ATENEO DE MANILA LAW SCHOOL

Persons and Family Relations Case Digests

Judge Bonifacio

1st Semester AY 2012-2013

Submitted by: Carene Leanne L. Bernardo 1D- Student No. 12-248

Article 2. Effectivity of Laws Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Taada vs. Tuvera Facts: This case involves reconsideration/clarification of the petitioners for the decision by the Court affirming the necessity for publication of some of these decrees. Invocation of due process by the petitioners demanding disclosure of presidential decrees which petitioners claimed had not been published as required by law is the central issue in this case. The government argued that while publication is necessary, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees declared their effectivity immediately upon approval. Petitioners ask the ff. questions: 1. What is meant by law of public nature or general applicability? 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? 3. What is meant by publication? 4. Where is the publication to be made? 5. When is the publication to be made? Issues: 1. What is publication? 2. What are the laws requiring publication so as to have binding force and effect? 3. Where should publication be made? 4. When does the law take effect? Does it necessary follow the prescribed fifteen day period after publication? Held: 1. The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the date of the publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. 2. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may, in its discretion, provide that the usual fifteen day period be shortened or extended. 3. The term laws should refer to all laws and not only those of general application. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition of its effectivity including presidential decrees and executive orders. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Laws which require publication are the ff: general application

 local application private laws administrative rulings enforcing a statute city charters central bank circulations presidential decrees and executive orders 4. Until otherwise amended by law, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication must be made only in the Official Gazette unless mandated by law authorizing publication in newspapers of general circulation. (UPDATE: Executive Order 200 modified Article 2 and now provides publication of laws in either Official Gazette or newspaper(s) of general circulation in the Philippines) Ratio Decidendi: The publication of the law must be in full or it is considered as no publication at all. Publication must be made in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided and the said law will be effective fifteen after days after said publication or another date specified by the legislature. De Roy vs. CA Facts: This case involves special civil action for certiorari seeking to declare null and void 2 resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Feliciana Perdosa De Roy et al. denying petitioners motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment; and the denial for the petitioners motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time. In the case Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Feliciana Perdosa De Roy et al., the firewall of the petitioners burned out building collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of the family of the respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence under Article 2190 of the Civil Code and awarding damages to private respondents on the basis that the petition for motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment was denied in Resolution dated September 30, 1987 for being filed on the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal; and petitioners motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time was denied in another Resolution dated October 27 of the same year. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion? Held: The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motions since it correctly applied rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, which this court en banc clarified that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

Ruling: Petition denied for lack of merit. Ratio Decidendi: There is no law requiring the publication of the Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their effectivity. Article 7. Repeal of Laws Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy Facts: This administrative case is based on the contention that respondent judge Hernando Domagtoy exhibited gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law brought by complaint of Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro on the basis of the following grounds: 1. Judge Domagtoy solemnized wedding of Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite knowledge that groom is recently separated from his 1st wife. 2. Allegedly, Judge Domagtoy performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction. Issues: 1. Whether or not joint affidavit issued by Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar presented in evidence is sufficient proof of Ida Pearandas (Gaspar Dagadans 1st wife) presumptive death? 2. Whether or not Judge Domagtoy committed gross ignorance of the law in when he solemnized the marriage of Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his courts jurisdiction? Held: 1. The Court held that for the purpose of contracting marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of the absent spouse. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding and absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Therefore, marriage between Tagadan and Borga is declared bigamous and void. 2. Article 8 of the Family Code which states that marriage can be held outside judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in

