[G.R. No. 118821. February 18, 2000] MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODIN ABDULA, petitioners, vs.

HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, respondent. CASE: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to set aside the WARRANT of ARREST issued by the respondent judge to ABDULA ordering the arrest without bail FACTS: On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder, docketed as I.S. No. 94-1361, was filed before the Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against herein petitioners and six (6) other persons[1] in connection with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao.[2] The complaint alleged that herein petitioners paid the six other respondents the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Abdul Dimalen August 22, 1994, Provincial Prosecutor SALICK U PANDA dismissed the charges of murder except for KASAN MAMA on the grounds that there was no prima facie evidence of murder against them

September 13, 1994, respondent judge returned the case to the prosecutor for further investigation out of 8 accused, only 1 was filed with information with the court without support on how they arrived with the conclusion as required under Section 4 of Rule 112

2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw took over the case. On December 28, 1994, he found a prima facie case for murder against herein petitioners and three (3) other respondents.[8] He thus recommended the filing of charges against herein petitioners Bai Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula, as principals by inducement, and against the three (3) others, as principals by direct participation. December 28 1994 SALICK U PANDA state that he was inhibiting himself from the case which may be disposed without his approval on the ground that the accused was the father in law of his son On January 13, 1995 the respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners ISSUE: W/N the WARRANT OF ARREST is null and void on the ground that the respondent judge failed to personally examine the evidences before issuing the WOA as requred under the Philippine Constitution HELD: YES. To be sure, we cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the respondents examination of the records should be. [42] The extent of the judges examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had before him two different

informations and resolutions charging two different sets of suspects. In the face of these conflicting resolutions, it behooves him not to take the certification of the investigating prosecutor at face value. The circumstances thus require that respondent look beyond the bare certification of the investigating prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the prosecutors determination of probable cause. The inordinate haste that attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest and respondents own admission are circumstances that tend to belie any pretense of the fulfillment of this duty. it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer. [G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004] SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIAS ABUNADO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. - On September 18, 1967, Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceo - On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a Zenaida Bias - On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. - On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. - Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 and has four childrenwith her prior to their separation in 1966. - Salvador was convicted in the RTC for Bigamy. - Case was appealed to CA claiming that his petition for annulment poses a prejudicial questionthat should suspend the criminal case until there has been a decision for the civil case. - CA still affirmed conviction of Salvador for bigamy.

Issue: Whether pending annulment case would suspend the criminal case of Bigamy Held: The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previ ous marriage void and invoke thependency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. The court cannot allowthat. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed validuntil declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventuallyobtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first andthe second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. When is a civil action prejudicial to a criminal case: 1. The civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; 2. In the resolution of the issue/s raised in the civil action, the guilt and innocence of the the accused would be necessarily determined 3. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodge in another tribunal. Based on the case at hand, the third requisite has not been complied with, that is, the annulment case of the accussed would not necessarily determine his innocence. In an annulment case, the marriage is valid until annuled. Hence, Salvador, who is validly married to two individuals on a certain period is guilty of bigamy even if the first marrige may be declared annuled in the future. [G.R. No. 149472. October 15, 2002] JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS: That on or about the 10th date of January 1986 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the Vice President and Treasurer of Aurora/Uni-Group, Inc., received from Olivier Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. as represented by Teresita M. Tujan the amount of $41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture of seven hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound to deliver to said complainant, and the accused

once in possession of the same, far from complying from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence and to defraud said complainant, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his own personal use and benefit despite repeated demands to return the said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned amount of $41,300.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency. Petitioner maintains that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action as estafa was not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group on the basis of the finding that the transaction between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale. Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,[48] the complaint should not have been instituted by Skiva as it is not the offended party contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the joint account.[49] ISSUE: W/N the complaint for the purposes of preliminary investigation must be filed by the offended party HELD: No. The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by a fiscal.[50] It is not necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation. Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.[52] Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva. CIVIL CODE (SALE CONTRACT) Art. 1597. Where the goods have not been delivered to the buyer, and the buyer has repudiated the contract of sale, or has manifested his inability to perform his obligations thereunder, or has committed a breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract of

sale by giving notice of his election so to do to the buyer. (n) Art. 1598. Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods, a court may, on the application of the buyer, direct that the contract shall be performed specifically, without giving the seller the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages. The judgment or decree may be unconditional, or upon such terms and conditions as to damages, payment of the price and otherwise, as the court may deem just. (n) [G.R. No. 122274. July 31, 1996] SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P. DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, HON. AMADO B. BAJARIAS, SR., Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 7, and VIVIAN G. GINETE, respondents.

where the court reiterated that the filing of the complaint in the fiscals office for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The constitution vests upon the ombudsman powers to initiate or conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases filed against public officers or employees. The Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the private respondents complaint against Llenes. The rationale of the Olarte and Francisco cases must then be applied to the present case. Since the complaint was filed on 12 October 1993, or barely 20 days from the commission of the crime charged, the filing of the information was very well within the six moth prescriptive period. The petition was dismissed.

