempting, particularly with the strong demand for such from the provinces. On the other hand, haste can undermine the thoroughness of consultations with the grassroots and other stakeholders, resulting in a law and policy that are deficient, which in turn has implications for a smooth implementation. The Government has, however, shown genuine commitment to involving stakeholders in the land policy debate. Given the centrality of land issues in Rwanda's society, economy and, not least, its past conflicts, importance should be attached by all stakeholders to a continued open and participatory debate. Research and studies that enhance the knowledge and understanding of the linkages between land issues and conflict will be of great value for the pursuit of sustainable peace.
Cultivation on land exceeding 10 degrees of inclination amount to 58% of arable land in Rwanda; similarly, the cultivated land with an inclination exceeding 30 degrees cover 14% of arable soil. 25 Sida (2001), Rapid Assessment of the Agricultural Sector in Rwanda. June.
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Although the pressure is already great on the authorities with regards to settling land disputes, there is reason to believe that the ratification of the land law could entail the equivalent of the opening of flood gates in terms of the demand on the authorities and justice system. A large number of people are accepting provisional land solutions for the time being but may be less inclined to do so once the law is out. Devising cost-effective ways of settling disputes and enhancing the capacity of the relevant authorities to deal with land disputes would appear to be tasks to be embarked upon as soon as possible. Likewise, information and sensitisation campaigns for all levels of Rwandan society regarding the implications of the land law will be necessary. The creation of off-farm, income-generating activities will also reduce pressure on land and thus minimize land disputes.
Implementation Partnerships
This chapter focuses on past experiences, current and future prospects of aid management in Rwanda. An analysis of general aid management and donor-government relations is provided. This is followed by a section that discusses human settlement and land in relation to the dialogue between partners, the cooperation that has taken place and PRSP and UNDAF as frameworks for partnership. The assistance to Rwanda is commonly divided into two phases26. Rwanda's so-called "emergency" period is generally regarded as taking place from 1994 to 1998, although from 1997 to 1999, the Northwest remained in an emergency caused by the insurgency activity. Since 1998, the aid community and the Government have regarded the country in a position to engage in long-term development co-operation. In fact, as early as 1995, the Rwandan government called for development requirements to be given greater emphasis by funding agencies.
Aid Relationship to Date

In view of the genocide, special treatment of Rwanda, including providing adequate resources to cope with the legacy, has been recommended by the Carlsson Report to the Security Council and the Masire Report to the OAU Heads of State Summit27. In many respects, the extraordinary nature of the Rwandan crisis has resulted in a number of initiatives for improved partnerships, overall aid management and resource mobilisation. Firstly, aside from the enormous humanitarian response in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, funding to Rwanda has been considerable, representing 10% of the GNP, 50-60% of the government budget (excluding debt service) and about 80-90% of the development budget. Secondly, a number of special aid channels have been established for Rwanda. Immediately after the genocide, the (rather unsuccessful) Secretary General Trust Fund was put in place. Soon after, the UNDP Trust Fund was established, through which nearly $120 million have been channelled until 1998. In 1999,
However, the labelling of "emergency" and "long-term development" is often blurred and usually a reflection of funding mechanisms and agencies' interpretations of their mandates as opposed to needs. This also holds true for Rwanda - a considerable part of the emergency activities in 1994-1998 were not only life-saving initiatives but also consisted of muchneeded reintegration and reconstruction. These activities were labelled "emergency" mainly as a consequence of the fact that traditionally humanitarian actors (such as UNHCR and ECHO) played an instrumental role in meeting the needs during this period. 27 The circumstances surrounding the 1994 genocide in Rwanda were treated in the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (S/1999/1257) of December 1999 (the Carlsson Report), and the Report to the OAU of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events : Rwanda the Preventable Genocide of May 2000 (the Masire Report).
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the Multilateral Debt Trust Fund was created in view of the fact that 84% of Rwanda's external debt (the net present value of debt - exports ratio is 520%) is owed to multilateral institutions. Thirdly, a number of consultations and round table meetings have taken place. A characteristic of these meetings has been that donors have used these occasion to discuss a much wider agenda concerning the regional and security context. The lack of strategic partnerships and co-ordination has been a recurrent theme. The consultations include the following: 1. In January 1995, with the assistance of UNDP, the first post-genocide Round Table Conference (RTC) was organised. $586 million were pledged. 2. In July 1995, a RTC Mid-Term Review Meeting allowed the Government to further present its political and socio-economic agenda as well as review disbursement rates. 3. In November 1995, thematic consultations on repatriation, resettlement and social reinsertion were held. $130 million were pledged. 4. In June 1996, the Second Round Table Conference was organised. It further shifted attention away from emergency needs and towards recovery of the economy and rebuilding essential services. $617 million were pledged. 5. In June 1998, an ad hoc meeting was held in Stockholm to look specifically at the macroeconomics issues and external financing requirements and provided the Government with the opportunity to demonstrate its adherence to the IMF expanded structural adjustment facility indicating good progress on macro-economic reform. Some $247 million were pledged for budgetary support and an additional $27 million were raised for the Multilateral Debt Trust Fund that was established in connection with this meeting. 6. In February 1999, thematic consultations were held on food security, education and private sector development. 7. In July 1999, another ad hoc senior level meeting was organised, this time in London. The meeting was characterised by frank discussions during which the donor community questioned the Rwandan delegation over the Government's military engagement in DRC, military expenditures, social spending and villagisation. One outcome of the meeting was that UNDP was tasked to lead a working group to examine mechanisms of donor co-ordination and make recommendations. The members of the working group are UK, Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, the World Bank, IMF, EU and ADB. 8. In 1999, thematic consultations on human settlement were undertaken. As discussed in section 0, little came out of the process. 9. In November 2000, a Government of Rwanda and Development Partners Meeting was held. The meeting was seen as a follow-up of the London meeting. The aim was not to mobilise resources, but to brief the donor community on the I-PRSP process and the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, a three-year budget-planning tool to provide more transparent and coherent planning and efficient execution of public expenditure. Aid co-ordination was again discussed and it was suggested that the PRSP serve as the framework for all interventions by development partners. The above list suggests relatively fruitful high-level conferences both in Kigali and at headquarters level. Indeed, the Round Table Mechanism has received the political recognition of Rwanda by the international
community as well as allowed for resource mobilisation. The institutionalisation of the DonorGovernment Conference in Kigali, thanks to the second such held meeting in November 2001, demonstrates the Governments strong commitment and ownership of the development process, which is translating into strategic partnerships on the ground. A document, Guidelines for a Productive Aid Coordination Process in Rwanda, has been developed under the leadership of the GoR, which seeks to adopt best practices in this area based on sector-wide collaboration with the task force of donors (Netherlands, Sweden, UK, EU and World Bank) that was established after the London meeting to address coordination. The concept lead ministries and lead agencies take the lead by sector, which allows for better communication between donors, agencies and the GoRs institutions. This, in turn, will help in the implementation of the PRSP. Through its five-year UNDAF, the UN Agencies have also designed a common response to the PRSP. Likewise, the EU has organised monthly meetings to share information on its programmes. While it may be important that these meetings take place in an informal manner, the guidelines mentioned above will help in promoting real partnerships and productive aid co-ordination. Governmental institutions and donor agencies will now be able to collaborate on the development of robust sectoral strategies, derived from the PRSP, and find flexible financing modalities for sector-wide approaches. The capacity of the governments Central Projects and External Financing Bureau (CEPEX) will be reinforced to facilitate the handover of functions. The suggested aid co-ordination mechanism is based on the PRSP and the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, which are both instruments that have the potential of improving strategic partnerships.
Government-Donor Relations
Considering the risk that the human settlement and land access problems pose in terms of potential civil strife, the lack of response to these potential problems on the part of the international aid community appears puzzling. Part of the problem may be the relationship between donors and the Government, which at times has been characterised by distrust. While relations have improved considerably over the years, at the root of this problem is the lack of international action to impede the genocide and, subsequently, sustaining of elements of the former regime in refugee camps. The Government has also felt that donors have undertaken unfairly heavy scrutiny of its domestic and sub-regional political actions, which the Government interprets as intrusions into the domain of national security. When donors have subsequently withheld funding, the Government has faced a liquidity problem in the national budget, which has made meeting budgetary spending targets even more difficult. It is also felt that donors are inconsistent in their positions, calling for Rwandan ownership but often circumscribing that ownership through imposition of conditions. Meanwhile, donor agencies see the limited capacity of the Government as a major constraint to effective ownership and priority setting. The extent to which they are prepared to provide budgetary support is limited. However, the priority setting within the PRSP generally seems to ring true with all parties, giving it a significant convening role.
Partnerships Regarding Human Settlement and Land

