Chavismo and Democracy in Venezuela

Damarys Canache University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana

To be presented at the Symposium on Prospects for Democracy in Latin America. University of North-Texas, April 5-6, 2007

When Hugo Chvez won the presidential election in 1998, few imagined the depth and breath of the societal transformation that he and his political movement would bring to Venezuela . Once in power, Chvez launched an ambitious political project, the Bolivarian Revolution, involving the re-founding of the Venezuelan republic. One of the programs fundamental changes pertains to the way in which democracy is being conceptualized, and therefore contested, in Venezuela. The question of what type of democracy exists, or should exist, in the country is not merely an abstract and theoretical matter, but is instead of direct importance for contemporary social and political dynamics in Venezuela. Public debate on the principles, substance, and institutions of Venezuelan democracy began prior to the arrival of Hugo Chvez to power, but this debate has taken center stage and infused power conflicts among old and new social and political actors in Venezuela during Chvezs in office. In 1998, Hugo Chvez was able to win support of ample sectors of Venezuelan society and became elected president by openly attacking some of the central principles and institutions of representative democracy. During his electoral campaign, Chvez talked about breaking with the past and overcoming the notion of representative democrcy a system he associates with the interests of wealthy sectors. As an alternative model of democracy, Hugo Chvez and his movement (hereafter Chavismo)1 put forward a broader notion of democracy, participatory and protagonist democracy.2
1

The term chavismo is used here to refer to the followers of Hugo Chvez political project. The chavistas include a heterogeneous set of political and social actors. There are military and civilian followers, and they may be unorganized or organized.
2

The notion of participatory and protagonist democracy is central to Chavezs political project. An illustration of how this view of democracy guides the actions of the Venezuelan government is the episode of the vote on the definition of democracy (contained in a U.S.-backed draft) for the Americas to be included in the Democratic Charter of the 2001 Summit of the Americas. On that occasion, the Venezuelan government openly objected to a definition of democracy that required free elections, a pluralist system of political parties, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Venezuelan government claimed that the proposed conceptualization of democracy was too narrow, and pushed for the inclusion of

In the aftermath of his electoral victory, Chvez convened a Constitutional Assembly to draw a new Constitution. This new legal framework, approved by the majority of Venezuelan voters in December 1999, became the central means to bring about sweeping structural political and societal changes in Venezuela.3 In the preamble of the new constitution, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is defined as a democratic, participatory and protagonist society. This broad and diffuse notion roughly speaks to the idea that societys government and political institutions should be constructed on the basis of direct popular participation in public affairs. Thus, in contrast to the representation principle prevailing in most modern democracies, the idea of participatory democracy conceives of direct citizen participation and engagement in public policy as an essential element of the democratic quality of a polity. In the 1999 Constitution, the idea of a participatory and protagonist democracy replaces the model of representative democracy installed in Venezuela in 1958. While at the formal level, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a democracy,4 the radical trajectory of President Chvez has led many scholars and observers of Venezuelan politics to question the democratic nature of his regime. For some, Hugo Chvez and his Bolivarian Revolution have seriously damaged democracy in Venezuela. From this perspective, his eight years in power have been characterized by a complete

the word participatory. Eventually, Venezuelas proposal was rejected, and Venezuela signed the democratic charter, but with reservations.
3

The decision to convene a Constitutional Assembly was approved in a national referendum with 92% of the vote. On July 25, 1999 elections were held to elect 131 deputies to the Constitutional Assembly, which debated proposals for the new constitution. The constitution was ultimately approved with 71.78% of the vote in a national referendum held in December 15th 1999.
4

Art. 2 of the 1999 Constitution states that Venezuela is a democratic state and a state of law and social justice that upholds as superior values of its legal framework and actions, life, freedoms, justice, equality, solidarity, democracy, and social responsibility, and in general, the preeminence of human rights, ethics, and political pluralism. (Constitucin de la Repblica Bolivariana deVenezuela, authors translation).

disregard for the rule of law, the weakening of government institutions, the breakdown of the party system, and lack of real competition, and deep political and social polarization. Chvez has been able to achieve full partisan control of key government institutions (i.e, National Assembly, the Courts, the National Electoral Commission, the Attorney General office, the Comptroller General office, the Ombudsman office), undermining their autonomy and independence. Further, Chvez has direct control of the spending and investment of the countrys oil income (through partisan hold of the oil state enterprise, PDVSA), a circumstance that allows him to design and implement populist policies and programs known in Venezuela as misiones that function as the central mechanisms of distribution of natural resources among the poor, the subject and object of his Bolivarian Revolution. From this perspective, Hugo Chvez is a populist leader who bypasses traditional political institutions and creates direct links with the popular sectors. In short, the current political system is Venezuela would be best characterized by populism and the increasingly personalistic and arguably authoritarian style of rule of President Chvez. For others, Hugo Chvez and his Bolivarian Revolution are foremost about empowering the poor. In a nation like Venezuela, a nation plagued with poverty and social inequality, the radical approach of Hugo Chvez with focus on redistribution of wealth and other social aspects of public policy is crucial, and justified, to address the entrenched disparity of the Venezuelan society. The Bolivarian Revolutions is effecting a major transformation in Venezuela, a transformation that involves greater social inclusion and democracy.