Doctrine: The rule that filing of complaint with THIRD DIVISION fiscals office interrupts the prescription of the [G.R. No. 138596. October 12, 2000] offense charged also applies to cases filed with SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION LAQUI, the Ombudsman for preliminary Investigation. SR. HELEN OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ, respondents. Facts: On October 13, 1993, Vivian Ginete, then OIC of FACTS: The offense of libel allegedly occurred on the Physical Education and School Sports Division of December 21, 1993 when petitioner circulated a letter the regional Office of region VII in Cebu (DECS) filed a containing allegedly malicious imputations against complaint for grave an doral defamation with the private respondents Srs. Helen Ojario and Bernadine deputy Ombudsmand for the Visayas against Susan Juarez. At this point, the period of prescription for the Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the same office. alleged crime had already started to run. The information was filed with the MTC on 28 March 1994 upon recommendation and approval of the investigation officer and the city prosecutor respectively. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense of grave oral defamation prescribed in 6 months and that since the information was filed 6 months and days after the alleged commission, the crime already prescribed. Private respondent contends that Rule 110 of the Rules of court provides that for offenses not subject to ther ile on summary procedure, the filing of the complaint in MTC or MTCT interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged. The motion to quash was denied by the MTC and said decision was affirmed by the RTC, hence this petition. Issue: W/N the filing of a criminal complaint with the Ombudsman interrupts the prescription period. Decision: Yes. In the case of People vs. Olarte, it was said that the filing of the complaint with the MTC even for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends the running of the prescriptive period. This decision was further broadened by the case of Francisco vs. CA

The one-year period of prescription for the

crime was interrupted on February 2, 1994 when respondents filed a joint complaintaffidavit[8] for libel against petitioner before the Office of the city Prosecutor in Quezon city. At this point, the prescription period had already run for forty-two (42) days. April 27, 1994 Asst. Prosecutor issued a resolutiona stating that a probable cause exists and recommended the filing of an information for libel against the accused on May 18, 1994 in the Metropolitan Trial Court September 18, 1996 the MTC tried the case even if it has no jurisdiction over it where it issued on order on November 8, 1996 to forward the case to RTC. April 27, 1997 the prosecutor re-filed the case in the RTC where the petitioner tried to have the case dismissed on the ground of prescription It is the contention of petitioner that the prescription period for the crime of libel charged against her commenced to run again when the Assistant City prosecutor recommended the filing of the information for libel. Petitioner further argues that the prescriptive period could have been interrupted again had the information been filed with the

Regional Trial Court, the court with the proper jurisdiction to try the case for libel. Considering however that the case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court, which under the law does not have jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the period of prescription continued to run its course. Consequently, petitioner concludes that when the information for libel was finally filed with the Regional Trial Court, the crime had already prescribed and the State can no longer pursue the case against her. ISSUE: W/N public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred in holding that the offense of libel in the instant case has not yet prescribed HELD: The right to a speedy trial is violated only when there is an unreasonable delay without the fault of the accused. Petitioner-accused is not without fault in the delay of the prosecution against her. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of libel prescribes in one (1) year, to wit: ART. 90. Prescription of crime.- Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in 10 years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. (underscoring supplied) The said prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall proceed to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, finally resolved the then conflicting views as to whether or not the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period for the crime. The Court restated the correct and prevailing doctrine, as follows: In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on

the merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal code, in declaring that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second , even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case had been shown. Another important teaching in Olarte is that it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. This is because in criminal prosecutions, the only thing that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO VS. JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of Bulacan A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005 Facts: In a wedding party, SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo, Jun Rances, Zoilo Salamat and Rey Santos were drinking together at the same table. While waiting to be seated, Pedrito Alonzo was introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as the son of ex-Captain Alonzo. SPO4 Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat. Pedrito and his companions took their seats and started drinking at the table across SPO4 Alonzos table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at the back of the house. Santos passed a bag to Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances likewise followed them. A shot rang out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the bag as he hurriedly left. The wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and Rances board a vehicle being driven by Santos. Pedritos uncle, Jose Alonzo, sought the help of SPO4 Alonzo to chase the culprits. He refused and even disavowed any knowledge as to their identity. Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4 Alonzo and a certain Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation1 was conducted by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor where

Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses testified. Upon review of the records of the case by the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, it was recommended that Salamat be charged with murder as principal, and Santos and Rances as accessories. With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro Atienza, the prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish their conspiracy with Salamat. Judge Concepcion of the RTC issued an Order directing the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information, so as to include all the aforenamed persons as accused in this case, all as principals. Issue: Whether or not the court has authority to review and reverse the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a respondent for the purpose of amending the Information. Held: The function of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. However, while prosecuting officers have the authority to prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime they have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the prosecutor who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of the prosecutor's should normally prevail. G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987 BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO ADLAWAN, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents. No. L-34162 December 29, 1987 Facts: petitioner Bienvenido Ebarle was then provincial Governor of Zamboanga anda candidate for reelection in the 1971 local elections

Anti-Graft League of the Phils. filed different complainst with the City Fiscalagainst the petitioner for violations of provisions of the Anti-Graft Law (RA3019) as well as Arts. 171, 182, 183, 213 & 318 of the Revised Penal Code on the bidding for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of Zamboanga del Sur in favour of Tabiliran Trucking Company on the collection of advances under the trucking contract of Tabiliran Trucking Company, making it appear that it was collected by Teoson Trucking Company, who held the subsisting contract on the bidding for the construction of the right wing portion of theCapitol Building of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, in favour of supposed winning bidder who is the brother-in-law of Ebarle on petitioners testifying falsely under oath that he acquired a certainlot by purchase but the lot was in fact owned by the provincialgovernment of Zamboanga del Sur (where the provincial jail is located) on the simulated bidding in favour of Tabiliran Trucking Company on appointments of people related to Ebarle to different positions inthe government petitioner filed for prohibition and certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur but the case was dismissed in the petition filed before the SC, petitioner claims that the respondents CityFiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of EO264 preliminary to their criminal recourses OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING THE GOVT OFFICIALS AND EPLOYEES WITH THE COMMISSION OFIRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED petitioner assails the standing of respondent AntiGraft League to commencethe series of prosecutions petitioner contends that the respondent Fiscal (in G.R. No. 34162) in givingdue course to the complaints notwithstanding the order the SC had issued(in G. R. 33628) which he claims applies as well thereto, committed a graveabuse of discretion petitioner claims that the prosecutions were politically motivated, initiated byhis rivals

Issues: WoN respondents had to comply with the provisions of EO 264 WoN Anti-Graft League had standing to commence the series of prosecutions WoN the complaints are politically motivated and thus should bedismissed Ruling: Petitions Dismissed. Held: the petitioners reliance upon the provisions of EO 264 has no merit it is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusiveapplication to administrative, and not criminal complaints Title: Commission of Irregularities no mention, not even by implication, of criminal offenses, orcrimes while crimes amount to irregularities, the EO could havevery well referred to the more specific term had It intended tomake itself applicable theretoprocedure provided by law and regulations pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to thepresentation of

administrative charges against erringgovernment officials the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements of existing rules Paragraph 3 = Sec. 33 of RA 2260, Civil Service Act of 1959 Paragraph 4 = Decentralization Act of 1967 Paragraph 5 = Police Act of 1966 specific reference to erring officials or employeesremoved orotherwise vindicated if it were to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would haveemployed such technical terms as accused, convicted, oracquitted is here material in construing the intent of the measure more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the petitionersarguments were accepted EO 264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in whichthe legislative power was vested exclusively in Congress if the EO was to be considered law, SC would be forced to saythat it is an amendment to RA 5180 which would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly Challenge against the personality of Anti-Graft League has no merit. a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed byany person the TRO issued in G.R. No. 33628 does not embrace the complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162 because the charges are not identical to one another the proper venue for determining whether the cases were filed to harasspetitioner is the preliminary wishes he wishes to block Petitions dismissed, TROs lifted and set aside.