This section focuses on implementation partnerships within the area of human settlement and land. An account of the course of the dialogue between the partners provided, followed by a description of the postemergency partnerships that have been undertaken related to land and human settlement. The last section discusses the development of frameworks for establishing implementation partnerships. The Dialogue The Government has engaged the international community in discussions about the land and settlement issues. As mentioned in section 0, a National Workshop on Land Policy took place in November 2000 and was considered a constructive exercise by the parties involved. Similarly, in 1999, the Thematic Consultation on Resettlement was undertaken and a steering committee composed of the Government, UN, donors, representatives from the NGO forum was used to foster a constructive dialogue on human settlement policy. However, the dialogue with the donors and NGOs more or less dried up during 2000. In connection with the proposed steering committee report in the consultations on resettlement, the donor community (Belgian, British, Canadian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Swedish and Swiss embassies/cooperation missions), the forum for international NGOs and the UN each prepared their own discussion notes to the Government regarding the imidugudu policy in the period December 1999 to January 2000. Some of the main components in the donors' note were: 1. A call for a clarification of the issues at stake namely, providing shelter, resettlement (moving people that already have shelter) and the concept of grouped settlement; 2. A questioning of the caseload of people in need of shelter; 3. The need for an elaboration of the strategy regarding popular participation in the process; 4. The impact of the villagisation process on agricultural productivity and suggesting a connection between the advanced villagisation in Kibungo and the current food shortages; 5. The need to incorporate lessons learnt from the implementation of the policy so far; 6. The questioning of the priority of shelter - donors felt that other issues were more pressing and the Rwandans should be responsible for constructing their own houses as has historically been the case. 7. A concern regarding the coherence of the policy with other relevant policy development, notably the land law. The donor community generally deemed it imprudent to address resettlement without resolving the fundamental issue of land tenure and land ownership. The donors stated that they were not willing to embark on the projects suggested by the Government until the points raised were dealt with. The Government countered with the following: 1. As a result of "broad consultations at all levels" the Government's imidugudu policy encourages grouped settlement patterns. It views resettlement as assisting people "currently without any permanent area of settlement to acquire one on a sustainable basis". Furthermore, "moving people with adequate shelter is not part of the envisaged 3-year plan of action. However, this is in line with the general policy of settling all Rwandese people.".
2. It confirmed that there were 370,000 "absolutely needy" families belonging to the vulnerable category within Rwandan society that needed urgent shelter. 3. Settling people with shelter is the core of any socio-economic development "it is difficult to imagine to empower a person with no shelter and any sustainable basis for livelihood, to actively participate in decisions concerning his own future and that of the community as a whole. 4. A rejection of the connection between famine in Kibungo and villagisation, citing the natural disasters as the cause and underlines that "agricultural production and environmental protection have been given due importance". 5. Indirectly the Government implies that lessons have been learnt through past mistakes and therefore "the principle of the participation of the population in all phases is the primordial one". 6. The fact that the Government was preparing both the imidugudu policy and the land law entailed that contradictions were not foreseen. The commentary prepared by the NGO Thematic Group on Settlement and Land Issues forwarded to the Government echoed many of the concerns raised by the donor discussion note. It also: 1. Expressed concern of the "over-ambitious" time frame and recommended a phased approach to ensure that full participation is not "sacrificed". 2. Called for a clarification on the strategy to make existing imidugudu more sustainable and viable entities. 3. Stated the opinion that the Resettlement Policy "should not be finalised without referral to the Land Policy". 4. Noted that experiences in other countries show that resettlement and "other social engineering to have a negative effect on agricultural productivity". It therefore called for an analysis of the "viability of resettlement with regard to agricultural productivity" and that plans are made to "monitor and assess the impact of resettlement on agricultural productivity, preferably before the projects proposed are implemented". In January 2000, the UN agencies forwarded the UN position on Imidugudu entitled "Common Framework for Assistance in the Context of the Imidugudu Policy". It recommended the following: 1. In-depth discussions on the sustainability of the imidugudu policy; 2. A thorough review of the surveys and academic studies undertaken on imidugudu; 3. A further elaboration on the participatory approach and the chronology of relevant legislation; 4. A clear distinction between shelter for the homeless, rehabilitating damaged shelter and re-locating people who already have shelter and have to abandon it and a corresponding prioritisation of action required. The UN also stated its commitment to support the Government to provide "long-term sustainable and consensual solutions to the issue of sustainable resettlement of displaced populations in Rwanda."
Since the dialogue between the partners on imidugudu made little progress during 2000, the Brookings Process thus offered an opportunity to revisit and re-address the relevant issues. In the meantime, the Government elaborated and improved the document " Thematic Consultations on Human Settlement for Vulnerable Families" the latest draft is dated July 2001. Partnerships In the last three years, donor support in the area of human settlement, particularly to shelter construction, has declined. However, some donors, especially bilaterals, have continued to work in that sector. Examples include: 1. The Japanese Government, through the UNDP Trust Fund, has donated $1,050,000 to resettle about 3,500 families in Gisenyi province, and $2,300,000 for infrastructure development in Kigali city to resettle mostly the urban poor. 2. The Netherlands and Japan, through the UNDP Trust Fund, donated $800,000 to resettle populations evicted from the Gishwati national forest. 3. The Government of Canada, through CIDA, has donated 10,000,000 Canadian dollars for sustainable community projects which include shelter construction, basic services provision, income-generation activities, etc. 4. The Government of France, through the French-Rwanda Cooperation, donated FF15,000,000 to construct about 1,150 houses for vulnerable families in Kibungo and Gikongoro. The project has other components like school construction, water supply, social recreation centres, and income-generating activities. 5. The Netherlands and Japan, through UNDP and the Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs, donated $3,088,659 to support housing for widows and womens economic empowerment in Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Kibuye, Umutara, Byumba, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Kigali city. Project components include housing construction for widows, credit scheme for women associations, support to orphans in schools and surveying of plots. 6. The Master Plan for Land Use was funded by the European Union, which donated 57,000 Euros for the preliminary study. It donated approximately $3.5 million for the project, which has the objective of providing a national strategic framework for agricultural development and food security based on profitable and sustainable use of land and land management. PRSP and UNDAF Both the PRSP and UNDAF offer important frameworks for enhancing dialogue, aid management and implementation partnerships. The interim PRSP was prepared in late 2000. The final PRSP was presented in November 2001 to the donor community. The specific actions foreseen by the Government in the area of land include: 1. Information dissemination about the land policy and law once they have been adopted to ensure that Rwandans are aware of their rights; 2. The development of a cost-effective and participatory system to allocate formal ownership tights;
3. Establishment of cost-effective mechanisms for resolving disputes at the local level. With regards to housing and resettlement, the PRSP calls for a distribution of roofing kits and construction of houses in line with the assessment results and project developed during the Brookings process. It also underlines the need for a community-based approach and the aim to integrate human settlement issues with sectoral strategies. Meanwhile, a core aspect of decentralisation is encouraging people to work together at a local level to overcome past divisions. Devolution will allow local governments to respond to local needs and can potentially increase the accountability of government. In particular, the decentralisation at the cellule level is expected to foster collective action and promote the development of community-led development projects. The UNDAF is expected to be finalised by the end of November 2001. In its strategic framework on transitional issues, the UN aims to ensure sustainable settlement and reintegration of affected populations. Among its objectives are28: 1. Institutional strengthening of the GoR in settlement activities and co-ordination; 2. Sustainable settlement of conflict-affected families that remain without adequate shelter;
3. Existing imidugudu rendered sustainable; 4. Restoration of environment in areas damaged by the settlement process; 5. Strengthened capacity of sectoral Community Development Committees to play a key role in the planning and development of settlement sites; 6. Reinforced peace-building and reconciliation efforts through settlement and reintegration programmes.
Conclusion
The extraordinary nature of Rwandan crisis has resulted in a number of initiatives for improved partnerships, overall aid management and resource mobilisation. This has included a number of special aid channels and high-level aid consultations. However, this has not yet translated itself into strategic partnerships on the ground. In particular, even though human settlement and land problems pose risks in terms of potential social unrest if not addressed, the strategic dialogue among partners and their response to these issues have been fairly limited. As discussed in chapter 2, the fact that funding of resettlement needs has tapered off could be explained by i) a traditional funding gap as a result of the institutional financing structures; ii) the relatively lower priority given to these issues by the individual donor agencies; and iii) the somewhat unclear institutional mandate within the UN system to assist the authorities with resettlement. The Brookings Initiative marks a willingness among the partners to explore ways of establishing strategic and operational partnerships to promote sustainable peace in Rwanda. At the same time, the PRSP process and the UNDAF provide important frameworks for enhancing dialogue and aid management at both the strategic and operational level. Therefore, the Rwandan aid community faces a unique opportunity to jointly embark upon an effort to address the residual effects of the conflict and prevent future social unrest.
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The list of strategies for achieving each objective can be found in the UNDAF document.
This will require transparent, active and participatory dialogue amongst the partners; effective coordination mechanisms; creative solutions and a solid commitment to the principles embodied in the concept of sustainable peace.
(XXX Please find out from Tore if a box including the strategies mentioned in the UNDAF can be included here)The Proposed Way Forward
The social fabric of Rwanda has been torn apart and infused with distrust, which has damaged its social capital - an essential building block for long-term development. Although the people of Rwanda are slowly making headway in strengthening unity and solidarity, all efforts aimed at improving the welfare of Rwandans crucially require a perspective of sustainable peace, particularly at the community level. As discussed in section 0, sustainable peace involves establishing social equality and justice, economic equity, ecological balance, protecting citizens from attack, and meeting basic human needs. However, merely promoting these aspects through assistance will not necessarily bring about peace.29 Efforts need to be accompanied by a sound assessment of the potential impact on conflict/peace. This would entail paying careful attention to avoid contributing to social tensions and at the same time promoting social cohesion. Based on the findings, the task force sees three main areas that warrant attention from a sustainable peace perspective. These are (i) immediate shelter needs; (ii) promoting community development that is sustainable from a peaceful co-existence/reconciliation, socio-economic and environmental point of view; (iii) support to broad-based consultations on land and building capacity for the implementation of the land law. All suggestions are in line with actions proposed in the PRSP, the Thematic Consultations on Resettlement of Vulnerable Groups and the objectives outlined in the CCA/UNDAF.
Immediate Shelter Assistance

Already in September 2001, the Brookings task force recommended the rapid assessment of immediate shelter needs for the people living under plastic sheeting or in makeshift shelters. As a result, during the month of October, the Government has mobilised 24 surveyors to assess families that have been (and are likely to remain) too vulnerable to construct even a minimal acceptable standard of housing. The assessment report is provided in Annex 4. As mentioned in this report, since 1999, the number of families in need of shelter has been reduced from 370,00 to 192,000. The data will improve planning at the central and local level and is expected to enhance the dialogue with partners at the Brookings Workshop scheduled for December. Following the assessment, a project to address this immediate shelter need is urgently required. The objective should be to provide adequate shelter as part of the social safety net to those vulnerable groups that still have not managed (through external assistance or self-help) to attain even a minimal acceptable standard of housing. MINITERE is working on integrating this project into the thematic consultation document covering resettlement for vulnerable families.
See, for instance, Peter Uvin's (1999) Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. New York, Kumarian Press.
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To the extent possible, this project should rely on community structures and locally available resources. This will enhance ownership, promote community action and reduce costs significantly30. Thus, while the data collected by the assessment will provide the scope of the acute need in each district, the actual identification of vulnerable households in need of shelter assistance should be undertaken through participatory community-based mechanisms. Likewise, community structures should be used to mobilise villagers to assist each other in the site preparation and the construction of the house walls. This will help to revive the traditional concept of neighbourhood solidarity and lead to peaceful coexistence. Once the basic house structures are ready, roofing kits, which are the most difficult materials for the villagers to obtain, will need to be supplied (for an estimated budget see annex 5). Procurement and distribution of the roofing kits would probably be most cost-effectively organised by MINITERE. In addition, two external doors and windows will be provided. Special assistance may be required for families that are too vulnerable to construct their own house or are not getting sufficient community assistance. The Brookings task force proposes that the GoR provides assistance to this group in form of transport while donors should be requested to fund the building materials. The above constitutes a short-term need that needs the immediate attention of the international community. The lack of shelter is a direct result of the conflict; the failure to address this problem could potentially lead to social unrest, the re-occurrence of violence and ultimately socio-economic development in the long term. Issues to be Considered in Relation to Immediate Shelter Assistance 1. Different types of partnerships for the immediate shelter assistance to vulnerable families, including already existing ones that could be built on, could be considered. Cost-effectiveness and a realistic time frame need to be taken into consideration. 2. Assistance needs could be integrated into existing or planned community-based or area-based projects. Other needs related to the promotion of sustainable peace could also be simultaneously addressed. 3. Mobilising communities and using community-based participation mechanisms should be done in the most effective way. Organisations that have experiences in the use of community mobilisation and participatory techniques could be identified. 4. A method to identify families that are too vulnerable to construct their own houses could be devised. Consideration should be given to both the selection process and to the criteria to be used in doing so.
Sustainable Community Approach