This paper considers how the idea of democracy endorsed by Chvez and his political project frame current understandings of democracy in Venezuela. For instance, do Venezuelans favor participatory democracy instead of representative democracy? The first section of the paper discusses the major politico-institutional features and political developments underlying the consolidation and demise of representative democracy in Venezuela, hereafter Punto Fijo democracy (1958-1998), and the transition toward the Bolivarian Republic (1998-). The focus of the analysis is on the limitations of institutions and political practices of the Punto Fijo democracy and in the emergence of demands for participatory democracy. The following section discusses the notion of a participatory and protagonist democracy as codified in the 1999 Constitution. This discussion takes into account diverse and competing perspectives on the meaning of participatory and protagonist democracy. Having outlined the ideological and political framings of the notion of democracy contained in the Venezuelan constitution, the paper assesses the efforts of the chavismo to concretize the idea of participatory democracy. Finally, the paper looks beyond the theoretical debate and the political struggle around democracy in Venezuela, and examines public opinion data on how the general population conceives of democracy. From Representative to Participatory Democracy Punto Fijo Democracy: The Rise and Fall of Representative Democracy in Venezuela The end of the rule of Marcos Perez Jimnez in 1958 marked the beginning of a long-lasting era of democratic governance in Venezuela.5 Until that moment, Venezuela
5

Since 1958 Venezuelan democracy has confronted several challenges threatening its survival. Such challenges include a significant guerrilla insurgency in the 1960s and attempted military coups early in the Punto Fijo era (1960s) and toward its end (1990s). In 2002, President Hugo Chvez was temporarily ousted from power by a joint civil-military coup and replaced by the president of FEDECAMARAS (the

had had only a brief and turbulent experience with democratic politics;6 this lack of democratic experience made the transition to the new regime an intricate process of coalition building and political compromise among national elites (Levine 1973; Levine and Crisp 1995). Once installed, the new regime, hereafter Punto Fijo democracy,7 opened the way to a long period of relative political stability rooted in a political formula endorsing quintessential procedures and institutions of liberal representative democracy. The essential feature of the Punto Fijo democracy was the development of a twoparty-dominant competitive electoral system. Political parties, and in particular the social-democratic party AD and the social-Christian party COPEI, came to dominate political and social relations to such an extent that a student of Venezuelan politics qualified the Venezuelan system as a party-regime or partyarchy (Coppedge 1994). This formula of power competition and representation was established and maintained over the years due to a developing consensus among Venezuelan elites. While initially cautious and untruthful toward each other, Venezuelan elites gradually came to agree on the opportunities for mutual benefit inherent in this model. Myers points to the years between 1958 and 1975 as a period of elite convergence, a period in which establishment elites concluded that they were prospering in a representative democracy dominated by mass-based political parties (2004, 20).

main business association in the country), Pedro Carmona Estanga.

6

The trienio period (1945-1948) represents the first and short-lived experience of mass politics in Venezuela.
7

The name refers to the foundational pact, the Punto Fijo Pact, signed between the major political parties, AD, COPEI and URD, with the exclusion of the left. Juan Carlos Rey (1972) coined the phrase of sistema populista de reconciliacin to signify this arrangement. The central tenets of the socio-political model being built in Venezuela were electoral democracy and sovereign control of the oil wealth, conceived as the basis of the nations economic progress.

Traditional elites represented by the landowners and the military assured themselves an advantageous situation under the Punto Fijo model, and despite their suspicions during the first two governments headed by the social-democratic AD, they gradually backed the political model.8 The business sector came to co-exist and benefit from a state-centered model of development advanced by the Punto Fijo democracy. Within an expanding state role in the economy, the private capital was able to prosper and gained a voice in the policy-making process. Prior conflict between the Catholic Church and the emergent political actors, in particular AD, was settled through a series of compromises9 that preserved the central role of the Catholic institutions in Venezuelas social fabric. The main political parties, AD and COPEI, were at the center of this process of consensus building, mediating agreements and compromises among the elites. Through these potent mass organizations, party leaders also shared benefits with their allies in societal organizations. The parties had established organic links with interest groups such as unions, peasant leagues, neighborhood organizations, professional associations, and so on, and throughout these connections were able to dispense substantial levels of patronage among their followers. For several decades, the two-dominant party system based on the cooperation among the party leaders to share and monopolize power assured that wealth distribution,
8

The traditional agricultural sector found that in contrast with the radical land reform policies of the trienio government (headed by Rmulo Gallegos, AD, 1945-1948), the policies of the first two AD administrations followed a path to land reform that did not substantially affect nor change the land distribution structure in the nations. Land distribution affected mostly state-owned rather than privatelyowned land, while public policy toward this sector favored credits, subsides, and the creation of markets for agricultural products. The military also was suspicious of the civilian leadership, but came to accept and to sustain the model of representative democracy. Among the factors explaining this change were the decision of the civilian governments to provide a significant budgetary allocation to the military and the redefinition of military responsibility as guardian of the constitution (Myers 2004, 21).
9