accordance with Art. 29; or (3) upon request of both parties in a sworn statement to this effect. The Court ruled that there is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, written request was made by only one party. While it may not affect validity of the marriage, it may subject the official to administrative liability. Ruling: Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby suspended for 6 months and given stern warning that repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Ratio Decidendi: Disuse, custom or practice to the contrary does not repeal a law. Gross ignorance of the law has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. Beso vs. Daguman Facts: This administrative case is based on the charge of respondent Judge Juan Daguman with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority in a Complaint-Affidavit by Zenaida S. Beso for solemnizing marriage outside his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and non-registration of marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar. Petitioner discovered that the respondent failed to retain a copy of the Marriage Contract and failed to register their marriage before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar upon inquiry of the same when her husband, Bernardito Yman abandoned her after their marriage without any reason at all. Issues: 1. Whether or not Judge Daguman solemnized Besos marriage with Bernardito Yman outside his courts jurisdiction? 2. Whether or not Judge Domagtoy neglected his duty when he failed to retain a copy of the Marriage Contract and failed to register their marriage before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar? Held: 1. Respondent Judge solemnized the marriage of Beso and Yman in Calbayog City when he is in fact the municipal judge of Sta. Margarita-Taranganan-Pagsanjan, Samar. Therefore he was not clothed with authority to solemnize marriage in Calbayog. 2. Article 8 of the Family Code which states that marriage can be held outside judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Art. 29; or (3) upon request of both parties in a sworn statement to this effect. Neither of the 3 instances stated above were unavailing in the case. 3. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code, it is the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate and send the duplicate and triplicate copies not later than 15 days to the local civil registrar where marriage took place. There is no justification for missing records save for fortuitous events.

Ruling: Respondent Judge Juan Daguman is hereby fined P5,000 and given stern warning that repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Ratio Decidendi: A judge is presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court. Article 9. Duty of Judges No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws. Chu Jan vs. Bernas Facts: This case is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of the First Instance of Albay for the grounds of dismissal of the case regarding a cockfight match declared by the justice of the peace court as a draw when plaintiff brought suit to the said justice. Grounds for dismissal pronounced by the Court of First Instance from the judgment appealed is due to the fact that said court always dismisses cases of this nature. Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Albay should take cognizance of the case appealed before it? Held: Such an excuse for the dismissal of the case is less acceptable because the Civil Code provides that the customs of the place shall be observed, and in the absence thereof, the general principles of the law. Ruling: Judgment and order appealed are reversed and the record of the case shall be remanded to the court from whence they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. Ratio Decidendi: Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings. People vs. Veneracion Facts: Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion rendered a decision in the rape with homicide case of Angel Alquiza, a minor 7 years of age, finding defendants Henry Petilla and Ernesto Cordero guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to Reclusion Perpetua instead of death as penalty simply because he refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees.

Issue: After finding accused in a criminal case committed Rape with Homicide is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either Reclusion Perpetua or Death? Held: Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death. Judgment being void, the trial court may not be deemed to have thereby lost jurisdiction of the cases. Ruling: Petition is granted. Case is remanded to Regional Trial Court for the imposition of death penalty in the case finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec.11 of RA 7659. Ratio Decidendi: Judges are guided by the Rule of Law and ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favour, resist encroachments by governments, political parties or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. Article 10. Doubtful Statutes In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. People vs. Purisima Facts: Twenty-six petitions for review involving 3 Courts of First Instance in Manila and Samar regarding the illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 is filed by the People of the Philippines as they involve one basic question of law. Subject to the dismission and quashing of Informations in these cases, the trial courts concurred that one essential element of the offense is missing from the information: carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Issue: Whether the perusal of paragraph 3 in P.D. 9 shows that prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. Held: 1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. Act 1780 and Ordinance No. 3820 does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favoured. 3. The offense carries two elements: first, carrying outside ones residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood; and second, act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. 4. Only the act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected or related to the elements quoted above is within the intent of PD 9 and nothing else. 5. Preamble of the statute and whereas clauses are necessary in order to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree. 6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favour of the accused. Ruling: 26 Petitions for review are denied. Orders of respondent judges dismissing or quashing the information concerned is affirmed subject to observations made regarding the right of the State or Petitioner to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 9, par. 3 , or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance. Ratio Decidendi: It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure. Article 11-12. Customs Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact according to rules of evidence. Martinez vs. Van Buskirk Facts: This was an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance finding Van Buskirk guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50. The case involving Carmen Ong de Martinez who was riding on a carromata when delivery wagon belonging to William Van Buskirk hit the carromata causing it to overturn thereby injuring Martinez and her child as well as the carromata. The delivery wagon was without a cochero since the cochero was unloading the forage when another vehicle drove by thereby causing the horses to be frightened and ran away subsequently hitting Martinezs carromata. Issue: Whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team is liable for the negligence of the driver?

