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JohnB.Taylor StanfordUniversity
October27,2011 7th AnnualEconomicTeachingConference Cengage Learning,GulfCoastEconomicsAssociation NewOrleans,Louisiana
Outline
Differentviewsofthefinancialcrisis,recession,and recovery
Notsurprisingly,economistsdisagree!
Differentimplicationsforteaching Exampleswillbepresentedthroughouttalkbasedon
EmpiricalResearch UndergraduateTeaching
Economics1atStanford
Textbook
PrinciplesofEconomics,7e,withWeerapana atWellesley
FirsttoincorporatetheFinancialCrisis,
First2eonthefinancialcrisis
Narrative
Economicpolicydeviatedfrombasiceconomic principleswhichhadworkedwell Result?Agreatrecession,afinancialpanic,anda veryweak,nearlynonexistentrecovery. Thedeviationsbeganwithpoliciessuchas
amonetarypolicywithinterestratestoolowfortoolong aregulatorypolicywhichfailedtoenforceexistingrules
OtherNarrative
USpolicywasnotanissueleadinguptothe crisis Globalcapitalflowsweretheproblem
Caused200709crisis:globalsavingsglut
Oreconomicsfailed
Toomuchfaithinmarkets Notenoughpsychology
Slowrecoverybecausetheinterventionswere toosmall;needmore
ImplicationofTwoViewsforBasicEconomics
1.Basicallysound,butstillamajorteaching moment 2.Needsareformulation
PaulSamuelson(January2009)
todayweseehowutterlymistakenwastheMilton Friedmannotionthatamarketsystemcanregulate itselfThisprevailingideologyofthelastfewdecades hasnowbeenreversed.
Butofcourseneedtopresentbothviews
EKGfortheAmericanEconomy
IllustrativemonetarypolicychartfromSan FranciscoFed,March1995,JuddandTrehan
196579
198792
199394
IllustrativemonetarypolicychartfromStLouisFed February2007,BillPoole
PolicyDeviationsLeadinguptothe CrisisandthePanicinFall2008
Interestratestoolowfortoolong DiscretionaryfiscalstimulusofFeb08($152B) Onagain,offagainbailoutsfinancedbycentral banksbalancesheet
on forBSCcreditorsbailout,off forLehmancreditors bailout,on forAIGcreditorsbailout,off forTARProleout
IllustrativemonetarypolicychartfromStLouisFed February2007,BillPoole
IllustrativemonetarypolicychartfromStLouisFed February2007,BillPoole
TheBoomBustinHousing (nowinEconomicsinActionbox)
HousingBoomandBust
Temporarystimulusmeets permanentincomehypothesis
Stock PricesDuringthePanic
TeachingAboutRegulatoryCapture:
Explainsfailuretoenforceregulatoryrules
LinesfromFightoftheCentury
Keynes:Evenyoumustadmitthatthelesson wevelearnedisthatmoreoversightsneeded orelsewellgetburned Hayek:Oversight?Thegovernmentslongbeen inbedwiththoseWallStreetexecsandthe firmsthattheyveled.
Policymakersthendoubleddown
Discretionaryfiscalstimulusof2009($862billion)
Onetimepaymentsagain Moregovernmentspendingtoo
Cashforclunkersprogram Quantitativeeasingin2009,nowcalledQE1
Purchasesof$1.25trillionofmortgagebacked securities,$300billionoflongertermTreasurybonds
QE2in2010and2011
purchasesof$600billionoflongertermTreasury bonds.
IncomeandConsumptionduringtheTwo DiscretionaryStimulusPrograms
Cashforclunkers:incentivesreallymatter (NowinEconomicsinActionbox)
Comparewithtextbookdiscussion: SharpdropinIcausesexpenditurelinetoshiftdown
25_10
New point of spending balance Income or real GDP falls by this amount (more than by amount I falls ). New income level Original income level INCOME OR REAL GDP
G rises
Billions of dollars, annual rates 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2 10Q3 10Q4 --- Federal government consumption --- Federal government investment --- Grants to state and local governments --- Temporary transfer payments and credits to persons
Two-Year Effect of ARRA on Major Federal Budget Categories (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis)
Billions of dollars, annual rates 2,300 2,200 2,100 2,000 1,900 1,800 1,700 1,600 1,500 1,400 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Purchases by state and local governments Recepits less ARRA grants Total receipts of state and local governments
A Legacy:ExplodingFederalDebt (ChartnowinFiscalPolicyChapter)
TowardtheZeroInterestRate
TheLiquidityTrap
TheMonetaryBaseandtheSize oftheFedsBalanceSheet
InternationalEconomicsIssues
IllustrativeChartfromtheOECD,March2008
IllustrativeChartfromtheOECD,March2008
Chinaspurchasesofforeignreserves
SoWhyDoEconomistsDisagree?
Studentsandeveryoneelsereallywantto knowtheanswer Onereasonisthatthedetailsoftheirmodels aredifferent,eventhoughthereisagreement aboutthebasicprinciples ThenextthreechartsfromtheNewYork Times illustratethiswell.
RobertBarro Harvard 6
5
With stimulus
4 3 2 1 0 -1 2009 2010
With stimulus
4 3 2
If no stimulus
1 0 -1 2009
If no stimulus
2010
The accumulation of hard data and real-life experience has allowed more dispassionate analysts to reach a consensus that the stimulus package, messy as it is, is working New York Times November 12, 2009
ImplicationsforTeaching
Manynewillustrationsofbasiceconomics Interestingdebatesbetweeneconomists
Rulesversusdiscretion Basicroleofgovernment
Moreintegrationofmicroandmacro
interestratestoolowfortoolong(macro) housingmarketsincludingbubbles(micro) stimuluspackage(macro) regulatorycaptureandmoralhazard(micro) newinstrumentsofmonetarypolicy(macro) riskpremia ininterestrates(micro) debateoversizeofmultipliers(macro) cashforclunkers,firsttimehomebuyer(micro)
ManyNewYouTubeVideos
QuantitativeEasingExplained.5milliondownloads.Doesn't getitallrightandbrutalinplaces,butgoodfordiscussion TheWrongFinancialAdviser CreatedbyNobelprizewinner BillSharpe FedChairmanontheDailyShowwithJonStewart.Fromtwo differentepisodesof60Minutes,focusonwhether quantitativeeasingisprintingmoney. UnmaskingInterestRates,HonkyTonk Style MerleHazardsings"InflationorDeflation InsideJobTrailer ChristineLagarde inclipfromInsideJob HayekKeynesrapvideos"FeartheBoomandBustandFight oftheCentury