For a detailed explanation see Levine 1973.

mostly derived from the oil rent, reached both relevant elites and the general public. The cornerstone for the stability of the Punto Fijo democracy was this arrangement and the ensuing, albeit partial,10 consensus on its effectiveness to achieve economic and social prosperity.11 Presiding over a powerful state apparatus, elites controlling the dominant parties initiated policies that turned Venezuela from a predominantly rural and backward society into an urbanized and modernizing society. In the early 1970s Venezuela was experiencing a boom of prosperity sustained by the high oil prices, and the idea (or dream) of the Gran Venezuela was seen as something achievable. Oil wealth both shaped and sustained the model of representative democracy, and assured its stability by minimizing class conflict. Soon after, however, the first signs of trouble for Venezuelas Punto Fijo democracy were in sight. Regardless of whether the focus of explanation12 hinges on political, institutional, and/or economic variables, most analysts agree that the illusion of

10

Leftist parties were marginalized under the Punto Fijo Pact. This marginalization led these forces to fight an armed struggle against Punto Fijo governments. These forces came from the Communist party (PCV), and factions from URD and AD. During the administration of Rafael Caldera (1968-1973), the amnesty policy provided a means for these forces to abandon the armed struggle and join the democratic game. Perhaps a good indicator of the partial consensus that existed on the legitimacy of the representative democratic model is the fact that some of the some of the leading figures of the guerrilla insurgency such as Luis Miquelena, Jose Vicente Rangel, and Ali Rodriguez Araque among others occupied top government positions in the first administration of Hugo Chvez.
11

For analysis that highlight the importance of negotiation and pacts among national elites for the transition and consolidation of the model of representative democracy in Venezuela see Levine, 1973; Karl 1987; Higley and Gunther 1992; and Peeler 1992, 1998.
12

Scholars have pointed to diverse explanations of the demise of the model of representative democracy in Venezuela. Some explanations focus on political and institutional variables such as the elitist and exclusionary nature of regimes built upon party pacts (Crisp, Levine and Rey 1995), the highly centralized and rigid design of the political parties of the Punto Fijo (Coppedge 1994, Oropeza 1983), and the lack of flexibility in drawing and applying lessons from past political experiences (Jcome 2000, McCoy 1999, 2000). Other theses emphasize political economy variables such as the inherent weaknesses of rentier states (e.g., Karl 1987, 1997), the destabilizing effects of adjusting economic policies (Naim 1993), and the emergence of class conflict (Ellner and Hellinger 2003). For more detailed explanation see Myers (2004).

plenty and the apparent social harmony to which Venezuelans had become accustomed started to crumble in the early 1980s. By then, escalating troubles in the economic, social, and political spheres converged to create profound disequilibria that threatened the functioning and stability of the political regime. The first marker of serious economic crisis emerged on February 18th 1983, or Black Friday. Following a deep fall in oil prices in 1982, the government of President Luis Herrera Campns decided on a massive devaluation of Venezuelan currency, awaking common Venezuelans to an ensuing reality of economic crisis. Unemployment, inflation, continued devaluation, social inequalityand poverty accumulated and fashioned a significant performance deficit for the democratic political system. In tandem with the deteriorating economic situation, the country entered a serious political crisis. An early sign of the crisis was the climbing rate of abstention in Venezuelan elections. Despite efforts to decentralize and democratize the political system through a series of reforms such as the introduction of separate municipal and state elections, and electoral reform aiming to enhance the connection between the legislators and their constituencies, voters showed disaffection with the traditional political parties, anchors of the model of representative democracy. Electoral abstention continued to rise throughout the 1980s and 1990s, while those who chose to participate in the electoral processes began to favor non-traditional parties such as the Causa Radical (LCR) and Convergencia. One of the most dramatic signs of the brewing political and institutional crisis took place on February 27th 1989. Reacting to the shock-treatment formula used to implement neo-liberal policies by the recently inaugurated president Carlos Andrs

Prez, the population of Caracas, and later the other main cities in Venezuela, staged massive protests and extensive looting that lasted for several days.13 El Caracazo, as these protests later became known, ended the illusion of social harmony. Those were days of social anomie in Venezuela. The majority of protesters came from the popular sectors, and particularly the poor living at the fringe of Venezuelan cities (Civit and Espaa 1989; Lpez Maya 1999). For the first time in several decades it was clear that the traditional mechanisms to channel social conflict such as parties, unions and community associations, were not working. As conflict turned violent, the government called for the intervention of the armed forces. The ensuing repression ended with an official count of 300 dead, but unofficial reports put this figure around 1,000 dead. El Caracazo revealed the intensification of social tensions and conflict, a situation that would remain true throughout the 1990s.

13

Protest and riots spread throughout Venezuela from February 27th to March 5th. The specific event that triggered the protest was a sudden increase in bus fares.