The other human settlement issues that are comparatively less acute, though no less important from a sustainable peace perspective, call for what the task force refers to as a sustainable community approach. Such an approach puts sustainable peace at the centre. It aims to bring partners together in a joint effort to promote sustainable peace by establishing implementation partnerships (both strategic and operational) that address human settlement issues in an integrated way, with strong community participation using different aid instruments. The sustainable community approach would serve as a common framework to address a range of human settlement issues that include:
During the emergency phase, the unit price usually exceeded $1000 because the construction was implemented by NGOs.
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Reintegration of returnees, ex-combatants and ex-prisoners - involving disarmament, reconciliation and trust-building measures; Provision of shelter (permanent houses) to vulnerable groups, as a social safety net and community development measure;31 Access to basic services, in particular safe drinking water, primary health and primary education; Sufficient means to make a livelihood in villages, in the form of inputs for increased on-farm productivity or off-farm income generation; Improved management of natural resources, both on farms and common land, aimed at halting environmental degradation; Conflict resolution, reconciliation and trust-building measures within the existing communities, with a particular focus on women's groups; and Empowerment of community structures and members, enhancing their capacity to efficiently interact with central and local government authorities.
Fundamental to the approach is a conscious effort to assess how assistance strategies can contribute positively to create social cohesion and avoid exacerbating tensions when addressing these issues. Another key element of the sustainable community approach is address a combination of needs simultaneously by prioritising them, choosing a multi-sectoral approach and by establishing synergies within the initiatives undertaken. For instance, Community management of water systems can at the same time promote social cohesion; Assistance to the community reintegration of demobilised combatants can be devised not only to support the individual, but can also contribute to the community as a whole. In particular, the skills of the demobilised combatants can be drawn upon for community-based, labour-intensive public works; and Income-generating activities can not only contribute to making villages more viable economic entities, but can also forge ties within communities. Common economic gains can enhance social capital and in turn promote reconciliation among groups.
Implementation Partnerships There are several ways to establish implementation partnerships between key actors in addressing human settlement needs within the framework of the sustainable community approach. To ensure effectiveness, these partnerships should be based on the comparative advantages of each actor. There are at least seven different types of key actors (central government, local government structures, multilateral development banks, UN agencies, bilateral agencies, international and local NGOs and community-based organisations) that enjoy different comparative advantages in relation to their:
The immediate shelter assistance could very easily be integrated as a dimension of the sustainable community approach. In fact, this may have advantages in terms of establishing synergies. However, because of the relative urgency of providing shelter assistance to the vulnerable groups, it has been kept separate in this report.
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1) competence and experience; 2) local knowledge and capacity to be present and active at the community level versus ability to benefit from economies of scale and thereby undertaken efforts at, for instance, a country-wide level; 3) ability to benefit from economies of scale and undertake efforts at a country-wide level; 4) available human and financial resources; and 5) aid instruments at their disposal (e.g. project support with specific objectives and a set time frame, or programme support based on overall goals that allows some flexibility to modify priorities and budget allocations to match the changing environment). Because of their experience and local knowledge, NGOs, community-based organisations and some UN agencies are likely to be particularly well-suited to establish partnerships that support reintegration, reconciliation, conflict resolution and empowerment at the community level. Some donors working in Rwanda have also acquired important local knowledge as a result of close collaboration with local authorities. On the other hand, with relatively larger financial resources, multilateral development banks, some UN agencies and bilateral donors often have particular strengths in relation to supporting basic services and infrastructure - assistance that can appropriately draw on economies of scale. A number of partnership combinations are therefore possible. The following section illustrates some examples of currently existing partnerships in Rwanda, several of which are coherent with the aims of the sustainable community approach. Bilateral or multilateral and local government structures: The EU, the Netherlands, World Bank and UNDP have already been channelling resources directly to the provincial and district level to support community-driven projects and programmes. It is estimated that about half the districts have benefited from this support which has strengthened the capacity of the respective administrative and grassroots structures. NGO, CBOs and local government structures: Partnerships between NGOs and local authorities and community-based organisations and associations can be an effective alternative. Oxfam Quebec has used this approach to make imidugudu more sustainable in Kigali Ngali and Byumba with the aim of fostering the emergence and consolidation of civil society. Priority setting of needs has been undertaken in collaboration with local officials and civil society representatives. The programme has included shelter construction, support to farming associations, building capacity of civil society organisations, environmental protection, micro-projects and the provision of community infrastructure such as a village hall and rainwater catchment systems for each household. As districts tap into the Community Development Fund, depending on what they aim to achieve, they have the opportunity of establishing partnerships with community-based organisations, NGOs, the provincial level or ministries. Bilateral, NGO, government, local government structures and CBOs: The Local Governance Initiative is a programme funded by USAID that also involves several types of partners MINALOC, the NGO Africare and CDCs and aims to engage the elected bodies and the communities in co-operative action in the interest of solving community needs for social and physical infrastructure. In the process, the programme aims to enhance the development of trust between the communities and the elected officials.
National Solidarity Fund In addition to project or programme assistance, another potential aid instrument would be a national solidarity fund modelled on the successful solidarity fund established in Tunisia to which the government, private citizens and the private sector contribute. This option is discussed in further detail in annex 6, which also includes a summary of the experience in Tunisia. This fund has been successful at stretching resources by having no administrative costs - personnel engaged in the fund are volunteers or are employees on loan from other government departments, as are the offices, vehicles and supplies needed to carry out the projects. Aside from the low overhead, the advantages of such a fund include full national ownership and the principle of solidarity it is based on, which helps rebuild trust between the various socio-economic groups of the population and has therefore the potential reconciliatory effect. There are already no less than five different funds in Rwanda. However, none of these funds have been particularly successful due i.a. to limited managerial efficiency. One alternative solution that has been already discussed between the Brookings task force, the Government (Presidents Office) and UNDP would be to merge these funds. Transparent governance and accounting procedures would be a prerequisite. Dialogue and Co-ordination An essential element of the sustainable community approach is effective dialogue and exchange of information. This should lead to collaborative and joint action, which would call for efficient coordination mechanisms. As stated in a discussion paper, The European Union's Political and Development Response to Rwanda,
Co-ordination is crucial in politically fragile countries, especially when security is an issue. Rwanda faces such a magnitude of needs that the only way to respond to them on time is through genuine coordination and even task division, sector by sector. In principle core responsibility for donor coordination should lie with the government itself, although many agencies hide behind government incapacity to take on such capacity. The absence of effective government co-ordination should not hamper donors' own co-ordinating initiatives32
The relevant institutional structure within the GoR with an overall co-ordination function is CEPEX. The PRSP constitutes an important mechanism for co-ordination, as does the UNDAF. The extent to which coordination should be formalised needs to be examined by the interested partners. Alternatively, the framework for a sustainable community approach could consist of a less formalised network structure. Co-ordination, communication and information between the central and local level also needs to be addressed within the context of supporting sustainable community development. At the central level, there is great concern over the lack of information sharing regarding projects under implementation and committed budgets. This becomes an even greater issue when the local governments can directly mobilise funds from external financial partners, through Community Development Funds, co-operatives or other CBOs. The lack of information sharing between the central and local level has consequences for budget planning at the central level and can hinder optimisation of district level allocations from the central budget. Decentralisation The decentralised structure offers an excellent entry point for the sustainable community approach. With the local structures involved in identifying needs and prioritising them, human settlement issues can
European Centre for Development Policy Management Discussion Paper No. 27 by Sophie da Cmara Santa Clara Gomes, p. 35.
32
potentially be addressed in an effective manner in line with community demand. At the district level, Community Development Committees have access to the Community Development Fund, which will consist of 10%33 of the government revenue and can be used to address human settlement needs. Likewise, the ubudehe programme, which aims to develop bottom-up budgeting and planning systems that articulate communities' needs, can potentially foster collective action in addressing pressing human settlement issues. In the process, a sense of local ownership of public programmes and a feeling of responsibility for the targets achieved can be attained through full involvement of the beneficiary groups in the planning process and project implementation. While empowering communities to develop themselves can be an effective way of addressing the poverty reduction challenges and overcoming the divisions that have been so destructive in the past, one needs to consider, however, that mistrust and a culture of fear has permeated Rwandan society for decades. Although decentralisation has so far shown promising results, it is important to be attentive to potential abuse of power and corruption at the local level that may end up contributing to social divisions and tension. The sustainable community approach therefore requires sensitisation and social mobilisation at the community level as well as consistent monitoring to ensure inclusiveness. Another critical aspect is the lack of capacity. Most CDC members were elected on the basis of trust and not competence and serve on a voluntary basis, resulting in significant variations in their ability to function effectively. Furthermore, a large number of CDCs do not even have basic office equipment such as chairs and tables. Recent project evaluations and the visits undertaken by the task force indicate that one of the weaknesses of the decentralised structure is that CDC members do not necessarily have a clear understanding of their role and responsibilities vis--vis the community. This is particularly true at the smallest administrative level, the cellule level. In some cases, the influence of the CDC chairman is so strong that truly participatory decision-making by community members is difficult to achieve. At the same time, experience so far points to the necessity of ensuring that the people themselves understand the importance of their participation in the community development process and the benefits they will have from it. Although focus will be on village communities, linkages between the central and decentralised structures need to be assured. Ministries are responsible in providing policy guidance and support to the decentralised structures. At the same time, line ministries need to ensure that issues related to sustainable community development are integrated in their sectoral strategies. At the same time, improved interaction among the line ministries at the central level is required. In this regard, there is a need to further support the Decentralisation Management Unit to play its co-ordination role at central and decentralised levels. Issues to be Considered in Relation to the Sustainable Community Approach With the promotion of sustainable peace being the point of departure, the Brookings task force is convinced that a common and integrated approach to human settlement needs, will most effectively lead to socio-economic development and poverty reduction among rural communities in Rwanda. However, the sustainable community approach should take into consideration a number of issues, including: 1. The structure of the sustainable community approach needs to be considered. A dynamic and efficient mechanism (or building on existing ones) that promotes effective dialogue, exchange of ideas, best practices and experiences could be envisaged.
33
Five percent in 2002, rising later.
2. The comparative advantages of our organisations could be capitalised on to ensure effective effort collaborative action. Coherence among the initiatives supporting sustainable community development could be undertaken to avoid overlap in activities. 3. Maximum output in terms of effective and synergetic initiatives at the community level should be considered. 4. Care should be taken in the selection of tools that are needed to, for instance, undertake conflict impact assessments. Inclusion could be monitored. Indicators that can help to monitor progress with regard to the promotion of sustainable peace could be chosen. 5. Existing initiatives and implementation partnerships could be examined to see how they could help in developing the sustainable community approach at both the strategic and operational level. Aid management experiences to date could be reviewed to ascertain how they could assist in developing this approach. 6. The approach should continue to cohere with the PRSP and UNDAF processes.
Land Issues
Consultations Given the centrality and sensitivity of land issues in Rwanda's society, economy and, not least, its past conflicts, importance should be attached by all stakeholders to a continued open, transparent and participatory debate. A regular mechanism for consultation on land policy issues between Government, its international partners and civil society should be considered. Knowledge Base Research and studies that enhance the knowledge and understanding of the linkages between land issues and conflict will be of great value for the continued land issues debate as well as the pursuit of sustainable peace. They should therefore be encouraged and supported. Capacity for Implementing the Land Law
Although the pressure on the authorities is already great with regards to settling land disputes, there is reason to believe that the ratification of the land law might open flood gates in terms of the demand it will exert upon the authorities and justice system. Although the contents of the draft land law indicate that the existing local solutions will be taken into account, a number of people that accept their land situation for the time being may be less inclined to do so once the law is out. By the time the Land Bill is passed, the GoR and its partners need to ensure that the capacity of national and local institutions is strengthened in relation to managing land-related issues and disputes so that over-burdened structures and delayed decisions do not contribute to potential conflict. Furthermore, there is a need to devise cost-effective ways of settling disputes and enhancing the capacity of the relevant institutions to deal with land disputes as soon as possible.
Furthermore, information campaigns and sensitisation for all levels of Rwandan society regarding the implications of the land law will be necessary. Civil society organisations, such as the media and community-based organisations, could play a constructive role in assisting the population to understand the new law, as well as capture concerns and disputes over the land at the grassroots level. Efforts to enhance the capacity for the implementation of the land law and devising cost-effective ways of settling disputes at the local level can conceivably be integrated into the sustainable, community approach discussed in section 5.2.
Issues to be Considered in Relation to Land 1. The mechanism for consultation on land issues needs to be carefully considered. One possibility is that such a consultation be undertaken within the framework of the PRSP. The mechanism could draw on and promote research and studies that enhance the understanding of the linkages between land issues and conflict. 2. The most strategic way of enhancing the capacity of institutions to implement the land law and policy should be considered. A method to identify the greatest needs in this regard could be created. The form(s) the support should take could be debated. The most effective way in which the support could respectively target the communal, provincial and central level could be reviewed. Consideration could be given to the most relevant types of implementation partnerships, assessing their respective advantages and limitations. 3. Rwanda's partners could contribute to the support of institutions responsible for settling property disputes, but consideration should be given to the extent of the need in this regard and to the most costeffective way in which to do so. Lessons could be drawn from the Gacaca experience thus far. The manner in which settling property disputes could be integrated in the overall sustainable community approach should be considered.
4.
Rwanda's partners could play a constructive role in supporting information and sensitisation campaigns regarding the land law and policy for all levels of Rwandan society. The comparative advantages of the partners in this regard could be assessed.
Conclusion
Using the promotion of sustainable peace as its point of departure, the Brookings Task Force is convinced that a common and integrated approach to human settlement needs will most effectively lead to socioeconomic development and poverty reduction amongst rural communities in Rwanda. Based on its findings, the Task Force recommends that attention be focused on three specific areas within a sustainable peace perspective, including: 1) immediate shelter needs 2) the promotion of community development that is sustainable from a peaceful coexistence/reconciliation, socio-economic and environmental point of view; and 3) support to broad-based consultations on land and building capacity for the implementation of the land law. In terms of addressing immediate shelter needs, the Brookings Task Force recommended an immediate rapid assessment of people living under plastic sheeting or in blinds by MINITERE, which was conducted in October and resulted in the figure of 192,000 families still being in need of shelter. A programme of assistance has been proposed by the Task Force to provide adequate shelter as a social safety net to these most vulnerable families. It should rely on community and self-help structures and locally available resources, thereby enhancing ownership, promoting community action and reducing costs. In addition, the Thematic Consultation on Resettlement document, which was prepared by the Government with the assistance of UNDP and the donors, indicates projects and could be used as a tool for resource mobilisation.
Nevertheless, other important human settlement issues also need to be addressed in an integrated manner through a sustainable community approach that focuses on all aspects and needs of a community and based on the principles of
participation, empowerment and ownership. Decentralisation offers an excellent opportunity and entry point for such an approach. With the local structures involved in identifying needs and prioritising them, shelter, basic services, incomegeneration activities, reintegration assistance and other needs can potentially be addressed in an effective manner in line with community demand. This approach would however require sensitisation and social mobilisation at the community level as well as consistent monitoring to ensure inclusiveness and a holistic approach.
Land and settlement also remain intrinsically connected and need to be addressed in an integrated manner as villagisation progresses in Rwanda. Given the complicated and delicate nature of land in Rwanda, the Government can only gain from a constructive dialogue with all partners and civil society on land policy issues. Likewise, research that enhances the understanding of the linkages between land issues and conflict will be of great value in the pursuit of sustainable peace. The land policy and land bill face not only the challenge of responding to the needs of agricultural development and land use planning, but also fair and transparent land ownership rights - the ultimate goal being reconciliation and the promotion of sustainable peace. However, the finalisation of the land policy and land bill will, in some respects, make the Government's and the justice system's task more difficult - while many Rwandans are showing some understanding and accepting provisional land solutions, once the framework for land rights is defined, pressure on the authorities may intensify. Considerable organisational and operational capacity among the relevant institutions will be required not least in the efforts to address land disputes. In addition, the legal framework that governs human settlement in Rwanda is the 1997 Ministerial Decree. Given the complexity of human settlement issues, it is imperative to accelerate the Housing Bill formulation process to ensure that it is taking place. By placing the sustainable peace approach at its centre, the Brookings Process hopes to help foster positive peace in Rwanda, a country still struggling with the long-term effects of conflict. Fundamental to this approach is a conscious effort to contribute positively to creating social cohesion. It also seeks to address a combination of needs simultaneously by embracing a multi-sectoral approach and establishing synergies within the initiatives undertaken. Undoubtedly, this approach will have wider ramifications on the countrys social, political and economic context with consequences for long-term peace and stability for Rwanda.
ANNEX 1 Terms of Reference
Donor Response to Conflict-Affected Countries: Implementation Partnerships in Rwanda TOR for the Task Force Second Draft, 3 September 2001 ____________________________________________________________________
Purpose
The background to and overall purpose of the Rwanda initiative are described in the Issues Paper, prepared by the Centre for Development Research and COWI for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2001. The aims of the continued Rwanda process are: 1. To explore ways to operationalise implementation partnerships in the framework of the PRSP to address conflict-related needs within human settlement and land access, and 2. To draw general lessons from experiences in Rwanda with regard to implementation partnerships aimed at responding to conflict-related needs and aid management in post-conflict situations. The specific aims of the task force are: 1. To extend the analyses of the Issues Paper and tailor them to a national workshop to take place in Rwanda, tentatively scheduled for June 2001. 2. To undertake preparations for the workshop and to support its implementation.
Tasks
In collaboration with partners in Rwanda (Government, civil society, donors and agencies), the task force shall: 1. Take stock of critical unmet needs with regard to human settlement and land issues and assess the potential risks they pose to building peace; 2. Establish an overview and analysis of current and planned programmes by donors in the areas of human settlement and land; 3. Establish an overview and analysis of aid management experiences so far in relation to human settlement; 4. Document the above findings and analyses in reports for the national workshop; 5. Prepare the agenda for the workshop and support its implementation, in collaboration with the UN Resident Co-ordinators office.
Task Force Qualifications and Composition