Held: 1. In the Courts judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence. It cannot be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. 2. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability although damage in fact ensues. Ruling: Judgment is reversed. Ratio Decidendi: When a custom has not been productive of accidents or injuries, the public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales Facts: This case involves a petition to review decision of Court of Appeals. In the said case, Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Caloocan leaving behind real and personal properties worth P300,000 more or less. Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee on the basis of Chinese customary marriage and the Court of Appeals ruled that it has not been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Such marriage needs to be proven valid in order for their children to be granted legitime governing successionary rights to Sy Kiats properties in the Philippines. Sy Kiat also had children with Asuncion Gillego and are being declared as natural children by Court of Appeals ruling. Issues: 1. Whether or not Court of Appeals seriously erred in declaring marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee not been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China? 2. Whether or not Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring Sy Kiats children with Asuncion Gillego as natural children? Held: 1. Two things must be proven to establish a valid foreign marriage under Article 71 of the Civil Code: a. existence of foreign law as a question of fact; b. alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence 2. Petitioners did not present ay competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage since testimonies presented cannot be considered as proof of Chinas law or custom since there is no showing that they are not competent to testify on the subject matter. 3. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court were abolished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 also

known as Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Their functions and jurisdictions are now vested in the Regional Trial Courts. Ruling: Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, is should be presumed that it is the same as ours. Article 13. Computation of Period and Time When the law speaks of years, months, day or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days of twenty-four hours; and nights, from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a) Garcia vs. Recio Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari of a Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan rendering judgment on the nullification of marriage between Grace Garcia, a Filipina, and Rederick Recio, an Australian citizen and declaring that both parties can now remarry since Recio was able to secure divorce decree from a family court in Australia. Trial court decreed that divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul. Issues: 1. Whether divorce between Recio and Editha Samson, an Australian, was proven? 2. Whether Recio was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Garcia? Held: 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence our courts cannot grant it. 2. Burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office

Petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requirement to adduce sufficient evidence has been agreed upon by this Court because the divorce decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/embassy of the country where it will be used. 3. In view of the insufficient proof of divorce, petitioners prayer to declare marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy cannot be granted since it may turn out that under the Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner. Ruling: Case is remanded to trial court to receive evidence, if any, showing legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failure to do that will result to court a quo to declare nullity of parties marriage on the ground of bigamy. Ratio Decidendi: Sufficient evidence must be presented during the period required by law in order to consider such foreign evidence admissible by the court. Article 15. Nationality Rule Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Van Dorn vs. Romillo Facts: This case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to review orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay which denied Motions to dismiss said case and reconsideration of dismissal order. Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines and Respondent is a citizen of the US who married in Hong Kong and divorced in Nevada. Petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. Respondent filed suit against Petitioner on the account of the petitioners business in Ermita on account that said business is alleged as conjugal property. The denial of the motion to dismiss in the abovementioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines where no divorce decree has no bearing is the issue of this petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether divorce decree is valid and binding in the Philippines when divorce is contrary to law or public policy? Held: No question to the validity of the Nevada divorce on the private respondent as an American Citizen. Thus pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and therefore has no locus standi to sue in the case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise jurisdiction on conjugal assets.