In sum, the Punto Fijo democracy established in 1958 adopted the liberal principles of protection of individual civil and political rights, and the institutions and mechanisms of political representation. In practice, this model operated for almost four decades through the establishment of a two-dominant party system. Strong and highly disciplined political organizations, the dominant parties AD and COPEI, took over the state institutions and penetrated the various spheres of Venezuelan society. These parties did more than articulate social interests and intermediate the relations between state and society, as they also developed mechanisms of co-option and social control that were instrumental in minimizing social conflict. Over time, however, two dynamics would affect the parties ability to continue dominating and managing the socio-political dynamic. The operation of the vast networks of clientelism and patronage that AD and COPEI developed were tied to the states rents. As a result, this pattern of partydomination, and the viability of the Punto Fijo democracy altogether, was highly vulnerable to the political economy of oil. Additionally, the leadership of the traditional parties grew isolated and distant from the rank-and file of their own organizations, and of the population in general. The traditional parties grew impotent to contain class conflict, and in particular to satisfy the demands of the lower classes that had suffered the most during the times of economic crisis (Buxton 2001, 222). Further, increasing perceptions of corruption among the population led to disenchantment with these parties, and therefore to the breakdown of the traditional party system. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, calls for democratizing democracy were voiced, but party leaders were reluctant14 to introduce constitutional and institutional changes that
14

The inability (or unwillingness) of the traditional parties to articulate and aggregate the multiple and heterogeneous interests of the middle and popular sectors created by the process of modernization that the country experienced in the 20th century led to what Carrera Damas, an influential Venezuelan historian,

10

would effectively expand the number of actors in the political and policy process. Dramatic events such as the protest of February 1989 and the two attempted military coups of 1992 revealed the depth of social polarization in Venezuela and eventually prompted some action from the political elites, but it was too little to late. Venezuelans were hungry for radical change.

Democratizing Democracy: Civil Society and Participatory Democracy The idea of participatory democracy in Venezuela is not of the exclusive property of the Chavista movement. New social organizations that sought autonomy from political parties began to emerge in Venezuela in the 1970s.15 In the early stages of civil society in Venezuela, these social organizations were concerned with non-political issues but by the 1980s the callings for a deeper democratic process began to be voiced. Demands for deepening democracy and greater participation, for a participatory democracy, were first articulated by the citizen movement mostly led by middle class social organizations, a movement that emerged as a reaction to the 1979 Ley Orgnica de Rgimen Muncipal,16 but soon after this movement came to incorporate the popular organizations as well. Different strategies, including popular mobilization and protest and
observes as the disarticulation between the political and societal, the political structure did not evolve at the same pace as society and lacked the capacity to channel the enormous forces that have been unleashed (cited in Cedeo 2006, 93).
15

Garca Gaudilla (2003) distinguishes distinct phases in the evolution of civil society in Venezuela. The first phase (1960-1980) saw the emergence and formation social movements. In contrast with formal organizations linked to political parties, these new social movements were autonomous from the state, they did not have corporative structures, and they endorsed the principles of participation, equity, and solidarity. These movements mobilized around issues that were not directly political such as the environment, gender, community, and human rights. A second phase in the development civil society (1980 1998) involved the adoption of objectives of high symbolic political value; for example, the struggles for political decentralization and participatory democracy took a central stage on the agenda of some of these social movements.
16

This law recognizes a limited role for the local community in the solution of their local needs.

11

the effective use of media to promote their goals and influence political decision-making, were useful to expand the scope of the movementfrom a Caracas-centered movement to a national movementand to give it a decisively political connotation (GarcaGuadilla and Roa 1996). For this heterogeneous citizen movement, participatory democracy meant greater participation in the decision-making process at the local, state, and national levels, and also meant political decentralization (Garca Guadilla 2003; Alvarez 2003). This push for more democracy fueled decentralization and state reform struggles that in the 1980s and 1990s led the political leadership to initiate a process of limited political reform. One of the most important initiatives was the creation of a national commission for the reform of the state, la Comisin para la Reforma del Estado (COPRE) by President Lusinchi (1984-1988). The 1988 COPRE prioritized citizen participation in the decisions of their local affairs, all within the frame of liberal democracy (Silva 1999; Garca-Gaudilla 2003).17 Implementation of the COPREs recommendations occurred in the context of increasing social and political turmoil. Following the massive 1989 protest, President Carlos Andrs Prez immediately began the reform of the 1961 Constitution that led to political-administrative decentralization in Venezuela,18 and therefore, to the formal recognition of the demands of greater participation articulated by social movements and various civil society organizations. This process of constitutional reform that lasted until 1994 occurred in a context of mounting economic troubles and serious political crisisheightened by the two coup
17

Silva (1999) explains how the COPREs report, while it sought to limit the excess of political representation and enhance citizen participation in their local affairs, did not propose the democratization of the political institutions that would eventually lead to a true participatory democracy. 18 Significant legal instruments were the 1989 Ley Orgnica de Decentralizacin y Transferencia de la Competencia, and the reform introduced the Ley Orgnica de Rgimen Municipal sanctioned in 1979.