The task force shall be small, with 3-5 members. It shall be composed of Rwanda-based and international consultants, who have in-depth knowledge of conflict-related needs in Rwanda and are experienced in analyses of aid management and in the design and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance.
Timing and Resources

The task force will start its work, as soon as the partners have committed sufficient human and/or financial resources to ensure high-quality preparation and implementation of the two-day national workshop.
ANNEX 2 List of Persons Met
BROOKINGS TASK FORCE: List of Persons Met ____________________________________________________________________

Government Officials Ministry of Lands, Human Resettlement and Environmental Protection (MINITERE) Prof. Laurent Nkusi, Minister Ms. Patricia Hajabakiga, Secretary General Mr. Eugne Rurangwa, Director of Lands Ministry of Local Governance and Social Affairs (MINALOC) Dr. Odette Nyiramirimo, Minister of State for Social affairs Mr. Aimable Nibishaka, Secretary General a.i. Mr. Callixte Gatera, Decentralisation Management Unit Mr. Wellars Gasamagera, Prefect, Kigali Ngali Province Mr. Boniface Rucagu, Prefect, Ruhengeri Dr. Wilson Rutaganira, Executive Secretary, Ruhengeri Province Mr. Ngabo Amiel, Executive Secretary, Gisenyi Province Dr. Innocent Matabishi, Social Director, Gisenyi Province Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) Mr. Clestin Kabanda, Minister of State for Economic Planning Mr. Vincent Karega, National Poverty Reduction Programme Ms. Claudine Zaninka, National Poverty Reduction Programme Office of the President Mr. Sheikh Abdul Karim Harelimana, Chairman of the Joint Commission for Repatriation and Reintegration of Rwandan Refugees and Presidential Advisor Mr. Claver Gatete, Director of General Economic and Social Development Affairs Mr. Joseph Nsengimana, Special Advisor Commissions Mr. Gasana Ndoba, Head, Human Rights Commission Ms. Aloysia Inyumba, Executive Secretary, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission Donor Community British Embassy / DFID: Mr. Giles Bolton, First Secretary, and Dr. Kenneth Dick, Senior Natural Resources Advisor, and Mr. Jean Gakwaya, Programme Officer Canada: Mr. Jacques Lpine, Chief of the Office, Counselor and Consul European Union: Mr. Jeremy Lester, Head of Delegation Germany: Mr. Wolf Grundies, First Secretary Netherlands: Mr. Gerrit Noordam, First Secretary Sweden: Mrs. Ingrid Lofstromberg, Counsellor, Swedish Embassy (SIDA) Switzerland: Mr. Walter Luder, Counsellor and Coordinator a.i., Swiss Cooperation USAID: Dr. Heather W. Goldman, Regional Food Security Officer Civil Society Organisations / International NGOs Association de Recherche et dAppui en Amnagement du Territoire (ARAMET): Mr. Andr Maniraho, Executive Secretary
Association Rwandaise pour le Dveloppement Intgr (ARDI): Mr. Evariste Ntawuyirusha, Executive Secretary Conseil de Concertation des Organisations d'Appui aux Initiatives de Base (CCOAIB): Honorable Nkusi Juvnal, Dput International Rescue Committee (IRC): Ms. Lise Macbride, Country Director Lutheran World Federation (LWF): Ms. Anne Masterson, Country Director Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD): Ms. Annie Kayiraba, Director UN System Mr. Edward Brown, World Bank Representative Mr. Mbaye Diouf, ECA Director Mrs. Suzanne Fafin, Head of Unit, Governance, UNDP Mr. Dirk Jena, UNFPA Representative Mr. Toni Kayonga, World Bank Operations Officer Mr. Peter Metcalf, UNDP Officer-in-charge Ms. Diana Opar, UNIFEM Regional Gender Advisor Mr. Tore Rose, UNDP Resident Representative Mr. Chrystian Solofo-Dimby, UNICEF Programme Officer
ANNEX 3 List of Documents Reviewed
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED _____________________________________________________________________________________ Africa South of the Sahara. 2001. Rwanda. Europa Publications. pp. 914-37. Africa Peace Forum. 2000. "Conflict and Peace Indicators - Great Lakes November 2000". da Cmara Santa Clara Gomes, Sophie. The European Union's Political and Development Response to Rwanda. European Centre for Development Policy Management. Discussion Paper No. 27.
Colletta, Nat J. and Michele Cullen. 2000. Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia. Washington D.C.: World Bank. May. Conseil de concertation des organisations dappui aux initiatives de base (CCOAIB). 2001. Rwanda Government Response to Human Rights Watch Report. 12 June. Kigali. _____. 2000. Problmatique du rgime foncier au Rwanda: Contexte et perspectives, relations avec lhabitat regroup. Rwanda: CCOAIB. Donors Meeting. 1999. Minutes. London, July 22-23. Economist Intelligence Unit. 2001. Rwanda Country Report. February and August. European Union. 2001 "Coopration entre le Rwanda et l'union europenne. Forhardt, Mark. 1997."Reintegration and Human Rights in Post-Genocide Rwanda." US Committee for Refugees. June 19. Hamilton, Heather B. 2001. "Rwanda's Women: The Key to Reconstruction", Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. As posted on www.reliefweb.int. 24 January. Hilhorst, Dorothea and Mathijs van Leeuwen. 2000. "Emergency and Development: the Case of Imidugudu, Villagisation in Rwanda." Journal of Refugee Studies 33 (3). Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival. 1995. "Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Rwanda." Human Rights Watch. 2001. Uprooting the Rural Poor in Rwanda. New York, USA: Human Rights Watch. International Crisis Group. 2001. Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention. June. International Rescue Committee (IRC). 2001. Support for Transition to Democracy and Poverty Reduction - Kibungo, Gisenyi, Kigali-Ngali, Gikongoro Provinces. July. Kigali: IRC.
Joint Commission for Repatriation and Reintegration of Rwandese Refugees. 2001. Transmission of Commission Activity Report for the Period of January to June 2001. Jones, Lisa. 2000. "The Evolution of Property Use in Rwanda. Refugee Survey Quarterly 19 (3). LandNet. 2001. LandNet Rwanda Brochure. Kigali. Ligue rwandaise pour la promotion et la dfense des droits de l'homme. 2001. "Rapport sur la situation des droits de l'homme au Rwanda". Kigali. February. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 2001. Government of Rwanda National Poverty Reduction Programme. Fourth draft. November. Kigali. _____. 2000. Etude prparatoire pour le schma directeur dutilisation des terres et damnagement: Rapport provisoire. Novembre. Kigali. Ministry of Lands, Human Resettlement and Environmental Protection (MINITERE). Position on the Discussion Note. 11 January 2001. Kigali: MINITERE. _____. 2001. National Land Policy. Draft. July. Kigali: MINITERE. _____. 2001. Thematic Consultation on Resettlement. May. Kigali: MINITERE. _____. 2001. Imbanziriza-Mushinga WItegeko Rigenga Ubutaka Mu Rwanda. Kigali: MINITERE. _____. 2000. Letter to the Royal Dutch Embassy regarding Steering Committee Report on Resettlement. January. _____. 1996. Poltique nationale de lhabitat. Kigali. Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs (MINALOC). 2001. Mission d'examen ponctuel du programme cadre d'appui la dcentralisation et la bonne gouvernance au Rwanda (Intervention en province de Cyangugu). 5 Septembre. Kigali. _____. 2001. Community Development Policy. May. Kigali: MINALOC. _____. 2000. Programme de cadre d'appui la dcentralisation et la bonne gouvernance au Rwanda. Juin. Kigali: MINALOC. _____. 2000. National Decentralization Policy. May. Kigali: MINALOC. National Human Rights Commission of Rwanda. 2000. First Annual Report of the National Human Rights Commission June - December 1999. Kigali National Poverty Reduction Unit (NPRP) and MINALOC. 2001. Ubudehe to Fight Poverty. Kigali: NPRP and MINALOC. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. 2000. National-Wide Grassroots Consultations Report: Unity and Reconciliation Initiatives in Rwanda. Kigali.
NGO Forum. 2000. Letter to Patricia Hajabakiga, Secretary General of MINITERE, regarding Report to the Steering Committee on Resettlement. 19 January. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2001. IDPs and the Resettlement Issue in Rwanda Review Paper. January. _____. 2000. "Rwanda: Inter-agency Humanitarian Situation Report: October- November 2000". As posted on www.reliefweb.int on 30 January 2001. _____. 2000. "OCHA Mission to Rwanda December 6-12, 2000 - Discussion Paper for Country Team Meeting." 12 December. _____. 2000. IDPs and other Affected Populations in Rwanda. September. OECD / DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. 1999. "The Limits and Scope for the use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations - Case Study Rwanda". June. _____. 1999. The Influencing of Aid: "A Synthesis of the Lessons Learned form Four Case Studies on the Use of Aid as an Incentive or Disincentive in Conflict and Conflict-Prone Situations: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwandan and Sri Lanka". 2-3 June. Paris. Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Rwanda. 2000. Note Verbale on Common UN Framework for Assistance in the Context of Imidugudu Policy. 2 February. Oldham, Linda, Jennie Burnet and Scholas Mirebwayire. 2001. Local Governance Initiative, Evaluation of Africare's Program in 30 Communes in Rwanda. March. Kigali: Presented to Africare, MINALOC and USAID. Organisation of African Unity. 2000. "Rwanda the Preventable Genocide". As posted on www.ReliefWeb.int on 24 January 2001. Prendergast, John and David Smock. 1999. "Postgenocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi". US Institute of Peace. 15 September. Programme dobservation de direction au Rwanda (POER). 2001. Rapport intrimaire sur les lections au Rwanda. 3 April. Kigali: POER. Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development. 1999. Survey Report on Land Use and Villagisation in Rwanda. April-July. _____. 2001. Culture, Practice and Law: Women's Access to Land in Rwanda: April. _____.2001. Workshop Report on Culture, Practice and Law: Women's Access to Land in Rwanda. April. Royal Dutch Embassy. 1999. Letter to Patricia Hajabakiga, Secretary General of MINITERE, regarding Report to the Steering Committee on Resettlement. 24 December.
Swedish Section for Development Cooperation (SIDA). 2001. Rapid Assessment of the Agricultural Sector in Rwanda. RELMA Mission. June. _____. 2001. "Semi-Annual Report - Rwanda - October 2000 - May 2001." _____. 2000. "Regional Strategy: The Great Lakes Region - Country Strategy Rwanda. Steering Committee on Resettlement. Discussion Note on the Report to the Steering Committee Meeting on Resettlement. 2 December 1999. Kigali. Stephens, Thomas W. 1999. "The UNDP Round Table Mechanism in Rwanda - Issues in Aid Management in a Post-Conflict Economy. UNDP: New York. United Nations. 2001. United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2002-2006 for Rwanda. Kigali: United Nations. _____. 2000. "Situation of the Human Rights in Rwanda". General Assembly, Agenda Item 112. October 1997. _____. 2000. "Situation of the Human Rights in Rwanda". General Assembly, Agenda Item 116. July. _____. 2000. Common UN Framework for Assistance in the Context of the Imidugudu Policy. 2 February. Kigali. _____. 1999-2000. Common Country Assessment for Rwanda. Kigali: United Nations. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 1994. General Comment No. 04: The Right to Adequate Housing. HR/GEN/Rev. 1 at 53. United Nations Development Programme. 2000. "Brief - Government of Rwanda and Development Partners Annual Meeting 8-10 November 2000." _____. 1999. Rapport dtude sur les sites de rinstallation au Rwanda. Kigali: UNDP. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1999. Joint Reintegration Programming Unit September Workshop: Working Document. Kigali: UNDP and UNHCR. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2001. Rwanda-Repatriation Briefing. _____. 2001. Imagine Co-existence. _____. 2001. Monthly Sitrep. August. _____. 2000. "Assisting the Transition - From Emergency - to Relief - to Development".
Uvin, Peter. 2000. The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of Participation in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda. Discussion Paper. Prepared for the Belgian Secretary of State for Development Co-operation.
World Bank. 2001. "Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program Mission - Draft of Aide
Memoire". August. _____. 2001. Community Reintegration and Development Project: Mid-Term Review. March. Kigali: World Bank. _____. 2001. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the amount of SDR 37.2 Million to the Republic of Rwanda for a Rural Sector Support Project in Support of the First Phase of the Rural Sector Support Program. 1 March. Kigali: World Bank. 1998. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Learning and Innovation Credit in the amount of SDR 3.7 million to the Rwandese Republic for a Community Reintegration and Development Project. 15 October. Kigali: World Bank. 2001. Rapport prliminaire de l'observation lectorale internationale, lections des autorits aux chelons administratifs de bases au Rwanda. Mars. Kigali.
ANNEX 4 Results from the Rapid Assessment of Shelter Needs
RAPID ASSESSMENT MISSION ON VULNERABLE FAMILIES LIVING IN SHEETINGS AND BLINDES
Introduction During the Brooking Process implemented in Rwanda, the Government of Rwanda, donors, UNDP and UNHCR jointly decided to assign a technical team to assess shelter and land needs, which were deemed to require additional sustained attention for Rwanda which emerges from one of the most catastrophic crises in history, characterized by genocide and mass killings which went hand in hand with the destruction of infrastructures, as well as unprecedented population displacements. A team composed of representatives from MINITERE, Denmark, UNDP, UNHCR, SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency), USAID, the National Programme on Poverty Reduction, and the Conflict Management Centre of The National University of Rwanda was established in order to assess policies, achievements and unmet needs during the transition period in the areas of human settlement and land. The team began its work on 10 September 2001. Concerning the human settlement sector, a major challenge of the Government of National Unity at the outset of the crisis, the team had to appraise how the issue was addressed during the emergency and the development phases. Of course there have been a lot of achievements, thanks to support from the international community, but there are still acute needs for those without shelter who were estimated at 370,000 households, according to the 1999 study. As this number dates back to two years ago, it was deemed wise to carry out a systematic study in order to update it because from that period on, people continued to build shelters for themselves, in accordance with their capacities. To that effect, the Task Force of the Brookings Process proposed a survey entitled, "Rapid Assessment of Immediate Shelter Needs". The Swiss Government made available US$ 20,000 to finance the implementation of the assessment. I. Survey Methodology Before undertaking field work, a preparatory meeting of the surveyors was organised. The meeting, chaired by the Director of Human Settlement together with an ECA (Economic Community for Africa) Population Expert, aimed at explaining the goal and methodology of the survey. After the meeting, a questionnaire with a notice to users was distributed to the surveyors. In addition, the Ministry of Lands, Human Resettlement and Environmental Protection wrote an official letter to all Province Prefects asking them to count the number of vulnerable households still living in sheetings and "blinds", as well as the number of shelters built in village sites (imidugudu) since 1995. The prefects themselves gave appropriate instructions to local authorities for the numbering of vulnerable households still living in sheeting and blinds in their respective areas. Upon arrival at the Province head offices, the surveyors met province officials in order to explain the purpose of their trip. Each Province had to assign an officer to accompany the surveyor in the districts, sectors and cells. The surveyors went with the officer to visit the sites in order to check the number of families without shelter who had been counted by the local authorities, with the principle of keeping only the most vulnerable cases. However, as time was very limited, the surveyors were able to only verify the sites where the number was relatively high.