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837. March 23, 2004] VISITACION L. ESTODILLO, ET AL., complainants, vs. JUDGE TEOFILO D. BALUMA, respondent. 3/23/04 The information need not be under oath, there ason therefore being principally that theprosecuting off icer filing it is charged with thespecial duty in regard thereto and is acting underthe special responsibility of his oath of office.* A complaint filed but not sworn to or signed is stillvalid. It is a formal defect. It can be cured.Generally , the signature is not needed.
Baluma's worries started when Visitacion Estodillo has filed an administrative complaint against Baluma in December of 2002. Baluma, who was the Regional Trial Court Branch 1 (Family Court) judge dismissed a criminal case, originally filed for preliminary investigation with the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of TubigonClarin. At the preliminary investigation, Judge James Stewart Himalaloan found sufficient ground for the case of Other Acts of Child Abuse to prosper. With the case transmitted to Provincial Prosecutor Macario Delusa, the provincial prosecutor also filed an information dated October 28, 2002. Baluma however dismissed the information on November 21 arguing that the records forwarded in the case were not subscribed and sworn by the prosecutor. Baluma, said the prosecutor's lapse would militate the validity of the information towards nullity and worthlessness of the [case] same. In response to the dismissal, Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Revival on December 12, stressing that there was no need to put the information under oath since it was a concurrence of the Judge Himalaloan resolution, which was already properly subscribed. By January 10, Baluma issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration and reviving the case, but also asking the public prosecutor to file a new information incorporating the formalities he was asking

earlier. Twenty days later, the prosecution filed an ex-parte motion to increase bail bond of the accused but Baluma refused to act on it pending compliance of the order to file new information. The prosecution manifested that it would not file a new information as ordered for it would be contrary to law and jurisprudence and is unprocedural. In the impasse for bail bond request, complainant Estodillo asked for the Court intervention, citing that Baluma has also dismissed another case on strikingly similar grounds. SIMILAR CASE On that Baluma dismissed case, the prosecution through a motion for reconsideration explained that only complaints are required to be under oath, not a properly subscribed information. With the argument, Baluma granted the motion and revived the case without asking for new information refiling. Using the argument, complainant charged that what Baluma was doing was a clear gross ignorance of the law. BALUMA'S REPLY Commenting on the charge, Baluma cited that the complaint lacked a certification of non-forum shopping. He alleged further that the complainant, upon instigation by Prosecutor Eric Ucat and Atty Esther Gertrude Biliran were mentally dishonest for not mentioning that before the complaint was filed March 2003, Baluma had issued the order in February. With that, Baluma filed a counter-complaint against Prosecutor Ucat and Atty Biliran with administrative case for disbarment or disciplinary action for gross violation of the Code of Professional Conduct, deceit, dishonesty, failure to exercise candor, fairness, good faith, doing falsehood or consenting to its doing and abuse of procedures. While doing so, Baluma stressed that he efficiently discharged his duties even when his Branch is one of the most burdened branches in Tagbilaran. In their rejoinders, both Ucat and Biliran denied participation in filing the complaints except taking the oath of complainants SUPREME COURT FINDINGS Court Administrator Velasco stressed that indeed, information need not be under oath, knowing that the prosecuting officer is acting the special responsibility of his oath of office. Velasco added that the respondent erred, though not seriously, in dismissing the information for not being under oath. With this, Velasco recommended a reprimand for Baluma with a stern warning that a recurrence would merit more drastic action of the court. While the Supreme court dismissed for lack of merit the counter complaint against Prosecutor Ucat and Atty Biliran, it also found Baluma guilty of violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.0.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The violation deserves a reprimand with a stern warning that a repetition of the same would be dealt with more severely. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION In his defense, Baluma filed a motion for reconsideration stating that his dismissal of the information was being innovative in the search for truth assuring validity of the information by making sure it goes without infirmity. Pleading further, considering that his decision was erroneous, his failure to interpret the law does not necessarily render him administratively liable. He said a disciplinary sanction goes for gross, malicious, deliberate or errors done in bad faith. Absent proof, he said a judge's decision is presumed to have been issued in good faith. (Ramir Mina vs Judge Rodolfo Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ 00-1264) Moreover, citing Morada vs, Judge Taya, 48 SCAD 131, he said as a matter of policy, without fraud, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity even though erroneous are generally not subject to disciplinary action. In view of the above arguments, Baluma prayed for dismissal of the administrative case or at least a lesser sanction, a warning. The imposition of a reprimand will surely leave an indelible mark which altogether blackens and does not consider the sincere, dedicated plight and efforts to be an exemplar among those privileged to wear the robe, he said. Offering an apology for the lapse being an honest error, which was timely rectified, Baluma begged the court for only a plain warning. But in a resolution dated July 12, 2004 , the Second Division of the Supreme Court denied Baluma's motion for reconsideration with finality.