12

attempts in 1992. This situation expanded the diversity of interests and ideologies of the social movements and organizations of the civil society that were participating in the process of constitutional reform.19 Garca-Gaudilla (2003) explains that, broadly speaking, there were two main groups of actors: those social organizations highlighting the question of neo-liberalism and its effects on social inequalities in the country, and those actors focusing attention on political and institutional reform. The breakdown of the consensus that existed in the 1980s among social movements and organizations was typical of these years and in turn differentiation and clarification of societal projects marked the rhythm of civil society. A renewed and articulated citizen movement emerged in 1999 when the new president Hugo Chvez convened a National Constitutional Assembly. By then, discredited political parties could not serve as legitimate representatives of society, and social organizations and movements occupied that space.20 Much like in the prior decade, the notion of participatory democracy integrated in a common and diffuse goal the agendas of heterogeneous social actors. This time, however, in contrast with their participation in the former process of constitutional reform, the various social organizations were promoting their particular values, interests, and societal projects (Garca-Guadilla 2003). Given the diffuse nature of the notion of participatory democracy, it is not surprising that contending views and interpretations on the meaning

19

Between 1989 and 1994 a vast number of social organizations formulated different proposals and projects that were presented to the national Congress. These proposals ranged from calling for a National Constitutional Assembly (rejected by Congress) to further constitutional reform (the path eventually decided by Congress). For a detailed account on the number and nature of the civil societys proposals, see Garca-Guadilla (2003) 20 Garca-Gaudilla (2003) describes the process of re-articulation of the citizen movement around the 1999 constitutional process. Using formal and informal networks, civil society organizations participated actively in multiple round-tables, workshops, seminars, and effectively used the media to advance their proposals.

13

of democracy and on the procedures, initiatives, and mechanisms for making democracy possible appeared in this process. At the end, social movements and organizations whose values and ideas were consistent with the Bolivarian project of Hugo Chvez were more likely to be included in the new constitution. For instance, measured by the percentage of proposals approved to be included in the 1999 constitution, there was a clear success for those organizations proposing a radical and alternative model of democracy (65% of proposals approved) in comparison with those organizations proposing a liberal model of democracy (only 33% of their proposals were approved) (Garca-Gaudillo 2003). Much of the social and political conflict that developed in Venezuela over the last years has been connected in some these conflicting views about democracy; therefore, outlining the tenets of this idea of participatory democracy, how Chvez and his movement is trying to implement the model of participatory democracy, and how the general population understands what democracy is are of vital importance if we are to gain insight regarding the likely future path of democracy in Venezuela. What is participatory and protagonist democracy? There is not a straightforward answer to this question. There are several reasons for this situation. First, the notion of participatory democracy is normative, and, as a result, controversial. Second, the conception of democracy established in the 1999 constitution has been subjected to interpretations in line with both a radical and a liberal conception of democracy, leaving ambiguity as to meaning. Third, the notion of participatory democracy has been and continues to be a point of contention in Venezuela, bringing continuing fluidity to how this concept is defined.

14

Elements compatible with two contending views of democracy can be found in the 1999 Constitution (Garca-Gaudillo 2003). The first perspective conceives of democracy as representative democracy, but it strives for real representation. This view,21 in line with the liberal conception of democracy, understands the participatory and protagonist dimensions of democracy to mean citizen participation through intermediating agencies, primarily through autonomous and representative social organizations. The second perspective assumes the participatory and protagonist dimensions of democracy to mean direct participation by the people in public affairs. Thus, this perspective conceives of democracy as direct democracy.22As delineated in Art.70 of the Constitution, direct participation means that the people have the right to use and activate a series of participatory mechanisms, including elections, referenda, citizen legislative initiatives, citizen assemblies, and so on, which are conceived as means of direct citizen participation in political affairs. Beyond this, in the economic and social spheres, this perspective recognizes a protagonist role to the people organized in social organizations such as community organizations, cooperatives, associations, and so on, to participate actively in the decisions concerning their particular needs and affairs. In sum, this perspective conceives of democracy as a means of empowerment of the people by promoting their direct participation in public affairs. The debate about what form of democracy exists in Venezuela is not merely academic in nature. After the enactment of the 1999 Constitution, much of the political struggle in the country has related to the issue of defining the relevant actors (which actors are to be included), and the mechanisms and institutions that would make possible
21

This view was proposed by SINERGIA, a civil society network, in the Ley Orgnica de Participacin Popular, Ciudadana y Comunitaria presented to the National Assembly. 22 This view was formally articulated by the project Machn presented by leftist social organizations to the National Assembly.

15

a participatory democracy in the country. Hugo Chvez and his movement have worked toward designing policies and institutions to concretize the idea of participatory democracy. Chavismo and Participatory Democracy While much focus of the analysis of Venezuelan politics is devoted to the figure of Hugo Chvez, his politics and policies, less attention has been given to the role that popular sectors are playing in shaping the nature of the political process in Venezuela. The bases of the Chavista movement includes both unorganized and organized popular sectors that have mobilized to support Hugo Chvez in critical times during his government, but that also maintain their own struggle for identity and autonomy from the state (Ellner 2006, Fernandes 2006).

16

Many of the emblematic Chavistas organizations have been born under the watch, and even guidance, of Hugo Chvez, but many others social organizations pre-date Chvezs leadership,23 and still others continue to flourish today in Venezuelas barrios and neighborhoods.24 Some of these organizations, such as community and neighborhood organizations, had a history of shifting clientelist relationships with the state, a situation that arguably is being refashioned by Hugo Chvezs social policies. At the center of the relationships between Chvez and these organizations are issues of autonomy and dependence vis--vis the Venezuelan state; a connection that I foresee as a key defining factor in determining whether democracy, and what kind of democracy, will endure in Venezuela.