This verification by the surveyors themselves was required in order to avoid any exaggeration of the number by local authorities, who might have been hoping to obtain support. After having collected field data, the surveyors presented on pre-developed forms the results obtained from respective Provinces to the Shelter Directorate for analysis and consolidation. II. Survey Implementation On 8 October 2001, the Ministry of Lands, Human Resettlement and Environmental Protection (MINITERE), in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) dispatched 11 surveyors and 2 supervisors throughout all the Provinces of Rwanda in order to carry out a comprehensive census of households still living in sheetings and grass-thatched shelters, generally known as "blinds." The surveyors, assisted by the respective province officers in charge of the shelter issue, had the duty of counting highly vulnerable households living in sheetings and blinds throughout all the Provinces of the country. The survey took 14 days and was concluded on 21 October 2001. The supervisors went to all the provinces in the country in order to monitor closely the work of field surveyors. First of all, the classification of vulnerable families living in sheetings and blinds caused definition problems; however, in collaboration with province authorities, the vulnerable families to be counted were clearly determined in order to avoid any confusion. The data collected on households without shelter in the Provinces as well as the verified number of houses built in villages "Imidugudu" are presented in Tables I and II respectively. The survey revealed a total of 191,844 households still living in sheetings and blinds. This decrease in the number of vulnerable households without shelter as compared to 370,000 families without shelter counted in 1999 is justified for several reasons, including : 1. The displaced and the returnees recovered their property 2. Construction of more houses by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with funding from various countries (Franco-Rwanda Cooperation, Swiss Cooperation, Canadian Cooperation...). 3. Government interventions as well as sensitization of people to build their own shelters. 4. UNHCR and WFP (Food for Work) provided aid for resettling some families without shelter. 5. Not all the people living under plastic sheetings or blinds and in grass-thatched small houses were counted; the concept of vulnerability had to be taken into account. All these reasons justify that there was a decrease of almost 50% in the number of households without shelter as compared to the 1999 survey.
III. Findings of the Survey
Table I: Number of families without shelter N Province 1 Butare 2 Byumba 3 Cyangugu 4 Gikongoro 5 Gitarama 6 Gisenyi 7 Kibungo 8 Kibuye 9 Kigali-Ngali 10 Ruhengeri 11 Umutara 12 Kigali - City * TOTAL Sheetings 9,632 878 513 2,919 18,932 19,200 2,541 352 62,669 11,281 137,819 Blinds 1,624 443 3,324 2,216 1,791 15,571 11,341 3,149 673 10,793 3,100 54,025 Total 1,624 10,075 4,202 2,729 4,710 34,503 30,541 5,690 1,025 73,462 14,381 8,902 191,844
* City of Kigali : this number represents vulnerable households living together under the same roof. Table II: Number of Houses built in "Imidugudu" villages since 1995 N Province 1 Butare 2 Byumba 3 Cyangugu 4 Gikongoro 5 Gitarama 6 Gisenyi 7 Kibungo 8 Kibuye 9 Kigali - Ngali 10 Ruhengeri 11 Umutara TOTAL IV. Comments on the Findings Vulnerable households are still living either under plastic sheetings or in blinds. They are mostly found in the Northwest of Rwanda (Gisenyi and Ruhengeri) due to a long period of insecurity pursuant to Interahamwe militia and Ex-FAR infiltration from the forests of the Democratic Number 5,937 4,871 8,200 1,771 8,741 11,930 120,664 1,954 9,072 74,249 17,840 265,229
Republic of the Congo. The sole province of Ruhengeri has 73,462 and Gisenyi has 34,503, that is a total of 107,965 vulnerable households without shelter. These vulnerable households without shelter are either returnees (old and new cases) or people whose houses were destroyed during the infiltration war. Kibungo and Umutara Province in the eastern region of the country have also received a great number of returnees of 1959 and 1973 refugees. This situation accounts for the large number of households without shelter: there are 30,541 in Kibungo and 14,381 in Umutara, totaling 44,922 vulnerable households without shelter. The Byumba Province in the North ranks 5th with 10,075 vulnerable households. This province was strongly affected by the civil war that started there and, since October 1990, it has had the biggest number of internally displaced people. For the Province of Kibuye, the number is large because this is a Province that was very strongly affected by the genocide that left a large number of people without shelter and vulnerable. In addition, many old-case refugees returning in the country decided to settle themselves in that area. The Provinces of Cyangugu, Gitarama, Gikongoro, Butare and Kigali - Ngali have relatively small numbers of vulnerable people without shelter. For Kigali - Ngali, this is easily understandable, since this Province benefited from most returnees resettlement interventions. The four others received less returnees compared to the other Provinces. V. Conclusion The "Rapid Assessment of Immediate Shelter Needs" survey reflects a positive change. The 1999 survey indicated a number of 370,000 households without shelter, whilst the present survey found 191,844. Similarly, the same survey indicates 265,229 shelters built since 1995, while they were 177,073 for the 1999 survey. Vulnerable people without shelter are either widows, elderly people without labor nor resources, children, heads of households, for whom support is crucial in order to address their primary shelter need. With regard to this number, it should be noted that poverty cannot be overcome unless sustained assistance for the resettlement of this needy group of people is provided. Considering the current situation, Government efforts would not be sufficient without support from the international community. In addition, support should also be provided to improve shelter and life conditions of the population, to develop primary infrastructures and to create income-generating activities, which are prerequisites for sustainable settlement and without which sustainable peace is impossible.
ANNEX 5 Budget Estimate for Immediate Shelter Assistance for the Most Vulnerable Families
IMMEDIATE SHELTER ASSISTANCE FOR MOST VULNERABLE FAMILIES BUDGET ESTIMATE
The following budget estimate will serve as a reference when redrafting the MINITERE document: Thematic Consultations on Human Settlement for Vulnerable Families to be presented to the donor community. The budget does not include transport and running or management cost. (US$ 1= 445 FRW) Option 1: 1. Iron sheets : 36 sheets per house 2,500 FRW per sheet 2. Nails : 3. Timber poles: 21 poles per house 300 FRW per pole
Sub-Total = 90,000 FRW Sub-Total = 1, 500 FRW
Sub-Total = 6, 300 FRW Total = 97, 800 FRW Total Option 1 = US$ 220/ family
Option 2: In addition to items 1, 2 & 3 of option 1, the following items would be provided: 4. External doors : 2 doors per house 10, 000 FRW per door 5. Small windows : 4 windows per house 5, 000 FRW/ house
Sub-Total = 20, 000 FRW
Sub-Total = 20, 000 FRW Total = 40, 000 FRW Total Option 2 = US$ 310/ family
ANNEX 6 Proposal for a Rwandan National Solidarity Fund
PROPOSAL FOR A RWANDAN NATIONAL SOLIDARITY FUND _____________________________________________________________________________________ There have been several initiatives of central and local funds in Rwanda, which have been created to support very low income and vulnerable groups or to improve basic infrastructure and shelter conditions in rural areas. These initiatives include: A Fund for the Survivors of Genocide and Massacres (FARG), A Fund for shelter assistance, set up in 1997 after the 1996 massive return. Money was collected at MINALOC then due to big water shortages, in particular in Umutara province and to special requirements for an environmental project in the Akagera Park, the fund was redirected to MINAGRI for the building of valley dams in Umutara. A Fund for vulnerable groups (e.g. handicapped), at MINALOC, A Communal Fund for education, at district level, A Fund for the protection of children in difficult circumstances.
These funds have not been very successful due mainly to the very limited private sector participation, but also to limited efficiency in their management and in the mobilisation of the private sector. Another reason is that these funds were often ad-hoc without preliminary analysis and planning. These existing Funds could be merged into one integrated National Solidarity Fund34 modelled on the successful Tunisian National Solidarity Fund35 for the lowest income and most vulnerable groups and for the least viable36 areas. This proposal is being studied at the Presidents office37.
34
Other existing funds, which are targeting different layers of the population, would remain. (e.g. habitat fund, mainly targeting civil servants). See attached document. Areas lacking basic services (e.g. water, schools, health centers, etc.) . Following discussions between the UNDP consultant -Brookings Task Force- and Dr. Nsengimana, Special Advisor to the President.
35 36 37
TUNISIAN NATIONAL SOLIDARITY FUND Solidarity against poverty and exclusion ________________________________________________________________________________ The National Solidarity Fund (FSN) is a special fund created in 1992 (by law). The purpose of the fund is to finance interventions to benefit low-income population categories and disadvantaged regions remote, usually rural areas, which lack such basic community services and facilities as: drinking water, surfaced and unpaved roads, electricity, health care facilities and schools, decent housing and infrastructure. The National Solidarity Fund, originally designed for 8 years (1993-2000) ultimately aims at: Providing those living in these areas with the amenities needed to preserve their dignity; Introducing programmes of employment and production that will create stable sources of income for the inhabitants of these areas; Gradually incorporating them into the countrys economic and social channels and protecting them from marginalization and exclusion.
The funds projects will be extended to 2004. Financing of the fund: The FSN receives funds from the two main following sources: Donations by individuals and by public and private enterprise (around of the total budget) Contributions and taxes instituted on behalf of the fund,
Other sources include: budget endowments, donations from the government and national and foreign institutions and agencies, and any other financing provided for under the prevailing legislation. Criteria for eligibility and local development committees: Interventions by the fund are based on the following criteria: The region is at a remote distance from the nearest local or regional urban centre. It is lacking in at least 2 basic community facilities38. At least 26 families live in the region39. There is no basic care health centre, less than 5 km from the region.
38 39
See above list The fund is also called 26
There is no school, less than 5 km from the area.
Local development committees made up of residents in the disadvantaged regions help plan and set priorities for National Solidarity Fund interventions in their regions. (These committees are made up of 15% of women). They also participate in selecting the beneficiaries of income-generation projects and liaise with the technical services working in the disadvantaged regions. The community also takes part in the actual construction work. Financial supervision of fund projects, transparency: The fund projects are subject to the usual contracting and financial control procedures, which are carried out in stages: Initial control by the controller of public expenditures in the governorate (province) concerned, concomitant control by the tax collector regional council accountant, the bureaux for inspection of public services and the agencies for control of finances and state-owned property and finally, after project completion, control by the State audit office. To ensure transparency, all control mechanisms in the management of the fund and the supporting legal tools have been described in a booklet published end of 1999. Concurrent projects: Programmes in the social, health, cultural, sports and volunteer spheres are carried out concurrently with the projects for basic infrastructure and micro-projects creation, funded by the FSN to improve their impact on the target population in the disadvantaged regions. Achievements from 1993 to 2000 : (1 TND = around 360 FRW, 1 TND = around $0.77) Total Investment (Infrastructure + income generating projects) Planned figure 1993-2000 Actual figure 1993-1999 TND 500 477 (in millions) FRW 180,000 171,720 US$ 385 367 Average per year (in millions) TND 62.5 68.1 FRW 22,500 24,531 US$ 48.1 52.4
Breakdown of total investment: 1. Basic infrastructure projects Houses construction/rehabilitation Electrification Potable water Roads and paths Health Number Cost (in million Dinars) 24,592 70,198 66, 933 115 families families families centres 40.9 125.9 84.8 148.8 4.8 % of total investment 10% 30% 20% 36% 1%
3, 635.55 km
Education Other projects40 TOTAL Average = 46m US$ / year 2. Income - generating projects (1994-1999): Agriculture Artisanat Petits metiers TOTAL (Average = 7.5 m US$ / year)
134 111
schools projects
3.2 10.1 418.6
1% 2% 100%
Cost (In millions) TND 44.2 6.9 7.4 58.5 FRW 15,912 2,484 2,664 21,060 US$ 34 5.3 5.7 45 % 75 12 13 100
Projects for the year 2000: A number of provinces have submitted their project proposals for a number of disadvantaged regions for a total amount of 117 m TND. Following consultations with line ministries, with regional and local authorities and with the members of the local community development committees, it was decided that the year 2000 National Solidarity Fund investment would be 71.8 m TND = around $55.3 million. The investment concerns 220 disadvantaged areas inhabited by 25,558 families. ________________ [ World Solidarity Fund: On 20 December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution in favour of the Tunisian initiative to create a World Solidarity Fund for the eradication of poverty in the world.] ________________
40
Sanitation, projects against desertification, public showers, youth clubs, etc.
ANNEX 7 Briefing Note on Decentralization
DECENTRALISATION
I/ National Decentralisation and Community Development Policies