Ruling: Petition is granted. Respondent judge ordered to dismiss Complaint filed in the Civil Case of his court. Ratio Decidendi: An American granted absolute divorce with Filipina wife is cut off from marital and successional rights of the latter and the Filipina, although living abroad is still subject to the provisions governed in the Civil Code of the Philippines and therefore shall not be discriminated against in her own country. Barreto vs. Gonzales Facts: Both Baretto Gonzalez and Gonzalez are Filipino citizens and residents. They mutually agreed to allow Gonzalez to support plaintiff and their children for P500/monthly, said amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity and the title of certain properties transferred to plaintiff. Shortly, Gonzalez went to Reno, Nevada and was able to secure divorce there and subsequently remarried to another Filipino. After departure, defendant reduced monthly payment and has not made payments in the Reno alimony. Issue: Whether the Court of First Instance erred in confirming and ratifying Nevada divorce? Held: Ratification of Reno divorce clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent national laws of the Philippines regarding divorce and securing a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by law did not confer jurisdiction upon the Nevada court to dissolve the bonds of matrimony. Ruling: Judgment of Court of First Instance is reversed and defendant is absolved from demands against him in the petition without prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and intervenors may have against defendant. Ratio Decidendi: Litigants cannot compel courts to approve own actions that permit personal relations of Filipino citizens to be affected by decrees of divorce in foreign courts since it is contrary to public order and good morals under Philippine laws. Government vs. Frank Facts: George Frank entered into a contract for a period of two years with the Philippine government through a representative to work for 2 years as a stenographer. He appealed on the judgement rendered by Court of First Instance of Manila that at the time of contract he entered into in

Illinois he was considered as an adult and had full authority contract as opposed to his contention that he was a minor under the Philippine laws and therefore not responsible under the law. Issues: 1. Whether or not amendments to Acts No. 80 and 224 affected the terms of the contract? 2. Whether or not defendant is fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was made? Held: 1. Amendments to Act Nos. 80 and 224 has in no way affected the terms of the contract in question. 2. Defendant being qualified to fully enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was made cannot plead infancy as defence at the place where the contract is being enforced. Ruling: Judgment of Court of First Instance is affirmed. Ratio Decidendi: Validity of the contract is determined by the laws of the place where the contract is made (lex loci celebrationis). Barnuevo vs. Fuster Facts: Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez de Barnuevo were joined in a canonical marriage in Spain. Fuster came to the Philippines and acquired real and personal property in Manila. Barnuevo came to Manila and lived with Fuster until April 1899. They made an agreement to separate and live apart and husband authorized wife to move to Spain and undertook to send money to her for support. Issues: 1. Whether or not Courts of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction to try actions for divorce even though they were Spanish subjects? 2. Whether or not evidence not made part of the record will be accepted as considerations of findings of fact? 3. Whether or not cause or ground for adultery should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the law? 4. Whether or not evidence of the foreign law can be proven by an affidavit? Held: 1. Courts of the First Instance have jurisdiction since parties involved, although Spanish subjects,

are residents and had their domicile in Manila. 2. Evidence not submitted on appeal, being unable to review it, are deemed accepted based on the findings of the trial court. 3. Claim for adultery, even if proven, would not be a cause for divorce since there was no public scandal resulted therefrom nor was there contempt displayed for the wife. 4. Affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never submitted as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has never been subjected to any cross examination, is not a means of proving a foreign law. A foreign law may be proved by the certificate of the officer having in charge of the original, under the seal of the state or country. Ruling: Petition of property decreed in the judgment is confirmed. Two judgments appealed are hereby affirmed. Ratio Decidendi: The exclusive and irrefutable law governing defendant and plaintiff is the domicile of the defendant and plaintiff irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. Article 16. Laws Governing Real Properties Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a) Testate Estate of Bohanan vs. Bohanan, et al. Facts: Magdalena Bohanan contests the validity of the testamentary provisions excluding her and giving her children by the testator a legacy of a total of only P12,000 out of the total estate in cash worth P211,696.33. However, testator is a citizen of Nevada despite of his long residence in the Philippines. Issues: 1. Whether or not testamentary dispositions should be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is in question? 2. Whether said testamentary provisions, especially those for the children which is short of the legitime given by the Civil Code of the Philippines are valid? Held:

1. Magdalena Bohanan has no right to share in the inheritance in favour of a divorce wife since there exists no right in Nevada and that there is now no conjugal property between testator and Magdalena Bohanan. 2. In accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the national law of the testator which is Nevada, allows testator to dispose of his property according to his will. Ruling: Order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in accordance with testamentary provisions is hereby affirmed. Ratio Decidendi: Testamentary dispositions are governed by national law of the testator being a citizen of Nevada. Bellis vs. Bellis Facts: Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines which he directed that after all taxes and obligations had been settled, he directed $240,000 be given to his first wife, P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children and remainder shall be divided equally to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives. This case involves renvoi doctrine since the decedent is domiciled in the Philippines but is a Texas national. Issue: Whether upon reliance to Article 16 of the Civil Code applies to the national law of the decedent which did not provide for legitimes? Held: 1. If Texas has a conflicts rule, lex rei sitae is adopted where the properties involved are found in the Philippines. 2. In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it is presumed to be the same as our local conflicts rule. 3. The decedents national law governs the order of succession, amount of successional rights and the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and the capacity to succeed. Under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Ruling: Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed. Ratio Decidendi:

Testamentary dispositions are governed by national law of the testator being a citizen of Nevada. Aznar vs. Garcia Facts: This case appeals from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime. Edward Christensen, the testator, was a citizen of the United States but at the time of his death was domiciled in the Philippines. In his will, he declared that he has one child, Maria Lucy Christensen, who will get all of his properties minus P3,600 to be given to Maria Helen Christensen who though was baptized Christensen was not in any way related to him. However, Helen, the respondent, contested the will and claimed that the will must be subjected to Philippine laws as stated in Art,16, and thus entitled to of the said properties. Issue: Whether or not Philippine laws or California Law shall apply, being it the natural law of the testator, in accordance to Art.16 of the Civil Code? Held: 1. Citizenship of deceased acquired in California was never lost when he resided in the Philippines. However, there exists a California law conflicts rule regarding citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. 2. The national law indicated in Art. 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any general American law. California prescribes 2 sets of laws for its citizens: 1) internal law for resident citizens; and 2) conflict of law rules for citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. 3. Since second set applies to the testator which makes the domicile of said testator applicable in this case, pursuant to Articles 887(4) and 894 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, natural children are legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them thus Helen Christensen Garcia is entitled to of the estate in full ownership. Ruling: Decision is reversed and case returned to lower court with instructions that partitions be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Ratio Decidendi: When there exists a conflicts rule on testamentary successions, court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to the court where testator is a citizen since such action would leave the issue incapable of determination. Article 19-21. Abuse of Right Doctrine

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage. Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA Facts: Marinduque Mining Industrial Corporation obtained from PNB various loan accommodations. To secure the loans, Marinduque Mining executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage in favor of PNB. Marinduque Mining executed in favor of PNB and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) a second Mortgage Trust Agreement. In said agreement, Marinduque Mining mortgaged to PNB and DBP all its real properties located at Surigao del Norte, Sipalay, Negros Occidental, and Antipolo, Rizal, including the improvements. Marinduque Mining failed to settle its loan obligations causing PNB and DBP to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged properties sometime on July and August 1984. Issue: Whether or not there is fraud on the part of Marinduque Mining and its transferees to warrant the piercing of the corporate veil? Held: 1. The question as to whether the Civil Code and the Insolvency Law can be harmonized is settled by Article 2243. The preferences named in Articles 2261 and 2262 (now 2241 and 2242) are to be enforced in accordance with the Insolvency Law." It becomes evident that one preferred creditor's third-party claim to the proceeds of a foreclosure sale is not the proceeding contemplated by law for the enforcement of preferences under Article 2242, unless the claimant were enforcing a credit for taxes that enjoy absolute priority. 2. If none of the claims is for taxes, a dispute between two creditors will not enable the Court to a ascertain the pro rata dividend corresponding to each, because the rights of the other creditors likewise enjoying preference under Article 2242 cannot be ascertained. 3. Although ruling in Barretto involved specific immovable property, it should apply equally in this case where specific movable property is involved. As the extrajudicial foreclosure instituted by PNB and DBP is not the liquidation proceeding contemplated by the Civil Code, Remington cannot claim its pro rata share from DBP. Ruling:

The Petition is GRANTED. Order of the Court of First Instance of Manila now appealed from, decreeing that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale be apportioned only between appellant and appellee, is incorrect, and must be reversed. Ratio Decidendi: Failure to settle obligations to another party necessitates indemnification of the aggrieved party of the loss or damage done. Uypitching vs. Quiamco Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial courts decision which is the basis of this petition. Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Turns out that said motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, told petitioner corporations collector, Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly been taken by respondents men. Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the AntiFencing Law against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. Trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for moral damages? Held: 1. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. 2. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. Ruling: Petition is denied. Ratio Decidendi:

Malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to respondent but also the taking of the motorcycle in a forcible manner contrary to law. Article 22. Unjust Enrichment Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. Villalva vs. RCBC Savings Bank Facts: This case involves petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse decision of the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals with regards to these facts: Petitioner spouses issued 48 checks in favour of Toyota Quezon Avenue for the purchase of a 93 Toyota Corolla. Under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, petitioners were to issue the vehicle against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire and endorse the policies to the mortgagor. Evidence shows that petitioners faithfully complied with the obligation but for the period of Aug. 1996-Aug. 1997, petitioners did not deliver the policies to the respondents until Jan. 1997. As consequence, respondent insured vehicle and paid insurance premium however, said insurance policy was later cancelled on the account of the existence of an insurance policy secured by the petitioners. Respondent bank was then reimbursed for a fraction of the insurance premium by Malayan Insurance Company. Respondents letter of demand allegedly representing unpaid obligations was ignored by the petitioners. In view of this, respondent, in order to get 93 Toyota Corolla, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Replevin against petitioners at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay. Issue: Whether petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to insure vehicle under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage? Held: 1. Due to the mortgagors failure to notify petitioners to application of the latters payments to insurance premiums, the Court held that mortgagors had not defaulted on their obligation. 2. Petitioners were not enriched when respondent obtained insurance for mortgaged vehicle since the petitioners had already obtained the required insurance coverage Ruling: Petition is granted. Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside and the decision and resolution by Municipal Trial Court was reinstated as well as that of the Pasay Regional Trial Court. Ratio Decidendi: Enrichment consists of patrimonial, physical or moral advantage so long as it is appreciable in money. Conditions stating when demand may be considered in default cannot be applied.

Article 26. Respect of Others Privacy, Personality, etc. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and the similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: a) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence b) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another c) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends d) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect or other personal condition. Van Dorn vs. Romillo Facts: This case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to review orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay which denied Motions to dismiss said case and reconsideration of dismissal order. Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines and Respondent is a citizen of the US who married in HongKong and divorced in Nevada. Petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. Respondent filed suit against Petitioner on the account of the petitioners business in Ermita on account that said business is alleged as conjugal property. The denial of the motion to dismiss in the abovementioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines where no divorce decree has no bearing is the issue of this petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether divorce decree is valid and binding in the Philippines when divorce is contrary to law or public policy? Held: No question to the validity of the Nevada divorce on the private respondent as an American Citizen. Thus pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and therefore has no locus standi to sue in the case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise jurisdiction on conjugal assets. Ruling: Petition is granted. Respondent judge ordered to dismiss Complaint filed in the Civil Case of his court. Ratio Decidendi: Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another when one has no legal standing is prohibited by law. Pilapil vs. Somera, et al. Facts: Imelda Manalysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a

German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After 3 and a half years of marriage, a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court. German law said that the court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. Two months later, private respondent filed adultery charges against former spouse before the City of Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. Issues: Whether or not the petitioner, after a valid divorce decree has been issued, still has the right to file adultery charges against former spouse? Held: Husband of petitioner had no legal standing to commence the adultery case since they are not married anymore at the time the charges of adultery were filed. The legal imposture that the German was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit cannot stand due to their divorce. Ruling: Questioned order denying petitioners motion to squash is set aside and another dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Temporary restriction order is hereby permanent. Ratio Decidendi: According to the law, in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Since the husband is divorced from the wife at the time of filing adultery charges, therefore he cannot legally file the complaint.