23

For example for 1998 a study found that the spectrum of civil society organizations in Venezuela includes about 25,000 organizations (Gmez 2005). 24 Fernandes (2007) illustrates this point by narrating her own experience during her fieldwork in Venezuela (2004-2006) where she witnessed the birth of grass roots social organizations from community radio, health committees, cofradias, mural collectivities, etc.

17

The grass-roots movement in support of the Chvez government and his view of democracy is heterogeneous. Jcome (2006) classifies the chavista social organization those allied with the governmentin two basic categories. On one side, there are organizations created from above. Among these organizations were found different degrees of state control over the organizations. First, there are organizations over which the government has substantial control because they are organized and financed by the government. One of the most emblematic of such organizations is the Crculos Bolivarianos25 (Hawkins and Hansen 2006; Valencia Ramrez 2005). The Crculos Bolivarianos were presented by president Chvez as a mechanism for the participation of the people and for the strengthening of the revolutionary process and implementation of participatory and protagonist democracy (Gmez 2005). Originally, the Crculos Bolivarianos were supposed to work on community problems concerning education, health, and other social issues, but as the political crisis intensified (2002-2004) these organizations proved to be very effective in mobilizing political support from the popular sectors. The Crculos Bolivarianos, like other organizations created from above such as the Unidades de Batalla Electoral, the Unidades de Desarrollo Endgeno, have proven to be short-lived, and have served a punctual political goal. Other social organizations, although not created by the government, organizations such as the Tupamaros, the Clase Media en Positivo, the Fuerza Bolivariana de Trabajadores, were rapidly politicized and weakened by the recruitment of their activists by the state and for the benefits offered by the states social policies (Ellner 2006).

25

Hugo Chvez presented himself as the main leader of the Crculos Bolivarianos, and the office for the direction of these organizations was established in the presidential palace.

18

Pro-government organizations have also mushroomed around specific social programs such as cooperatives (i.e., cooperatives mixtas de abastecimientos, cooperatives de gas, cooperatives de medicinas), Fundos Zamuranos, and various community organizations (Alayn 2005). Further, the government has displayed efforts toward these new social organizations and unorganized social sectors such as the informal sector (buhoneros), the unemployed, the retired and students through a number of social programs or misiones. (Garca-Gaudilla 2003). These programs combine to create a vast network of clientelism that is instrumental in addressing some of the needs of these sectors, while at the same time assuring political support. At the other end of the chavista field, there are social organizationssome of them existing prior to the arrival of Chvez to power such as Comits de Tierras, Mesas Tcnicas de Agua, Consejos Comunitarios de Aguathat are focused on social rather than political issues, and that strive to maintain their own identity and autonomy from Hugo Chvez, his political party, and the state bureaucracy. Acting above these myriad diverse social organizations and sectors is a powerful state apparatus that, thanks to the high level of income from oil, is able to implement a number of social programs aiming to empower the popular sectors (Lpez Maya 2005). Several misiones sociales Misin Barrio Adentro (in the area of health), Misin Robison I, Misin Robison II (in the area of literacy), Misin Ribas, Misin Sucre and Misin Vuelvan Caras (in the formal and vocational education areas), Misin Habitat (in the area of housing), Misin Mercal (in the area of food distribution and security), among the most important (Salas 2004, Lpez Maya 2005, Alayn 2005, La Cruz 2006) have been instrumental in making the state a facilitating agent of peoples empowerment.

19

A recent and major development concerning the future of civil society in Venezuela, the relation between state and civil society, and the future of participatory democracy, concerns the establishment of the Popular Power, whose central elements are represented by the consejos comunales. The antecedents of the Consejos Comunales date back to the local planning councils (consejos locales de planificacin)26 designed to create a space for people to directly participate within the local governments. Late in 2005, the figure of consejos comunales as the new unit of social organization for selfgovernment was introduced by President Chvez. On March 2, 2006 the Ley of Consejos Comunales was approved. This lawwhich is currently under revision by a presidential commission, designated Consejo Presidencial del Poder Populardefines these organizations as units formed by a group of families (for example between 200 and 400 families in the case of urban areas) that should act as means of articulation and integration of disparate community organizations toward the end of assuring that people participate in public policy. The consejos comunales coordinates and links any social organizations such as Mesas Tcnicas de Agua, sport organizations, cultural associations, etc., functioning within a given territorial area. In sum, the consejos comunales are integrating social organizations corresponding to a given territorial units. Arguably, the current structure of the consejos comunales offers limitations to the idea of participatory democracy, or more precisely of autonomous participatory democracy. According to the law, the consejos comunales are highly dependent on the Executive power, and more specifically on the Presidential Commission for the Popular Power (CPPP) where they must register (and therefore be recognized as legitimate

26

The Law regulating the Consejos Locales de Planificacin was published in Gaceta Oficial in June 12, 2002.