The overall objective of the Decentralisation Policy, enacted in May 2000, is to ensure political, economic, social, managerial/administrative and technical empowerment of local populations to fight poverty by participating in the planning and management of their development process. Therefore, this policy should integrate the aspect of vitalizing the imidugudu communities. The national election to put the decentralized structures at the grassroots level in place was held in March 1999. Each of the 11 provinces of the country elected community representatives from the sector and cellule levels, and councils and executive committees at those levels were established. The executive committee comprises two sub-committees: PAC (Political/Administrative Committee) and CDC (Community Development Committee). The Community Development Policy was adopted in May 2001. It recognizes that the communities at the grassroots level are the pillars of sustainable development, and are best positioned to identify and prioritize their needs and to draw development plans accordingly. Based on needs, elected CDC members coordinate and design development plans, mobilize development resources and implement the plans. In March 2001, the population elected the members of district41 and city councils and executive committees. The chart at the end of the annex shows the position of the CDC in the existing structures at the grassroots level. The Fiscal Decentralization Policy also came into effect in May 2001. Its general objective is to provide the adequate resources to fulfill local service responsibilities. One of the major components of the policy is to establish a Community Development Fund (FDC) to provide a grant support for the local development budgets. The National Decentralisation Policy stipulates that a minimum of 10%42 of central government annual receipts shall be allocated to the FDC. The actual allocation of these funds is due to start in January 2002.
II/ Decentralisation, Human Settlement and Land

Among the main issues related to human settlement and land, particularly imidugudu, is the lack of participation of the population, leading to lack of ownership and efficiency in implementation of development projects. This has generated frustration among the population and could become a potential source of conflict and a threat to peace.
41 42
There is a total of 106 districts in Rwanda. Discussions are under way at the central Government level possibly setting the 10% as a ceiling for the FDC rather than a fixed
percentage and also reviewing the allocation procedures.
Resettlement issues are of primary concern at the grassroots level. Therefore, resettlement programmes should naturally be reflected through the prioritization and planning work of the CDCs. CDCs, CBOs and other local community development agents can play a key role in addressing resettlement issues through a participatory, bottom-up approach. The Community Development Committee (CDCs) will play a major role in conception, planning and management of human settlement programs These structures under the guidance of democratically elected local councils are expected to improve human settlement planning and other development programs in their respected areas.43 Therefore, human settlement and land issues can be looked at from the community development perspective rather than through the emergency shelter-building approach.
III/ Progress
An increasing number of donor projects / programmes target communes directly through CDCs or CBOs and other local community development agents. These projects / programmes rest on the assumption that individuals know best how to use resources to satisfy their needs. Likewise, local communities are in a better position to identify their needs and required actions than higher administrative echelons. The following are examples of participatory community development projects within the broader context of decentralization and good governance: 1. Community Reintegration and Development Project (CRDP)- World Bank (Effective March 199944, for 3 years, US $ 5 million) The project assists returnees and other vulnerable groups through a process of community-based reintegration and development, and strengthens the capacity of local communities and the administration at the communal (district) and national levels for the implementation of development projects. The project targets 12 communes (=districts) with a total budget of US$ 5 million. Since July 2000, each district has opened an account in a private bank and will receive US$ 90,000 each year for three years for: Infrastructure sub-projects, Income-generating sub-projects, and Capacity-building sub-projects (nearly 20% of the total budget is devoted to institution and capacity building as well as support to project management).
Based on the efficiency of the activities carried out so far and on discussion with the Government, the World Bank is considering a future project (FYO3), to go to scale with the CRDP approach. This would entail a total budget of US$ 50 million. 2. Decentralization and Good Governance Program in Cyangugu (Netherlands, MINALOC, SNV, IRC) (1999- December 2002, US$ 12 million)
43 44
Thematic Consultation on Resettlement for vulnerable families, MINITERE, May 2001. After the completion of the national local elections.
The programme follows up several previous programs conducted during 1998-2000 in the same region, which focused on the reinforcement of administrative structure and strengthening of civil society. The programme is designed to achieve decentralization along with democratic principles, transparency, free choice and expression at the sector and cellule level. It is also designed to enhance capacities, particularly of the CDCs, which is directly involved in tasks such as planning, coordination, management and followup evaluation of development activities. Specific objectives of the programme include: reinforcing the capacity of the deconcentrated state administrative structure at the province level, of the decentralized administrative structure at the district level, and of all elected representatives for decision-making, planning, coordination, management, implementation, and follow-up of the development activities; reinforcing capacities of the civil society that can play significant roles, complementary to those of the public sector in the regional development; supporting development actions technically and financially in decentralized administrative structures and committees of elected representatives for poverty reduction management in the Cyangugu province; supporting specific activities technically and financially across the local levels in the province to initiate the provincial support program (PPA) that corresponds to priorities in poverty reduction; and carrying out the management of FDCs regularly supplied by the proper resources of the district, the Government and external financial partners in every district.
3. Area Rehabilitation and Development Plans (ARDPs) (UNDP, MINALOC, 1997-2000, US$ 785,000) It strengthens the capacity at the provincial level (for all provinces), in particular for planning activities (Area Reintegration and Development Plans-ARDPs). It focuses on the intermediary level of the decentralisation strategy. ARDPs quickly identify short- and medium-term priority projects and subprogrammes, which constitute a plan of rehabilitation and development over an administrative area. These projects are based on a needs assessment by the population and its representatives at the district level. UNDP uses Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs45) to identify the reconstruction needs in all districts of all provinces but does not provide resources through this project. 4. Community Development Fund FDC- (UNDP/MINALOC) (May 1998-June 2001, US$ 4.5 million) The project is complementary to the ARDPs. Its main objectives are: 45
To strengthen the capacity of the communities at grassroots level to participate in their own development, To strengthen the capacity of local leaders to efficiently manage the FDCs, To promote a credit system for the most vulnerable, and
Equivalent to the CDC at the cellule level.
To rehabilitate/build socio-economic infrastructures at sector level.
The project has been implemented in 15 communes/districts of Butare, Umutara and Kigali Ngali provinces, for a total budget of about US$ 4.5 million. The project provided direct community development funds for the following sectors: construction and rehabilitation of social infrastructure (health centers, schools, training facilities, water supply systems, etc.); support to income-generating activities (micro projects, etc.); and strengthening of management capacities of local communities and of attitudes towards participation, reconciliation and democratic structures. 5. UNDP Support to the Decentralisation and Democratisation Programme (January 2001-December 2003, $3 million) This UNDP programme co-funded by the Netherlands, Switzerland and UNDP is designed to enhance the administrative capacities of the local government structures. Its objectives are: 1) To develop institutional capacities for carrying out the decentralization policy; 2) To design and operate a new decentralized administrative structures and management system as well as a decentralized financial management and accounting system. These systems will maximize fiscal capacities of the local government to collect and appropriate the budget. The systems will also increase effectiveness, accountability and transparency in the planning and utilization of the budget, and ensure the most effective budget-sharing and coordination between the central and local administrations; 3) To ensure an open and enabling environment for the development and continual adaptation of legal texts concerning decentralization and democratization; 4) To develop a comprehensive program related to information, communication, sensitization and civic education in order to provide network and to promote responsive leadership; 5) To develop and implement a coordination and follow-up system for participatory community development activities; 6) To develop capacity of elected local representatives, local authorities, technical and administrative personnel as well as central government officials. This new programme has elaborated and adapted some legal texts including a national community development policy, begun a communication/sensitisation program on decentralisation, and organized training sessions for elected leaders at the district level. 6. Decentralization program in Kibungo province (IRC, USAID): (US$ 2.4 million) The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is conducting a decentralization programme in Kibungo province. Kibungo province has many, newly developed resettled communities that often lack basic services. Therefore, efforts made by the CDCs are crucial for development of local communities. The objectives of the programme are:
to support the establishment of inclusive democratic institutions and community development committees at the district, sector and cell levels; to increase the participation of civil societys voluntary associations and the private sectors local enterprises in the civic affairs and socio-economic development; to increase the management capacity of local governance initiative project implementers.
To achieve these objectives, the programme conducts capacity-building activities for the CDCs but also for the community which sustains its functions. The main activities are: 1) training elected officials in managing public institutions and development funds; 2) sensitizing individuals to exercise their responsibilities as citizens; 3) training leaders of voluntary associations in managing community development projects; 4) promoting small private enterprise and income generating activities; and 5) disseminating information and creating communication networks, particularly improving mechanisms of the CDC by promoting networking and exchange of experiences between local government councils. 7. Local Governance Initiative (USAID/AFRICARE/MININTER46) (1999 to 2001) The LGI project aims at empowering communities to participate more in local Government and changing local government policies to be more responsive to community needs. LGI, working in 30 districts, focuses on capacity building within the elected members of the decentralized government to work with populations to identify needs at the grassroots level, to formulate projects and to manage their implementation. LGI tries to engage the elected bodies and the general population in cooperative action in the interest of solving their own pressing needs for social and physical infrastructure, and in the process, attempts to facilitate the development of trust and competence within both groups. As the LGI project focuses on developing the community capacity, its priority is extensive training for rural populations for them to take more responsibility for development in their communities, specifically, training of LGI staff, the grassroots structures and local populations. The total budget of the LGI project is US$ 8.2 million. Constraints and the Way Forward 1. Sensitisation at the Central and Decentralised Levels on the Scope of a Participatory Approach
In a number of project evaluations and during our field visits, we have noted that one of the weaknesses of the decentralised structures especially at the sector and cellule levels, is that CDC members do not necessarily have a clear understanding of their role and expected activities within the community. It is also the case for the local population itself which needs to be further sensitized to the possibility and the importance of their participation in the community development process. At the local level, the CDC presidents often hold the actual administrative authority. The influence of the head of the executive committee over the CDC is often so strong that the CDC cannot always maintain direct and smooth communications with the community members. With this cultural influence, designed participatory decision-making over development policies by community members is not in effect due to the control by the administrative authority in the local government.
46
Now called MINALOC.
Decentralisation will change but not reduce the responsibility of sectoral ministries. Most sectoral ministries will shift from being implementers to providing policy guidance to the provinces and the districts. Further sensitisation and civic education programmes within central and local levels would be necessary. 2. Capacity Building
With the March 1999 elections, all CDCs were institutionally formed but only part of them are operational because most CDC members were elected based on trust, not competence. Thus, the levels of operationality actually vary significantly from one district/sector/cellule CDC to another. One example we could draw from the CRDP World Bank project experience: The project had a slow start, which was mainly due to an extensive capacity-building programme for CDC members47 (which took 18 months). Although main decentralization and good governance projects, which focused on capacity building of CDCs and CBOs, have led to a substantial improvement of the local capacity, this improvement remains limited to an estimated 60% of the total 106 districts. On the other hand, the districts form larger and economically more viable entities than the former communes. The previous control exercised by the commune on the citizens through the sector advisor has been removed. District, sector, and cellule governments are more community-driven since women, youth, and vulnerable groups have earned representation in the advisory and executive committees. However, their technical and organizational capacity is weak. It is important to develop community capacity that can identify needs at the grassroots level and carry out development projects effectively. Assistance in the provision of equipment would be also required. 3. Coordination & Communication
Communication and information sharing Communication and information sharing between the central and the local level are another element that needs improvement. At the central level, there is a great concern over the lack of information exchange regarding implemented projects as well as committed budget. This is particularly the case when local government could directly mobilize funds from external financial partners to utilize for specific programmes formulated at the local level, through FDCs, cooperatives or other CBOs. The lack of information sharing between the Government and the local administrative structures could hinder the budget planning at the central level, which aims at optimizing the national budget allocation to the district level, fair use of the national budget at the district level, and avoid redundancy of resource mobilization to certain programmes. Communication problems are often due to the lack of communication systems and information network.
47
CRDP Mid-Term Review- March 2001. World Bank.
Improved communication system and capacity could be achieved through better communication equipment and a comprehensive IT training to set up a coordination/information-sharing mechanism. The
planned National ICT programme, although requiring substantial investment, should ultimately address the issue. Coordination Information sharing being the basis for any coordination action, the need to share experience among donors who have carried out community based projects (e.g. pilot projects listed earlier), is crucial to any coordination effort. This would ensure harmonisation of the methodologies (e.g. standardized manuals and training modules). Better coordination amongst donors is needed to carry out projects with common goals and similar methodologies. DMUs coordination role also needs to be supported so that the units supervising role could be maximized. 4. Remuneration of Members of the Local Administrative Structure
The CDC members are currently serving communities on a voluntary basis. This reflects the spirit of democracy, but realistically, a lack of motivation among the CDC members cannot be ignored. This phenomenon often appears as long absence of the members from the service in communities or very slow execution of services. In the World Bank mid-term review of the CRDP, it is estimated that per the decree establishing the CDCs, they are to meet twice per month. Providing Frw 500 per meeting (equivalent to one day of hired rural labor) to each of the 160,000 CDC members would result in annual costs of almost Frw 2 billion, or over $4.5 million at the current exchange rate. 5. Implementation of Fiscal Decentralisation
The actual allocation of the Community Development Funds is due to start in January 2002. There is a feeling that this is going too fast and a concern over the current capacity of the district CDCs to manage such funds. Some CDCs are more apt to utilize a larger amount of fund than others do. Once the Government starts allocating 10% of the national budget to FDC, it requires some political arrangement to allocate different amounts according to the capacity of each district. A possible alternative could be to set criteria for % allocation of the funds based mainly on the management capacity of each district CDC.
IV/ Sustainable Community Development