20

community organizations) and present the proposals and projects related to their community and local needs. At the end, it is the CPPP, and Hugo Chvez himself, who decide on the financing of resources for these projects. Thus, as the law is currently conceived, rather than peoples empowerment, these programs promote clientelism.

How Venezuelans View Democracy Both formally and informally, the conceptualization of democracy in Venezuela has undergone a substantial transformation. At least nominally, the most dramatic element of this transformation has involved the downplaying of representative democracy, and a corresponding increase in emphasis on participatory democracy. As we have seen, pragmatic rather than exclusively philosophical mattersespecially the generation of political support through clientelismhave motivated this change. Nonetheless, the shifting conceptualization of democracy potentially has brought an array of consequences. One area will be examined here, namely whether Venezuelan citizens conceptions of democracy reflect the changes that have occurred in their nations constitutional structure and policy arena. The replacement of representative democracy, or, as Chvez and his followers frame it, of elite-led democracy, with a more participatory structure is a keystone of the Bolivarian Revolution. Therefore, learning how the general public in Venezuela conceives of democracy is of critical importance in assessing the extent of success of the Bolivarian Revolution, and perhaps of the possible limits that citizens may impose on what some see as the increasingly authoritarian leanings of Hugo Chvez and his regime (e.g., Nam 2001; Corrales 2006)

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How do Venezuelans evaluate their democracy? Are their evaluations different from those of citizens elsewhere in Latin America? According to data from the Latinobarometro surveys, there is a clear preference for democracy in the Latin American region in comparison to other political regimes, but that preference has declined in recent years. While in 1996, 61 percent of Latin American respondents supported democracy in comparison to other forms of government, in 2005 the average support for democracy in the region was 53 percent, with only three nations, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela, reaching levels of support higher than 70 percent. That Costa Rica and Uruguay, with their strong democratic tradition and their solid trajectory on social welfare, have high levels of support for democracy is unsurprising. However, it is somewhat surprising that Venezuela sits in second place, after Uruguay, among the countries with the highest support for democracy in the region. In Figure 1, we see that support for democracy in Venezuela is considerably higher than the regions average. Given Venezuelas recent political turbulence and continuing social inequality, the bases of Venezuelans positive assessments of democracy warrant consideration. The 2005 Latinobarometer also asked respondents to assess how democratic was their country. Specifically, respondents in the 17 nations of the study were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 10 whether their country was totally democratic or not democratic at all. The data, displayed in Figure 2, reveal that Venezuelans rated their country as highly democratic (with a 7.6 score). In fact, the Venezuelan political system was deemed by their own citizens as the most democratic when compared with corresponding assessments in other countries in the region. On this measure, Venezuela exceeded even Uruguay and Costa Rica.

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If democracy enjoys such a highly favorable outlook among Venezuelan citizens, how is it, then, that large numbers of observers, including some within Venezuela, view the current political system as increasingly authoritarian? Seemingly, Venezuelan citizens and observers of the Venezuelan political system are somehow talking past one another, perhaps assessing democracy on different bases. Latinbarometer data permit an indirect test of this possibility. If Venezuelan citizens conceptions of democracy have shifted toward a more participatory framework, then we should see differences in how Venezuelans and other Latin Americans interpret the meaning of democracy. Specifically, Venezuelans should be less likely to emphasize features of representative democracy such as matters related to the occurrence of competitive elections,27 and should instead prioritize mass participation and social and political equality. I examine this question with data from the 2005 Latinobarometer survey. Specifically, I consider data from an open-ended item28 that asked respondents what democracy means for them; this item offers the respondent the opportunity to mention up to two definitions of democracy. The data in Figure 3 reveal, first, that most Venezuelans were able to verbalize the meaning of democracy, with about 40 percent of respondents providing two definitions of democracy. Overall only about 11 percent of respondent did not provide an answer to the question when asked for the first time (about 9 percent said that they did not know what democracy is, and about 2 percent did not answer), versus a dont know rate of over 30 percent among the remainder of Latin Americans. Hence, postponing for the moment assessment of how Venezuelans conceive of democracy, the
27

This point is debatable. On one hand, the occurrence of meaningfully competitive elections under a stable multi-party system quite obviously is less central in the Chavez era than in earlier times. But on the other hand, the Chavez government has emphasized the importance of mass participation in elections. 28 The exact wording of the question is Para Ud., que significa democracia? Y qu ms? This item has been included in the 2001, 2002 and 2005 surveys.

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level of politicization, and therefore willingness to define democracy, among Venezuelans is strikingly high. As to the substance of respondents conceptions of democracy, the evidence is consistent with the thesis that emphasis on participatory democracy on the part of the Chvez government has resonated with the Venezuelan citizenry, albeit perhaps only rather marginally. Setting aside dont know responses, and focusing solely on respondents substantive replies, the leading conceptualization of democracy both in Venezuela (63.9 percent of all answers regarding the first and second meaning of democracy) and in the remainder of Latin America (58.0 percent) is in terms of civil rights. These conceptualizations are not central to Venezuelas shifting emphasis from representative democracy to participatory democracy, and thus it appears that political change in Venezuela has not been of direct relevance for many citizens views as to the meaning of democracy. However, three other categoriesgovernment by the people, social and economic equality, and electoral proceduresdo link more squarely with central features of governance under Chvez. Here, we see that, relative to other Latin Americans, Venezuelans are, by the thinnest of margins, more likely to conceive of democracy in participatory (5.8 percent for Venezuela versus 5.4 percent for the rest of Latin America) and outcome-based (4.7 percent versus 2.7 percent) terms, and only half as likely to define democracy in terms of electoral procedures (4.8 percent versus 9.5 percent). These differences, although less than overwhelming in magnitude, suggest that political change in Venezuela has resonated with the citizenry. Venezuelans have not raced to embrace participatory democracy in the sense of defining democracy as

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government by the people, but there is a subtle emphasis on democracy as implying social and economic equality. More prominently, in Venezuela relative to the remainder of Latin America, there is a clear tendency to defer from defining democracy in terms of competing parties and contested elections. It warrants reiteration that these differences between Venezuela and other Latin American nations are very modest in magnitude. Hence, we are left with something of a puzzle. The Venezuelan political structure has undergone a dramatic transformation in the past decade. Viewed favorably, this transformation has changed the nations orientation with respect to democracy. Viewed more critically, this transformation has propelled Venezuela down an undemocratic path. Yet, at the mass level, Venezuelan citizens exhibit relatively high levels of support for democracy, and their conceptions of democracy are only slightly at odds with those of citizens of other Latin American nations. Certainly it does not appear that the people of Venezuela view developments in their nation as threatening to democratic governance. But what we do not know is whether this sanguine response is founded on an appreciation of the scope of the structural changes that have occurred in Venezuela, or, instead, is rooted in more momentary considerations. Conclusion The promise of a better democracy rooted on the principle of the peoples participation in politics and public policy has been a key factor in Hugo Chvezs electoral success. After eight years of Chavismo, the reality of participatory democracy is an open and difficult question looming over the future of Venezuelas polity. In line with the trajectory and history of social movements in Latin America, Venezuelas social

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organizations, and in particularly pro-government organizations, display a low degree of autonomy vis--vis the state. In Venezuela, the enormous resources from the countrys oil wealth finance numerous social programs targeted to the popular sectors, and have created strong patron-client relationships between the state and popular organizations. By co-opting and controlling these social organizations, Chvez and his government undermine one of the most important conditions to sustain participatory democracy, autonomy from the state. The Venezuelan case exemplifies the difficulties and challenges that social organizations may confront in defining their relations with those in power, even when the official discourse endorse the idea of participatory democracy. At least thus far, however, any repercussions for mass sentiment have been neutral, and perhaps even positive. Venezuelans are highly supportive of democracy, and their views of the meaning of democracy differ only modestly from the interpretations of democracy provided elsewhere in the region. After his 2006 electoral victory Hugo Chvez moved rapidly to concretize his proposal of Socialism of the 21th century. Is this a new characterization for the process of deepening of democracy in the second term of Chvezs rule? Is this idea a reconceptualization of the notion of participatory and protagonist democracy that guided the process of political and institutional change from 1999 to 2006? How is this socialism different from participatory democracy? What will be the institutions of this new system? Who will be the central actors? For Venezuelan citizens, all of these remain open questions, yet questions of critical importance in determining the nature of their nations political system. Data from 2005 reported here reveal that a strong majority of Venezuelans conceive of democracy in terms of freedom and civil rights, while relatively

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few citizens view democracy in terms of competing political parties, contested elections, or even mass participation. If this basic conceptualization of democracy continues to endure, then the ultimate success, and perhaps even stability, of the Chvez regime may well hinge on the extent to which citizens perceive that their freedom suffers no erosion under Chvezs brand of socialism.

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Fig. 1 Support for Democracy in 2005

100 90 80 70 percentage 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Support for Democracy

Venezuela

Rest of Latin America

Source: Latinobarometer 2005, N=20,207 Q: With which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government / Under some circumstances, and authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one/ For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime. Here Democracy is preferable to any other kind of regime.

Fig. 2 How Democratic is (country) in 2005? (mean score)

10

scale of democracy

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Venezuela

Rest of Latin America

Source: Latinobarometer 2005, N=20,207

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Q: This is a scale to rate how democratic (country) is? The top 10, means that (country) is totally democratic, the bottom1 means that the country is not democratic. Where would you place (country)

Fig 3a. Percentage of Don't Know/No answer replies to the Democracy Meaning Item (first mention)

35 30 25 percentage 20 15 10 5 0 Venezuela Rest of Latin Am erica

Source: Latinbarometer 2005, N=20,207 Q: To you, what does democracy mean? What else (open-ended)

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Fig 3b. Meaning of Democracy in 2005

70

60

50

percentage

40

30

20

10

0
Freedoms and Elections and Government Civil Rights Political Rights of, by and for the people Economic and Social Outcomes Peace and Unity Other Positive Neutral Meaning Negative Meanings

Venezuela

Rest of Latin America

Source: Latinbarometer 2005, N=20,207 Q: To you, what does democracy mean? What else (open-ended)

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