We are now building our homes, and when the walls are strong and the roof is solid, we will build a school for our children and a hospital for our sick. It will then be time to grow our crops and produce other things, time to be like any other commune.
Settlers in Kibungo prefecture.
December 1996.
This is the first time that we are asked what we need. If this is the approach this government is taking, we will finally be able to develop our country.
Community elder reflecting on the first participatory rural appraisal being undertaken in his commune, April 1997. The community development participatory approach will in particular help overcome traditional top-down planning, by promoting decision making on the allocation of funds and planning of projects at the communal level. By encouraging people to work together at a local level, it will also help overcome the divisions, which have been so destructive in the past, and create a higher degree of self-reliance and a sense of local ownership of public programmes. It will also lead to a feeling of responsibility for the achieved targets (e.g., building of dwellings). As the Task Force has seen, the willingness of donors to support this approach is expressed increasingly by the implementation of community driven projects and programmes. The capacities of the grassroots structure have been strengthened by these participatory projects. It is estimated that more than half districts have benefited from such projects. Partnership with the civil Society and other community-based organisations is also an important component of the community development approach. In particular, network and advocacy capacities of civil society at the local level can play a key role in increasing the communities participation and collaboration with the local administrative structures-CDCs. As an example, the Community Development Policy describes the role of NGOs (and religious congregations) on community development affairs as: - assist[ing], each in its field of specialization the grassroots structures in conception, preparation, implementation, follow-up and evaluation community projects. - strengthening the capacities of local actors (CDC/APC, technicians, and CBO, etc). - assist[ing] technically grassroots structures and impart to them new technologies with proven test of performance. - N.B.: The international NGOs will rather make subcontracting with local NGOs competent in the activities concerning the domains of intervention of those international ones. Technically, more specifications are necessary for actual NGO involvement such as approval by the local authority before NGO involvement, NGO budget integration into FDC, which would require frequent and transparent communications between the local government and NGOs. Most importantly, however, as the last article mentions, technical transfer to a local entity, either the local government or a local NGO, is key to a successful partnership. So far, this attempt finds some cases of collaboration between the decentralized local government and communities (e.g., NGOs, associations). For example, in a local government initiative project in Kibungo province, the IRC provides technical assistance in managing the FDC of $80,000. This fund is allocated to
75 social infrastructure projects (schools, health centers, markets, secondary roads) and re-capitalization (goats-banks) of poor households. Another case is found in Byumba province. In Cyumba district, AMIZERO, a local microfinance institution to which World Vision provides a financial base, manages a fund provided by the Government for loans to the community, and the sector CDC appraises these loans.
The sustainable community development approach can be used to deal with land issues. The new land law is about to go into effect in the near future, and the law will substantially determine the course of issues over land ownership, land sharing, settlement, etc., but controversies at the individual level simply will not be solved by the law. Rather more discussions over the law as well as legal disputes are expected. While discussions to optimize the law in the Rwandan context continue, a number of disputes at the grassroots level remain as a destabilizing factor in the society. On land issues, currently a group of international and national NGOs formed a consultation group called Landnet. This group studies issues and attitude of the population at the grassroots level over the land issue, exchanges information, and brings community-based consultation to the Government to yield both social legitimacy and more appropriate interventions. This type of involvement over the land issue by CSOs and stakeholders is essential for a long-term durable peace. Currently, the consultation and institutionalization for the new land law has moved forward, problem-solving mechanisms are not yet to be considered. The same type of Government-CSO partnership used for consultation could be also effective for problem-solving/mediation. This mechanism would be ideal to assist effective implementation of the new land law, to assist the population in understanding the new law, to capture concerns and disputes over the land at the grassroots level before they erupt in the society and to find community-led solutions to problems where the law cannot reach. In addition, a network could facilitate the exchange of experiences of each specific case throughout the nation so that it could generate a sense of equality among the population in terms of treatment on the land issue. In terms of the funding mechanisms, each Commune will receive funds for projects submitted to an elected Communal Development Committee (CDC), which will be in charge of project appraisal and approval. Community Development Funds will be channelled through the existing Banking System to the Committee. Financial control of the funds and technical assistance to the Communal Development Committees will be provided by an international NGO. This does not exclude funding through other CBOs and local structures. Attention should be drawn to the need to share information with local and central administration in order to ensure coordination and optimise efficiency.
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CDC STRUCTURE AT THE GRASSROOT LEVEL

DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DISTRICT COUNCIL
5 Chairperson (Mayor) Secretary in charge of Finance and Economic Development Secretary in charge of Social Services Secretary in charge of Gender and Women Development Secretary in charge of Youth, Sports and Culture
1 1
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE FOR THE COMMMUNE
WOMEN COMMITTEE AT
YOUTH COMMITTEE AT DISTRICT LEVEL

1
Administration, Finance and Development Budget SubCommission SECTOR COUNCIL

2 2 Representative of the women of the cell 2 1
Project Activities Co-ordination Sub-Commission
10 1
WOMEN COMMITTEE AT SECTOR LEVEL
SECTOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (10) Administrative & Political Affairs Sub-Committee Socio-Economic Affairs and Development Sub1
Representative of the youth of the cell
YOUTH COMMITTEE AT SECTOR LEVEL

1
Coordinator/Cell
Wise men
WOMEN COMMITTEE AT CELL LEVEL YOUTH COMMITTEE AT CELL LEVEL
CELL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (10) Administrative & Political Affairs Sub-Committee

4
Socio-Economic Affairs and Development Sub4
WOMEN ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES AT CELL LEVEL YOUTH ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES AT CELL LEVEL
CELL COUNCIL

Rwanda Settlements Nov 01

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Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

MINISTRY FOR LANDS, HUMAN RESETTLEMENT & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

BROOKINGS INITIATIVE IN RWANDA: LAND AND HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

The Rwanda Initiative - Findings of First Mission

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Task Force

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

1995-1998 Response to Shelter Needs

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Response to Human Settlement Since 1998

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Thematic Consultation on Resettlement (2001), p. 1. Ibid.

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

OCHA, (2000), IDPS and other Affected Populations in Rwanda. September.

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Table 1: Number of Extremely Poor Shelters by Province, October 2001.11

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Land Related Initiatives

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Draft Land Policy and Land Bill

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Master Plan of Land Use

Studies and Consultations

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Jones (2000), p. 140.

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Production and Sustainable Use

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Aid Relationship to Date

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Partnerships Regarding Human Settlement and Land

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Immediate Shelter Assistance

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Sustainable Community Approach

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Five percent in 2002, rising later.

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda

Brookings Initiative in Rwanda